VOLUME 10
NUMBER 2

THE
CYPRUS
REVIEW

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Cyprus Review is an international bi-annual journal which publishes articles on a range of areas in the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus. As such it aims to provide a forum for discussion on salient issues relating to the latter. The journal was first published in 1989 and has since received the support of many scholars internationally.

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Manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, *The Cyprus Review,* Research and Development Center, Intercollege, P.O.Box 4005, 1700 Nicosia, Cyprus, with a brief bibliography, detailing: current affiliations: research interests and publications.

Formatting Requirements:

(i) Articles should range between 4,000-7,000 words.

(ii) Manuscripts should be typed on one side of A4 double-spaced; submitted in four hard copies together with a 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word 1995 or 1997 saved as rich text format. Pages should be numbered consecutively.

As manuscripts may be sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page. The author's full academic address and a brief bibliographic paragraph detailing current affiliation and areas of research interest and publications should also be included.

Manuscripts and disks will **not** be returned.

(iii) An abstract of no more than 150 words should be included on a separate page.

(iv) Headings should appear as follows:

Title: centred, capitalised, bold e.g.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE-MAKING IN CYPRUS

Subheadings: I. Centred, title case, bold.

II. Left-align, title case, bold, italics.

III.Left-align, title case, italics.

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(vi) Notes should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes (see vii below) and should be numbered consecutively in the text and typed on a separate sheet of paper at the end of the article. Acknowledgements and references to grants should appear within the endnotes.

(vii) References: As the TCR is a multi-disciplinary journal, either of the following formats are acceptable for references to source material in the text:

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Books, monographs:

James, A. (1990) *Peacekeeping in International Politics.* London, Macmillan.

Multi-author volumes:

Foley, C. and Scobie, W.I. (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus.* Starpord, CA, Hoover Institution Press.

Articles and chapters in books:

Jacovides, **A.J.** (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed), *Cyprus Reviewed.* Nicosia, Jus Cypri Association.

Journal articles:

McDonald, R. (1986) 'Cyprus: The Gulf Widens', *The World Today,* Vol. 40, No. 11, p 185.

(viii) Dates should appear as follows: 3 October 1931; 1980s; twentieth century. One to ten should appear as written and above ten in numbers (11, 12 etc.).

(ix) Tables and figures are to be included in the text and to be numbered consecutively with titles.

(x) **Book review** headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, e.g. *Cyprian Edge,* by Nayia Roussou, Livadiotis Ltd (Nicosia, 1997) 78 pp. Reviewer's name to appear at the end of the review.

(xi) First proofs may be read and corrected by contributors if they provide the Editors with an address through which they can be reached without delay and can guarantee return of the corrected proofs within seven days of receiving them.

(xii) Each author will receive two complimentary copies of the issue in which their article appears in addition to five offprints.

(xiii) Articles submitted to the journal should be unpublished material and must not be reproduced for one year following publication in the Cyprus Review.

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Alan James went to Keele in 1974 to set up the Department of International Relations. Before that he taught at the London School of Economics for seventeen years, having graduated from that institution in 1954. Between graduating and taking up his first academic appointment, he spent two years in the civil service and read for the bar. During 1968 he was a Research Fellow at Columbia University, New York. In the 1980s he was a Visiting Professor in Nigeria and India. From 1979 to 1983 he was Chairman of the British International Studies Association and was recently Chair of the International Law Section of the US-based International Studies Association. In 1993 he was guest professor at the National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo. In research, Professor James is very interested in the factors which permit states to engage in relations with each other, and has written a book on sovereignty and edited another on international order. Chiefly, however, he is known for his expertise on international peacekeeping, on which he has written two books.

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Articles

VOLUME 10
NUMBER 2

THE MAKING OF THE
CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, 1958-60

Alan James

Abstract

This paper deals with the transitional arrangements and complexities that preceded the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The involvement of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, the two communities and in particular Archbishop Makarios in the developments that finally led to Cyprus' independence are traced in light of the aims they each pursued.

The Cyprus settlement emerged after three years of fierce Greek-Cypriot demands for union (enosis) with Greece. The campaign was formally led by the traditional spokesman for the Greek Cypriots - the Archbishop (Makarios - who for most of the time was exiled from Cyprus); and in the field by 'General' Grivas. Their partnership was often uneasy, but apparently successful in that Britain changed her view about the nature of her interest in Cyprus. She decided that in principle she could, after all, get out, provided that her strategic interests were satisfied, in the shape of permanent bases and certain facilities on the island. But as a practical matter, she could not leave without an agreement between Greece and Turkey, the sponsors of the Greek Cypriots and the (roughly 20%} minority Turkish Cypriots. Of that there seemed no sign at all. Then, however, and entirely out of the blue, there was a breakthrough. ·

It occurred in highly improbable circumstances: after a contentious debate at the United Nations. Greece had begun taking the question of Cyprus to that forum in 1954. By that date it was becoming clear to the colonial powers that they were less protected against public inquiry into their imperial affairs than they had anticipated.

They relied on an Article in the UN Charter which (except for the use of force to maintain peace) forbade intervention 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. But the Charter also included a 'Declaration' on non-self-governing territories, and gave the General Assembly (in which all member states were represented and each of them had one vote) a licence to 'discuss...any matters within the scope of the present Charter'. The settlement of any procedural argument about the Assembly's competence was, if it so wished, up to the Assembly itself. And by the mid 1950s a number of members were ready to use their votes to permit the examination of certain colonial issues. Before long, of course, the undermining of colonialism was to become one of the UN's main aims. It was a striking instance of how political developments can sweep institutions beyond their initial purposes[1].

But in 1954, Britain still felt relatively safe, and in response to the Greek initiative successfully played her domestic jurisdiction card: a substantive debate was held, but ended without an attempt to pass a resolution. In the following year the Assembly went, from Britain's point of view, one better, refusing even to place Cyprus on its agenda. But then Britain concluded that she should change her tactics. Cyprus was a far from typical colony. It was located in Europe; relatively well developed; and, on grounds which could not be denied, attracted the close interest of Greece and Turkey. These factors, together with the increasingly-serious revolt, resulted in Cyprus having a high international profile. Inevitably, there would be strong pressures for a wide-ranging UN debate on what was going on. Accordingly, Britain now allowed that it was legitimate for the Assembly to consider Cyprus - but as an international rather than a colonial question. And in that context she pressed for it to be left to herself, Greece, and Turkey to sort out. The Assembly reacted sympathetically, simply urging (in February 1957) the conclusion of a peaceful, democratic, and just solution. Who could ignore such a high-minded call?

But by the end of that year Britain's response was being viewed somewhat critically, and the Greek case against her was endorsed, broadly speaking, by the Assembly's Political Committee, where voting was on a simple-majority basis. However, to receive the imprimatur of the plenary session of the Assembly, the draft resolution had to obtain a two-thirds majority in that body, and it failed to do so. Nonetheless, Greece had secured a 'symbolic victory'.[2] Clearly, in this particular campaign, Britain needed to improve her parliamentary diplomacy (as the practice was becoming known). She set about gathering votes with a will, and in December 1958, after long d bates, seemed to have secured her reward: an Iranian draft resolution, in the wording of which Britain had had a hand, was passed in Committee on 4 December 1958. *It* said, in UN code, that Britain was not doing such a bad job on Cyprus, and gave its blessing to the idea (which Greece had already rejected) of an international conference. The draft did not receive a two- thirds majority. But Britain believed that this deficiency would be rectified when the draft was voted on in the plenary session, and Greece gloomily shared this view.[3]

After the Anglo-Turkish victory in Committee, the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, was publicly approached by his Turkish counterpart, Zorlu (who tended to be somewhat abrasive). Averoff raised his hackles, only to be hugely surprised by words of warm congratulation from Zorlu on the way in which he had presented the Greek case. Some cautiously-conciliatory remarks about Cyprus followed, which ended with Zorlu suggesting that they should meet to talk the matter over. Averoff did not disagree, but said that first they should see what happened in the plenary session of the Assembly the next day.[4] The answer turned out to be "a lot". Very possibly spurred by the Averoff-Zorlu encounter, compromise was pervadingly in the air. The Iranian draft was left on one side; an 'anodyne resolution calling on the three governments concerned to renew their efforts to find a solution"[5] was quickly put together; and it was no less quickly adopted by the Assembly, without any objection.

The way was now clear for a fuller exchange between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, which was actively encouraged by Britain. Indeed, as Averoff was showing signs of hesitation, some members of the British Mission to the UN found themselves almost ushering him along to the meeting. It took place in the UN building on the morning of 6 December (a Saturday). The two principals, with just a few close advisers, talked for about two hours, sowing the seeds of what was soon to emerge as a "final" settlement. They agreed to keep the whole matter as secret as possible, and to renew their intensive interchange at the earliest opportunity.[6] This came within a couple of weeks, in Paris, under the cover of a North Atlantic Treaty (Nata) meeting; and a meeting in the same city in mid-January 1959 of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation enabled them to take the matter further. Normal - but very limited - diplomatic channels were also used to advance the still very private discussions. The stage was being speedily set for one of the more remarkable surprises of the early post-War years. It emerged from a Greco-Turkish summit meeting at the Hotel Dolder on the outskirts of Zurich where, after almost a week of negotiations, it was announced on 11 February 1959 that agreement had been reached.

The heart of this accord was the acceptance by Greece and Turkey that the way forward for Cyprus was for it to become an independent state. The details of its proposed status were set out in four documents. One was a "Gentlemen's Agreement", which was kept from public view. It envisaged the entry of Cyprus into Nata, and the taking of measures by Cyprus (to be urged on her by Greece and Turkey) to outlaw the Communist Party and Communist activities.[7] Another was a Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, which included provision for the stationing in Cyprus of small Greek and Turkish military contingents (950 and

650 strong respectively). A third was a Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, by which the last three recognised and guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the new state, and guaranteed its renunciation (given in the Treaty) of enosis and partition. These two Treaties were to have entrenched constitutional force. An outline of the Basic Articles of the Cyprus Constitution - which were also guaranteed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey - was presented in the fourth document.

These Articles provided for a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President. There would be ten Ministers - seven Greek and three Turkish - with one of the Turks holding either the Foreign Affairs, Defence, or Finance portfolio. In the legislature (the House of Representatives) 70 per cent of the seats would be held by representatives of the Greek community, and the remainder by Turkish representatives. Decisions there would be taken by a simple majority, but the adoption of any law on duties, taxes, the electoral system, and municipalities (there were to be separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns) would need a simple majority of both Greek and Turkish members. Both the President and Vice-President would have a veto over any law or decision relating to foreign affairs, defence, and security. The civil service was to be 70 per cent Greek and 30 per cent Turkish; the gendarmerie and police likewise; but the army was to be 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish. Each community was to have its own Communal Chamber, which would exercise authority in all relevant matters.[8]

This was indeed a massive advance, burying what could well have become a very bloody hatchet. On the one side, Turkey was giving up the possibility of taking the Turkish-Cypriots directly under her wing. However, there was never a realistic likelihood of an agreement to that effect; nor of unilateral armed action by Turkey securing much diplomatic support. If, therefore, Britain was to leave Cyprus (which was now firmly on the agenda), it made sense for Turkey to get the best deal which she could for the Turkish Cypriots, especially as the United States was pressing hard for a settlement.[9] Under the Zurich Agreements the Turks in Cyprus were to be provided with as much protection, on paper, as a minority of 20 per cent could expect. Possibly more.

On the other side, Greece seemed to be making very large concessions. To an extent which went far beyond anything which she had previously contemplated, she was accepting Turkish-Cypriot participation in the government of Cyprus, and the safeguarding of Turkey's interests in Cyprus. But even all that paled before the fact that she could no longer look forward to the fulfilment of a key aspect of the Hellenic dream. A daughter Greek state could doubtless be seen as a fine thing; but it would not compensate for the closing of the door to the daughter's long-awaited return home. Nonetheless, in some yet larger interest the necessary renunciation had been made.

The exact nature of that larger interest, however, was not entirely clear. A Greek writer has speculated that the mounting East-West crisis over Berlin may have nudged both Greeks and Turks towards conciliation.[10] But at least in the case of Greece, it does not carry much conviction: a keen and specific local interest is rarely sacrificed for some wider and vaguer cause. The Governor of Cyprus thought that Greece had been helped to a more accomodating frame of mind by Britain's determination to press on with her own scheme for constitutional development - the "Macmillan Plan" - notwithstanding its rejection by Greece and the Greek Cypriots.[11] In the view of a Foreign Office official then with Britain's Mission to the UN, Greece thought she might be losing the political battle in New York and had therefore decided to think about a settlement.[12]

Perhaps there is something in both these ideas, and they do not run counter to Averoff's own explanation. He said (much later) that once the Macmillan Plan had been put into operation, 'Turkey had become the decisive factor'. (Doubtless he was referring to Turkey's growing interest in the position of the Turkish Cypriots, and in the possibility of partition.) As Greece, militarily the weaker of the two, would be unable to secure enosis against Turkish opposition, 'one had no option but to come to terms with her'.[13] It has to be said that this would have been somewhat out of keeping with the general Greek disposition towards Turkey, which was cantankerous rather than conciliatory. But there is probably something in it, especially as the intra-Nato feud with Turkey was aggravating a number of Greece's allies, not least the United States. To get the fullest picture, however, the human element probably needs to be taken into account. Early in 1959 Averoff told the British Ambassador to Greece, 'with the half-conscious and rather engaging naivety of which he is sometimes capable', that he was 'flattered' by Zorlu's congratulatory words, and had it not been for that 'he might never have been so forthcoming in his reply'.[14] This factor may well have had an importance which went beyond the mere timing of the Zurich Agreements, contributing even to their *very* making.

Be all that as it may, an agreement had been secured. However, two of the key parties to the proposed package - Britain and the Cypriots - had had no hand in it. Manifestly, there could be no progress towards its implementation unless they were brought on board.

What was needed from Britain was a willingness to withdraw from Cyprus. There was unlikely to be much difficulty about that, provided her special interests on the island - relating to military bases and connected sites - could be accomodated. However, until arrangements to safeguard them were in the bag, Britain was naturally reluctant to give a firm undertaking on withdrawal - and Averoff had earlier irritated the Foreign Secretary (Selwyn Lloyd) by trying to secure one. As the Greek Ambassador in London was told by A D M Ross, it was 'obvious' that Britain

accepted the principle of Cypriot independence, but setting it out 'in black and white' would be the 'climax', not the start, of the negotiations.[16] This climax was scheduled to emerge in London at a conference which was to open on 17 February 1959.

Its main purpose was seen as the provision of assurances for Britain regarding her strategic needs, thereby facilitating the tr msfer of sovereignty, and the making of arrangements for all the consequential discussions which would be necessary. (Getting the agreement of the Cypriots was not regarded as a problem.) Greece and Turkey had agreed the previous December that the two bases which Britain wished to retain should be under British sovereignty,[17] and when this news reached Makarios he made no objection. Thus the state and the island of Cyprus would not be coterminous, as the state would not include what were to be known as the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Equally, it was accepted on all sides that - as she stated in a formal Declaration made at the London Conference - Britain would need certain rights on the territory of the new Republic of Cyprus to make effective use of the SBAs. These rights included access to and complete control of certain installations scattered throughout Cyprus - the Retained Sites, as they were to be called. It should be noted that such Sites would not be British sovereign territory; rather, they would be in the nature of British-owned property on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

Additionally, Britain wanted a specific acknowledgment from Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus of her special position on, and of her rights in, Cyprus. The chosen vehicle for this was the Treaty of Guarantee which had been agreed by Greece and Turkey at Zurich. Under this Treaty (as has been noted), Britain, Greece, and Turkey guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and the Basic Articles of its Constitution. In the event of a breach of any of the provisions of the Treaty, the three guarantors agreed to consult together with a view to remedial joint action. If they could not agree, each of them reserved the right to take unilateral action to re-establish the pre-existing state of affairs. [18] Thus the Treaty gave Greece the right to protect the Greek Cypriots (against Turkey), and Turkey the right to protect the Turkish Cypriots (against the Greek Cypriots, and Greece); put differently, it was designed to block partition on the one hand, and internal malpractice and enosis on the other. It also gave both Greece and Turkey the right to call on Britain for help in these tasks. But the essence of the Treaty was not its joint but its several aspects: it was in the nature of two separate pieces of legal insurance.

The idea for such a guarantee had been in the air for a while, and all concerned seem to have assumed that such a feature would form part of a settlement.[19] When Britain received the terms of the Treaty which emerged from Zurich, she did not seem at all bothered about accepting them. The Foreign Secretary did point out to the Cabinet that Britain was being invited to guarantee the basic terms of a constitution 'which we had no part in shaping'. Moreover, intervention 'might be

embarrassing' given that there was no assurance that the Government of Cyprus would 'implement the Constitution in a satisfactory manner' or be able 'to maintain law and order'. But on the other hand, 'the Treaty represented a courageous and honest attempt to establish a balance between the conflicting Greek and Turkish interests in Cyprus; and it gave us the right - though it imposed on us no obligation - to take independent action if we had reason to believe that this balance was in danger of being disturbed'. If any of his colleagues had doubts about being a party to the Treaty, no record was made of it - which suggests that there were none. Furthermore, the Cabinet as a whole invited the Foreign Secretary to continue discussions with a view to giving effect to the Zurich proposals.[20]

But what Britain was certainly very bothered about was securing formal recognition for her own position in Cyprus after the settlement came into effect. She wanted her own piece of legal insurance. In consequence it was agreed in London that an Additional Article should be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee, by which Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus undertook 'to respect the integrity of the areas' to be retained under British sovereignty, and 'guarantee the use and enjoyment' by Britain of the 'rights to be secured to her' by the Republic of Cyprus.[21] Thus the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee regarding its enforcement would apply also to this Additional Article. Accordingly, in the event of any Cypriot interference with her position on the island, Britain would be entitled to call upon Greece and Turkey for support and - the heart of the matter - to take such unilateral action in defence of her bases and installations as she deemed necessary.

In these ways Britain's needs had, in principle, been met. The details (like those of the Cyprus Constitution) had still to be worked out (and in fact, as will be indicated later, this was by no means plain sailing). But the wind seemed set fair. All that was now necessary for the whole package to be tied up was the agreement of the Cypriots - who, for the first time, were making an appearance, albeit in the wings, at the international discussions about the future of their island.

When, in September 1958, it looked as though the Greek Cypriots might lose out from their rejection of the Macmillan Plan, Makarios put the goal of enosis to one side for the time being, and came out with a plan for an independent Cyprus. Such a status, he suggested, might be replaced by enosis or partition only with the approval of the UN. Evidently, he did not bargain for Greece and Turkey coming up with a scheme for independence which, effectively, would never permit enosis.[22] However, when he was presented with their Zurich proposals, he approved them (according to Averoff) 'without any reservations at all, which was most unusual for the Archbishop'. [23] The word was passed on to Britain, with the result that the only thing which worried her about Makarios' visit to the London Conference was that he

might find himself before the courts for his part in the Cyprus revolt.

A Foreign Office official recalled that in respect of a previous proposed visit by the Archbishop, it had been suggested in the press that he (after all, a British subject) should be charged with treason. No sooner had this recollection been put to paper than news arrived that a private application had been made for a warrant for Makarios' arrest 'as an accessory before and after the fact to murder'. (The magistrate postponed his decision.) Some ways in which Makarios might be afforded immunity from criminal proceedings by giving him diplomatic standing were considered - but all of them had to be dismissed. Nothing, apparently, could be done by the host state to protect Makarios from the process of its law.[24] Breath was held, and the hope expressed that he would leave before the time bomb detonated. (He did.)

But hardly had Makarios arrived in London than he delivered a bombshell of his own. He could not, after all, accept the Zurich Agreements. (It was, Britain's Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, who observed after an eve-of-the- Conference dinner, 'an example of Archbishop Makarios' usual technique which had become only too familiar over the past five years'.[25]) Makarios explained that in particular he was troubled by certain aspects of the Treaty of Alliance and of the Treaty of Guarantee. He did not want the former to be entrenched in the Cyprus Constitution; and he objected to the latter permitting each of the guarantors to intervene in the internal affairs of Cyprus (i.e. to maintain the Basic Articles of its Constitution). Greece was furious. She immediately got her diplomatic machine into high gear, working both on Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot delegation which he had brought to London (and which, independently of Makarios, wanted to reject the Zurich Agreements). On 18 February, the delegation agreed to support whatever decision Makarios reached. For his part, he was told by the newly-arrived Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, that the honour of Greece was at stake. If he persisted in his objections he would get no further help from Greece.[26] 'I give you Cyprus on a plate, and you refuse to take it. It' s monstrous'. But Makarios remained adamant.

An unhappy tripartite meeting nonetheless decided to hold a second session of the Conference on the evening of the 18th 'to get the Archbishop's statement of his position on to the record'. It would then immediately disperse, and a joint Prime-Ministerial statement would be issued the next day emphasising Makarios' isolation.[28] But at the evening session Makarios prevaricated. He was told by Selwyn Lloyd that he had to 'take it or leave it'[29] He sought an extra day. This presented difficulties on the British side, as the next day the Colonial Secretary was leaving for the Far East, and Prime Minister Macmillan for Moscow.[30] But eventually it was agreed that he could have until 9.45 the following morning.[31] Much activity followed including, reportedly, a telephone call to Makarios from the Queen[32] of Greece.[33]

The next morning Makarios reported the results of his reflections. He had spent the night, he said, in prayer and fasting. (This occasioned some concealed merriment on the part of his British auditors, who had just been reading the transcripts of the lengthy telephone conversations he had had during the small hours.)[34] He would accept the Zurich Agreements, as well as those reached in London in response to Britain's concerns - on which he and the Greek-Cypriot delegation never expressed any reservations. The signing ceremony followed. Later in the day, adopting his tantalising manner, Makarios asked Karamanlis and Averoff whether they really believed that he would not agree. Unsurprisingly, they wanted to know why, in that case, there had been so much fuss. In the same mode, Makarios replied, 'I had my reasons'.[35] It has been said, with some cogency, that the fear of partition was among those reasons.[36] Later he declared the settlement to have been one of 'harsh necessity', also saying that 'not for a moment did I believe that the Agreements would constitute a permanent settlement'.[37]

But for the moment the prevailing air among the other signatories was one of relief and rejoicing. In the view of Britain's Prime Minister, her policy of 'the Bible in one hand and the sword in the other' had proved a success.[38] There were some complaints in Ankara, a great many in Athens, and in Cyprus Grivas was far from pleased: he called the outcome a 'surrender'.[39] But the settlement was endorsed by the legislatures in all three capitals. The revolt was over, the EOKA fighters were given an amnesty, and those in gaol released. On 1 March Makarios returned to Cyprus after three years of exile, to be met by ecstatic crowds. A couple of weeks later, Grivas left for the mainland. Averoff had suggested that Britain would do well to provide this recently most-wanted-man with a guard of honour at the airport. But although the point was seen, Britain felt it was 'impossible to take such a dramatic step because of [her] public opinion'.[40] In Athens, however, both the people and the state gave him a hero's welcome.

What the Zurich and London Agreements established was 'the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus'.[41] To erect the necessary structures on this foundation three bodies were set up: a Joint Committee in London to devise a Treaty of Establishment, which would deal with the legal aspects of the transfer of power from Britain to Cyprus; a Transitional Committee in Nicosia to make the necessary administrative arrangements; and a Joint Commission in Nicosia to draft a Constitution for the new state. It was envisaged that everything would be completed within a year, which was another way of saying that 19 February 1959 was pencilled in as independence day.

The Transitional Committee worked smoothly, and quickly. The Joint

Commission encountered a number of difficulties, notably on the question of the executive power (to be held by the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President). But to all intents and purposes it had completed its work within the stated time scale. The Joint Committee, however, ran into very choppy water, as considerable disagreement emerged over the extent of the areas on the island which Britain was to retain as sovereign bases, and certain related matters. This caused two postponements of the date for Cyprus' independence. Britain was also exercised by two other matters (although they did not much impinge on the work of the Committee): the political and financial relationship between her and Cyprus; and her legal position on the territory of the new state.

This last matter had a number of aspects. One concerned Britain's legal right to take such action as was necessary to defend her bases - the SBAs - should Cyprus be attacked (by a non-guarantor of the settlement: the Soviet Union was, of course, the presumed aggressor). Early in April the Ministry of Defence pointed out that the effective defence of the SBAs required the defence of the 'island as a whole'. (This, of course, had been exactly the argument for **not** getting out of Cyprus!) The Ministry felt that Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus had an obligation to cooperate with Britain in this, noting (among other things) that an "Agreed Minute" (drawn up at the London Conference) stated that these three 'will consult and co-operate with the United Kingdom in the common defence of Cyprus'.[42]

A Cabinet Committee of officials, however, did not agree that such an obligation existed; and on the specific point about the Agreed Minute noted that its statement of what Cyprus would do had been drawn up by Britain, Greece, and Turkey without consulting the Cypriot representatives and, indeed, was being kept from them! As for Britain's right to take unilateral action on the soil of Cyprus in defence of the SBAs, the Committee thought that this would be justified under the Treaty of Guarantee in face of an actual attack, but not if an attack was merely threatened. It saw no prospect of a direct amendment of the Treaty to provide for such a contingency, and instead suggested that an attempt be made to insert a wording similar to that of the Agreed Minute in the Treaty of Establishment. It thought, by a complex process of reasoning, that the breach of any such undertaking would permit unilateral action to counter a threat which could be 'demonstrated'.[43]

The Attorney-General was very unimpressed by this last line of argument.[44] His view was accepted by a Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet, which thought that Britain would have to do without the right of unilateral action in Cyprus in face of a threatened attack (demonstrable or not). But it was not much bothered. As the Prime Minister summed up: 'we could envisage American co-operation in the event of a major external threat to Cyprus and in those circumstances there should be no undue difficulty in taking whatever steps seemed necessary at the time'. Nonetheless, it would be expedient, 'if only as a matter of presentation' to get Cyprus to accept an obligation to cooperate with Britain in defence of the island.

The attempt should therefore be made to get such a clause included in the Treaty of Establishment.[45] (It was successful.)

Then, in May, another disturbing issue popped up. It concerned the definition of the rights which were guaranteed to Britain by Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey - that is, her right to use certain facilites and installations which lay outside her sovereign bases. They were identified in the Additional Article of the Treaty of Guarantee by referring to Britain's unilateral Declaration about their necessity. However, their detailed identification was to be made in the Anglo-Cypriot Treaty of Establishment. When that Treaty came into effect (that is, on the independence of Cyprus) 'the Declaration will be spent and legally ineffective'. In its existing form, therefore, the Additional Article of the Treaty of Guarantee would refer to a document which no longer had any standing, and to that extent Britain would no longer receive the Treaty's benefit. Her guarantee, and her entitlement to take action under it, would be left hanging in the air.

The ideal - and apparently obvious - response to what, on the face of it, was just a technical hitch was for Britain to secure the amendment of the Additional Article so that it referred to the Treaty of Establishment instead of the British Declaration. But it was thought that the other negotiating parties would, at least at that stage, 'react strongly against any attempt on our part to tamper with the Treaty of Guarantee'. It was therefore decided to prepare an extra article for the Treaty of Establishment which would link that Treaty with the Additional Article of the Treaty of Guarantee; and to table it at a later stage if, meanwhile, no opportunity had arisen to alter the Additional Article.[46] In the event such an opportunity did arise, so that worry was settled.[47]

But then it seemed that instead of having a guarantee for certain rights which had to be given secure definition, Britain would have no gurantee at all. In midsummer Greece and Turkey tabled the proposed final text of the Treaty of Guarantee. To Britain's considerable dismay, the wording of what had been the Additional Article (now Article 3 of the Treaty) had lost the key word, "guarantee", so that Britain's 'use and enjoyment' of her rights in Cyprus was now merely to receive the 'respect' of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. That meant that 'we should lose the right to call upon Greece and Turkey to assist us in asserting our rights against the Republic of Cyprus; they could simply say that it was not they who were failing to respect these rights and' they were not therefore bound to take action against the Republic'. In response to Britain's complaint, Turkey thought that that matter was a 'verbal' one, and could be put right without difficulty. But the Greek Delegate claimed it was one 'of substance', and gave an explanation for the wording which Britain found unconvincing. In her view a change in the text had to be sought, as it was 'of vital importance for us to have this guarantee'.[48]

It was decided to pursue the question through diplomatic channels rather than

the Joint Committee, and in October lengthy discussions were held in London with the Greek Ambassador. He wanted a statement that a Greek guarantee of Britain's rights would not oblige her 'to defend British installations in the island against any fifth power'. Britain was prepared to go that far, but declined the Greek request that she give a similar assurance to the other signatories - by which she meant Cyprus. It was one thing to give Greece what she wanted, 'because we trusted them: it was quite another to say the same thing to the Cypriots who, at least so long as they were represented by Mr. Rossides, would be only too likely to twist our words and argue that we had released them from all obligations in regard to common defence'.

Later, Britain gave way on this point, on the ground that the obligation on Cyprus under the relevant article of the Treaty did not relate to external defence. (Doubtless she also bore in mind her earlier conclusion that in case of necessity she would defend her installations against an external threat, whatever Cyprus said or did.) Further discussion followed about the exact wording of the British statement, who should make it, and how it should be introduced into the work of the Joint Committee. There was also internal debate in the Foreign Office as to whether the statement should take the form of a "Note" or a "Letter" - it emerged as the latter. Eventually it was all satisfactorily wound up, as at the same time were some other exchanges with Greece about the French text of the Treaty of Guarantee and whether the English text was at least equally authoritative with it. It had all been rather tiresome for the British official who had been dealing with these matters (A D M Ross). He minuted: 'I think the Greeks have pushed us around enough'.[49]

There was one further, and different, risk to the solidity of Britain's legal position regarding her interests in Cyprus. It concerned the provision in the Treaty of Guarantee which permitted the guarantors, in certain circumstances, to intervene in Cyprus, either jointly or individually. This was mainly an expression of Turkey's concern about the Turkish minority, and Britain's wish to have a sound legal basis for defending her use of the facilities and installations which were identified in the Treaty of Establishment. However, except in response to an armed attack the UN Charter prohibited the use of force against a state's territorial integrity or political independence; and the Charter also stated that its provisions overrode those of other treaties. There was therefore a danger of the interventionary rights under the Treaty of Guarantee being deemed invalid.

The Greek Cypriots were alive to this possibility, and at the London Committee proposed that an article be added to the Treaty saying that it did not prejudice the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the UN Charter. It was opposed not just by Britain and Turkey but also, 'rather surprisingly', by Greece, and therefore foundered.[50] Turkey tried a gambit to the opposite effect, proposing an article saying that the various treaties making up the settlement were in conformity with the UN Charter. Again the guarantors showed a united front, but it was not pressed in view of the 'firm opposition' of the Greek Cypriots.[51] Neither of the

proposed additions, of course, would necessarily have put the matter to rest. And in fact it did not go away. But Britain was already taking the philosophical line that this was a situation she would have to live with.[52]

When questions relating to the SSAs came to the fore, notably the issue of their extent, it was the turn of the Greek Cypriots to try to push Britain around. The bases themselves, strictly defined, were not over large. They were in two separate places: one, in the south of the island adjacent to Episkopi and Limassol, was at Akrotiri; the other, in the south east between Larnaca and Famagusta, was at Dhekelia. In all they came to about 12 square miles.[53] However, it was recognised on all sides that additional space would be needed for their functioning as self-contained bases surrounded by foreign territory. Reinforcements might need to be accomodated; existing installations might need to be expanded, or additional ones constructed; and storage facilities would be required both for the bases themselves and for the provisioning of the Retained Sites which lay beyond their boundaries. There was also the need for dispersal space in case the bases were attacked; and it was at least desirable that the bases controlled their own water supplies. But on the question of the amount of extra space which these requirements would entail, the two sides started from very different positions.

Britain came up with an initial figure of 170 square miles; the Greek Cypriots suggested that 36 square miles would be enough. Recognising that the Cypriots wanted to minimise the number of their nationals who would find themselves under British jurisdiction, Britain played with boundaries, reducing the area which she needed to 152 square miles, and the number of Cypriots living within it from 16,000 to 4,500. This was 4.1 per cent of the island. Further haggling followed, with Britain coming down to 122 square miles, and the Greek Cypriots going up to 80.[54]

By now almost a year had gone by; an international conference had been held in London in the hope of breaking the deadlock, but failing to do so; and the date for independence had been postponed by a month. Negotiations were moved to Nicosia, whither Julian Amery, a junior Minister at the Colonial Office and also the Prime Minister's son-in-law, was despatched to hurry them along. Britain's Ministry of Defence returned to its maps, and while it concluded that further sacrifice would be 'neither reasonable nor prudent', it said that for the sake of a settlement an additional paring ot'18 square miles could be made, provided Britain could make use of the facilities it contained. But, said the Minister, this was the 'minimum requirement', and he went on to make some alarmist remarks about the effect on public opinion in general and the Conservative Party in particular if the cutting-down process was continued.[55]

However, this reduction did not produce results, and independence was again postponed, this time without a new date being set. Now Britain began to think of the presentational allure of a two-digit figure,[56] and the Turkish Cypriots weighed in with the suggestion of the nice round figure of 100 square miles. Makarios then proposed a common Cypriot front on the figure of 95, and was thought to be reluctant to increase it for fear of being judged to have been carried along to the slightly higher figure by the minority Cypriot community. Various devices for bringing Makarios up to 99 were advanced by Britain, but to no avail.[57] For her part, she refused to go any lower. The Minister of Defence reported to Parliament that every concession to Makarios was 'merely a springboard for another demand',[58] and in May talks were broken off. Subsequently Britain made it known that as certain Parliamentary legislation was necessary for her to withdraw from Cyprus, the lack on an agreement by early July would mean (because of the long summer recess) that independence would be postponed at least until the late autumn.[59] That seemed to speed things up, and early in July agreement was reached on 99 square miles.[60] Makarios is thought to have drawn comfort from the two-digit figure, and from the fact that as it included a lake of four square miles, he could claim that his offer of 95 square miles had, in terrestrial terms, been accepted.[61] Britain had also agreed that if she ever relinquished the base areas they would be passed to Cyprus.[62] Thus the SBAs issue was at last out of the way.

The final matter to be settled with the Cypriots was the financial aid which the new state was to receive from Britain. At a later date it became common for her ex-colonies to be so endowed - a kind of coming-of-age gift. In 1960, however, it was an idea with which Britain was still coming to terms. A January 1960 memorandum for a Ministerial Committee worried about 'embarrassing repercussions elsewhere' if Cyprus were given a 'free grant'; any gift would therefore need to be presented as a device to bring 'the revenue balance up to a reasonable level'. In particular, it must not be interpreted as payment for 'defence facilities'; any such course was 'wholly unviable'.[63] In Committee, Ministers favoured the making of loans, but agreed that if a grant had to be made, it would be over a period of five years, and would be reduced each year. This tapering principle was seen as of considerable importance,[64] doubtless to make it clear both to Cyprus and to other newly- independent territories that they would not be subsidised indefinitely.

However, this was exactly what the Cypriots were after, causing the Chancellor of the Exchequer much concern. In April he sent a minute to the Prime Minister saying that he had reluctantly agreed that the question of future financial aid would be discussed five years hence, but that the Cypriots were pressing for a wording which implied not just that aid would be continued after the initial period but that it would be on the initial scale. He 'could not possibly accept' that. Moreover, he thought the initial British offer of 10 million was 'an exceedingly liberal payment to a

small country with such a prosperous outlook and can only be justified by reference to the immediate circumstances.'[65]

Britain had decided that this matter should be left to the end (doubtless because getting an agreed figure offered even more scope for haggling than fixing the area of the SBAs). At that time a figure of 12 million for general financial aid was agreed (to be allocated on a tapering basis over five years), plus some other sums for specific purposes arising out of Britain's strategic needs, and some aid for the Turkish community. While the figure was higher than Britain had hoped, there is reason to believe that an even higher one could have been extracted, so that this was one occasion on which Makarios was (as he soon suspected) outwitted.[66]

It can be seen with hindsight that independence for Cyprus was negotiated at a time when the prevailing view about the international acceptability of small states was in transition.[67] It had been supposed, although it had never been set out with precision, that a state the size of Cyprus - with half a million people - could not expect to play a full international role. Admittedly, two smaller states (Iceland and Luxembourg) were members of the United Nations. But special historical reasons could be advanced for that, Luxembourg having been independent since 1815, and Iceland having enjoyed self-government since 1918. Furthermore, all the other UN members had populations of well in excess of one million. Thus the inclusion of these two tiny members could be seen as exceptions which proved the rule.

Given this context, it is not surprising that at first there was some uncertainty about how an independent Cyprus should be treated, especially as it was obvious that Britain, Greece, and Turkey all wanted to claim a special say in the running of certain aspects of its affairs. In January 1959 a British Committee of officials thought that Cyprus should have the 'status of independence subject to certain limitations', and loftily went on to observe that it would be 'undesirable' for her to become a UN member, 'although it would be useful' for her to be associated with the regional work of the UN Specialized Agencies.[68] A treaty was drafted embodying Britain's more specific 'requirements', which included the provision that Cyprus would not, in her foreign policy, adopt an 'attitude which...might create difficulties for any of the other Parties [to the settlement] or...enter into any military obligations with any other country'.[69] Next month, the secret agreements reached at Zurich and London - the bilateral Gentlemen's Agreement and the tripartite Agreed Minute - were along similarly-paternalistic lines, each of them setting out policies on important external and internal matters which Greece, Turkey, and Britain would expect the new state to adopt.

But before long it was realised that this sort of approach was just not on.

Pressure on specific issues could, of course, be brought on Cyprus in the usual ways; but - with the exception of the agreed restrictions of the Treaty of Guarantee Cyprus had to be treated as formally in control of her own affairs. Independence meant independence. Hence, as the Foreign Office concluded late in 1959, Britain 'cannot possibly contemplate' trying to stop her entering the UN; indeed, 'a virtue [should be made] out of necessity' by actively sponsoring her.[70] Likewise, decisions about her foreign, defence, and domestic policies were ones for Cyprus alone to take.

But on one matter Britain continued for a while to nurse the hope that Cyprus could be shunted into second-class citizenship: her relationship with the Commonwealth. Late in 1959 Britain presented a note to the Cypriots suggesting that Cyprus should enjoy a 'Special Association' with the Commonwealth, through which she would enjoy its normal privileges in the areas of trade, finance, and citizenship, including representation at the Commonwealth committees dealing with these subjects. But what was missing from the bill of particulars was attendance at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings - which normal membership' would entail. A long list of reasons was advanced by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Earl of Home, explaining to his colleagues why in this case the usual sort of membership was undesirable: Cyprus' 'close Treaty and other links with Greece and Turkey', including the presence of their troops; 'the security considerations (not forgetting the possible effects on Anglo-American relations) to which attendance' at the Prime Ministerial Meetings 'might give rise'; the 'precedent' for smaller colonies'; her 'small size and population'; her 'dubious past'; her 'scant weight in international affairs'; and the 'possible ill effects on the Commonwealth' through its 'growing dilution' by 'like size dependencies', which would take it to a point 'where serious political and other forms of consultation become impossible'.[71] Was the Commonwealth, the Prime Minister later asked, 'to be the R.A.C. or Boodles?'[72]

But despite all this, Home regretfully concluded that the Special Association scheme was not viable. It had received only the 'grudging and provisional' agreement of some other members (notably Canada), and Makarios had said that Cyprus 'could not possibly accept' unequal status within the organisation. If Cyprus did apply for membership, it would be 'difficult if not impossible' for Britain to turn her application down unilaterally; the other members would have to be consulted. And while they would be informed of Britain's views, the Minister had no expectation that they would prevail.[73]

Subsequently, however, Prime Minister Macmillan perceived a straw, and eagerly grasped it. The Independence Bill being submitted to Parliament provided that although Cyprus would (at least temporarily) not be a Commonwealth but a foreign country, she should continue to enjoy Commonwealth privileges until the question of her Commonwealth status had been resolved. It was envisaged, and indicated in

the Bill, that nine months might be needed for this process. Then the question arose of whether the Bill should be amended, to allow for greater time. The Governor of Cyprus thought that this might encourage the Cypriots to 'go on indefinitely, getting the best of both worlds'. But the wily Macmillan immediately wondered 'if this would not be a good thing. Would they not then be accepting **de facto** that very special association with the Commonwealth which they rejected **de jure?'.** Thus he favoured playing the question of membership 'as long as possible', worrying only that this languid course might be upset by the 'zeal of Her Majesty's Representatives; we should have to tell the latter both in Cyprus and elsewhere to take no initiative in the matter at all'.[74]

Cyprus, however, did not take the bait: a formal application for Commonwealth membership was made, and accepted at the Prime Ministers' Meeting in March 1961.

Meanwhile, Cyprus had become independent on 16 August 1960. On that day sovereignty was transferred from Britain to the new Republic, and the Cypriot Constitution came into force. Also on that day the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance (together with an enabling Treaty for the latter) were signed by the parties in Nicosia, and immediately took effect.[75] These ceremonies took place immediately after midnight on 15/16 August, as Britain - doubtless wanting to pocket the guarantee of her position in Cyprus without delay - was anxious for there to be 'no hiatus between the coming into being of the Republic and the signing of the Treaties'. There was, however, no flag-lowering and raising ceremony at midnight: the Union Jack was taken down at dusk the previous evening, and the Cypriot flag raised for the first time the next morning.[76]

Could these wary and rather muted arrangements have reflected some foreboding about the prospects for the new state?[77] If so, it was soon to be justified.

Notes

1. The Articles of the UN Charter to which reference is made in this paragraph are, respectively, 2(7), 73 and 74, and 10.

2 Xydis Stephen G. (1973) *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic* . The Hague and Paris, Mouton, 333.

3. Ibid., 338.

4. See ibid (a book chiefly based on Averoff's papers), 337-8; Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos (1986) *Lost Opportunities. The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963,* translated from Greek by Timothy Cullen and Susan Kyriakidis New York, New Rochelle,

Caratzas, 295-6; and Mayes, Stanley (1981) *Makarios: A Biography.* London, Macmillan, 123.

5. PRO: FO 371/145242, UN 1011/1, Annual Review of events at UN during 58, from Pierson Dixon, Despatch no. 3, 2 Feb 59.

6. This account is based on the works by Averoff and Xydis cited in footnotes 4 and 2, and on private information. Xydis (342) says they met in the Delegates' Lounge, but that seems inherently improbable, and is also contrary to what the present writer has been told.

7. See PRO: CAB 129/96, C(59)32, 16 February 1959.

8. See Ertekun, Necati (1984) *The Cyprus Dispute and the British of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.* Nicosia North, Rustem, Appendix I, Part II, 146-52.

9. See PRO: FO 371/144629, RGC 1051/8, letter from Sir Derek Hoyer Millar (civil service head of the British Foreign Office) to Sir Roger Allen (Ambassador to Greece), 5 February 1959; and Kitson, Frank (1977) *Bunch of Five.* London, Faber, 212.

10. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 298.

11. See PRO: FO 371, 144646, RGC 1073/87, letter of 19 March 1959 from the Governor (Foot) to Sir John Martin at the Colonial Office.

12. Private information.

13. Averoff, work cited in footnote 4, 367.

14. PRO: FO 371/144643, RGC 1073/63, letter from Sir Roger Allen to AD M Ross, Foreign Office, 5 March 1959.

15. See PRO: PREM 11/2629, FO to Ankara, 3922, 25 December 1958, and FO 371/136314, RGC 10319/283, FO to Athens, 1975, 26 December 1958.

16. PRO: FO 371/136314, RGC 10319/287, minute reporting conversation, 28 December 1958.

17. See PRO: PREM 11/2267, record of a meeting in Paris, 18 December 1958.

1-8. See UK Parliamentary Papers, Session 1958-59, Cmnd. 679.

19. See a British reference to it having been agreed in January 1959 that 'the new Cyprus should be tripartitely guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and Britain'. This seems to refer to a Greco-Turkish rather than a tripartite agreement, but no exception was taken to it at all: PRO: FO 371, 144629, RGC 1051/16, Southern Department round up of 29 January 1959.

20. PRO: CAB 128/33, C.C. (59), 9th Conclusions, 13 February 1959.

21. Cmnd. 679, cited in footnote 18. It should be noted that Greece, Turkey, Cyprus did *not* 'guarantee' the 'integrity' of her sovereign bases, but only undertook to 'respect' it. Initially, the word guarantee *had* been used in respect of the bases, but it did not appear in the final version of the Additional Article: see PRO: CAB 134/1592, C.Y. (0) (59) 16, 15 February 1959, and C.Y. (0) (59) 18, 16 February 1959. Later, the Greek Delegate to the London Joint Committee said that he believed the word guarantee had been removed from the part of the Article which referred to the bases 'since it seemed inappropriate to "guarantee" United Kingdom sovereignty': PRO: FO 371/144647, RGC 1073/110, minute by C R E Brooke, 9 July 1959. This seems plausible, as a state of Britain's standing would perhaps not have been entirely happy about appearing to be in need of a guarantee of help from Greece and Turkey should two pieces of British territory, housing major military facilities, be threatened by the tiny state of Cyprus.

22. See Reddaway, John (1986) *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection.* London, Nicosia, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and K Rustem & Bro.,143; and Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 242.

23. Averoff, work cited in footnote 4, 337.

24. PRO: FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/49, various minutes, 16-24 February 1959.

25. PRO: FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/41, 16 February 1959. The same Minister had said of Makarios' tactics in 1956 that "'as soon as one obstacle is out of the way another one, unheard of until a week or two before, rears its head"'.

26. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 437-41.

27. Salih, Hali! Ibrahim (1978) *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State.* University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, quoting from Psomiades, Harry J. (May 1965) 'The Cyprus Dispute', *Current History* 48, no. 285, 271-2.

28. PRO: FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/54, 18 February 1959.

29. Quoted in Polyviou, Polyvios G. (1980) *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960 -1980.* London, Duckworth, 14.

30. Admirers of Macmillan will recall that this was the occasion on which he appeared in Moscow sporting an ancient white fur hat which, he did not realise at the time, 'was a form of headdress peculiar to Finland': Macmillan, Harold (1971) *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959.* London, Macmillan, 591.

31. The time is taken from Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 453; Vanezis, P N (1979) *Makarios: Life and Leadership.* London, Abelard-Schuman, 54, gives it as 10.30.

32. See Mayes, work cited in footnote 4, 133-5.

33. This may also have been the occasion when, so it is said, Makarios was visited by a member of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, allegedly presenting evidence of his unorthodox sexual proclivities and saying how regrettable it would be should the material find its way into the hands of the press. The present writer has been assured that such an incident occured at or about this time. It has been said that such evidence was gathered by the security apparatus in Cyprus in 1958: see West, Nigel (1990) *The Friends. Britain's Post-War Intelligence Operations.* London, Coronet edition [originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988], 103. It should be noted, however, that Makarios was not in Cyprus during 1958.

34. Private information.

35. Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 456.

36. See Foley, Charles and Scobie, W I (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus.* Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 157.

37. A 1964 statement to the Greek Government, quoted in Sonyel Salahi, R. (1997) *Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic. British Documents 1960-65.* Huntingdon, Cambs, Eothen Press, 80. Similarly, the leader of the Greek Cypriot delegation at the Commission which drafted the Cyprus Constitution has said that the Agreements which it reflected were accepted only reluctantly and with the intention of abrogating them in order to achieve Enosis': see Necatigil, Zaim M. (1993) *The Cyprus question and the Turkish Position in International Law.* Oxford, Oxford University Press, second edition, 12 fn 21.

38. Macmillan, work cited in footnote 30, 692.

39. Foley Charles (ed.) (1964) *The Memoirs of General Grivas.* London, Longmans, 192.

40. Landa, Ronald D., Miller James E, Patterson David S, Simpson Charles S (eds.) (1993), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960* Volume X, Part 1, *Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus.* Washington DC, United States Goverment Printing Office, 777.

41. Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities all put their signatures at London to documents which included this phrase: see Cmnd. 679, cited in footnote 18, and Ertekun, work cited in footnote 8.

42. PRO: CAB 134/1593, CY (0) (59) 38, 8 April 1959. The text of the Agreed Minute is given in CAB 134/1592, C.Y. (0) (59) 22, 25 February 1959.

43. PRO: CAB 134/1593, C.Y. (O) (59) 31 (Revise), 15 April 1959, para 9.

44. See PRO: CAB 134/1593, C.Y. (0) (59) 41, Attorney-General to Foreign Office, 15 April 1959.

45. PRO: CAB/134/1587, C.Y. (M) (59) 1st Meeting, 28 April 1959.

46. PRO: CAB 134/1593, CY (0) (59) 44, Note by the Foreign Office, 8 May 1959.

47. See PRO: FO 371/144646, RGC 1073/90, minute of RLWG [Robert Wade-Gery),12 June 1959.

48. PRO: FO 371/144647, RGC 1073/110, minute by CR E Brooke, 9July 1959.

49. PRO: FO 371/144652, RGC 1073/144, series of minutes, 1-19 October 1959.

50. PRO: FO 371/144653, RGC 1073/158, minute by R L Wade-Gery, 20 October 1959.

51. Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 514.

52. See PRO: FO 371/144646, Defence and Foreign Policy of Cyprus, Report by the Cyprus Committee, 10 April 1959.

53. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 481.

54. See PRO: PREM 11/2923, minute and attachment from the Minister of Defence to the Prime Minister, 18 February 1960. Cf CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) 2nd Meeting, 14 January 1960.

55. Ibid.

56. See PRO: PREM 11/2923, Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, 4 April 1960.

57. See PRO: PREM 11/2923, Nicosia to FO, 429, 11 April 1960, and PREM 11/2924: Minister of State at the Foreign Office to Prime Minister, 11 April 1960.

58. Mayes, work cited in footnote 4, 146.

59. Private information.

60. Two villages and a power station were to be enclaves of Cypriot territory within the SSAs with special arrangements for access to them. The only village under British sovereignty was to be that of Akrotiri, which was too close to the Akrotiri airfield to be treated as a Cypriot enclave: see PRO: PREM 11/3242, House of Commons statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 July 1960.

61. See PRO: Prem 11/2924, Nicosia to FO, 753, 2 July 1960.

62. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 481.

63. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) 12, 13 January 1960.

64. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60), Second meeting,14 January 1960.

65. PRO: PREM 11/2924, 29 April 1960.

66. See PRO: PREM 11/2924, Nicosia to FO, 735, for the Foreign Secretary from Amery, 1 July 1960; and private information.

67. See p.346, Garner, J. (1978) *The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68.* London,

Heinemann.

68. PRO: CAB 134/1591, CY (0) (59) First meeting, 2 January 1959. (It should be noted, however, that *very* shortly afterwards a Foreign Office memorandum said that 'there would be little objection from our point of *view* to Cyprus as a United Nations member': CY (0) (59) 4, 9 January 1959.) See also FO 371/144629, RGC 1051/16, Southern Department round-up of developments, 29 January 1959, in which it is said that the basis for the solution of the problem is 'a type of independence' for Cyprus.

69. PRO: CAB 134/1592, CY (0) (59) 3 (Revised), 3 February 1959.

70. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) 1, membership of International "Organisations, Memorandum by the Foreign Office, 1 January 1960.

71. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) Second meeting, 14 January 1960, and attached memorandum, C.Y. (M) (60) 6, 8 January 1960.

72. Quoted in McIntyre, W.D. (1996), 'The Admission of Small states to the Commonwealth', 24 *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 2, 269. The R.A.C. and Boodles were two Gentlemen's Clubs in London, but the latter was the much more exclusive of the two.

73. PRO: CAB 134/1588, documents cited in footnote 71.

74. PRO: DEFE 13/382, minute from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Prime Minister, P.M. (60) 45, 14 July 1960, and Prime Minister's reply, 15 July 1960.

75. There had been concern in the British Foreign Office over the Republic Cyprus being a party to the Treaty of Establishment, given that it would not become independent until the Treaty had come into force: see PRO: FO 371/144639 RGC 1073/1, 4 February 1959. The answer was given by the Colonial Office in FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/55 - an undated document which was handed to Cypriot representatives on 16 February 1959. See also FO 371/144631, RGC 1051/49, 16 July 1959.

76. See PRO: PREM 11/3242, exchange of telegrams between the Colonial Office and the Governor, 20 and 21 July 1960, and despatch no. 1 from I F Porter, 7 September 1960.

77. Fairfield Roy P. (1959) 'Cyprus: Revolution and Resolution', 13 *The Middle East Journal* 3 quotes a letter from a Greek friend which 'reflects dimensions of the problem not found in public statements' (247). In her belief 'every single Greek soul all over the world' is embittered by cooperation with Turkey 'against whom we keep an eternal hatred in our hearts for untold hardships...for so many centuries' (248).

THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION AND THE DENIAL OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Niazi Kizilurek

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to address the issue of separation in Cyprus and the wider concept of separatism on the island. The latter covers all political actions which disable intergration, destroy unity and consequently lead to segregation.

Looking at politics in Cyprus a simple fact becomes obvious: the desire for autonomy of the two communities has resulted in separation.

Since autonomy is the goal of all nationalists, we will have to examine nationalism in Cyprus. Before we do so, however, a few words about autonomy have to be said at the outset.

"With the concept of autonomy we have entered the Kantian world of self-determination. With Kant, autonomy becomes an ethical imperative for the individual, a principle of his being. Applied by Fichter and other German romantics to groups rather than individuals, the ideal of autonomy gave rise to the philosophy of national self determination and collective struggle to realise the authentic national will."

Nationalism signifies the awakening of the nation and its members to its "true collective self', so that it, and they, obey only the "inner voice" of the purified community. "Authentic experience and authentic community are, therefore, preconditions of full autonomy, just as only autonomy can allow the nation and its members to realise themselves in an authentic manner" (Smith, 1991).

The construction of the unique collective identity is possible only through a shared unique culture. By discovering that culture we discover ourselves, the authentic self. This process of self-definition and location is in many ways the key to national identity. Therefore, autonomy, unity and collective identity are the basic characteristics of nationalism.

It is important at this point to distinguish between cultural nation (Kulturnation) and political nation (Staatsnation) as done by German historian Friedrich Meineke.

According to him, the political nation centres around the idea of the individual and collective self-determination and derives from the individual's free will and subjective commitment to the nation. In this case as in the formulation of ·Ernest Rennan, "the nation is a daily plebiscite", and depends on the will of the individual. Therefore, the population of a given historically evolved territory perceives itself as a nation and citizenship is equated with nationality (Alter, 1989).

This suggests that, whatever else it may be, what we mean by national identity involves some sense of political community. A political community, in turn, implies at least, some common institutions and single code of rights and duties for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong (Antony Smith, 1991).

By contrast, the spirit of community that exists in a cultural nation is founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement (so called historical land), religion, customs and history, and does not need to be mediated by a national state or other political form. Conciousness of unity and the sense of belonging together develop independently of the state (Alter, **1989)**.

The first obvious feature is the stress on descent - or rather presumed descent- rather than territory. The nation is seen as a fictive "super family". In this conception, the nation can trace its roots to an imputed common ancestry and, therefore, its members are brothers and sisters, differentiated by family ties from outsiders. In fact nationalism contains both conceptions in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasised (Smith, 1991).

Greek-Cypriot nationalism developed as ethnonationalism, creating a strong sense of belonging to the "family of the Greek nation", was the main determinant of the Greek-Cypriot identity and hence of the collective self.

The achievemnet of autonomy was not based on a political community securing the civil rights of its citizens but on the cultural expression of the authentic self i.e. of the *volksgeist.* Cyprus was not perceived as a self-contained territory, in which an independent politia could be created, but as a piece of territory, which assumes sense only if it is a part of the "super family" of the Greek nation. Thus "the authentic self" can only realise itself and become autonomous through the unification of the island with Greece. In this context political demands and aims are the expression of the national identity and of the authentic self. There is no differentiation between identity and politia at all.

As Kitromilides observes, "the growth of a movement of national consciousness raising and national assertion that culminated in a political vision of national

emancipation through union with Greece turned the archaic, distant Greek speaking community of Cyprus into a dynamic, political society, which excluded as heresy and treason the visualisation of any other forum of collective existence short of union with Greece" {Kitromilides 1990).

The equalisation of nation and identity with politia led the Greek-Cypriots "to see and handle the Cyprus Question exclusively as a problem of self-determination of the Cypriot people in the Hellenic ethnic sense. They were not prepared and willing to tackle the problem from the aspect of a political nation that would comprise the Greeks as well as the Turkish-Cypriots" {Tzermias, 1994).

Indeed the expansion of Greek nationalism in Cyprus resulted in an oversight, even oblivion of the Turkish-Cypriot community. This Hellenic, culturalistic discourse and spiritual inwardness resulted in the denial of difference in relation to the Turkish-Cypriots and also of otherness within the Greek-Cypriot community. Another important result of this process, was the fetishism of history and culture where history and culture have been presented as admonishing, crying or demanding.

The idea of an organic relationship between language, culture and history on the one hand and the politia on the other, prevented the Greek-Cypriot community from approaching the Turkish-Cypriot community and from adapting to the reality of domestic and international conditions.

Any criticism of the politics of unification with Greece - which was thought to be the only way to realise the authentic collective self - was perceived as a denial of identity, thus as abnormal and corrupt. According to this concept of national identity, where Greek-orthodoxy, ethnicity and the state are considered as an organic whole, nation and people {Staatsvolk) had to be one.

In this context we can undermine the critical remark made by Makarios concerning the creation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960: "the Agreements created a state but not a nation".

This led to an undermining of the Cypriot state and hindered the emergence of a political community, composed of all Cypriots in the sense of the citizens of the island.

Alongside this lack of recognition of difference by Greek nationalism in Cyprus, it is important here to mention the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, although taking into consideration the ethnic identity in many respects, did not enable the state to go beyond the collective identities and to create a unity through difference.

During the years after the formation of the Cypriot state we come across certain social groups desiring to move from the ethno-nation to a territorial state, claiming

that "Cyprus belongs to its people". For the first time in the 1960s we see the differentiation between demos and nation. However, the ruling idea "Cyprus belongs to Hellenism" remained until 1974 and loyalty remained centred around culture, which was understood as the organic whole covering religion, ethnicity and politics, rather than around the concept of political society.

From the Politics of Difference to the Politics of Separation.

Nationalism arrived in the Turkish-Cypriot community almost one century after it had arrived in the Greek-Cypriot community. The Turkish-Cypriots seem to have been affected by Turkish nationalist ideas during the emergence of modern Turkey. Newspaper articles indicate that "Turkishness" begins to be pronounced in 1919, at the beginning of the Turkish war of liberation. The establishment of the Turkish state led to increased nationalist ideas amongst the Turkish-Cypriot intelligentsia.

However, the gradual transformation of a pro-British Muslim community into a Turkish ethnic minority on the island that saw itself as part of the Greater Turkish nation is not to be unde·rstood independently of the growth of Greek-Cypriot national consciousness. There is a close relationship, perhaps a dialectical one, between ethnic antagonism and the development of the Turkish-Cypriot national identity.

The call on ethnicity, although influenced by Turkish nationalism and encouraged by British colonialism, developed in reaction to the "Other", the Greek-Cypriot community, which was perceived as a threat to the Turkish-Cypriots.

It is not a coincidence that the spread of nationalist feeling amongst the Turkish Cypriots gained momentum in the 1950s, when the Greek-Cypriot demand for unification achieved its highest momentum. This constant conflict has itself crystalised a Turkish-Cypriot sense of ethnic identity in what was before only a linguistic-religious category. It was during this period that the demand for partition as a counter-ideology to enosis came to be pronounced by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.

The articulation of blind nationalism by Greek Cypriots which in fact was the politicisation of intercommunal difference, combined with the cold war interests of the Western Alliance made the Turkish-Cypriot minority of Cyprus a "Distinct Community" within the Republic of Cyprus.

But to maintain and cherish distinctiveness was not limited only to the legitimate interest to maintain the cultural integrity of the Turkish Cypriots. It aimed in fact at the legitimation of the politics of partition, in reaction to the "Other", the Greek Cypriots. Thus, Cyprus became a place similar to the Sartrian world of "No Exit" where the other is perceived as hell.

In the words of Kitromilides, "Out of the configuration of two opposed

conservative and authoritarian nationalisms, symbolically antagonistic and mutually exclusive, developed the dialectics of intolerance that provided the ideological content of ethnic conflict. Precisely on the eve of her independence Cyprus experienced this dialectic of intolerance that stretched from ideological to most other levels of public life" (Kitromilides, 1990).

Given that a political community is defined as a group of people living under a common regime, whose representatives make important decisions for the group as a whole, one can argue that the ruling elites of the newly born state of Cyprus aimed instead for separate conflicting national policies. The insistence on separate national interests left no room for emergence of a united Cypriot society.

The existence of a centralised agency to which all are understood as equally subject sustained an awareness that there was at least one level at which they all shared an attribute, and this shared attribute could have become the basis for insisting on extending the range of shared attributes. However, this was inconceivable in the "Cypriot Society" in which social roles and rights derived and were trapped within the respective ethnic communities. For this reason the emergence of the state and the doctrine of sovereighty did not have a profound and lasting effect on the process of political socialisation in Cyprus as it did in the West.

In fact the state of Cyprus has been perceived by the ruling elites of the two communities as a threat to the Greek and Turkish national identities as they were understood in Cyprus. Throughout the years of independence the Turkish-Cypriot leaders saw a great danger in the 'Cypriotisation" of the Turks, as they have admitted. On the other hand the Greek-Cypriot leadership was after the complete "hellenisation" of the Cypriot state and Cyprus as such.

This instability of the post-colonial state fuelled the ethnic conflict and tended to promote a heightened sense of ethnic identity, which in turn strengthened the aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots for a separate ethno-national identity. Alongside the group anxiety caused by the discourse and actions of the Greek-Cypriot nationalism, especially in the 1960s, the uneven development between the two communities of Cyprus encouraged further ethnic separatism among the Turkish Cypriots.

So, Turkish-Cypriot ethnic nationalism became the vehicle for a new national identity which drew many members of the community, involved in the conflict, into a new type of politicised vernacular culture and created a different kind of participant society. In this context the separatist movement itself was the prototype and harbinger of a new society. Its cells, schools, army units, welfare associations, self-help groups, labour unions, as well as its songs, flags, poetry, sports, arts and crafts, all presaged and created the nucleus of the future ethnic community and its political identity.

Fear of Interdependence

The failure of state building in Cyprus, because of Greek and the Turkish ethno-nationalisms, is to be understood as the fear of interdependence. In fact interdependence was the very characteristic of the Cypriot state, which was based on the concept of bi-communalism . Neither of the two communities could arrange the affairs of the state without considering the general will of the other community.

But this, instead of recognition of the other and co-operation with them brought about denial and antagonism. The very process of acquiring, the autonomous collective self prevented both communities from coming to terms with each other. The ethno-nationalist way of achieving the collective self through separateness and the development of mutually exclusive identities, left no space for commonality and led to the lack of recognition.

For the Greek-Cypriot elite, any consideration of the Turkish Cypriots, was seen as a hindrance to the full expression of the Greek cultural identity and the political will. The Turkish-Cypriot elite saw in the concept of interdependence the mere protection of the Turkish-Cypriot collective self and encouraged the distinctiveness of the community in a way which turned against unity.

In the micro-cosmos of Cyprus we can observe how interdependence without empathy can become a painful experience leading to the total renunciation of the other.

It is important at this point to consider the roles of Greece and Turkey in relation to Cyprus and the Cypriot state. Despite the fact that the two countries agreed to exclude the unification of Cyprus with Greece and the partition of the island, they never ceased as national centres to strengthen the Greek and Turkish national consciousness in Cyprus. Alongside their control of the Cypriot state and their military presence, both countries were actively involved in the educational and communication systems in order to increase their respective influences on the island. For example, as a former member of the Greek embassy in Nicosia, recently admitted, Greece, concerned by the weakening of "hellenistic emotions" in the 1960s in Cyprus, financially supported those Greek Cypriot newspapers, which were engaged in developing strong ties between Cyprus and mother Greece. It is for sure that the same applies to Turkey in relation to Turkish Cypriots and despite the original agreements concerning enosis and taksim, the Cypriot elites were encouraged to see the source of hope for enosis and taksim in Greece and Turkey respectively.

Furthermore, the tendency of the Western Alliance to resolve the Cyprus

encouraging Turkey and Greece to political maximalist position on Cyprus, since whatever happened, the interests of the Alliance were protected. So, the cooperation of the two countries concerning Cyprus, which began in 1959, was always overshadowed by their competition.

After the events of 1974, which divided Cyprus into two parts, there began a negotiation process for the unification of the island on a bi-zonal federal basis. The presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus changed the balance of power completely. Since federation had been a Turkish proposal for the settlement of the Cyprus question, one expected after the high level Agreement in 1977 between Denktas and Makarios a smooth movement towards the implementation of the federal concept.

However, such expectations are yet to be fulfilled. After the freezing of the conflict for twenty years, the Turkish Cypriot leadership have come to seek a new definition of the Turkish Cypriot community on the basis of nation-building. According to this definition the Turkish Cypriots are entitled to the right of self-determination and to national sovereignty with the dogma of what is territorial is national and what is national is territorial continues the naturalisation of north Cyprus vis-a-vis Turkish nation, intensifies the frustration and emotional reaction in the Greek-Cypriot com*munity.*

It is like history repeating itself, with changed positions. In the 1960s *it* was the Greek Cypriots who sought the right to ignore the Turkish-Cypriots. Today it is the Turkish Cypriots who are claiming the same right.

Today, after the bitter experience of nationalisms, Cyprus is threatened by lack of communication and compromise, emotionalism and readiness for the use of violence in a strategic and calculated way. Enough has happened for Minerva to take its dusk flight. If only we prove able to learn and to face interdependency this time, with empathy.

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CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

Hubert Faustmann

Abstract

As most Greek Cypriots identify with Greece at least culturally, one would expect the political culture of contemporary Cyprus to be more or less the same as that of mainland Greece. However, this is not the case. Cyprus possesses more features of a Western European country than Greece and fewer signs of their common Ottoman heritage. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that this is to a great extent the outcome of social and political developments in Cyprus during the 82 years of British rule. This social and political change in Cyprus during this period is best understood by analysing clientelism which is a feature shared by all the countries of the former Ottoman Empire.

Clientelism

Definition

Despite the absence of common agreement amongst social scientists about the precise definition, there are some general features in any understanding of clientelism in this part of the world:

According to Jeanette Choisi, clientelism or patronage is a reciprocal relationship between two persons or groups of persons of different social status in a small or traditional agricultural society.[1] Clientelism creates a ritualised, morally ruled scheme of interaction between the patron and his clients .

Clientelistic relationships in Greece are according to Legg based on free approval, mutual esteem and respect for the freedom of both sides *(" Philotimo").*[2] The more influential patron and the client are under the obligation to give favours or services to each other.[3] The patron is obliged to give money, posts, promotions and shelter to his client, while he gains power, wealth and social prestige from the client who has to support and vote for his patron. An essential element of clientelism is the personal

relationship between the client's family and his patron. A patron is often also advisor, godfather or marriage witness, expected to use his influence for the benefit of his client and his family.[4]

According to Almond and Bingham Powell, these clientelistic relationships can spread hierarchically within society and create an extensive or even state-wide network: *"The institution of friendship, based upon the moral notion of equality and the free exchange of favour, builds up, in situations of material inequality, a structure of patronage which links up the authority of the state through the economic power of certain individuals to the network of neighbourly relations."*[5]

Favouritism, nepotism, corruption and *"rousfett'* (i.e. favours given by the patron to the client in exchange for his support or services) characterise patron-client interaction, but also emerge outside clientelistic relationships. The duty of the client to support politically his patron or the candidate backed by him in exchange for *"rousfetl'* is essential for clientelism. It is the personal patron-client relationship that determines this behaviour.

According to Lemerchand and Legg, clientelism is part of any political system.[6] Therefore, patron-client relationships have to be defined and analysed within the specific historical, economic, cultural and political circumstances of each society.

The Heritage of Clientelism in the Ottoman Empire

When the Ottomans conquered a country they usually exterminated the ruling oligarchy in order to render the people leaderless and prevent potential upheavals. They then chose local clergymen or laymen to run the villages, towns or regions. Those local notables often acquired a double function: they became the leaders of local population and the target for repression by the Ottoman authorities if something went wrong in their area of responsibility. They interceded with the authorities on behalf of their fellow citizens and in return they acquired prestige, power and wealth. The local notables expected loyalty from those they favoured.[7] Soon they were also rich enough to lend money to their fellow villagers thus increasing dependency.[8] This patron-client structure was the main source of clientelism and became a common feature of all countries of the former Ottoman Empire, including Greece.

After Greece's independence clientelism became the means to run the country. The new political structure of the state was built around patrons, who used their relationships with clients for political purposes. They distributed favours to their clients who were expected to vote for them in elections. Soon Greece was covered with rivalling clientelistic networks. When political parties emerged they incorporated clientelism in the form of political party patronage, as Richter describes: *"The party was the clientele of the party leader and he alone decided on the course to follow. Conflicts within a party led to the separation of sub-networks. Party allegiance*

became a function of the success of the leader i.e. of the rousfetia he could distribute. Change of power was achieved by change of allegiance of sub-networks. In general elections Greeks did not vote for a party but against that party which had not procured the expected rousfeti."[9] This clientelistic system survived all political changes of the 20th century and remained the decisive factor in shaping the political system of contemporary Greece.

When Cyprus was taken over by the British in 1878, after 300 years of Ottoman rule, clientelism was an important part of the island's social and political life too. Cyprus was a traditional, mainly village based, agricultural society whose Greek Cypriot community was dominated by a small elite of influential families and the high clergy. Its small and closed society provided an ideal ground for personal patron-client relationships reinforced by an Ottoman administration and judicature which were characterised by unequal treatment and corruption. Before 1878 the administration had been virtually the monopoly of the Ottoman officials and the Muslim Cypriots who had been the dominant community under the Ottoman Millet system. During the nineteenth century, however, the economy, commerce and manufacture were increasingly controlled by the Greek Cypriots who were led by the Orthodox Church, the biggest landowner.[10]

Sources of Clientelism in Cyprus under British Rule

Due to the lack of research on clientelism for the whole of Cyprus, there is not much information on patron-client relationships. It is therefore difficult to draw a precise picture of the extent of clientelism under British rule. The examination of the social and political changes during that period as well as information provided by British sources lead to the conclusion that on a local or regional level clientelistic relationships were prevalent during large parts of British rule. Moreover, its existence as a decisive form of interaction within the Greek Cypriot community is not disputed in the literature.[11]

During the first half of their rule the British did not pay much attention to the social and economic conditions in Cyprus. They needed Cyprus for geostrategic reasons. A tribute payable to the Ottoman Sultan used up most of the money they got out of the island from taxes. The economic backwardness remained and *"laissez faire"* was the guiding principle in ruling the island with as little effort and money as possible. Therefore, the socio-economic structures created during Ottoman rule remained largely unchanged. It was mainly in these sectors of society that clientelistic patterns shaped large parts of the Greek Cypriot community.

The British limited the extent of corruption in all areas of the island's administration after 1878. Moreover, clientelistic structures could not spread into the public sector on a large scale since the highest administrative, financial and judicial

posts were taken over by a handful of British officials. The colonial power created an administrative system based on British norms, which according to Georghallides, *"...over a quite brief period of time, imparted honesty, order and efficiency to the conduct of public business".*[12]

During the first decades of British rule Greek Cypriots were not interested in an end to colonial rule by a mass struggle for union with Greece (*enosis)* or self determination lest Cyprus should be returned to the Ottomans. Therefore, there was no need for a comprehensive political organisation within the Greek community on the island. The local patron-client relationships remained but they did not develop into larger organisations such as political parties. On the political level it was only in the limited areas of administrative participation and episcopal election that clientelism played an important role.

The main features that characterised the process of money-lending, the system of agricultural product selling and the leasing of land preserved patron-client relationships for a large part of British rule. Similarly, education, the Church and administrative institutions such as the Mukhtar and the Legislative Council contributed a great deal to the preservation of old, and the creation of new, clientelistic relationships. The importance of those structures became evident in the 1920s. Threatened by a growing enosis movement the British directed their reform policies precisely towards undermining the central elements which sustained patron-client relationships.

The Network of Landowners, Merchants, Brokers and Moneylenders

In 1878 Cyprus was an agricultural society. Most of the peasants owned land, but due to the inheritance system of dividing land among the children, it was usually too small and the tax burden too heavy for many farmers to secure more than just the basic means of living. The small size and fragmentation of holdings became one of the main obstacles to agricultural progress. Moreover, during the first 60 years of British rule most Cypriot peasants were indebted to and frequently dependent on moneylenders, who were in fact usurers.[13]

With the exception of a British survey conducted in 1927-28 there are no detailed data about rural indebtedness during British rule. Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Cyprus from 1926 to 1932, initiated the survey and reports in his autobiography that 70% of the peasants were *"chronically indebted to usurers and merchants".*[14]

Michael Attalides describes how the money-lending system on the local level worked during the early decades of British rule: *"It has already been pointed out that money was frequently lent on the basis of 'word of honour'. In general the idiom of the relationship had to be one of friendship, as the frequently illiterate peasant was virtually at the mercy of the broker. Not only did he depend on him for his annual*

credit and sales, but also for keeping an account of these transactions. [...] It was only through exhibitions of friendship and if possible with bonds of fictive kinship that the client could hope to limit the broker's rapacity. [...] In this context, political alignment was part of the relationship of friendship and dependence. Generally people simply voted for whomever the broker they dealt with told them to vote for. [...] The merchant and broker network was reinforced by its overlap with the government administrative system. [...]

Through a series of individual vertical coalitions [...] the brokerage system provided the urban and rural merchant class with an extremely tight control over the peasant producer."[15]

Regional networks were created by merchants who supplied local brokers with money for credits. Once totally at the mercy of the local brokers, merchants and moneylenders, the farmer lost the freedom to sell his product on the market directly. The richer merchants bought the products the peasant had to sell to his broker or sub-broker. This broker network, linked with merchant houses which were sometimes connected with bigger ones in the cities, built the economic basis on which clientelistic structures could be formed.

Another source of potential patron-client relationships was the leasing of land to farmers by the big landowners and the Orthodox Church. According to Lanitis, in 1944 about 20% of the cultivated land belonged to religious institutions, big landowners, moneylenders or other town dwellers while the remaining 80% belonged to and was cultivated by farmers.[16] Approximately 25% of the peasants were either scrapholders or full-time tenant farmers. According to the General Survey conducted by the British between 1909-1929, 5,3% of the total agricultural land was owned by the various bodies of the Orthodox Church.[17] Large estates owned by the Church were frequently leased to wealthy people such as big landowners or merchants who in turn often sub-leased them to small cultivators. Smaller properties owned by village churches were usually leased to co-villagers. Amongst the various forms of leasing the short term lease (3-5 years) predominated[18] so the tenant was highly susceptible to political pressure. The dependency of the farmers and indebted peasants on the moneylenders, merchants and big landowners allowed the elites not only to exploit their clients financially, but also to control their behaviour at the polls. It could have serious economic consequences for an indebted peasant or a tenant not to vote for his patron or the candidate supported by him in elections for educational, religious or political offices.

However, the dependency of the peasants on the merchants, moneylenders and big landowners did not necessarily produce patronage for the poor by the rich and influential. If the big landowner or the moneylender was not involved in politics or if he was satisfied with the financial profit of the relationship, it is fair to assume that no political pressure on the indebted peasant or the tenant was exercised. In addition

around 20-30% of the peasants had only small or no debts. These peasants could be "free" voters, not bound in a patron-client relationship based on economic dependency. Their political support could be gained through different forms of patronage created for example by wedding and baptismal sponsorship *("koumparia")* or the payment for the education of children. Unfortunately, no precise figures about this widespread practice are available.

The Legislative Council

Two groups led the Orthodox Cypriot community during the first decades of British rule: the merchants, brokers, big landowners and lawyers, on the one hand, and the Orthodox Church, on the other. When the British took over in 1878 they no longer accepted the Church as the official representative of the Orthodox population, as had been the case under Ottoman rule.[19] Instead, they tried to upgrade the role of the lay Orthodox elites, who subsequently became more influential.

In 1883 the British introduced the elected Legislative Council as a kind of parliament.[20] It consisted of six nominated British officials, three Muslim and nine Christian members, who were elected by their respective communities. Until its end in 1931 the Legislative Council remained a relatively powerless organ that gave British rule a veneer of democracy. It possessed no authority to enact laws and its jurisdiction was strictly limited. On controversial matters the Turkish members almost always sided with the appointed British members in voting against the Greeks. In the resulting stalemate the High Commissioner[21] had a casting vote. In the rare case that the Legislative Council did not enact a bill, it could come into force by an "Order in Council" of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Membership in the Legislative Council gave prestige to its local representatives but only limited possibilities to distribute money, posts or favours. The members had great influence on the appointments and promotions of teachers until 1929 and after 1923 on the appointments of the local governmental representatives, the Mukhtars. In this respect, Greek members of the Legislative Council could give favours and establish patron-client relationships. However, since the British controlled employment in the civil service and state expenditures there were only limited possibilities for the members of the Legislative Council to distribute favours on a broad scale and thereby become heads of large clientelistic networks. Furthermore, politically unpopular members could be sanctioned by the British who would not enable them to distribute favours.

The electoral system for the Legislative Council limited but at the same time also opened doors to the use of clientelism. Only male Cypriots over 21 who had paid their verghi taxes[22] in the year before the elections were allowed to vote. Therefore, the number of registered electors was directly related to the general state of

indebtedness. This resulted in the de facto exclusion not only of the lower strata but also of large parts of the rest of the electorate from voting, as Katsiaounis points out: *"In a society where indebtedness was becoming a chronic malaise this condition was tantamount to political rights being denied not only to pauperised labourers but also to the less competitive of petty traders and smallholders."*[23] From the 58.916 men who were liable to the verghi-tax only 21.703 (35,8%) were entitled to vote in 1882. The number of all Cypriots entitled to vote dropped by 1891 to 12.232 despite the increase of the population.[24] Many heavily indebted peasants, who were completely dependent on moneylenders, were not allowed to vote. Thus, clientelistic support based on economic dependency in elections for the Legislative Council was limited to electors who were dependent on moneylenders, merchants and landowners, but who also paid their taxes. At the same time, the limited number of voters potentially offered great advantages to a patron: each of the three electoral districts[25] elected three Christian members of the Legislative Council until 1925. Assuming that the number of voters in the three districts was roughly the same and given that three candidates were elected in each district, only a relatively small number of votes was necessary in each constituency for a candidate to be elected.

The extremely limited number of polling stations gave advantages to those candidates who could best mobilise their supporters and clients and who could defray the electors' transport and other expenses. A peasant often lost an entire day if he came from a remote village to vote. This was apparently a reason for many peasants not to vote at all.[26] Consequently, in particular during the early decades of British rule the poll was very low, as a 1883 report indicates: *"It is worthy of note that out of 63 villages with a total of 1,556 registered electors, not a single voter went to the poll and that 40 villages with an electorate number of 1,025 sent one voter apiece, and he, in the majority of cases, was the village representative whose presence is compulsory!".*[27]

Moreover, since balloting was open voters had to cast their vote within view of the candidates or their agents. Even after 1906, when secret balloting was introduced, the danger of a client being caught voting against the will of the patron was very high, especially given the small size of Cypriot society. People in the villages usually knew for whom somebody had voted. It is therefore arguable that the number of clients who did not fulfil their expected electoral obligation after 1906 was very small.

A report of the Commissioner of Kyrenia in 1912 shows the extent to which the electoral system and voting procedure contributed to the domination of clientelism in the elections for the Legislative Council: *"The elected persons are all well to do, and generally towns-people such as Advocates, Medical men, Merchants e.t.c. to whom the majority of the voters are indebted;[...] it will be noticed that nearly all the voters who recorded a vote either live at the town where the poll is held, or so close by that they can be turned out on the actual polling day by the candidate or his agents."*[28]

In 1925 the British made some amendments to the constitution of the island, including the increase of the Christian members from 9 to 12, now elected in 12 instead of three constituencies. High Commissioner Stevenson suggested the increase of the constituencies as a means to undermine the urban nationalists in 1923: " ...there is undoubtedly a tendency for political power to be concentrated in the hands of a few politicians in Nicosia and Limassol towns and, if the Council is to be fully representative, smaller constituencies are necessary".[29]

The urban Greek elites continued to control the political life of the island despite intense rivalries within them. In the 1920s their power derived not only from the successful operation of their clientelistic networks but also from their role in the pursuit of enosis. The Greek nationalists successfully boycotted the 1922/23 elections as a first climax of the growing enosis-movement. In 1925 they ended their boycott policy. Six Greek members of the last properly elected Legislative Council[30] (1916-1921) ran again but only one was re-elected. Two former members won seats again but the other nine were new and more moderate. But even this limited British success was at least as much the result of the serious blow on nationalist aspirations after the Greek defeat against Turkey in Asia Minor as it was the outcome of Stevenson's reforms. Union with a defeated Greece in chaos and flooded with refugees did not seem that desirable anymore. This made less nationalist candidates more popular even though some of them had fewer clients than their nationalist rivals. Although they owed their election to political conviction rather than clientelism, they too were part of the traditional elites, supported by their own clientele.[31]

Stevenson had increased the number of constituencies from 3 to 12 in order to strengthen the position of local candidates against the network of the dominating urban elites. The smaller size of the electorate automatically gave local candidates higher chances. But in terms of patronage the measure enhanced the effectiveness of local clientelistic networks and caused only a temporary setback of the traditional nationalist urban elites. In 1930 the nationalist candidates won most of the seats in the Legislative Council again, proving that the enosis movement had recovered.[32]

In Marios Lyssiotis' survey of 56 Greek-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council between 1883 and 1931,[33] it was found that the members belonged almost exclusively to the traditional Greek elites. 88% were merchants, lawyers[34] or big landowners - the typical professions of Cypriot patrons. Since it was common for people of these professions to have several jobs at the same time many of them were moneylenders as well.[35]

The survey also showed that the continuity amongst the Greek members in the Legislative Council was quite high. This was for Lyssiotis an indication of "not only the conservative nature of the society but also of the hold which the political elites held on the society'.[36] Around 50% of the official leaders of the Greek Cypriots were re-elected, 19,4% three or more times. Moreover, 32% of all Legislative Council

members were directly related (either father and son, brothers, or uncle and nephew), reflecting the strength of the oligarchy of some influential families. If only the "father-son" and the "brother" categories are counted, 25% of the members of the body belonged to seven families.[37] So the Legislative Council consisted of a quite homogeneous group dominated by the traditional patrons, the rich merchant and land-owning families.

But it would be too simplistic to explain this homogeneity just with clientelism. A candidate had to be well off and able to pay for the electoral campaign. It was customary for agents of the candidates to give money in order to secure votes and to hold large feasts in the local coffee shops.[38] The level of education and political skills of the candidates were taken into account by many "free" voters as well. Hardly anybody outside the traditional elites was eligible and wealthy enough to run for a seat in the council.[39] Given that different positions on decisive political questions - as in 1925 - were rare within the Greek Cypriot elite, "free" voters usually had to decide between rivalling persons rather than diverse political programmes. Elaborated political programmes did not make much sense anyway given that nothing could be realised without British approval and assistance. The obvious powerlessness of the Legislative Council contributed also to the low poll. And the lower the poll the higher the likeliness that a candidate's success was determined by his clientele.

After the nationalist revolt of 1931 the British abolished the Legislative Council and no other similar body replaced it until 1959. Therefore, the already limited possibilities for parts of the Greek Cypriot elites to strengthen their position by giving favours via the central administration of the island were completely eradicated.

The Mukhtar

Since Ottoman times the Mukhtar was an elected member of the village who carried out lower administrative duties such as registration of births, deaths, land transfers, lodging of visiting officials, collection of certain taxes and reporting crimes to the police. Mukhtars remained during British rule the representatives of the government on the village level and at the same time they pursued the interests of the village through their contacts with the leading politicians in the cities and the government. Thus, Mukhtars had obligations toward the villagers but at the same time exercised control over them.[40]

Only very few villagers were qualified for the Mukhtar's office. Literacy was required for the performance of his duties. He also would have to be wealthy enough to extend hospitality to visiting governmental officials. Moreover, his job would have to allow him time for his duties as a Mukhtar.

During the first decades of British rule the Mukhtars were elected by the villagers

as had been the case in Ottoman times. In 1923 the British changed the electoral procedure in order to tighten their control over Mukhtars: the villagers selected or elected a list of persons and gave it to the District Councils ("Mejlis Idare") who chose two persons from the list. The elected members of the Legislative Council selected another three out of the proposed candidates. The Governor finally decided who of the five would eventually become the Mukhtar, while the other four became his advisors. This *"odd blend of local election, intermediate and executive selection"*[41] encouraged the development of clientelistic relationships between the notables of the village and members of the Legislative Council, whose support was needed in case a villager sought to become Mukhtar. As the most important Greek newspaper, Eleftheria, commented soon after the new law was implemented in 1923, influence, jobbery and bribery became the acknowledged methods for the selection of the Mukhtars.[42] After the 1931 uprising the Governor changed the system to direct appointment, convinced that many Mukhtars had been disloyal to colonial rule.

A powerful Mukhtar could gain substantial influence and local patron status through his connections within the government, the Legislative Council, and the colonial administration. This enabled him to obtain favours or minor governmental posts for his clients. This local patron position was strengthened by the fact that some Mukhtars were at the same time teachers or brokers. In turn, his influence made him a useful client to potential as well as existing members of the Legislative Council in the constituency to which his village belonged. However, not every Mukhtar managed to become a patron on the local level. To achieve this, a strong personality and sufficient resources were required, as Peter Loizos points out: *"It is likely that only a 'big man' can turn the mukhtar's office into an important patronage position - it is not the case that the office itself inevitably brings much power.*"[43]

The Orthodox Church

The ottomans had accepted and used the Orthodox Church during their rule as the subordinate authority on the island. Therefore, the Church acquired a double function: it represented the Orthodox Cypriots to the Sultan and at the same time it undertook administrative tasks for the colonial power. Among its duties in the ottoman Millet system was the collection of taxes for the rulers. Moreover, during Ottoman rule many peasants had given their land to the Church as pious donations in order to forestall Ottoman expropriations. Together with the Ottoman notables the Orthodox Church became the biggest landowner in Cyprus. In 1925 the various bodies of Orthodox Church owned still 5,3% of the total acreage under cultivation.[44]

At the same time the Church was the leader of the Greek Orthodox people preserving their Hellenic culture and identity. Kyriacos Markides describes the role of the Church under Ottoman rule as follows: *"In the eyes of the Greeks the Church was not only the symbol of their ethnic and religious identities, but also their protector*

against mistreatment by local officials. Thus, the Church under the Turks gained substantial honour and prestige in Cypriot society. As long as the Turks occupied Cyprus, the Church remained the central institutional sphere around which the political, intellectual, and cultural life of Greek Cypriots revolved."[45]

When the British took over, the political life of the island was centred around the competing of prelates and heads of prominent families for influence and posts within the Church. The Archbishop and the Bishops were the only subjects of popular election beyond a local level. Clientelistic networks were used by the big families to ensure support also in Church politics. As Katsiaounis points out, the heads of these networks mainly lived in the cities: *"Localism had been a significant factor in the formulation of political allegiances; in this context the most significant decisions concerning the community were heavily influenced by the powerful Greek notables in Nicosia.*"[46]

Some of the British administrative changes after 1878 offended the clergy. The colonial administration tried to minimise the ethnarchical role of the Church, i.e. being the political and religious leader of the Orthodox Cypriots. The Legislative Council was established, with popularly elected representatives. State support for the collection of the Church dues was no longer granted, as it had been under ottoman rule. In the years after 1878 the income of the Church was reduced to less than one third of what it had been before.[47] The authority of the Bishops on several issues of the community was taken away. The direct and indirect changes within the Greek-Cypriot community caused by British colonialism were perceived as a threat to the power of the Orthodox Church. The clergy also became alienated from the rulers because they realised during the 1920s that the British would not satisfy their nationalist aspirations. As a result, large parts of the clergy became increasingly hostile towards British rule as did parts of the educated upper class.[48]

The strong political and clientelistic power of the Church had several roots. Ideologically, it was based on the ethnarchical concept of being the political and religious leader of the Orthodox Cypriots. Resistance against the will of the Church signified resistance against the representatives of God in a highly religious society such as Cyprus. Moreover, the Orthodox Church was a major economic force as an employer and landowner. With the exception of the state property, it remained the biggest landowner until the end of British rule. The practice of share-cropping, in which the tenant annually rented the land of the Church and shared the harvest with it was widespread. Given the short-term character of the contracts, tenants could easily be pressured by the local or central leadership of the Church to vote for a certain candidate.

The Church also had influence in the Legislative Council, either by supporting candidates or even directly: out of all Christian members of the Legislative Council ever elected, 7,1% were clergymen.[49] The Orthodox Church contributed to the costs

of local education over which it exercised a high degree of influence. It was the stronghold of perpetuating Hellenism and therefore anti-British nationalism. Particularly during the second half of British rule it organised and led the movement for union with Greece.

Together with the Orthodox Church the wealthy traders, brokers and lawyers dominated the internal political life of the Greek Cypriots under British rule by virtue of their economic power and their membership in the Legislative Council. However, their influence was limited compared to that of the Church. They could become heads of regional clientelistic networks but only the Church had the organisational structure, moral authority and enough land to be influential in all parts of the island. On the other hand the political power of the Church was limited by the frequent personal and political rivalries and conflicts between its leading members.

Governor R. Stubbs described in 1933 the political and partly clientelistically structured power of the Church as the leader of the nationalist movement. He also shows the typically self-deluding perception of the British colonialists regarding Greek nationalism as an elite phenomenon with no roots in the population: *"The Church is notoriously the worst landlords. And yet its influence persists [...] Of course, as the largest landlord in the country the Church can bring much pressure to bear its tenants [...] In my opinion, if the Church were removed, Philhel/enism would die out quickly.*

[...]As regards the Church, I think it is a case not of loving Greece but of hating England, because English rule means the gradual termination of the power to the Church."

The British failed to develop the country's political institutions and as a consequence the Orthodox Church retained its ethnarchical role. Its economic power, based on its large property, also remained untouched. The Church continued to be the leader of the nationalist movement during the struggle for enosis under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III in the 1950s.

Education

The British preserved the Ottoman system of separate education for the Greek and the Turkish communities of Cyprus. In 1895 the British supported the expansion of education by creating administrative bodies. Heading the school administration was now the Board of Education comprised of a board for Christians and another for Muslims. The Christian Board consisted of the British Chief Secretary to the Government, who chaired the entire board of education, the Archbishop, three Orthodox members of the Legislative Council and six Greeks, each chosen by one of the six District Committees for Education. The District Committees presided over by the British District Commissioners consisted of the Bishop and four representatives

elected by the Greek inhabitants of the district. On the local level, the people of the towns and villages elected their school committees. The important town committees were chaired by the Bishops of their respective episcopate.[51]

During the first decades of British rule Greek schools were mainly financed by private fees, subscriptions and Church donations. Even though the government also paid annual grants in aid of the primary schools, official financial assistance was not sufficient so the education depended mostly on the Cypriots' own efforts. In 1901 the British gave school committees permission to raise taxes for financing improvements in education.[52]

The Board of Education recommended to the High Commissioner which of the schools in the villages should get British grants in aid.[53] It also decided together with its subsidiary organisations on district, municipal and village level about employment, salaries, promotions and transfers of teachers. Board members, in particular those of the Legislative Council, could make use of the possibilities of their respective bodies to distribute favours and to create patron-client relationships.[54] This was encouraged by the fact that the British education policy was characterised by non- interference. However, the possibilities for Board members to give favours was limited by the role of the British officials in the Board of Education and in the District Committees.

The teacher was an important figure in village politics: According to Surridge, *"he was the party 'boss' in politics and was forced to bow the knee to the local Member of the Legislative Council to whom, not infrequently, he owed his appointment."*[55] Teachers were therefore an important part·of the clientelistic network on the local level. Their career often depended on their political patron.

Education, particularly through those secondary school teachers who were trained in Greece or were mainland Greeks, transmitted the nationalist ideals to the ordinary people. Their loyalty to the nationalist Greek-Cypriot elites was thereby secured. A report of the British colonial administration in 1929 describes the power of the Board and the impact of nationalism in the schools: *"As the Board has complete power over the schools with respect to salaries, appointments, promotions, and all other administrative matters, it is an important body in the life of the Island. [...]. The main criticisms levelled against it are[...]:*

1. The Board of Education has been turned by the local politicians into a political machine. The politicians control the teachers. [...]

2. The schools through the operations of this system are turned into hotbeds of anti-British propaganda. The children of the Island are therefore being brought up on a curriculum which may in future have serious political effects if nothing is done to check it."[56]

A further pursuit of a laissez-faire policy in education could in the long run

endanger British rule. Moreover, this system encouraged the development of clientelistic networks. In 1929 Governor Ronald Storrs finally put an end to it: *"The method of appointing, transferring and dismissing teachers, male and female, by the Greek Members of Council was open to grave objections. The politicians too often exercised their power for political or petty personal aims. The teacher was usually the only educated man in the village; as a political agent he was therefore almost indispensable to the politicians, who were exclusively town-dwellers. Being dependent upon the politicians for advancement in his profession he had to serve the political purposes of his masters. This system was bad, but had been tolerated, partly because the Government had lacked the financial means to pay the teachers itself."*[57] Storrs handed over the authority to make decisions about appointments, promotions, transfers and salaries of elementary teachers from the educational boards to government officials.[58] After 1929 the possibilities of creating patron-client relationships on the primary school level came under the exclusive control of the British administration.

After the 1931 uprising the British made an attempt to fight nationalist education in the schools. In all primary schools the subject of Greek history was removed from the curriculum and English language lessons were obligatory. The Orthodox Church as the guardian of Hellenistic culture and many Greek Cypriots regarded this as an attack against their national identity. But the British measure had to fail for financial reasons. With the exception of small governmental grants in aid, the British were neither able nor willing to cover the expenditures of secondary schools and pay the salaries of the teachers. The urban secondary schools were able to raise substantial fees from their students, so in their majority they remained financially and politically independent of the British authorities despite tighter control during their dictatorial rule between 1931 and 1940. Thus, secondary education was mostly influenced by the mainland Greek Ministry of Education. The curriculum was the same as that of Greece and nationalism was reinforced by mainland Greek teachers.[59]

The Decline of Traditional Forms of Clientelism - the Rise of Mass Politics

The End of the Money-Lending System

Changes caused by two conflicts weakened the merchant-moneylender networks in a long process starting in the 1920s. The merchants and moneylenders were part of the Greek elites who came into conflict with the colonial government about *enosis.* The other conflict arose between the Greek elites and the developing agricultural and working class movements partly led by the newly founded Communist Party of Cyprus.

In 1917 the British administration appointed a commission of enquiry for the problem of rural indebtedness. They decided to enact laws in 1919 which apart from

their apparent usefulness in reducing indebtedness were aimed at the indirect reduction of the political power of the money-lending members of the nationalist Greek elites. The maximum interest rates for credits was limited to 12% by law. It was now also possible to challenge excessive interest rates in court. Merchants were obliged to keep records about their financial transactions, including debts, credits and bonds under the supervision of a Court officer. The forced sale of a rural debtor's property was limited - enough land had to be left to him to support himself and his family.[60]

In reality the laws of 1919 proved to be counterproductive, as the governmental survey edited by 8. J. Surridge in 1929 reports: *"The immediate result of the 1919 Laws was restriction of credit which in its turn led to the selling up by creditors of the immovable property of their debtors, an increase in the number of landless peasants and a general lowering of commercial morality".*[61] The farmers still had no alternative or better sources of credit. Therefore, they could risk the hostility of their only financial source by taking their creditors to court. Consequently the situation of the indebted peasant had worsened since 1919.

When the enosis movement became more active in the 1920s the British started to take serious measures against the potential danger for their rule from the political and economic dependency of the peasants on the moneylenders. In the British perception the peasants were misguided by the nationalist elites and once the influence of the elites on the peasants could be reduced, they would only care about their everyday life and not about politics.[62] Therefore, the British now seriously tried to set up agricultural village co-operatives and credit societies in order to weaken the dependency of the peasants and to increase productivity. Their first attempt in this direction had been the "Co-operative Credit Societies Law" in 1914, allowing villages to set up their own credit societies, giving their members long term credits at reasonable interest rates.[63] But the number and importance of co-operative credit societies remained on a very low level due to the lack of governmental financial support until 1925, when finally the British, following popular demand, set up an Agricultural Bank.[64] The political aim was to break the influence of moneylenders by giving reasonable long term loans at an interest rate of 4% to the co-operative credit societies. From the economic perspective rural indebtedness was also regarded as the main source of widespread peasant apathy while an increase of productivity was important to the British. In the early years however, the money the co-operative societies borrowed from the Agricultural Bank was used not so much for co-operative purposes but for the payment of old loans to moneylenders.[65]

Nevertheless the co-operative societies slowly began to undermine the dominance of the moneylenders and brokers in the agricultural market by starting to sell their products themselves. In addition, the British at long last transferred the main tax burden away from the peasants to the traders: in 1926 they abolished the

cereal tithes and imposed higher taxes on imports and exports instead.[66]

After 1925 the number of co-operative societies increased rapidly: while in 1925 only 29 co-operative credit societies existed, there were 318 by 1929.[67] But according to a British memorandum, in 1929 still 80% of the peasants were indebted to moneylenders.[68] The British measures could not destroy the merchant-moneylender system yet, but they could reduce its influence by breaking the money-lending and product-selling monopoly of the brokers and merchants. While before most farmers were indebted to a private moneylender, they could now get money for long-term credits at reasonable interest rates from other sources as well such as the credit society or the local bank.[69]

The anti-clientelistic aims of the British measures and their limitations were summed up in a report of the colonial administration in 1929: *"The power of the usurer will inevitably continue, but not to the extent of enabling him to dictate the choice of the voter [...]. His power however is already in the process of abatement owing to the operations of the Agricultural Bank and the co-operative Credit Societies and in several cases moneylenders have recently found it necessary to reduce their rate of interest in order to retain their business."*[70]

But the British reforms were not comprehensive yet. Given that the Agricultural Bank lent money to the co-operative societies only for long term loans there were no funds for short term loans. Therefore, even members of the co-operative societies who had managed to transfer their debts to the Agricultural Bank fell back into the hands of moneylenders. During the 1930-1933 economic depression the repaying capacity of members was considerably reduced as they were pressed for the repayment of their debts by both the Agricultural Bank and the moneylenders. Again many farmers lost their land.[71]

A new phase in the history of the co-operative societies started with their reorganisation in 1935. A British "Registrar of Co-operative Societies"[72] was appointed and a Department of Co-operation was introduced. The aim was to promote the co-operative idea and to monitor the existing co-operative societies. They soon managed to increase the spreading and effectiveness of the co-operatives:[73] while in 1934 16.000 peasants were members of co-operatives, their number had almost doubled in 1942: about 29.000 peasants organised themselves in 362 co-operative societies. In 1954 759 co-operative societies existed with a membership of 131.604 i.e. almost all peasants were members of co-operative societies.[74] the 445 credit societies with 74.772 members in 1954 there were 210 consumer or store societies which distributed the products of the co-operative societies (before 1945 only 18 co-operative retail stores existed), 29 Savings Banks, 29 producers' marketing and processing co-operatives and various other specialised co-operatives.

The inability of the Agricultural Bank and the co-operative credit societies to

provide the peasants with short term loans led in 1937 to the establishment of the Co-operative Central Bank. A few years later medium-term credits were also given. The Bank was financed by deposits from co-operative societies and the British Barclays Bank.

Apart from increasing agricultural productivity and improving the living standard of the rural population, the various reforms aimed also at taking the sources of economic and political influence away from the moneylenders. But although the financial situation of the Cypriot peasant continuously improved from 1936 onwards, in 1940 low peasant productivity was still the result of high debts and the low prospects of paying them off: *"The mass of long-term debt owed to money-lenders constitutes the most serious burden on the country {...] that since the loans often included no provision tor repayment, the usurer looked on them as an investment and the client remained as heavily indebted as ever after years of work, consequently, it was only natural that peasants lacked interest in improving productivity."*[75]

The old network created out of friendship and economic dependency led by the traditional elites still controlled the majority of the rural society.[76] In 1940 the British finally decided to attack the core of the problem. The agricultural commission created in 1940 a "Debt Settlement Board" and "Rural Debtors Courts" to enforce the process of alleviating the burden of peasant indebtedness by enforcing fairer interest rates on their old debts. Some debts were discounted by 30% and the period of repayment was limited to a maximum of 15 years in annual instalments. Debts due to the Government, the co-operative societies and the Agricultural Bank remained untouched. The whole burden of debt reduction had been borne by the private creditor without any compensation from the state.[77] According to Attalides, some of the brokers and moneylenders lost so much money that they went out of business.[78]

During the five years of its existence the Debt Settlement Board helped about a third of all peasants to reduce their debts. The rates of interest on any debt or obligation contracted after 1944 were now finally fixed on a maximum of 9%, signalling the end of usury. In addition, a strong increase in the prices of agricultural products as well as inflationary tendencies during the Second World War enabled many peasants to repay their debts.[79]

After 1945 the trend towards debt reduction was reversed and rural debts increased rapidly again. But this time for different reasons: debts were mainly caused by the purchase of agricultural machinery and water pumps during the post-war years, when those goods were available again. Agricultural land previously obtained by moneylenders through foreclosure, was in the majority of cases purchased back by the farmers during the post-war years. High peasant indebtedness was now a sign of improved standard of living. It also reflected the confidence of the farmers in the continuation of the agricultural boom of the war years. But since many peasants

became excessively indebted they soon had to face serious problems again. Given that money was now lent mainly by co-operative credit societies and the Agricultural or Co-operative Central Bank dependency on private moneylenders was not renewed on a large sale.

In a 1955 report on rural welfare the Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W. G. Alexander, describes the success of the British policy in fighting moneylenders through the co-operative movement: *"The moneylenders have definitely lost their strong hold over the villages and some of them left the village or changed occupation and deposited their surplus money with the co-operative movement. They have been replaced by the co-operative societies which enabled the farmers to obtain credit on reasonable terms. (...) The farmer unlike the old days, was freed from all sorts of exploitation."*[80]

The success of the co-operative movement and the British measures to reduce peasant indebtedness and economic dependency finally destroyed most of the money-lending and broker networks. Moneylenders and usury continued to exist but after 1940 their influence declined rapidly. Merchants and moneylenders were no longer strong enough to create politically decisive clientelistic networks on a broader scale. Ideologically based loyalty and other forms of patron-client relationships had to replace economic dependency in order for the elite to maintain its leading role in the community.

The Rise of Communism

After 1878 several rural crises led to waves of expropriations and increased social problems. In particular after the First World War, when the prices of agricultural products dropped, many indebted peasants lost their land to usurers. Many of the expropriated peasants became part of the local labour market, seeking jobs in the new and fast growing mining industry while others emigrated. When the war ended large parts of the lower strata desired a policy that would solve the social problems and put an end to colonial rule. However, most members of the traditional leadership refused to demand substantial social reforms which would have damaged their own interests. This caused tension between the elites and the mass of the poor peasants. But the Greek community, including the lower strata, remained closed around their traditional leadership, because of the possibility that a post-war settlement would lead to enosis. When the elite-controlled nationalist movement became stronger after the First World War, demanding enosis but no social reforms, an increasing number of people realised that they could not expect much help from their leaders in fighting the social problems of the island.

Therefore, in the early 1920s the Greek labour class - poorer peasants, share croppers, artisans, miners and other wage earners - started to organise itself by

founding trade unions.81 Following several unsuccessful attempts to create a communist movement in Cyprus in the early 1920s, some bourgeois intellectuals founded in 1924 a club for workers in Limassol. They soon attracted workers and farmers' unions around Limassol. The club published a newspaper under the name "Neos Anthropos" (New Man), which called itself the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Cyprus. In August 1926, 20 Cypriot Communists formally established the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK= Kommounistikon Komma Kyprou).[83]

The social base of the early communist movement led by bourgeois intellectuals was the politically and economically unsatisfied workers and peasants. The aim was to organise them in trade unions. In the following years the KKK established itself as a political force in Cyprus by organising several successful strikes and gaining supporters.

They were opposed to the Greek Cypriot elites as well as to British colonial rule, whom they blamed for poor social conditions. The atheist,[84] anti-capitalist and revolutionary ideology was a threat to the Church and the privileged groups. The conflict between the communists and the Greek Cypriot elites was used by the British in their effort to apply the method of 'divide and rule' within the Greek society.[85]

Until 1929 the KKK policy favoured unspecified autonomy for Cyprus. It tried to unite the Greek and Turkish communities against British rule, neither excluding nor supporting enosis. In the ensuing years it followed in the question of enosis a see-saw policy between the demand for union with Greece and Cypriot autonomy. The communist party in Cyprus remained during large parts of British rule mainly a Greek Cypriot party, accused of being "not Greek", when it did not pursue enosis. Their policy was strongly influenced by the Communist Party of Greece and the Comintern but also by events such as the revolt of 1931.[86]

In 1929 the KKK started a campaign against the nationalist Church and the bourgeoisie, supporting the establishment of a socialist republic in Cyprus. Two years later, in 1931, the communists took part in the anti-British uprising and their leaders strongly supported enosis.[87] As a consequence of the revolt the KKK and the trade unions were proscribed in 1931. But despite their proscription it was the communists who organised and controlled the trade unions after their legalisation in 1936.[88]

The Second World War brought about major changes which had an important effect on the socio-economic development of Cyprus. A pre-war population increase and the war itself led to a rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. The economic growth caused social changes: Before 1945-46 most people worked in the agricultural sector. Until 1931 the number of town-dwellers remained about the same (in 1881 17%, in 1931 19% of the population). From 1945 to 1960 the urban population increased by 80%.[89] Now an urban working class emerged and

membership in trade unions organised by the communists went up from 2.544 in 1939 to 12.961 in 1945.[90]

Although the communists always enjoyed greater support in the cities, their power increased in the more conservative and traditional rural areas as well. After the legalisation of parties in 1941 a new left - but originally not communist - party AKEL (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou = Progressive Party of the Working People) was founded, which was turned within half a year into a Leninist party. AKEL coexisted with the old, more orthodox KKK, which was absorbed by the new party three years later. In 1943 the strength of the communist movement became evident in the first municipal elections after the 1931 revolt. The communists won the majority of seats in Famagusta and Limassol and the mayors of both cities were members of AKEL. Even greater was communist success in the municipal elections of 1946: AKEL candidates became mayors of the four biggest cities in Cyprus (Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca). The communist party had been the only political party which supported social and economic reforms convincingly. Communism was therefore bound to become a mass movement. After the Second World War it became the strongest communist party outside a socialist country.

The grass roots of communism in Cyprus were the trade unions and in particular their umbrella organisation PSE (Pankypria Syntechniaki Epitropi = Pan-Cyprian Committee of Workers), founded in 1941.[91] The farmers' associations organised by the leftists also gained strong influence in the agricultural co-operative movement.[92]

The political right founded its own trade unions and farmers' associations in an attempt to counterbalance communist strength. Left and right wing farmers' associations organised collective sales in the post war years, thereby facilitating the reduction of economic dependency of peasants on single merchants and therefore potential patrons.

Gradually, political loyalty of many workers and peasants was not so much connected by personal connection with a patron but by their direct affiliation with the left or right political camp instead. Attalides sums up the result as follows: *"Social changes during the war made possible horizontal peasant coalitions. The struggle between groupsel/ing schemes and merchants indicates an attempt by peasant producers to alter their articulation with the market. In this they were helped by the fact that AKEL existed as a national party with a strong base in the urban areas. They were also helped by the fact that as a counter to Communist influence the Church also promoted the creation of peasant associations. These conflicts resulted in the increasing separating of individual economic linkage and political control."*[93]

This development affected the clientelistic structures decisively. The British administrative changes after 1925 and the rise of the communist movement contributed significantly to the breakdown of the economic basis for patron-client relationships built on money-lending and the monopoly on selling and distributing the

clients' products. Money-lending continued to exist. But as a source of political dependency its influence was not comparable to the pre Second World War years.

With the exception of the municipalities, the communists - like the political right - remained excluded from administrative power and could not distribute much rousfeti until the end of British rule. But within the trade unions, farmers' associations and, after 1943, on the municipal level, communist leaders could give favours and offer posts to their supporters. Furthermore, higher education in socialist countries granted to members of AKEL ensured their loyalty. Communist support was therefore based on both political conviction and the new form of party patronage.

Nationalism as a Source of Loyalty

British rule brought social, political and economic changes in the direction of a modern, capitalist and secular society. These changes posed a threat to the power of the old ruling elites and the Orthodox Church. Their traditional ways of ensuring power and loyalty through economic dependency and clientelism gradually weakened. The reinforcement of nationalism in the Greek community from the 1920s onwards - mainly through education and the Church - was therefore also used by the Greek elites as an alternative source of political loyalty to economic dependency. Consequently, it also became a means to fight the growing communist movement. This dual function of nationalism soon made it the most important linkage between the elites and the ordinary people.[94] But despite the political and socio-economic changes some of the old patron-client relationships were still present in the 1950s: *"Patron-client ties reminiscent of the period of unchallenged brokerage co-existed with ideological appeals from right-wing nationalist and left-wing parties, each claiming to represent the interests of the producers."*[95]

With the exception of a brief period after the 1922 Greek defeat in Asia Minor, nationalism in Cyprus had been increasing rapidly since the end of the First World War, when the long desired union with Greece seemed possible in the context of a post-war settlement. The need to promote and organise the demand for *enosis* led in 1921 to the foundation of the "Political Organisation of Cyprus" by the Greek Orthodox Church and parts of the Greek-Cypriot elites.

The Political Organisation created a network that covered the whole island. This network was comprised of the National Council, Executive Committee, District and Municipal committees. The National Council was the highest committee of the Political Organisation. It consisted of 46 persons: the Archbishop, the metropolis of Paphos, Kition, Kyrenia and the abbot of Kykko monastery were ex-officio members. One member was elected by the primary and secondary schoolteachers. The other 40 were elected indirectly in six voting districts by representatives of the residents of each parish. Every Greek Cypriot over 21 had the right to vote and every Greek over

25 was eligible. The National Council considered itself the representative of the entire Greek community in the effort to achieve union with Greece: *"The National Council represents the Greek people of Cyprus in all matters generally concerning the promotion of the purposes of the Political Organisation, has the Political and Financial Management of the Cyprus Struggle..."*[96] The Executive Committee consisted of five members, announced annually by the National Council. Its duties were to carry out the Council's decisions, transmit them to the District Committees and to control the finances. The six District Committees consisted of the local Bishop, the abbots of the monasteries of the district, the local members of the National Council and the Greek mayors of the cities and bigger villages of the district. The president of the teachers' association of the district and the editors of the Greek newspapers who lived there also had a seat. The committees were always chaired by the Bishop. On the municipal level, the local priest, the members of the school committees and the teachers of the area formed the committee.[97]

The dominance of the Church in the National Council, the District and Municipal Committees is striking. On all levels the people of influence and prestige, potential and real patrons, were members of the committees. The Political Organisation of Cyprus was therefore the umbrella organisation linking the nationalist elites and the Church in their struggle for *enosis.*

The National Council followed a policy of non co-operation with the government achieving an almost complete abstention of the electorate from the elections for the Legislative Council in 1922 and 1923. But soon conflicts within the body resulted in a significant loss of its prestige. In the following years the activities of the National Council were limited to the level of speeches and proclamations.[98] Moreover, the immediate improvement of the economic conditions of the lower class was not on the agenda of the elite-controlled Political Organisation, as Katsiaounis points out: *"The leaders of the National Council offered no outlet to the distress of rural smallholders and the labouring strata in the towns. To the mass of the population this was the cardinal weakness of the National Council."* In the perspective of National Council it was the achievement of enosis that would pave the way for social, economic and political reforms.

The National Council ensured by its influence and clientelistic power, that most successful candidates in the elections of 1925 and 1930 were also members of the body.[100] By the end of the 1920s the prestige of the National Council was re-established. In 1931 its influence was described by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs as follows: *"The National Organisation appears to bear the same relationship to the Greek elected Members as does the Third International to the Soviet Government, that is to say they play into each other's hands and into those of the Church, while the organisations shoulders responsibility for utterances and actions too overtly hostile to the Government to be publicly reconcilable even with that minimum of co-*

operation conceded by the Legislative Council.'[101]

But in autumn 1931 old as well as new conflicts and rivalries paralysed the body again. On 17 October, one day before the outbreak of the 1931 revolt, it finally dissolved.[102] The nationalist riots of 1931 proved that despite the failure of the Political Organisation the attempt of the nationalist elites to instil the desire for enosis to the ordinary people had been successful. Conversely, the British attempts in the 1920s to detach the "apolitical" masses from the nationalist Greek Cypriot elites proved to be a complete failure. In 1931 the British had to learn that their perception of nationalism as purely an elite phenomenon in the 1920s had been wrong. The people followed the Church and the nationalist elites against the British rulers under the slogan of *enosis.* In fact, the masses mobilised themselves to such a degree that the violence that occurred was largely against the caution of their leaders, who - with the exception of the electoral boycott in 1922/23 - had always been moderate in their choice of means.

The nationalist movement gradually succeeded in its effort to make the desire for enosis indistinguishable from "being Greek" for most Orthodox Cypriots including the communists.[103] After 1931 any Greek Cypriot who was opposed to enosis denied automatically his Greek identity. Particularly in the years after 1945, when the Greek Cypriots legitimately expected that their national aspirations would be respected by the colonial power as it was the case in other parts of their empire, British intransigence reinforced the nationalist feelings of many Greek Cypriots. Nationalist ideology had become a new strong link between the elites and the rest of the Greek Cypriot population.

New Potential Sources of Clientelism after 1941

Political Parties

The process of forming a party system in Cyprus in the 1920s was stopped by the British as a consequence of the revolt of 1931. The communist-dominated trade unions and co-operative societies remained the only important organisations under the control of Cypriots until 1941. Not only were these new organisations of labourers and farmers independent of traditional clientelistic relationships but they also contributed decisively to their dissolution.

To secure maximum Cypriot support in the Second World War, the British liberalised the dictatorial rule they had imposed on the island since the 1931 revolt. In 1941 they reinstated some basic freedoms including party formation. To counter the influence of the left party AKEL, the political right founded the KEK (Kypriakon Ethnikon Komma :::: Cypriot National Party) which was based on the idea of *enosis* and enjoyed the support of the traditional elites.

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Parties were now allowed to take part in municipal elections. Ideological polarisation and the universal suffrage for men led to the rise of mass politics. The large electorate could no longer be bound by the traditional clientelistic relationships, which had become insignificant due to the British measures anyway. With the exception of sectors of municipal politics, the parties had no possibility to distribute favours on an administrative level. Favours could only be given within the trade unions and farmers' organisations or, in the case of AKEL, by granting education to party members in socialist countries. Therefore, the size of the electorate, on the one hand, and the limited access of the parties to the administration, on the other, prevented them from creating clientelistic relationships on a large scale. Ideological conviction became the most important means to ensure political support which could not be gained by party patronage alone.

EOKA

After 1955 the Church-led nationalist demand for *enosis* culminated in the violent struggle of an underground organisation, EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston = National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) against British rule. During the anti-colonial struggle EOKA created a new powerful network, based both on the widely accepted idea that its members were the only "true" fighters for *enosis* and the use of force against those who did not share its views or did not respect its authority. Despite the fact that most of the young EOKA fighters had not been part of the elites,[105] they quickly gained political influence. They often replaced the old elites as power-holders on the local level as Attalides describes: *"The young men who had joined EOKA acquired the power to assert themselves over all the forces which were locally competing for power before their appearance. But at the opening stage of the anti-colonial campaign it was free-floating power and not attached to social institutions other than the organisation of violence and the legitimisation of the nationalist ideology."*[106] At the same time the right wing organisation, EOKA, also turned against AKEL which by supporting enosis only through peaceful means lost influence over the lower strata.

Many "homines novi" emerged from the EOKA struggle as powerful political figures. Those nationalist EOKA veterans enjoyed the support of many Greek Cypriots who prior to the liberation struggle had been loyal to the traditional elites. Ironically, by challenging the traditional elites and their social power, nationalism undermined the position of those who had led the struggle for *enosis* also to preserve their position as leaders of the Greek community. After 1959 new clientelistic networks developed around those EOKA veterans who became an important part of the new political elite in the transitional government and, after 1960, in the independent Republic of Cyprus.[107]

Summary and Conclusions

As soon as the British took over the administration of the island in 1878 they formed a new political system introducing Western European institutions and values into the political culture of Cyprus such as the eradication of administrative corruption and arbitrariness and the establishment of an equitable justice system. These measures, although initially introduced to ensure efficiency, were at the same time hostile to the existing clientelistic structures.

In the British administrative system there were only a few prestigious offices accessible through elections and usable for distributing favours. The most important office until 1931 was membership in the Legislative Council. But with the exception of teachers and Mukhtars, relatively few people owed their job, promotion or other favours to members of this body. Although the Legislative Council was the only political institution which could have enabled its Greek Cypriot members to develop islandwide clientelistic networks, its limited resources and strict British control made that practically impossible. Therefore, most of the patron-client relationships under British rule were built outside the administration mainly on economic dependency on a local or regional level.

In the 1920s the British started to regard nationalist tendencies among the Greek elites as a threat to their rule. By introducing different political and economic reforms, the colonial rulers tried to cut off clientelistic links between the nationalist elites and the rural masses, whom they considered apolitical and misguided. The limited possibilities of the Greek elites to distribute favours in the administration were finally taken away from them. Moreover, on the economic level the British fought the dependency of the peasants on merchants and moneylenders. Their measures gradually led to the destruction of the traditional clientelistic networks. However much to the displeasure of the British, the economic and therefore also political liberation of the peasants could not prevent enosis-nationalism from becoming rooted in the Greek Cypriot community.

During the dictatorial period between 1931 and 1941 no political parties existed and no elections were held. This made the use of clientelistic networks impossible. In 1941, when a party system was established, the increasing importance of communist and nationalist ideology became evident. Conviction and to a lesser extent the new clientelistic form of party patronage had replaced traditional forms of clientelism as the main source of political loyalty.

British policy had unintentionally prepared the ground for the rise of communism and a nationalist movement leading to the EOKA struggle. Both AKEL and, ironically, also EOKA were hostile to the surviving clientelistic structures. After 1959 new political leaders emerged from the EOKA struggle some of whom were not part of the old elite. By the end of British rule clientelism was no longer the decisive means to ensure political support. After independence it re-emerged initially around the new

powerholders most of whom were former EOKA fighters. The ensuing establishment of a party system led to the formation of clientelistic relationships based on party patronage. However, clientelism never shaped the political culture of Cyprus as decisively as that of Greece.

The institutions and values established by the 82-year British rule have limited the extent of clientelism until today. The newly founded Cypriot state retained almost unchanged the British administrative system. However, traditional clientelistic patterns such as favouritism and nepotism as well as political party patronage are also prevalent in the small and closed Cypriot society. These features continue to coexist with the British values of non-corruption, meritocracy and efficiency in shaping the political culture of modern Cyprus.

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NOTES

1.Choisi, J. (1993) *Wurzeln and Strukturen des Zypernkonfliktes 1878 bis 1990.*

Ideologischer Nationalismus und Machtbehauptung im Kalkül konkurrierender Eliten. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, pp. 48-49.

2.   Legg, K.R. (1969) *Politics in Modern Greece.* Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 38-39. Legg describes the clientelistic system of Greece, which in terms of the internal structure of the relationship was the same as that of Cyprus.

3.   Lande, C.H. (1977) 'The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism', in Schmidt, S. (ed) *Friends, Followers and Factions.* London, p. **XIV.**

4.   In Greece a patron was often the godfather of hundreds of people. This ensured their loyalty as long as he fulfilled his commitments.

5.   Almond, G.A. and Bingham Powell Jr. G. (1966) *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach.* Boston Little, quoted from: Legg, Modern Greece, p. 33.

6.   Lemerchand, R. and Legg, K. (1972) 'Political Clientelism and Development', in *Comparative Politics.* No. 4, p. 149.

7.   Richter, H.A. (1996) 'The Political Culture of Cyprus', in Charalambous, J. Serafis, M. and Timini, E. (eds.) *Cyprus and the European Union: a Challenge.* London, University of London Press, pp. 104-105.

8.   Legg, *Modern Greece,* p. 34.

9.   Richter, *Political Culture,* p. 105.

10.   Katsiaounis, R. (1995) 'Social and Political Change in Cyprus: 1878-1924', in *Epetiris tou Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, XX/.* Nicosia, p. 223.

11.   There are authors who have dealt extensively with clientelism in Cyprus during British rule: Michael Attalidis, Jeanette Choisi, Rolandos Katsiaounis, Peter Loizos and Heinz Ricther.

12.   Georghallides, G.S. (1979) *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926, with a Survey of the Foundations of British Rule.* Nicosia, Zavallis, p. 37.

13.   Christodoulou sums up information on rural indebtedness during British rule. Rural debts were estimated around the end of the nineteenth century at £150.000, Surridge put it at the end of the 1920's at £1.800.000, Oakden in the mid-1930s at £2.000.000 and Lanitis in 1940 at £2.329.000. Christodoulou, D. (1959) *The Evolution of the Rural Land Use Pattern in Cyprus.* London, Taylor & Co., p. 92.

14.   Storrs, R. (1939) *Orientations.* London, Nicholson & Watson, p. 491. The colonial survey was conducted for the whole island in 1927-28 and prepared by the Commissioner of Larnaca, B.J. Surridge. According to the survey out of the 59.175 peasants in Cyprus 48.513 (or 82%) were indebted. The lower the estimated value of property the higher the percentage of debtors became. Out of the mass of small and smaller landowners around 85% were indebted. Their average debt was £10 for

property of estimated value lower than £50 (14.177 debtors), £19 for property between £50 and £100 (8.468 debtors and 27 for property between £100 and £150 (6.262 debtors). According to Hill, the average annual per capita income was £10 in 1927. It is evident that most small landowners were heavily indebted and that their financial strain made it very difficult for them to pay off their debts. Hill, Sir G. (1972) *A History of Cyprus.* Vol. IV.: *The Ottoman Province, The British Colony 1571-1948.* Cambridge, University Press, p. 459.

Around 80% of the bigger landowners were also indebted. The average debt was £36 for property valued between £150 and £200 (6.032 debtors or 81%); £48 for property between £200 and £300 (5.424 debtors or 79%) and £69 for property between £300 and £400 (4.009 debtors or 80%). Even 74% of the big landowners with property worth more than £400 (4.141 debtors) had average debts of £125. Surridge, B. J. (1930) *A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus.* Nicosia, Government Printing Office, p. 37.

Lanitis compared average indebtedness with the estimated value of the peasants' property. For the two lower categories average indebtedness was 33% (estimated value of property up to £50) and 25% (estimated value of property up to £100). Indebtedness of landowners in the remaining higher categories was considerably lower (between 19 and 21%). The real debt burden for the small and smaller landowners was even higher, given that the same amount of money possesses a relatively higher value for poor than for wealthy people. Lanitis, N.C. (1944) *Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus.* Limassol, pp. 26-27.

15. Attalides, M.A. (1977) 'Forms of Peasant Incorporation in Cyprus during the Last Century', in Gellner, E. and Waterbury, J . (eds.) *Patrons and Clients.* London, Duckworth, p. 141.

16. Lanitis, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

17. According to the General Survey, out of the 4.175.324 donums of alienated land 222.296 donums were owned by the Orthodox Church. Christodoulou, *op.cit.* p.74.

In the last years of British rule about 16% of the cultivated land was leased to small farmers. According to the Annual Report for Cyprus in 1959, 5% of the agricultural land was on short leases (1 or 2 years), 5% for longer terms and 6% was share cropped. Colonial Office (ed.) (1960) *Report for the Year 1959.* London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, p. 31. According to Christodoulou, sharecropping was much more common before the abolition of the tithe by the British in 1926, for it enabled a precise estimate of the entire crop. Christodoulou, *op. cit.,* p. 83.

18. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

19. Attalides assumes that the motive was Western secularism. Furthermore, it seems a fair assumption that it was not in the British interest to use a powerful institution such as the church, which was hard to control and whose support was strengthened through religious loyalty, as a representative of the Orthodox Cypriots. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 139.

20. Between 1878 and 1883 all the members of the Legislative Council were nominated directly by the High Commissioner, from 1883 until its abolition in 1931 they were elected. Dischler, L. (1960) *Die Zypernfrage.* Dokumente XXXIII. Frankfurt/M. Alfred Metzner, p. 11.

21. Due to the Anglo-Turkish ratification of the Treaty of Lausame, Cyprus became a British Crown colony and so the title of the highest British official changed from High Commissioner to Governor in 1925.

22. There were three classes of *verghis:* a tax of 4 per 1.000 on the registered value of land, houses and other immovable property, a tax of 4% on the rent of all property not occupied by its owner and a tax of 3% on trade profits and salaries. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* p. 25.

23. Katsiaounis, R. (1996) *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century.* Nicosia, Cyprus Research Center, p. 85.

24. Ibid., p. 86. By 1906 still little more than 20.000 out of a population of 235.000 had the right to vote. Loizos, P. (1975) *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 31.

25. Larnaca-Famagusta, Nicosia-Kyrenia and Limassol-Paphos.

26. Some examples out of the year 1883: The polling station of Limassol served 56 villages. Lefka was the polling station for villages in a very remote area. Katsianounis, Social Change, p. 228.

27. SAI/3829. Merton King, Commissioner of Nicosia to Falk Warren, Chief Secretary, on 8 November 1886.

28. CO 67/165. The Commissioner of Kyrenia W. N. Bolton to Charles Orr, Chief Secretary, on the 5 January 1912.

29. CO 67/210. Stevenson to Devonshire on the 24 October 1923.

30. See notes 33 and 39 for the boycott policy of the National Council and the composition of the Legislative council from 1921/22 to 1925.

31. Six were lawyers (S. Stavrinakis, G. Hadji Pavlou, K. P. Rossides, P. L. Cacoyiannis, S. Pavlides, P. Ioannides), two merchants (C. Fieros, L. Pierides) and one, N. Mylonas, was the Bishop of Kition. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* pp. 433-452 (Biographical Notes).

32. Georghallides, G.S. (1985) *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs. The Causes of the 1931 Crisis.* Nicosia, Zavallis, pp. 380-381.

33. Eight members of the Legislative Council between 1922 and 1925 were not included in most parts of the survey for several reasons. Two of them were Maronite church officials who were elected as non-Muslim members during the Greek Cypriot boycott of the 1922 elections. Out of the seven Greek Members, picked by the government to fill the empty seats in 1923, six were excluded too, due to massive abstention from their election and its exceptional conditions. Lyssiotis regards it as improper to include the six in the political class studied. Only pne of the seven, who was re-elected in "regular" elections was included in the survey. Lyssiotis, M. (1990) 'An Analysis of the Cyprus Legislative Council', in *The Cyprus Review,* Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 57.

34. Lawyers were usually the sons of big landowners or merchants, because only they could afford to give their children a university education abroad. Many of them depended on moneylenders, whom they represented in trials against insolvent peasants. They were also hired to threaten debtors that they would take legal action against them if they were late in paying off their debts. Choisi, *Wurzeln,* p. 108.

35. Out of the 30 lawyers seven were big landowners and/or merchants, two owned a factory and one was a bank manager. From the 11 merchants six were big landowners and/or lawyers. Lyssiotis, *op.cit.,* pp. 62-64.

36. Ibid., p. 64.

37. Ibid., pp. 59-66.

38. Loizos, *Greek Gift,* p. 35. Storrs reports that in 1930 election expenses of some members exceeded (illegally) £4.000. Storrs, *op. cit.,* p. 527.

39. The bad impression seven members of the Legislative Council (called therefore *"heptadics")* left in the collective memory of the Greek Cypriots until today, proves this: In 1921 the traditional nationalist leadership had successfully organised a boycott of the 1922 elections for the Legislative Council. Defying their leadership some hardly literate Cypriots finally ran and were elected in 1923, despite the small number of votes they got. These seven members were completely overtaxed with their duties in the Legislative Council and had hardly anything constructive to say in the lawmaking process. Katsiaounis, Social Change, pp. 248-249 and Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* p. 240.

40. Loizos, P. (1977) 'Politics and Patronage in a Cypriot Village, 1920-1970', in Gellner, E. and Waterbury J. (eds.) *Patrons and Clients.* London, Duckworth, p. 122.

41. Ibid., p. 122.

42. *Elefteria,* 19 September 1923, quoted from Georghallides, *Political and*

Administrative History, p. 291.

43. Loizos, *Politics,* p. 123.

44. Christodoulou, op. cit., p. 74.

45. Markides, K.C. (1977) *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic.* New Haven and London, Yale University, p. 5.

46. Katsiaounis, *Social Change,* p. 224.

47. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* p. 61.

48. Katsiaounis, *Social Change,* p. 227.

49. Lyssiotis, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

50. CO 67/254/4. British Governor R. Stubbs in a memoradnum from the 16 October 1933.

51. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* pp. 49-50. 52. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

53. Loizos, *Politics,* p. 119.

54. Choisi, *Wurzeln,* p. 119.

55. Surridge, *op. cit.,* p. 20.

56. CO 67/232/1. Memorandum of the Advisory Committee on Education in Cyprus in 1929.

57. Storrs, *op. cit.,* pp. 521-522.

58. The process of submitting elementary education to full government control had already begun with the Greek education law of 1923. Still in 1929 the continuous abuse of power by the Board of Education was criticised even by parts of the Greek elites. Consequently, three Greek members of the Legislative Council voted in 1929 in favour of legal changes. As a result none of these three "traitors" was able to run in the 1930 elections. Ibid., p. 522.

59. Choisi, Wurzeln, p. 123.

60. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* pp. 178-182.

61. Surridge, *op. cit.,* p. 46.

62. Governor Ronald Storrs suggested unsuccessfully to the Colonial Office in 1929 that three quarters of the Legislative Council should by law be engaged in agriculture and money lenders should be indelible. Storrs, *op. cit.,* p. 521.

63. The co-operative movement in Cyprus began in 1909 in Lefkonico village with

the establishment of a "Village Bank". Its foundation was initiated by a village school teacher who had visited Germany and happened to hear about the "Raifeisen" system. In 1917 the Village Bank was converted into a Co-operative Credit Society. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

64. In 1906 the Anglo-Egyptian Allotment Company of Cairo set up an Agricultural Bank in Cyprus. By 1919 the Bank had lent £141.106. It ended its unsuccessful activities by the end of 1923. Christodoulou describes its role as follows: *"There is no doubt that the Bank gave long-term loans at a fair rate of interest, but the malady of rural Cyprus could not be cured simply in this way. Land held on security when sold did not pay for the loans. The Bank neither reduced indebtedness   nor put the farmer on his feef'.* Christodoulou, *op. cit.,* p. 95. The demand for a new and state supported Agricultural Bank was raised first by a peasant movement led by a populist lawyer, Kyriacos Pavlou Rossides. The movement reached its peak at an agricultural conference in the village of Lefconico on 13 April 1924. It was organised by the Mukhtars of several villages of both communities also demanding the lowering of taxation. The aims of the movement were not in the interest of the elites and the conference refused to deal with any issues concerning the island's political future. Katsiaounis, *Social Change,* p. 249. This proves that not all Mukhtars were part of, or exclusively, influenced by a clientelistic network dominated by the traditional elites.

65. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

66. Loizos, *Politics,* p. 117 and Attalides, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

67. The numbers given in the literature for 1929 vary. Attalides reports 422 co-operative credit societies, Loizos only 204 and Lanitis 320. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 144; Loizos, Politics, p. 117; Lanitis, N.C. (1944/Revised 1992) *Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus* Limassol, Proodos, p. 78.

The official - and therefore presumably correct - number of registered societies given in the colonial report prepared by J.B. Surridge is 318. In December 1929 co- operative credit societies existed in 402 out of 641 villages. Surridge, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

68.   CO 67/22714-143277. The deputy of the Governor, Nicholson, in a memorandum dated 30 January 1929 to the Minister tor the Colonies, Amery. As quoted above Governor Ronald Storrs speaks of 70% of *chronically* indebted peasants in 1927/28. Storrs, *op. cit.,* p. 491.

69. Surridge reports that in 1929 approximately 20% of the total rural mortgage debts were already held by the Agricultural Bank operating through the co-operative credit societies. According to Georghallides, the Agricultural Bank had given 294-542 pounds in loans by the end of 1929. Georghallides, *Ronald Storrs,* p. 299. This was more than double the sum of all credits given by the Anglo-Egypt "Allotment

Company" (see note 64) in Cyprus between 1906 and 1919 (141.106 pound Sterling). Christodoulou, *op. cit.,* p. 95. Surridge estimates that in 1928 rural debts amounted to 1.800.000 pounds. Surridge, *op. cit.,* p. 42-48.

70. CO 67/22714 from the 30 January 1929.

71. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

72. The former Commissioner of Larnaca, B. J. Surridge, who prepared the colonial survey on rural indebtedness in 1927-28 was appointed as the first Registar.

73. The Registrar registered co-operative societies and had the power to strike off any co-operative society which he thought should be liquidated. He audited the accounts and could directly intervene in the administration and disputes of the co-operative societies. With the enactment of a new law for the restatement of loans in 1938, farmers could get long-term loans directly from the Agricultural Bank with no mediation from co-operative societies which in the British view should focus exclusively on purely co-operative activities. Therefore, many societies which were established with the only purpose of borrowing funds from the Agricultural Bank were gradually liquidated. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

74. John-Jones, L. St. (1983) *The Population of Cyprus. Demographic Trends and Socio-Economic Influences.* London, p. 44 and Lanitis, op. cit., 1992, p. 142.

75. John-Jones, *op. cit.,* pp. 43-44. Jeanette Choisi published a report of the District Commissioner from 1936 in which she enclosed a printed contract widely used by moneylenders. A peasant whose property was seized due to his large debts had to sign this contract if he wanted his land back or another piece of land. The main provisions of the contract as quoted by the report are as follows:

"Para. 1. The Purchaser {the villager) must work the property or pay for the work to be done.

Para. 2. The Purchaser pays all the taxes.

Para. 3. Failure of pay regularly means the forfeiture (as rent) of all previous payments, plus the liability to pay a special penalty and the cancellation of the agreement.

Para. 4. All the produce is the exclusive property of the Vendor. The purchaser cannot touch the result of his own labour unless a solvent guarantor is found.

Para. 5. An improvement, addition and so on, becomes the absolute right of the Vendor. There is no question or argument about it.

Para. 6. A *nice and large compensation clause.*

Para. 7. A *nice and large compensation clause.*

It is so easy to see how it works. Mr. A. *signs and agrees to purchase for Pound Sterling 300-0-0. After years of struggle (during he is encouraged to fall behind his payments) he has paid perhaps Pound Sterling 280-0-0, not nearly enough in view of the interest due, the taxes paid by the Vendor but to be charged by the Purchaser, etc. At the right moment, i.e. when the chances of getting another piastre are remote, the default is noticed, (not a shilling paid has reduced the original debt, it has all been rent, sinking fund and interest) and the agreement is cancelled (para. 3). The moneylender (Vendor) has, by now, had all the money he can get, the free labour of the unfortunate Purchaser, the actual produce at a price dictated by the moneylender (para. 4), the debt remains intact plus interest and penalty added (para. 7) and the moneylender retains the property, absolutely, plus all improvements, addictions etc., and is ready to play the same trick on Mr. B. So long as such agreement is possible, and upheld in Court, one cannot blame a Villager for displaying little interest in his alleged property".*

A peasant had hardly a chance to pay his debts off for the rest of his life. CO 67/271/13. Office of the Commisioner of Limassol, Greening, report from the 8 December 1936 quoted from Choisi, *Wurzeln,* p. 50.

76. Lanitis estimates that in 1939 about 63% of the entire debts of the peasants were owed to money lenders and that before the Debt Settlement Department was set up in 1940 still only 18% of all peasants were free of debts. Lanitis, *op. cit.,* pp. 24 and 43.

77. Ibid., pp. 25-27.

78. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 144.

79. John-Jones, *op. cit.,* pp. 43-44.

80. SA 1/1380/7.

81. Katsiaounis, *Social Change,* pp. 246-250.

82. In June 1925 peasants recently dispossessed of their land by moneylenders formed unions in three villages of the Limassol district. These unions were working in co-operation with the communist "Labourer's Club" in Limassol. Adams, T.W. (1971) AKEL: *The Communist Party of Cyprus.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, p. 14.

83. Richter, H.A. (1996) 'Die Kommunistische Partei Zyperns (KKK) 1926-1944', in: *THETIS* 3, p. 210.

84. Atheism never played an important role in Cypriot communism. Almost all Cypriot communists remained Christian Orthodox.

85. Choisi, *Wurzeln,* pp. 136-139.

86. Richter, *KKK,* pp. 207-213. 87. Ibid., p. 212.

88. Adams, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-19.

89. John-Jones, *op. cit.,* p. 127.

90. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 145.

91. The PSE was renamed in PEO (Pankypria Ergatiki Omospondia = Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour) in 1947.

92. Richter, *KKK,* p. 215. .

93. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 146.

94. Choisi, J. (1995) 'The Greek Cypriot Elite - Its Social Function and Legitimisation', in *The Cyprus Review.* Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 37.

95. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 138.

96. CO 67/207. Article 17 of the Political Organisation of Cyprus quoted from Choisi, *Greek Cypriot Elite,* p.45.

97. Ibid., p. 44.

98. The authority of the National Council reached its lowest level in 1925, when the majority of its members objected to the idea of authorising a list of candidates for the Legislative Council. According to Georghallides, *"with this failure the National Council in effect abdicated its authority. Its members were no longer willing to subordinate their personal ambitions for the sake of overall decisions".* Georghallides, Political and Administrative History, p. 345. Despite the low prestige and influence of the National Council and the competition within it for a seat in the Legislative Council, the former remained the umbrella organisation of the nationalists.

99. Katsiaounis, *Social Change,* p. 248.

100. Even out of the 12 Greek members of the moderate Legislative Council in 1925, at least seven were members of the National Council. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History,* pp. 433-452 (Biographical Notes).

101. FO 371/15233. Confidential report by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs to the Minister for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, from the 12 February 1931.

102. Tzermias, P. (1991) Geschichte der Republik Zypern. Tübingen, Francke, p. 42.

103. Loizos, *Greek Gift,* p. 14.

104. In December 1955 AKEL was proscribed by Governor Sir John Harding allegedly because it promoted disorder. It remained so until 1959, a few months longer than EDMA Eniaion Dimokratikon Metopon Anadimiourgias (United Democratic Reconstruction Front), the political party of the right-wing *enosis* which backed EOKA. Adams, *op. cit.,* pp. 48-51.

105. Loizos points out that from the 86 EOKA fighters that were killed only a handful can be placed in any plausible elite. Loizos, *Greek Gift,* p. 16.

106. Attalides, *op. cit.,* p. 148.

107. The first cabinet of Makarios in 1960 consisted almost exclusively of former EOKA chiefs and their close associates. In the 1960 Legislature 26,7% of the right-wing House members were leading EOKA members. A prominent example is the first Minister for the Interior, Georkadjis, murdered in 1970. Being the son of a peasant he bacame one of the most powerful politicians by creating a large clientelistic network during the 60s. Papaioannou, I.A. (1984) *Politics in Cyprus between 1960 and 1981.* Nicosia, Theopress, pp. 48-49.

ETHNICITY AND SPACE

Nadia Charalambous

Abstract

Broadly speaking, this paper is concerned with the ways in which different ethnic groups co-exist within a given spatiotemporal framework. More precicely the study investigates the spatial and social relations between the two major ethnic groups in the island of Cyprus, that is, the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority, which existed in the rural area of the country from the time in which the island was under the British colony until it achieved independence in 1960. Spatial analysis and more precisely the "space syntax" method is used to investigate the relations between the ethnic groups. It is suggested that throughout each community and its social groupings, a similar set of spatial characteristics is reproduced and through this repetition we recognise ethnicity is space. Space is therefore, in itself a social behaviour not merely a backloth to social behaviour, and under its material shell encloses logic and abstract rules.

Introduction

It seems that the first cluster of research problems facing the student of intercommunal similarities or differences between the two ethnic groups in Cyprus, will involve the exploration in systematic detail of the forms of ethnic co-existence, through a study of the social behaviour of each group. Against the background of ethnic co-existence, one could then try to trace the process or signs of ethnic differentiation that culminated in ethnic conflict.

Historically the two groups have been co-habiting in Cyprus in different ways; first they lived together in spatial proximity to each other, either in nearby villages or even within the same village or town. This situation changed with time and today the two ethnic groups are spatially and socially separated. What makes the study interesting is that during the period under study, spatially the conflict does not fit into any conceivable pattern of regional concentration nor ethnic segregation on an urban-rural dichotomy. Ethnic mixture geographically, has persisted throughout this period (Papadopoulos, 1965).

Its seems that space was somehow implicated in the relations between the two

groups or at least the social relations between them. It does seem obvious that human societies are spatial phenomena. They occupy regions of the earth's surface and within and between these regions material resources move and people encounter each other. It has been suggested (Hillier and Hanson, 1984) that a society has a definite and recognisable spatial order in two respects: firstly, by arranging people in space and locating them in relation to each other; and secondly, by arran- ging space itself by means of buildings, boundaries, paths and so on, so that the physical milieu of that society also takes on a definite pattern.

Consequently, the spatial patterns of Cypriot society will be the subject of study in this paper, in an attempt to explore any relations between space and cultural diffe- rences or similarities. The area of investigation, that is the study of conflict and collaboration in lifestyle, will then be directed towards the architecture and spatial dimension of the problem.[1]

Although the paper does not attempt to diagnose the problem by considering the origins and the processes leading up to conflict through a historical, political or socioeconomic analysis, the recent history of the island is inevitably sketched in. This is done in a highly selective manner, in order to touch upon issues and problems needed to attain a full understanding of the nature of ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

Society, in terms of its social roles, institutions, group identities and so on, will be studied within each ethnic group, in order to highlight cultural differences at a purely sociological level. On the other hand, the most phenomenally material creation of the social behaviour of the two ethnic groups, the man-made ordering of space will be analysed. The "local" level of domestic space organisation will be analysed first followed by an analysis of the "global" level, the settlement's public space. In addition to possible similarities or differences between the two communities at the local level, the paper will explore whether the two groups also present similarities or differences in their relation to the whole structure of the village; the global level.

Two methods of analysis based on Space Syntax[2] Theory will be used for the purpose of studying the above. The first method deals with the analysis of settlement forms. The method sees a settlement as a bi-polar system arranged between the primary cells or buildings, (houses, etc), and the carrier, (world outside the settlement). The structure of space between these two domains is seen as a means of interfacing two kinds of relations: those among the inhabitants of the systems; and those between inhabitants and those who visit the system, the visitors.

In other words, this method describes in a structured and quantitative way how the continued open space of a village is constructed; this is done in such a way so as to deal with the global physical structure of a settlement without losing sight of its local structure. Based on this, the analysis establishes a method of describing space in such a way as to make its social origins and consequences a part of that description.

The second method adapts the analysis to building interiors. It shows how buildings can be analysed and compared in terms of how categories are arranged and related between the occupants and those who enter as visitors.

It will be of interest to this paper to see how far syntactic analysis might reveal the underlying spatial structures of Cypriot traditional houses and how far it will be possible to show these structures quantitatively.

From Co-existence to Confrontation: Historical and Sociological Background

A selected number of themes and issues which bear continuously on the paper's main concerns need to be touched upon in an attempt to provide a better understanding of the nature of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. The origin and the maintenance of the Turkish community on the island, the attitude of the Turkish and British administration towards the Greek and the Turkish communities and the relationship between the two ethnic groups within this period are the main issues to be dealt with.

Firstly, the nature and extent as well as the diachronic character of the links between the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus call for an explanation which must start with the origin of the Turkish community on the island.

The conquering expedition of the Ottomans concluding in 1571, is thought of as a turning point in the evolution of the Cypriot society. The conquest brought about three fundamental changes in the Cypriot social structure:

- the destruction of European feudalism (Hill, 1952);

- the restoration of the Greek Orthodox church to its former position of dominance;

- the settlement in Cyprus of a sizable Turkish minority.

The Turks once they conquered Cyprus, either killed or expelled the European nobles. The feudal system was abolished and land was distributed to the former serfs, who were Orthodox Christians and to the newly arrived Moslem settlers (Papadopoulos, 1952). The Turkish conquest created ethnic heterogeneity. Turkish migrants settled in Cyprus and gradually a sizable Turkish Cypriot community was formed, eventually composing eighteen percent of the total population.

Lastly, the Turkish conquest restored the Greek Orthodox church to its former princely status and endowed it with secular and spiritual powers. The church became the central institutional sphere around which the political, intellectual and cultural life of Greek Cypriots revolved (Hackett, 1901).

These three transformations in Cypriot society had respective spatial consequences. Firstly, with the destruction of European feudalism, the distribution of

land changed as it began to be occupied by different social groups: the Greek serfs and the Moslem settlers. The most important spatial consequences were the settlements created by Moslems, which were usually physically separated from the Greek settlements. In other words, these changes in Cyprus, social and at the same time spatial, mark the time when relations between the two ethnic groups start, and suggest that social movements had at least a spatial expression of ethnic co-existence.

Finally, the central position given to the Greek Church resulted in it becoming a key feature in Greek Cypriot villages. The church, and with it the church square, became the spatial centres of the Greek Cypriot settlements, where all the villagers would attend at least once a week. All major occasions, feasts, trade and so on took place in the church square.

In considering the problem of the origins and the process leading up to conflict, it has been argued (Attalides, 1979) that the natural starting point should be the historical and the social situation in which conflict is absent; that is, the stable context of traditional society in which "co-existence" and "harmonious symbiosis" were believed to prevail in the island (Kyrris, 1975).

"Co-existence" was believed to be founded on a *"shared folk piety and a common life style...",* a product of shared conditions of existence and the basic needs of survival set by the land-bound pattern of life in traditional society. The most eloquent testimony to this *"co-existence"* or *"peaceful symbiosis"* has been the ethnic geography of Cyprus which was marked by interspersion of Greek and Turkish settlements all over the island.

It has been suggested by the aforementioned authors, that in the Ottoman social context, oppression from the latter consolidated the conditions of existence at the grassroots; it stimulated common protests in various forms in which religious distinctions subsided before shared claims to the rights of survival. Kitromilides (Kitromilides, 1979) suggests that the dynamics of co-existence nurtured by these conditions could work out unobstructed when an extended period of tranquility and order was made possible in Cyprus in the last fifty years of Ottoman rule.

Against this background of co-existence in traditional society, an attempt is made to trace the process of ethnic differentiation that culminated in ethnic conflict. This transformation is suggested to have begun with the gradual growth of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus (Alastos, 1960). In other words, the culmination of the process of ethnic differentiation in the consolidation of structurally and culturally distinct and often antagonistic communities, deeply conscious of their premordial attachments set the preconditions of ethnic conflict.

Historians, political and social scientists tackling the "Cyprus Question", identify as the main source that led to ethnic conflict, nationalism, cultivated mainly by external

forces. It seems that political and social history is only crudely spatial; that is, it advances a strategy of escalating "territoriality".

Yet, from what we have observed, social and political movements had at least a spatial expression on physical separation and a more thorough-going construction of different ways of organising space so that even without labelling, the characteristic space patterns of the two ethnic groups was different. In other words, while space seems to be a necessary part of understanding the ethnic history of the island, it is not stressed through the political and social history.

Studies restricted to "space syntax" accounts suggest clear spatial hypotheses, where space is shown to play an important part in the conflict between the two ethnic groups; in other words, the cultural conflict is already present through space organisation.

In a "space syntax" study of Cypriot villages, Hadjinicolaou (Hadjinicolaou, 1981) suggested that there were more differences than similarities. The Turkish Cypriot public space was shown to be composed of irregular parts which varied in size and shape. The purely Turkish Cypriot villages were also shown to be more "shallow" and easily accessible from the outside than the Greek Cypriot, where the entrances to the settlements were narrow and the approach to the interior more "complicated". Hadjinicolaou argued that these spatial differences derived from cultural differences between the two communities especially the different forms of their "social solidarity".

According to this study, the Turkish Cypriot community achieved coherence as a group by sharing a common ideology, a set of common beliefs similar among all members, whereas in the Greek Cypriot community the activities of its members were more personal, in which achieving coherence as a group was based on the differences between the individuals. The former presented a more 'transpatial" form of social solidarity, closer to what Durkheim (Durkheim, 1964) has called a "mechanical" type, while the latter formed a society for which space was more important in maintaining its coherence, presenting a form of social solidarity closer to what Durkheim has called "organic". Similar observations were made by Pelecanos in the spatial analysis of Nicosia (Pelecanos, 1990).

Spatial Analysis

Domestic Space Organisation

Ethnographic studies of domestic space organisation have suggested that space features in our society in surprising and often unexpected ways as a means of social and cultural identification (Bordieu, 1973). Studies of domestic space arrangement which have concerned themselves with social organisation, have suggested that cultural features are not only present in space organisation but are also prime

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movers in a series of changes in patterns of everyday living which occur over the years. These studies have suggested that the household is a "sociogram" not just of a family but of something more: a whole social system (Hanson and Hillier, 1979, 1982).

For example, the different sociological character of three sub-cultures of English society were suggested to be spatially expressed through different spatial relations (in other words the sociological character of variation in domestic space organisation in these sub-cultures could be given precise structural and numerical form). So, whereas space in a fairly standard English cottage built in the latter part of the nineteenth century for the working class, were strongly segregated from each other (spatially and in terms of use), in the conversion of the same house for middle-class occupants in the 1960s segregation between spaces was reduced. These spatial changes were shown to be both influenced by and reflect social change from one social class to the other.

Ethnographic material on the rural life of Cyprus suggests that the household formed the main social and functional unit of Cypriot society (Markides, 1978; Loizos, 1975). All social and most work related activities of the family took place within the boundaries of the household. The agricultural economy of the villages, (both Turkish and Greek Cypriot) led to similar needs for each household to be self-sufficient. Each family attempted *to* produce whatever was needed through the house and work in the fields.

The similar pattern of rural life of the two ethnic groups led to similar "spatial ingredients". Visual inspection of some of the houses' layouts confirms this observation (Figs 1a, b, c). The "ingredients" of each space-code are identical: yards, kitchens, living rooms, bedrooms, storage for animals and goods. Most of the work related activities within the household took place in the yard. Here we find the ovens, sinks, tables for working on, and so on. Around the yard we find the functional spaces of the family like the kitchen, living room and so on and subsidiary spaces for the storage of goods and animals.

However, although we are able to inspect the plans visually and compare broad geometric and locational aspects, it is difficult to ascertain how the Greek Cypriot sample differs or is similar to domestic forms in the Turkish Cypriot sample or to suggest what the dimensions of variability within each sample might be. We could broadly suggest that although all cases are made of the same spatial 'ingredients', it is the way these are configured that brings about ethnic identity. Therefore, it remains to be seen how far a syntactic analysis can clarify these points and demonstrate whether the forms of these dwellings embody patterns of family life and culture which are unique to each ethnic group.

The first step is to transcribe each house plan in order to clarify its spatial confi - guration and permeability pattern. On the basis of the access graphs[3] from the front

door, (whether this is a boundary or entrance to a room) without considering the label of functions, a number of preliminary observations can be made (Fig. 2).

Firstly, it is evident that irrespective of the internal organisation of the complexes, the relation of the interior of the houses to the exterior is made in most of the cases, by a transition. A second striking feature is the tendency of the Cypriot dwelling to get deeper as it gets bigger. The tendency to increase with the number of cells in the complex is clear; in other words, asymmetric relations predominate over symmetric relations.[4]

In addition to the predominance of asymmetric over symmetric relations in the sample, a second striking feature is revealed: the preponderance of non-distributed over distributed schemes. To be more precise, a non-distributed complex or sub-complex is one on which all relations to the carrier are controlled by one cell; a distributed complex or subcomplex is one where there is more than one non-intersec- ting route back to the carrier.

It seems that within a morphologically variable sample, groupings of characteristics can be observed. So far, the plans have been looked at without taking into account the labelling of spaces. The location of particular rooms and the relations entailed in them are vital elements for an understanding of the ways in which space carries cultural information. For example, in some cases labels may become regularly associated with specific positions over a wide range of examples. In some cases, spaces with particular functions may be separated from each other or may be systematically placed near or not to the exterior of the dwelling.

The most striking observation which can be made about the major part of the sample, in relation to the ethnic groups and the ways in which spaces are named, is that in most cases a transition space, the yard, is the shallowest and the most integrating space in the complexes. However, as far as depth is concerned different positions of the yard identifying with ethnic groups are revealed (Table 1).

Table 1 - Summary of Houses' Syntactic Data by Ethnicity & Occupational Class[5]

Ethnic Group	Occ. class	RRA	RRA Funct.	RRA Trans.	RRA Exter.	L	Y	B	K	Integr. Space
Greek Cyp.	Total	1.16	1.34	0.69	1.32					
	C2	1.32	1.48	0.98	1.41	0.26	0.69	1.84	1.22	Y
	C3	1.16	1.34	0.78	1.36	0.09	0.48	1.70	1.20	Y
	C4	1.02	1.19	0.31	1.18	0.18	0.23	1.18	1.14	Y
Turkish Cyp.	Total	1.14	1.20	1.06	1.50					
	C2	1.20	1.22	1.07	1.40	0.87	0.48	1.45	1.10	Y

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C3	1.19	1.25	1.06	1.75	0.77 0.64 1.44 1.36 L
C4	1.02	1.12	1.05	1.34	0.68 0 .25 1.17 1.51 Y&L

For most of the Greek Cypriot subset the yard is the shallowest and the most integrating space. It is most of the times at depth 1, that is, it is directly permeable to the carrier; it is the main link between the carrier and the other functions of the complex and it controls all relations between the inside and the outside of the house.

In the Turkish Cypriot subset, the yard seems to have different properties. Out of the 91 cases only in 25 houses is the yard the shallowest space. Most of these cases are found in the smaller houses. As the houses and the graphs get more complex, the syntactic properties of the yard seem to change. It becomes up to five steps deep although it is still the most integrating space. In these cases which form the rest of the Turkish Cypriot sample, the shallowest spaces directly connected to the carrier are either living rooms or verandas and gardens which are only used as a transition to the living room (whereas as we have seen in the introduction to the sample, the yard does not only serve as a transition space).

In other words for most of the Turkish Cypriot sample, the yard becomes an internal courtyard, a "back yard", which serves as a link between the two parts of the split graphs identified in the unlabelled spatial analysis.

Broadly speaking, the different configurational properties of the yard seem to identify with ethnic identity. However, some examples seem to cross the ethnic divide (particularly in the case of the smaller houses), and present variations within the ethnic groups.

Similar observations can be made for the living rooms. Firstly, it should be noted that in the smaller houses living rooms (as separate rooms) are rare, but where they occur they are shallow and integrating. In the bigger examples things are different. In 32 cases of the sample, the living room is the shallowest space and directly permeable to the carrier. It is clear from the sample that most of these cases belong to the Turkish Cypriot subset. In the Turkish Cypriot houses, the living room is shallow and integrating in relation to the rest of the effective spaces; it is usually at depths 1 and 2. In the Greek Cypriot houses living rooms are deeper (at depths 3 and 4), and re- latively segregated.

In other words, in the case of the living rooms, as with the yard, although in the smaller houses examples may cross the ethnic divide, differences in the majority of the sample are more than similarities. The same seems to happen within the ethnic groups. In the Greek Cypriot sample, living rooms get deeper and more segregated as the houses get bigger. In the Turkish Cypriot sample, variation is more evident; as the houses get bigger the number of living rooms increases. Most importantly a new type of room appears, called the "guest" room or "oda". This room is shallow, (usually two steps into the complex), but segregated.

Bedrooms are deep and segregated in both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sample. Work places like stables and store rooms are shallower and more integrated in the Greek Cypriot sample; it should be noted that work related spaces occur with a higher frequency as the houses get bigger.

We have so far looked at the ways the two ethnic groups organise their space at the level of the internal structures of the dwellings; that is, within the boundary of the house. By its very nature, however, the boundary creates a disconnection between the interior space and the global system around it, the settlement, of which it would otherwise form a part. Consequently the above analysis only accounts for a proporation of the total spatial order in each system: the local level. No reference has yet been made to how the dwellings relate to the rest of the system, the global level of the settlements or how the public space in the settlements is organised. In this way, we can approach the relation of society to space with a more coherent and unified picture.

The Global Level: Analysis of Settelements Layout.

The household formed the main social institution of Cypriot villages. Interaction mainly took place in the neighbourhoods and on special occasions in the Church in the Greek Cypriot villages or the Mosque in the Turkish Cypriot village; around it one usually found the villages' square where all important occasions took place and nearby the local school.

Another important institution in Cypriot life was the coffee shop. This was usually found in the villages' centre and served a multitude of services: it was once the grocery, the place for a drink, the meeting place for friends, an unofficial labour exchange. Strictly for men, the coffee shop was the second most important institution in village life. Around the village's centre, one would find small shops like ba- keries and groceries.

In other words, it is suggested that like the houses, so the villages of the two ethnic groups are made of the same spatial "ingredients", the coffee shop, the church square, the school, the small shops, the neighbourhoods. Visual inspection of the villages' layout maps confirms this observation. Again they seem to enunciate differences which are geometric and have to do with the ways streets or open space is configured.

So, although we are able to study the layouts visually and compare broad geometric and locational aspects, it is difficult to ascertain how the purely Greek Cypriot cases differ or are similar to the purely Turkish Cypriot cases and how both differ or are similar to the mixed villages; or to suggest that although all cases are made of the same spatial "ingredients", it is the way these are configured that brings about ethnic identity and following this, social identity. In order to establish how these

"ingredients" are configured within the villages we need to study first the open space structure of the villages.

The open space in a settlement is where interaction takes place in public, as opposed to the houses where interaction takes place in a private sphere. According to Hillier and Hanson (Hillier and Hanson, 1984) the public space in settlements is seen as a means of interfacing two kinds of relations: those between the inhabitants of the system, and those between the inhabitants and the visitors, people who visit the settlements but do not live there.

Consequently, two levels of analysis will be used to describe the organisation of public space and to capture the spatial correlates of these bifurcating principles. The "convex" analysis or "two-dimensional" organisation of the system, refers to the local organisation of the system from the point of view of those who are already statically present in the system; it can be described by dividing the public space into smaller spaces in such a way that it is divided into the fewest and "fattest" convex spaces.

The second level of analysis, the "one -dimensional" or axial organisation, refers to the global organisation of the system from the point of view of those who move in to and through the system; that is, terms of its lines of access and sight. It can be described by drawing the fewest and longest straight lines which pass through all the convex spaces of the settlement.

Because strangers tend to move in a settlement, while inhabitants tend to have static relations to the various parts of the local system, the axial organisation refers to the access of strangers to the system whereas the convex organisation creates static zones where the inhabitants are more in control of the interface. A key map describing interface is the convex interface map.

By applying the division of space into convex spaces and axial lines, as suggested by Hillier and Hanson, we have a description of the public space of the settlements by their Convex Map and by their Axial Map.[6]

Confirming Hadjinicolaou's suggestion, a study of the syntactic analysis reveals more differences than similarities. The open space maps of the Greek Cypriot villages show how the islands of buildings form a system of open spaces which vary in width and length (Figs 3a, b, c). The "beady ring" structure is revealed; that is, the "fatter" segments of space are knitted together by longer segments, like beads on a string. This property is more obvious through the convex maps of the Greek Cypriot villages; through the length and width of the convex segments and their variety.

In the same way, if we look at the Turkish Cypriot public space we can see both similarities and differences. In the smallest systems we see similar properties as the respective system in the Greek Cypriot case. In the bigger systems, however, the Turkish Cypriot public space seems to be composed of more uniform parts. The buildings are arranged in such a way as to create a flow of open space with sections

of little variation in size.

However, since visual inspection of the maps may suggest similarities between villages crossing the ethnic divide we need to quantify. Firstly, we need to quantify the degree to which open space is broken up into convex spaces. Normally the most convenient and informant way of doing this, is to divide the number of buildings into the number of convex spaces. This will tell us how much "convex articulation" there is for that number of buildings.

These properties are more clearly revealed through the study of the convex interface maps of the villages. In the Greek Cypriot villages, the maps are dense and ringy, suggesting that the interface map will be more or less the permeability map of the settlement. Indeed the interface organisation values confirm this observation. These values give the average number of buildings adjacent and permeable to the open space structure of the villages per the whole number of buildings in the villages. The high values in the Greek Cypriot villages indicate that interface and permeability maps are more or less the same {Table 2). What this suggests, is that the interface in the Greek Cypriot settlements probably takes place in the open, public space.

In the Turkish Cypriot villages, on the other hand, a good many buildings and boundaries are relatively remote from the public, open space of the settlement, as the low interface organisation values indicate. A complete permeability map would therefore, need to include relations of adjacency and direct permeability from buildings to secondary boundaries and from secondary boundaries to each other. This observation suggests that unlike the Greek Cypriot settlements, interface in these villages most probably takes place at the back of the houses and not in the public space.

Table 2 - Purely Greek Cypriot and Purely Turkish Cypriot Villages-Basic Syntactic Data[7]

No	Code	Ethnic Group	Axial Organ.	RRA	Con	Depth	Convex Articul.	Convex Organ.	Axial Artie.	Inter. Organ.
1	Vavat.	GC	0.65	1.38	2.44	6.60	0.89	1.16	0.42	0.96
2	Lefkar.	GC	0.90	1.42	2.50	4.75	0.74	1.53	0.33	0.93
3	Ora	GC	0.73	1.38	2.42	8.34	0.94	1.53	0.43	0.95
4	Psev.	GC	0.69	1.29	2.33	6.94	0.82	1.55	0.28	0.96
5	Menn.	TC	1.26	1.59	2.71	3.94	0.74	1.65	0.24	0.76
6	Klav	TC	1.23	1.90	3.26	4.17	0.71	1.61	0.18	0.82

| 7 | Kellia TC | 0.98 | 1.71 | 3.03 | 5.18 | 0.86 | 1.67 | 0.31 | 0.66 |
| 8 | Kivisil. TC | 0.98 | 1.00 | 2.97 | 8.05 | 0.79 | 1.62 | 0.29 | 0.73 |

These results account for the local properties of space. A study of the global properties of the settlements, through the axial maps, shows that in the Greek Cypriot villages, the entrances to the villages are "complicated" and segregated; this is clearly shown in the bigger systems. In other words, the outside or carrier in the Greek Cypriots villages is relatively deep and segregated from the centre of the settlement.

As far as depth and axial organisation are concerned, the data shows that the Greek Cypriot settlements are deep and less axially organised (that is, more segregated from the carrier), than the Turkish Cypriot villages (Figs 3a, b, c).

A look at the integration cores[8] of the settlements illustrates further these points. In both cases, the intergration cores include the most public spaces like coffee shops and small shops. However, in the Greek Cypriot cases the integration cores are relatively deep from the outside while in the Turkish Cypriot cases, they are based towards one end of the villages, which is in most cases the centre.

However, if we have a look at the other extreme, the less integrating spaces, we find that in the Turkish Cypriot settlements these tend to cluster towards the periphery; a marked change in integration values is observed in these areas, which are relatively cut-off from the centre. These spaces include the residential areas of the villages. In the Greek Cypriot settlements, on the other hand, the less integrating spaces are clustered as we have already seen, around the entrances to the settlements. The quiet residential areas between the periphery and the centre, are of lower integration values but are achieved without. cutting them off the main structure of the settlements.

Having in mind that the axial organisation refers to the access of visitors into the system, while the convex organisation refers to the inhabitants, we may broadly suggest that in the Greek Cypriot villages, access of visitors into the settlement is difficult; but once inside, the system ensures that the .natural movement of inhabitants to, from and between the more segregated zones within the villages intersects the spaces used by visitors. This creates a strong, natural "probabilistic" interface between inhabitants and visitors in the settlements.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot settlements although easily accessible from the outside, restrict their integration cores and the movement of visitors to well defined peripheral areas and segregate large areas of the villages for the more exclusive use of the inhabitants. The stranger is allowed in the villages but under strong restrictions and control. The dwellings are segregated from both the open space of the village and from the outside world. Consequently, inhabitants do not interface with strangers in their role as inhabitants because of the depth of the open space from the

dwellings, while strangers rarely penetrate into the residential neighbourhoods, because of their depth from the carrier. Even if a stranger does circulate through the residential neighbourhoods, as it happens in the smaller systems, the lack of interface taking place in the public realm shows him/her a very different settlement to the one the inhabitant knows and sees.

In the mixed villages, the two communities seem to occupy either two completely different areas or different neighbourhoods with a scattering of ethnic elements within the villages. The Turkish Cypriot part is deeper with respect to the outside than the purely Turkish Cypriot villages. In other words, the Turkish Cypriot part appears more anti-axial.

Differences. in space organisation, however, are also found within each ethnic group; certain neighbourhoods or areas exhibit different spatial properties than others within the structure of the villages (Table 3). As we have seen in the previous section, certain forms of domestic space organisation seem to identify with different sub-cultures or socio-economic groups within each community. This part of the study explores whether similar trends are found in terms of neighbourhoods or houses' locations within the villages. We will concentrate on the only mixed villages where Turkish Cypriots still live, Pyla and Potamia, in order to have more reliable results.

Table 3 • Summary of Syntactic Data by Ethnic Group and Occupational Class

Ethnic origin	Class	RRA	Depth	Connect
GC	C2	1.14	5.14	2.91
	C3	1.56	4.16	3.16
	C4	1.07	4.86	2.53
TC	C2	1.40	4.70	4.83
	C3	0.96	6.50	2.50
	C4	0.71	6.10	1.83

In the mixed village of Potamia the axial map of the settlement reveals certain consistencies concerning location of houses according to occupational structure. In the Greek Cypriot part, houses of different occupational structures seem to share, more or less similar syntactic properties. In the Turkish Cypriot parts syntactic data reveals a different picture. Houses of higher occupational classes seem to be clustered along integrating axial lines, whereas houses of the lower occupational class are located in relatively deep and segregated locations. In all cases, the lower class is deeper, and both locally and globally, more segregated than the higher class.

A further comment which could be made is that a look at the convex and axial maps of these villages, suggests that wealthier areas in the Turkish Cypriot parts are more convexly organised; that is, axial lines cover a large number of convex spaces, giving a better local - to - global relation. In the "poorer" areas, axial lines are many times as long as the convex spaces.

Although sketchy, the above observations reveal further differences between the two cultures that ethnic differentiation alone cannot explain; differences concerning their system of stratification, social status and power. These issues, along the issues of gender, division of labour and kinship, in relation to spatial organisation will be the subject of the last part.

From Space to Society

We have seen two quite distinct forms of spatial organisation. To account for the social significance of these differences, the paper will attempt to discern possible relations between spatial patterns and sociological elements of each ethnic group.

In the traditional society of Cyprus, the household was the most important social unit (Kyrris, 1975). Familism was the most important orientation in both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cultures (Balswick, 1972); (Loizos, 1975). Within the family kinship was implicated in the construction of gender, that is, ideas on maleness and femaleness. In other words, in a similar way as spatial "ingredients" of the two groups identified in the previous part, we could suggest that both cultures are made of the same social "ingredients". Both societies are built of family and gender, that is kinship, but as we will see shortly, in radically different ways.

Greek Cypriot Community

The Household

The household formed, the most important institution of the basic needs of the family. The furniture of the living room consisted of a bed impeccably set with hand made sheets. It is interesting to note that this marital bed was only used by the couple for a very short period after their marriage; soon afterwards the couple would move to the *sospiton* and the marital bed would remain a mere decorative item in the living room. The other articles of furniture were a sendouki (the traditional Cypriot chest) where the few clothes of the family as well as the dowry brought by the bride were kept; a small table with decorative plates and family photographs and finally some straight chairs and stools. Near the ceiling of the room, across the main wall, was located the souvantza. This was a wooden or gypsum carved shelf painted and decorated with colourful plates, vases and lamps. The walls were decorated with family photographs, portaits of EOKA heroes and icons of saints and martyrs of the

church. These pictures expressed the fundamental attachment of the Cypriots to their nationalism and their church.

In the wealthier household, in addition to the traditional decor, modern items were added; a settee in addition to the chairs, lamps and vases on the tables in addition to the family photographs, reproductions of paintings on the walls in addition to the icons; all suggesting a higher status.

In complete contrast to the living room, the yard has the contrary syntactic principles: shallow from the exterior and mostly integrated with the rest of the household. Mostly one step deep in this space, throughout the whole sample, is the key locus of spatial solidarity: it is the space to which all members of the household have equal access and to which they have equal rights. But it is also a space in which all local interaction dependent on spatial proximity - relations with neighbours - normally take place.

However, although the yard door is usually left open for most of the day, neighbours who are involved in frequent interaction outside their houses, seldom enter one another's living spaces. Family life is reserved for the home. Every family struggles through each of its members to defend its honour, this being the expression of its moral heritage and of its social achievement. This situation has been described elsewhere as autogonistic, in the sense of a contest before a chorus. In Greek Cypriot villages success in the struggle for survival and honour, from the constituents of reputation, honour, (time), being the more purely moral evaluation. To protect itself against mocking and gossip, the family conceals the actions of its members in a shroud of privacy (Peristiany, 1965).

The house is considered as the exclusive precinct of the family, closed to outsiders, except kin and under special conditions such as for hospitality. This clearly accounts for the segregation of the living spaces from the carrier.

However, as we are about to see, the sharp differentiation between the nuclear family and the outside world is modified by a number of relations which fan out of the family into the community, linking the family groups in a number of different ways. Therefore, the family/others opposition is partly neutralised by the links woven by the family with the world outside it, each individual and each family being at the centre of a web of relations situated within a wider structure.

Outside the house, within the public space of the villages, the social behaviour of the individual is directly influenced by the social norms of the society. The public behaviour of a man towards his wife is such that it clearly demonstrates to others that he is the master in his own home. The wife always shows respect and submission to her husband in public.

Indeed, at first sight the Greek Cypriot men appear to have a big advantage in terms of spatial arrangements outside the house, which is not available to women;

they have a special place, the coffee shop, where women are not allowed to go. The coffee shop *(kafenio),* is gradually receiving the ethnographic attention it deserves as a core institution in Greek social life (Photiades, 1975). The village coffee shop offers a multitude of services: it is at once the grocery, the place for a drink, the meeting place for friends, an unofficial labour exchange, a clearing house for news, the haunt of the visiting government official, the local parliament which appropriately is at times converted into a cockpit (Papataxiarchis, 1988).

The coffee shop suggest ideas that contrast with those of the household and immediate locality or the neighbourhood. The latter are *"closed units, the sites of reproduction for individual families that exert strong demands over members to commit their energies and resources to family welfare".* Household stands then, in competitive opposition to what is communicated and transacted between men in places of recreation. In such places the dominant ethos *kerasma* (poorly translated as treating), and the creation of open friendship groups that do not recruit through the compulsory moral ties of kinship and affinity but rather through personal choices of *sympathia* (fellow-feeling).

The coffee shop is in this respect openly anti-household and male oriented. This institution and the open space of the villages are the arena for men's social encounters. Women, on the other hand, do not visit the coffee shop where men would gather after their day's work; a woman would rarely be seen passing through the central square of the village where most of the coffee houses lie and where there would be the greater concentration of men.

These observations would seem to imply that a woman's social world was limited to her neighbourhood whereas a man's social world was the coffee house and the open space of the village. However, this is not actually the case; women are powerfully present throughout the local open space of the Greek Cypriot villages, not as a group but distributed everywhere.

Firstly, through church attendance on Sundays and through work in the fields; a woman's domestic role can also extend to services that she may offer to the agricultural and sheep-raising activities of the family. In poorer families where the head of the family is a shepherd, the woman's activities are also extended to helping her husband in his work or to make cheese for sale in the open market. In middle class fa- milies, women tend to work at home usually as an extension of domestic work, such as sewing, embroidery and so on. In upper class families women tend not to work. In the main, the need for women to work is much greater in households that start married life with little land. In fact, as Loizos observes, in the house where the wife worked the status of the man slightly diminished.

Secondly, through neighbourhood life; the latter is well developed and like the house, is the particular domain of female activity. In the wider context of social life, the fundamental dichotomy of the "house" and the "road", the inner and outer realms,

is the point of orientation and interaction between women in the neighbourhood. As we have seen, the doors of the front yard are usually left open and afternoon gatherings take place facing the street. In this way, the sharp distinction between the interior of the house and the road is temporarily reduced and interfaces between both inhabitants on one hand and inhabitants and visitors on the other take place.

In a similar way in the mornings, women can be found standing in small groups on street corners or neighbourhood shops, discussing domestic matters or village gossip. Thus, social contact takes place under the disguise of some other activity, such as buying bread and shopping at the local grocery. Women, therefore, far from being in total seclusion, manage to combine a high degree of social interaction outside the home with their primary obligations as housewives.

The house and family would exist in potential isolation were it not for the clearly defined code of neighbourhood conduct, emphasising sociability, openness and requiring frequent interaction from residents in the locality. This way of life accounts for the dense interface pattern both between inhabitants and between inhabitants and visitors, found in the Greek Cypriot settlements.

However, visits do not only take place within the neighbourhoods. The village family, apart from being a nuclear family, also seems to opt for neolocal marital residence expressing the villagers' wish that a married couple start life in a separate household from their parents (see Fig. 33) which shows kin within the village of Potamia. As in the community of Roussilon, so in our case the practise of setting up separate households has important effects on the nature of the community.

Firstly, there is no chance for one family to build up its numbers (or amass capital), by concentrating living and working arrangements. Secondly, it tends to diffuse people within the settlement; it is rather rare (although it does occur), for related households to occupy contiguous houses. This encourages visits between kin that are not restricted to the immediate vicinity of the neighbourhood.

Micropolitics: Status and Power within Greek Cypriot Society

In every human group some members are more, some less admired and respec - ted; some more, some less able to impose their will on others. Description and discussion of this hierarchical arrangement relies heavily on the word 'status'. It is used to mean both a place on a scale and a social position. In this wider sense, the first meaning is partly a matter of an individual's place in a hierarchy of power. In practice the two scales sometimes largely coincide, sometimes not. A man may exercise power yet be despised for the ways he acquired it, while another may be admired for moral qualities yet exercise little power. The way this happens varies, depending on the particular society.

One of the major challenges that confronts students of Greek Cypriot society is the delineation of its stratification system. The fluidity of Cyprus' social structure and the relative absence of dire poverty, renders the study of social class difficult or at best problematic.

The apparent lack of class crystallisation was vividly manifested in the Greek Cypiot villages, where there were no clusters of families with clearly defined characteristics such as place of residence, mannerisms, clothing and style of life that one may encounter in other developing societies. This does not of course mean that there were no economic differences among the villagers. As we have already seen from the first part, there are some wealthy as well as some relatively poor and there is the great majority in the middle. To that extent, there are social classes in the villages, if we restrict the concept "class" to the economic position of the individual within the economic sphere.

In other words, the aim of this part is a traditional one, to distinguish the econo - mic, status and power situations of different actors in such a way as to identify key social categories.[10] To run ahead of the argument, as we have already seen, there are three major categories to be distinguished which, however do not correspond to any clear distinctions maintained by the villagers.

The latter do not use any percentages and tables to describe land or wealth. They use a few basic distinctions - I *phtochi,* the poor, I *metrii,* middling people, and finally I *plousii,* the rich. Such terms do not have sharp boundaries and how they are used depends on who is speaking and his/her relation to the person being discussed.

So, as far as occupational status is concerned, those men with little land, who earn their living by heavy labour for others, whose wives and daughters must also work, are at the bottom of the village status scale. At the top are the men who, for one reason or another, depend on no one for their prosperity, who employ labour, whose wives and daughters do nothing outside the house; these men have large land holdings and are fully occupied with them. Between these extremes are a number of possibilities, each with slightly different status implications; these include workers, builders, carpenters, craftsmen and so on.

Economic class in Greek Cypriot villages was, however differentiated from "power" and "social status". The villagers granted high status to the educated like teachers and doctors; the most powerful and highly regarded individuals were hardly rich men. The mukhtar, for example, the village's headman whose main duties include the registration of births and deaths, the collection of number of taxes, meetings with visiting officials and so on, was not always a rich man. The main reason why men would take this position is because it offers prestige through the notion of giving service to the village.

In other words, in Greek Cypriot society, the honour-prestige hierarchy does not

correspond to social classes. For example, as we have seen, the office of the mukhtar was a role in the administrative system which provided opportunities for skilful men to become patrons to their fellow villagers. However, it is likely that only a "big man" could turn the mukhtar's office into an important patronage position; it is not the case that the office itself inevitably brings much power.

At this point, we could suggest that a similar paradox appears, as the one noted by Bailey in "Gifts and Poison". In the Cypriot society people compete to remain equal; as Bailey puts it in the community of Valoire, people remain equal because "each one believes that every other one is trying to better him, and in his efforts to protect himself, he makes sure that no one else ever gets beyond the level of approved mediocrity". Equality then, is in fact the product of everyone's belief that everyone else is striving to be more than equal. Equality comes about through the mutual cancellation of supposed efforts to be unequal.

Turkish Cypriot Society

Village and Household

Village and household are also the main social units in Turkish Cypriot society. Only through a membership of a household does an individual take part in the economic, political and social life of the village. Within the household the most intimate and emotionally important social relations are played out; what goes on within it is a major part of village social life. As in the Greek Cypriot households men form the permanent core of any household; they do the heavy work in the fields, control all transport and conduct all relations with the outside world, including almost all buying and selling. They make all major decisions and defend the household and its honour. Women carry out all domestic tasks including cooking, cleaning and raising the children, in a similar way as in the Greek Cypriot culture.

However, the spatial structure of the house in the Turkish Cypriot sample carries a great deal more social information embedded in its layout and the labels which are attached to spaces. There are special places where visitors are entertained; men and women are allocated specific spaces and there is an obvious attempt to enforce a strong boundary between the interior of the dwelling and the public street. In other words, the main difference between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot households seems to be that they are not built into the bricks and mortar and are not institutionalised in such a way as to create structural inequalities.

Many houses in the villages, that can afford it, have separate living rooms, one for men and one for women which serve to further separate the two sexes. So, whenever the villagers are relaxing, the men are in the men's room which as we have seen is syntactically integrated and relatively shallow from the exterior and at the same time a strong point of control; most routes from one space to another in the

system as a whole (and certainly those leading in and out of the women's domain located around the back yard) will pass through this living room. Women come into this room rarely, usually to clean it when the men are away in the fields or only when the immediate family is present. The main living room, the *ev,* is the province of the wife of the household, where she sleeps with her husband and usually with her young children. No man enters the *evof* another's household, unless he is very close kin - even then he might hesitate.

Within this general scheme of things, however, differentiation is revealed among the three subsets identified in the previous part. While in the poorer households only one living room exists for the rare entertainment of guests and most often kin, the wealthier households have a special room for the men of the household where they sit in the evenings and entertain neighbours and guests. These rooms are more luxuriously furnished and are called "guest" rooms or *misafir odasi* or simply just *oda,* (room). These are in fact more than just entertainment rooms, as we shall see soon.

In contrast to the main living room (ev) the guest room belongs to the men and should preferably stand apart from the rest of the house, or have a separate entrance so that male visitors see nothing of the home at all; in other words, the guest room should normally be strictly segregated from the rest of the household. The syntactic values of this space express these requirements; it is shallow from the exterior but deep from the rest of the spaces in the house, it is segregated and non-distributed. These properties are immediately referred to the concept of transpatial solidarity, like the living room in the wealthy Greek Cypriot house. However, unlike the latter, the guest room is solely for the realisation and strengthening of male solidarity.

Just as the living room is the most powerful space governing inside to outside relations, so the back courtyard is the most powerful space governing inside to inside relations. The back yard in the Turkish Cypriot house becomes the hinge which separates the two different areas of the household, it is mainly a place for the realisation of women's solidarity, strongly segregated from the outside world. Within these observations, we could suggest that in the Turkish Cypriot house, space and social activities are split into pieces; exactly the way in which life in Turkish Cypriot society is.

It seems reasonable to press the argument concerning this male-female separateness to its extreme conclusion, so that marriage may be considered as one moment of tangency of two worlds which are organised as to meet for only brief encounters without trespassing on each others domains.

Outside the house, within the open space of the villages, this is even more strongly emphasised. The world of men is the public world of the street, the place of business, the mosque and above all the *Kahve,* the coffee house. Men have normally less to do with the actual life inside the household than the women. Although they eat and sleep in the house, most of them spend as much of their time as possible

away from the actual house. When they are at leisure, they prefer to talk in groups out of doors, in guest rooms or in the coffee houses. The men's avoidance of the house, except for the specific purposes of eating and sleeping reflect their wider social relationships and their clear superiority in Turkish Cypriot village society.

Women are not excluded from the street or the mosque; they pass along the streets or do business in the shops or markets, but for them it is foreign soil, entered by necessity; they move through it briskly, well covered and when possible in groups. Only a few women attend the mosque on special ocasions - during the month of Ramadan and on other Muslim Holy days, but they are separated from the male congregation behind curtains in a balcony.

The world of women in Turkish Cypriot villages is the private world of the house and the back courtyard. Very often the houses have passageways leading from courtyard to courtyard which allow one to move between houses without a public lane or street. The physical setting of lanes and courtyards awards the maximum amount of seclusion to women and the round of domestic activities which consumes the household.

That reflects how rules of residence have affected the proliferation of family segments over time. This is clearly seen in the sparse interface maps of the Turkish Cypriot villages; a consequence of these properties is that visitors experience a different settlement than the inhabitants know.

The creation of inequality is largely strengthened by the tendency of the usually extended Turkish Cypriot family to patrilocal or virilocal postmarital residence. Virilocality and the requirements of male co-operation in trade or family agriculture promoted an agnatic emphasis in kinship. The special value put into maleness and male-male relatedness makes equality between husband and wife the norm. Men dominate at least in appearance and usually in reality too. Property, names and re-putations are basically under male control and are transferred from father to son.

Every village is divided into a number of quarters or *mahalle* which have no clear boundaries and which as we will see shortly are spatially clear. Because close neighbours often intermarry, and as we have seen above close agnates and some times other close kin live near each other, these quarters often have some kinship unity as well. Households belonging to a lineage usually formed local clusters; the separate dwellings of married sons tended to be located adjacent to the natal house; it was rare to locate a married son outside of his mahalle, thereby resulting in a high degree of residential solidarity within mahalle limits.

This tendency, to set up households adjacent to the natal household had important effects on the nature of the Turkish Cypriot community. In contrast to the Greek Cypriots, a family had the chance to build up its numbers (or amass capital) by concentrating on living and working arrangements. In fact, this was a common

way of acquiring wealth and power within the village, as we shall see shortly. This is clearly revealed through the different, if not inverse, syntactic properties of the poor and the wealthy households within the villages.

Secondly, people were concentrated into local clusters and it was a common phenomenon for related households to occupy contiguous houses, even sharing the same courtyard. The maximal extent of domestic relations therefore, was limited by mahalle boundaries.

Micropolitics: Wealth, Status and Power within Turkish Cypriot Society

Inspite of the difficulties, already described in the study of the Greek Cypriot society, arising out of the study of status scale in the communities, it is possible to establish a rough overall hierarchy among the village men. In the guest rooms, in the mosques, at wedding feasts, people arranged themselves publicly according to a more or less generally accepted scale.

As we have already seen, as far as occupational status is concerned, there are three major categories to be distinguished although as in the Greek Cypriot sample, there are no sharp boundaries between them. The poor of the villages are those who have little or no land and who make all or most of their living by unskilled labour; these include shepherds and agricultural workers. At the other end of the scale were households which owned plenty of land and on many occasions combined agriculture with other skilled or commercial activities. Between these extremes, it is difficult to sort out a significant order of rank for the majority of the villagers in the middle of the scale. A number of possibilities exist including skilled labour, craftsmen and so on.

In other words, occupation and wealth can be treated as a single scale. But, unlike Greek Cypriot society, economic power, (a publicly accepted right to a relatively large scale of the community' s resources) and political power (the ability, publicly accepted or not, to get other people to do what one wants them to do) are closely related. The one generated the other and no one could hold one without some of the other; in most villages examined for example, the mukhtar was one of the wealthiest men in the village. It is a case in point where this position becomes a patronage position.

In order to elaborate on this issue, we need to reconsider the domestic cycle in Turkish Cypriot society. Sons were an asset for the household; the latter was usually virilocal and in many cases joint, patrilocal. So, a particular family had the chance to concentrate living and working arrangements, grow wealthier and usually establish direct political control over the co-villagers; in other words, the domestic cycle entailed an economic cycle. Of course, this kind of empire building was rare but nevertheless, it did happen.

The assymetrical relationships within every aspect of the Turkish Cypriot

community are promising seedbeds of inequality, patronage and patron/client relations. This was experienced both at the local level of the domestic interior and the global level of the village. In the former case, as we have already seen, every household contained a living room but only the better off could afford a guest room. In other words, to have a guest room is a mark of wealth and standing; the wealthier houses had one, the humbler and poorer ones on the whole did not.

This room is more than an entertainment room; the interpretation at this point overcomes the limits of cultural entities and enters into the area of political interpretation. Attendance in one of those rooms, implied political submission to and support of its owner; no one would enter a guest room of a man he regarded as an enemy.[11]

At the global level of the village, as we have seen above, due to the domestic cycle described above, wealthy households tended to cluster in particular locations while poorer houses were located in different mahalles. Each group exhibited different syntactic properties; the poorer were isolated within the segregated areas of the villages while the wealthy were concentrated in the centre of things, occupying the most integrating areas.

In other words, both the local and the global level of the Turkish society can be seen as a spatial mapping of a strong hierarchy in terms of social status and wealth within the villages.

In a similar way, different social groups within this community were spatially se - parated. "Poorer" households were shown to be located in deep and segregated areas, while "wealthy" households were found in more integrated areas. So, while "poor" people were isolated and both locally and globally weak, wealthier people were both locally and globally strong; locally through the neighbourhoods and glo-bally through their political power over the whole village.

In other words, the Turkish Cypriot community is spatially fixed and territorially runs on a correspondence model and tends towards a deterministic model with a space full-governed encounter system.

In the Greek Cypriot community we find an endogenous model organising relations within and between the households, which are spatially stable but non-territorial. Separation between the sexes is not built into space as in the Turkish Cypriot community. Within the household, men and women occupy similar spaces, so do inhabitants and visitors. The relation of the interior to the exterior allows interaction to take place in the public space of the village. Although the exterior was found to be relatively segregated from the living functions, the relations between neighbours and especially women, overcomes this segregation.

Interaction between men and women, inhabitants and visitors, inhabitants and inhabitants, took place in the open space structure of the villages and across space.

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Men interacted in the coffee shops and the open space of the village while women interacted in groups, in the neighbourhoods. In other words, men are globally strong in non-distributed way but are internally split; women are locally strong but in a distributed way and do not encounter each other in large numbers; more non-correspondence for women.

Interaction between visitors and inhabitants also took place in the open space structure of the villages. Residential neighbourhoods, although more segregated, were not cut off from the villages' centre and encounters between inhabitants and visitors took place throughout the villages. In other words, the Greek Cypriot community is non-correspondent with a fluid arrangement of people in space, runs on a short model and tends towards a probabilistic system with a pattern of dense and probabilistic encounters within the villages.

After examining if spatial differences between houses and quarters were associated with social class differentiation between different social groups of the two communities, it was shown that at the level of the domestic interior spatial differences within each ethnic group were indeed associated with different occupational classes.

In the Greek Cypriot houses *loggias* and in general transition spaces were added in the higher occupational classes, making the exterior more segregated and therefore marking a move from the spatial to the transpatial; in a similar way the living rooms became deeper and more segregated. However, at the global level of the villages it was shown that within the Greek Cypriot community social differentiation resulted in minor changes in the form of their spatial organisation.

It mightnot be too far-fetched to suggest that the strong adherence to rules in the Turkish Cypriot society splits space and social activity into pieces, largely reflecting the actual pattern of life within Islamic law. The generalised principles within it, allow a visitor to have a literal grasp of their world. Society is expressed directly through the way in which the space pattern is lived; it is a fact, a reality.

In the Greek Cypriot society, the weakening of rules and the randomness characterising the spatial patterns has the potentiality to invest in space many relations and structures that may show the tendency of the whole system towards a more symbolic representation of reality. In other words, what a visitor experiences might exist precariously in the particular layout due to the numbers of unstructured events ta- king place, and be merely a symbolic representation of reality.

NOTES

1. The sample used for the analysis consists of fourteen Cypriot villages: four purely Greek Cypriot, four purely Turkish Cypriot and six mixed villages. At the local

level, the sample is made up of 184 houses taken from the above villages: 93 Greek Cypriot houses and 91 Turkish Cypriot houses.

2. "Space Syntax" is a set of techniques for the representation and quantification of spatial patterns.

3. This pattern is represented by the justified or access graph. In this graph, each effective space (room), is represented by a circle, each subsidiary space (stable, stores) and transitions (stairs, verandas) by a point and each permeability (door, opening) by a line. The exterior (in this case the open space of the village) is selected as the "root" and the rest of the spaces are then aligned above it according to how many spaces one must pass through to arrive at each space from the rest. The number of spaces that need to be crossed to move from one space to another is defined as the Depth between two spaces. The relative depth of the space taken as the root from all others in the justified graph is used in this paper as the quantified form of depth, the Real Relative Asymmetry, ARA. Low values of RRA indicate a space from which the system is shallow, that is a space which tends to integrate the system, and high values indicate a space which tends to be segregated from the system.

4. To make this observation more precise, a symmetric complex or subcomplex is one in which the relation of cell a to cell bis the same as that from cell b to cell a; an asymmetric complex is one in which one or more cells control permeability to at least one other cell, thus in the case of a and b, they are asymmetric components with respect to each other but both are asymmetrically related to c.

. 5. All values are the mean values of total ARA, ARA of living rooms, yard, kitchens, bedrooms, functional spaces, transitions and exterior. Careful study of the information obtained from the Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance in Cyprus led to the differentiation of occupations in four occupational classes. Guidance was also given by the village's headman. Information on Turkish Cypriot houses is based on informatin provided by local people and headmen familiar with the village's history. It should be noted here that the apparent lack of class crystallisation was manifested in the Cypriot villages where we could not find clusters of families with clearly defined characteristics such as mannerisms, clothing and style of life that one may encounter in other developing societies. There are to some extent some wealthy and some poor and there is the great majority in the middle. To that extent there are social classes in the villages if we restrict the concept "class" to the economic position of the individual within the economic sphere.

6. The Axial map of each settlement is represented in its quantifiable form; that is, in terms of its Real Relative Asymmetry, RRA. This value measures the integration of the system, it compares how deep the system is from a certain axial line with how

deep it could theoretically be. Low values of RRA indicate axial lines with "low integration" or "segregated" and are shown in dark black lines.

7. Convex Articulation is given in average number of buildings per convex space. Convex Organisation is given as the axial integration of convex spaces (average number of convex spaces per axial line). Axial articulation is given in average number of buildings per axial line. Axial organisation values are given in RRA values from the outside. RA3 is the integration value within three steps of the local system under study.

8. The integration core of a settlement consists of the 10% most integrating lines.

9. A label grouping is called here transpatial because it does not depend on spatial proximity.

10. The presentation of social structures is by no means exhaustive. Themes are selected in relation to the paper's main concerns and are to a large extent gene-ralised. Differences in social organisation also exist; however, villages were chosen from the same region in order to avoid possible regional variability, and themes were carefully selected in order to give a clear picture of the prevailing social structures.

11. Stirling (1965) has gone so far to argue that the existence of a very roughly agreed scale or rank in the villages became clear from the seating arrangements in the guest room; the position nearest the fireplace was that of the greatest honour.

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
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
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
village 13 - Potamia
Ethnic Origin: Mixed

Greek Cypriots


13.01

13.02

13.03 Ground Floor   First Floor

Village 11 - Pyrga
Ethnic Origin: Mixed

Turkish Cypriots

11.01


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
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
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
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Justified Graphs

Fig. 4a. Global Analysis - Greek Cypriot Villages

Syntactic Properties		
Synt. Prop.	Values	Rank
Convex Articul.	1.65	7
Axial Organis.	1.26	1
RA3	1.59	8
Connect.	2.71	7

Code: Village 5
Name: Melmoyia
Ethnic Group: Turkish-Cypriot
Population: 143

Syntactic Properties		
Synt. Prop.	Values	Rank
Convex Articul.	1.61	4
Axial Organis.	1.23	2
RA3	1.9	5
Connect.	3.26	3

Code: Village 6
Name: Klavdia
Ethnic Group: Turkish-Cypriot
Population: 524

Fig. 4b. Global Analysis - Turkish Cypriot Villages

Convex Break-up Map

Axial Integration Map

Syntactic Properties		
Synt. Prop.	Values	Rank
Convex Articul.	1.75	16
Axial Organis	1.22	3
RA3	2.00	1
Connect.	3.41	2

Open Space Map

Interface Map

Code: Village 14
Name: Pyla
Ethnic Group: Mixed
Population: 961

Convex Break-up Map

Axial Integration Map

Syntactic Properties		
Synt. Prop.	Values	Rank
Convex Articul.	1.63	6
Axial Organis.	.92	9
RA3	1.78	4
Connect.	2.97	6

Open Space Map

Interface Map

Code: Village 11
Name: Pyrga
Ethnic Group: Mixed
Population: 381

Fig. 4c. Global Analysis - Mixed Villages

THE CYPRIOT WELFARE STATE: CONTRADICTION AND CRISIS?

Anthos Shekeris

Abstract

*Within the Framework of the socio-economic evolution of Cyprus the welfare system of the island is depicted since the 1960s. A discussion then follows as to what extent Cyprus can be viewed as a welfare state using Mishras' (1990) definition and in what category it falls under using Esping-Anderson categorization (in Mishra 1990). Finally, a brief overview of the contradiction of the Cypriot conservative/corporatist welfare state is highlighted vis-à-vis its crisis-ridden Eurooean counterparts.*

Introduction

(a) The Theory

Ramesh Mishra defines the welfare state as:

> a liberal state which assumes responsibility for the well-being of its citizens through a range of interventions in the market economy, e.g. full employment policies and social welfare services. The term includes both the idea of state responsibility for welfare as well as the institutions and practices through which the idea is given effect.[1]

The general principle in simple terms, as Mishra clarifies, is the fact that governments could and should indeed assume responsibility for the welfare of their citizens in terms of "... maintaining a decent standard of life for all citizens."[2] Three major elements are incorporated within this general principle. Primarily Mishra claims that a regulation of the market economy should exist so that a high and stable level of employment could be maintained. Second, it incorporates the public provision of a wide range of social services eminent amongst these being education, income security, medical care, housing and different personal social services aimed at meeting the very basic needs of citizens. What has however, to be pointed out is the fact that these social services are regarded as universal. This important principle of universality implies that state services are actually meant for

all citizens and not merely for those with a low income. Finally, a 'safety net' of various assistance services based on a test of income or specific arrangements to satisfy rather exceptional cases of need and to abate poverty should exist.[3] In fact what is required is that the government has an active as well as ongoing role of intervention "... to keep inequalities in check."

Cyprus[5] since the 1980s can be classified as a social welfare state as it is in line with the definition given by Mishra. However, to fully comprehend this a general introduction to the economy of Cyprus is required. The social welfare services of the island follow the history of the political economy of Cyprus like many European countries whereby "economic growth was [...] the irreplaceable foundation of the traditional welfare state."[6]

(b) Sociopolitica/ History of Cyprus: An Overview

Primarily, what has to be put forward regarding Cyprus is size. Size in terms of territory, population as well as economy, has, throughout history, dictated the fate of the island. Cyprus is a micro-state being highly dependent on the outside world and has therefore been characterized as a price taker dealing with problems of limited proportion.[7] Its geographic position gives it a certain status because being surrounded by Eurasia and Africa, Cyprus has always had an offshore function.[8] Its history has always been dictated by external factors and as Wilson claims "most of the great Mediterranean and Middle Eastern civilizations have left their mark on the island."[9] Therefore, today imprints of its past conquerors are to be found on the islands' economy, culture, politics, and population.

In terms of natural resources Cyprus has been quite limited. In fact land and water make up the most important physical resources of the island. Agriculture takes up only about a third of the land whilst the rest has been taken over for "... more profitable uses - residential, commercial, industrial, transport and tourism."[10] Water tends to be a limited resource for it undergoes fluctuations that sometimes reach a very painful degree although major water storage as well as distribution works in the 1980s have managed to cushion these shocks. What is however, crucial and exceptionally vital as a resource is the islands' population. In short, as Christodoulou clarifies, its effective as well as efficient use may perhaps constitute the most vital element for the economy of Cyprus in the future.[11]

Since 1988 Cyprus has been officially ranked with the high-income economies of the world. With independence in 1960, the newly formed Republic of Cyprus, in spite of the limited development undertaken by the British,[12] inherited an economy with symptoms of underdevelopment.[13] Therefore, the predominant and central issue for the government became development, the latter being pursued both in a systematic way and on a much larger scale.[14] The basic principles of indicative

planning were adopted and so five-year development plans were established which clearly embodied both the development strategy and economic policy of the government.[15] Furthermore, considerable efforts were undertaken by the government to raise the level of health, social security, education and general welfare.[16] The years between 1960 and early 1974 were characteristic of sustained economic growth but as early as 1963 inter-communal clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots broke out.[17] By 1974 an escalation in the inter-communal fighting between the two communities and a failed coup d'etat led by the dictatorial junta of Greece, provided the pretext for invasion of the island by Turkey. The invasion left the island with 37% of its territory occupied by Turkey and a shattered economy.[18]

In spite of this very big setback, the economy of the island managed, within a relatively short time, to recover. This recovery is indicated by the impressive rate of real growth which averaged about 8,5% over the period 1976-81.[19] Behind this, to some extent "miraculous" recovery, was a series of Emergency Economic Action Plans implemented by the government of Cyprus together with the"... spirit of social solidarity and with a will to survive [the people of Cyprus] rebuilt their lives, their political institutions and their economy."[20] Manufacturing and construction were to become the dominant sectors for employment soon after the invasion. Although by the end of the '70s domestic exports showed a poor performance the economy however had actually achieved a higher average rate of growth than expected. What was in fact responsible for this growth was the performance of tourism. Since then the tourist industry has become the dominant activity in the economy of Cyprus and has been characterized as the "... main engine driving economic growth."[21]

To some extent the economy of Cyprus had undergone a rigorous transformation. Although today the primary and secondary sectors are of extreme importance the service sector over the past two decades has acquired an ever growing importance. In the 1980s the rate of growth of economic activities, in real terms, averaged 6,2% per year, and unemployment averaged 2,9% (even declining to 1,8% in 1990).[22] The rate of economic growth in 1994 was approximately 5%, whereby unemployment averaged 2,7%, and inflation 4,7%. In addition to this, the 1994-98 Strategic Development Plan was designed within guidelines that emphasized adjustment of the policies of Cyprus in the socio-economic sector towards those in Europe. Specifically"... through the gradual adoption of secondary legislation and the policies of the European Union and its convergence with the Maastricht Treaty."[24] The final goal of this plan being accession of Cyprus to the European Union following the Association Agreement of 1972 and the Customs Union Agreement of 1987 between the two parties.[25]

In general terms the population as already claimed is relatively small in fact it is relatively smaller "... than the population of most European capital cities and only around that of Oslo, Norway" being even smaller than the population of Palermo,

Sicily.[26] Females exceed males the lowest ever ratio being recorded being in 1960 whereby the ratio was 967 males per 1000 females.[27] Moreover, as Chappa clarifies 1960 can be regarded as the"... beginning of a gradual aging population."[28] The aging of the population increased even more, for by 1987 the median age reached 29,8 whilst the proportion of children below 15 decreased to 25,4% with the cohort of old aged persons 65 and older increased to 10,4%. A drop in fertility also occurred giving further impetus to this aging population. Although this does not compare to European populations who have a median age of approximately 38 years it must be pointed out that the population of Cyprus has not reached an advanced stage of aging.[29]

The 1974 invasion along with the economic devastation also created a severe social and demographic setback. Massive emigration, geographic redistribution of population together with fertility decline as well as increased mortality summarize the two year period after the invasion. However, by 1994 the mid-year population was estimated as 638, 300 in the Government controlled area. In spite of an aging population and a drop in fertility the latter population is seen as increasing particularly between 1989 and 1993. This is due to the fact that the government allowed foreign workers into Cyprus to alleviate acute labour shortages. In addition to this an increase of expatriates returning to Cyprus for permanent settlement has occurred. Furthermore, the fertility rate for 1993 was 2,3 continuing to be just above replacement level. Men however, in 1993 made up 49,8% of the population and women 50,2%. The Crude Birth Rate per 1000 population was estimated as 16,8 whereas the Crude Death Rate per 1000 population at 7,7.[30]

Chappa forecasts an outline of the future population trends as well as prospects for the period 1985-2020. Various .conclusions are drawn from Chappas analysis:

• The population will undoubtedly continue to increase even though fertility will decline below replacement level.

• There will be a general rise in the number of elderly people exceeding 13% by the year 2020 under the most conservative assumptions.

• The share of the youthful population to the total will be actually declining after 1990.

Primarily, what must be highlighted is the fact that these conclusions have undoubtedly an impact on the welfare state; in particular due to the limited population growth and the increase of the elderly combined with a decrease in the youthful population.[31] In fact, these factors which are even evident today, strain to some extent the economy. This overall sums up the small scale of the most vital resource in Cyprus - its population.[32]

(c) Objective of Study

Taking into consideration the definition of the welfare state given by Mishra and in the light of the economic overview of Cyprus an attempt will be made to illustrate the evolution of Cyprus as a welfare state since independence in 1960. A discussion will follow as to how far this complies with the definition of Mishra and the different course taken by Cyprus from its other European counter parts.

Cyprus: The Ironic Establishment of the Welfare State

The size along with the history of the island also gave it an altogether different path towards becoming a welfare state than the post-war European states.[33] Primarily the Republic in 1960 inherited a similar but limited and basic social welfare system, to that of its colonial power Great Britain. In the early 1960's there existed a probation service as well as a child care program made up of foster care and children's homes. In addition to this there existed a 'Public Assistance Scheme' *for* the relief of poverty which was administered by District Commissioners. What can be highlighted from the colonial era is the fact that the excellent legislative and administrative foundation left behind allowed *for* the modern social welfare service to be built.[34] Therefore, once the colonial "yoke" was lifted huge improvements in terms of development were achieved.[35] From the 'birth' of the Republic and even today all social welfare services are incorporated under the Department of Social Welfare Services. The department itself is under the competency of the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance, making it perhaps as Konis claims "... the most comprehensive in the world[...] [as one] department has undertaken to provide all [social welfare] services ..."[36]

The actual importance of efficient and effective social services however, albeit somewhat ironically, became apparent after the invasion and occupation of the island in 1974. The shear fact that a third of the population was uprooted resulted in the creation of many social problems and an immense increase of vulnerable and dependent groups on the state.[37] In fact, as Christodoulou clarifies, the development agenda was radically altered with the refugee crisis topping it.[38] Aid, as the long term was to indicate, was used effectively[39] and in fact what actually occurred as Zetter states was that "... despite the rural-agrarian origins of the majority of the refugees, they were incorporated into an urban wage-economy through labor intensive policies structured around an urban industrial base."[40] Indeed:

paradoxically [and ironically] the remarkable experience of Cyprus over the

last two decades in rebuilding its economy from the disaster of ethnic conflict now provides a very significant model for the reconstruction which will inevitably have to take place much closer to the European core, Cyprus is well placed to advise other European states on the issues of large scale forced migration from its experience![41]

The government, in the early years of the invasion, had focused primarily on fulfilling the basic survival needs of refugee.[42] Achieving this, it has slowly moved to the provision of long-term housing services, free education, health services, a wage related social insurance scheme, scholarships and loans for needy students in order to study abroad, new schools, hospitals, as well as old people's homes, geriatric centers, community welfare centers, children and youth homes, hostels and day-care centers.[43] By 1981 Cyprus could be classified as a welfare state within the parameters set by Mishra, for the government clearly defined its social policy with the following three basic objectives:

• to secure a minimum acceptable standard of living for all citizens, especially for those who do not participate, or participate to a limited extent, in the productive process.

• attain a more equitable distribution of the national income and the tax burden, both between different income groups as well as regions; special emphasis being attached on improving the income position of the refugees.

• implement as well as improve existing social programs by preparing the introduction of new institutions, programs and schemes aiming at the steady improvement of the social services so as to respond effectively to the expectations of those in real need.[44]

These were to be achieved through a wide variety of social services such as the implementation of a massive house program, introduction of a wage related social insurance scheme, provision of free medical services to the needy, and the extension of free education to the first three classes of general education as well as to all technical and vocational training.

(a) Labor and Social Insurance

(i) Unemployment

In the early aftermath of the invasion the unoccupied part of the Republic faced a multitude of acute problems with respect to its human power. Primarily, it faced a problem of the influx of as Christodoulou clarifies"... people totally assetless into an economy robbed of most of its productive capacity ..."[45] In addition to this, a large proportion of the people were proletarianised overnight. That is, this predominantly rural population was turned into a large pool of labor and eventually housed in

various refugee settlements developed near urban areas. However, this very specific factor was taken by the government seriously and so as Christodoulou clarifies "the problem of the size and characteristics of population and labor force utilization begun to receive systematic attention."[46]

The government of Cyprus following the invasion in 1974 set out, in the form of emergency economic action plans, to resolve the acute problems created especially with regards to the mass unemployment. The First Emergency Economic Action Plan 1975-76 set out to:

• make up of the lost production and to raise investment

• economize and increase foreign exchange

• *provide maximum employment*

• distribute more equitably the new burdens so as to ensure an acceptable general living standard[47]

At the beginning employment opportunities were to a large extent hastily improvised but were soon to be taken over by manufacturing and construction which dominated the economy of Cyprus until the end of the 1970s. Therefore within a relative short period of time the government from its initial interventions managed to lower the unemployment rate by aggressive internal policies via interventions in the economy.[48] In fact, the government managed to create a "... very fast rate of growth of economic activity [which] was translated into expanding job opportunities.[49] The economy overall has managed to sustain the unemployed at a very low level. In fact the unemployment rate has never risen (since 1975) beyond 3,7% (1986) and has somewhat stabilized between 1,8% to 2,8%. The effectiveness of the governments' indicative planning has evidently been fruitful. The four emergency plans set forth from 1975 until 1988 incorporated guidelines made up by the government for the private sector, having always as a general aim employment levels. Where the private sector was either unable or reluctant to proceed with the implementation of the objectives and targets of the plan the government would take initiative and intervene decisively.[50] From 1988 the government has moved away from this policy and although the general 'health' of the economy is still of prime importance the government merely provides guidelines for the private sector but forges ahead with its own operations.[51]

(ii) Social Insurance

A year after the invasion, in 1975 the first law with regards to social insurance was passed which as Konis clarifies was "... to provide for the payment of public allowances and the provision of services to persons in need." In fact the law went further in giving the rights to every Cypriot citizen to a minimum income in order to

satisfy basic or special needs.[52] Primarily this focused upon refugees but with the gradual improvement of the economy, the government by 1980 established a new social insurance scheme whereby contributions to and benefits from the scheme became earnings related. It covers all employed people as well as self-employed. Employees contribute 16,6% of their earnings (the maximum being Cy£1265 per month). Out of the 16,6%, the employee, 6,3%, pays 6,3% by the employer, and 4% is put in from the General Revenue of the Republic. Self-employed people contribute 15,6% of their income; 11,6% paid by themselves and 3,5% by the General Revenue of the Republic.[53]

The scheme provides benefits such as: maternity allowance, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old-age pension, invalidity pension, widows pension, orphans benefit, missing person's allowance,[54] marriage grant, funeral grant and benefits for employment accidents and occupational diseases, disablement benefit and death benefit. Moreover, since March 1995 the government provides a pension to housewives who have reached the age of sixty-eight.[55]

(b) Education

The responsibility for overall education lies with the Ministry of Education and Culture. Public schools are state-funded and offer free pre-primary, primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Private institutions tend to raise their income from tuition fees and various state subsidies. Secondary education is given at either Lyceums that offer elective subjects or Technical/Vocation Schools. Furthermore, special schools are run by the state for physically handicapped and mentally retarded children.

With independence, the government, considering the structural weaknesses of the economy it had inherited and with a large agrarian labor force, developed specialized institutions to deal with these problems. In 1963 with the aid of the United Nations Development Program and the International Labor Office the Cyprus Productivity Center (CPC) was established to help both the private and the public sector to use its human and capital resources to increase productivity. Today vocational training programs, workshops and seminars are organized both for management and employees.[56] In addition to this the Higher Technical Institute (HTI), the Higher Hotel Institute Cyprus (HHIC), the Forestry College, the School of Nursing and Mid-Wifery, were also created. The HTI, offers three-year full-time courses for the Diploma of Technician Engineer in: Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Marine Engineering, and Computer Studies. The HHIC offers a three-year Diploma in Hotel and Catering Management, Culinary Arts Program, and a one-year Front Office and Housekeeping program.[57] All these tertiary education programs are offered free of charge to Cypriot nationals. What has also to be pointed out is that only since 1992 the University of Cyprus started

its operations. It was expected to reach its full operational level with 4,000 students in 1998. This undoubtedly will add more stress to the economy as the welfare budget has and will increase even more.

(c) The Health Services

Three general systems of Medical Services provide the medical needs of Cyprus:

      i.   The Government Health Sector

      ii.   The Private Health Sector

and   iii.   Various schemes covering specific sections of the population.[58]

The Government Health Sector provides medical and health care free of charge to refugees, the army and civil servants (along with their dependents). It also provides medical care at reduced rates or free of charge to citizens of a low and middle income.[59] That is, individuals who earn less than Cy£2,750 per year, households earning less than Cy£4,600 per year as well as households with more than three dependents receive free health care. Individuals who do not earn more than Cy£4,750 and households that do not earn more than Cy£7,000 are eligible for reduced rates.[60]

The private sector has a large number of physicians in either individual practice or who have created polyclinics offering a wide range of medical services. Patients pay for each consultation and so the latter sector is open to anyone who can afford to pay the actual treatment.[61] What must be pointed out however is that a comprehensive and integrated National Health Insurance scheme does not exist. The health care system today, in its totality, both public and private, has an excess supply of doctors[62] and facilities. In addition to this it is characteristic of a somewhat fragmented system of healthcare finance and delivery and therefore could be dealt a severe blow in terms of bankruptcy. This problem is further enhanced by the fact that medical care is provided free of charge to all the cases that are treated by the Accident and Emergency Departments irrespective of the economic situation of the person involved.[63] Considering this, the government has proposed principles and key guidelines for a National Health Insurance (NHI) system to avoid the collapse of the current system.[64]

(d) Housing

Housing became an overnight problem for the government immediately after the Turkish invasion in 1974. Therefore in the 1970s the main issue was the provision

of accommodation to the refugees but in the early 1980s once the former problem was eased the government began to provide for the housing needs of non-refugees with a low or middle income and the population in general.

For the refugees the government established the Special Service for the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons and put forward various schemes and programs that involved:

• Construction of low-cost housing estates

• Self-help housing schemes through the provision of free building plots and grants-in-aid to cover part of the construction, or the provision of grants-in-aid and low long-term interests to build on land of their own or to purchase a house or flat

• Rent subsidies are provided to eligible refugees

• Refugee civil servants have their own housing schemes made up of long-term, low interest loans.

The government also provides for the low and middle income population in general through the Cyprus Land Development Corporation (CLDC) and the Housing Finance Corporation (HFC). The former CLDC provides land and houses for prices lower than the private sector; whereas the HFC provides low interest long-term loans, eligibility for both being income related.[65]

ii. **Discussion**

Cyprus was to a large extent, in contrast to other European welfare states, a late comer. Whereby in countries such as the United Kingdom, the golden age of the welfare state can be traced and identified as a 'by-product' of the Second World War, it is pointed out that:

> ... welfare states tended to emerge in societies in which capitalism and the nation state were both already well established and these pre-existing economic and state formations have themselves prescribed the limits of subsequent welfare state development.

In addition to this what is seen is that in fact the increasing trend of industrialization prompted states to actually adopt welfare policy. However, the welfare state as known today was, as Pierson claims, an innovation that was "... both gradual and mundane ..."[67] Pierson goes further to clarify that in fact one cannot pin point the exact origins of the welfare state but puts forward three sets of criteria which can also put Cyprus into perspective.[68]

Cyprus could be classified as a welfare state only in 1980. It had first introduced a rather concrete as well as comprehensive social insurance scheme in 1980. The

government of Cyprus can be seen as moving towards the direction of de-pauperizing its public welfare during the period 1980-until today. Furthermore, although still quite small in contrast to many countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), social expenditure in Cyprus had moved away from the 3% of GNP which is taken by Pierson as the"... notional indicator of the origins of the welfare state."[69]

Undoubtedly, various major events in the late history of Cyprus account for the late introduction of welfarism. Primarily, to a large extent Cyprus did not feel the full repercussions of World War II as many of its European counterparts did. Furthermore, Cyprus during this time was under British rule which only in the late 1940s began to implement major (-in contrast to the previous sixty years-) development plans. However, between 1955-60 the British faced an armed insurrection and thus halted abruptly all development. With independence in 1960 the newly established Cypriot government would face deep political divisions and ethnic strife which would culminate in 1974 with the Turkish invasion. These latter events do indeed clarify to a large extent this delay.[70] In fact 1974 and the aftermath can be regarded as a similar period faced by Western Europe during and after the Two World Wars. The period after the invasion can also be seen as the 'Golden Age' of the welfare state as suggested by Pierson. The major difference with Cyprus though is that it 'missed' out on the industrialization phase. In spite of this what can be claimed is that Britain as a colonial power had already initiated on a very small scale welfarism. Cyprus following independence worked within the constraints set by colonialism for as Gifford and Louis clarify independent states inherited:

> international boundaries; military and police forces [...]; a revenue system based on agricultural products and raw materials, the external value of which would fluctuate with the world market; [...] parliament; and usually government offices with files, typewriters, and telephones[72]

and as Hargreaves clearly points out"... men have to operate in conditions shaped by history; and Africa's [as well as Cyprus] most recent historical experience is of colonial rule."[73] Undoubtedly, as Wilson states, the island was left in a sense far better equipped to understand and deal with Europe and is in fact in more harmony "... with the community than mainland Greece."[74] So even though Cyprus did not undergo industrialization like other European countries, Britain had not only set the foundations for the welfare state but had in a very limited sense promoted it.[75]

From 1974 onwards the introduction of welfare policy in Cyprus evolves together with the actual improvement of the economy. Pierson expresses this link claiming that ".... the growth in prosperity [...] generat[es] the necessary resources for the expansion of social programs."[76] It is a fact that other political reasons such as the mobilization of labor movements or the growing capacity of interest groups to mobilize in favor of sectional interests also play an active role.[77] In retrospect, however the Cyprus government provided whatever possible for its citizens shortly

after the invasion and the destruction it had caused. What has to be pointed out is the effectiveness of the government in terms of actually implementing the emergency plans drawn up every five years covering primarily the economy. Indeed the government, as Mishra claims did regulate its market economy and in a short time managed to sustain a high and stable level of employment. Undoubtedly, the government, with the guidance it offered to the private sector and its interventions where the latter failed, brought about miraculous achievements within a relatively short time in the economic sphere.[78]

In addition to this, the government following the establishment of employment, housing of refugees, education policy, and health policy has begun to assume responsibility for the welfare of its citizens in terms of "... maintaining a decent standard of life for all citizens."[79] The government by the late 1970s began directing policy towards the public as a whole providing a wide range of social services eminent among them free education, income security, medical care, housing and various different personal social services which were to a very large extent aimed at meeting the basic needs of all its citizens; in particular the refugees. The government well into the 1980s, and as the economy improved, began to universalize its social services setting out the very important principle adopted by Mishra in that state services are actually meant for all citizens and not merely for those with a low income. Furthermore the welfare state services provided by the government of Cyprus to encompass a 'safety net' based on a test of income and specific arrangements to satisfy rather exceptional cases of need, such as the refugees. This policy, as Mishra defines it, is aimed at abating poverty. In effect the government of Cyprus plays an active as well as ongoing role of intervention in order"... to keep inequalities in check."[81]

However, in spite of extended policy with regards to welfarism it has to be pointed out, that in general, social expenditure in Cyprus is significantly lower than in major (OECD) countries; in 1985 this amounted to only 10% of the GDP. Demetriades and House highlight the lower social expenditure in Cyprus by highlighting various factors which contribute to it.[82] Primarily, it is identified that Cyprus has coverage rates which are much lower than other European countries. That is, the public University of Cyprus has only been functioning for the past three years. Furthermore, the majority of students who study abroad rely heavily on scholarships or private funds to finance their higher educational studies. In fact as Demetriades and House clarify "public expenditure from local sources for Cypriots studying abroad is negligible."[83]

The lack of a National Health Insurance scheme also plays a significant role with respect to this issue. Today it is estimated that 60-70% are eligible for free medical services however the actual utilization rate of government medical services tends to be somewhat lower at 50-60%. In addition to this, the tertiary level of health services has not developed -patients with rare or special diseases often have to

travel abroad for treatment – and there is an absence of any actual research activity unlike many OECD countries.

Furthermore pensions although widespread are relatively low as pensioners tend to receive only basic pensions. What has to be highlighted though, is that the Social Insurance Scheme was only adopted in 1980 and thus can be regarded as far from being mature. Also those over 65 years of age and over make up only 11% of the population in contrast to 15% in most European countries.[84]

Unemployment benefits also shed some light into why social expenditure is so low in Cyprus. It has to be pointed out that unemployment benefits tend to be payable only for the first six months without work unlike many OECD countries where payment is for longer periods. What is of extreme importance with respect to Cyprus is the fact that unemployment has never risen above 3% throughout the 1980s; for 1994 unemployment registered 2,7% substantially lower than any OECD country.[85] Social Expenditure can however, be expected to increase substantially now with the establishment of the University of Cyprus and as the age cohort of 65 years and older is set to increase. The increase of this cohort will also be affected by the fact that women or rather housewives over the age of 65 will be receiving pensions without directly contributing to the economy. Furthermore, due to the increase in the life expectancy at birth -for males 74,6 years and for females 79,1 years- an increase of social expenditure will also be needed to cover the needs of an expanding older cohort who live longer thus requiring more medical treatment and whatever involved with old age.

Conclusion: Contradiction and Crisis?

Pierson poses this question with regards to Western European welfare states which since the early 1970s had undergone a serious strain following the oil crisis. What is pointed out is that "... since 1975, 'the growth party is over' and growth in the welfare state has been severely (though variably) restrained. "[86] Problems and changes to the welfare state are however profound evolving around the changing international political economy that has alternated to a large extent the operations of the welfare states. The underlying factor of this is that the welfare state may, as Pierson clarifies, lose its social democratic vision, the very mechanism used for taming capitalism via its redistributive social policy. It is claimed that the core elements of the welfare state"... the commitment to economic growth, the enabling capacity of the state bureaucracy and the attempt to exercise indirect control over capital are increasingly under challenge."[87]

The welfare state however, will not simply disappear but instead, as Pierson states, it "... will be varyingly "reconstructed" so as to reflect a new pattern of rights and interests" which as clearly illustrated is already occurring. Indeed aggregate

social expenditures does not seem adequate enough to explain this 'reconstruction'. Esping-Anderson analyses this putting forward the notion of the type of welfare state regime a country has.[88]

In the case of Cyprus however, difficulties are observed in actually defining the welfare state in terms of Esping-Andersons' three ideal type typical regime types. Primarily the crisis which has undoubtedly caused discussion in the traditional Western European states has not occurred. Moreover, whereby many of the Western European countries classified as welfare states seem to be curtailing their social expenditures the opposite is occurring in Cyprus. The welfare state under scrutiny is undergoing rapid structuring by strengthening its social policy as well as moving towards universalizing the system as a whole; unlike the restructuring in many welfare states. What can be claimed is that Cyprus, as a welfare state, does not fall under the *liberal welfare state* for its is not dominated by the logic of the market, benefits are not modest whereas the state is moving towards establishing a balance between public/private provision of forms of welfare. In addition to this Cyprus cannot be considered either as a social democratic welfare state. "... Universalism and the usurpation of the market" have not been fully achieved although it seems that the government is moving towards this direction. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that Cyprus, in the way it is structuring its welfare, can be placed among the *conservative I 'corporatist' welfare states*[89] and may be expected to further develop as it is striving towards harmonization with the European Union "... through the gradual adoption of secondary legislation and the policies of the European Union (EU) and its convergence with the Maastricht Treaty."[90] The goal of Cyprus to accede to the EU means that indirectly it will move to upgrade its social policy in order to actually bring it in harmony with the rest of Europe. In spite of the fact that states in Europe are evidently curtailing welfarism due to the recession, Cyprus has the economic viability to keep on structuring and expanding its welfare within pre-established guidelines and examples set by these already existing welfare states.

Overall what can be concluded is that Cyprus historically can be viewed as a contradiction when regarded side by side with already established European welfare states. Moreover, the problems faced by these latter countries can indeed be used to structure a welfare system in Cyprus free of today's ongoing debates concerning welfare states in Europe. Perhaps, as a paradox to what is occurring in general with welfare states harmonization and overall accession of Cyprus to the EU can foresee the creation of a rather well established *conservative/corporatist welfare state,* with a well structured and defined, universalistic and holistic character.

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NOTES

1. Ramesh Mishra. *The Welfare State in Crisis: Social Thought and Social Change.* (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1984), p. xi.

2. Ramesh Mishra. *The Welfare State In Capitalist* Society.(Hetfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 18.

3. Ibid., p.18-19.

4. Ibid., p. 19.

5. Cyprus lies in the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin, the total area of the island is 9,251 Km^2 and is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. It has a population of approximately 700,000 of which 79,2% are Greek Cypriots, 18,6% Turkish Cypriots whilst the final 2% is made up of Armenians and Maronites. Today Cyprus is an independent republic with a constitution modeled on Western democratic systems. It has a presidential system of government with the prime executive, the President, being elected by universal suffrage for a five year term of office. The executive power is exercised by a Council of Ministers appointed by the President. The legislative authority is exercised by the House of Representatives the latter being elected via the system of proportional representation. Justice is administered by the Republic's separate and independent judiciary. In terms of economy the island is a free market with until 1995 a large degree of government intervention in the form of indicative planning.

6. Christopher Pierson. *Beyond the Welfare State?* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995), p. 131.

7. Rodney Wilson. *The External Relations of the Republic of Cyprus.* (A Conference of the Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 20-21 September, 1993), p.1.

8. D. Christodoulou. *A Conceptual Framework for a Political Economy of Twentieth-Century Cyprus.* (A Conference of the Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 20- 21 September, 1993),pp.2-3.

9. Wilson, p.3.

10. Christodoulou (1993), p. 6.

11. Christodoulou (1993), p.7-8.

12. The British, the last colonial conquerors of Cyprus (1878-1960), in 1946 had initiated a Ten-Year Development plan which had injected planned change in the infrastructure, advanced the training of cadres and advanced the development of agriculture and water resources. This was however cut short when the war for independence broke out in 1955.

Sir David Hunt. *Footprints in Cyprus: An illustrated History.* (London: Trigraph Limited West Africa House, 1990), p. 294.

13. Irma Adelman and C. T. Morris. *Society, Politics, & Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach.* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 231 - 265.

14. Christodoulou (1993), p. 20-21.

15. The Republic of Cyprus. *The Republic of Cyprus: An Overview.* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1994), p. 34.

16. Christodoulou (1993), p. 22.

17. *Enosis* (unification with Greece) after independence was still sought by various Greek Cypriots whilst *taksim* (division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots) was sought by various Turkish Cypriots. These contrasting ideologies were to clash soon after 1960. In addition to this as Christodoulou clarifies "... 'independent' Cyprus was given an awkward and flawed constitution which furthermore was imbued with communalism and anti-majoritarian aims" thus creating even more friction.

Christodoulou (1993), p. 28.

18. Yiannis Kranidiotis. *Cyprus and the European Community.* (A Conference of the **Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia** and the **Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London,** 20-21 September, 1993), p. 4.

19. *The Republic of Cyprus: An Overview,* p.36

20. Christodoulou (1993), p. 30.

21. Ibid., p. 7.

22. Central Bank of Cyprus, pp.2-3

23. Republic of Cyprus. *Address by the Minister of Finance before the House of Representatives on the Occasion of the Debate on the Budget for 1995.* Nicosia : Minister of Finance Mr. Chr. Christodoulou, 22nd December, 1994, pp..4-5.

24. Ibid., p. 6.

25. Ibid.

26. Demetrios Christodoulou. *Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini-Economy.* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1992), p. 7

27. Chappa claims that the apparent decrease in the proportion of males could be attributed to one or more of the following factors:

1. Improvement of the enumeration. Some under-enumeration of females in the early Census years might be suspected.

2. Decline of mortality at a higher rate for females than for males as evidenced by the widening of the disparity in life-expectancy in favor of females.

3. Continuing emigration consisting mainly of males

4. The participation of males in wars (i.e. World War I) must have also contributed to the sharp change after 1920.

In Ioanna Chappa. *Demographic Change in Retrospect.* in E. I Demetriades, W. J. House and S. Matsis eds. Population and Human Resources Development in Cyprus: Research and Policy Issues. (Nicosia: Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, 1992), pp. 35-38.

28. Ibid., p. 29.

29. Ibid., p. 41.

30. Planning Bureau. *Five Year Development Plan 1989-1993.* (Nicosia: Central Planning Commission, 1994), p.41.

31. Ibid., p. 42.

32. Christodoulou (1992), p. 7.

33. It is a fact that Cyprus too like its European counterparts is a welfare state and has mixed economy however as evident "welfarism" is very recent in Cyprus.

34. Takis Konis. *" The Progress of Social Welfare Services."* J. Charalambous and G. Georghallides. *Focus on Cyprus.* (London: University of North London, 1993), pp. 90-91.

35. In the early 1960s using UN assistance, plans were made to upgrade professionally staff of the Department of Social Welfare Services with long-term fellowships abroad and an intensive in-service training program. Konis, p. 92.

36. Konis, p. 89. 37. Ibid, pp. 92-94.

38. Christodoulou (1992), p. 11.

39. Republic of Cyprus. *Address by the Minister of Finance before the House of Representatives on the Occasion of the Debate on the Budget for 1995.* Nicosia: Minister of Finance Mr Chr. Christodoulou, 22nd December, 1994, p. 6.

40. Roger Zetter. *The Greek-Cypriot Refugees After Two Decades: Perceptions of Return.* (A Conference of the **Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia** and the **Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London,** 20-21 September, 1993), p.15.

41. Ibid., p. 3.

42. The Republic of Cyprus. *The Cyprus Refugee Problem: Humanitarian Aspects.(Nicosia:* Press and Information Office, 1989), pp.11-12.

43. The Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus. (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1994), p. 159.

44. Ibid.

45. Christodoulou (1992), p. 11.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid, p. **xxxiii.**

48. E.J. Demetriades, W.J. House and S. Matsis."The Labor Market." in E. I Demetriades, W. J. House and S. Matsis eds. *Population and Human Resources Development in Cyprus: Research and Policy Issues.* (Nicosia: Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, 1992), p. 155.

49. Ibid, p. 163.

50. Ibid, p. **xxxvi.**

51. For a comprehensive understanding of the current policy of the government towards indicative planning see: Planning Bureau. *Five Year Development Plan 1989-1993.* (Nicosia: Central Planning Commission, 1994).

52. Kanis, p. 99.

53. The Republic of Cyprus. *The Almanac of Cyprus 1994-95.* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1995), pp. 234-235.

54. 1,619 people have been declared Missing In Action since the invasion.

55. "Pensions to 13,000 Housewives." *Phileleftheros,* Tuesday 24 October 1995, p. 4.

56. Cyprus, pp. 177-181.

57. *The Almanac of Cyprus,* 1994-95, pp.231-234.

58. *Cyprus,* pp. 159-160.

59. The per capita Gross National Product for 1995 was CY£6,057 (U.S.$ 12,720), *Economic and Social Indicators,* p. 19.

60. *The Almanac of Cyprus* 1994-95, pp. 214.

61. Ibid., p. 216.

62. It must be pointed out that in 1993 there were 433 persons per doctor, 235 persons per nurse, 191 persons per hospital bed; these evidently can be considered as quite high.

In Republic of Cyprus: Cyprus in Figures 1994. p. 8.

63. Cyprus, p. 160.

64. *The Almanac of Cyprus:* 1994-95, p. 219. 65. *Cyprus,* pp. 161-165.

66. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

67. Ibid, p. 105.

68. For a full description of the origins and development of the welfare state see Pierson (1995) pp. 102-140.

69. Ibid., p. 107

70. For an account of these turbulent years in the history of Cyprus see: M. A. Attalides. *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics.* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979) and R. Katsiaounis. *Society and Politics During British Rule.* (A Conference of the **Cyprus Research Center, Nicosia** and the **Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London,** 20-21 September, 1993).

71. Pierson (1995), pp. 125-140.

72. P. Gifford and R. W. M. Louis. *Decolonization and African Independence.* (New York: 1988), p. xi.

73. J. D. Hargreaves. *Decolonization in Africa.* (New York: Longman Inc., 1989), p. 230.

74. Wilson (1993), p. 3.

75. Konis (1993), p. 90-91.

76. Pierson (1995), p. 140.

77. Ibid.

78. Christodoulou (1992), pp.: xxiii-x1ii. 79. Mishra (1990), p. 18.

80. Ibid, (1984), pp. 18-19.

81. Ibid., p. 19.

82. E.I. Demitriades and W.J. House. "The Impact of Demographic Change on Social Expenditure." in E. I. Demetriades, W. J. House and S. Matsis eds. *Population and Human Resources Development in Cyprus: Research and Policy Issues.* (Nicosia: Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, 1992), p. 123-152.

83. Ibid., p. 133.

84. •Ibid., p; 129.

85. Ibid.

86. Pierson (1995), p. 177.

87. Ibid., p. 177-178.

88. Ibid., p.184-186.

89. Ibid., p. 187.

90. Republic of Cyprus. *Address by the Minister of Finance before the House of Representatives on the Occasion of the Debate on the Budget for 1995.* Nicosia: Ministry of Finance Mr. Chr. Christodoulou, 22nd December, 1994, p.6.

Commentary

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S-300s REVISITED

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The Cyprus problem is certainly going through a delicate phase. At the international level the quiet yet intense diplomatic motions behind the scenes are as yet to produce any tangible movements on the ground. At the European level the ongoing application of the Governemnt of the Republic for accession to the EU could potentially sabotage Turkey's relations with the European Union. As such Ankara is anxious to sever this process through whatever means available. Her national interests dictate that short of a settlement in Cyprus, Cyprus' accession to the European Union would put her in the most uncomfortable position of being the occupier of the territory of a member of the European Union. She does not want that. And for that matter, nor do the Europeans. What is to be done?

S-300 is now a phrase all too familiar to all Cypriots and those following Cypriot current developments. This saga which took new turns in opposite directions every so often had provided the Turks with the ideal scenario they could wish for. And as an added bonus for them it was a scenario they had not created. It was handed to them on a plate. The introduction of the S-300 missiles would have reinforced the military aspect of the problem in Cyprus and that would have been a welcome development for the Turks in two respects.

Firstly as Turkey enjoys overwhelming military superiority vis-a-vis Cyprus and Greece, the transformation of the struggle for Cyprus from political arenas to military battlefields would only strengthen Ankara's negotiating hand. It is usually at times of direct military confrontation or just before it that the more powerful can extract more concessions from the military subdued party. We have already seen that in Cyprus in 1967 and 1974 when in the former case 10,000 Greek troops had to leave the island at the behest of the Turks and in the latter period when the introduction of Turkish military power into the equation changed both the nature and the prospective solution to the problem of Cyprus.

Moreover, had the missiles arrived and been deployed in Cyprus, the threat of a military action by Turkey would have been enough to deter the tourists from the islands for as long as that threat remained in force. Such a scenario would have been detrimental to the development of Cypriot economy. Ankara would not even have needed to fire a bullet but keep the pressure on the economy of Greek Cypriots by repeating and keeping the threat of a strike alive. Deterring tourists is a far easier task than attracting them. In such an eventuality even after the issue of the missiles had been resolved it would have taken money, time and effort to re- attract the deterred tourists who in the meantime may have discovered new holiday

resorts.

Secondly and perhaps even more importantly would have been the impact of the missile crisis on Cyprus's application to join the European Union. Had the missiles arrived and been deployed - which would have been against the opinion of almost all EU member states - the resulting tension could have only delayed the process of accession . It is quite a different proposition to allow a divided Cyprus into the Union at the risk of disrupting EU-Turkey relations and disregarding the wishes of Washington, from one in which Cyprus as prospective member would have seemed at the brink of war or military confrontation with Turkey. Even if the former were not a terribly attractive scenario, the latter would appear a desirably avoidable one.

Such a development would have automatically assisted Turkey in tackling her problems as regards Cyprus' application for full membership. Without having played a role in the resultant political drama and therefore bereft of any blame for it, her case against Cyprus' admission into the EU would have been backed up by a new and powerful reality on the ground: the volatility of the situation. No doubt she would have also claimed that it was an untimely and ill-advised position taken by the EU on Cyprus' application that proffered Greek Cypriots the misguided courage to indulge in such a military procurement. Furthermore even when her European partners advised Cyprus to refrain from importing the missiles, Ankara would have added, Greek Cypriots went ahead and acted unilaterally. These arguments and more would have not been helpful to project a positive image of Cyprus to Europeans particularly at a time when they wish and work for their full cooperation.

Two other points beg to the mentioned here. One was the position of Athens and the other the question of Russia. As the least developments indicate (and they have been indicated for a long time) the Government of Prime Minister Simitis, to put it mildly, was not fully behind the importation of the missiles into Cyprus. Why? The reasons are clear and simple. What was Greece going to achieve from a military confrontation with Ankara? Probably nothing. There were and are no foreseeable gains in such an act for Athens, be it military, political, economic or social. What was she going to lose from such a confrontation? Probably quite a lot; the most important of which would have been a deferment of her plans to join the European single currency; not to mention the renewal of hostility with Ankara which as a long- term political strategy Greece seriously wishes to avoid. Therefore why should Greece have supported this move? There are no convincing answers to that question.

The question of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis Cyprus should not go unheeded either. The Russians and their predecessors, the Soviet Union, have always been interested in gaining a foothold in Cyprus. The S-300 missiles would have given the Russians exactly that long-awaited chance. The deployment of the missiles would have required permanent stationing of Russian military personnel who would, in the

final analysis, have been operating the system, at-least for some time to come. Consequently the Russians would have had a new, however minor, role in the military configuration in the island. Considering the unstable nature of the Russian politics at the moment such a scenario would inevitably have raised a few eyebrows in Washington and London. Therefore this scenario was not viewed with sympathy in the Western quarters.

The Russian ambitions to gain a foothold in Cyprus have so far been strenuously and successfully resisted by the West. Even though the Cold War no longer dominates every twist and turn in the international political arena, it would be premature to assume that the West is now prepared to fully up-grade Russia to an equal status as its own. The absence of an enemy from the scenery does not necessarily suggest the departure of basic tenets of contemporary international life. States still persevere to further their national interests and there is no reason or development to indicate that their behaviour has now found a new basis. The fundamentals of international relations are essentially the same as they were during the Cold War. The framework of alliances, however, may have gone through some changes. To be brief, the United States and the West still operate in a manner compatible with their national interests and the end of the Cold War has not shifted their allegiance to the prime motivator of policy.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the missiles did not arrive. The losses that were avoided were far greater than the perceived advantages that could have been gained from the missiles in Cyprus.

For one thing a serious rift with Athens, the primary mover and initiator of Cyprus' accession negotiations, if not inconceivable is hardly desirable. Secondly, the likely consequences of their importation into Cyprus as regards Turkey's actions and their impact on the Greek-Cypriot economy were at best unwelcome and at worst disast rous. Thirdly, Nicosia was ill-advised to embark upon an action so blatantly against the wishes of the West. Particularly when she is in a tentative state of requiring their support for her bid for the Greek Cypriots to reinforce the military aspect in search for a Cyprus solution. The Government of Cyprus is best to press on with diplomatic efforts, which is her strongest international card.

Cyprus: In Search of Peace; *Minority Rights Group Report 97/3*

(London: Minority Rights Group, 1997), by Keith Kyle 40 pp.

To informed outsiders it has often been seen as strange that a problem as complex as Cyprus should be presented by the parties involved as being essentially very simple. For the Greek Cypriots the question that needs to be addressed is one of Turkish invasion and occupation. On the other hand, for the Turkish Cypriots, the issue in Cyprus is one of a numerical majority bullying a minority. The reality, as history has shown, is that both parties have truth on their side. For this reason it has often proved extremely difficult to provide a neat account of the Cyprus Problem. Hitherto, any attempt to present an unbiased narrative of the Cyprus Problem has usually steered too far from the main controversies to be useful or has somehow fallen in favour of one or other side, in perception if not in reality. In this report Keith Kyle has largely managed to avoid both of these problems. As a result he has written what could arguably be regarded as being the best concise and up-to-date guide to the issues at play in Cyprus. (To ensure balance and accuracy the Minority Rights Group insists that all their publications are reviewed by eight independent experts on the subject at hand before they are sent to press).

That Keith Kyle should have been able to do this is by no means unexpected; he has four decades of experience as a commentator on Cyprus. Yet for all of his historical knowledge, the author does not become bogged down in irrelevant detail, instead choosing to look at the main issues. To this extent there will be those who will criticise the work for being too shallow at points. This would be an injustice. One cannot hope to cover all points at all times in a work as short as this. What has been attempted, and achieved, is a balanced account of the politics of Cyprus in all their facets. For example in the work there are chapters.each of two-three pages, on the constitution, the start of violence in 1963, the events of 1967, and the 1974 crisis, the consequences of 1974, as well as several sections on the events in the years since. Within these sections there are a number of very good summaries of other aspects of the politics of the island such as politics in the north and in the south, the Defence Dogma, and membership of the EU. It was particularly gratifying to find that a chapter addressing the minority communities of the island was included. This is an issue that is too often overlooked when Cyprus is discussed. It is easy to forget that Cyprus is not inhabited simply by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. To this extent the author briefly examines the status of the Maronites, Armenians and Latins. In addition, Greek Cypriots living in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south are also mentioned as being minorities and their relative positions as such are given.

Significantly, the work ends with a series of eight proposals to promote a resolution to the Cyprus Problem. These are interesting and cover a wide range of questions such as the use of bicommunal contact, cross-voting in presidential and

vice-presidential elections, the role of the EU in promoting safeguards for the Turkish/Muslim character of the north, and the position of the 'minority communities'.

The one aspect of this work that was slightly troubling was that the question of Cyprus as a facet of overall Greek-Turkish relations was played down. Much as one may like to think of Cyprus as being a problem between the two communities, it is not. The Cyprus Problem intimately involves both Greece and Turkey and it is clear that any settlement that has any hope of long-term success will require the consent of both countries, in particular Turkey. This should really have been addressed in greater detail. However, as an intoductory guide to the politics of the island one would be hard pressed to find a better account than this one.

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