TCR Staff

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Cyprus Review is an international bi-annual refereed journal which publishes articles on a range of areas in the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus. As such it aims to provide a forum for discussion on salient issues relating to the latter. The journal was first published in 1989 and has since received the support of many scholars internationally.

Submission Procedure:

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, *The Cyprus Review,* Research and Development Centre, Intercollege, P.O.Box 24005, 1700 Nicosia, Cyprus, with a brief biographical note, detailing: current affiliations: research interests and publications.

Formatting Requirements:

(i)   Articles should range between 4,000-7,000words.

(ii)   Manuscripts should be typed on one side of A4 double-spaced; submitted in four hard copies together with a 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word saved as rich text format. Pages should be numbered consecutively.

As manuscripts may be sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page. The author's full academic address and a brief biographical paragraph detailing current affiliation and areas of research interest and publications should also be included.

Manuscripts and disks will **not** be returned.

(iii)   An abstract of no more than 150 words should be included on a separate page.

(iv)   Headings should appear as follows: Title: centred, capitalised, bold e.g.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE-MAKING IN CYPRUS

Subheadings: I. Centred, title case, bold.

II. Left-align, title case, bold, italics. Ill. Left-align,title case, italics.

(v)   Quotations must correspond to the original source in wording, spelling and punctuation. Any alternations to the original should be noted (e.g. use of ellipses to indicate omitted information; editorial brackets to indicate author's additions to quotations). Quotation marks (" ") are to be used to denote direct quotes and inverted commas (' ') to denote a quote within a quotation.

(vi)   Notes should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes (see vii below) and should be numbered consecutively in the text and typed on a separate sheet of paper at the end of the article. Acknowledgements and references to grants should appear within the endnotes.

(vii) References: As the *The Cyprus Review* is a multi-disciplinary journal, either of the following formats are acceptable for references to source material in the text:

(a)   surname, date and page number format OR

(b)   footnote references.

Full references should adhere to the following format:

Books, monographs:

James, A. (1990) *Peacekeeping in International Politics.* London, Macmillan.

Multi-author volumes:

Foley, C. and Scobie, W.I. (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus.* Starpord, CA, Hoover Institution Press.

Articles and chapters in books:

Jacovides, A.J. (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed.* Nicosia, Jus Cypri Association.

Journal articles:

McDonald, R. (1986) 'Cyprus: The Gulf Widens', *The World Today,* Vol. 40, No. 11 p. 185.

(viii) Dates should appear as follows: 3 October 1931; 1980s; twentieth century. One to ten should appear as written and above ten in numbers (11, 12 etc.).

(ix) Tables and figures are to be included in the **text** and to be numbered consecutively with titles.

(x) **Book review** headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, e.g. *Cyprian Edge,* by Nayia Roussou, Livadiotis Ltd (Nicosia 1997) 78 pp. Reviewer's name to appear at the end of the review.

(xi) First proofs may be read and corrected by contributors if they provide the Editors with an address through which they can be reached without delay and can guarantee return of the corrected proofs within seven days of receiving them.

(xii) Each author will receive two complimentary copies of the issue in which their article appears in addition to five offprints.

(xiii) Articles submitted to the journal should be unpublished material and must not reproduced for one year following publication in *The Cyprus Review.*

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Articles

CONSTITUTIONAL LEARNING FOR CYPRIOTS IN THE LIGHT' OF THE SWISS AND EU EXPERIENCE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Marios Constantinou

Abstract

Public misconceptions in Cyprus concerning the "Swiss model" abound on both sides of the contentious federalist debate. This aggravates an already intractable conflict and further complicates attempts to apply constitutional principles of justification to the settlement of rival constructions of rights. I wish to argue that Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot impressionistic understandings of Swiss federalism instrumentalise the federalist debate through cursory remarks and perfunctory summaries that trivialise the Swiss experience, hampering thus comparative constitutional learning through the initiation of constitutional reflexivity in the public discourse of both sides of the ethnic divide. This will be attempted through extracting some orientations from an analysis of the Swiss model which are deemed appropriate to the purpose of breaking through the systematically distorted communication that prevails in the constitutional hermeneutics of both communities. The aim will be to establish the comparative value of the Swiss experience in the federalist debate on Cyprus hoping to convert learning to policy relevant theory, encompassing as much complexity as the deadlock under consideration allows. In this first of two articles I critically examine the Turkish Cypriot constitutional vision; in a sequel article I consider relevant Greek Cypriot views.

Part I: Inducing Reflexivity in the Turkish-Cypriot Constitutional Vision*

Introduction: Misconceiving Swiss Federalism

Among the Greek-Cypriot public and many media pundits there prevails an irrational fear that any deliberation over aspects of Switzerland's cantonal federalism amounts to sanctioning partition, two separate state sovereignties and ultimately approval of a confederal solution legitimising the status quo. They get carried away by nominalist impressions of the "Helvetic Confederation", portray its weak rotating presidency and cantonal self-government as evidence of its confederal aspects and conclude that any resolution of the Cyprus problem on the

basis of the Swiss model will be nothing less than a "Turkish veil cloaking partition".[1] Equally careless, misleading and unprofound references are common among Turkish-Cypriots who are generally more well-disposed and unreserved with Switzerland's political institutions when they discuss comparative issues of constitutional design. A good case in point is the Turkish-Cypriot constitutionalist Zaim Necatigil who argues his community's case as follows:

> The Turkish-Cypriot view, regarding a weak federation with a proviso that more powers may devolve upon the central government as confidence grows, is supported by the Swiss example. Under the Swiss constitution of 1848 the central government's powers were mainly those generally considered an initial necessity in a federation: foreign attairs; defence and foreign commerce (...). As confidence grew, more and more powers were transferred to the federation (...). *This shows that the Swiss state was not artificially centralised, but built up from below (...). Will the sovereignty of the future federation (of Cyprus) derive from the sovereign peoples of the two communities previously organised in states of their own or will that sovereignty be derived from a single central government?* (Necatigil,1989, pp. 150-151).

Yet, no sustained effort has been undertaken by either Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot constitutionalists to probe the Swiss case. If comparative lessons are to be absorbed creatively in the attempts to federalise Cyprus then it is the task of social, political and constitutional theory to identify conditions and critical variables that affected historical outcomes in the country that the Island is called upon to consider as a model of federalisation. Let me therefore engage this scattered Cypriot commentary on Switzerland by examining its implicit constitutional assertions in the hope of rationalising the terms of the debate. In this article I will critically examine Turkish Cypriot evaluations of the Swiss model.

a. Federalism and War

Usually the lack of historical knowledge prompts constitutionalists to single out country-cases of accommodation which are not properly placed against the sociological background of longer-time perspectives. In the above mentioned quotation by the legal scholar Zaim Necatigil, Switzerland is presented as having had an unencumbered free-wheeling constitutional evolution from confederation to federation. Although Switzerland did not escape the centralising tendencies of modern state-making, Necatigil seems to be arguing, its centralisation was not artificially engineered but sprang from below. This argument, however, cannot be fully sustained by Swiss history which no less than other European states witnessed authentic armed conflict and civic strife, in other words "war-making" as an ingredient of federalisation.

When the three states of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden were joining the first *Bundesbrief* (pact of confederation) in August 1, 1291, they did so by pledging mutual assistance against enemies. In this first assertion of federal liberty the citizens of Swiss valleys promised solidarity whenever the House of Habsburg tried to impose upon them a foreign judge. This primitive Swiss *Bundwas* defensive and directed against a visible and defined enemy nobody could misrecognise. For this reason it was reaffirmed in 1315 after another unsuccessful attempt by the duke of Habsburg to conquer the valleys and was consolidated in 1386 after a victorious battle against the German nobility. The Swiss *Bund* evolved as a defence treaty with Lucerne, Zurich, Berne, Glarus and Zug. Under this shape the confederation entered into war with Charles the Bold and added in 1481 two new members, namely Fribourg and Soleure before the next war against the German emperor Maximilian. In 1501 followed Basel and Schaffhausen while Appenzel joined in 1513. Under this composition the old Swiss Confederation lasted for more than two and a half centuries until the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquest. *It is important to underscore the fact that with the exception of Fribourg all the thirteen member states enjoyed the homogeneity of German-speaking culture. No less important was the expansionist policy of the Confederation* that did not hesitate much to conquer the territories of Thurgau and Ticino (J. Wayne Baker, 1993, p. 21; Otto Kaufmann, 1989, p. 207).

So far it is evident that among the factors we should isolate in order to explain the sociological stability and durability of the old Swiss Confederation are,

I) Defence against a common enemy, be that the House of Habsburg, Charles the Bold, the German Emperor, the local German nobility or the Napoleonic French occupation.
II) No member-state or linguistic group ever declared a wish to disband the confederation and join Germany or for that matter the neighbouring France, Italy or Austria despite tension among their rank.
III) Ethnic cohesion and linguistic homogeneity among the original thirteen member-states was a favourable sociological condition for the early consolidation of the confederation.

When, therefore, Turkish-Cypriot legal scholars point at the "serene" constitutional evolution of Switzerland they should also be able to account for the following:

I) Germany was not looked after or admired by Swiss communities as a "motherland".No Swiss city or canton ever entertained en masse irredentist feelings, not even during or after the French occupation. By contrast, early on both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots did not entrust their

consociational institutions which were set-up not against a common enemy but against each other, conspiring therefore to destabilise the republic by looking respectively at Greece and Turkey with unabated irredentist feeling.

II) Unlike Cyprus where reluctant elites were called to join forces in a common republic, in Switzerland it was citizens and "men of the valleys" promising each other, forever, assistance whenever anybody attempted to impose foreign rule. That constituted a solid sociological base for the confederation.

III) No mentality of independence comparable in sociological depth to the Swiss one as it was shaped against German imperial dynasties (Habsburgs, Maximilian) ever appeared demandingly to the foreground in order to have consciousness-shaping effect against Greece and Turkey. Even the anti-colonial revolt against British rule involved only one community while the other abstained at best and collaborated with the colonial masters at worst. Militant labour strife involving sectors of both communities did develop in the late 1940's but failed to obtain continuity and long-term political impact.

IV) Exception to III was the development of considerable Greek-Cypriot resistance to cold-war partitionist plans which at various moments were promoted with the consent and active involvement of Greece. The legacy of Greek-Cypriot revolt against partitionist plans (such as Dean Acheson's) as well as the armed resistance put up against the Greece-led and U.S.-backed *coup d'etat* organised in 1974 in order to impose the former remains a consequential source of civic patriotism covering the Centre-Left partisan space. The sociological ripening of a pro-independence civic mentality against the Greek state's synergy in implementing partition argues against the totally *"penetrated society"* hypothesis put forward by the Turkish-Cypriot legal scholar Metin Tamkoc (1988, pp. 54-56).[2]

Moreover such an expressly manifested civic sentiment should potentially be counted among the moral foundations of Cypriot federalism. This potential however is presently neutralised by the following paradox. While Greek-Cypriot civil society developed a strong regionalist consciousness and grew more confident in relation to Greece due to an economic take-off and divergent cold-war alignments that triggered possibilities for new identity formations disconnected from Greece, Turkish-Cypriot elites discern in such newly grown confidence a renewed threat of Greek-Cypriot hegemony. Perceived threat of Greek-Cypriot hegemony in a reunified republic intensifies their insecurity making them even more reliant on Turkey *which in turn compels Greek-Cypriots to appeal to Greece for military protection.*

The Republic of Cyprus could not afford the Swiss confederation's German speaking homogeneity at least in its original stages. Cypriot bi-communalism

overloaded the constitutional process of partnership and that could not be mitigated by unity in the face of external threats. Moreover, the young Republic could not afford "nation-building" via expansionist policies which helped initially stabilise the Swiss confederation by keeping the "threat of diversity" at moderate levels.

Turkish-Cypriot scholars should thereby consider the absence (in the Cypriot case) of such enabling factors which fortified and perpetuated the Swiss federal process. In the light of all the above reasons, Necatigil's recommendation for a Swiss-model of federalisation from below ought to suggest alternatives that could realise it. One way of exploring such alternatives (in order to make up for a number of factors that choke prospects of successful federalisation), is to consider how cantonal civil societies allow their modernising lifeworlds a horizon of mutually presupposed meanings and deprovincialised norms shaped and elaborated through direct-democratic forms of participation. Insofar as Turkish-Cypriot constitutionalism seeks guaranteed ethnic homogeneity of communal territories, Swiss federalism may not be much pleasing for its aspirations. Once Swiss federalism has been designated by Turkish-Cypriot constitutionalism as a privileged source of inspiration it is incumbent upon it to rethink the constitutional frame of self-government as it actually evolved in the sociological and historical context of the Swiss Rechtstaat. Indispensable dimensions of such rethinking are certainly the direct-democratic compounding of majorities and the fact that *cantons, the most potent element of Swiss federalism, are not ethnically based. Is Turkish-Cypriot constitutionalism prepared to assume this immanent risk?*

b. Civil War and International Law

How did the Swiss Confederation survive its own civil wars? By 1529 Zurich, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen and Appenzel were swept by the Reformed faith of Ulrich Zwingli who was envisioning a new federation of Reformed cities under the banner of *Christliche Burgrecht* (Christian Civic Union). The Catholic alliance retaliated by forming *Christliche Vereinigung* (Christian Union) *in direct association with Austria.* The fielded army of the Christian Civic Union *headed by Zurich* forced the Catholic Christian Union into negotiations and a truce. In the resulting treaty – First Peace of Kappel – the Catholic Christian Union was placed under the obligation to disband its forces and *annul its treaty with Austria.* But the Christian Civic Union itself was after an expansion of the Confederation involving South German protestant territories and to this end Zwingli sought after an alliance with Philip of Hessen. Among the German-speaking cantons Bern opposed Zurich's expansionist policies by suggesting instead an economic embargo on Catholic states in order to force them to comply with the provisions of the treaty of 1529. Zwingli who envisioned a larger Protestant Confederation argued against the embargo on the grounds that Catholic states would thus be allowed time and place to regroup and initiate

hostilities. Indeed a reassembled Catholic force outrun Protestant troops in 1531 and Zwingli himself was counted among the victims (J. Wayne Baker, 1993, pp. 22-23).

The Catholic victory led to the Second Peace of Kappel ending thus Zurich's growing hegemony and prosyletization campaigns in Catholic areas. The vision of a greater, united, Protestant Switzerland was crushed. The Reformation had brought the country to the brink of partition between two federated territories. A century of religious strife had brought the old Confederation to its knees. Interestingly the Thirty-Years War (1618-1648) halted further disunity despite deep confessional divisions. Neutrality prevailed and the Treaty of Westphalia which concluded the war in the tradition of *jus publicum Europaeum* (Carl Schmitt, 1974) bestowed official recognition to Swiss independence. Swiss unity therefore was enhanced by the pluralist jurisprudence of *jus pub/icum Europaeum,* an order which

I)   put an end to religious civil wars
II) replaced theological disputes with the deliberated statutes of jurists and
III) stipulated that war and peace would be conditioned by the recognition and legal protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This order lasted until the Napoleonic conquest which signalled the rising sociological significance of bureaucracy and the concomitant functionalisation of constitutional law. Napoleonic imperial politics mandated administrative centralisation of the Swiss state and constitutional engineering from above. This policy failed and Napoleon was forced to restore the Confederation through the Mediation Act of 1803. Upon Napoleon's defeat, the Treaty of Vienna (1815) as another epitome of the legal tradition of *jus publicum Europaeum,* revalidated Swiss independence from the German Reich and French encroachments, recognised Swiss neutrality as a stabilising factor in European politics and further respected its territorial integrity by confirming the accession of Valais, Neuchatel and Geneva in the Confederation.

Time and again we therefore observe Swiss federalism enjoying the benediction of the *jus publicum Europaeum* without which its continued neutrality and *situation unique* would have been impossible. The fact that wars of extermination and massive population displacements were replaced by what Carl Schmitt called *gehegter Krieg,* that is contained, limited and controlled wars – *"wars in form"* – whereby the enemy was considered a legal subject, a *Justus hostis* defending an equally just cause, turned out to be a blessing for the constitutional evolution of Swiss federalism. *Wars in form* notwithstanding, one should not be oblivious of the dark side of the Congress of Vienna which proclaimed the preservation of the European status-quo based on the ill-famed "stability of things", meaning that internal revolts had to be suppressed by police-state methods in order to make

manifest the legality of existing regimes (Thomas 0. Hueglin, 1982, p. 32). This geopolitical pressure exerted by the neighbouring European powers which needed a *buffer-state* between them is an extra-constitutional factor which contributed immensely to Swiss unity. The federal system, Duchacek argues, partly mirrored the geopolitical balance of power surrounding Switzerland (Duchacek, 1970, p. 329). Unity was also, initially, enhanced geographically by the inaccessibility and unassailability of the Alps in the formative years of Swiss federalism.

As it was explained above, contrary to Turkish-Cypriot perceptions and notwithstanding favourable international circumstances Switzerland's internal constitutional development was asymmetrical and far from being uneventful. Fifteen years after the Congress of Vienna had secured the independent status of Switzerland, a wave of radical liberalism spread throughout protestant cantons culminating in the drafting of a new constitution only to be yet once more opposed by Catholic cantons. Eighteen years of rivalry, tensions and communal intransigence (1830-1848) culminated in a decisive civil war which although conducted in the spirit of *jus publicum Europaeum* imposed by majority a new federal constitution. When Turkish-Cypriot legal scholars appeal to Switzerland in order to exemplify the constitutional model which a federalising Republic of Cyprus should aspire to emulate they should not overlook the hard fact that *the present amicable partnership of consociational agreement was not in place when it was mostly needed.* From 1848 to 1891 the Federal Council consisted entirely of Liberals who had won a military victory over the Catholic cantons (Steiner, 1974, p.33). For forty-two years after the *Sonderbund* war the stability of Swiss federal government was maintained by the victors who monopolised the executive. A Christian Democrat was elected in the Federal Council only as late as 1891 while the Social Democrats who on proportional basis were qualified for a seat in 1919 did not receive one until 1943 and their proportional share of two by 1959 (ibid., p. 33).

What is thereby inferred is that Swiss federalism was imposingly shaped by winner-loser arrangements facilitated by the favourable international treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Vienna (1815) and sealed by the outcome of a determinative civil war (1848) which settled once and for all the internal balance of power not unlike the federal reunification of the United States effectively brought about also by civil war. The outstanding feature of this war however is that apart from being a test of strength that decided the victor and the vanquished, it considered the latter as a *Justus hostis* respecting the juridical and civil status in what was a self-limited contained and controlled war. Thus the jurisprudence of the *jus publicum Europaeum* to which Switzerland owed its continuing existence as a unified confederation was domesticated and integrated as a fundamental asset of its constitutional evolution.

c. Cyprus: From Colony to Post-colonial Quasi-state

Unlike Switzerland which could afford the luxury of civil strife without incurring territorial mutilation thanks to the special protection it enjoyed by international treaties concluded in the spirit of *jus publicum Europaeum,* Cyprus was founded by *Grossraum* expediencies which dictated its limited sovereignty. Therefore the unthought contradiction of Turkish-Cypriot constitutional discourse in its seductive engagement and fascination with the Swiss model is the following. Switzerland evolved a strongly resonant federal model, echoing and re-echoing the unencumbered status of its independence and sovereignty, consolidated by treat in the spirit of *jus publicum Europaeum.* Cyprus on the contrary was founded during the cold-war era which consummated the subversion of *jus publicum Europaeum* by establishing a *Grossraum* legality as the foundation of a functionalisied international law. The treaties which founded the Republic of Cyprus acted as the constitutional bottleneck of its independence reflecting the new foundations of global domination. How therefore could Cyprus – in itself a case study *Grossraum* constitutional politics – seek to emulate dimensions of a federal mol which was stabilised in the era of *jus publicum Europaeum?* Could a quasi-state or limited republic belonging to the third sphere of non-aligned states resist the influence of supra-state powers and constitutionally narrow the bottleneck?

A *Grossraum* according to Schmitt is a hegemonic geopolitical sphere which is constituted as a "bloc" whose political magnitude and influence extends beyond the states that comprise it as a spatial entity. The space defended by particular states cannot constitute a counterweight or challenge the hegemonic power of a *Grossraum.* The transition to a spatial order of *Grossraum* altered drastically the parameters of international law operated under the regime of *jus publicum Europaeum* which provided that states would base their recognition on equality and reciprocity and that every state thereby had a legitimate spatial dimension. That was the qualifying factor which enabled the U.S. to insist that the armed insurrection of the seceding South by no means constituted a state of war impairing the sovereignty of the American government by creating belligerent populations entitling foreign states to intervene (G. L. Ulmen, 1987, p. 66). The decline and demotion of the *jus publicum Europaeum* in international affairs gave rise to the notions of "limited sovereignty", "spheres of influence" and "satellite state dependent on new spatial formations. The founding of the Republic of Cyprus was a salient apophysis of this international order of *Grossraum* super-legality and *post colonial constitutional paternalism.* The process of decolonisation thereby overlapped with *Grossraum* formations which rendered tutelary constitutionalism consistent with the cold-war international law of limited sovereignty.

For the purpose of elucidating the *Grossraum* dimension of Cypriot constitutional politics it suffices to highlight the fact that the Greek-Cypriot armed campaign for

enosis (1955-59) was deeply enmeshed in an international constellation of imperial forces under an emerging U.S. hegemony within NATO.[3] After the entry of the U.S. into World War II in 1941 it became necessary for the British Empire to account for a no longer self-justifying colonialism. The State Department requested timetables for independence throughout the War (A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell, 1987, p. 29) although U.S. enthusiasm for decolonisation declined following the advent of the cold-war and its *Grossraum* realignments. *The ideological residues of the U.S. revolutionary tradition of anti-colonialism dissipated in the face of solid bloc priorities and expediencies.* This notwithstanding, U.S. tolerated and even encouraged anti-colonial movements (against the British and French empires) which were not inclined toward the Soviet Union. The Greek-Cypriot leadership of the *Enosis* movement ventured to capitalise on such an intra-imperialist rift in Western hegemony. During U.S. Congress discussions over aid programmes to Greece and Turkey in 1947 the State Department released a document which testifies U.S. support for ceding Cyprus to Greece through Greco-British negotiations in spite of its withdrawal after strong British representations and U.S. apologies that it was only intended as a discussion-document (Francois Crouzet, 1973, pp. 208-209).

When in 1950 a Greek-Cypriot delegation visited Washington in order to submit to the State Department copies of a plebiscite demanding *Enosis* they consciously included in their address to the Secretary of State an emphatic appeal to the divergence between U.S. and British colonial policies (Attalides, 1979, p. 5). The Greek-Cypriot leadership also attempted to trade upon U.S. alertness with the sprawling strength of local communism *(AKEL)* which British colonial policy in Cyprus did not mind manipulating as an ideological counterweight to right-wing *Enosis* nationalism. *AKEL* at the time was solidly forming itself into a *Lager* of social reform and British colonial policy in complete disregard of NATO's anti-communist agenda in world politics did not hesitate to use it as a balancing sociological antipode to right-wing *pro-enosis* forces. This was expected to legitimise evolutionary colonial constitutionalism and therefore prolong British domination. The British ideal which wanted colonial people to graduate (through a long evolutionary process) from the "Burkean School of Constitutional Law" in order to qualify for self-government was thus conveniently overlapping with the Empire's strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. British colonial philosophy aspired to secure a peaceful path of constitutional evolution combining internal self-government with the carrying out of strategic imperatives.

Indeed it appeared in the 1950s that a strategic overlap of interests existed between Greece, U.S. and the Greek-Cypriot irredentist bloc since the former was by 1951 a member of NATO with the Royalist Right solidly established in power after the crushing defeat of the Left in the civil war (1946-1949) and the U.S. taking over the patronage of the conservative forces with the launching of the Marshall

Plan (ibid., p. 5). Moreover it is contended that the U.S. offered assistance to EOKA, the irredentist but also vigorously anti-communist guerrilla organisation which championed *Enosis* (Goldbloom, 1972). Union of Cyprus to Greece would render *Grossraum* strategic designing more efficient by containing Soviet influence on Arab regimes, as well as the strong and growing communist *Lager* in Cypus. Soviet advances in Egypt, the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and the upsurge of Arab nationalism and neutralism necessitated the final settlement of the Cypr Question within the context of Natoist diplomacy.

At this moment, however, a significant shift appears in U.S. security considerations which was destined to arrest the aggressive momentum of *Enosis* by ushering Turkey in as a pivotal factor of containment politics. By 1953 Defence Secretary John Foster Dulles was considering Turkey an indispensable component for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and the extension of NATO influence in the Middle East. The formation of the CENTO pact concluded in 1955 had elevated Turkey's strategic importance in the Natoist system of bilateral a multilateral alliances hence the U.S. foreign policy dilemma over the *Enosis* dispute had to be resolved without risking Turkey's alienation from the carefully crafted security architecture of the West (Van Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 104). Consequently U.S. policy on Cyprus after 1955 emphasised a NATO-mediated resolution by "quiet diplomacy" and tripartite negotiations between Britain, Turkey and Greece.

The Greek government, however, was highly unstable and less than ten years after the end of the civil war was under mounting domestic pressure by an astonishing comeback of the Left. The latter thrived in supporting unconditional *Enosis* against a U.S. backed government trapped between its NATO commitments and Greek-Cypriot irredentism. The threatened status of the lives and properties of the (100.000) Greek minority in Istanbul and Izmir by Turkish government-instigated vandalism retaliating Greek irredentism allegedly threatening the Turkish minority Cyprus was an equally destabilising factor. It exposed a Natophile right-wing government as harmful to the national interest. The Greek government, therefore, deferred to public opinion and pursued the Cyprus Question in the U.N. General Assembly despite U.S. warnings and a threat for a negative vote. The undissuaded Greek government failed to obtain a positive resolution in its successive appeals (1954-1958) which were rebuffed as expansionist schemes seeking to annex Cyprus under the guise of the right of self-determination (Terlexis, 1971, pp. 159-213).

Guided by an exclusive emphasis on containment-politics and a resolution of the Cyprus Question satisfying vital security-interests of the Western alliance (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 107), Dulles instead submitted in 1957 at the NATO Foreign Ministers' conference a scheme by which Cyprus would

I)   join NATO

II)   be ruled by a triumverate of commIssIoners (one Scandinavian, one Portuguese and one Mediterranean)

III) enjoy limited self-government

To this purpose the U.S. called Greece and Turkey to revise their national agendas in accordance with the overall interests of the Alliance (Attalides, 1979, p. 11).

The four-year (1954-1958) diplomatic fiasco of Greece in the U.N. along with the exhaustion of the Greek-Cypriot revolt practically translated in the dissipation of any political and military resources to support the right of self-determination.[4] By identifying the right of self-determination with the incorporation of Cyprus to Greece and not with independent statehood, the Greek-Cypriot leadership as well as the Greek foreign policy were faced with their limits. Greek-Cypriot discountenance with transitional self-government and outright dismissal of the potential for political development through constitutional evolution by reserving the right of self-determination, kept the irredentist revolt hostage to the Greek state's multilateral commitments to NATO. Between *evolutionary constitutionalism* and a *NATO-bound revolt,* it appears in hindsight that only the former could keep alive the right of self- determination without risking partition.

Incapacitated by a persistent diplomatic cul-de-sac, Greece joined the band of "quiet diplomacy" which revolved around the "partnership" plan of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The Macmillan plan announced in 1958 envisaged that the national aspirations of the two communities should not be met by the principle of self-determination but by association with Turkey and Greece in a partnership of shared sovereignty (Reddaway, 1986, p. 104). Had this plan failed the British government under Macmillan was resolved to proceed with a final solution of "double self-determination" and therefore impose partition (ibid., p.115). The Macmillan plan propelled Turkey and Greece to work out a settlement of the Cyprus dispute that would proscribe partition as well as *enosis* through "a policy that was subject to confidential consultation and discussion within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" (ibid., p. 112).

In December 1958 the Foreign Ministers of Greece *(Averoff)* and Turkey *(Zorlu)* met in the context of a NATO conference where the Cyprus question was discussed. Secret negotiations recommenced on January 20, 1959 where an outline of comprehensive constitutional settlement was drawn up in the absence of Cypriot representatives which secured *inter alia* the sovereignty of British military bases. Following this meeting, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey discussed this outline along with their Foreign Ministers in Zurich on February 11. Then with almost incogitable speed on February 18 the Cypriot representatives were invited

over to London after all was said and done to sign the London agreements embodying the constitutional draft agreed in Zurich a week earlier along with the three associated treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee. In less than a month and without involving the constituent power of Cypriots, Turkey and Greece on behalf of the Alliance had formulated *Grossraum* constitutional principles for the founding of a limited Republic which was offered to Cypriot representatives in a "take it or leave it" fashion. Indicative of such *"expedited constitutionalism"* is a quite suggestive incident whereby Makarios, the Greek-Cypriot representative, after having realised that he was faced with a *fait accompli* requested a margin of time to consider the agreement. He was told instead that Prime Minister Macmillan and Secretary of Colonies Lennox-Boyd "were to leave next day for the Far East and Moscow respectively and therefore (he) had to give his answer immediately"(Polyviou, 1980, p. 14).

In view of the treaty structure binding the protectorate Republic by *unilateral rights of intervention* which were enshrined in order to secure that Cyprus remained a NATO ally, the Treaty of Guarantee could remain effective only as long as Greece and Turkey could themselves remain regardful of *joint intervention.* In this respect the "will of the people" literally emanated from allied *Grossraum* power.

It has been argued that Treaties intended to bind a Republic in perpetuity by an alliance established in terms of *foedus inequale* are invalid (Tenekides, 1964). There appears at first blush to be a strong case for this insofar as the Cypriot leadership signed the Treaties before the threat of partition thus alienating through the treaty process fractions of its sovereignty by establishing a *casus intervention,* under the assumption that only the preservation of the constitution may sanction intervention. This protective provision notwithstanding, Cyprus acceded to the Treaty under duress therefore voiding the Treaty *ab initio* (James H. Wolfe, 197 pp. 42-43). To this effect the Greek-Cypriot jurist Criton Tornaritis asserted that th constitutional enshrining of *casus interventionis* fails the test of the U.N. Charter legality (Article 103) which invalidates treaties violative of the sovereign equality of states. Therefore, Tornaritis argues, the Republic's adherence to the U.N. Charter in 1960 relieves it of any obligations restrictive to its sovereignty under the Treaty of Guarantee (1977, pp. 42, 60). Insofar as the Treaty of Guarantee authorises interventionary force in contravention to the peremptory norms of *jus cogens* and the U.N. Charter then (Article 103) provides that in the event of conflicting right: under the Treaty and obligations under the Charter, the latter shall prevail. U.N. Charter legality is also reinforced by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which encompasses the view that cases of neocolonial aggression car justify the denouncing of treaties as *"affirmative servitudes"* imposed upon former colonies as a precondition of their independence.

A *Treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the U.N. Charter.* [5]

Expectedly, the records of the Conference on the Law of Treaties indicate that "the representative of Cyprus was emphatic in its approval while his Turkish counterpart expressed serious reservations" (James H. Wolfe, 1979, pp. 43-44).

Turkey's hermeneutic counterpoint is that the very preamble of the U.N. Charter mandates respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law (Zaim Necatigil, 1989, p. 103). Even in terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties it is stipulated (Article 4) that *its provisions have no retroactive application* (ibid., p. 109). Turkish constitutional hermeneutics also calls attention to the case of Canada whose power to amend the constitution was obtained as late as 1949 while the constitution itself was enshrined in an Act of the British Parliament. It was only in April 1982 that the British Parliament relinquished control over the Canadian constitution, so the argument goes (ibid., p. 112). This argument however is morally unfortunate and constitutionally unsound since the evolving relationship of English Canada with Great Britain does not correspond in any way whatsoever to the Greek-Cypriot connection to Great Britain, so that it may constitute a precedent.[6]

The Turkish hermeneutic strategy, however, provides more cogent arguments on the issue of Cyprus' status compatibility. It is certainly not mere constitutional acrobatics to argue that *Cyprus' accession to the U.N. was subject to its special status under the treaties, which status it cannot unilaterally alter* (Necatigil, 1989, p. 113). It must therefore be assumed that Cyprus must have waived its right to challenge the compatibility of its U.N. membership with the U.N. Charter insofar as the issue of status compatibility was neither raised nor debated in the General Assembly or the Security Council at the material time of Cyprus' acceptance as a member. Moreover Cyprus' *treaty legality* was not derogated to a pre-existing independent entity but was itself a guarantee of Cyprus' independence which came into being as a result of a set of international accords (ibid., p. 114).

According to all indications presented here *above,* Turkish-Cypriot constitutional discourse and International Relations theory appear to subscribe to the notion that *independence* is not essential to statehood. A fully independent and sovereign state could not and cannot be an acceptable option for Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Independence qua sovereignty was not and is not an end in itself. *"It is not unusual for a multinational small state to be subjected to the penetrative power and authority of a larger state or group of states, the principle of "sovereign equality" of all states notwithstanding. History is replete with stories of small states being created, influenced, controlled, and then swallowed up by major*

powers for the good of all' (Tamkoc, 1988, pp. 65-66). The constituent power of *Client States* to make and enforce either higher or lower law is limited *de facto* by a status of dependency and *de jure* by a treaty structure which over-determines State practice in terms of "permissible intervention". The ultimate test of legitimacy for the Republic of Cyprus, thereby, is not whether it is independent and sovereign vis-à-vis other states but whether it can fulfil the purpose for which it was created. In this respect Turkish-Cypriot discourse emphasises the *Grossraum rationality* of the framers of the constitution who embarked on the mission of founding a *sui generis Client Republic* with the deliberate purpose of restoring the cohesion of NATO's destabilised South-Eastern flank, namely the alliance between Greece and Turkey in the face of Soviet challenge in the Mediterranean. The *raison d'etre* of the founding was neither self-determination, nor independence qua sovereignty but accommodation of a *Grossraum condominium* under NATO influence which was given by way of treaties constitutional force. *Sui generis* condominia vary in purpose and duration but Cyprus in the light of the above considerations can be safely classified along with Samoa Islands (Great Britain, USA, Germany, 1889-1900), the New Hebrides (Great Britain, France, 1906 to date), the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Great Britain, Egypt, 1889-1956) and Tangier (Great Britain, France, Spain Portugal, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, 1923-1956) (Gerhard von Glahn, 1981, p. 78). To counter the Greek-Cypriot assertion about Cyprus' status incompatibility with the U.N. Charter, Tamkoc (1989, p. 66) refers to the examples of New Zealand Australia, Canada, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic which were admitted to the U.N. with full independent status while at the material time of their admission they were to varying degrees under the jurisdiction and control of Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

However legitimate or illegitimate Cyprus' treaty foundations of legality were at the time of its inception, one can hardly fail to sense the strongly neo-colonial resonance of such legal positivism. *The reified and cumbersome treaty legality notwithstanding, Cyprus may count upon new possibilities of constitutional reconstruction after the end of bipolarity and the emergence of a pluralist geopolitical alternative.* The cold war pressure which aggravated inter-communal conflict has been lifted much as the adhesive glue holding the Atlantic alliance together cannot be sustained any more by neo-colonial arrangements regulated by regional treaties. The decline of the U.S. monopoly on foreign policy initiatives with respect to regional disputes, the security shift toward a European defence structure, the consolidation of common constitutional instruments and the progressive solidification of principles concerning a unified foreign policy orientation by the E.U. comprise the elements of a *Grossraum* power transition after the exhaustion of cold war bipolarity. In terms of international law the evolving constitutional formation of the European federation signifies the emergence of a new public order beyond the

old *Realpolitik* predicated on the concept of an increasingly obsolete sovereign state. For the first time in its history Cyprus is presented with new comparative opportunities to move beyond a neo-colonial treaty-legality and an elite-centred perspective in constitutional politics. The revival of constitutional thought in sociology and political theory after the collapse of state socialism, the end of apartheid and the launching of European federation invigorate comparative learning to unprecedented levels.

Cyprus in this sense ceases being a mere constitutional curiosity of international law since its quasi-statal character overlaps with the E.U.'s non-statal constitutional evolution. Cyprus much like the evolving E.U. does not fit the criteria of statehood in terms of peoplehood and sovereignty. The Republic of Cyprus does not enjoy a "we the people" clause in its constitution which instead enshrines the principle of concurring majorities and communal dualism on all levels of government. The terms "popular sovereignty" implying majority-rule and national government is never mentioned. It is nowhere mentioned throughout the constitutional text that "the people of Cyprus" is the ultimate source of sovereignty. The treaties binding the Republic of Cyprus do not derive their constitutional validity from the political will of its citizens. The authors and addressees of the constitution are not identical and no constitution-making as an act of political self-determination ever took place. Moreover Cypriot sovereignty appears to be a constitutional impossibility with respect to the concept of territoriality. If territoriality means that no other authority than the state itself can exercise jurisdiction within its boundaries then Cyprus does not fulfil yet one more criterion of statehood since it is effectively divided since 1963 by a regime of *de facto* partition in force to this day. The Republic of Cyprus is not presently effective throughout its territory insofar as it cannot exercise comprehensive and unlimited authority over the Turkish-Cypriot community in the North. By the same token the E.U. has no territoriality of its own since it is the member-states which define the territorial limits of its authority. The status of citizenship is contingent upon the status of nationality in member-states (Ulrich K. Preuss, 1996, pp. 212, 214-215).

Neither the constitutional predicament of Cyprus nor the E.U.'s notorious democratic deficit are definable in the normative terms of democratic theory. With respect to processes of post cold war constitutional challenges it is much more creative to address such quasi or non-statal entities in terms of a federal theory of cross-cutting publics and pluralist associational subsystems co-existing with functional forms of bureaucratic success-oriented, elite-based intergovernmental federalism. Neither liberal democracy and majority rule nor consociational elitism are ends in themselves. *The E.U. is defined by processes of polycentric legitimation which couple structured elite-domination with transnational inter-institutional penetration along with civic formations, subcommunities and regions*

competent in participative politics. This process of polycentric legitimation presents Cyprus with a new range of possibilities for federalisation beyond neo-colonial treaty-determined, elite-centred, constitutional designs on one hand and/or unlimited majoritarian exercise of the constituent power inherent in popular sovereignty on the other.

While the E.U. in its drive to achieve greater coherence in its security policy in the Eastern Mediterranean started "a pulling of constitutional wires" in Cyprus by assuming a role of diplomatic broker, the government of the Republic made in 1990 a formal application for E.U. membership anticipating reunification of the islancd along the model of Germany. Governments in Athens and Nicosia view the E.U. as a reliable instrument of conflict-management with respect to Greco-Turkish disputes, one that eventually may take over the role of NATO (Theophylactou,1995, p. 117). Greek foreign policy expects that Cyprus' accession in the next E.U expansion drive, will render the divided Republic a beneficiary of the normative aspects of the Union's constitutional momentum especially those instrumentally concerning the *acquis communautaire,* namely existing E.U. law and the patently centralising doctrines of direct applicability, direct effect and supremacy of Community law which must prevail when found in conflict with the provisions of national law. Greek foreign policy therefore contemplates the prospect of reunification and demilitarisation of Cyprus that will neutralise Turkish zero-sum gains, counting on the far-reaching implications of *acquis communautaire.* Insofar as the E.U. is still a non-state whose only fundamental property beyond economic harmonisation is law-making independently of member state legal orders, the European Court of Justice becomes the principal agent of a liberal constitutional integration hence foregrounding the three fundamental freedoms (movement, property, settlement) as the principled premises anticipated to have direct effect in the resolution of the Cyprus Question.

Turkey on the other hand, opposes Cyprus' full membership in the E.U. by invoking Articles I and II of the Treaty of Guarantee which proscribe Cyprus' union with any state. In particular the second paragraph of Article I enjoins the Republic "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever". Article II moreover puts Greece, Turkey and Great Britain under the obligation to frustrate this endeavour. Yet as I explained above, Cyprus' full- membership in the E.U. does not constitute a "union with a state" but *a union between a non-state and a quasi-state.* The legal status of such *non-statal union* may restrict the scope of Greek-Cypriot aspirations by the combined effect of two fundamental principles of European jurisprudence, namely *subsidiarity* and *proportionality.* Considered under these two principles *the breadth and intensity of the three fundamental freedoms for the grace of which Nicosia pursues its accession to he E.U. might be modifiable.* Any political resolution of the Cyprus

Question, thereby regulating, imposing ceilings or defining conditions for the implementation of these freedoms is not likely to be challenged by the liberal European Court of Justice as Greek-Cypriots expect despite the impressive arsenal of doctrinal limits on such an eventuality. On the contrary, a final settlement may be filtered through a jurisprudence of subsidiarity and proportionality which are moreover increasingly informing foreign policy-making.

Subsidiarity as an elevated principle of the E.U.'s constitutional design reassures the constituent states and *notably the regions and other subcommunities within member states that their distinctiveness will be respected at the European Community level* (George A. Bermann, 1994, p. 367). *Self-determination, preservation of identities, diversity and respect for the internal divisions of member states have figured prominently in the E.U. discourse of subsidiariy.*[1] Subsidiarity's vague reference to the virtues of localism undermine, I sense, Greek-Cypriot reliance on the E.U.'s role as a diplomatic broker. A contradiction appears to lurk in the principle of subsidiarity as a procedural *norm of constitutional design* on one hand and *policy-making instrument* on the other. The latter seems to place preference at the most local level favouring thereby loose confederational ties, yet *consistent with achieving a government's stated purposes. State-subsidium* to regions and subcommunities, however, *may not destroy or absorb* them, in case that is a secretive Greek-Cypriot aspiration. It is, otherwise put, a *sociological Treaty of Guarantee for the separate (territorial) existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community.* This is fully consistent with the Turkish-Cypriot claim about the existence of "two separate peoples", thereby in the event of concluding an agreement on Cyprus' full membership, the E.U. is obliged to include the Turkish- Cypriot people in the proceedings on an *equitable basis* (Zaim Necatigil, 1989, p. 300) .

But Greek-Cypriot aspirations for a tight local federation may still be sustained insofar as the principle of subsidiarity does not seek to challenge the direct applicability, direct effect and supremacy of E.U. law or any of the prerogatives of the Court of Justice which is authorised with laying the normative foundations of constitutional integration as first priority (Bermann, 1994, pp. 362, 365). The Greek- Cypriot leadership is more likely to read into the principle of subsidiarity an enlargement of spheres of competence by central institutions, and within these spheres delegate some to lower organs as the higher organisation sees fit. After all the E.U. concept of subsidiarity expresses a preference for local governance *consistent with achieving a central government's stated purposes,* something which departs from the original meaning as stipulated by a crucial document of Catholic social philosophy namely the Papal Encyclical *Quadragesimo anno,* paragraph 79:

> It is an injustice ..... for a larger and higher association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower associations. This is a fundamental

principle of social philosophy ..... Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help *(subsidium affere)* members of a social body, and *never* to destroy or absorb them (J. Finnis, 1980, pp. 144-150, 158-159).

Yet absent of concrete evidence that subsidiarity actually exerts legislative interpretive or adjudicatory influence and given its ambiguous status and difficulty in operationalising it without contradiction, appears sharply double-edged by raising dramatically the constitutional stakes for both communities within the E.U. Both communities may gain and lose by the application of subsidiarity as the fundamental law and measuring rod of E.U. federalism.

The same probabilities and competing scenaria about the impact of E.U constitutional dynamics on the final pattern that will be imposed on the resolution of the Cyprus dispute, feature in the principle of proportionality. The 1992 Edinburgh guidelines issued by the European Council with respect to *proportionality* clarify that the principle is not restricted to the judicial review of the legality of E.U. action but it is also *a legislative doctrine to be followed in policy and decision-making.* The 3rd guideline states that "while respecting community law, *care should be taken to respect well established national arrangements and the organisation and working of member-states' legal systems'* (Bermann, 1994, p. 387). These guidelines were elaborated as a modification of the Maastricht Treaty in order to induce the Danish electorate to support ratification of the Treaty in a second referendum following a no-vote in the first referendum. *The intentions of the Edinburgh shortcut formulations are therefore consistent with the scope of Turkish-Cypriot concerns regarding constitutional safeguards about the status of political equality which they anticipate to be enshrined in a final settlement.* Insofar as subsidiarity is more operationalisable in areas of environmental and consumer protection, or regional and cultural rights than in the more inflexible areas of market harmonisation, the Turkish-Cypriots may expect to have comparative gains.

Both principles derive their status from the Natural Law tradition and were used as recommendations for rulers with respect to statesmanship. But a substantive use of these principles "may enmesh the European Court in political judgements" for which it is ill-equipped to make (ibid., p. 391). *Procedural or substantive, these two norms of European jurisprudence may reinforce centripetal or centrifugal tendencies in a prospective Cypriot federation.* Both communities however appear to have a stake within the E.U., a stake that is in *engaging these instruments that enable their self-articulation vis-a-vis one another and also enhance the indispensable interaction with each other.*

If it is true that European jurisprudence has embarked on recovering from its positivist frenzy endeavouring to establish a new equilibrium beyond legal

motorisation, state rigidity and unresponsiveness to new challenges and is, coming to represent the legal will of Europe as opposed to egoistic communalism and national factionalism, if indeed European jurisprudence appears to move as Carl Schmitt (1943-44/1990) envisioned it, beyond the legal technicism of decrees and directives, then the constitutional settlement of the Cyprus conflict poses as a critical test-case for its normative principles. If these principles are expected to evolve into a constitutional *lingua franca* of the European spirit which in spite its positivistic dependency on the established corpus of community law *(acquis communautaire)* still enjoys considerable margins of authority and legislative dignity, then this development is all the more important for the Cypriot communities *whose neo-colonial treaty legality has degenerated into* "a *poisonous dagger" by which one (community) stabs the other in the back dissolving right into nihilistic opportunism.* The challenge for European jurisprudence in the case of Cyprus is to safeguard the supranational sources of legal consciousness by applying the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in ways that

> *I)*   *do not serve the deadly legality of centralisation and majority rule* and

> *II)*   *do not reinforce a type of communalism which poses arrogantly as an unchangeable museum artifact supervised and conserved by ethnic elites whose privileged status is predicated on the perpetual reification of ethnic particularities.*

Otherwise this would trigger a vicious circle of infinite regression whereby sanctified ethnic reification becomes a source of intercommunal strife calling either for a strong central administration to regulate it or secession. Insofar as *only living communities able to resist bureaucratic redefinition can become susceptible to effective and lasting forms of federalisation* (Paul Piccone and G. L. Ulmen, 1990, pp. 29-30) European jurisprudence is then called to steer clear of further administrative fixation of identities through a prudent and innovative application of the principles of *subsidiarity* and *proportionality* enabling dereification and recapturing of the creative moments of such identities. Jurisprudence is called to seize this creative moment in its own authorial and masterly way, that is by refining, enriching and enlarging the rationality of law. Insofar as the spirit of law is wiser than the intentionality of the legislation at the moment of its enactment calls for commentary and interpretation by virtue of *juris-prudence.* Jurisprudence therefore stands for the *surplus of law,* an existential embodiment of practical reason, presence of mind, perspicacity and sound judgement under the pressure of hard cases, resisting expedience, scheming and politicness. But the far-sightedness of jurisprudential deliberation is also called to integrate the two fundamental principles that govern the very legitimacy of the European project, namely *utility* and *efficiency.*[8] After all, Cypriots evaluate the legitimacy of the European Union in terms of the presumed superiority of its problem-solving capacity over their own

inexperience and short-sightedness.

On the other hand the non-statal framework within which European integration evolves, challenges the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities to rethink the traditional ways they make sense of democracy and associated concepts such as sovereignty, legality, legitimacy, majority rule etc.

Greek-Cypriots may certainly have to reconsider their cherished ideal of sovereignty, unitary state and democratic majority-rule and put it in a federalit perspective much as Turkish-Cypriots are called to revise the *idee fixe* of separate self-determination and communal homogeneity.The polycentric, diffuse and incomplete character of legality in the European Union invites Cypriot communities to rethink their implicit sociological theories of state. The latter presently commits them compulsively to *government by state* while the Swiss and now also increasingly European challenge appeals to an adjustment of their competing constitutional visions to a non-statal framework of *government by civil socieity* whereby sharp demarcations of statehood do not hold. In my view the integration of Cyprus in the E.U. will take on the character of what Ulrich Preuss calls *"osmotic relationship',* only that this will be carried out between a non-statal federation and a quasi-state insofar as there is no identifiable constitutional centre able to accumulate and subsume the political quintessence of a supranational community either in the E.U. or in Cyprus. *The changing nature of international law may no longer require statehood as the only valid model of legal development or demand that any small country claiming the respect of its neighbours by achieving independent status must therefore by necessity consolidate sovereign state power. The impulse to construct strong states is no longer self-evident.* Here, the Swiss model stands again as a precurso,r indicating beforehand the track of current developments in the E.U. and may therefore serve as a comparative workshop for Cyprus' apprenticeship in a new geopolitical field between quasi-statehood and non-statehood.

Switzerland's Polycentric Structure of Legitimation as a Working Model for Redesigning Cyprus' Quasi-stateness in the Context of European Integration

Switzerland serves as a useful example of the sociological distinction between the concept of state *strictu sensu* and the more amorphous notion of a political centre. The Swiss mode of centralisation although in essence no less violent than other cases of state-building did not lead to "virtual statehood". *As a consequence of its own historical processes Swiss civil society evolved multiple centres of decision making which tolerated and accommodated resistant areas of de-differentiation through epigenesis rather than through bureaucratic rationalisation*

as the principal method of modernisation. Although the civil war decided victors and vanquished, political change allowed overpowered traditions to remain unchanged and yet accommodated thereby shaping the process of political centralisation in ways peculiar to Swiss culture. Self-government by civil society fostered the development of the market but also encouraged reliance on forms of direct-democratic participation hence strengthening the autonomy of the former. Self- government by civil society and direct democracy became mutually reinforcing. Switzerland thus achieved *centralisation* without *etatization* despite the experience of civil war and the near threat of a class war in 1918.

Contrary to opposing views, the Treaty of Confederation signed in 1291 as a permanent pact of alliance and mutual aid was violated repeatedly resulting to a chain of civil wars. These wars *nonetheless account for the uniqueness of the Swiss political system that was able to maintain a pluralist confederation during and after the civil wars* (Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, 1983, p. 132). The ultimate military triumph of market liberalism, itself a unilateral outcome of German- Protestant mobilisation necessitated unification, nation-building and the imposition of a new constitution as an essential and indispensable condition for the continued existence of the Confederation. Yet, and this is precisely what is noteworthy about Switzerland, *neither the unification of the market nor constitutional integration operated as catalysts of etatization.* The self-centralisation of associational networks in civil society did not translate into a further strengthening and higher institutionalisation of central authority. The weakness of the Swiss state is prominent even today and is best exemplified by i) the modest size of civil service (32.000) which has not been successful in obtaining any substantive bureaucratic autonomy vis-a-vis civil society. *Most of the civil servants are employed by cantons, are employed for four-year terms and are usually recruited from the private sector* (ibid., p. 133). *That Swiss federal bureaucracy Jacks officially sanctioned career patterns or the guarantee of lifetime employment along with the absence of shared common background, training, status, resources and information, and the fact that it receives the lowest share of tax revenue among OECD countries illustrates a striking neutralisation of state power* (Katzenstein, 1984, p. 116). This is further demonstrated by ii) the weak formal supervision of the banking system and above all by the virtually autonomous status of the *Nationalbank* whose monetary policy is free of government interference (ibid., pp. 116-117).

Switzerland is characterised by a considerably centralised system of interest-representation, corporatist bargaining, cumulation of leadership roles, working class self-help culture and a weak, understaffed, underpaid parliament along with the private character of the welfare state and the potential use of referendum power by interest associations and political outsiders, bring about a national network of public policy-concertation which renders federal bureaucracy a minor actor. Superior

personnel and resources, their centralised-national organisational infrastructure as well as their prominence in pre-parliamentary bargaining makes Swiss associations unrivalled when compared to state and party-bureaucracies. Certainly business corporations like *Vorort* are hegemonic and dominant. Whether the modest federal bureaucracy in this way becomes a loyal agent of business corporations is, all considered, a relative question since the *relations and intensity among class, associations, parties, cantons, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups are* not *decided by rule of state but by the multiple centres of decision-making which all these factors comprise, that is by the polycentric structure of legitimation in civil society and not by an autonomous state possessing bureaucratic power of mediation.*

In this respect the "Swiss archetype" of non-statal federalism becomes a forerunner of European integration, exemplifying *"the road not taken"* at the time when Europe was painfully embarking circa 1650 in the construction of sovereign state-forms. Despite a spate of state-seeking nationalism following 1989, a variety of theorists who promoted the rise of state in sociology such as Charles Tilly argue that nations in the sense of culturally connected populations may survive, prosper and form anew *but they will live detached from powerful states. Historical sociology burrows out of the prison-house of state thinking* Tilly argues and calls attention transnational connections and comparisons without evoking uniform societies insisting that the units of observation be states. Looking at contingent connections among groups, organisations, localities and events rather than standard sequences packaged in "continuous societies" may enable sociology to extricate from its fixation on stateness (Tilly, 1991, pp.1, 7).

In the same mood Philip Schmitter suggests to read the trend of globalisation in terms of regional agglomerations: "The future of democracy is not likely to be global but might be regional". The E.U., according to Schmitter exemplifies a *"world-region"* with a considerable density of cross-border transactions and a shared experience with inter-governmental institutions (Schmitter, 1999, pp. 941-942). Yet these forces affecting its configuration do not seem to push the "Euro-polity" in a unitary direction but instead "toward diverse outcomes with no stable equilibrium likely to emerge in the future" (ibid., p. 942). Its most likely outcome within a medium term of twenty years will be a non-state form beyond an intergovernmenal organisation or a supra-national state or any other form along this institutional continuum (ibid., p. 943). Schmitter calls attention to the growing incongruence between functional and territorial domains in the emergent "Euro-polity" and emphasises the assertion and even consolidation of a "plurality of polities" at different levels of aggregation (national, sub-national and supra-national) that overlap in a multitude of domains (ibid., p. 943). Without sovereignty or a strong political centre empowered to resolve conflicts there is only a process involving

multiple actors such as states, the growing presence of sub-national units at the international level, the formation of cross-border issue coalitions, treaty-making by municipalities and sub-regions, professional associations, parties, social movements and firms. Schmitter refers, consequently, not to a single Europe but to many Europes beyond the Eurocracy of harmonisation policy, *with multiple regional institutions producing a variety of public goods* (ibid., p. 945). Schmitter readily identifies "formidable co-ordination problems" and conjectures that *coordination* can only emerge *"in an improvised and incremental fashion from successive compromises'* among actors with divergent interests and institutional legacies (ibid., p. 945).

This suggestion however is less European and much less novel since it resonates strongly with really existing Swiss liberal corporatism. Indirect Swiss influence on Schmitter's non-statal thinking is also evident in his proposals for a redesign of Euro-citizenship, representation and decision-making. He recommends reform of direct election to the European Parliament by

I) *Switching to electronic or postal voting over an extended period (perhaps a week) instead of the traditional voting booth while ensuring that Euro-elections do not coincide with any national or sub-national election.*

II) *Attaching advisory, non-mandatory referenda to Euro-elections in order to stimulate voter-interest and the emergence of a continental public space. In addition voters in Euro-elections may distribute vouchers to European-level associations and movements who they believe can best defend their interests and passions. These organisations would subsequently receive public subsidies from E.U. funds in proportion to the vouchers they received.*

III) By admitting small (Cyprus, Estonia) and medium size (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic) newcomers, the E.U. *should persist on overrepresentation and overweighing of votes in the Council of Ministers. Such polities of different size, capability and identity should be assured against being persistently outvoted by large ones just as linguistic, religious and ethnic minorities should feel protected.*

Schmitter's second proposal combines ingredients of the Swiss formula namely parliamentary democracy and direct democracy while his third proposal builds on the Swiss consociational arrangement of proportional representation. Yet, Switzerland's manifestly liberal corporatist system of interest representation and intermediation along with referendum democracy relegate the parliament to a mere ratificational instrument and this may - when considered in the E.U. context - undermine an already ineffectual Euro-Parliament and Euro-Party system. If it is true that the E.U. is increasingly relying on mediated linkages and multiple layers of

claim-making, aggregation and representation through the initiation of networks articulating functional, territorial and post-material concerns then this is predictably expected to hamper an already impotent Euro-party system obtaining viable constituencies.

All the same the emergence of a post-Eurocratic order of multiple Europes with their own principles of democratic participation and complex web of polycentric legitimation through a variety of federal domains of functional, territorial, political and civic action poses a momentous dilemma for Greek-Cypriots who are called to dilute their majoritarian principles of democratic legitimation through the evolving complexity of multiple actors interposing on different spheres of Euro-policy making *Many Europes may imply many Cypruses coordinated through polycentric and diffuse processes of legitimation which contradict the experience of traditional. statehood, strong central government and a single political power-centre* Schmitter's third proposal which empowers small size newcomers in the E.U. through overrepresentation and overweighing of their vote exacerbates the following contradiction: Greek-Cypriots will welcome Cyprus' overrepresentation in the Council of Ministers but will resent Turkish-Cypriot overrepresentation in the Cypriot central government. On the other hand a serious coordination problem arises insofar as Eurocratic thinking counts on strong and stable national governments – evidently at the expense of subnational levels – with respect to fiscal harmonisation thereby favouring the Greek-Cypriot insistence on a strong central government. This may establish stateness as a fait accompli. Be that as it may, the *predicament of Greek-Cypriot constitutionafism under the circumstances seems to be the pursuit of a unitary state with a strong central government in an era which "Europeanises" in admittedly contradictory ways such Swiss goods as non-stateness, weak federal bureaucracy, strong cross-cutting associations, liberal corporatism, direct democracy and self-help culture. In other words the challenge for Cyprus' reunification fies in the constitutional strengthening of cross-cutting civil societal rather than statal processes.* The present state of E.U. integration seems to entail above all an abandoning of the focus on unitary stateness superceded strong cross-cutting webs of functional interests, public spaces and associational networks. The Swiss-European challenge for the Cypriot communities therefore is twofold and requires self-limitation in the following sense. Turkish-Cypriots are called to restrict the scope of their separatism by upholding constitutional guarantees for *civil societal traversibility* within their community i.e. by rendering their communal boundaries permeable by associational cross-ties while Greek-Cypriots are called to self-limit their majoritarian emphasis on unitary statehood and sovereignty.

Although Swiss institutions are not transplantable on the E.U. level they can serve as a source of inspiration in experimenting with new forms of citizenship,

representation and decision-making through a *"plurality of polities at different levels of aggregation"* (Schmitter, 1999, p. 943). *The problem which remains stubbornly unseen by Greek-Cypriot perceptions therefore lies squarely with the diffuse and contradictory institutional dynamics and possibilities of constitutional evolution within the E.U. and not with any inherent flaws of Swiss federalism per se.* Non-stateness in the *case of the E.U. engenders contradictory processes of legitimation while in the case of Switzerland the neutralisation of central authority was condusive in a certain sense to unitary nation-building and the crystallisation of "Swiss character".* Cypriot communities are presently found on the receiving end of E.U. experimentation with non-statal thinking and government by civil society.

Cyprus' Grossraum quasi-stateness seems to be approaching its end. It was felt by many Cypriots as a curse because the cold-war contradictions of quasi-stateness led eventually to *de facto* partition. But the latter is not *de jure* and is still reversible if Cypriot communities redefine quasi-stateness beyond neo-colonial treaties and discredited cold-war machinations. That is by engaging quasi-stateness in a normative redesigning through transnational and regional clusters of public space, primary and secondary forms of citizenship and tertiary levels of federalism under the new security umbrella and trust-building environment of the E.U. This however implies *"reargard constitutional politics",* more pragmatic in character than programmatic. Such *reargard constitutionalism* engages with *metaprescriptive dimensions of federalism,* i.e. federalism as an experiment which involves *practices* and innovative combinations of accommodative politics rather than affirmation of standard *categories.* The question that readily comes forward is whether such *de-essentia/ised, non-categorical* federalism can be enhanced by the formative influence of E.U. institutions. If this is so then the E.U.'s impersonal institutional influence transcends the mere framework of providing a trust-building and safe security environment and becomes a *potential constitutional paragon* and indirect power broker defining the context of a conflict-settlement. The dilemma therefore between the E.U. as a mere "security umbrella" indifferent to the context of the Cyprus conflict settlement and the E.U. as a direct power-broker does not hold. To Cyprus the E.U. stands both as a security provider and as a horizon of indirect constitutional influence becoming therefore an impersonal power-broker. This means that along with that of the E.U., Cyprus' federalisation process shall not take place through some "constitutional big-bang". Rather it means that it will take place *"by stealth"* through a noiseless evolutionary yet contradictory federalising process. *For this to evolve however Turkish-Cypriots as well as Greek-Cypriots may have to reflect more cautiously on the stakes of federalisation within the E.U.*

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Notes

* The sequel article (Part II), sub-titled "Theoretical and Practical Stakes of Federalisation is to be published in the next issue of *The Cyprus Review,* (Vol. 15, No. 1).

1.   Symptomatic of this penchant in Greek-Cypriot journalism is Yiannos Charalambides' article in the daily *Simerini,* August 15, 1999: "The Veil of Partition and the (Greek-Cypriot) entrapment in a viable settlement of the Cyprus Problem".

2.   Tamkoc elaborates on James Rosenau's concept of the *"penetrative process"* according to which foreign missions, subversive cadres and organisational staff of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another by sharing authority in the (penetrated society's) allocation of values thus establishing *"linkages"* (Rosenau, 1969) .
The two motherlands according to Tamkoc developed a *"relationship of emanation"* toward their respective communities in Cyprus. Being mere extensions of their motherlands, Tamkoc continues, the Cypriot communities denied their own local identity and came under the overwhelming power of two patrimonial sources of emanation. Turkish-Cypriot scholars; display an inexplicable difficulty acknowledging visible and solid signs of pro-independence mentality among Greek-Cypriots notwithstanding "emanation politics" that also determine a partially penetrated society. Had emanation politics been so dominant there would be no need for the coup d'etat of 15 [th] July in the first place. Armed civilian resistance to the "coupists", the failure of the illegal government to obtain recognition, its subsequent resignation only a week after the executed coup allowing a partial revival of constitutional legitimacy call for more subtle negotiation of "emanation politics".

3.   Already by 1946, U.S. security concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean dictated a more active "naval diplomacy" which led to the formation of the Sixth Fleet.

4.   A statement admitting this new reality was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff in the Greek Parliament, February 25, 1959, quoted by Terlexis, 1971, p. 367.

5.   The text of the "Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" was published in the *Americ Journal of International Law,* No. 63 (October 1969) pp. 875-903.

6.   In the former case English Canada prevailed over *Acadia* and *La Nouvelle France* through conquest and established itself as the Dominion of Canada and King George Ill's loyal constitutional flock. English speaking settlers who colonised Canada by defeating French imperial dominions had migrated more or less voluntarily and voluntarily they had chosen British allegiance. However even in the case of the British colonists' subjectship it was evident that they had voluntarily contracted with the monarch by trading allegiance for protection (Robert Bothwell, 1993, pp. 30-31). Unlike Greek-Cypriots, mid-Victorian English Canadians were high-minded of the sweep and majesty of British power. Citizenship in the greatest empire the world had ever seen exerted tremendous appeal. *"What ambitious young Canadians would turn from the privilege of membership in the empire to assert* sole *allegiance to a country whose population and world stature was comparable to Romania* (Desmond Morton, 1993, p. 55).

7. See the Declaration on the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union, October 29,
1993, DOC/93/8, issued by the European Council in Brussels.

8. See A. Weale's paper *'The Single Market, European Integration and Political Legitimacy':*
quoted by Ulrich Preuss, 1996, p. 219.

9. On this subject see also John P. Netti and Robert Robertson, *International Systems and the Modernisation of Societies,* London, Faber and Faber, 1968.

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IN THE WAKE OF 1974: PSYCHOLOGICALL WELL-BEING AND POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS IN GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEE FAMILIES

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Abstract

This study examines the health of Greek Cypriot refugee families who suffered the traumas of displacement and death of family members. Thirty refugee and twelve non-refugee families (N=118) completed ten self-report inventories assessing their resources, coping styles, well-being, and post-traumatic stress. Results indicate that the resources of social support, education, income, and family adaptability, and coping through support-seeking, positively predicted adaptation to war trauma. Twenty-two per cent of the refugee family sample and none of the non-refugee family sample exhibited PTSD, and 94% of these subjects were women. A model of family adaptation is presented, and implications for clinical intervention and public policy are discussed.

Introduction

As witnessed in Cyprus, and more recently in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, armed conflicts dramatically disrupt and irrevocably change families' lives. In the past decade, the number of refugee families has risen precipitously (van der Veer, 1998), and there are more than twenty-six million refugees worldwide (United Nations, 1995). In the wake of the sudden and unpredictable socio-economic and personal changes wrought by war, how do refugee families adapt? This study examines how the resources and coping strategies of Greek Cypriot families affect their adaptation to catastrophic events such as the loss of their homes and disappearance and death of family members in the 1974 war. The psychological well being of Greek Cypriots across the categories of refugee status, sex, and generation is examined twenty-eight years after the war.

Review of the Literature

Most studies on the effects of war (e.g., Fairbank and Nicholson, 1995; Hogancamp and Figley, 1983; van der Kolk, 1985; Solomon and Flum, 1988) have

focused on combat veterans and have not examined social and family relationships (Figley, 1995). Hill (1949) conducted the first major study of the role social relationships play in individuals' adjustment to war trauma. In a study of World War II veterans and their families, Hill found that the crises of war and post-war reunion have considerable impact on the family system. While research has indicated that families can work to alleviate the deleterious sequelae of traumatic events (Figley, 1983, 1989), family systems can also be sources of stress and trauma themselves (Matsakis, 1988), as in cases of family physical and sexual abuse. Studying family characteristics of Israeli soldiers who had suffered combat stress reaction Solomon, Mikulincer, Freid, and Wosner (1987) found that one-year after the war married soldiers had higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than unmarried soldiers. In a study of Vietnam veterans and their families recruited via a national random survey, Kulka et al. (1990) found significantly more problems (e.g., marital distress, family violence, child behavioural problems) in families with a PTSD-inflicted parent than veteran families without a PTSD-inflicted parent. Such findings challenge conventional wisdom that intimate partners or family members necessarily mitigate the impact of trauma.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (American Psychological Association, 1994) asserts that individuals can develop PTSD in response to three kinds of events: (1) incidents that are, or are perceived as, threatening to one's life or physical safety; (2) witnessing acts of violence against others; or (3) hearing about violence to or the unexpected or violent death of persons one knows well. Common symptoms of PTSD include anxiety, startle responses, sleep disturbance, nightmares, intrusive thoughts, difficulty concentrating, and problems dealing with feelings of anger (Keane, Wolfe, and Taylor, 1987). As a group, refugees may endure many traumatic events, including armed conflict, witnessing the beating, killing, and mutilation of people, sudden flight, and involuntary migration (Chambon, 1989; Stein, 1986). Sack et al. (1994) asserted that war-related traumas increase the risk of developing PTSD, and Lipton (1994) posited that any traumatic experience in which people perceive that death is imminent or people perceive themselves as totally helpless increases the risk of developing PTSD. Acute emotional reactions to war trauma include numbing, panic, and bereavement (van der Veer, 1998), and PTSD symptoms can appear months or even years after exposure to war trauma.

Figley (1979) identified four elements of war which define it as a traumatic stressor. First, armed conflict is imminently *life-threatening,* with refugees fearing for their lives and the lives of others (van der Veer, 1998). Second, refugee families experience a *sense of loss.* Refugees lose their communities, homes, and personal belongings, which may never be recovered following their destruction and/or a forced exodus due to military occupation of territory. Refugees may also lose

relatives or close friends due to death and/or disappearances that may never be fully resolved (L'Hoste, 1986; van der Veer, 1998). Third, war produces a *sense of helplessness,* in which refugees cannot stop the killing and devastation, and may be powerless for extended periods of time to protect themselves or those close to them. Last, refugees are witnesses to destruction and *disruption.* In the terror and confusion associated with armed conflict, family members can become separated from one another, and later endure hardships in the strange surroundings of refugee camps (van der Veer, 1998). In the case of Greek Cypriot refugees, disruption means a "a loss of continuity with the past-the home as the physical and symbolic representation of what has been irreplaceably lost in exile" (Zetter, 1999, p. 9).

Only a handful of studies have examined the direct impact of war on family relations or how families cope and transform their lives from war trauma. For example, Zetter (1992, 1999) conducted a longitudinal, ethnographic study of Greek Cypriot refugees' processes for adjusting to the meaning of protracted exile and their perceptions of a "return home." But no study in Cyprus has examined the mental health consequences of war or the impact of war trauma on families. Research in other countries has demonstrated that the stressors of war are associated with somatic disorders, depression, anxiety, and poor interpersonal relations (Ben-David and Lavee, 1992; Boscarino, 1995; Farhood, 1986; Farhood, Chaya, and Madi-Skaff, 1997; Finley-Jones and Brown, 1981; Kaplan, Roberts, Camacho, and Coyne, 1987; McCubbin, Joy, Cauble, Patterson, and Needle, 1980). For example, a random, population-based survey in war-time Lebanon found that the loss of one's home and property was related to psychological distress (Hourani, Aremenian, Zuryak, and Afifi, 1986). War and non-war stressful life events were associated with depressive symptoms in Lebanese women, with income and education acting as buffers to symptomatology (Bryce, Walker, and Peterson, 1989; Bryce, Walker, Ghorayeb, and Kanj, 1989). Studying families who had endured the sixteen-year Lebanese war, Farhood et al., (1993) found that war stress reduces mental health, with social support working as a mediating factor. Farhood (1999) found that family resources, such as social support and education, had a positive impact on family adaptation.

Theoretical Rationale

The authors grounded the present study in family stress theory and the Resiliency Model of Family Stress, Adjustment, and Adaptation (Mccubbin and Mccubbin, 1996). This model attempts to account for the personal, family, and community processes and properties that interact and influence families' healthy functioning over time. Post-crisis processes that contribute to the quality of family's adaptation to traumatic life events include vulnerabilities (subsequent stressors,

strains, and transitions that challenge a family's ability to adapt), family resources (family and social resources called upon in order to adapt), and coping and problem solving (cognitive and behavioural strategies for coping). For healthy adaptation to occur, families must institute changes in patterns of functioning and in their relationship within a larger social context. This study considers three primary factors: (a) Family Life Events, specifically, war and non-war traumas, and more recent family strains and transitions, (b) Family Resources, including social support adaptability in the face of crises, education, and income, and (c) Family Health including family members' physical, emotional, and social well-being and post-traumatic stress symptoms.

The following series of hypotheses about relationships between the variables are examined in the present study. The greater the frequency and severity of war and non-war traumas experienced by the family, the more likely the family will have a more difficult time creating strategies for transforming trauma. Problematic adaptation is manifested in lower physical, emotional, and social well-being and in post-traumatic stress symptoms. Furthermore, it is hypothesised that the frequency and severity of traumas will contribute to a greater number of recent family stressors, which will decrease family adaptation. In addition to family resources, coping strategies will work to mediate the impact of stressful life events.

Differentials in power and the cultural context of the research subjects are taken into account in the interpretation of the study's findings. Analysis of the data was guided by feminist and ecosystemic theoretical frameworks (Agathangelou, 2000; Falicov, 1995; Keeney, 1982) that emphasise the importance of the historical and social contexts in which family relationships and presenting problems are embedded. Any person's access to resources, power, and privilege relative to others is constituted through multiple locations within the ecosystems of gender culture, social class, race, ability, religion, education, and age, to name a few, and effects further access to resources and institutions.

Method

Subjects

Thirty Greek Cypriot refugee families were selected from a government database on displaced and missing people by drawing a random sample. A comparison group of non-refugee families was drawn from the urban and rural areas in which the refugee families resided. The total sample comprised twelve families who did not lose their homes and possessions in the war, eighteen refugee families who lost their homes and possessions, and twelve refugee families who lost their homes, possessions, and a family member in the war. Two to four family

members responded from each family, at least one respondent from each of two generations (total N=118, 54 men and 64 women). Parents were at least fifty years old and had one or more adult children who were six years or older at the time of the war.

Procedure

The measures consisted of previously devised instruments that had been translated and then validated on the Greek Cypriot population. The participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire and ten self-report instruments. A trauma inventory tapped subjects' experience of severe stressors such as combat, major fire, natural disaster, serious car accident, violent crime, displacement, witnessing someone being mutilated, injured, or violently killed, sexual coercion, death of a family member by accident or homicide, any other traumatic event, and a traumatic event that they could not speak about or describe. Subjects were asked to report the frequency and severity of each trauma at the time of the event. Subjects were also administered the Penn Inventory for PTSD (Hammarberg, 1992), which measures twenty-six post-traumatic stress symptoms and has an internal consistency of .94 and an overall predictive power of 93% for correctly diagnosing cases of PTSD.

Eight additional instruments measured the major components of the Resiliency Model: a twenty-item measure of family transitions and strains in the past year (McCubbin and Patterson, 1981; Mccubbin and Patterson, 1982); the seventeen-item Social Support Index (SSI) (McCubbin, Patterson, and Glynn, 1982); a twenty- four-item measure of family coping behaviours called the Family Coping Index (FAMCI) (McCubbin, Thompson, and Elver, 1995); a ten-item measure of family coping strategies called Problem-Solving Communication (PSC) (Mccubbin, Thompson, and Elver, 1995); the twenty-item Family Hardiness Index (FHI) (McCubbin, McCubbin, and Thompson, 1986), featuring three subscales measuring cohesion, adaptability, and locus of control (higher scores on this subscale reflect a generalised belief that personal events and occurrences are more the result of one's own efforts and behaviour [internal control] instead of luck, chance, or other contingencies [external control]); Family Solidarity, a nine-item measure of families' sense of strength and cooperation in the face of problems and challenges, derived from items from the FAMCI and FHI; finally, an eleven-item measure of Family Member Well-being derived from the original FMWB (McCubbin and Patterson, 1982) and augmented with three items from a measure of Family Distress (McCubbin and Patterson, 1981). These measures possess internal reliability coefficients ranging from .74 to .89. Informed consent was obtained, confidentiality and anonymity were assured, and participation in the study was voluntary, involving minimal personal risk. The forms were completed in the participants' homes and

they were free to withdraw from the study at any time. Data were analysed, T-tests and multiple regression procedures.

Results

A step-wise multiple regression procedure found that 62% of the variance in the dependent variable PTSD symptoms was accounted for (F < .0001) by the independent variables of trauma history (B = .34, p < .001), family member well being (FMWB) (B = -.33, p < .001), social support (B = -.31, p = .005), educational level (B = -.24, p = .01), and focus of control (B = -.15, p = .048) (Beta coefficients are all standardised). Support from friends, family and the community, education, a more internal focus of control, and a strong sense of emotional and physical health in oneself and one's family was reciprocally related to the reporting of PTSD symptoms. Logically, the frequency and severity of traumas were positively associated with the reporting of PTSD symptoms. In addition to the direct reciprocal relationship between the family resource of education and PTSD symptoms, the resources of family adaptability and income had an indirect, reciprocal relationship to PTSD symptoms by accounting for 47% of the variance in the independent variable of locus of control.

A step-wise multiple regression procedure found that 49% of the variance FMWB was accounted for (F < .0001) by three independent variables: fam stressors in the past year (B = -.36, p = .0002), PTSD symptoms (B = -.33, p .0006), and family coping behaviours (B = .22, p = .0135). Thus, symptoms PTSD and recent family stresses and strains appear to diminish subjects' FMV\ while family coping behaviours buoy FMWB in refugee families.

Regarding the T-tests, the mean for the non-refugee families on FMWB was significantly higher than for the refugee families (p = .004), but the means for social support did not differ between refugees and non-refugees. Men scored significantly higher on FMWB than women (p = .004), but the means for locus of control did not significantly differ between men and women, or between generation one and two. However, refugees reported a more external locus of control than non-refuge, (p < .001) and significantly higher levels of experienced trauma (p < .001) ar PTSD symptoms (p < .001) than non-refugees. Women reported more PTS symptoms than men did (p < .001), less education (p = .032), less social support (p = .004), and less seeking of support from friends and relatives (p = .05). The was also an interaction between gender and social class on the dependent variable of FMWB. Finally, FMWB, social support, and family stressors did not differ between the generations, although parents did report significantly more traumas (p = .005) and significantly more PTSD symptoms (p = .002) than their adult offspring.

Discussion

Support for the Refugee Family Adaptation Model

The results supported the hypothesised relationships in the model. Figure 1 shows a trimmed model of the statistically supported paths among the variables. Non-normative traumatic events and normative family stresses predicted family adaptation. Specifically, war and non-war traumas predicted post-traumatic stress symptoms while more recent family stressors and transitions predicted family member well-being. This finding lends legitimacy to the model because, logically, traumatic events, not normative family stresses, would contribute to post-traumatic symptoms. In addition, it makes sense that normative family stressors in the past year would have an impact on FMWB in the past month but would not contribute to PTSD symptoms. Number and severity of traumas also accounted for 10% of the variance in family stressors in the past year.

Figure 1:
Statistically Supported, Trimmed Model of Refugee Family Adaptation

The perception of family and community social support positively predicted FMWB, and utilisation of these supports in their coping strategies reduced PTSD symptoms. While family solidarity did predict a significant proportion (27%) of the variance in problem solving communication (PSC), PSC failed to reach significance (p = .15) in its prediction of either measure of family adaptation in this sample. This is a curious finding in light of past research, clinical anecdotes, and conventional

wisdom which have held that affirming, non-incendiary communication styles are positively related to well-being in post-crisis families (Figley, 1995; Mccubbin and Thompson, 1992; McCubbin, Thompson, Thompson, Elver, and McCubbin, 19 McCubbin, McCubbin, Thompson, and Thompson, 1995). Because family is centrally important in Greek culture (Tsemberis and Orfanos, 1996), it is possible that some subjects provided socially desirable responses to this inventory so that their families would appear healthier and happier regardless of the act communication patterns. Another possibility is that PSC is not an appropriate measure for Greek Cypriot refugee families due to cultural differences. For instance, yelling and shouting during arguments or debates are not necessarily viewed as inappropriate in the Greek Cypriot cultural context. Further research could explore the extent to which measures of problem solving are reliable and valid across cultures.

Other family resources that played a significant role in family adaptation were education, income, and family adaptability. Family income and adaptability were linked to locus of control, with a more internal locus of control predicting fewer PTSD symptoms, while higher levels of education were directly linked to fewer PTSD symptoms. One interpretation of this finding is that having more knowledge about topics such as physical and mental health affords subjects an awareness self, alternative frameworks for understanding events, experiences, and symptoms and alternative methods of responding to them. For example, having gone to college, a family member is likely to be aware of the psychological concepts of stress, anxiety, and panic, and this information would be available to help explain the occurrence of symptoms such as palpitations, cold sweats, and unusual breathing patterns. Additionally, these family members may be aware of the institutional resources available (e.g., access to "good" doctors, access to the state's resources and knowledge) and the methods necessary to tap into them when needed. A subject possessing two years of college education might view these symptoms as indicators of a psychological state of anxiety or a panic attack: and examine what is going on internally and externally to contextualise the experience. In contrast, a subject possessing two years of primary school, education might view these symptoms as an indication of a serious health problem (e.g., a heart attack) or as a sign that they are "going crazy." Because education plays such an important role in how persons (1) make sense of their of experience, and (2) access resources and support, helping professionals should include it as a standard part of their assessment protocol when working with survivors of traumatic events.

An unanticipated finding was the strong reciprocal relationship between the family adaptation variables of FMWB and PTSD symptoms. As noted earlier, studies of families with a PTSD-inflicted member have demonstrated that the

presence of a person suffering from PTSD symptoms is frequently associated with stressful experiences for all family members (Matsakis, 1988). Flashbacks, nightmares and sleep disturbance, outbursts of anger, substance abuse, and violence can work to traumatise those intimately connected to a person with PTSD, and the consequent deleterious effects to family systems can be extensive and enduring (Boudewyns, Hyer, Klein, Nichols, and Sperr, 1995). In this study, the presence of a member manifesting significant PTSD symptoms diminished members' sense of FMWB, suggesting that some family systems were themselves sources of stress, and the presence of a PTSD-inflicted member elevated other members' concerns about their own health and that of others. The authors explored this phenomenon further by comparing scores on FMWB between families who did and did not have a member who had a probable diagnosis of PTSD. The criterion was whether a family member had scored at or above the clinical cut-off score of thirty-five on the Penn Inventory (Hammarberg, 1992). Families who had a PTSD-inflicted member scored significantly lower on FMWB (p = .004) than families who had members who scored less than thirty-five on the Penn Inventory. Families who had a PTSD-inflicted member also sought more support from relatives and friends than those who did not have a PTSD-inflicted member (p = .025).

Conversely, families who possess a strong sense of emotional and physical health may draw upon this as a resource to buffer the impact of traumas. For example, families who did not experience emotional and physical violence or substance abuse before, during, or following traumatic events probably view themselves as stronger and more emotionally and physically healthy; a positive history of family health as well as access to alternative therapies (such as homeopathy, chiropractic care) may help members view a trauma as something that they can handle and survive together. Additional findings are discussed below under the categories of refugee status, gender, and generation.

Refugee Status

As expected, refugees reported significantly more traumatic experiences and post-traumatic stress symptoms than persons who had not lost their homes and possessions. Thirteen out of sixty refugees (22%), and no non-refugees, scored at or above the clinical cut-off score on the Penn Inventory suggesting the presence of significant post-traumatic stress symptoms. This finding is consistent with others (Bramsen, 1995; Mooren and Kleber, 1996) which stipulate that 15-25% of those who suffer multiple traumas as a result of war can exhibit signs of serious mental disorder up to fifty years afterward, but that most people do not develop serious disorders such as post-traumatic stress (Yehuda and McFarlane, 1995). Twenty-seven years after the war, 22% of the Greek Cypriot refugee sample were suffering from PTSD. The prevalence of PTSD in this refugee family sample stands in stark

contrast to the 1% prevalence found in the general population in the U.S. (Davidson, Hughes, Blazer, and George, 1991; Sack et al., 1994), but parallels the estimates of prevalence of 16% (Gong-Guy, 1987) and 22% (Clarke et al., 1993 found in Cambodian refugees twelve to fifteen years after their displacement. Similarly, in their national sample of Vietnam veterans, Kulka et al. (1990) found PTSD prevalence rate of over 15% ten to twenty years after their service Vietnam. Refugees also reported a more external locus of control than non-refugees, meaning that they tend to view life events as being determined by circumstances and luck and not by their own agency. This finding is likely to be connected to the experience of a catastrophic stressor (e.g., displacement) that is sudden, unpredictable, and completely out of one's control, both then and now (no refugee has returned home to the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus). Interestingly levels of social support did not differ across refugee status. Despite their diaspora within Cyprus and the disruption of their original communities in the north, refugee may have maintained a sense of connectedness and continuity by developing bonds in their new communities and by attending the weddings and funerals of former co-villagers (Zetter, 1999).

Gender

Women scored significantly higher on PTSD symptoms than men, and reported less social support, less seeking of support, less education, and less FMWB than men. The interaction between gender and social class on FMWB also indicates that being female and working class predicts significantly lower scores on this dimension of overall emotional and psychological health. Twenty-five per cent the women and only 2% of the men received a diagnosis of PTSD, and sixteen out of seventeen of the persons receiving a PTSD diagnosis were women (χ^2 = .001).·Since the adaptation model suggests that education is a major resource and seeking support is a major coping strategy in reducing PTSD symptoms, Greek Cypriot women logically are at a higher risk than men for developing PTSD. This finding is consistent with others (e.g., Kinzie et al., 1990) that being female has, been correlated with a higher prevalence of PTSD in refugee groups. However since women reported fewer traumas (p = .07) and somewhat less distress associated with these traumas (p = .094) than men, questions arise about their adaptation processes and the *qualitative nature* of their traumas.

In 1980, the United Nations High Commissioner designated refugee women, a high-risk group for developing severe psychological problems due to pre- migration war experiences of rape and sexual violence (Refugee Women Development, 1990). In this study, for the hugely underreported trauma of sexual coercion and violence, five women reported experiences, whereas no men reported such an experience. Eleven women also reported experiencing a trauma that they

could not talk about, and six men reported having had such an experience. The total frequency of sexual violence and traumas participants could not talk about was sixteen for women and six for men, indicating a gender gap in the incidence of traumatic events which the participants experienced difficulty disclosing.

Some feminists argue that modern medicine and psychiatry developed in a process parallel to colonial expansion (Myntti, 1985, p. 169; Giacaman, 1989), and their practice serves the interests of capitalist-patriarchy. Women's health, and lack thereof (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, 1998; Thompson, 1994), is intimately connected to women's access to resources, knowledge production, and power both inside and outside the family . Across the globe, women face barriers to their use of medical care such as not being able to take time out of work or losing pay for doing so, childcare, limited economic resources, and fewer facilities in rural communities. "Who gets health care and what kind of care" are political questions, and the health care strategies of any society have a significant class, gender, a racial, national, and ethnic dimension (Stork, 1989, p. 4). Similarly, in Cyprus, the refugee women's experience of the state's support and caring in 1974 is no exception. The Greek Cypriot state approached women's violated bodies in the conflict ridden context as propaganda tools. In 1991 it seized upon international events, such as the ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, and fomented anxieties about the sexually violent practices of the enemy in 1974. However, this same state did not invest any resources to create agencies to support and care for the women sexually violated during the war (personal interviews with women sexually violated in 1974). Such lack of support through state policies reflect an attempt to recapture and recuperate the past while simultaneously neglecting the needs of women traumatised in 1974 (Agathangelou, 2000, p. 14).

It is possible that the tendency for families and communities to shun or "blame the victim" in cases of abuse, molestation, and sexual assault and the intense feelings of shame associated with such experiences may contribute to silence around their experiences. In addition, women are sometimes seen as "damaged goods" or property in patriarchal social relations, and women may perceive that a discussion of sexual violence might erode spouses' sense of being in control and in power. Furthermore, in wartime, discussing the traumas of being physically beaten or witnessing a mutilation or killing may carry less severe social consequences in one's social network than talking about the trauma of sexual violence. The mental health of particular persons (e.g., a woman who lost her husband and son in 1974) and groups (e.g., those living in refugee housing) is linked to the institutionalisation of trauma, which in turn, is linked to a focus on the still unresolved national question. The institutionalisation of trauma locks many persons into the category of "victim" blocking other strategies and "possibilities of intervention ....short of the removal of the military occupation" (Giacaman, 1989, p. 19).[1] In the hermeneutic world, the self

is a constantly changing affair, not a fixed social property. "Understanding and meaning are cultural, public, and intersubjective" (Goolishian and Anderson, 1992 p. 11). Mental space is a public space, public through labour and dialogue, and the self is always evolving out of this public space. Thus, not talking about traumatic experiences can delay or impede the healing process (Koss et al., 1988), and this phenomenon, combined with a lack of social support and community resources, may contribute to more PTSD symptoms and a lower sense of well-being in women.

Generation

The number and severity of traumas and PTSD symptoms were significantly higher for generation one than two. This makes sense because research participants who were parents in 1974 had already experienced traumas prior to this war. They were witnesses to or participants in the war against the British in the 1950s, and the ethnic conflicts of 1963, 1964, and/or 1967, and were more likely to have experienced a broad range of stressful situations during the 1974 war (e.g being beaten and/or imprisoned, or actually killing people). This finding supports the notion of "stacking," which suggests that a greater number of traumatic events clustered together carries a greater risk factor for developing PTSD. However, the variables of family member well-being, social support, and family stressors in the past year did not differ between the generations. Further analyses, beyond the scope of this article, may shed light on these findings.

The Significance of Social Support

Studies have found community social support to be significantly related to successful family adaptation in adjusting to stressful circumstances (Lavee, McCubbin, and Patterson, 1985; McCubbin and Thompson, 1988; McCubbin and Thompson, 1992; Thompson, Mccubbin, Thompson, and Elver, 1995). In this study, perception of social support strongly predicted lower PTSD symptoms, suggesting a finding of other researchers (Brownwell and Shumaker, 1984; Figley 1983, 1988; Pilisuk and Parks, 1986) that social support networks play a vital role in the healing process of traumatised families. Women's significantly lower scores on social support indicate that they perceived that this resource was not available to them to the extent that men viewed it to be available for themselves. The reasons why men report higher levels of social support than women will be explored further elsewhere, but preliminary findings from descriptive data suggest that men typically frequent the *kafeneia,* or coffee houses, in their local communities on a daily, and sometimes nightly, basis in Cyprus, and this provides a very regular opportunity for both routine and sociopolitical conversation. Having a place to go and talk about daily and historical events may serve as a buffer to long-term maladaptation to trauma and may enhance a person's sense of well-being.

However, patriarchy privileges men's power and control but does not bestow the same prerogatives to women. Men's social support at the *kafeneia* represents access to a public space whereas there is no parallel privilege, activity, or social outlet for women in the Greek Cypriot context.

Implications for Public Policy and Intervention

In the case of Greek Cypriot refugees, families were relocated on the southern side of the UN Green Line within their own country, sometimes only minutes away from their original homes. They did not experience the culture shock that most refugees undergo in having to adjust to a new language and totally unfamiliar beliefs, customs, and traditions. Nevertheless, refugee families have experienced significant forms of disruption and discontinuity. Greek Cypriot refugees are distinguished from their non-refugee hosts, in that they "cannot repossess their original houses either as symbols or physical artefacts" (Zetter, 1999, p. 9). Zetter (1999) describes the metaphorical meanings of home and how these are integral to "the myth of return":

> The metaphor of roots permeates the construction of the myth... not just of return to their village.. .but an imperative to reclaim the very foundations of the house they were forced to leave in 1974. Continuity is expressed, preserved and reinforced by the culturally specific symbol of the house, built and inherited from preceding generations.. ..Exile from access to the ancestral graves intensifies, for the refugees, the significance of this lost rite....The acquisition, ownership and disposal of land symbolised social status and material wealth and, especially through the dowry system, the continuity of line (p. 11-12).

But public policies such as the housing programme have not taken into account these important symbolic meanings and need to re-establish continuity. Specifically, as Zetter (1999) asserts:

> ...small terraced housing for nuclear families, incapable of extension or adaptation, on large, mass-produced 'refugee' estates, contrasts in every way with the traditional housing type of the past. Paradoxically, despite the remarkable physical achievement, this has created a powerful symbol of refugeehood, reinforced their status as insiders and outsiders, and has limited transition in some cases (p. 20).

Regarding the provision of other services, the prevailing view in the Western tradition of the helping professions is that talking about traumatic experiences is the single most therapeutic behaviour in which survivors of trauma can engage (Bolton, 2001; Davis and Friedman, 1985). However, the value of a "talking cure" has not been established in many cultures, and psychotherapy has not gained universal acceptance. In some European countries (e.g., Greece), counselling and therapy

are taboo, and families do not discuss personal problems with strangers (McGoldrick, Giordano, and Pearce, 1996). In Greek Cypriot society, therapy is still not viewed as a legitimate option by many distressed families, even those who have suffered the loss of family members, their homes, and their possessions as a result of war. Therefore, the following questions remain: To whom do refugees talk, and how can helping professionals approach the provision of services to refugee families in an effective, politically aware manner?

At the level of groups and communities, public health officials and mental health professionals should not underestimate the value of group organisations and group healing for persons who have experienced displacement and/or combat. Officials, professionals, and other civil society organisations can help families connect with other families who have gone through similar difficult experiences to share their own hardships and strategies of survival. Group treatment approaches help survivors, to realise that life will go on for them and empower them to reconnect with a wider community by devising strategies that centralise them as agents and designers of their own communities and lives. Examples include veterans gathering at Vet Centres, utilisation of indigenous healing practices by Native Americans veterans and treatment of Southeast Asian refugees in socialisation group settings (Boehnlein and Kinzie, 1997). When relocated families perceive a positive and supportive community, members can be encouraged to tap into available resources of advice, favours, companionship, and a sense of belonging (i.e., being part of something bigger than themselves). In addition, women lacking formal or informal social support networks can be supported through state resources and women's organisations to meet together to discuss their experiences, the structural context within which these social relations of violence and violation emerge and the conditions under which they become possible. Moreover, the state and women's organisations need to work with women of all classes to recognise that healing requires more than just understanding one's feelings regarding sexual violence and violation and their refugee position in the society. It calls for the recognition that health requires clean water, air, food, adequate housing, safety and security healthy working conditions, and emotional and material resources. Thus seemingly unconnected issues like poverty, racism, and sexism are also healtr issues and need to be linked to the conditions that create them. However, war rips the social fabric of refugees' lives, disrupting physical, psychological, and emotiona structures that may have been in place for generations and leaving persons botr without a home and without a sense of belonging. Empowering communit cohesion in villages and towns in Cyprus enters the realm of grass roots organising, activism, and public policy, and thus working with refugee families erodes the Western dichotomy between public and private; the two are inextricably linked.

For mental health professionals working on an individual basis, a good

beginning would be to assess the severity of post-traumatic stress symptoms and the presence of those resources that predict positive adaptation in refugee families. Investigating providers' knowledge, attitudes, and service provision patterns for Bosnian refugees suffering from post-traumatic stress, Weine et al. (2001) found that "less than half of all providers systematically assess for PTSD, and standardised instruments for PTSD are rarely used" (p. 261). In addition, only half of the providers reported providing education to refugees and their families about the possible mental health consequences of trauma. Weine et al. (2001) conclude that assessment, intervention and educational activities of providers are inconsistent with literature documenting the high prevalence of PTSD in refugee populations. Such research highlights the importance of education and training in assessing and treating PTSD for those helping professionals providing services to refugee populations. Use of an instrument such as the Penn Inventory (Hammarberg, 1992) that has a proven specificity or "hit" ratio for diagnosing PTSD is highly recommended. In addition, it would be helpful to know what specific traumas were experienced in addition to displacement (e.g., combat, sexual coercion, refugee camp experience, etc.) and family members' appraisals of how distressing these events were to them. Since some traumas are too painful, terrifying, or shaming to discuss verbally, it is wise to include as part of an interview or assessment form an item asking refugees if there was an event that they cannot describe or talk about.

Severe symptoms of PTSD, or a diagnosis of complicated or "chronic" PTSD, necessitate a treatment regimen that will provide sufferers the safety, predictability, and control they need to tolerate later clinical interventions (Boudewyns et al., 1997). Persons suffering from severe PTSD are so vulnerable and fragile that questions, directives, and challenges by therapists and other authority figures are frequently construed as threats. Even impeccably timed and sound technique can be misperceived and become counterproductive:

> Therapy in which technique is good, but knowledge of the dynamics of the disorder is lacking, can be just as dangerous...The therapist must be knowledgeable about PTSD and clear about what he or she is trying to accomplish with an intervention, so that unexpected responses or deviations can be shaped to accomplish the original therapeutic goal (Boudewyns et al., 1997, p. 372).

A critical component in clients' healing is the carefully guided recollection of forgotten aspects of the traumatic events. But equally important to the healing process is the therapeutic *management* of the remembering. The rushing flood of memories can be very distressing and precipitates a dissociative reaction in many clients (American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, 2000). Thus, it is important for helping professionals to assess clients' ability to self-sooth and

effectively cope with their memories of traumatic events and to refrain fron treatment if such skills have yet to be developed. To minimise the risk o retraumatisation, decompensation, or even suicide in traumatised clients, helpin professionals can evaluate their resilience and stability by finding answers to thE following two questions: (a) Have the clients experienced a single traumatic event (b) if they have been repeatedly traumatised, do the clients possess stable backgrounds and the resources and resilience to sort out and distinguish the personal traumatic events? An affirmative answer to either question means that the client can talk about a personal trauma, and address personal traumas, one at c time (Rothschild, 2000). Usually these clients have the resources necessary tc begin to work directly on the traumatic incidents that precipitated their need fo1 services. In contrast, a negative answer to the second question points to the neec for resource rebuilding through the therapeutic relationship before the traumas car be addressed.

As this study demonstrated that social support is crucial in recovery from war trauma, this resource should also be assessed in families that have relocated. In addition to perceiving the presence of a supportive family and community, another factor associated with higher levels of well-being was the coping strategy of actively seeking support from friends, relatives, and neighbours. Professionals should also evaluate family members' levels of education as part of their assessment protocol, since education was shown to be another major predictor of family adaptation. Because a positive family environment is a resource for families who have a member suffering from PTSD, assessment of members' perceptions of their own emotional, social, and physical well-being would also be useful, including a measure of depression to screen for the risk of suicide (e.g., Scale for Suicide Ideation (SSI), Beck, Steer, and Ranieri, 1988). Therapists also should assess family members' adaptability, problem-solving communication, and indications of substance abuse or family violence.

Once clients feel a sense of familiarity and safety with the therapist, promising avenues of intervention include trauma therapy, psycho-education, relationship enhancement, and community activism. When clients are in touch with their resources and can cope with traumatic memories, family sessions can become an important part of therapy. Professionals can assess the degree to which family members are supportive to one another, coach them when interpersonal and communication skills are lacking, and encourage them to utilise social supportiveness from their own members and communities. Educating families about normative emotional and psychological acute and long-term reactions to extreme stressors may provide the basic knowledge survivors need to develop alternative understandings of what has happened and how they can choose to respond to the trauma and its sequelae in the future. Eschewing clinical terminology

and pathologising concepts, therapists can describe PTSD symptoms in terms of relational dynamics frequently observed in PTSD sufferers such as social withdrawal. Over time, these strategies for avoiding painful intrusive thoughts and feelings connected with traumas dramatically diminish intimacy, self-disclosure, and skills for conflict resolution in couples and families. Thus, systems in crisis can benefit from learning and implementing a variety of interpersonal skills. Therapists can coach families to engage in behaviours that lead to effective information exchange, problem solving, and resolving conflicts (Guerney, 1977).

Figley (1995) discussed how families who are still in crisis years after the original traumas can be assisted in learning and using helpful, therapeutic skills. Healthy families help each other by encouraging recapitulation of the trauma and facilitating resolution of their memories and conflicts. Supporters can facilitate a review of the circumstances of traumatic events and the meanings associated with them. Important questions include "what happened and why," "why did I react the way I did," and "if something like this occurs again, will I be able to cope more effectively?" (Figley, 1995). By listening to the recounting of traumatic events in a non-judgmental and caring manner, and offering constructive interpretations of the meaning of such events, families help reframe traumas and facilitate a movement towards a *healing theory* (Figley, 1979) in which survivors can finally answer the preceding questions to their satisfaction. Nearly always, families possess the capacity for coping with nearly all of their traumatic stressors (Figley and McCubbin, 1983; Figley, 1989). By talking about their experiences, they may feel more confident and competent about future challenges.

Future Directions for Research

Future studies could focus on comparative studies of refugee families that have relocated to different contexts, such as Greece, the US, or Great Britain. While this study did account for a majority of the variance in the adaptation variable of PTSD symptoms, the inclusion of additional variables might increase the proportion of variance accounted for in this variable and that of FMWB. Possibilities include subjects' level of self-disclosure following traumatic events (Bolton, 2001) and the degree to which they experience supportive or unsupportive social interactions from others and the larger society in the wake of trauma. Such variables may prove important because the period immediately after a trauma significantly shapes clients' overall experience of how severe and enduring the effects of that particular trauma will be in their lives. In addition, since current knowledge about adaptation and resilience in a family context is limited, more qualitative studies are needed to complement quantitative studies (McCubbin, Thompson, and McCubbin, 1996). The meanings that subjects make of their traumas and what would constitute help in their aftermath are of vital importance to health and family researchers and

therapists. Additional investigations are needed regarding the ethnic, class, and gender factors that account for women's higher rates and severity of post-traumatic stress. Finally the political economy of choosing to provide particular health care strategies should be further examined.

Conclusion

This study found that particular family resources-social support, education income, and adaptability – are crucial to families' long-term adaptation to war trauma. Living in a community that is safe and secure increases the likelihood tha family members will feel supported. Education permits family members new paradigms for understanding symptoms and behaviours in themselves and others. Income allows access to material resources such as quality health care and safe housing, thereby permitting a greater sense of agency and a more internal locus of control following trauma. Family adaptability translates into the ability to collectively reframe painful events and demonstrate resilience in the face of the hardships of losing one's home, all one's possessions, and even family members.

As the incidence of armed conflicts and natural disasters persists at high levels, and as European Union member states continue to absorb high numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, it is crucial that public health officials and mental health professionals become aware of the unique experiences of refugee families and learn effective assessment and delivery of resources to these families so that they can be assisted in (re) integrating to their new environments. Since most family systems do not self-destruct or deteriorate to the point of requiring therapy, but recover from adversity, larger system interventions intended to augment family well-being should ideally work in tandem with families' own resources and resiliencies (McCubbin and Mccubbin, 1996; Walsh, 1998). For this reason, public policies should be guided by research and theory that acknowledge and build upon families' own material resources, ways of understanding and making meaning, and strategies of survival. Refugee family crises also must be assessed and understood within the context of larger social systems and structures which may not be conducive to healing (e.g., a host context in which Greek Cypriot refugees are both insiders and outsiders). Mental health "is not a neutral set of institutions, knowledge and practice. In conjunction with other sectors and relationships, it reproduces power." (Navarro, 1989). Movement from the status quo in mental health requires "new mechanisms of accountability" among social institutions: the state, the social networks, communities, helping professionals, and the citizens themselves (Navarro, 1989). Transforming trauma at the levels of citizens, families, and nation will require material and social resources to create new mental health services and enhance their accessibility. Equally crucial is the need for consciousness raising about mental health, as a transformation in popular understandings of mental health can open space for the development of new narratives of what is a healthy society.

Note

1.   For example, the primacy of the discourse surrounding the national political contradiction pushes new strategies for mental health to the margins of the political agenda, even for feminists and members of the political left.

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LEGITIMATING DISCOURSE: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES IN U.S. OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON CYPRUS

Fusun Coban Doskaya

Abstract

This article is about a concrete example on the discursive aspects of political legitimation. It studies the press briefings and press conferences that are delivered by U.S. officials roughly through the second-term period of former U.S. president Bill Clinton. After a theoretical analysis of legitimation, this article aims to examine what a legitimating discourse says and how it says these things. In order to study the legitimation process of U.S. official political discourse on Cyprus, of the vast number of discourse structures and strategies it only concentrates on semantic macrostructures.

1. Introduction

This study defines and discusses legitimation within a discourse analytical framework and examines its discursive aspects in general. In particular it analyses some properties of the discourse of U.S. officials and concentrates on U.S. official political discourse on Cyprus.

Political discourse is one of the most ideological of all discourses. The same "discourse may be uttered by a professor [...] but it becomes a political discourse simply by the fact that it is uttered by a politician speaking and writing in a political context" (van Dijk, 1997, p. 19). Therefore, political discourse can be described as the discourse of politicians. However, this does not mean that an informal conversation of a politician is political discourse; "the discourse must be produced by the speaker in her professional role of a politician and in an institutional setting. This means that discourse is political when it accomplishes a political act in a political institution" (van Dijk, 2001, p. 6). That is, only those discourses of politicians that are produced in institutional settings are considered to be political discourse and thus what makes discourses political are their roles in political situations and their functions in the political process.[1]

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The official documents that are selected for analysis in this article have been gathered from the homepage of the U.S. embassy in Nicosia, under the title "The Cyprus Issue," the subtitle "U.S. Official Policy" and the heading "Official Statements on Cyprus." In order to limit the text types under analysis in this article only U.S. State Department press briefings and press conferences of U.S. officials are analysed while other documents like the White House monthly reports are not included. The data covers an analysis of ninety press briefings and twenty-two press conferences that are delivered roughly during the second-term period of former U.S. President Bill Clinton, between June 1997 and January 2001.[2]

In this study, press briefings and press conferences are chosen, because they are direct expressions of political power. They allow speakers to control the agenda, topics and other important aspects of institutional talk, and formulate a good example for legitimating discourse. In addition, since they are political texts, in them ideology and power relations are easy to follow and the discursive reproduction of dominance is more significant. Both press briefings and press conferences are well-prepared, well-thought, persuasive texts that are effective and authoritative. They are precise, heavily monitored, and intended for the record. They are institutional discourses, produced by a person who is authorised to make a declaration. The speakers of these texts are powerful and influential political decision makers, not speaking of themselves alone, but speaking on behalf of their countries. Through their speeches and answers to the questions, the policy of the U.S. at the highest possible level can be witnessed. They enable people everywhere to hear fundamental outlines of U.S. foreign policy from government officials.

Press briefings and press conferences are typical political propagand,a mediums, since they both have the aim of propagating and justifying a certain type of ideology. The argument in them is simple, clear and repetitive as their sole aim is to make U.S. policy known and legitimated.

The U.S. officials justify their actions on Cyprus as morally and politically defensible and as beneficial for the people living on the island. Throughout their discourse on Cyprus, they try to show that their policies and actions towards Cyprus are legitimate, are executed within the boundaries of moral order and are correct procedures. By focusing on the structures and strategies of legitimation, this article aims to question the legitimation process of U.S. official political discourse on Cyprus and analyses the contribution of semantic macrostructures to the legitimating discourse.

2. Method of Analysis

This part is about the theoretical analysis of the various levels and dimensions of legitimation and legitimation strategies. It examines very briefly what a legitimating discourse says and how it says these things. After introducing what legitimation and delegitimation are and after giving the relationship between legitimation and ideology, characteristics of the discourse of legitimation will be pointed out. In the second part of this section Theo van Leeuwen's (1996) legitimation categories will also be summarised.

2.1   Legitimation

The concept of legitimation has been extensively studied in social and political sciences, in law and in philosophy. Max Weber was among the first great social theorists to stress the importance of legitimacy. In his definitional foundations of the types of social action, he gave particular attention to those forms of action that were guided by a belief in the existence of a legitimate order: a set of "determinable maxims", a model regarded by the actor as "in some way obligatory or exemplary for him" (Weber, 1968, p. 31). In his own works, Weber applied the concept to the legitimation of power structures, both corporate and governmental. His widely rehearsed typology of administrative systems depended on whether the subordinate actor regarded the order as binding because of its traditional nature, the charismatic qualities of its leader, or because it had been legally constituted.

After Weber, Talcott Parsons (1960) broadened the focus of legitimation to include features other than power systems. He claimed that for organisations to have a legitimate claim on scarce resources, the goals they pursue should be harmonious with wider societal values. The focus of the organisation's value system "must be the legitimation of this goal in terms of the functional significance of its attainment for the super ordinate system" (21). Such an approach to legitimacy, emphasising the consistency of organisational goals with societal functions, was later accepted by Pfeffer and colleagues (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

Meyer and Rowan (1977) were among the first to call attention to the ways in which organisations seek legitimacy and support by incorporating structures and procedures that match widely accepted cultural models embodying common beliefs and knowledge systems. Later Mark Suchman formulated all of these approaches by defining legitimacy as follows: "Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions". For Suchman legitimacy is a "generalised perception representing the reactions of the

observers to the organisation as they see it; thus, legitimacy is possessed objectively, yet created subjectively" (1995, p. 574).

As the above-mentioned studies on legitimation suggest, the discursive and communicative characteristics of legitimation are not studied much although legitimation is a communicative act and an ongoing discursive practice. It is amazing that even though legitimation is an important function of discourse and is most of the time exercised by text and talk, it did not receive enough attention from discourse analysts either. Legitimation is related to the speech act of defending oneself, in which speakers explain why they did or did not do something, and why such an action is reasonable and acceptable. For that specific reason, legitimation is accomplished by persuasive or manipulative discourse. However, a persuasive discourse is not enough for legitimation. Certain contextual factors are compulsory for a justificatory discourse to have a legitimating function. Martin Rojo and van Dijk (1997) argue that three conditions are needed to be satisfied, in order to consider a discourse as legitimate: "(i) their sources (speakers, institutions, etc) must be legitimate, (ii) their representation of events must appear to be true and trustworthy, (iii) their linguistic and discursive forms must be socially appropriate, authorised or 'politically correct'" (550).

Depending on the above-mentioned criterion, one can argue that legitimation is an institutional justification with the aim of justifying the actions of the institution That is, since, there is a relation between legitimation and institutional power, for legitimation to be actualised, not only must speakers be a member of an institution occupying a special role or position, but also the action should be official. Therefore, to a certain extent legitimation can be considered as the "institutional counterpart of justifications" and as

... a discourse that justifies 'official' action, in terms of the rights and duties, politically socially or legally associated with that role or position. Indeed the act of legitimation entails that an institutional actor believes or claims to respect official norms, and hence to remain within the prevalent moral order (van Dijk, 1998d, p. 256).

Still this does not mean that legitimation is necessary in each institutional context. In the normal course of events, when no challenges to institutional power or authority are anticipated, legitimation is not needed. It becomes "imperative, in moments of crisis when the legitimacy of the state, an institution or an office is at stake" (van Dijk, 1998d, p. 258). For that reason, when officials are accused of breaking the law, or when they expect principled opposition against their decisions, policies or political action, they try to legitimise their deeds and actions. In broad terms, legitimation aims to justify the actions of the institution itself. It presupposes moral or legal grounds for the judgment of official action, such as norms, values or

formal laws.

The process of legitimation is most of the time discursive and involves the usual moves of positive self-representation and negative other representation. Therefore, in legitimation what is said is as important as how an event or an action is said or presented. In legitimating discourse, through the speech event, legitimacy is formed and created within discourse itself. Therefore, a legitimating discourse can be described briefly as "sociopolitical legitimation accomplished by discourse, which contributes to the reproduction of power by monopolising the truth and by monopolising public discourse" (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, p. 531). This is one of the reasons why discourse of legitimation is usually discursive and often argumentative. It is "related to the speech act of defending oneself, in that one of its appropriateness conditions is often that the speaker is providing good reasons, grounds or acceptable motivations for past or present action that has been or could be criticised by others" (van Dijk, 1998d, p. 255). Besides, legitimating discourses presuppose norms and values, as they implicitly or explicitly state that some course of action, decision, or policy is "just" within the given legal or political system, or more broadly within the prevalent moral order of society (256). Legitimation discourse is "prototypically political" as people who are expected to legitimate themselves are the ones who are "appointed to public office and exercise power because of such office" (van Dijk, 1998d, p. 256)[3]

2.2   Legitimation Strategies

Discourse may itself be (de)legitimated, since it has a very important role in the formulation and expression of ideologies. The discourse of any social group can be controlled, legitimated or delegitimated in certain ways. Each of these ways may be included within the four legitimation categories developed by Theo van Leeuwen (1996), which he calls the 'grammar of legitimation'. They are authorisation, rationalisation, moral evaluation and mythopoesis.

2.1.1 Authorisation

Theo van Leeuwen defines authorisation legitimation as legitimation by reference to authority.

> [It is] the answer to the implicit or explicit question 'Why is it so?' or 'Why must it be so?' is essentially 'Because I say so', or 'Because so-and-so says so', where the 'I' or the 'so-and-so' is someone in whom institutionalised authority is vested - a parent, a teacher, a doctor, an expert, a famous contemporary French philosopher, etc. The authority may be impersonal, e.g. 'the regulations', 'the law', 'the Bible'. In both cases, the typical form in which this kind of legitimation is expressed involves either a saying verb with the relevant

authority as subject ('The rules stipulate that ... ', 'The Bible says that .. .') or a circumstance of attribution ('According to Foucault .. .', 'As my Grandmother used to say.. .') (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p. 104).

In other words, authorisation may be based on the authority of tradition, custom, law, impersonal or personal authority, or expertise. In addition to that, as stated above in the quotation, authorisation legitimation is done by either institutionalised authorisation or impersonal authorisation. In political documents, most of the time, impersonal authorisation is used, and to a large extent, they are legal authorisations that quote from certain laws, rules or regulations. Conformity authorisation, which is also another kind of authorisation, 'rests on the principle that something is legitimate when 'everybody does it', or 'everybody does so'.[4]

2.1.2 Rationalisation

The rationalisation legitimation can be described as "legitimation by reference either to the utility of the social practice or some part of it ('instrumental rationalisation'), or to 'the facts of life' ('theoretical rationalisation')" (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p. 105). Very briefly, it means the utility of institutional action and its cognitive validity in accepted knowledge, which may involve a specification of purpose, functions, strategies, effectiveness, scientific arguments, and so on. Instrumental rationalisation appears at first sight as the straightforward and rational justification of practices or parts of practices by reference to the purpose or function they serve, or the needs they fill, or the positive effect they will have. However, these purposes usually turn out to take the form of "moralised activities". On the other hand, theoretical rationalisation legitimations 'embody moral values (and social prejudices), which are detached from the moral logic from which they stem and presented as common-sense fact' (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p. 107-108).

2.1.3 Moral Evaluation

Moral evaluation legitimation is based on norms and may involve moralisation (by abstraction or comparison), evaluation and naturalisation (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). It has two forms, namely, moral abstraction and moral evaluation by means of straightforwardly evaluative clauses. Moral abstraction appears to be straightforward description of what is going on rather than an explicitly formulated legitimatory argument, and it is therefore one of the least explicit forms of legitimation. Very briefly, moral abstraction legitimation means moral values expressed in abstract references (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p. 108).[5]

2.1.4 *Mythopoesis*

Mythopoesis is the fourth major type of legitimation, which is achieved through the telling of stories. It is legitimation conveyed through narrative. In some discourses, the telling of stories is very important. A story or an event is taken as an evidence for a general norm of behaviour. However, most of the time negative stories are being told. In other words, Mythopoesis involves telling stories about what good or bad may happen when one does (not) do what is expected.[6]

In order to contribute to the four legitimation categories of van Leeuwen, Luisa Martin Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk (1997) introduced semantic legitimation strategies that belong to the four categories mentioned above:

Authorisation: (Legality, Legal Procedures, Authorisation, Normality, Standing Procedures, Positive Self-Representation)

Rationalisation: (Special circumstances, Necessity, Threat, Comparisons)

Moral Evaluation: (Consensus, Carefulness, Democracy)

Mythopoesis

The two scholars argue that the pragmatic and persuasive functions of justification can be successful only when they are based on a defensible semantics of representation. For that reason, they give a lot of importance to semantic legitimation strategies. In order to make it easier for readers to follow, these semantic legitimation strategies will be explained in the analysis section with direct quotation from the data.

2. Analysis

The aim of this analysis section is to examine the process of discursive legitimation. More specifically, it is to show how through the speech event, the U.S. officials create and enforce both authority and legitimacy within their official statements on Cyprus issue. The following analysis is done to evaluate the detailed properties of the legitimating discursive act, and focuses on semantic macrostructures since they are one of the most important discourse structures that should be included in a study of political discourse genres.

Discourses are not only locally coherent, but also have global coherence that may be defined in terms of themes or topics. In other words, the meaning of discourse is not limited to the meaning of its words and sentences, but also has

more global meanings, such as topics or themes. Topics regulate the overall coherence of discourse and are semantic macro-propositions derived from propositions expressed in the text, through a process of information reduction (van Dijk, 1980; 1995; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 2000a). Semantic macrostructures, global meanings, topics or themes all refer to the same thing. They express the upshot gist or what is found to be the most 'important' information of a discourse and they tell us what a discourse is about (van Dijk, 1980; 1999). They consist of the information most readers will remember out of a discourse. This makes the assignment of topics by speakers or recipients not only more or less subjective, but also liable to ideological control. In other words, defining the situation is related not only with the knowledge of the world, but also on more general attitudes and ideologies. Therefore, discourse topics are very important in the 'formation and accessibility of preferred ideological models, and thus, indirectly in the formation or confirmation of ideologies' (van Dijk, 1998d, p. 266).

Topics or themes are mostly intentional and consciously controlled by the speaker. For this reason, they influence other structures of discourse. For instance, when a story is globally defined as an example of a specific concept, such as racist or terrorist, other discourse structures (e.g. local meanings) are supposed to contribute to it or exemplify it (van Dijk, 1995). Furthermore, because of the fact that topics are under the control of speakers, they also have 'effects on the recipients and hence on the process of reproduction that underlies social power and dominance' (van Dijk, 2000a, p. 7). Hence, 'there are probably no structures of text and talk, which have a more prominent effect on the construction and further processing of models than semantic macrostructures or topics' (van Dijk, 1998d, p. 266). In simple terms, "macro-structure" is an underlying thematic and propositional framework that enables the text to hang together (van Dijk, 1980).

Topics or macrostructures are derived from a text by inference, that is, through a process of information reduction. Some mapping rules called macro-rules are needed to obtain macrostructures from texts and they both organise and reduce the information in texts by linking them to one macro-proposition (van Dijk, 1980; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).[7]

Topical analysis of discourse is crucial for establishing what dominant groups think, speak or write about. It represents what language users find most important and it regulates coherence. It signals the most important information of underlying models and expresses indirectly ideological group representations about Us and Them. Thus, it gains more importance in political discourse, where speakers want to portray themselves as good and the others as bad. Therefore, while doing topical analysis, both in the press conferences and the press briefings about Cyprus, the first question one should be able to answer is: What exactly are the U.S. officials talking about when they talk about the Cyprus issue?

In a critical study, identifying topics is the first task of a semantic analysis, since they point out how speakers are defining a situation and how they construct the events. For that specific reason, in the present article, as a first step, the global structures of the data, that is the semantic macrostructures and their schematic superstructures (based on van Dijk, 1980) are analysed. After giving a line number to each of the texts in the data, topics or macrostructures are derived from each text by inference, through a process of information reduction. In order to reduce the given information and obtain macrostructures from texts, macro-rules (explained in note 7) are applied. Thus, the following topics or macro-propositions are found.

Topics of Press Conferences:

(T1)   We [Americans] benefit from the U.N. led talks.
(T2)   The Cyprus problem is a difficult problem.
(T3) The issues between Greece and Turkey are of great importance to the United States and among the many issues between them, Cyprus is the most important one.
(T4)   The United States is engaged, because Cyprus is the core issue.
(T5)   For a solution, creativity and flexibility of both sides are required.
(T6)   Both Greece and Turkey play significant roles in the equation.
(T7)   The United States supports a bizonal bicommunal federation.
(T8)   We recognise the Republic of Cyprus and we recognise Glafcos Clerides as its president.
(T9)   Cyprus cannot move forward without Turkey's support.
(T10) The United States is not going to spend the rest of the century wandering around, trying to create a settlement between sides if the parties do not want a settlement.
(T11) People-to-people contacts are good and should not be destroyed.
(T12) Our [U.S.] interest in Cyprus is not recent.
(T13) The United States cannot recognise the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'.
(T14) The U.S. is engaged, because both sides want it.
(T15) The Turkish side has preconditions that make the settlement difficult.
(T16) Turkey is aware of the importance we attach to the Cyprus issue.
(T17) The United States will remain engaged and available to help the parties.
(T18) We would like to see a united Cyprus enter the E.U., not a divided one.
(T19) We cannot impose a solution.
(T20) It is the right time to move toward a comprehensive settlement and to resolve the Cyprus problem.
(T21) The U.S. government is in favour of demilitarisation.
(T22) We are working with the Government of Cyprus to find a solution.
(T23) Our objective is, has been and will be a solution to the Cyprus problem, and

if we cannot solve it, to help reduce tensions.
(T24) The Turkish side has not accepted the proposals that we discussed.

Topics of Press Briefings:

(T1) Turkey ought not to threaten Cyprus.
(T2) Turkey is a friend of the United States, as is Greece, as is Cyprus.
(T3) We strongly support the U.N.
(T4) Greece and Turkey must work together peacefully to resolve problems.
(T5) The U.N. led talks are useful.
(T6) The U.S. recognises the government in Nicosia as the legitimate governmer of Cyprus.
(T7) The United States Government is working hard and closely with Greece Turkey and both communities on Cyprus to promote a negotiating process.
(T8) The United States cannot impose a solution on Cyprus.
(T9) The U.S. cannot recognise the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. The U.N. cannot recognise them. The E.U. cannot recognise them.
(T10) We work with Turkey, a close ally and friend, on a wide range of important issues and believe that it is in Turkey's national interests to support a Cyprus settlement.
(T11) The primary responsibility lies on the Turkish side.
(T12) We want to help Greece and Turkey resolve their problems peacefully.
(T13) We continue to urge the Turkish Government to resolve this issue through diplomatic means.
(T14) The missile deal complicates our effort to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute.
(T15) We continue to urge the Government of Cyprus to cancel the missile deal.
(T16) We strongly support the E.U.'s decision to start accession talks with Cyprus
(T17) The U.N. is in favour of U.S. engagement.

  In a further reduction, the below topics are summarised as follows:

(T1) Cyprus is important for the United States.
(T2) The U.S. government is doing whatever it can to solve the problem.
(T3) The U.S. cannot impose a solution on Cyprus: the structure and terms of a settlement are matters for the Cypriots to decide.
(T4) The U.S. government works in cooperation with the U.N. and supports its efforts.
(T5) The U.S. engagement is supported by the U.N. and requested by both sides.
(T6) Solution of the problem requires support of Greece and Turkey.
(T7) The only government we [Americans] recognise is the government in the south and we are not going to recognise the so-called 'TRNC' in the north.

The implied consequence of these topics is that promotion of a Cyprus settlement is a core issue for the U.S. The U.S. government is doing its best to find a solution to the issue and will continue to support the U.N.'s efforts. However the success of all of these efforts requires the positive support of Greece and Turkey and the terms of settlement are for the Cypriots to decide. We see that these various topics indeed represent very high-level principles. These propositions are direct expressions of some tenets of U.S. official policy towards Cyprus. In other words, the macro-propositions express the general ideological principles of the priority of U.S. interests and then apply these to the special case of Cyprus. In fact, their main aim is the reassertion of American leadership and security. The U.S. government has anxieties about the future of NATO and before expanding eastward, it wants to settle possible problematic issues. In that part of the world, there is uneasiness between the two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece over a problem on Cyprus. The U.S. views the Cyprus problem as the cause of the friction between Turkey and Greece and treats the island as a problematic area that could weaken the southern flank of NATO. Therefore, the U.S. wants a peaceful settlement in that area. Their efforts on Cyprus reflect their awareness that tensions over Cyprus threaten the stability of a strategically important region and are an obstacle to the kind of cooperative relations they would like to see between Turkey and Greece. They interpret their efforts on Cyprus as a reflection of American values, notably the belief that people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds can work together to ensure peace, stability, and a better future. For the U.S. officials the status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable, and the period's U.S. administration is committed to fostering a settlement based on a bi-zonal, bi- communal federation. Their immediate goal is to move to comprehensive negotiations under U.N. auspices without preconditions. As they put it, the people of the region, Turks, Greeks, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots alike, desire peace, prosperity, and security for themselves and for their neighbours, regardless of religious differences.

After this brief synopsis of what the Americans say in their discourse about Cyprus, one can summarise these macro-propositions with the overall macro- proposition (topic): "the settlement of Cyprus issue is a constant of U.S. foreign policy".

The main concern of U.S. officials , here, is to legitimate their actions and to delegitimate the actions of the others. Throughout their discourse on Cyprus, U.S. diplomats endeavour to show that their policies and actions towards Cyprus are not only legal but are also executed within the boundaries of moral order. As the given Table overleaf makes it explicit U.S. diplomats try to legitimise three points both in Press Briefings and Press Conferences. Firstly, they try to legitimise U.S. official policy on Cyprus by showing that the U.S. practices on the island are morally and

politically defensible. Secondly, they try to legitimise the reason of their engagement in the Cyprus issue. Finally, they attempt to legitimise their preference for not recognising the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)'.

Table: Macro-propositions & Semantic Legitimation Strategies

Macro-propositions	Semantic Legitimation Strategies
Cyprus is important for the United States	Special Circumstance Seriousness
The U.S. government is doing whatever it can	Positive Self-Representation Normality and Standing Procedures
The U.S. cannot impose a solution, it's for the Cypriots to decide	Carefulness Positive Self-Representation
The U.S. works with the U.N. and supports its efforts	Authorisation Comparison
U.S. engagement is supported and needed	Positive Self-Representation Authorisation
Solution of the problem requires support of Greece and Turkey	Consensus Carefulness
We recognise the Republic of Cyprus and cannot recognise the 'TRNC'	Consensus Normality andStanding Procedures

Each of the above given macro-propositions, in fact, serve as a semanntic legitimation strategy used by the U.S. officials. In this part of the analysis, therefore the emphasis will be on the legitimation strategies adopted by the U.S. officials.

The first strategy the U.S. officials use is *Special Circumstance.* Highlighting the special case of the accomplished action is a legitimation strategy used very often. It is especially necessary, when the speaker needs to legitimate his/her specific decision for his/her action. Cyprus issue is special for the U.S. government because, as stated above, this part of the world is important for United States' national security.

This area of the world, by which I mean all of south-eastern Europe, is *critical to stability for the United States' national security* and for the Europeans. Two of our great allies,

NATO nations , are in this part of the world ... we believe that *stability in the area is an essential goal* in the post-Cold War period (Holbrooke, 11 November 1997) .

The history of this area is complicated for the U.S. government. It cannot ignore this part of the world. As the U.S. officials put it, this part of the world has a great significance for the U.S. and peace and stability in the region is their major concern. In addition to that, two of the U.S.'s great allies Turkey and Greece are in this region and they have a very serious unresolved conflict over Cyprus, which for the U.S. officials is the most important problem in the area.

There are many issues between Greece and Turkey, but in my personal view, the *other issues cannot be dealt with unless Cyprus is dealt with centrally.* It is the *core* issue (Holbrooke, 11 November 1997).

To the U.S., Cyprus has a unique kind of situation with a unique set of problems which is why it is special. For over thirty years it has defied the negotiators of the United States, the United Nations and other countries and thus has become a difficult problem. It is "a problem, in which progress is often made in millimetres". In addition to that,

This is the *last place on earth* where people are *divided by a line.* It troubles us [Americans] all... (Holbrooke, 4 April 1998).

This problem not only has tragic implications for the people of Cyprus, but has had a profoundly negative effect on the whole region (Holbrooke, 1 May 1998).

The Cyprus issue is also special for the speakers, because its settlement is a core foreign policy goal of the Clinton administration. Cyprus is the country with the last divided capital city in Europe and therefore deserves the attention of the U.S. The rhetorical repetition of "unique" in order to emphasise the special circumstances eliminates any blame that the U.S. government might have. In the same way, by saying that the existing problem on the island affects not only the Cypriots, but also the whole region, the U.S. speakers put the responsibility on everyone. In this way, the responsibility of the opposition can be legitimately assessed and this puts a dent in the opposition's argument and credibility.

The emphasis on the special circumstance of Cyprus immediately brings with it the seriousness of the case. *Seriousness* or emergency rhetoric "is a common characteristic of political discourse and most of the time is used in the legitimation of certain measures taken" (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, p. 538). Cyprus is a very serious issue for the speakers in our texts and needs to be taken care of, because it is related to U.S. national security. For the U.S. officials, the Cyprus

issue is serious, as it can easily bring Turkey and Greece to the edge of war. Besides, military authorities on both sides indulge in the actions of provocation and exacerbate tensions. They expand, upgrade and modernise their armaments.

> [The] Cypriot Government decision to acquire S-300 anti-craft missiles from Russia is a *setback for our efforts* to resolve the Cyprus issue peacefully. At the same time, we are firmly opposed to *threats to address the* missile *question militarily* (Rubin, 19 Sept 1997).

For the U.S. officials both deploying missiles and engaging in hostile threats are mistakes. According to them, their task is growing more difficult and complicat each day, because the tension escalates and the link between the parties become looser. They say "the task is much more complicated when one or the other side is saying, as we often hear, as we often see in the media, go tell them, the other, to do x and I will see how I will react" (Miller, 10 March 1998). In addition, they emphasise that the diplomatic efforts on the island are in such a difficult phase that a solution to the problem necessitates from now on the involvement of all the related countries. The involvement of the leaders of the island is no more sufficient.

> The diplomatic situation has been at a *difficult* stage and the solution to it involves not just the leaders on the island but also people outside the island in Brussels, in Athens, in Ankara, and in Bonn, just to name several places. The U.N. and the United States will be heavily involved supporting that effort (Holbrooke, 4 April 1998).

The seriousness of the situation, results in a final step, in which the other side is represented in a negative way and as a *threat.* Hence, in Cyprus, the U.S. diplomats are exposed to a serious, special issue, which is getting complicated each day and such a situation obliges a heavy U.S. engagement. The U.S. speakers, within the analysed data, legitimise their involvement on the Cyprus issue by saying that they were asked to be engaged. Both the Greek and the Turkish sides have made it clear to the American Cyprus team that they want the United States to continue its efforts in creating a positive climate on the island. Therefore their being on the island is not their idea. It is neither the idea of President Clinton nor that of Secretary of State Albright.

> But the degree to which the United States is active, the degree to which Ambassador Miller, as the Special Cyprus Coordinator, and myself as the President's Representative for Cyprus are engaged, the level of our involvement and the level of the involvement of the Secretary of State and of the President and of other senior American officials, is dependent on the degree to which the two parties want us to be involved in the search for a solution[...] If we are going to be engaged, it is going to be because the *parties want us* to be (Holbrooke, 5 April 1998).

I came back here at the *request* of the two sides who, a month ago, both asked me and my team, Ambassador Miller, Miriam Sapiro from the White House, and of course always Ambassador Brill representing the United States here in Cyprus. We came back at their *request* to continue the discussions (Holbrooke, 4 May 1998).

In addition to being requested to come back to the island at the highest possible level, the speakers both in the press briefings and press conferences also stress that they feel obliged to respond positively, whenever they are needed in any part of the world. Obviously, such an affirmation also underlines the helpful and democratic nature of the overall strategy of positive self-representation. In addition to being asked to come, they legitimate their existence on the island, by saying that they have come because the United States government strongly believes that its involvement is crucial in providing help. A settlement will serve everyone's purposes and lead to great economic prosperity for both parts of the divided Cyprus as well as reducing tensions. Thus, each speaker finishes his argument with the statement that, the United States will remain engaged and available to help the parties reach that long-overdue solution, which would benefit everyone.

In response to accusations about the failure of their policies on Cyprus, the U.S. diplomats use a defence mechanism and one of the speakers says the following: "we don't have a horse in the race, so to speak. What we have is a destination, which we hope the two parties will arrive at" (Moses, 10 January 2001). To the allegations, they react by saying that they are not a party to the conflict. However, saying that 'we are the U.S. Cyprus team' and 'we do not have a horse in the race' are two contradictory statements. If there is a Cyprus team of the United States, and if certain U.S. diplomats are portrayed as able team players, this connotes that there are also teams other than the U.S. team. It is apparent that there is a race going on and saying that we do not have a horse in the race (or we are not one of the players) does not reflect the truth. If you are a team, you aim at a destination and work hard with the members of your team to reach it. Since within the team of the United States there are no members of the other involved parties, it is clear that the Cyprus team of the U.S. serves the interests of the Americans. This makes them a participant not a referee. Therefore, saying that we are the destination is a covering up strategy.

This is *not an American problem.* America is trying to be of help in this problem. This is a problem of the people of the island, some of the parties in the region, and this is not a failure of American diplomacy. I refuse to take the blame on this one. We are trying to be helpful. And I will tell you it's *very* hard sometimes to be helpful in these kinds of circumstances (Miller, 10 December 1998).

Regularly, the U.S. speakers in their discourse make it clear that the U.S. cannot

solve this problem on its own. The U.S. is prepared to invest considerable diplomatic resources and effort to bring about such a settlement. However, the parties too must be committed to making progress. There has not been any success regarding the Cyprus problem, but if there is a failure, the U.S. diplomats refuse to accept it as a U.S. failure. The U.S. officials believe that they can make progress on the problem through direct negotiations. They underline the fact that they cannot impose a solution on Cyprus and make it clear that the American way of solving the problem will not be through demands, pressure or anything else as some of the parties in the conflict threaten to do.

> People use words pretty loosely like "demand" and "pressure" and things like these. That is not the world that I live in. That is not the world that I work in (Miller, 10 March 1998).

Thus, the U.S. officials guarantee that the U.S. government is not going to force an agreement down Turkey's or Greece's throat. The U.S. is a friend, who is trying to encourage something and is always ready to help. However, they also highlight the fact that they cannot wait *forever* and "be part of a theatre without a meaning (Holbrooke, 5 April 1998).

> The United States is *not going to spend the rest of the century wandering around,* trying to create a settlement between sides if they do not want a settlement. And I repeat: If the two sides don't want an agreement, no one can force them to (Holbrooke, 5 April 1998).

Another semantic legitimation strategy used by U.S. officials is that of *Similarity.* It is a part of Comparison strategy, which claims that legitimate others have also been engaged in similar actions. Such a strategy of comparison can also be used to blame critics for applying double standards and hence accusing them of being unfair (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). The legitimate other that the U.S. officials give as an example, both in press briefings and press conferences most of the time, is the United Nations. They legitimate their actions by comparative reference to legitimate actors of the United Nations. Throughout the texts, the speakers continuously identify the actions of the U.S. government with that of the United Nations and try to show that they have U.N. support.

> We remain committed on the political level to working to a solution in the area *in conjunction with the European Union, the authorities of all the governments in the area,* and the *United Nations* (Holbrooke and Egelund, 13 December 1998).

> The purpose of our discussions was to see whether we could start a process that would lead to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation - a goal to which both sides, the U.N., and the U.S. have been publicly committed (Holbrooke, 4 May 1998).

The U.S. officials do whatever they can to show that they are in close contact with the U.N. officials.

We are *eager to work with the U.N.,* with *the international community[..]* We stay in close contact with *U.N. officials.* I have met the new Chief of Mission of the U.N. Ann Hercus on her way out here. I look forward to seeing her again in my visit as well[...] (Miller, 23 July 1998).

We have been working very closely with the U.N., with Dame Ann Hercus - to try to produce a result that is acceptable to the Government of Cyprus (Miller, 1O December 1998).

Secretary General Kofi Annan is in favour of that [an intense U.S. engagement] (Holbrooke, 4 April 1998).

Showing Kofi Annan as a person who supports U.S. actions contributes to the legitimation of U.S. efforts on the island. To put it another way, we can say that, by exposing themselves to the others as thinking similar with the United Nations officials, the U.S. diplomats use the move of necessity and legitimise their actions. They use this strategy to support their claim that they have no personal interest in the Cyprus problem, but act as a moderator like the U.N. They represent themselves as the collaborators of U.N. officials. This implies that if something goes wrong the U.N. bears equal responsibility. This strategy is closely linked to another legitimation strategy called *Authorisation* that will be examined later.

Another legitimation strategy the U.S. officials use is that of *Carefulness.* Carefulness strategy is also needed, as seriousness, necessity or the threatening characteristic of the case is not enough to legitimise some of the actions. Therefore, it is essential to emphasise that the accomplished action 'was carried out very carefully, and competently, with due preparation, planning and with consideration to the relevant articles of the law' (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, p. 539). The Cyprus issue may be a very special serious case for the U.S. diplomats and their involvement in the problem may be mandatory, but this still does not give the U.S. diplomats the opportunity or the luxury to do whatever they want. As stated before in this part, not only the official policy of the United States on Cyprus must be legitimated, but also the way they carry their policies on Cyprus must be morally justifiable. Therefore, the U.S. diplomats are very careful in dealing with the subjects on Cyprus. They are careful in not speaking for the others and are cautious in talking about the stages of the process.

The U.S. is not a member of the E.U. so I will let the E.U. speak for itself (Holbrooke, 4 April 1998).

I can speak for myself I can speak for Ambassador Holbrooke, Secretary Albright, and my government, but I am not going to start speaking for the leaders of the two communities (Miller, 10 March 1998).

We listen carefully, we analyse carefully and we make suggestions. And we will continue to do so (Holbrooke, 4 May 1998).

If I came out and talked to you about where we are at every stage of the process, I guarantee we could never find that solution (Miller, 10 December 1998).

Interestingly enough, what the carefulness legitimation strategy brings to mind is the idea that the procedures applied on Cyprus are standard steps and are not new, Thus, the officials employ another strategy called *Normality and Standing Procedures.* This strategy is used very often to point out that the accomplished actions are standard procedures that are carried out routinely, whenever they are needed. This strategy is applied in order to highlight that the accomplished deeds are not new or exceptional ones but normal and hence legitimate ones that do not have anything special or new. Applying this strategy, gives the U.S. officials the opportunity to show that not only their actions but also their procedures are quite normal. Thus, one of the standing points of the political legitimation of U.S. government's official practices on Cyprus is that, these practices are usual and ordinary. In order to prove that, everything they do is within the routine procedures they either refer to U.N. Security Council Resolutions or other legal authorities in their speeches.

What we are endeavouring to do is to persuade both sides to enter into negotiations *without preconditions* under U.N. auspices. That is what has [been] called for by the *G-8* and *U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1250 and 1251.* As far as our policy is concerned, we remained committed to a Cyprus solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and that has not changed (Foley, 29 September 1999).

By appealing to U.N. resolutions they try to strengthen the legal basis of the U.S. government's commitment to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, as Security Council also reaffirms its position that Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus comprised of two politically equal communities in a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation.

We would like to see progress in all aspects of relations between the two countries [Greece and Turkey]. We hope this visit [of Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey] also helps our efforts to jump-start comprehensive Cyprus negotiations *without preconditions* under U.N. auspices, as *called for by Security Council resolutions* and the *statement of the Group of Eight* as well (Rubin, 4 October 1999).

We continue to work hard to get the two sides [Greek and Turkish Cypriots] into negotiations *without precondition* under U.N. auspices, as called for by the *group of AID* and *U.N. Security Council resolutions* (Rubin, 6 October 1999).

In these examples the speakers imply that the U.S. policy on Cyprus to convince both sides to join U.N. led talks without preconditions is normal, because U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1250 and 1251 and the statement of the Group of Eight also call for the same thing. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1250 calls upon the two leaders to give their full support to a comprehensive negotiation and to commit themselves to certain principles, the first of which is 'no precondition'. Since the U.S. is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the officials think that they have the right to ask the parties to join talks without preconditions and deserve to be appreciated because of their efforts. Such an argument may be defeated by a counter argument, which claims that the above-mentioned resolutions of the U.N. do not give the U.S. government such responsibility or a duty.

In addition the U.S. speakers claim that their official policy on Cyprus is not only within normal and standing procedures, but also beneficial to everyone. They are right in asking the parties to reach an agreement, because the current situation disadvantages not only the people of both communities, but also the security and the prosperity of the entire region. Thus, their job, which is to facilitate the parties in their efforts to arrive at a comprehensive settlement, is normal and moral. Besides, the rules that apply to each negotiation are also applied to the Cyprus issue and nothing out of the ordinary is being done.

The *standard rule* that applies for any serious negotiation applies here and both Rauf Denktash and Glafcos Clerides said very clearly that they would not reveal the content of our discussions either (Holbrooke, 4 April 1998).

It seems as though the U.S. officials do not introduce anything new or unexpected to the problem. They follow the regular procedures of certain legal authorities and their engagement in the issue produces nothing extraordinary. Thus, they avoid possible critique of the opponents and emphasise that the U.S. actions on the island are normal and hence legitimate. Furthermore, they use this strategy to show that not only the actions are normal, but also the procedures followed by the American Cyprus team are moral and correct.

In addition, while trying to legitimate their policies on Cyprus, on moral grounds, the U.S. officials describe their efforts of finding a solution to the problem in a positive manner. As the given quotations below suggest, the speakers sometimes feel the necessity to show some of the characteristics of the members of the U.S. Cyprus team. They do this on purpose to claim that the procedures followed through

these men cannot be wrong. In one of the speeches, by pointing out that on Cyprus a secret lasts about five seconds, the speaker tries to emphasise that the members of the U.S. team are able, honest, decent and are totally transparent for all to see They either represent the U.S. president or the U.S. government, thus are authorised to make statements.

> Look, what the United States is trying to do in assisting to help solve the Cyprus problem is clear and it's above board and it's *totally transparent for all to see.* The statements that are made by our people are statements that are *authorised statements* {Miller, 23 July 1998).

> Let me say that what I discuss with one side I generally discuss with the other side. There are *no secrets.* As you know, on Cyprus a secret lasts about five seconds - maybe. So what I discussed with one side, I discussed essentially with the other side (Moses, 11 March 2000).

In addition to that, the below listed names and their positions within the U.S. government, is given by one of the speakers to show determination of the U.S. to find a just and lasting solution to the problem.

> Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Marc Grossman oversees polici for Cyprus. The post of the special Cyprus coordinator is the top full-time position in thE European Bureau, charged with coordinating Cyprus policy. Tom Miller, the former DCIv in Athens, has been appointed to this position. Special Presidential Emissary Richard C Holbrooke reports to the President, to the Secretary and to the Assistant Secretary Within the Bureau, the Office of Southern European Affairs is charged with overall polic implementation for that region. Office Director Steven Mull, Deputy Director Peter Petro and two country officers deal with Cyprus issues (Miller, 10 December 1998).

Referring to the involvement of certain legal authorities while describing the efforts of the U.S. government in finding out a solution to the Cyprus problem is in fact a well known legitimation strategy called *Authorisation.* This strategy is carried out by involving authorities. It goes without saying that the involvement of other authorities with the accomplished deeds gives .the speaker lots of advantages. Firstly it protects the speaker against the harsh words of critics. In such a situation, the critics know that while criticising the speaker they would be criticising a large number of people or prestigious agencies. Secondly, it gives the speaker the opportunity to assume and accept his/her responsibility and "thereby both covers for (and hence sanctions and legitimates with his own authority) all possible actions of the various agencies, while at the same time sharing possible blame with them if mistakes had been made" (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, p. 536). To put the same point in a different way, if the speaker is perceived as legitimate, the others will be

legitimated with him/her. If s/he fails in legitimating his/her actions, then he or she can disassociate or separate himself/herself from the deeds of the other authorities.

Within the discourse of U.S. diplomats, the United Nations and the European Union are the most cited legal authorities.

I have talked to the *White House,* the *State Department* and *Kofi Annan* this afternoon. Secretary General Annan is in London. I briefed him on what was happening since we are operating within the framework of the United Nations effort. He will get in contact with *Mr. Cordovez* and inform him of what we have done. Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed his support for the efforts and the White House and the State Department are fully up to speed on what we have been doing so far here (Holbrooke, 4 April 1998).

I also want to make clear that *our efforts are under the umbrella of the United Nations.* I talk regularly to *Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General;* I briefed him on our trip before I left. Ambassador Miller and I are in close consultations with his representative *Diego Cordovez* and with Deputy Undersecretary General of the United Nations *Kieron Prendergast* (Holbrooke, 1 May 1998).

The speakers in these examples try to show that, the U.S. efforts for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem are in conjunction with the E.U., with the U.N. and with the authorities of the involved countries. What the speakers claim in these quotations are that the U.S. Government is operating under the U.N. umbrella.and working within the framework of the U.N.'s efforts. Firstly, such an utterance implies that the U.S. government's efforts in finding out a solution are supported by the U.N. Secondly, it connotes that the U.S. acts as another branch of the U.N. Saying that the U.S. officials are in close consultation with the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, is a strategy. Informing him about what they [Americans] do, talking and briefing him regularly are nothing but just strategies of sharing the possible victory or blame that may come from the critics. This means that, by including these other participants or authorities, in their discourses, the U.S. officials guard themselves against the criticisms of their opponents, who would not like to criticise a large number of groups or prestigious institutions. That is, criticising U.S. actions would mean accusing at the same time the legal authorities, which are cited as well.

Another legitimation strategy the U.S. officials use is that of *Consensus.* It is a legitimation strategy, which involves and hence shares responsibility with opponents. This consensus strategy "is not merely persuasive, but in fact the core of an attempt to establish attitudinal hegemony" (Martin Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, p. 537). In addition to that, one must not forget that agreeing on the problem immediately brings with it working together in its solution. The U.S. speakers claim that there should be no difference of opinion within the U.S. government when it

comes to solving the problem on Cyprus. The most important point that the U.S diplomats are in consensus with each other is the fact that they cannot recognise the 'TRNC'.

The United States cannot recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. We've said [it] so many times. The U.N. cannot recognise them. The European Union canno recognise them (Holbrooke, 1 May 1998).

The U.S. government appears totally in agreement with the U.N. and E.U. on that subject. They continuously repeat that the only government they recognise is the Republic of Cyprus and the recognition of the 'TRNC' is out of the question.

3.   Conclusion

In this article, some properties of the discourse of legitimation have been examined and the processes of discursive legitimation have been studied. Topical analysis of U.S. discourse on Cyprus helped us in finding out the most important information of underlying models. The macro-propositions helped us to express the general ideological principles of U.S. priorities and at the end of the analysis, they have been reduced to one overall macro-proposition (topic) which indicates that the settlement of the Cyprus issue is a constant of U.S. foreign policy. From the topical analysis, it has been examined that when U.S. officials talk about Cyprus, they talk about the importance of the area for the U.S. interests.

It is clear from the above analysis that the main concern of U.S. officials in the analysed data is to legitimate their actions. Throughout their discourse on Cyprus, U.S. diplomats endeavour to show that their policies and actions towards Cyprus are executed within the boundaries of moral order. Using each of the macro-propositions, which have resulted from a detailed topical analysis, this study makes it clear that the U.S. diplomats stress three points in their Cyprus discourse. Firstly, they try to legitimise U.S. official policy on Cyprus by showing that the U.S. practices on the island are morally and politically defensible. Secondly, they try to legitimise the reason of their engagement in the Cyprus issue. Finally, they attempt to legitimise why they do not recognise the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)'. These three points make it clear that the target of legitimation in the analysed data covers all the interested parties in the conflict.

It has been found that the U.S. officials' semantic legitimation strategies display three of the four legitimation strategies of van Leeuwen (1996); authorisation, rationalisation and moral evaluation. In other words, many properties of U.S. officials' speeches fit in the categories of legitimation. In the analysed texts, it has been found that through the speech event, both authority and legitimacy are enforced and created within discourse itself.

Notes

1.   For more information on political discourse, among the many studies, see, e.g., Atkinson, 1984; Chilton, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995; Connolly, 1983; Fairclough, 1989, 1995a, 1995b; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Gamson, 1992; Geis, 1987; van Dijk, 1998c; Wilson, 1990; Wodak, 1989.

2.   The press briefings and press conferences quoted here are listed in the *Sources* at the end of the article.

3.   For earlier studies of the language and discourse of legitimation, see Mueller, 1973; for more details on legitimation see, e.g., Allen and Caillouet, 1994; Habermas, 1993; Tyler, 1990; van Leeuwen, 1995; Yagcioglu and Deger, 2001; and for a detailed description and foundations of the discourse of legitimation see, e.g. Habermas, 1975, 1996.

4.   For conformity authorisation, the current tendency of many countries claiming to be fighting "terrorists" can be given as an example. In this way Israel seeks to justify its action against the Palestinians, Russia against the Chechens, Macedonia against the Albanians, etc.

5.   For moral evaluation, an example could be the dispute between the U.S. and China on human rights issues. While the U.S. accuses China about its political prisoners, China points at the many homeless people in American cities, a condition that China claims is against human rights.

6.   For mythopoesis, the U.S. arguments for a strike on Iraq could be given as an example.

7.   The simplest and at the same time the most general macro-rule is that of 'DELETION'. It is the rule of deleting all the irrelevant propositions , that is, the details that do not contribute to the construction of theme or topic. It eliminates full propositions from a given text base. The second macro-rule is a stronger variant of the first macro-rule, which can be called 'STRONG DELETION'. The first rule, which may be called WEAK DELETION, deletes irrelevant detail. This second rule deletes locally relevant detail. The third rule is the 'CONSTRUCTION'. In some cases, this rule may have the appearance of a DELETION rule. However, it reduces the information not by deletion but by introducing new information. That is, in this rule a new proposition must be constructed. The last macro-rule is 'GENERALISATION'. The reductive nature of this macro-rule is characterised by the operation of DELETION, which is an integral component of this rule. Some propositions become directly part of macrostructure without undergoing any operation. This non-application of the macro-rule is taken as the application of a ZERO-RULE. For further information on macro-rules see, e.g., van Dijk, 1977, 1980; Yagcioglu, 1992).

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INDEPENDENCE POSTPONED:
CYPRUS 1959-1960

Hubert Faustmann

Abstract

From the settlement of the Cyprus dispute at a conference in London in February 1959 until the declaration of independence on August 16th 1960, a final agreement on all outstanding issues concerning the putative Republic had to be reached. By July 1960, the political and constitutional order of the new state was finalised. Cyprus was ready for independence. But on some of the controversial issues only temporary arrangements had been made by the two communities which would soon be disputed or not adhered to. Moreover, the constitutional order created during the Transitional Period on the basis of the agreements of Zurich and London was not to last for longer than three years. The article will focus on some of the most controversial issues that were negotiated during these eighteen months and assess the extent to which the breakdown of the constitutional order in 1963 might have had its roots in the Transitional Period.

The Cypriots commemorated the 40th anniversary of their independence on October 1st 2000. Most Cypriots were aware that the low profile celebrations were actually six weeks late since the island had become independent on August 16th 1960. Practical as Cypriots are, in July 1963 the council of ministers moved Independence Day to October 1st in order to avoid the summer heat and the main holiday season. What most Cypriots do not know, however, is that if things had progressed as planned, this change would not have been necessary. At the London conference in February 1959, Independence Day had originally been set for February 19th 1960. But the Transitional Period, during which the agreements reached in Zurich and London about the future Republic of Cyprus were to be deliberated in detail, lasted six months longer than planned. The negotiations ran into unforeseen difficulties and independence had to be repeatedly postponed Moreover, the agreements reached during that period were not to last. Only three years later, the constitutional order of the Republic broke down. In an attempt to reconstruct some key aspects of the negotiations during those eighteen months, this article will therefore also focus on the extent to which the crisis of 1963 had its roots in the Transitional Period.

For the sake of more clarity within a rather complicated topic, this article is divided into three parts:

a) A general overview of some of the main events and developments during those eighteen months;

b) An account of the negotiations concerning British military requirements being the main reason for the delayed independence as well as being the most important and contentious issue between the Cypriots and the British;

c) A brief analysis of the three issues disputed and negotiated mostly between the Greek and Turkish sides, which were to be in the centre of the bi-communal dispute after 1960:

  i. The 70/30 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the civil service.
  ii. The establishment of separate municipalities.
  iii. The distribution of executive and legislative power.

Part I: A General Overview of the Transitional Period

On March 1st 1959, the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, returned to the island in triumph after almost three years in exile. However, he had not brought with him the prospect of *enosis,* the union of Cyprus with Greece, but a future as an independent state which neither the Greek Cypriots nor the Turkish Cypriots had really wanted until 1959.

Moreover, the leader of the Greek Cypriot armed struggle in Cyprus, Colonel Grivas, had not yet even officially accepted the agreements of Zurich and London. One week after Makarios' arrival, Grivas finally declared his acceptance of the Cyprus agreement as a fait accompli in a leaflet distributed throughout the island. But the EOKA leader, who had become a legend within the Greek Cypriot community, did not hide his disapproval making clear that he was neither happy about the settlement nor about the fact that he had not been consulted before to agreements were signed.[1]

The way Grivas should leave the island was the dominant issue in early March since the British would not tolerate his presence on Cyprus as long as they were officially in power. Moreover, any open triumph of Grivas, who was held responsible for the death of dozens of British soldiers and civilians, was not acceptable to the British. On March 17th Grivas finally left the island without a hero's farewell since the public was not informed about the precise date and time of his departure, though the way he was received in Athens largely made up for this.[2]

With Grivas out of the picture and the emergency finally over, the negotiations about the putative Republic of Cyprus could commence. In Zurich, the Greek and Turkish delegations had agreed that three committees should finalise the treaties and negotiate the outstanding issues:

   i.   The Transitional Committee and the Joint Council, located in Cyprus.
   ii. The Joint Committee, also called Constitutional Committee, also located in Cyprus.
   iii. The London Joint Committee on Cyprus, located in Britain.

The Transitional Committee was established in Cyprus on March 5th 1959. It was responsible for *"drawing up plans for adapting and reorganising the Government machinery in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic."*[3] Moreover, it was the British intention to share responsibility for administration with the Cypriots whenever possible already during the Transitional Period, and to train the future Cypriot ministers. Therefore, the Transitional Committee formed together with the Governor's Executive Council a *Joint Council* which functioned as the main governing body during the Transitional Period.[4] The purpose of the Joint Council was to set up a Cabinet system and a system of ministerial responsibility. Therefore, the Cypriot members of the Transitional Committee were *"invited"* by the Governor in April to assume special responsibilities for specific departments and functions of government as *"Ministers"* at a ratio of seven to three.[5] For a long time, the Transitional Committee remained the only body in which rapid progress could be achieved since it had to make decisions only on practical but not on principal matters.[6]

The second body was officially called the Joint Committee but became known as the Constitutional Committee. Its task was to draw up the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus adhering to regulations and principles laid down in the Zurich agreement. Interestingly, Britain was not part of this body. Cyprus was one of the few colonies where Britain did not play a key role in shaping the constitution of the putative state.[7] The leader of the Greek Cypriot delegation was the close aide of Archbishop Makarios, Glafkos Clerides, while his Turkish Cypriot counterpart was Rauf Denktash, who after Dr. Fazil Kutchuk was the second most influential Turkish Cypriot politician. The Greek delegation was headed by the eminent Athenian lawyer and former Minister of Justice, Themistocles Tsatsos. Turkey had sent the expert on international law and former Minister of State, Professor Nihat Erim, who later became Prime Minister. The Swiss expert on constitutional law, Professor Marcel Bridel, was jointly appointed by Greece and Turkey as a "neutral" legal advisor to the Committee.[0]

The *"London Joint Committee on Cyprus (LJC)"* consisted of representatives of

the three governments and the two Cypriot communities. Its duty was to prepare the final Treaties which put the conclusions of the London Conference into effect[9] Given that the LJC was the only body in which all signatories of the Cyprus Agreement were members (the UK was not represented in the Constitutional Committee; Greece and Turkey were not in the Transitional Committee), it was regarded as the central body for negotiations on all topics during the Transitional Period. The reasons for its key role as well as its London location were largely tactical. In keeping with the spirit of the Zurich/London agreement, the British hoped for Turkish and Greek support during the negotiations against any Greek or, less likely, Turkish Cypriot resistance which might endanger a final agreement. Therefore, the British opposed any attempt to *"reduce the importance of the London Joint Committee and try to concentrate work in Cyprus where of course H.M.G. would have to deal with Makarios (and [the Turkish Cypriot leader, H.F.] Kutchuk) without the intervention of the Greeks (or Turks)."[10]* Only after the negotiations in the London Joint Committee had failed to produce any significant results would the British change strategy. After February 1960, the London Joint Committee lost its significance and British officials conducted direct talks with Makarios and Kutchuk on the key issue of British military requirements in Cyprus.

Dealing with the representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey in London were the former diplomatic advisor of Makarios, Zenon Rossides, and his Turkish Cypriot colleague, Osman Orek, Secretary-General of Kutchuk's *Cyprus-is-Turkish Party,* and first Defence Minister during the Transitional Period as well as after independence.[11]

While the negotiations in the various committees were in progress, a serious rift occurred within the Greek Cypriot community. On July 30th 1959, the traditionally uneasy relationship between Grivas and Makarios escalated into an open conflict. Grivas *"formally disclaimed responsibility"* for the Cyprus agreement.[12] The former EOKA leader, who had decided to enter Greek politics, warned the Cypriots against the ratification of the Zurich/London agreement, explaining that he withdrew his support because the signatories had entered into verbal commitments in London, of which he was not aware in spring 1959. Moreover, he informed Makarios that the British base areas were too large for him to accept. He also intimated that Makarios was making concessions which would adversely affect the interests of the Cypriots.

Soon the right wing of the Greek Cypriot community was sharply divided into Grivas' and Makarios' supporters. The danger of a violent clash between the two camps as well as an armed struggle against the supporters of the Cyprus agreement was imminent, alarming the British. The internal Greek Cypriot feud became a dominant feature for the rest of the Transitional Period putting Makarios

under immense pressure not to make concessions in his negotiations with the British and the Turkish Cypriots.[13]

On October 18'\ the famous *Deniz* incident took place. A British naval patrol boarded and searched the Turkish vessel *Deniz* off the coast of Cyprus. They found two cases of ammunition. The incident was a serious blow to the relations between the two communities. It confirmed Greek Cypriot suspicions that the Turkish Cypriot underground organisation, TMT, was still active in Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriots were arming themselves as a precaution against future troubles or a breakdown in the negotiations.[14] In response to the incident Makarios suspended the work of the Greek Cypriot team in the Constitutional Commission. Kutchuk, who had denounced the incident, questioned, albeit not very convincingly, if the ship's real destination had been Cyprus. The Turkish Government quickly denied any involvement.

In late 1959, Makarios was heavily criticised by both the right and the left. He had upset the traditional elites when he had called only young EOKA fighters and their close associates into the Cabinet. The older men of influence from the left and the right felt ignored and contemplated revenge as the presidential elections were drawing near.[15] A campaign led by the Bishop of Kyrenia and the mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dervis, was launched in November with a view to removing Makarios as the political leader of the Cypriots and overthrowing the Zurich and London agreements.[16] On November 15th John Clerides, a widely respected Greek Cypriot (and father of Makarios' close aide, Glafkos Clerides) and his previous opponent, Dervis, met in Nicosia and decided to form a new party, the Democratic Union. Their objective was to oppose Makarios in the upcoming presidential elections.[17] Makarios was criticised for ruling the Greek Cypriot community in a dictatorial manner and failing to use the *Deniz* incident to oppose the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops on the island. Not surprisingly, Clerides himself became the presidential candidate of the Democratic Union by the end of November.[18]

The foundation of the Democratic Union was followed by the re-emergence of the communist party, AKEL, which had been proscribed during the EOKA emergency. On December 4th 1959, only one week before the presidential elections, the British Governor, Hugh Foot, finally lifted the ban on the communist party.[19] AKEL came out in full support of Clerides, who was now supported by a mosaic of political forces: radical supporters of the political right, determined to overthrow the Cyprus agreement, communists, who at least accepted the settlement as a necessity for an interim period, and moderates, who opposed Makarios for various reasons.[20]

During the pre-election period fighting broke out between supporters and

opponents of Makarios as well as between the Left and Right in several districts.[21] On December 13th 1959, Makarios won the first presidential election gaining 67% of the votes, while Clerides received 33%.[22] The island returned to an uneasy calm. Considering the traditional strength of AKEL, which claimed to control about a third of the electorate, and the opposition to Makarios, this was a big political success for the Archbishop and a clear signal that any policy aiming to abrogate the Cyprus agreement would be resisted by two thirds of the electorate.

The Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazil Kutchuk, had an easier task. He automatically became Vice-President since he had been unopposed.[23] For the first time, the Cypriots had elected and recognised political leaders with a democrat legitimisation to sign agreements.

Originally, elections for the House of Representatives were scheduled for January 17th and for the two Communal Chambers for December 31st, which would have completed the establishment of the legislative and executive bodies of the future Republic.[24] But the British linked the date for the elections with a successful outcome regarding their military and other requirements.[25] This could not be achieved by the intended date for independence in late January. Therefore, these two elections were postponed pending agreement on the outstanding issues, which did not come about until early July 1960.

Consequently, polling days for the parliamentary bodies took place in late July and early August 1960.[26] In the run-up to the election for the House of Representatives, the communist party AKEL changed sides in exchange for a guarantee of five seats offered by Makarios. It was known after the municipal and presidential elections that AKEL represented about 30% of the electorate but was not granted a corresponding number of seats. In a Cold War context, any higher representation of the communist party was regarded as unacceptable by all outside powers involved in the Cyprus question.21 The Democratic Union of Clerides and Dervis boycotted the elections rightly accusing the electoral system of being discriminatory.

It was already clear before the elections for the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers actually took place that the existing leadership of each community would prevail. On the Turkish Cypriot side there had never been any significant opposition during the Transitional Period. The candidates of Kutchuk's Turkish National Party won all seats in the House of Representatives and the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber with little opposition. The very few independent candidates were well behind those of the Turkish National Party.[26]

Cyprus finally became an independent Republic on Tuesday, August 16th 1960

hardly six weeks after the end of the long and intricate negotiations. Only by early July had it become clear that independence was imminent and that it would be granted on August 16th. Consequently, there had been no time for large-scale preparations of the celebrations which turned out to be simple and improvised. Foreign guests were not pouring into the island to celebrate the establishment of a state nobody had really wished for.[29]

Following the handover of power by the British to the Cypriot representatives, the Greek and Turkish military contingents, whose presence had been decided in the Zurich/London agreement, arrived and went to their respective provisional camps on the afternoon of Independence Day.[30] The Turkish soldiers were welcomed by a large number of Turkish Cypriots while a significantly smaller number of Greek Cypriots assembled to greet the Greek contingent. Most of them attended the enthusiastic welcoming ceremony for twenty-one EOKA exiles who returned to Cyprus from Athens.[31]

The celebrations were rather ominous. The two communities celebrated separately, one celebrating the arrival of the Turkish contingent, the other the return of the exiles. On the streets mostly Greek and Turkish flags were used for decoration while hardly a Cypriot flag could be seen.[32]

Part II: The Negotiations About the British Military Requirements

For the Greek Cypriots a success in the bases question was, as the British scholar Robert Holland describes, *"one of the few ways that the Greek-Cypriot politicians could sustain the illusion that Lancaster House [i.e. the Zurich and London agreement] had been a great 'victory' for themselves."*[63] It was the only question of substance in which the Greek Cypriots had retained a free hand in the otherwise mainly imposed Cyprus agreement. That was at least what they thought. The British view was exactly the opposite. Therefore, the stage was set for a British - Greek Cypriot confrontation of a magnitude that would exceed the worst British fears.

Negotiations on British military requirements became the dominant issue throughout the Transitional Period. The most important, but not the only disputed topic, was their size. When the first official British maps were tabled in the London Joint Committee in May 1959, the British demanded an area of 152 square miles,[34] which included seven villages with a Cypriot population of about 4.400, as sovereign base areas. The area represented about 4,1% of the entire island and was larger than the island of Malta. The Greek Cypriots were outraged and offered, in their counterproposal in October 1959, 36 square miles excluding any Cypriot population.

Even though the British presented their military requirements from a position of strength, as the rulers of the island, this position had in fact been decisively weakened by the Zurich/London agreement. By signing it, Britain had agreed to give up sovereignty over the island only if its military demands were met. However, politically, Britain had in fact committed itself to leaving Cyprus. Consequently, the British position from spring 1959 that there was nothing to negotiate, had to be gradually abandoned since the Greek Cypriots insisted on a negotiated agreement on British military requirements before any real progress on other outstanding issues could be achieved. But, when the first British concession was offered in late 1959, it could not prevent a head-on collision with the Greek Cypriots. It was not simply the divergent views on the size of the bases that made an agreement difficult. There was also a difference in the perception of what the British sovereign bases should be and what practical and political implications derived from sovereignty. Originally, the British demanded, in effect, small colonies with a separate civil administration and a military purpose, *"our Gibraltars",*[35] as the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, had named them. Britain was determined not to be dependent on Cypriot goodwill in running the bases. Therefore, London insisted on large areas with access to the sea which could function even against the will of the Cypriots.

The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were determined to eliminate any traces of "colonialism". They were only willing to agree to purely military installations under British sovereignty with extensive external sites and facilities. Moreover, once the rift between Makarios and Grivas had become open, the Archbishop was under even greater internal pressure to make a determined effort to reduce the area of the British military bases.

The unavoidable deadlock over the issue of British military requirements soon paralysed the entire negotiation process and threatened to prevent an agreement in time for the intended date of independence, February 19th 1960. In a last minute attempt to reach an agreement, another London conference was convened in January 1960 (16-29th). As in 1959, the idea was to bend Makarios by the joint pressure of Greece, Turkey and Britain at a meeting of principals. But this time, Makarios was determined to prevent a repetition of 1959 and succeeded in doing so for five reasons.

First, already prior to the conference, Makarios had freed himself from the deadline pressure by indicating that he would rather accept a postponement of independence than an unsatisfactory settlement.

Second, he was no longer dependent on Greece since all parties were bound by the Cyprus agreement. When Greece aligned with Turkey and Britain during the

conference in order to push the Archbishop into an agreement, as they had done in 1959, Makarios resisted, carried on negotiating and made the rift between him and the Greek government public. Much to the embarrassment of Athens, he successfully demanded that Greece (thus also Turkey) be excluded from the final negotiations on British military requirements in and after London.

Third, the other parties had no realistic scenario in hand which could force Makarios to agree in order to avert a worse development. Neither a return to the Macmillan Plan nor a partition threat could be brought forward as a credible scenario anymore after the Zurich/London agreement had been reached. No British government could justify in parliament and to the public a return to violence and the suppression of colonial people because of disagreement on the size of its bases.

Fourth, the three-country front Makarios was now facing was not as united as in 1959. Greece as well as Turkey did endorse to some degree Makarios' claim to limit the size of the bases and exclude as much population as possible. Greece, which was caught in the middle of the dispute with interests, loyalties and commitments to both sides, extended only conditional support to the British claims. In particular, the British refusal to state its intentions concerning any future cession of the bases caused suspicion in Athens and limited Greek support.

Finally, the position and role of the Turkish Cypriots had changed in London. In the light of extensive British demands concerning the size of the bases as well as sites and facilities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots finally joined forces instead of opposing each other as they had done throughout 1959.

In order to understand this change it is necessary to briefly outline the goals and principles that had shaped Turkish Cypriot policy during 1959. For most of 1959 (and to a lesser extent during 1960) the negotiations on British military requirements as well as on many other issues had only two protagonists: the British and the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leaders regularly subordinated Cypriot national interests to a policy of corroboration, or at least not upsetting, the British.

Why?

First of all, the Greek Cypriot goal to make the new republic as independent as possible ran contrary to the Turkish Cypriot aim to ensure the maximum Turkish and British influence as a safeguard against future Greek Cypriot domination or attempts to effect *enosis.*

Secondly, Turkish Cypriots as well as Ankara could not afford to oppose Britain in order to ensure British support in pending key demands of the Turkish side such

as the veto rights of the Vice president, the separate municipalities, the 70/30 ratio in the public service, and British financial aid.

Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriots followed the orders and instructions of Ankara which throughout the Transitional Period remained a loyal ally of Britain with very few exceptions. But since most of the vital Turkish and Turkish Cypriot demands for which British support was needed had been satisfied in early 1960, the Turkish Cypriot policy could now change. Starting with the London conference, their leadership pursued a seesaw policy between safeguarding some Cypriot national interests by siding with the Greek Cypriots, mediating between the British and the Greek Cypriots and trying to squeeze out as much British aid for their community as possible in exchange for the support of British claims.

At the London conference the Turkish Cypriot support in many, though not all, issues strengthened Makarios' negotiating position decisively, given that any settlement against the will of either community would have had an openly imposed character. This could not go down well amongst the British as well as the world public opinion. The old mechanisms of divide and rule were no longer effective. Against joint resistance the British views had no chance of prevailing.

After Makarios had refused to accept a reduced British demand of 122 square miles for their bases and had gained Kutchuk's support against the British intention to create a separate civil administration within the base areas, it was agreed to postpone independence for one month, until March 19th. Following the advice of the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, *"to get tough",* the British gave the Cypriot delegation a ten-day ultimatum to reach agreement otherwise independence would have to be postponed once again.[36] It was agreed that negotiations between Makarios, Kutchuk and a new British chief negotiator, Colonial Under-Secretary Julian Amery, should continue in Cyprus and on February 4th, Amery arrived. In order to meet the new deadline for an agreement, he aimed to settle the outstanding issues within 48 hours after his arrival.[37] In the end, he spent almost four months on the island.

No agreement could be reached until the set deadline. But this time no new date for independence was announced and it was postponed indefinitely until agreement on the British military requirements could be reached.

To make things worse for London, Kutchuk and Makarios issued statements which in varying degrees blamed the British government for the failure to reach an agreement. In particular, Kutchuk's criticism upset the British as well as Ankara. In an angry telegram the British Ambassador in Turkey, Burrows, cabled to the Foreign Office: *"Several members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have recently drawn our*

attention, to the fact that Kutchuk is tending to pay considerably more attention to the views of Makarios and not to be so blindly obedient to the requests of the Turkish Government as previously. They detected in this a growth of 'island mentality' in which the provincial interests of the Cypriot politicians were beginning to weigh more strongly than the wider international considerations.[100] Now the Turkish Cypriot leader came under strong pressure by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, to back the British position publicly. This produced some results although the conversations between Zorlu and Kutchuk were now, according to another report by Burrows, *"almost acrimonious and Kutchuk had even threatened to resign"*[39] In the end, Kutchuk bowed to the Turkish pressure and closed ranks with the British again.

By mid-February, the negotiation positions of the three sides could be summarised as follows: The British demanded 120 square miles under British sovereignty. Makarios was willing to offer 80 square miles plus 40 under Cypriot sovereignty with Britain possessing special facilities. Kutchuk suggested 80 square miles plus 40 under joint British-Cypriot sovereignty.

In order to overcome the stalemate, the British repeatedly asked the Greek and Turkish governments to exert strong pressure on Makarios. But despite the support the British seemed to enjoy from Greece and Turkey – they had now virtually formed a new alliance that was publicly annoyed by Makarios – Athens and Ankara, in fact, softly pressured the British to settle for less than 100 square miles, the maximum figure regarded as acceptable to Makarios.

On March 30th 1960, the British had finally, albeit only internally, agreed on the magic figure of 99 square miles. This was also the position wholeheartedly supported by Greece, Turkey and Kutchuk. It was clear that once the British had been brought down to 99 square miles, no further concession would be possible. While an agreement seemed imminent Makarios escalated the situation in a speech delivered in commemoration of the outbreak of the EOKA struggle on April 1st. He publicly threatened to instigate civil disobedience against British authorities and proclaim independence unilaterally. Moreover, he stated that the struggle for *enosis* would continue in a different form *"preserving [...] the same substance and the same contents[...] The realisation of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements[...] We have acquired a bastion and starting point for peaceful campaigns.* [40] Makarios' open declaration that the Cyprus Agreement was not the final solution to the Cyprus problem rightly upset Kutchuk and reinforced the strong Turkish Cypriot suspicions that the Greek side would not adhere to the Zurich and London agreements after independence.

Nevertheless, negotiations continued and a final agreement over the size of the bases was reached on April 25th when Makarios accepted the British proposal of

99 square miles. But the issue of the Sovereign Bases was far from settled Agreement on the size did not mean agreement on its precise delimitation Moreover, the differences over an eventual cession of the bases if the British were ever to give them up and the inclusion of Cypriots in the base areas were still unresolved. Still, one of the biggest obstacles for a Cypriot-British agreement had been overcome. Now the question of an eventual cession of the bases became the central issue of the negotiations. The Greek side had demanded that the British bases should be ceded to the Republic of Cyprus if they were ever to be relinquished and was determined to exclude the possibility that they could be handed over to Turkey. Ankara had up to now blocked any formula which excluded the possibility that one or both of the British bases be ceded to Turkey in the future. A dramatic political change in Turkey made an agreement on this topic possible. On May 27th, the Turkish government was overthrown and their successors, eager to reach an agreement in Cyprus, gave their approval to a formula that would allow the transfer of the British bases only to the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, the negotiations about the British military requirement could be successfully concluded in time for independence on August 16th.

The last obstacle for independence proved to be the lack of an agreement on two issues negotiated between the Greek and Turkish sides: the 70/30 ratio in the public service and the separate municipalities.

Part III: Sources for Bi-Communal Conflict after Independence

70/30 Ratio

The Zurich/London agreement had granted the Turkish Cypriots 30% of the posts in the public service and 40% in the army following independence. Since the Turkish Cypriot community comprised only about 18% of the population, most Greek Cypriots regarded this as an unjustified privilege.

Eager to cash in their gains, the Turkish Cypriots wanted the 70/30 ratio in the civil service to be implemented prior to the end of British rule.[41] Since the Greek Cypriots held more than 78% of the posts in 1959, the correct proportions could only be achieved either by dismissing Greeks or by enlarging the civil service to an extent not justified by its workload.[42]

Consequently, Archbishop Makarios, demanded a gradual implementation and the employment of only sufficiently qualified Turkish Cypriots. This created a problem for the Turkish Cypriots since their educational level on average was much lower than that of the Greek Cypriots, so there were not enough of them possessing the necessary qualfications.[43] But their two leaders, Fazil Kutchuk and particularly

Rauf Denktash, insisted on the immediate implementation of the 70/30 ratio irrespective of practical difficulties.[44]

After hard bargaining during the last days before independence it was finally agreed that the implementation of the 70/30 ratio should take effect within five months from the date of the declaration of independence.[45] The Greek Cypriots did not deliver on their commitment. This upset the Turkish Cypriots and became a source of bi-communal conflict after 1960, though by December 1963 the 30% ratio had almost been fulfilled.

Separate Municipalities

The second unresolved issue by June 1960 concerned the establishment of separate municipalities. The concept of administrative communal separation on which the constitution was based was also applied on a municipal level. In acknowledgement of the fait accompli created by the Turkish Cypriots in 1958, article 20 of the *Basic Structure for the future Republic of Cyprus* had ruled that: *"Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns.[. ..] The President and the Vice-President shall examine within four years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue."*[46]

While the Greek Cypriot mayors publicly pressed Makarios to amend this article of the Zurich/London agreement and prevent the official establishment of separate municipal councils, the Turkish Cypriot leadership insisted that the separate municipalities should officially already be in place during the Transitional Period. These demands triggered a conflict about the interpretation of article 20.

During the negotiations the dispute centred on the question of whether separate municipalities should be maintained for a limited period of time or permanently. The Turkish Cypriots insisted that municipal segregation should be permanent, while the Greek side was only willing to accept a temporary separation.[47]

Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots wanted to establish separate municipalities in a geographical as well as administrative sense, meaning Turkish Cypriot control over the Turkish quarters of the towns. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, interpreted article 20 of the Zurich agreement as administrative but not geographical separation. All Greeks should be administered by Greek Cypriot and all Turks by Turkish Cypriot municipal councils but there should be no Turkish Cypriot control over territory.

For the Turkish Cypriots, separate municipalities were an important achievement

on the way to self-administration and potentially a first step towards partition should the Republic of Cyprus fail. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were opposed to separate municipalities for exactly the same reasons that the Turkish Cypriots wanted them. Next to the obvious functional disadvantages, they were regarded as a first step towards partition and as the Trojan horse of mainland Turkish influence on the island.

The boundaries of the separate municipalities also remained subject to agreement. That was virtually impossible since, despite the ethnic cleansing and terror in 1958, Greek and Turkish Cypriots still lived together in mixed areas. Moreover, property ownership by the two communities hardly followed a pattern of separate communal areas.[48]

Bi-communal negotiations on the issue were fruitless. On October 12th 1959, an interim legislation was enacted which temporarily authorised action by the Turkish Cypriot municipal authorities in the five main towns created in July 1958.[49] The Turkish Municipal Committees, as the provisional councils were called, were allowed to *"exercise all rights and powers and perform any duties expressly or by implication conferred or imposed on a Municipal Council in regard to the collection and recovery of revenue..."*[50] This was a success for Makarios since this provisional organ was working on the basis of administrative but not geographical segregation. This provision should expire *"upon the establishment of separate municipalities by the Turkish inhabitants of the five towns.*"[51]

Again, it proved impossible to reach a final agreement by the time of independence. As a compromise, article 177 of the constitution gave the Greek President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President the right to determine the delineation of the separate municipalities. This looked like a Turkish Cypriot victory on the lines of geographical partition. On the other hand, article 173 ruled that the municipal councils should be elected by their respective communities, which made sense only in the case of purely administrative separation.[52]

Consequently, the issue of separate municipalities remained unresolved and became one of the permanent sources of dispute that eventually led the constitutional order to collapse.

The Distribution of Executive and Legislative Power

The third conflict stemming from the Transitional Period concerned the distribution of Executive and Legislative power. The constitutional power balance between both communities had been agreed upon by Greece and Turkey already in February 1959 in Zurich and there was not much scope left for negotiations within

the Constitutional Committee. The fundamental principle of the constitution was the dualism of power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The parliament consisted of two different bodies. The House of Representatives comprised of thirty-five Greek and fifteen Turkish Cypriot members. It was responsible for all the laws which affected the affairs of both communities. Laws about taxes, finances and elections had to be approved by separate majorities. Therefore, theoretically, eight Turkish Cypriots out of the fifty members could block any law in the above mentioned areas. Moreover, separate Communal Chambers were in control of all religious, cultural and educational affairs of the respective communities.

The thorniest problem in the negotiations about the constitution proved to be the exercise of executive power. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President should have equal powers to be exercised jointly. The Greek side insisted that the equal powers of the Vice- President were limited to foreign affairs, security and defence. In November 1959, an agreement on the guidelines for exercising executive power was finally achieved. It ruled that the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice- President should have a separate veto power on issues concerning foreign policy, defence and security, as well as the right to return decisions of the Council of Ministers and laws of the House of Representatives for reconsideration.[53] So, unlike the issue of the 70/30 ratio and the municipality issue which were still unresolved at the time of independence, the work on the substance of the Cyprus constitution had been completed by January 1960. The power distribution between the two communities had been agreed upon long before Independence Day. Therefore, any change in this sphere required an amendment of the constitution which was exactly what Archbishop Makarios intended with the thirteen proposals he submitted in 1963.

Conclusion

What is the legacy of the Transitional Period? As far as the British military bases are concerned, the riots against the installation of a new antenna for espionage purposes in 2001 illustrate that the bases and their colonial character remain a bone of contention between the Cypriots and their former ruler. However, despite the extremely difficult and controversial negotiations during the Transitional Period, the British military bases did not stand in the centre of the Cyprus dispute after 1960. This is unlikely to change until a solution to the Cyprus problem has been found. Things are then likely to look very different and a conflict about the future of those two colonial relics will seem inevitable.

Of more importance with respect to the collapse of the constitutional order of the Republic in 1963 was the fact that no final and mutually acceptable agreement on the 70/30 ratio in the public service and in the municipality issue could be reached by Independence Day. The differences were patched up during the last days of the Transitional Period in order to achieve independence with temporary agreements that were not to last or be adhered to by the Greek Cypriot side. One can speculate with good reason that the Republic of Cyprus would have secured a better start had these two issues been resolved, finally and not purely temporarily during the Transitional Period. This was not the case and the non-agreement over both of these issues contributed to the escalation of the conflict which culminated in 1963.

However , at the heart of the collapse of the constitutional order in 1963 stands the dispute over the power distribution within the Cyprus Republic. The constitution had established the Turkish Cypriot minority as a second, and politically almost equal community on the island. This was bitterly resented by the Greek Cypriots The wish to reverse these Turkish achievements, which were used by the Turkish Cypriots to paralyse the state machinery in order to achieve their goals, led to Makarios' thirteen proposals in late 1963. In substance, the thirteen proposals aimed at reducing the status of the Turkish Cypriot community to that of a protected minority. The most important of the proposals were the abolition of the veto-rights of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the need for separate majorities for certain laws in the House of Representatives. This proved to be unacceptable to the Turkish side.

In conclusion, the question of whether the agreements reached during the Transitional Period provided a basis on which the Republic of Cyprus could have functioned longer than just three years is one of the most disputed issues in Cypriot historiography. While many authors regard the constitution as unworkable it should be pointed out that anything else but this complex diarchic order – unacceptable as it was to the Greek side – would not have been feasible given the power-political strength of the Turkish side in the years after 1958. The debate about the power distribution between the two communities has remained unresolved and controversial ever since 1963. It is most likely that if a solution of the Cyprus problem is found the power distribution in a re-united Cyprus will be even more favourable to the Turkish Cypriot side than in 1960. Any future constitution will be based to an even greater extent than in 1960 on the cooperation of each community if it is to succeed. Will both sides this time accept a new status quo and commit themselves to making probably an even more complex constitution work? This is the question that will be the deciding factor over peace and stability in a post-solution Cyprus.

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Notes

1. Charles Foley (ed.): *The Memoirs of General Grivas.* (London: Longmans, 1964), p. 198.

2. Robert Holland. *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 327.

3. Cmnd. 1093, *Cyprus.* Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence by Command of Her Majesty. July 1960. Reprinted at the Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, pp. 3-4.

4. Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt. An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece.* (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1978), p. 351.

5. FO 371/144652. Report about the progress of the negotiations by J. M. Addis from 15 October 1959.

6. Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* p. 351.

7. Holland, *op. cit.,* p. 331.

8. Cmnd. 1093, *op. cit.,* p. 173 and Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* pp. 351-352.

9. The opening meeting on 23 March was held at Carlton House Terrace. But all meetings after 1 April took place in York Terrace. FO 371/144642. Undated Official Memorandum on the London Joint Committee on Cyprus from February 1959.

10. FO 371/144646. Undated and unsigned report on the work of the London Joint Committee written sometime between the 11 and 15 April 1959.

11. FO 371/144643. Undated and unsigned Foreign Office note on London Joint Committee Personalities.

12. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question,* 1950-1963. (New Rochelle, N.Y: Caratzas, 1986), p. 387.

13. Ibid., pp. 388-389.

14. Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* pp. 353-354.

15. Ibid., p. 354.

16. Ibid.

17. Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition.* Vol. 1. (Nicosia: Alithia, 1989), pp. 90-92.

18. Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* pp. 354-355.

19. DO 35/8021. Minute by the Commonwealth Relations Office from 31 December 1959.

20. Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* p. 355.

21. Ibid.

22. DO 35/8021. Minute by the Commonwealth Relations Office from 31 December 1959 and Cyprus. The Transitional Year (Cyprus Government, 1959), Vol. 111, pp. 6-7, here quoted from: Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* p. 355.

23. DO 35/8021. Minute by the Commonwealth Relations Office from 31 December 1959.

24. DO 35/8021. Minute by the Commonwealth Relations Office from 31 December 1959.

25. FO 371/144652. Report about the progress of the negotiations by J. M. Addis from 15 October 1959.

26. FO 371/152833. Foot to Lloyd from 5 July 1960.

27. FO 371/152834. Foot to Lloyd from 1 August 1960.

28. Ibid.

29. FO 371/152834. Minute entitled "Cyprus: Inauguration of the Republic" from I. F. Porter from 28 September 1960.

30. FO 371/152934. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from 18 August 1960.

31. FO 371/152834. Minute entitled "Cyprus: Inauguration of the Republic" from I. F. Porter from 28 September 1960.

32. Ibid.

33. Holland, *op. cit.,* p. 330.

34. In July, the British replied to the demand of the Greek side from 20 May to provide precise information about the size of each base. The estimated size of what was then named Episkopi/Akrotiri base in the British Memorandum was 75,3 square miles; that of Dekelia 74,8 square miles. FO 371/144649. Annex to Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the Committee of Deputies from 13 July 1959.

35. Alistair Horne: *Macmillan, 1957-1986.* Vol. II (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 691, here quoted from: Holland, *op. cit.,* p. 306.

36. *Cyprus Mail,* 31 January 1960.

37. FO 371/152864. Outline instructions for Mr. Amery from February 1960.

38. FO 371/152875. Telegram No. 236, Burrows to Foreign Office from 11 February 1960.

39. PREM 11/2923. Burrows to Foreign Office from 13 February 1960.

40. FO 371/152879. Text of a public statement by Kutchuk on the evening of 2 April in which he quotes the Archbishop.

41. . Crawshaw, *op. cit.,* p. 361.

42. FO 371/152833. Minute by the Secretary in the Joint Secretariat of the London Joint Committee and member of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, R. Wade-Gery, from 13 June 1960.

43. Averoff-Tossizza, *op. cit.,* p. 385.

44. FO 371/152833. Minute by Wade-Gery from 13 June 1960.

45. FO 371/152833. Governor H. Foot to Colonial Secretary from 4 July 1960.

46. Article 20 of the Zurich Agreement, here quoted from: *Cyprus Mail,* 19 May 1959 .

47. *Cyprus Mail,* 11 April 1959.

48. Clerides, *op. cit.,* p. 121. In Limassol, for example, Ayios Ioannis should belong to the Turkish municipality, according to the British Surridge Report. But, its population composition was 1,273 Greek and only 160 Turkish Cypriots. At Chiflikoudhia, another area of Limassol, there were 240 Greeks and 170 Turks. *Cyprus Mail,* 11 April 1959.

49. FO 371/144652. Report about the progress of the negotiations by the Head of the Southern Department in the Foreign Office, J. M. Addis, from 15 October 1959.

50. FO 371/144602. Governor Foot to Colonial Secretary from 9 October 1959.

51. Ibid.

52. Cmnd. 1093, *op. cit.,* Art. 173 and 177, pp. 159-161 and Pavlas Tzermias, *Geschichte der Republik Zypern. Mit BerOcksichtigung der historischen Entwicklung der Inse/ wahrend der Jahrtausende.* (Ti.ibingen: Francke Verlag, 1991), p. 173.

53. Furthermore they had a veto right on the following matters: the design and colour of the Cyprus flag, the imposition of compulsory military service, the reduction or increasing of the security forces, the creation and awarding of honours, the exercise of the prerogative of mercy etc. Clerides, *op. cit.,* p. 123.

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