

VOLUME 16  
NUMBER 2

---

# THE CYPRUS REVIEW

---

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

*The Cyprus Review, a Journal of  
Social, Economic and Political  
Issues*, P.O. Box 24005, 1700  
Nicosia, Cyprus.

Telephone 22-353702 ext 301, 22-841555

E-mail: cy\_review@intercollege.ac.cy

Telefax: 22-353682, 22-357481,

North American Subscription Office:

Phillip Young, Director of Libraries,

University of Indianapolis, 1400 East

Hanna Avenue, Indianapolis, IN

46227-3697, U.S.A.

Copyright: © 2004 Intercollege,  
Cyprus.

**ISSN 1015-288.1**

All rights reserved.

No restrictions on photo-copying.

Quotations from *The Cyprus Review*  
are welcome, but acknowledgement  
of the source must be given.

---

## **TCR Staff**

---

**Editor:** Farid Mirbagheri

**Co-Editor:** Hubert Faustmann

**Managing Editor:** Nicos Peristianis

**Assistant to Editors:** Christina McRoy

---

# Advisory Editorial Board

**VOLUME 16**  
**NUMBER 2**

---

## CYPRUS REVIEW

---

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

- Peter Allen**, Ph.D.,  
Rhode Island College, U.S.A.  
**Vassos Argyrou**, Ph.D.,  
University of Hull, U.K.  
**Maria Hadjipavlou**, Ph.D.,  
University of Cyprus.  
**Yiannis E. Ioannou**, Ph.D.,  
University of Cyprus.  
**Joseph S. Joseph**, Ph.D.,  
University of Cyprus.  
**Michael Kammas**, Ph.D.,  
Intercollege, Cyprus.  
**Marios Katsioloudes**, Ph.D.,  
Saint Joseph's University, U.S.A.  
**John T.A. Koumoulides**, Ph.D.,  
Ball State University, U.S.A.  
**Costas P. Kyrris**, Ph.D.,  
Ex-Director of Cyprus Research  
Centre, Cyprus.  
**Peter Loizos**, Ph.D.,  
London School of Economics, U.K.  
**Phedon Nicolaides**, Ph.D.,  
European Institute of Public  
Administration, The Netherlands.  
**Andreas Polemitis**, D.B.A.,  
Intercollege, Cyprus.  
**Oliver Richmond**, Ph.D.,  
University of St. Andrews, U.K.  
**Maria Roussou**, Ph.D.,  
University of Kent, U.K.  
**Sofronis Sofroniou**, Ph.D.,  
Intercollege, Cyprus / University of  
Indianapolis, U.S.A.  
**Keith Webb**, Ph.D.,  
Intercollege, Cyprus.
-

## NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

*The Cyprus Review* is an international bi-annual refereed journal which publishes articles on a range of areas in the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus. As such it aims to provide a forum for discussion on salient issues relating to the latter. The journal was first published in 1989 and has since received the support of many scholars internationally.

### Submission Procedure:

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, *The Cyprus Review*, Research and Development Centre, Intercollege, P.O.Box 24005, 1700 Nicosia, Cyprus, with a brief biographical note, detailing: current affiliations: research interests and publications.

### Formatting Requirements:

(i) Articles should range between 4,000-7,000 words.

(ii) Manuscripts should be typed on one side of A4 double-spaced; submitted in four hard copies together with a 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word saved as rich text format. Pages should be numbered consecutively.

As manuscripts may be sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page. The author's full academic address and a brief biographical paragraph detailing current affiliation and areas of research interest and publications should also be included.

Manuscripts and disks will **not** be returned.

(iii) An abstract of no more than 150 words should be included on a separate page.

(iv) Headings should appear as follows:

Title: centred, capitalised, bold e.g.

## INTERNATIONAL PEACE-MAKING IN CYPRUS

Subheadings: I. Centred, title case, bold.

II. Left-align, title case, bold, italics.

III. Left-align, title case, italics.

(v) Quotations must correspond to the original source in wording, spelling and punctuation. Any alternations to the original should be noted (e.g. use of ellipses to indicate omitted information; editorial brackets to indicate author's additions to quotations). Quotation marks (" ") are to be used to denote direct quotes and inverted commas (') to denote a quote within a quotation.

(vi) Notes should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes (see vii below) and should be numbered consecutively in the text and typed on a separate sheet of paper at the end of the article. Acknowledgements and references to grants should appear within the endnotes.

(vii) References: As the *The Cyprus Review* is a multi-disciplinary journal, either of the following formats are acceptable for references to source material in the text:

(a) surname, date and page number format OR

(b) footnote references.

Full references should adhere to the following format:

*Books, monographs:*

James, A. (1990) *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. London, Macmillan.

*Multi-author volumes:*

Foley, C. and Scobie, W.I. (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus*. Starpord, CA, Hoover Institution Press.

*Articles and chapters in books:*

Jacovides, A.J. (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*. Nicosia, Jus Cyprici Association.

*Journal articles:*

McDonald, R. (1986) 'Cyprus: The Gulf Widens', *The World Today*, Vol. 40, No. 11, p. 185.

(viii) Dates should appear as follows: 3 October 1931; 1980s; twentieth century. One to ten should appear as written and above ten in numbers (11, 12 etc.).

(ix) Tables and figures are to be included in the text and to be numbered consecutively with titles.

(x) **Book review** headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, e.g. *Cyprian Edge*, by Nayia Roussou, Livadiotis Ltd (Nicosia, 1997) 78 pp. Reviewer's name to appear at the end of the review.

(xi) First proofs may be read and corrected by contributors if they provide the Editors with an address through which they can be reached without delay and can guarantee return of the corrected proofs within seven days of receiving them.

(xii) Each author will receive two complimentary copies of the issue in which their article appears in addition to five offprints.

(xiii) Articles submitted to the journal should be unpublished material and must not be reproduced for one year following publication in *The Cyprus Review*.

## DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in the articles and reviews published in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Intercollege, University of Indianapolis, The Advisory Editorial Board or the Editors.

*Indexing: The contents of The Cyprus Review are now indexed in the following publications: Bulletin Signalitiques en Sciences, Humanities et Socia/es; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; PAIS-Public Affairs Information Service; Sociological Abstracts; Social Planning, Policy and Development Abstracts and Reviews; Peace Research Abstracts Journal; JCSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews; Sociology and Social Anthrology; International Bibliography of Periodical Literature; International Bibliography of Book Reviews; and International Political Science Abstracts. In addition, TCR is available internationally via terminals accessing the Dialog, BRS and Data-Star data bases.*

*Advertising: Advertisements are welcomed. No more than ten full pages of advertisements are published per issue. Rates per issue: Full page \$200, Cyp£100, UK£125; Half page \$140, Cyp£70, UK£90, Back cover £380, Cyp£190, UK£240.*



# THE CYPRUS REVIEW

VOLUME 16  
NUMBER 2

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### SPECIAL ISSUE

#### CYPRUS, THE EU AND THE REFERENDA ON THE ANNAN PLAN

<b>Glen Camp</b> Cyprus and East Mediterranean Security Problems: New Developments - Old Problems	13-36
<b>Alexis Heraclides</b> The Cyprus Problem: An Open and Shut Case? Probing the Greek-Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan	37-54
<b>Tozun Bahcheli</b> Saying Yes to EU Accession: Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome	55-66
<b>Van Coufoudakis</b> Cyprus - The Referendum and its Aftermath	67-82
<b>Thanos Veremis and Philippos Savvides</b> Cyprus after the Referenda of April 24: What Next?	83-94
<b>George Vassiliou</b> The Cyprus Problem and the European Union	95-102
<b>Plus Commentary Articles by:</b>	
<b>Mehmet Ali Birand</b> Papadopoulos has Saved Us from Our Complex	105-108
<b>Keith Kyle</b> Twenty-one Years with Cyprus	109-112
<b>And Book Review:</b>	
<i>The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise</i> By Andreas Theophanous, (Intercollege Press: Nicosia, 2004) 218 pp. <b>(Michalis Attalides)</b>	115-117

## CONTRIBUTORS

**Michalis Attalides** is the Dean of the School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law at Intercollege. He has been a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Leicester, a counterpart to the UNESCO Expert at the Cyprus Social Research Centre and a Guest Lecturer at the Free University of Berlin. He has represented the Republic of Cyprus as its Ambassador in a number of capitals, including Paris, London, and the European Union in Brussels, before being appointed Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has also represented the Cyprus Government in the European Convention. Dr Attalides received his BSc(Econ) from the London School of Economics and Political Science and his PhD in Sociology from Princeton University. His books include *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, and *Social Change and Urbanisation in Cyprus*. He has also published a number of articles on society and politics in Cyprus and Greece.

**Tozun Bahcheli** is professor of Political Science at King's University College (University of Western Ontario) in London, Canada, where he teaches courses in international politics. He is the author of numerous journal articles and of *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Westview, 1990) and co-editor of *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty* (Routledge, 2004). During the 1995-1996 academic year, Bahcheli was a senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. Currently he is preparing a book on ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

**Mehmet Ali Birand** is currently the chief anchor and member of the board of CNN TÜRK and a prominent journalist and TV commentator in Turkey. He was European editor of Turkey's leading newspaper "Milliyet" in 1972, and became Milliyet's Head of Bureau in Moscow in 1984. In 1985 Mr Birand started to produce "The 32nd Day" - a highly popular TV programme now in its 19<sup>th</sup> year, which covers international and domestic policies. President Mitterand, King Hussein, President Gorbachov, Premiers Kohl and Thatcher are some of the world leader's who have been guests of Mr Birand on this programme. In 1991 he became a columnist with "Sabah" and in 1999 with "Pasta", Turkey's highest circulation newspaper. He has 40 national and international awards, bestowed on him as a journalist and TV programmer, including the Council of Europe's "Best Reporting" award. He has authored eight books on Turkish domestic and international policies which have been translated into English, German and Greek.

**Glen D. Camp** is Professor of Political Science at Bryant University in Smithfield, Rhode Island, USA. He completed his university studies at Harvard where he received his AB, MPA, and Ph.D. He also studied at George Washington University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He served with the US Information Agency (USIA) and the US Agency for International Development (AID). Professor Camp is the Amnesty USA specialist for Greece and



---

Cyprus. His academic interests include US foreign policy, international relations, German studies, Balkan, and East Mediterranean studies. He speaks English and German fluently as well as Russian, plus demotic Greek, and some Macedonian and French. Dr. Camp has authored numerous scholarly articles in political science.

**Van Coufoudakis** is the Rector at Intercollege. He also holds the title of Dean Emeritus and Professor Emeritus at Indiana University - Purdue University, Fort Wayne. He has written extensively on post-WWII US foreign policy towards SE Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. His latest book was co-edited with Eugene Rossides (Washington, DC, 2002) *The United States and Cyprus: Double Standards and the Rule of Law*.

**Alexis Heraclides** (born in 1952, in Alexandria) is professor of International Relations and Conflict Analysis at the Department of Political Science and History of the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Athens). Previously he served as senior counsellor for minorities and human rights at the Greek Foreign Ministry (1983-1995). He has written some fifty articles in scholarly journals and edited books as well as three books in English and five in Greek, including *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), *Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972-1992* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), *Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization* (London: Pinter, 1993), *International Society and the Theories of International Relations: A Critical Overview* (Athens: I. Sideris, 2000), [in Greek], *Greece and the "Threat from the East"* (Athens: Polis, 2001) [in Greek], and *The Cyprus Question: Conflict and Resolution* (Athens: I. Sideris, 2002) [in Greek].

**Keith Kyle** is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He was Visiting Professor of History at the University of Ulster from 1993-1999 and was a member of the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) from 1972 to 1990. He worked for 'The Economist' from 1953 to 1960 in Washington and at Westminster and for the BBC-TV programmes 'Tonight', '24 Hours', 'The Money Programme' and 'Newsweek' between 1960 and 1982. He is the author of *Suez. Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (I. B. Tauris, 2003) and two monographs on Cyprus published by Minority Rights International in 1983 and 1997.

**Philippos Savvides** is a Political Scientist specialised in the fields of international relations and comparative politics. Since September 2002 he has been a Research Fellow with the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). His research interests focus on the theories of international relations, European integration, and the issues pertaining to the whole debate about "global democracy." More specifically, his research has concentrated on Greek-Turkish relations,

developments in Turkey, Euro-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem. In June 2002 ELIAMEP published his "policy paper" entitled *Cyprus at the Gate of the European Union: Challenges and Prospects*. His latest publication is a co-edited volume with Professor Theodore Couloumbis entitled *Building Citizenship in a Democratic Cyprus* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2004).

**George Vassiliou** was born in May 1931 in Famagusta, Cyprus. He received his Degree and Doctorate in Economics from the University of Economics in Budapest and subsequently specialised in marketing and market research in London. He served as President of the Republic of Cyprus from 1988 to 1993, and as a Member of Parliament from 1996 to 1999. From 1998 to 2003 Dr Vassiliou was Head of the Republic of Cyprus effort for accession to the European Union. He was head of the negotiating team and responsible for co-ordinating the harmonisation process within the country. Dr. Vassiliou is the Chairman of MEMRB International - a major market research and economic consultancy organisation with offices in 30 countries in the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe - and of a number of other organisations. He is an active participant in international fora and a Member of the Trilateral Commission; Member of the InterAction Council; Member of the Board of Governors of the Shimon Peres Institute for Peace; Visiting Professor at the Cranfield School of Management in the UK, and Honorary Professor of the Cyprus International Institute of Management (CIIM).

**Thanos Veremis** is Professor of Modern History at the University of Athens, Department of European and International Studies and Member of the Board of Directors of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Education: Boston University {B.A. in Government 1965}, Trinity College, Oxford (D. Phil. 1974); Lecturer, Panteios School of Political Science 1977-83; Research Associate, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1978-79; Visiting Scholar, Centre for European Studies, Harvard Univ. 1983; Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Univ. of Athens 1984-87, Full Professor since 1987; Visiting Professor at Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ. 1987; Director of Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) 1988 -; Visiting Fellow, St. Antony's College, Oxford 1993-94; Advisory Board of European History Quarterly (Lancaster) 2000-02; Constantine Karamanlis Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford Massachusetts. Publications include: *Dictatorship and the Economy*, 1982; *A European History of the Twentieth Century 1900-2000*, 1982, 2001 *Greek-Turkish Relations*, 1986; *From the Interwar to the Cold War*, 1992; *Greece's Balkan Entanglement*, 1994; *The Military in Greek Politics*, London: Hurst and Co (1997); *Greece*, World Bibliographical Series, vol. 17, Oxford: Clio Press (1998); (co-editor), *Kosovo. Preventing Another Balkan War*, ELIAMEP (1998), with John Koliopoulos., *Greece. The Modern Sequel*, London: Hurst and Co, (2002).

# Articles

**VOLUME 16**  

---

**NUMBER 2**



# CYPRUS AND EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS – OLD PROBLEMS\*

Glen D. Camp

---

## Abstract

*We posit a former 'Loose Bipolar Model II' prior to the end of the Cold War now temporarily replaced by a 'unipolar' model with the US as sole remaining superpower. This unipolar system is clearly in transition and unstable as the absolute power of the US declines even as its military power increases. We further posit a set of concentric 'levels': a world, a regional, and a 'local' level.*

*Why is Cyprus important geopolitically? Because of its location and propinquity to two metropolises: Greece and Turkey. Thus Cyprus serves as an 'anchor' which has dragged Athens and Ankara to the brink of war. Thus rapprochement between Athens and Ankara has trumped abstract justice for Cyprus as viewed from both capitals. But it failed to persuade Greek Cypriots who opted for 'half a loaf' policy: safe entry into the European Union as preferable to the terms offered by the UN on 24 April 2004. They saw the Annan Plans (I-V) as tilting too far to the Turkish Pole. The Turkish Cypriots supported the Referendum for its economic and political advantages of reunification and improved living standards.*

*With the Greek Republic of Cyprus in the EU and the Turkish Cypriots left out, Ankara will have to decide which of three routes it will follow: **Status quo**, **Annexation**, or **Renegotiation** of Annan Plan V and the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. We believe the AKP-led government will choose renegotiation as part of its Kemalist yet moderate Muslim stance. Yet despite its remarkable rapprochement with Greece and reforms to join the EU, Cyprus remains a thorn in it's and the EU's side. The stringent changes required for EU membership may yet destabilise it. Those changes will necessarily include a fairer distribution of power between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots since Cyprus is neither Switzerland nor Belgium. We hope the major powers and Athens will help.*

---

"Something there is that doesn't love a wall....  
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know  
What I was walling in or walling out,  
And to whom I was like to give offence.  
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That wants it down."  
- Robert Frost, *Mending Wall*, from *North of Boston*, 1913.

**Athenians to the Melians:** "we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that ... the standard of justice depends on the ... power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."<sup>1</sup>

### **The End of the Cold War and the New Global Configuration**

We see a former 'Loose Bipolar Model II,' since two superpowers dominated the international system. We must add that a subset of 'non-aligned' states flourished to the mutual dismay of Washington and Moscow. Each superpower constantly tried to 'turn' these states including Cyprus and add them to its bloc so as to create Kaplan's Model III, 'the Tight Bipolar Model.' Ironically, this 'Bipolar Model' was only half true since the USSR was only a superpower **militarily**, since economically it was a 'dual economy' with only the defence sector enjoying world-class status. Economically the Soviet Union was outclassed, confronted by overwhelming economic competition from North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Unfortunately for the world (and Greece and Cyprus) this fundamental fact was not clearly understood in a strategic sense by many American leaders, many of whom seemed obsessed by an unrealistic fear of 'The Evil Empire.' Evil it surely was, in our view, but weak it also was; for it was never able to feed its people properly, even though Tsarist Russia (with about the same acreage) was a major grain exporter. Nor was its Gulag system an effective use of human resources or scientific genius, while even the 'free sector' of Soviet society was remarkably inefficient in its use of labour and materials, nor was the empire strengthened by its need to repress Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.

Clearly, Cyprus under Makarios was one of these 'non-aligned' states much to the impotent fury of Washington. Indeed Makarios was often considered, absurdly in our view, as 'The Castro of the Mediterranean' despite allowing U-2 spy flights from British Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's) and operation of UK and US electronic monitoring stations in the Troodos Mountains. The fact that AKEL, on which he depended for maintaining his position, was extremely independent and Euro-Communist (like the Italian and Spanish CP's and unlike the French CP) was not generally appreciated in Washington. Indeed AKEL's record is quite erratic even to

supporting current Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos' 'No' views on 24 April 2004 watershed Referendum on reunification of Cyprus, a 'nationalist' position in opposition to its Marxist class origins! The US view was also ironic: all Communist parties were alike just as all Communists were identical. The Cold War was ignorantly seen as a primordial struggle between Good and Evil, a Manichean moralistic crusade in which external parties had to choose - somewhat akin to the current Washington view of states 'assisting' terrorists. To Andrei Zhdanov and John Foster Dulles, the Cold War was a zero-sum-game with but one victor. Both followed the Leninist adage of '*kto kogo*' (who will kill whom) despite George F. Kennan's plea that the Cold War was being over-militarised by Washington.

We suggest that the current world system is unstable with the **absolute non-military power** of the US clearly declining and its trade deficit rising; even as the EU's euro and Japan's yen rise in relation to the former unchallengeable dollar, while China emerges as the next superpower.

Thus we live in a Unipolar world in transition. Moreover, a series of concentric 'levels' can be posited of which the largest is the outer or world level previously occupied by the US and USSR. After, the USSR's disintegration, it is now occupied solely by the US whose primacy is under severe challenge even by non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda.

The next or regional level is occupied by regional powers such as the three Guarantor powers of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution: Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Finally, Cyprus, the Aegean, the Balkans, and the Middle East comprise the third or local level and vibrate to the tones emanating from the world and regional levels. Alexis Alexandris cogently summarises the relationship of the regional to the local Ring by noting that "While Greece considers itself as the gate of the European Union in the new Balkans, the Turks are convinced that the post-Cold War environment has opened up new foreign policy options in a region stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Central Asia republics of the former Soviet Union ... The geographical boundaries of Greek-Turkish rivalry include the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Thus Ankara accuses Athens of forming an anti-Turkish alliance with Syria, while Turkey flirts with Albania and FYROM at Greece's northern backyard. The Greeks openly regard Turkey as their main threat, citing troop build-ups in the Thracian border and the presence of the [Turkish-GC] Fourth Army on the Aegean coast. For its part, the Turkish military cites the Greeks as the reason that these troops cannot be transferred eastwards to tackle the Kurds."<sup>2</sup> Alexandris observes that "An examination of the Greek-Turkish minority question cannot but include, beside Thracian issues, the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the regime of local self-government for Imbros and Tenedos provided by Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne, [also-GC] some formula ... So that the

native Greek Orthodox population may be repatriated in [*sic-GC*] Imbros and Tenedos ...." Alexandris concludes "The property rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne to the deported Istanbul Greek nationals should also be re-examined."<sup>3</sup>

Alexandris provides a detailed list of Greek concerns about apparent Turkish revisionism in the Aegean with which we are forced to agree by his logic and facts: "Since 1974, there is a consensus in Greece based on the perception that Turkey is pursuing revisionist objectives, seeking to impose a shared sovereignty and resource utilisation in the Aegean, in spite of various multilateral treaties and the customary international law." (*Ibid.*, p. 4) Among the further issues he lists in the Aegean are the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, (p. 5), the extension of Greek territorial limits according to the UN Law of the Sea (LOS), (p. 6), the Greek-Turkish Aegean airspace and control dispute including FIR (Flight Information Region), (pp. 7-8), Greek-Turkish NATO command structures (p. 8-9), the military status of the Aegean islands and the Turkish Aegean Fourth Army, (pp. 10-11) and Greek-Turkish relations regarding their mutual roles in Turkish entry into the European Union (p. 13). Indeed, Alexandris' paper is so complete, that one could recommend it as the basis for the Greek Government's negotiations with Turkey on a 'Big Package' *rapprochement*:

From our point of view, his meticulous list of complaints against Ankara *circa* 1996 clearly demonstrates the linkage between the regional and local geopolitical rings listed *supra*. He also includes Cyprus (pp. 13-20) "Although Cyprus continues to burden Greek and Turkish foreign policy agendas" (p. 13) and is indeed "both the cause and victim of a recrudescence of a Greek-Turkish antagonism" (p. 13). Thus Cyprus interacts on several levels and certainly involves the world level: "On another level, the Cyprus question is an international problem, for the settlement of which the Secretary General of the United Nations, in cooperation and co-ordination with the United States and the European Union, has been offering his good offices since the 1960s" (p. 13).<sup>4</sup>

Even as US non-military power has generally declined **absolutely**; its power has increased **relatively** owing to the disintegration of the USSR and the break-up of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia into competing nation-states each dominated by a single 'custodial ethnic elite.' Many of these states are seeking a road to national unity as is Turkey.

More importantly, the EU, gradually coalesced from a strictly Iron and Steel Community under Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, into a vast customs union. Now it has moved into the monetary field (the European Monetary Union), and is just starting to develop a fundamental aspect of a loose confederation: via a 'National Defence Identity'.<sup>5</sup> Contrary to many analysts, we feel the US has done everything it can to **assist** this process, a policy which we find difficult to reconcile



with their view of the US as a 'hegemonic power'. Yet by the Cold War Manichean policies of Acheson and Ball, Cyprus was to be 'cantonized' rather than assisted to become a single international state. The current 'Bush Doctrine' of permanent, preventive and pre-emptive war has also crippled US multilateral efforts in Cyprus. Clearly an over-reliance on compulsion extends to a counterproductive 'tilting' toward Ankara in the Annan Plan version V. Thus Annan V permanently forbids any amendments to the proposed Cyprus 'Main Articles' via PART VI, article 37:2 (p. 38) .

Annan V gives Ankara most of what it has sought for the last 30 years in the North. Meanwhile it gives the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) very little in return except for a spurious 'reunification' of two separate, non-integrated states and a modest reduction in the area of the North (37% down to 28%). As Tassos Papadopoulos, the RoC President noted, **"there isn't much left to give"** on the Greek Cypriot side.

It is true that the current Bush Administration seems as anxious as the Clinton and first Bush administrations to see a settlement of the Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean issues. The problem is that its view is less nuanced and sophisticated than the Clinton or first Bush administration's view. Thus great pressure from Washington and the UK was placed on Athens and Nicosia to accept Annan V 'as is' without the major changes required to be viable, effective, and fair to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Athens also pressured the Greek Cypriot's to accept the Plan without essential changes since it has interests external to Cyprus, primarily *rapprochement* with Ankara. We must not forget that Athens **twice** rejected British offers to give all of Cyprus to Greece – once under Venizelos and once at the beginning of World War I (16 October 1915). Finally, Turkey pushed for acceptance of the Annan Plan since it gives most of what Ankara and the 'TRNC' leaders have long demanded: recognition of a Turkish State in the North with sovereign immunity of that state from the weak, rotating central government provided by the Plan. In exchange the Plan asks only that the North give up about 9% of the land which it took by armed force in 1974 in clear violation of Turkey's obligations under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee as well as the precepts of international law and US-Turkish agreements. These bilateral agreements provided that the arms given to Turkey would not be used except for NATO defence. And brutal as the Athens Junta was in 1974, it was no threat to NATO militarily – only to the Greek people, the Greek Cypriots, and RoC President, Archbishop Makarios.

Signs of a constructive 'paradigm shift' in relations between Athens and Ankara include the exchange of rescue efforts by Greek and Turkish rescuers<sup>6</sup> which also, however, contains a warning by Professor Thanos Veremis at Athens University

who doubts that the 'logjam' in relations can be broken since "the Turkish military is highly conservative and it wants to preserve its political power."

But foreign governments, Kinzer concludes, including the US, "are encouraging the countries' new-found friendship"<sup>7</sup> and US President Clinton received Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit and visited both Turkey and Greece. The EU held crucial summit meeting in Helsinki and Turkey is "hoping that Greece will help persuade the 15-nation Union, many of whose members have been critical of Turkey's human rights record, to add Turkey to its list of prospective members."

Though war between nation-states is still perhaps the major problem in international relations, we suggest that Realists overlook the importance of economics and apotheosise, in our view, the importance of military capabilities. We have discussed 'dual state' powers such as the ex-USSR already. We agree with Paul Kennedy's views on the endemic 'overextension' of empires as a result of 'side payments' and the gradual 'hollowing out' of their domestic strength. As noted earlier, we find his comments apply also to the US<sup>8</sup> and its policy toward the Third World. Certainly, US efforts to obtain Ankara's help in sending troops to the north of Iraq at the beginning of the current Iraq War suggest the failure of 'side payments' together with the growing democratisation of Turkish political culture. Despite Washington's pressures, the AKP and the Turkish General Staff were unable to persuade the Turkish Parliament to cooperate and send the troops prior to the invasion of Iraq.

We would stress the remarkable development of Greece in recent years into a mature civil society<sup>9</sup> together with the concomitant efforts of the Europeans (including Greece) to develop both a joint Monetary (via the EMU) and European Security and Defence Identity. We note the EU slowly and painfully setting up an independent but integrated European pillar within NATO. This 'pillar' would be capable of acting autonomously from NATO in certain situations, say in ex-Yugoslavia or other localised European areas or even the Middle East. That is, Greece and the other European democracies would be 'separable but not separate' from NATO's integrated command structure within a common WEU framework.

Such a new European Defence Identity would clearly have profound effects on the strategic shape of Eastern Mediterranean affairs including Greek-Turkish relations and the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and probably exert a stabilising effect both on the Balkans and Turkey's Middle East neighbours. For the EU, the price would have to include entrance of Turkey as a full member.

For Turkey it would clearly require paying two high prices: First, resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes with Greece. But this would mean that Turkey would

have to follow Greece's example begun by Papandreou and almost completed by Simitis via his 'New Balkan Profile': good relations with Ankara's European and Balkan neighbours. But then Turkey would be free to deal with her less altruistic neighbours: Syria, Iraq, and Iran while pursuing the Kemalist dream of a secular Turkey as a fully accepted partner of the Western democracies.<sup>10</sup> Second, Turkey would have to develop domestic policies to meet the *aquis communautaire* and Copenhagen standards of the EU in such areas as the economy, and political and human rights for all citizens, including Kurds.

Would Turkey be prepared to pay such heavy prices? We believe it will have little choice for the alternative is to be 'marginalized' as a Third World power and experience a tragic descent into the miasma of a secular military dictatorship such as Iraq, or – even worse from the Kemalist elites' point of view – become another Iran and suffer the victory of the hated Muslim fundamentalist extremists within Turkey such as Necmettin Erbakan.

Thus we suggest the present period of US unipolar dominance is likely to be challenged further by rising new aggregations of power including the EU and the European 'pillar' of NATO, Japan and South-east Asia, and later on China, etc. We also believe that Russia will gradually 'get its act together' and once more become a major player in international politics. At the present time, Russia is almost totally preoccupied with its domestic problems and tragic, futile war with Chechnya. Consequently, it is most unlikely that it will be able to play much of a role in the former Turkic republics of the ex-USSR or do much in the Eastern Mediterranean beyond offer to provide arms or stuff Cypriot banks with dubiously-obtained cash from looted assets in Russia.

But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Greek-Turkish policy of the US evidently did not, change fundamentally. Tragically, US policy remained on course as Professors Van Coufoudakis and Phillippos Sawides argue. US **interests** remained the same as did the **policies** intended to defend them. Annan V suggests clearly that in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean, US policymakers had 'forgotten nothing and learned nothing.' Acheson I and II, Ball, the NATO Plan, and other policies pursued by the US clearly were intended to achieve 'double *enosis*' with consequent partition of Cyprus.

But that existing partition has not led to a lessening of tensions between Athens and Ankara, and division of Cyprus via a 'Hispaniola Partition' has clearly **not** brought about any lessening of the bitter hatreds of the parties involved.

This failure of US and UK policy, we believe, was clearly **not** recognised by Foggy Bottom and Whitehall. The problem is 'What is to be Done?' (*Sto delar?*)

now, after the disastrous failure of Annan V. We still believe that the only real solution is a 'Big Package' agreement between Athens and Ankara similar to that achieved by Paris and Berlin in the 1950s or between Venizelos and Ataturk in the 1930s. But that agreement will have to take Greek Cypriot needs more fully into account and not egregiously tilt toward Ankara only. It is not widely known, but Ataturk recommended Venizelos for the Nobel Peace Prize in that period.

Thus the 'Theory of Continuity' which is so well developed by our friends, Van Coufoudakis and Philippos K. Savvides, is still relevant.<sup>11</sup> We suggest that both scholars make an irrefragable case with respect to the period from the early days of the Cold War through the Nixon Administration. Henry A. Kissinger clearly and admittedly 'tilted' toward Turkey in the grim 'July Days' of 1974 and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces. He and his administration did nothing to prevent the totally illegal and continued occupation of northern Cyprus (37%) by Turkish troops as well as the importation of some 35-40,000 Anatolian settlers which illegally changed the demography of the area in clear violation of customary international law as well as Treaty obligations freely accepted by Turkey, i.e., Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee of the London-Zurich package and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The former required any of the Guarantor Powers, after consultation (which Turkey did with the UK) in case of unilateral intervention, to re-establish the situation *ante-bet/um*. That is, each guarantor power "reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing a state of affairs created by the present treaty" (Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee). This clearly Turkey did not do, rather in August 1974 it began a further advance from occupying about 3% of Cyprus to some 37% after its own recalcitrance led to the failure of the Geneva meeting of the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain.

### US Policy

The Clinton foreign policy team of Secretary Albright, UN Ambassador Holbrooke, Secretary Cohen and President Clinton had rather different ideas about the goals of US power in the Eastern Mediterranean. As Secretary Albright noted in greeting Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides on 6 June 1997, "The United States' goal remains to encourage a Cyprus settlement that establishes a stable, bizonal federation, with adequate security guarantees for all." She noted further: **"What we seek (sio-GC) is the reunification of Cyprus. We believe that the division of the island (of Cyprus-GC) is unacceptable ... We continue to support the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We will do everything we can to bring the process forward."** (balding added-GC)<sup>12</sup> Did they really mean it? We cannot know for certain since they did not reunify Cyprus. But the subsequent administration clearly returned to the 'Melian' formula for Cyprus.

For the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been left out in the cold by the world's powers including Athens, Ankara, London, and Washington. Thus the interests of the Cypriots have been overlooked in favour of a more humane version of the Melian formula: "... the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." However, the 'weak' [Greek Cypriots] refused to accept their fate and vote 'Ochi' (no) preferring to protect their perceived interests at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots by entering the EU and thus 'importing' the Cyprus problem into that somewhat ramshackle organisation already burdened by many other serious issues. The Greek Cypriots by 76% voted "kalo pente kai sto xeri para deka kai karteri" ["a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."] It was a practical if bitter decision whose effects have yet to be worked out. At best it will be renegotiated and the Turkish Cypriots will be brought into a fairly united Cyprus – at worst it may presage permanent bifurcation of Cyprus via a 'Hispaniola' settlement like that between Haitians and Dominicans – two cultures, two languages, two states.

The US leadership clearly does not believe that the current 'Hispaniola Formula' is both dangerous and counterproductive. Yet it adds little to Turkish or Greek or Cypriot or American or UK or world security. But with an apparent Greco-Turkish rapprochement underway, neither the US as a superpower, nor London, nor the EU nor UN need fear that Cyprus' division will likely trigger an eventual disastrous Greco-Turkish conflict. If Europe (the EU) and America move together, Turkey will either join in or be marginalized and that would run directly counter to the Kemalist *Weltanschauung* of the Turkish military and civilian elite. It would be a *denouement* which could not but arouse alarm among Turkish decision-makers. For Turkey needs Europe, and Europe needs a reformed Turkey as a full partner in the EU, EMU, revised WEU, Balkan peacekeeping force, and NATO.

### Other Sinners

In our view, all sides to the Cyprus tragedy made serious and unnecessary policy misjudgements which led to great suffering for all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish. The polemic between the 'National Narratives' of the Greek and Turkish peoples of Cyprus with their subtexts might not have been so devastating if the two peoples had not been together on an island the size of the US state of Connecticut.

But the British used one people against the other in classic '*divide et impera*' imperial policy to maintain their control over the island when in fact they only needed two SSA's, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, for their reduced role as a European regional power. Ironically the Cyprus tragedy might have been avoided had the British given more weight to realistic political and less to unrealistic security needs in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed it is a tragedy that little trans-ethnic 'Cypriot nationalism' ever developed, for in our view there is no 'Cypriot nation' – only two

ethnic communities: one Greek and one Turkish. In my various trips to Cyprus, I never saw a Cypriot flag, only Greek on one side of the Green line and Turkish on the other. I doubt if many Greek Cypriots know what their flag looks like and they have, as far as I know, no national anthem. Pollis is correct in suggesting that British colonialism bears much responsibility for the lack of a Cypriot sense of 'nationhood.' Still we doubt very much that such a hybrid nationalism could have emerged in the cruel world of Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean politics: for Cyprus has been the object of foreign intrigues since Neolithic times. As Markides suggests pessimistically regarding Turkish-Cypriot (T/C) nationalism:

As early as 1914, [T/C-GC] leaders protested ... against Greek agitation for *enosis*. And in December 1949, only six years before the EOKA struggle had started, about 15,000 Turks marched through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia cursing Enosis and hurling insults and threats at the [G/C's-GC]. Cyprus never became a "consociational democracy" like Switzerland ... owing to the failure of political will of both elites [G/C and T/C-GC].

Markides concludes as do we with the sad negative conclusion that "Nothing short of a 'cultural revolution' can establish the *internal preconditions* [ital. added-GC] of a lasting intercommunal peace."<sup>13</sup>

Those 'preconditions' just do not exist in the view of Professor Thomas Ehrlich of Stanford; they "could only develop if supported by pressures from without."<sup>14</sup> We would suggest that the EU and the US should seriously consider ways to help provide additional external support by adding to the strength of internal Cypriot forces on both sides of the Green line which are willing to push for a 'bizonal, bicomunal, federal' solution brokered by the UN and supported by the Western democracies including Greece. Joseph S. Joseph comments in similar negative fashion:

Despite four centuries of coexistence and physical intermingling, the [G/C's and T/C's-GC] remained separate and distinct ethnic groups divided along linguistic, religious, cultural, and political lines. The preservation of their ethnic identity could be attributed to ... loyalties with Greece and Turkey. *With the establishment of the [RoCJ, the ethnic and political fragmentation inherited from the past were institutionalised and incorporated into the state apparatus and the political process.*

*Communal dualism became the foundation of political structures and practices that prevented the development of ... common patriotism, joint Cypriot consciousness, and unifying political culture supportive of the Cypriot state* [Ital. added-GC)].<sup>15</sup>

For a contrary view, blaming primarily British policy for the lack of a common Cypriot nationalism, cf. Adamantia Pollis.<sup>16</sup>

We conclude that although Whitehall's policy in Cyprus exacerbated the problem of intercommunal relations for reasons of *raison d'etat*, Britain was **successful** in this policy because of **pre-existing conditions of communal division**. Moreover, mainland Greeks and Greek-Cypriots (G/C's) seemed never fully to take into account in their strategic calculations that Turkey was only forty miles away while Greece was four hundred miles away. The continued struggle for *enosis* was bound to produce a bitter response from Ankara. Their huge majority of 80% vs. 20% blinded them to these strategic realities with tragic results. They understood *their* Pole for they were surrounded by it. But they failed to consider the Turkish Pole.

President Makarios himself committed a second Greek policy failure on 30 November 1963 when he unilaterally proclaimed his famous '13 Points' which in effect unilaterally revised the London-Zurich Agreements with disastrous results. We admit that those Agreements were rigid, that "The 1960 Constitution was a peculiar and highly rigid one that, in the final analysis, proved to be unworkable." But that begs the question, "could the Constitution have been made to work absent Greek (EOKA, EOKA B!) and Turkish (TMT) extremism?" But Makarios clearly, unilaterally, and illegally revised the London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution with disastrous results.

Indeed, one must ask, "Where were the reformers (on both sides) on Cyprus? Where were the Jean Jaures, the Mahatma Gandhis, the Martin Luther Kings, the Ibrahim Rugovas? Why was there until recently no Cyprus branch of the Greek Amnesty International or Akim Birdal's Turkish Human Rights Association?" The answer, we suspect, involves the depth of the ethnic divisions and the regnant political culture of Cyprus. Even the then President and Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus made little effort to 'reach across' to the 'other' community and build a sense of common Cypriot nationalism. The ultimate reality of Cyprus remained the 'we-they' distinction of separate ethnicities.

In cataloguing Greek policy failures we must also include Ioannides' fatal errors of judgement in beginning the 'July Days' by trying to overthrow the elected leader of the Cypriot people, President and Ethnarch and Archbishop Makarios. The Junta's inability to realise Turkey's propinquity to Cyprus is a bit mind-boggling in retrospect, but must be included in Greek errors of contributing to the Cyprus tragedy.

Finally, the Greek side must take some responsibility for the activities of General George Grivas (Dighenis) who died on 27 January 1974. Grivas is rarely mentioned in Greek or Greek-Cypriot national narratives. Rarely is he given responsibility for contributing to the pathological fear of Greek Cypriots which we observed on the part of Turkish Cypriots and which we believe was made indelible by the 'July Days'.

Nor were we Americans without guilt in the Cypriot tragedy. Perhaps then US Ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Tasca, was correct: the brutal leader of ESA, (*Ethniki Stratiotiki Astinomia* or Greek Military Police) was only a 'cop'. But that hardly relieves Tasca in our view from the responsibility of dealing with him. Diplomats are not entitled to choose the leaders of countries to which they are accredited and simply walk away.

Tragically, it is widely believed by many Greeks and Turks as well as by some foreign students of Eastern Mediterranean affairs that the US Government financed EOKA-B! despite its bloodthirsty practices toward patriotic but dissenting Greek Cypriots. Whether the US helped finance TMT is also not clear, but it certainly followed similar practices toward its dissenting majority. Again, absent convincing evidence, a 'Scotch Verdict' must suffice until the files are available.

Moreover, there is the counterproductive role played by President Nixon in sending his Vice President, Spiro T. Agnew, to visit the Junta leadership in Athens and Nixon's Secretary of State and former Special Assistant for National Security, Henry A. Kissinger's dubious statecraft before and during the 'July Days' of 1974. Kissinger's vaunted *Realpolitik* seemed to backfire as both America's allies, Greece and Turkey, responded negatively to his 'tilts' – first toward the Greek Junta, then toward Ankara. He did not even follow the dictates of Bismarkian *Realpolitik*, which never **required** that the manipulator of the balance of power should not consider at all the deeply felt wishes of the manipulated. But Kissinger seemed oblivious to both Greek and Turkish national feelings. For after Congress instituted a boycott on US arms to Turkey, the Turks closed down US bases in Turkey while America's best friend, the wise though conservative Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO. He was the same Greek leader who advised Makarios *against* proclaiming his 13 Points discussed earlier. We conclude that the 'July Days' of 1974 brought little credit to US statecraft or then Secretary of State Kissinger, for it is rarely the goal of prudent diplomacy to infuriate one's closest allies. Once again, US policy seemed oblivious to strongly felt local needs, and seemed unnecessarily dominated by short-term security considerations at the expense of regional alliance and local political needs.

### **UN Negotiations for Cypriot Reunification<sup>17</sup>**

UN negotiations to reunify Cyprus have been prolix, difficult, and tedious as well as unproductive. We shall therefore try to summarise them with cruel brevity, reserving our conclusions for the UN plan, known popularly as Annan Plan V rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots and accepted by 65% of the Turkish Cypriots.

The major landmarks include;



1. The 1977 Makarios-Denktash meeting
2. The 1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communiqué
3. The 1984 Proximity Talks
4. The 1985-1986 UN Draft Framework Exercise
5. The 1988-1989 Talks
6. March 1990-April 1992. Security Council (SC Res.) Resolution 649, 13 May 1990
7. April 1992 - the S-G's 'Set of Ideas'. S-G Boutros-Ghali's April 1992 report
8. 1992-1994 CBM's: On 19 November 1992 the S-G called for CBM's
9. The 1997 Talks
10. On 24 January 1998 the Paphos air base became operational for Greek fighter planes and the S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base. On 16 June, Athens sent six planes to the Paphos air base and Turkey responded on 18 June by sending six planes to the 'TRNC'. Cypriot troops in Russia completed their S-300 training with a test-firing of their new weapons, whereupon US Secretary Albright asked Clerides to reconsider the S-300 purchase, to store the missiles outside Cyprus, or to replace the order with shorter-range SA-15's. On 29 December 1998, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus. UNSC S/Res.1251 stated that the UN goal was a Cyprus with a single sovereignty comprising two politically equal communities in a biz-bic federation.
11. The 1999-2001 Proximity Talks. Clerides and Denktash met on 4 December 2001 for the first time since August 1997. They agreed to begin direct talks with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to continue until a comprehensive settlement was achieved. Denktash proposed Belgium as a model for foreign affairs and Switzerland as a model for domestic matters. These events led to the current situation: the Annan Plan as amended five times or Annan V.

### **The Annan Plan V – or Mark Twain's Stew**

On 16 January 2002 Clerides and Denktash met with de Soto and agreed to hold intensive peace talks beginning 21 January at the Nicosia Airport, a UN base but closed to other air traffic. They agreed there would be no final agreement until all issues were settled. On 29 April, Denktash proposed a Cypriot 'Partnership State' to be based upon the two now existing 'states' on Cyprus. This would, of course, imply legal recognition of the 'TRNC' which the UN and other states had never done since it was illegally created by Turkey and recognised only by Turkey which had established it. In fact, this idea of Denktash's was incorporated into the Annan V and was rejected by the Greek side. After the rejection, the Greek-controlled RoC entered the EU on 1 May with the *legal* and *de jure* right to control the North though no *de facto* control over the Turkish-Cypriot controlled area occupied by 35,000

mainland Turkish troops with up to 100,000 mainland Turkish settlers brought in by Ankara in part to take over formerly Greek-Cypriot farms, orchards, and businesses.

Each 'partner' would retain authority over its domestic affairs in the **Denktash Plan** and both would set up a 12-member Council consisting of two presidents and five representatives from each ethnic group. Thus Denktash would win his long 30-year battle for recognition of the 'TRNC state' diminished by 9% of its territory along with equal representation in his Council as to members and "Co-Chairs even though the Turkish Cypriots are only 18% of the island's population while the Greek Cypriots are about 80%".

Under **Annan V**, however, executive power would be vested in a Presidential Council of six members elected by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies based on relative populations of the two 'states' but reserving a minimum of one-third of the membership from each 'state'. This would guarantee the Turkish Cypriots at least one-third of the Council membership or two Council members.<sup>18</sup> Decisions of the Presidential Council would be by 'consensus' – a rather strong leap of faith given the history of the 1960s London/Zurich Agreements and subsequent events. If 'consensus' failed it would take decisions by simple majority provided this majority included at least one member from each 'state'. This would give the Turkish-Cypriots an opportunity to 'veto' any governmental decisions with one vote in the Council.<sup>19</sup> The Presidential Council in Annan Plans I-V seems to be an 'executive board' of the proposed United Cyprus State and recalls Jeremy Bentham's bitter comment: "A board, my Lord, is a *screen*.... What is everybody's business is nobody's business; what is everybody's fault is nobody's fault, by each one the fault is shifted off upon the rest...".<sup>20</sup>

Oddly enough, the judicial arm of the United Cyprus State (The Supreme Court) would have the power to resolve disputes within the Presidential Council including 'deadlocks' within federal institutions if this is indispensable to the proper functioning of the federal government.<sup>21</sup> Thus the *judicial branch* (Supreme Court) is empowered to impose *executive decisions* on the *executive branch* or any other 'federal institution'.<sup>22</sup>

Even more anomalously, however, the Cyprus Supreme Court would have three non-Cypriot judges "until otherwise provided by law".<sup>23</sup> Thus *foreign nationals* might well cast the deciding vote in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Presidential Council since the other three Court members are to be drawn equally from the two 'constituent states.' Can one imagine any other government in the world in which non-citizens are so empowered? This plan seems to violate the very essence of

'sovereignty' elsewhere proclaimed in the Annan Plan and defined by many, including the inventor of the idea, Jean Bodin in *Six Books of the Republic*, as "the right to say what the law is."

In the executive or Presidential Council, The Annan Plan closely follows the Denktash proposal also, but reduces the number of members to six (two of whom have to be Turkish-Cypriots) with the Co-Chairs termed 'non-voting members'. However, these 'non-voting members' appear to be 'equal' and may place an item on the agenda of the Council.<sup>24</sup> Again, the Denktash proposal is repeated in the Annan Plan largely intact, violating the Greek population 'Pole' in favour of the Turkish propinquity 'Pole'. Clearly, the UN Plan represents another clear Turkish minority victory over the Roe Greek-Cypriot majority.

Mark Twain once gave his recipe for 'horse and rabbit stew' composed of 'equal parts': one horse and one rabbit. The UN Plan seems to follow his recipe in its draft Constitution. A joint parliament would have an equal number of members from each side but here the Plan proposes two houses, one based on population (the Chamber of Deputies) while the other has equal membership from each 'state' (the Senate). Both houses would have forty-eight members with the Chamber of Deputies reserving a minimum of one-quarter of the members from each 'constituent state'.<sup>25</sup> Again, the Turkish Cypriots receive 25% of the votes with only 18% of the population.

It is hard to disagree with the conclusion of the American Hellenic Institute's (AHI's) conclusion that the Annan Plan "creates a minority veto for the 18% Turkish Cypriot minority" and that this veto would apply to:

1. Adoption of laws concerning taxation, citizenship, and immigration;
2. Approval of the budget; and
3. Election of the Presidential Council [the executive-GC]

We are also compelled to agree with the AHi conclusion that **"This arrangement is clearly undemocratic, a recipe for stalemate, and harmful to all Cypriots."** We further agree with the AHI's conclusion that "The Annan Plan is a more complicated version of the 1959-1960 London-Zurich agreements imposed on the Greek Cypriots by the British during the Cold War" and that "Political paralysis in the exercise of executive power will be the result" for "The Annan Plan vetoes exceed the minority vetoes of the London-Zurich ... agreements which vetoes led to the breakdown of the Cyprus constitution."<sup>26</sup>

In sum, the Annan Plan veers too far to the Turkish 'Pole' of Propinquity and too far away from the Greek 'Pole' population. It is simply the wrong 'mix' of democracy

and protection for legitimate minority rights. **In our judgment it should have been rejected** as it was. The UN drafters should return to their table and develop a fairer constitution - for this one is worse than that of 1959-1960 which clearly failed.

An additional serious contribution to the 'democratic deficit' of Annan V is the "highly complicated, ambiguous, and uncertain regime for resolving property issues and is based [apparently-GC] on the principle that real property owners even ultimately be forced to give up their property rights which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights and international law."<sup>27</sup> Granted that the property restitution issue is excruciatingly complicated, nevertheless we feel either restitution or full and fair compensation should be addressed more effectively than is done in Annan v.<sup>28</sup>

This also raises the vexed question of the estimated 100,000 mainland Turkish settlers who were brought into the North by Ankara to take over businesses created and operated by Greek Cypriots before the invasion. International law specifically forbids changing the demographic structure of a conquered land as it forbids illegal conquest in general and specifically via Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee of the 1959 Agreements (which, *inter alia*, are incorporated into the Annan Plan V. The 'phased withdrawal' of all Greek and Turkish troops from 2011-2018 is a potentially good idea, but it does not deal with the illegality of Turkish military occupation since 1974 of 37% of Cyprus.<sup>29</sup>

A further politico-juridical problem is the Annan Plan's 'derogations' from the Copenhagen standards as well as the detailed 70,000 pages of the *acquis communautaire* which reasonably should apply to *all* of Cyprus – upon the entry of Cyprus into the European Union. A cursory reading of the Annan Plan does not suggest that these standards apply and this adds to the democratic deficit if not to the legal tangle incident to the Annan Plan after entry into the EU.

Among the alleged contradictions of the Annan V with the Treaty of Rome (which established the EU in 1957) are:

- Art. 3 by denying refugees freedom of movement, of goods, of persons, services, and capital.
- Art. 8 by denying refugees the right to vote and stand as potential candidate(s) for municipal elections; and by denying refugees the right to vote and to stand as candidate(s) in elections for the EU Parliament in the Member State in which they reside.
- Art. 48 by preventing free movement of workers.
- Arts. 52 - 53 by preventing refugees from setting up their own businesses in the North; and

Art. 59 by preventing refugees from providing services in the North.

In addition, Annan Plan V apparently violates Articles 1, 8, and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights on protection of property, right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence, and right to an effective remedy. It is not clear how Annan Plan V would deal with these apparent 'derogations' or violations of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Finally, there remains one very serious structural anomaly regarding the 'freezing' of the Main Articles of the Annan Plan V. In statements by UN and Western diplomats the public was repeatedly told that the Annan Plan is based upon the model of the Swiss Confederation (really a Federation) as to domestic legal structure and the Kingdom of Belgium for external or foreign relations. Yet a study of either Switzerland or Belgium reveals both linguistic and ethnic differences requiring many adjustments and amendments to the constitutional order of these countries. Yet Annan V (Part VI, in Art. 37, paragraph 2, p. 3) apparently 'freezes' the proposed United Cypriot State constitution in Annan V **forever**. It states: "**The Basic Articles of this Constitution cannot be amended.**" This means that later experience and wisdom cannot be adopted via the amendment of the current Main Articles of the proposed Cyprus constitution.

Yet in the constitutions of Switzerland and Belgium, the models for Annan V, have been changed and amended many times as experience and wisdom accumulated over the centuries.<sup>30</sup>

Yet the Annan Plan forbids **forever** any amendments or changes to the 'Main Articles' of the Plan.

In assessing the Annan Plan, we conclude that its courageous drafters, after years of effort and hundreds of pages, have constructed a juridical and constitutional order designed for gridlock, for failure, for impotence. And such a design is not democratic, not workable, and not fair for either group of Cypriots. As such it cannot last – and certainly not without major amendment.

**We therefore regretfully conclude that the UN drafters and the governments which supported them - the UK, US, and Turkish - should go back to the drawing boards and create a constitution which more fairly operates between the two Poles: the Greek population Pole and the Turkish legitimacy Pole. We regretfully recommended that the Republic of Cyprus enter the EU alone until the UN can redraft a fairer constitution. Much of the work has been done and is incorporated in the Annan Plan V. What is needed is an Annan Plan VI fairer to both groups which will work. The risks to both**

**Greeks and Turks by rejecting Annan V on 24 April 2004 were outweighed by a supine acceptance: the 76% Greek-Cypriot vote was justified even though the Turkish Cypriots were left in the cold.**

### **Quo Vadis?**

The Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004 together with nine other candidates including Malta and many Central or East European countries. Greece, which chaired the military aspects of the meeting and succeeded Denmark as Chair, indicated it would veto the admission of any new EU members if Cyprus were *not* admitted. Turkey, on the other hand, threatened to annex the North if the Republic *is* admitted to the EU. Turkish Cypriots clearly wanted reunification of their island as large demonstrations in the North in favour of EU membership for all of Cyprus occurred between November 2002 and February 2003. With an income disparity of \$5,623 per person in the North vs. \$16,400 in the RoC, the Turkish Cypriots had a clear economic reason for demanding reunion.<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, the \$250 million per year 'subsidy' from Ankara was neither enough nor targeted to help properly. But they desperately wanted to end their isolation which had lasted since 1964. The economy was in bad shape, banks had collapsed, unemployment and emigration were high, and repression included thirty-one bombings, with the major opposition newspaper (*Avrupa/Afrika*) bombed twice and its journalists arrested. Opposition parties in the North (YBH and CTP, TKP, trade unionists, businessmen, and peace activists) were also threatened with death. According to several sources, the National Security Council in Ankara and the Chief of Staff of Turkey had carried out 'psychological war plans' one of which was code named, 'Operation Falcon.' Fascist 'grey wolf' thugs were imported from mainland Turkey and an ultra-nationalist UHH (Ulusal Halk Hareketi) group was formed to oppose reunification efforts by 'This Country is Ours' which was composed of forty-one NGO's in the North in 2000.<sup>32</sup>

Some analysts stress the role of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara (Tuerk Genelkurmay Baskanligr or TGB), their role in the Turkish Armed Forces (Tuerk Silahlı Kuwetlerin or TSK), and the Turkish National Security Council or Milli Guvenlik Kurulu or MGC. All these agencies evidently felt that Turkish security would be seriously jeopardised "by Turkey's military withdrawal from [Cyprus]".<sup>33</sup>

### **Conclusions**

We hope and believe that the moderate Islamist AKP government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan will restart negotiations under UN auspices rather than carry out the threat of turning the North into the 81<sup>st</sup> province (villayet) of Turkey. Of course if the

Erdogan government were to fall, annexation of the North might occur but that would mean a provisional end to Turkey's hopes ever to join the EU and consequently appear counterproductive to the Kemalist forces in Turkey including the military.

Legally, the Republic's admission to the EU means its sovereignty will *de jure* be island-wide, including the North, since only *de facto* does Ankara control the North and no country other than Turkey has recognised the North as a 'state' in international law.

Thus the thirty-year agony of partition may remain, but the entire security situation will change dramatically. Turkish foreign policy will be seen by all as having provisionally failed in its efforts at a 'two-state' solution on the Island. Turkey will be confronted by several major choices - all painful. Three scenarios seem possible and we list them in order of their probability.

First, a **Status Quo** Policy under which the present situation is maintained as much as possible with minatory gestures and a vast public relations campaign of threats and a general circling of the wagons. Over-flights of Greek and Greek-Cypriot airspace could be expected as well as further reinforcements of the 35,000 Turkish mainland troops on Cyprus. Such a policy would, ironically, indicate a victory for the sophisticated elites in the military and National Security Council (MGK) since it would preserve the 'bargaining chip' card discussed above. It would have the advantage of delaying further the painful and enormous domestic changes in Turkish society required by modernisation and subsequent entry into the EU. Its costs would include a continuation of the present unacceptable status quo with all its dangers of further 'Imia-Kardak' Greco-Turkish conflict but attenuated by *rapprochement* between these two NATO allies as supported by the US and UK. It is unlikely therefore to lead to escalation and a situation which neither Ankara nor Athens could control. It would not resolve the Cyprus problem, but might permit an **Aegean settlement** which is evidently more important to Athens than a Cyprus agreement.

Second, **Annexation**. Turkey may respond as it has threatened: Annex the North and move away from the West toward its neighbours. This option has considerable costs. It means giving up the chance to join the EU for the foreseeable future. It also violates the basic Kemalist elite's desire to move toward the West as noted in the introduction. It would also mean the 'hard liners' had won, since it would mark a serious and dramatic diplomatic defeat which could hardly be concealed and might lead to domestic upheaval between the Westernisers and Islamicist nationalists. It would lead to an exacerbation of the 'brain drain,' native Turkish Cypriots driven abroad by economic and fiscal problems imported from Turkey as

well as by the dramatic and painfully obvious differences in living standards between the Greek Cyprus and the North. Finally it would mean giving up the possibility of any arrangement for reunification of the Island which is an important bargaining chip in dealing with Greeks, Greek Cypriots and the US, EU, and UN. This 'bargaining chip' of pretended interest in a peaceful non-partitioned federal settlement (the so-called 'biz-bic' [bizonal-bicommunal federal] solution) has served Ankara's and Denktash's tactical diplomatic needs very well. Since the North is *already* annexed *de facto* to mainland Turkey, annexation would be a confession of weakness that Ankara could not resist domestic political pressures to annex officially what it has already annexed unofficially.

Third, **Fulfilment**. Turkey may begin major and real domestic change in cooperation with the EU and US. The costs of this policy are also very high. Even with a 'Marshall Plan' by the EU and US for Turkey, the vast problems of modernisation of Turkey will be enormous; while the striking differences between the Greek-controlled South and the Turkish-controlled North of Cyprus will likely grow even larger. The GDP per capita of the Republic is approximately \$16,400 per year; the corresponding figure for the North as noted earlier is only \$5,263. The social costs are likely to be enormous, possibly even leading to a breakdown of the current power structure in Turkey. The domestic changes required would be comparable to those instituted by Ataturk upon the founding of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. They might well lead to an 'Iran Reaction' of Islamic fundamentalism by the population, similar to that in Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini or the Taliban-Al Queda rise in Afghanistan, i.e., the ascent to power of the hated Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey, the *bete noir* of the Kemalist dream which is anathema to military and Kemalist civilian elite alike.

We suggest that in the long run, the first scenario, the **Status Quo** Policy is the most likely with the second, outright **Annexation** the next most likely – and unfortunately the third or **Fulfilment** Policy the least likely since it would require the greatest vision and renegotiation of the Eastern Mediterranean *status quo*. A constructive and imaginative US-EU Marshall Plan for Turkey might change the probabilities somewhat. But unlike Europe, which required only re-establishing a pre-existing economic and social status quo after WWII, Turkey requires building up from the grass roots. A US which is opposed to 'nation-building' and a Europe which is turning inward and more conservative, are unlikely to be willing to provide the necessary help.

Thus we cannot be sanguine about fundamental reform in Turkey or of reunification of Cyprus - especially in the short run. We are, however, very sanguine that the Republic of Cyprus will take its proper place as a European state with its fellow EU countries. That admission will transform the Eastern



Mediterranean security situation in fundamental ways. Moreover, reunification may well come later after admission of Cyprus has become embedded into the architecture of the New Europe. It is only regrettable that Turkey is unlikely in our view to join the EU soon or end the division of Cyprus - for Turkey needs the EU, and the EU needs a reformed Turkey. Moreover, the US and UK in drafting Annan Plan V have apparently not helped but merely confirmed the 'Continuity Theorists' in their pessimistic if accurate view of Western policy toward Cyprus.

We do believe, however, that EU action in opening trade between the RoC and the North in Cyprus as well as RoC efforts to attenuate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots may lead to a gradual disintegration of the Green Line (the 'Wall') of rigid demarcation. It may lead to a slow reunification of the island, removal of Turkish troops and resolution of the even more difficult problems of relative property rights and the Turkish presence of an estimated 100,000 Turkish settlers on Cyprus brought over in violation of international law to occupy former Greek-Cypriot-owned properties.

---

### Notes

\* This article is based in part on a paper originally delivered before the 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities held on 16 April 2004 at Columbia University in New York City under the rubric, 'Greece and Turkey Security Dilemmas.'

1. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*. London/NY, Penguin Books, 1954, Book Five, 89, pp. 401-402, [bolding added-GC].
2. Alexis Alexandris, 'Greek-Turkish Relations: A View from Athens,' Draft MS presented 12 June 1996 to the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 2-3.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Louis R. Golino: 'European Union Links up with NATO,' *Providence-Journal* article of 29 September 1999, p. 86.
6. *New York Times* article by Stephen Kinzer, of 13 September 1999, p. 1, 'Earthquakes Help Warm Greek-Turkish Relations'.
7. Kinzer, *Ibid.*
8. For Paul Kennedy's views on the inevitable overextension of empires, the 'grim' Soviet dilemma, the importance of economics, and the US decline in absolute *even* as its relative power increases, see *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. (NY, Vintage Books, 1987-1989), pp 513-514. For John Meersheimer's thoughtful review of the 'Realist' vs. the 'Liberal' schools of international relations, cf. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (NY/London, W. W. Norton and Co., 2001), pp. 1-27

9. Cf. Adamantia Pollis, 'Modernity, Civil Society, and the Papandreou Legacy,' *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 1997; cf. also Theodore C. Kariotis (ed.), *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989* (NY, Pella, 1992).
10. "The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks ... but we Turks have always consistently moved toward the West ... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative." Kemal Atatürk as cited in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 38.
11. Phillipos K. Savvides, 'US Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the "Theory of Continuity" Still Relevant?', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 1998, Vol. 24, Number 1, pp. 31-59.
12. Press remarks of 6 June 1997.
13. Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 21-23 and 186 *passim*.
14. Thomas Ehrlich, 'Cyprus: The Warlike Isle; Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis,' *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1986), p. 1089.
15. Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus, *Ethnic Conflict and International Concern* (NY, Lang, 1985), pp. 241-242.
16. 'International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus' in *Small States and Segmented Societies* (NY, Praeger), pp. 44-83; also *Ibid.* 'Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus' in *Comparative Politics* (July 1973), pp. 576-599.
17. The Annan Plan V may conveniently be found at <http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/>.
18. The Council (Part V, sec. B, Art. 26, paragraphs 1-10, pp. 31-32.
19. *Ibid.*, paragraph 7, p. 32.
20. Jeremy Bentham in *The Radical Reform Bill (1819)* as reprinted in A. Dunsire, *Administration, the Word and the Science* (NY, John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 64.
21. Part V, Section D, Article 36, paragraph 6. Such decision requires "application" by the President or Vice President of either Chamber of Parliament, the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, or a member of the Presidential Council. In case of "deadlock" of these worthies would surely so apply based on Cyprus' past history of communal strife.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Main Articles, Article 6, paragraph 2.
24. Part V, Section B, Article 26, paragraphs 1, 7, 8. By paragraph 7, a voting member may delegate his/her voting right to a non-voting member. In any event, by paragraph 6, both one-third of voting and one-third of non-voting members "must hail from each constituent state" despite the fact that only 18% of Cypriots are Turkish Cypriots.
25. Part V, Section A, Article 22, paragraphs 1-4.
26. Press Release of 19 February 2004 – No. 6, 'AHI ALERTS PRESENT GEORGE W. BUSH OF GREEK AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS' CALL FOR CHANGES IN THE ANNAN PLAN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US' by Gene Rossides, general counsel of the American Hellenic Institute on behalf of AHI, AHEPA, The Hellenic American National Council, the Cyprus Federation of American, the Panepirotic Federation of America, the Pan-Macedonian Association of America, p. 2. See also the Statement by the Pancyprian Association of America on the Annan Plan of 27 February 2004 which also calls for rejection as "unjust, undemocratic, and dysfunctional."
27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
28. Attachments 2-4, pp. 106-132.
29. Annan V, Main Article 8, paragraphs 1-6, pp. 11-13.

## CYPRUS AND EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS

30. *Political Handbook of the World, 2000-2002*, edited by Arthur S. Banks, et al., Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, pp. 102 ff. (Belgium) and 1062 ff. (Switzerland).
31. Income figures from US Agency for International Development web page <http://usaid.gov/counti:y/ee.cy/> > p. 1. Also see Seagull Eluding in *Seuddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich-SPD), 21 April 2004. Compare his figures with those drawn from the USAID web site.
32. Gregory R. Copley, 'Cyprus: Blaming the Victims, Missing the Point,' editor, *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, May 2004. Copley does not consider that Turkey might well have **legitimate** security concerns regarding the North of Cyprus considering the propinquity of Mersin and southern Turkey to Cyprus, the placement of oil pipelines nearby, etc. Copley also connects the MGK and TGB views to Turkey's concerns about US actions in Iraq and he argues dubiously that "It has become clear that there was no real understanding of the TGB's underlying strategic imperatives on the part of US, UN, UN and Greek officials who were pushing the governments of Turkey and Cyprus into achieving a settlement ...". Finally, he does not consider the role of AKEL, the Communist Party of Cyprus which joined Tassos Papadopoulos of the moderate-right DISI and the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church (!!) in a united front to demand a 'No' vote on Annan V. No wonder one participant-analyst who prefers anonymity calls Cyprus the "Land of Absurdities". (*Cyprus Discussion List*; [Cyprus@mit.edu] 27 Aug 2004).
33. Cf. Pavlos Andronikos in [MGSA-L@uci.edu](mailto:MGSA-L@uci.edu) of 23 August 2004 ([Andronikos@froggy.com.au](mailto:Andronikos@froggy.com.au)). Also George Baloglou ([baloglou@Loswego.edu](mailto:baloglou@Loswego.edu)) 24 August who contends, "The Anglo-American authorship of the Annan Plan was publicly and shamelessly admitted at a public meeting in Washington on 26 June by Daniel Fried, a senior US State Department official who now works for the US National Security Council: "When we were trying to pressure Turkey to allow the passage of troops through its territory into northern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives: several billion dollars in grants and loans, and Cyprus in the form of the Annan Plan." It should be noted that the White House spokesman, Mr. Boucher seems to deny this contention in saying: "There is no connection between Iraq and the Annan plan". But Mr. Boucher did not specifically deny Fried's work on the Annan Plan nor Lord David Hannay's support of that plan. Thus the question remains muddled, pending opening the diplomatic files or clear denial of US and UK work on the exact wording of Annan Plans I-V.



# THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: AN OPEN AND SHUT CASE? PROBING THE GREEK-CYPRIOT REJECTION OF THE ANNAN PLAN

Alexis Heraclides

---

## Abstract

*This article tries to probe the reasons for the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, by following two lines of inquiry. One is to access the dominant view among the Greek-Cypriots before and after the appearance of the Plan. A second line of reasoning is to try to chart the reasons for the rejection at the level of the Republic of Cyprus. As regards the first approach, (a) in the days before the Plan, the Greek-Cypriots were in their majority not prepared to accept a loose federation; (b) from the 1<sup>st</sup> Annan Plan and up until the Referendum there was never a clear majority for the Plan. The article then goes on to examine seven Rational Actor hypotheses as explanations for the unflinching posture of the Greek-Cypriot leadership: sheer bad faith; international conspiracy theory; tough negotiating strategy; the asset of EU membership negotiation-wise; poker strategy; a 50-year backward leap; and the nationalist mind-set.*

---

The results of the 24 April 2004 Cyprus Referenda (Greek-Cypriots 'No' of almost 76%, Turkish-Cypriot 'Yes' of almost 65%), would probably go down in the annals of the Cyprus Question as a watershed. In the wake of the referendum, the spectre of a final partition pervades the atmosphere as never before, for now it is the willingness of the numerical majority for a reunification in a political system establishing equality and power-sharing between the two communities, that is seriously in doubt. At least this is the predominant view internationally. As crisply put by UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, "[w]hat was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint"<sup>1</sup>.

The Cyprus vessel has now entered uncharted seas, in what is a fourth more opaque phase of the conflict. The other phases are 1948-1959, November 1963-August 1974 and September 1974-2003. Indeed 24 April 2004 may be the end of the Cyprus problem, as we have known it these 55 years<sup>2</sup> and it could well be that, for all practical purposes, it has eclipsed from the world scene as a major regional

ethnic problem worthy of international concern.

### **The Loss of an Historical Opportunity for Reunification**

The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots represents 'another missed opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem'.<sup>3</sup> However it is more than that; it amounts to 'a major setback'<sup>4</sup> on the road to peaceful resolution via some form of reunion. From December 2001 until the referenda we witnessed one of the most focused attempts, since 1974, to re-unite the island into one sovereign state. Three factors made this opportunity exceptional and not very likely to resurface again in the near future.

One was the prospect of EU entry, a veritable *deus ex machina*, which ignited the whole process, after almost a decade of sterile adversarial posturing. Even within a strict zero-sum assessment of the situation, there were obvious 'carrots' for both communities if Cyprus entered the EU reunified. And once in the EU, the benefits would probably have outweighed the costs for both communities; and, with the passage of time, the net result could conceivably be judged as positive-sum. Had Cyprus entered the EU as a whole, the deep-seated and understandable *Angst* of the Greek-Cypriots regarding their external security and territorial integrity would have made less sense, almost overnight, in what is after all the European zone of democracy, peace and security. Equally, the Turkish-Cypriot fears, that the Greek-Cypriots are bound to overwhelm them, would have found little ground under the protective EU shield with its vigilant institutions (Commission, Court, Parliament) on constant alert for any abuse of power by the stronger party.

Then there was the Annan Plan, which for all its shortcomings (and no doubt there were several) was the most comprehensive blueprint to date aimed at resolving the conflict and reuniting the island. It was, by and large, a sensible and balanced framework, particularly if one bears in mind the following features of the Cyprus conundrum as it unfolded: the bitter history of the conflict from November 1963 until August 1974 with the Greek-Cypriots as the main culprit until the day before the Turkish invasion; the innumerable attempts to resolve the conflict from 1975 onwards; the existence of the two communities as separate societies for decades that rendered the division between the two communities greater and deeper by the day; as well as the dominant national narratives, commemorations, anniversaries and so on, all aimed at exalting one's own side and demonising the Other. Indeed the situation was – and is – so extreme, that the heroes of one side are the villains and murderers of the other side.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, the Annan Plan was not something novel. It was based on previous well-known blueprints, such as the various plans of UN Secretary Generals, de Cuellar and Boutros-Ghali, on the previous bilateral talks between the two communities from 1975 onwards and of course on the rough understanding reached in the more recent Clerides-Denktash

talks of 2002. In view of all these the Annan Plan was widely regarded internationally as well meaning, logical and just, as a basis for establishing a loose federation along consociational lines in a situation of deep ethnic cleavage. With the possible exception of the 1986 de Cuellar Plan probably no other peace initiative since 1975 had gained such widespread acceptability and advocacy among articulate and respectable members of the two communities.

Thirdly, in the last three years, the most favourable of conditions for resolution coalesced as *never* before in the story of the Cyprus Question, at least from September 1974 onwards. They included strong encouragement for reconciliation by Greece, which was rarely in evidence from 1982 until the late 1990s; more surprisingly there was a dramatic *volte face* on the part of Turkey, from its initial uneasiness coupled with blunt threats of annexation in 2000-2002, to whole-hearted support for the Annan Plan under the Erdogan Government from late 2003 onwards; strong support and assistance for a solution by the United States, Britain and of course the EU; an unprecedented interest for reunion on the part of a large segment of the Cypriot population, especially on the Turkish-Cypriot side; and last but not least, the erosion of Denktash's power and legitimacy among the Turkish-Cypriots.

Under the circumstances one can speak in terms of 'conflict transformation', that is fundamental changes in the whole structure of the conflict situation that provide for new opportunities to find common ground.<sup>6</sup> Yet in the Cyprus case *even* this unprecedented degree of transformation could not do the trick. If reunification cannot be mustered under these unique of circumstances can it ever be achieved? Could it be that for all practical purposes, the Cyprus question is an open and shut case, with the existing *status quo* of partition, however unsavoury, the only realistic outcome for the foreseeable future?

We will try to probe the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan by following two lines of reasoning. One is to access, as accurately as possible, the dominant view among the Greek-Cypriot community before the appearance of the Annan Plan as well as after it was put on the table. A second line of inquiry is to try to chart the reasons behind the outright rejection by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. One of our ultimate aims in this whole exercise is to try to access the prospects of a second chance for reunification, be it now or in the not too distant future.

### **Rejection Pervading the Atmosphere**

#### ***The Hardening of Greek-Cypriot Public Opinion before the Annan Plan***

The resounding Greek-Cypriot 'No' of 24 April 2004 may have come as a shock to

many even in this part of the world. Indeed it has left many a senior former diplomat and politician in Greece, with intimate knowledge of Cyprus and affinity with the Greek-Cypriots, utterly confounded. It was for them inconceivable that the Republic of Cyprus could miss such a unique historical opportunity to cancel the *fait accompli* of the Turkish intervention-occupation.<sup>7</sup>

Yet for those of us who have been studying the Cyprus landscape more dispassionately, the rejection was less of a surprise, above all because it had become increasingly clear that, as time went by, as one golden opportunity after another was wasted in the 1980s and early 1990s, it was not only the Turkish-Cypriots under Denktash who were digging their feet. However, with Denktash entrenched in his intransigence, the Greek-Cypriots could make themselves appear to the outside world as conciliatory, even when they were rejecting the Boutros-Ghali 'Set of Ideas', when they were ordering Russian S-300 missiles or seemed eager to set up the Joint Defensive Doctrine with Greece (which clearly solidified partition with the Greeks as a whole on one side and the Turks as a whole on the other). By the late 1990s even AKEL was showing signs of less enthusiasm for reunification than in previous decades, as seen by its lukewarm criticism of the Joint Defensive Doctrine and of the S-300 missiles affair.<sup>8</sup>

According to my estimates for the period 2001-early 2002, that is before the launching of the first Annan Plan, the situation in the Republic of Cyprus presented itself as a fairly even split between rejectionists and supporters of reunion on a federal basis: the stark rejectionists amounted to 48%, while those supporting a reunification along federal lines did not surpass the 50-52% mark.<sup>9</sup> However this even split, with a slim edge for the pro-rapprochement supporters was misleading, as I had tried to point out at the time, for two important reasons: how a federation was conceived on the Greek-Cypriot side; and what was regarded as a just solution in the southern part of the island.

First of all, the majority of supporters of a federal solution on the Greek-Cypriot side understood it more in terms of a tight federation and not as a loose federation. Needless to say, a loose federation of two constituent parts is the only realistic avenue for re-union and for putting an end to the existing *de facto* partition, after so many years of ill-feeling and division; and it is clearly a logical 'split the difference' solution, between a unitary state or tight federation strongly favouring the Greek-Cypriots and a confederation of two sovereign states. Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that until the 2002 Clerides-Denktash talks, the great majority of Greek-Cypriots had little understanding of what federalism meant in the first place, let alone of what a federation with two constituent parties would have implied – above all equality between the two parties – even though they had accepted the principle of federalism as way back as 1977 and had clung to it ever since. This tendency became even more evident after the introduction of the Annan Plan,



where it was more than obvious that equality with the Turkish-Cypriot community was difficult to understand, let alone accept as the linchpin of re-unification. It would seem that the Greek-Cypriots, having enjoyed a state of their own since the beginning of 1964, found the prospect of power sharing with the Turkish-Cypriots very hard to swallow. This unusual state of affairs of a Cypriot state only for the Greek-Cypriots, is somehow seen as normal in the southern part of Cyprus, even though the Greek-Cypriots are not alone in the island. A Greek-Cypriot state is apparently preferable to the necessary compromises, sacrifices, friction and time-consuming hauling and pulling associated with ethnic power-sharing. This also applies to the economic dimension, which comes to reinforce the vital political aspect. As aptly put in the final Annan Report, "[t]he contrast between economic stagnation in the north and prosperity in the south is visible and palpable. Most of the disposed in the south, by hard work and enterprise, have carved out a prosperous livelihood, as have many others who are not originally from the north. While they strongly state their wish to reunify, many see in a settlement very little gain, and quite a lot of inconvenience and risk".<sup>10</sup>

Second and equally important is the dominant Greek-Cypriot view of what constitutes a just solution. For a solution to be reckoned just by the great majority of Greek-Cypriots, it had to include the following desiderata:<sup>11</sup> the departure of all the Turkish forces down to the last soldier; the eviction of all the settlers without any exception; the return of all the Greek-Cypriot refugees to their homes and the return of all their property (the full enjoyment of the famous 'three freedoms'); the creation of a unified state – be it a unitary state or a tight federation – in which the Turkish-Cypriots would have political and other clout on the basis of their percentage in the population, that is some 18% (as was their percentage until 1974); and concrete guarantees for security and territorial integrity with no right of intervention on the part of any power.

Clearly the above (with the exception of the last point) were incompatible with what the Turkish-Cypriots regarded – and regard – as being the elements of a just solution. However, for the majority of Greek-Cypriots the above ingredients were – and apparently continue to be – a *sine qua non* for any solution. Any wavering on the matter by their Government would almost certainly be regarded as a sell-out by at least some two-thirds of the electorate.<sup>12</sup>

#### ***The Dim Prospects of Accepting the Annan Plan (November 2002-March 2004)***

But did the Annan Plan ever stand a chance of being accepted by the Greek-Cypriot community? The conclusion of a thorough recent study of opinion polls to be published in Greece is unequivocal: but for a fleeting moment in the wake of the December 2002 Copenhagen EU Summit (when the Republic of Cyprus's entry into

the EU was decided without strings attached, that is without a prior solution), the Annan Plan never stood a chance among the Greek-Cypriots. From its very first appearance onwards (that is some four months before Papadopoulos took over), the negative evaluation of the plan was unwavering, ranging from 60% to as much as 85%, with the supporters of the pivotal AKEL vacillating between a third against and more than a half against. The small opening that appeared briefly in December 2002 was apparently 45% for the Plan, 40% against with 15% undecided.<sup>13</sup>

The Annan Plan may have had a chance, but again only barely, if Glafkos Clerides had won in the presidential elections of February 2003. However, a crucial structural parameter could have made the difference: if the EU had stated in no uncertain terms that entry comes only *after* re-unification. Of course such a decision by the EU would have been regarded as a form of blackmail to many a Greek-Cypriot and mainland Greek; as 'a Catch-22 situation' given Denktash, who dominated the scene at the time with his well-known intransigent posture. But in view of the hardening on the part of the Greek-Cypriots, it was probably the only way to avoid a clear 'No' and the prospect of eventual partition. However in the Copenhagen Meeting of December 2002 the EU decided that, if necessary, it could even accept a disunited Cyprus. With entry virtually in the bag, the Greek-Cypriots could relax and simply concentrate on avoiding being seen as dragging their feet. As the Turkish-Cypriots complained at the time, the other party had little incentive to show moderation and a spirit of compromise.

But then again a marginal 'Yes' by the Greek-Cypriots would have made the implementation of the Annan Plan virtually treading on thin ice. The various 'spoilers' and rejectionist 'outflankers' in both communities would have had ample opportunity to make the implementation of the new Cyprus Constitution a living nightmare for all concerned. They could even blow the whole edifice to pieces in what could have been a messy affair. After all these years clearly no lasting settlement can be achieved without the overwhelming and enthusiastic support of the great majority of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots<sup>14</sup> and the corresponding willingness and single mindedness of their respective leaderships, as seen with the mayhem to the east of Cyprus, in Israel and the Occupied Territories (Palestinians).

In any event, Clerides did not win the presidential elections of February 2003. Apparently, with resolution-reunification just around the corner in early 2003, most Greek-Cypriots 'began to have cold feet'.<sup>15</sup> As a cynic would put it, when the chips were down, the Greek-Cypriots made sure to place their own diehard at the helm, Tassos Papadopoulos, who could be counted upon to reject any form of power-sharing and equality with the Turkish-Cypriot community.<sup>16</sup>

**The Rejection by the Republic of Cyprus:  
Seven Hypotheses in Search of Clear Evidence**

The handling of no lesser matter than the future of Cyprus by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has raised many an eyebrow among the supporters of a solution, even among those with a decidedly pro-Greek-Cypriot inclination.

In particular, why did President Papadopoulos formally request the re-introduction of the Annan Plan in the first place, with his December 2003 letter to the UN Secretary General? Furthermore he clearly indicated that he was prepared to 'play ball' in his Brussels meeting with Kofi Annan, on 29 January 2004. Why act in such a manner and revive the Plan, a blueprint he disliked – as it turned out – so vigorously as to call for a 'resounding' rather than a qualified 'No'? The plan was safely on the shelf and as for the Secretary General he hardly seemed in earnest to make a comeback in the shifting Cyprus sands. Was the pressure from the Greek Government so intense that Papadopoulos felt he had to make such a move? This is not very convincing as far as the last months of the Simitis Government are concerned;<sup>17</sup> and in any event the assured victory of the party of New Democracy in the March 2004 elections in Greece (a fact well known throughout the previous year), was bound to relieve Papadopoulos from any firm Greek pressure, for the upcoming New Democracy's lack of enthusiasm for the Annan Plan had not remained a secret, certainly not to the Greek-Cypriot leader. Or was he motivated by the urge to placate or perhaps to outmanoeuvre his key partner AKEL? Did the Papadopoulos camp make its move out of a strong desire not to give the impression to the EU and to the UN that it was the 'spoiler' and to conveniently put all the blame on Rauf Denktaş? Alternatively, is it possible that he was so confident and impervious to international signals that he came to believe that he could change the Annan Plan substantially rendering it virtually unrecognisable?

In an attempt to make sense of the perplexing Greek-Cypriot posture, we would entertain some seven Rational Actor hypotheses as possible explanations: (a) sheer bad faith and duplicity; (b) the belief that an international conspiracy was afoot; (c) negotiating strategy along *Realpolitik* lines coupled with vintage Makarios brinkmanship; (d) the asset of EU membership negotiation-wise; (e) poker strategy; a fifty-year backward leap; and (e) the nationalist frame of mind.

These explanations do not cancel each other out, but could be read in various combinations, one or perhaps all reinforcing each other. I have derived most of them from a careful reading of the various statements made by President Papadopoulos himself and his supporters and on the extended heated debates that took place at the time, which found their expression in the Greek-Cypriot and Greek

press and other media.

### ***Bad Faith***

As it is well known, a number of governmental and intergovernmental officials with heavy involvement in this last ditch attempt to reunite Cyprus and resolve the problem, are left with the distinct feeling that the Greek-Cypriot leadership did not act in good faith, indeed that duplicity was afoot, from December 2003 onwards or even before that, from the moment that Papadopoulos took over, in February 2003.

This serious accusation is based on a number of inter-related reasons. An attempt to summarise them would include the following:<sup>18</sup>

- (1) The well-known fact that the Annan Plan did not come out of the blue, but covered well-known ground from similar plans that had been thoroughly discussed for some three decades.
- (2) The Annan Plan was open to reformulation; it was hardly on a 'take it or leave it' basis, as had been the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959 or the August 1974 Gunes Plan – in fact a Kissinger inspired Plan – for a federation on cantonal basis. Only the final Annan Plan (Plan 5), was not to be touched, with its provision that the referenda would have the last word.
- (3) The Plan had picked up at the point where the Clerides-Denktaş talks faltered in mid-2002. However in those secret talks a number of difficulties had been overcome and there was notable headway, though this was not known to the wider public, due to the embargo on divulging information and in view of the agreed procedure, which was 'nothing is decided before everything is decided'.
- (4) The Plan, for all its drawbacks (e.g., in the economic sphere, a weakness that was apparently remedied by Plans 4 and 5, the role of the guarantor powers, which is patently an anachronism, etc.) was widely regarded, at least outside Cyprus, as a sound, balanced and fair deal for both sides, establishing a system of loose federation and power-sharing known to work in other situations of deep ethnic division.
- (5) The understanding at top EU level in December 2002 at Copenhagen (when resolution-reunion was not put as a pre-condition for entry), was that on the Greek-Cypriot side everything possible would be done to resolve the conflict before admission; rejection could come only from the Turkish-Cypriots under Denktaş, who would have suffered the consequences of intransigence. A Greek-Cypriot 'No' was simply inconceivable.

Under this light the handling of the whole matter by President Papadopoulos, appears perplexing to say the least. What makes it appear even more questionable internationally is that even before the New York Meeting, the Greek-Cypriot leader had done his utmost to undermine and demonise the Annan Plan in every

imaginable way. Characteristically, the Greek-Cypriot leader did not make realistic and constructive proposals for the amelioration of the Plan so as to meet Greek-Cypriot needs and anxieties, in spite of the repeated prompting by Alvaro de Soto, by Annan himself and by the EU, British and United States envoys and others. The last touch was of course the Russian veto in the Security Council secured by none other than the Republic of Cyprus, so as to wreck AKEL's last attempt to salvage the Annan Plan.

Of course it could be that the international society got it all wrong and that the Greek-Cypriots under their new leader were acting in good faith from day one. This is what Papadopoulos has claimed, forcefully, in his detailed official reply to the final Annan Report. Alternatively, he may indeed have acted in bad faith precisely because he was totally convinced of the nastiness of the whole Plan: not only did it spell disaster as a badly conceived plan, but it was deliberately intended to damage the Greek-Cypriots and rob them of their gains. This brings us to the next two hypotheses.

### ***Conspiracy Theory***

The international conspiracy-international collusion approach has a long tradition in Cyprus and has earned a place even among some studies of the Cyprus problem that claim scholarly credentials. The two first presidents of Cyprus, Makarios and his successor Kyprianou, are well known to have peddled this view (and this remains a favourite line in mainland Greece until this day, even among many informed people). Kyprianou for instance rejected the very promising 'ABC Plan' of 1979, a joint plan of the United States (then under a President Carter eager to placate the Greeks when he was about to lift the arms embargo on Turkey), Britain and Canada, not so much on the basis of its merits as a scheme, but because it was regarded as an imposed plan by untrustworthy authors to boot.<sup>19</sup> The international conspiracy theory is also one of the favourite lines of AKEL (and of the Left in general in Greece) particularly if it can be branded as 'an imperialist plot'. Ironically on the Turkish-Cypriot side, international conspiracy is traditionally one of the favourite hobbyhorses of none other than Rauf Denktaş, who also sees the Annan Plan in this light.

It is thus far from implausible that Papadopoulos had reached the conclusion that the Annan Plan – not least because of the active involvement on the part of the United States and Britain – was an ingenious ploy to outmanoeuvre the Greek-Cypriots, destroy their state and impose an unworkable federation that would have amounted to 'a partition in disguise'. Hence his dramatic statement that "I have not received a state to deliver a community", which created a stir among his compatriots. And Papadopoulos was not alone in this assessment. Apparently a noteworthy number of Greek-Cypriots, even sophisticated members of that

community, with liberal or leftist inclinations, had been made to believe that the international society, at UN level, had for some reason conspired against them under the guidance of Washington and 'perfidious Albion'; that the United States and Britain have huge interests in Cyprus, which, presumably, could not be met by the British bases alone; that the astute UN Secretary General and his envoy, Alvaro de Soto, were mere lackeys of the Americans.

*Tough Negotiating Strategy*

Under the circumstances and to the extent that the Plan was seen as harmful and devious, a tough negotiating strategy may have appeared as the most appropriate and effective way to deal with the matter.<sup>20</sup> According to the blunt version of the traditional Realist Paradigm of international politics, the most appropriate negotiating strategy is to put maximum pressure and appear intransigent so as to extract as many gains as possible for one's own side and inflict as many losses as possible to one's adversary.<sup>21</sup> This was after all the favourite approach of Papadopoulos's mentor, the venerable President Makarios.

If this was, by and large, the strategy followed by Papadopoulos, it is more than clear that the post-Clerides Greek-Cypriot leadership does not seem to realise that this device has run its course and in today's setting it is more likely to be counter-productive. The lesson to be drawn from its 'over-use' by the Greek-Cypriots, is that it has led to every new solution (which was rejected on the basis of 'realist' assumptions) being usually worse than the previous one, at least for them. In the case of President Makarios, his famous '*krimnovasia*' (brinkmanship) is not only an act hard to follow, but was clearly a failure in the long run. It did not lead the Greek-Cypriots very far save perhaps in the period 1964-1974, a situation that was so unreal and untenable (with the Turkish-Cypriots cramped in enclaves) that it could not have lasted very long. Note that Makarios' handiwork in all the attempts at solving the Cyprus problem – which, interestingly, has left him with many admirers till this day, particularly among Greek-Cypriots – had made him non-credible as a negotiator for the future of Cyprus. Papadopoulos will probably find himself in the same predicament should he attempt to re-open the negotiations on Cyprus's future.

The greatest mistake of the Greek-Cypriots is that in their majority they continue to see the conflict in zero-sum terms (one's gains are the other's losses and the other way round). This is a decidedly self-defeating strategy as the history of the Cyprus problem has shown from the 1950s onwards. Only 'new thinking', a problem-solving approach, aimed at a 'win-win' solution can lead to the resolution of the Cyprus problem.<sup>22</sup> After all the Greek-Cypriots are supposed to live in harmony with their Turkish-Cypriot compatriots. For this to come about the aim cannot possibly be to end up with net-losers and net-winners. The various sacrifices

should be outweighed by gains to both sides and by meeting their fundamental human needs that have suffered under the existing *de facto* partition reigning from 1974 onwards.

### ***EU Membership as an Asset Negotiation-wise***

The Greek-Cypriots had assured entry into the EU even without solving their 'national issue' (that is reunion). Hence they could choose to play indifferent or tough with little risk and this is precisely what Papadopoulos did once he took over power. One of the basic rationales behind the Greek-Cypriot rejection was that 'once we are in the EU we will be in a better position to negotiate the future of Cyprus'. This line was convincing even to many people outside the hardcore rejectionist camp.

To my mind this is probably the most serious argument put forward by the Papadopoulos camp. However even this seemingly 'tough nut' is far from difficult to crack. Indeed upon closer scrutiny it is almost equally unrealistic if not indefensible in the case of Cyprus. For one, the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey will not oblige; they will not fall on their feet begging for entry at any price as Papadopoulos believed, not least because they can afford to do so, being the clear moral victors of 24 April 2004. And President Papadopoulos, try, as he might, is not likely to find supporters for such tactics among his EU partners, save perhaps lip service by an embarrassed and far from enthusiastic Greek Government. But the real problem with this line of thinking on the part of the Greek-Cypriots is that it runs against the grain of conflict resolution in the Cyprus situation, of a just and logical outcome, which can only be, as we have pointed out above, a solution with a 'win-win outcome' and not one based on outwitting and imposing one's will on the 'underdog', the Turkish-Cypriots, from a position of strength, by being in the EU.

### ***Poker Strategy***

Several relentless critics of Greek-Cypriot rejectionism, in Cyprus, Greece and beyond, have been discussing the situation as it evolved with the use of the 'poker game' analogy; in particular that the Greek-Cypriots were conveniently 'hiding behind Denktash'. Though obviously proof is needed to substantiate this view it is hardly far-fetched.

If one is to follow this line of reasoning, the situation probably unfolded itself as follows from December 2003 onwards. For whatever reason (strong international pressure, AKEL or other), Papadopoulos decided to re-open the discussion on the Plan in December 2003. He confidently calculated that he could afford to take the plunge for he was absolutely convinced that Denktash would not budge an inch; furthermore that Ankara would back his intransigence all the way, because its newly-found support for the Plan was only skin-deep and basically a propaganda

stunt aimed to gain a date for the start of negotiations for EU entry. At this point it was stressing that for Papadopoulos and his confidants in Cyprus and in Greece, Turkey is not – and cannot become – a normal democratic state; it is nothing more than an aggressive militaristic dictatorship in all but in name; should it try to change and try to become more democratic and European it will be committing suicide as a state.

If the presentation so far resembles what actually transpired, the New York experience (with Erdogan putting great pressure on Denktash to change his position) must have come as a huge shock to the Greek-Cypriot leader. His bluff was called, but obviously he could not stall in New York and thus reveal to the whole world that he had been conveniently 'hiding' behind Denktash all along. It seems that when Papadopoulos found himself in this dire position, Athens contacted him, to see if he needed its assistance to extract himself from the three-stage procedure that had been decided in New York (bilateral talks- talks that would include Athens and Ankara-referenda). Apparently he found the nerve to retort that he was in full control of the situation.<sup>23</sup> Yet in no way was he in control. Erdogan had deftly pulled the carpet from under his feet and he was now 'hooked', in what appeared to be an 'automatic pilot' procedure of three stages, leading almost certainly to the adoption of the Annan Plan in its final version.

However the three-stage automatic pilot process was far from watertight as some of us had pointed out at the time.<sup>24</sup> The wily Greek-Cypriot leader had one last ace up his sleeve: apart from doing nothing in stage one (the bilateral talks) and giving ample room for Denktash to make a mockery of the talks, he knew that, at the end of the day, he could muster a 'resounding No' in the Referendum. This was his first concern upon his return to Nicosia from New York: to build on the damage he had already done among his constituency to the Annan Plan. The rest is history. He pulled it off leaving the rest of the world dumfounded.

### ***Going Back Half a Century***

According to yet another view, the Greek-Cypriot leader's acquiescence in New York or even before that, with his December 2003 letter to the Secretary General, was a calculated move all along to throw the Annan Plan into the dustbin for good.

This line may overestimate the guile of President Papadopoulos, but one aspect of it is worth taking on board: the goal of demolishing any prospect of power-sharing and equality with the Turkish-Cypriots. Papadopoulos is well known for decades for neither favouring the status of the Turkish-Cypriots as a community nor favouring a binational federation, let alone a loose federation. For him as for Lyssarides or the ultra-nationalist party, *Neoi Orizontes*, the Turkish-Cypriots cannot be permitted to become equals not even quasi-equals (Junior partners) in Cyprus. For them Cyprus



is 'Greek', it belongs to the 'Greeks'. Put in current legal parlance, the logic is as follows: the Turkish-Cypriots are a minority; hence, whether they like it or not, they should respect the will of the majority and be content with minority rights and protection in what would after all be a democratic Greek Cyprus, based on Westminster-style majority rule. As for the majority it goes without saying that it will not abuse its power but act compassionately towards the minority, within the confines of the rule of law.

Of course the official public line of Papadopoulos has not been to actually hark back to the pre-Zurich period, that is to the state affairs before the Turkish-Cypriots were officially acknowledged as a community, but rather to speak in terms of a workable tight federation and not the loose 'unworkable' one foreseen by the Annan Plan. But even if there has been a switch in the Papadopoulos camp from the aim of a unitary Greek-Cypriot dominated state to that of a tight federation – which is very doubtful, AKEL's claims notwithstanding – it is equally a non-starter. In present terms a tight federation implies the clear dominance of the numerical majority (as was the case with Canada many decades ago and could have been the case with Switzerland, had the German speakers asserted their status on the basis of being a clear majority of almost 70%). Furthermore, when the partners are two and not three or more, it is obvious that the relationship can only be one of equality or quasi-equality at least at the legal-constitutional level, with clear elements of consociationalism and positive discrimination to protect the weaker party from abuse of power by the far larger and more powerful group.

### ***The Nationalist Mind-Set***

As it is well known for the majority of Greek-Cypriots there is a clear preference for the Greek flag, instead of the flag of Cyprus. And the Republic of Cyprus has, incredibly, been using from around 1967 the national anthem of Greece as its official national anthem. Clearly this is the constituency likely to be moved by Papadopoulos's dramatic plea for a 'resounding No' to the apparently 'horrible' Annan Plan. One could perhaps go a bit further and place this whole development that brought Tassos Papadopoulos to power, to the nationalist backlash that surfaced in the days of Vassiliou's Presidency, placing constant obstacles to his sincere and bold attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

For staunch EOKA nationalists, like Papadopoulos and the hard core of his supporters, the Turks are basically outsiders, not very different from the Turkish settlers sent by Turkey after 1974; they are an alien body in the island, reminiscent of the Ottoman conquest and of the repulsive 'Turkish yoke'.<sup>25</sup> For the nationalist mind-set among the Greek-Cypriots and in Greece any compromise is deemed even worse than a sell-out; it is regarded as demeaning, as an affront to Greek national honour and dignity. For Papadopoulos, like his mentor Makarios, the goal

of the 'Greeks of Cyprus' (as he prefers to call the Greek-Cypriots), be it Enosis or a state of their own in the whole of the island, is a *belle cause*, presumably morally unassailable. The Greek of Cyprus, locked, as they are in their own 'groupthink', impervious to any negative feedback from without, basking in their glorious Greek pedigree, cannot even contemplate the Turkish-Cypriots as equals, but only as the despicable 'Trojan horse' of the great and terrible enemy, Turkey. And clearly it is beyond their capacity to grasp that the Turkish-Cypriots may also have a noble cause of their own, which in 1964-1974 was more elementary – and for this reason more laudable internationally – for it was none other than their cultural if not their physical survival.<sup>26</sup>

***Another Possible Explanation: 'No Solution is a Solution'***

Clearly more hard evidence is needed to establish which, if any, of the above seven explanations is closer to what actually transpired in the hearts and minds of the Greek-Cypriot leadership in the crucial period from February 2003 until the referenda. For my part I would also seriously toy with another possibility that would give another twist to the above seven explanations. It goes as follows: perhaps the more pragmatic Greek-Cypriot rejectionists were aware that with their stance they were throwing out the baby with the bathwater, but in fact this is precisely what they wanted. Since they realised that they could not possibly ever get all of Cyprus under their control they were prepared to accept partition though, for obvious reasons, they could not say this openly. This harks back to a famous adage on the Cyprus problem: that the 'lack of solution is a solution', for any solution on the basis of equality with Turkish Cyprus is totally unacceptable.

**Future Scenarios**

In the wake of the referenda, a number of scenarios have been entertained for the immediate future. They include the following:

- To try to revitalise the Annan Plan by making a number of changes that would suit those Greek-Cypriots who are not in fact diehard rejectionists but could support a federation based on equality between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.
- To let the matter stand in a state of limbo until another opportunity for resolution arrives which could perhaps be linked with Turkey's entry into the EU.
- To accept that for the time being and for the foreseeable future the conflict may not have been resolved through reunification, but that it has been settled, by default, with the crystallisation of the separation, by what is probably an irreversible process leading to final partition establishing some kind of *de facto* confederation.
- Another possibility is what could be called incremental reunification, through

the back door, as it were, by various well-calculated initiatives on the part of the EU, since Cyprus (the island of Cyprus) is after all nominally in the EU in one piece and not in two morsels.

On the basis of what we have discussed above and as long as Tassos Papadopoulos is at the helm, the prospects for a breakthrough and another go at the Annan Plan – as it is or with some minor changes – are dim if non-existent. On the other hand the ball is clearly on the Greek-Cypriot court. And even if a segment of the Greek-Cypriots could be convinced by ameliorations in the Annan Plan – notably in the economic sphere, as regards security, the guarantees question, etc. – the results of a second referendum could hardly be the exact opposite: a resounding 'Yes', which is absolutely necessary if the loose federation envisaged by the Plan is to work smoothly.

After a number of years, say in 2010, 2014 or 2024 another opportunity for reunion may arise. Reinforcing elements that one could envisage are the positive experience of having lived as members of the EU for several years that may put the Greek-Cypriots more at ease; having lived without friction side by side with the Turkish-Cypriots, in what would be a *de facto* confederal system; the rise to power of moderate Greek-Cypriot leaders in the footsteps of Vassiliou; corresponding power to staunch moderates among the Turkish-Cypriots, people like Mustafa Akinci; even more cordial relations between Greece and Turkey; and an eventual official entry of Turkey; and not just of any Turkey, but of a genuinely democratic, culturally pluralistic and Western-oriented country into the EU.

Such developments would no doubt contribute immensely to allaying the present security and other fears of the Greek-Cypriots. But they are a tall order and hard to come about. But to set the ball rolling once again, what is needed is the following, as stated by the UN Secretary General: if the Greek-Cypriots "remain willing to resolve the Cyprus problem through a bicommunal, bizonal federation, *this needs to be demonstrated*" [our emphasis].<sup>27</sup> Of course such willingness has to be reciprocated by the other side and to be seen as genuine. Yet it may well be that the recent overwhelming Greek-Cypriot rejection and the role of AKEL in this, has done irreparable damage in this regard.

\* \* \*

For the immediate future it would seem that Cyprus does not lend itself so much to an immediate conflict settlement, but rather to skilful and imaginative conflict management and conflict prevention under the EU, hopefully with Greece and Turkey on board as forces for moderation. The over-riding task is easing the turbulence and showing an abundance of good will. However the most pressing

task on the table boils down to one over-riding issue: how the Turkish-Cypriot side will no more be isolated and become incorporated, as soon as possible, into the EU and into the world at large. However until now very little has been done on this score. And it is not only the legalistic stance of the Republic of Cyprus that is to blame for this, but also the pusillanimity of the EU that is difficult to understand.

Of course, the ultimate question remains: are the Greek-Cypriots, in spite of their recent negative stance, in favour of living together with the Turkish-Cypriots on the basis of equality, in the post-Denktash, post-Papadopoulos era? Or is Cyprus an open and shut case, perhaps 'a burnt out case'? For the time being at least, I think that we can safely surmise that the island of Cyprus remains 'an unimaginable community'<sup>28</sup> and will probably remain so for many years to come. It may well be that for all practical purposes the Greek-Cypriots with their 'No' have 'resolved' the 55-year Cyprus question by a divorce. After all 'marriage' by arm-twisting or even by a generous dowry can make little headway and it is more likely to be unworkable. Separation, division, partition or whatever one may call it, is one way of resolving ethnic clashes. If you cannot keep them together, keep them apart.

At the end of it all what is perplexing is the apparent determination on the Greek-Cypriot side, at this historical juncture, to have it both ways: on the one hand not having been prepared to accept the Turkish-Cypriots as an equal in the state of Cyprus and on the other wanting the whole island for their own. Obviously, the Greek-Cypriots can if they so wish, have a state only of their own. No one would dare deprive them of such an expression of self-determination, however short-sighted this may be seen to many. But in this case they will be left, inevitably, with half of Cyprus for their own. Apparently many in the southern part of the island for some reason cannot easily grasp this simple fact.

---

### Notes

\* I would like to thank two anonymous referees who made valuable comments to the first version of this article.

1. 'Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good-Offices in Cyprus', United Nations/Security Council, S/200/437, 28 May 2004 [henceforth *Annan Report*], p. 20.

2. For an attempt at a brief overall appraisal of the Cyprus problem and its main features from 1948 until 2003, see Heraclides, A. (2003) 'The 55 Year Cyprus Debacle: a Bird's Eye View', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 65-80.

3. *Annan Report*, p. 1.

4. *Annan Report*, p. 20.

5. On this last point see in particular Markides, K. (1995) 'I Kypros kai oi prospathies gia

omospondia' [Cyprus and the Attempts at Federation] in Peristianis, N. and Tsangaras G. (eds.), *I Anatomia mias metamorfosis: I Kypros meta to 1974* [The Anatomy of a Metamorphosis: Cyprus after 1974], Nicosia, Intercollege, p. 340; and Loizos, P. (1995) 'Katanoontas to 1974, Katanoontas to 1994' [Understanding 1974, Understanding 1994] in Peristianis, N. and Tsangaras G. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 114-115.

6. Vayrynen, R. (1991) 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts' in Vayrynen, R. (ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*. London, Sage.

7. Based on discussions with distinguished Greek retired ambassadors and veteran politicians with extended experience of the Cyprus affair. Others of course with deeper knowledge of Cyprus were less surprised.

8. Based on discussions in previous years with several senior leftist Greek-Cypriots, who were wary of this AKEL stance.

9. See Heraclides, A. (2002) *To Kypriako: Syngrousi kai epi/ysi* [The Cyprus Problem: Conflict and Resolution]. Athens, I. Sideris. Heraclides, A. (2002), op. cit., pp. 342-346. I ended up with this result based on the 2001 elections in the Republic of Cyprus. At the time I was far too harsh with DISY, having roughly calculated 20% of the 34% of DISY as hardliners.

10. *Annan Report*, p. 20.

11. This list is largely based on Stavrinides, Z. (1999) 'Greek Cypriot Perceptions' in Dodd, C.H. (ed.), *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*. London, The Eothen Press, pp. 59-61. Interestingly, the May 2004 memorandum of eleven points explaining the reasons for the rejection of the Annan Plan which was tendered to the various embassies in Nicosia by Papadopoulos (without the previous knowledge of the National Council of the Republic of Cyprus, something which created a row in its midst) runs more or less along these lines.

12. Heraclides, A. (2002) op. cit., p. 348.

13. The research of opinion polls is by Ilias Nikolakopoulos and his colleagues. I would like to thank him for the information and for allowing me to mention his findings.

14. Bahcheli T. and Rizopoulos, N. (1996/1997) 'The Cyprus Impasse: What Next?', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 28; Heraclides, A. (2002) op. cit., pp. 338 and 380.

15. Heraclides, A. (2003) op. cit., p. 66.

16. Papadopoulos's statements against power-sharing and a binational federal solution are legion. In the early 1960s he was, together with his close friend and associate, Polykarpos Yiorkantzis, an unrepentant supporter of *Enosis*. Days after the second Turkish invasion, as president of Parliament, in talks with the top leadership in Athens (Premier Constantine Karamanlis), he openly disagreed with the then Acting President Glafkos Clerides who favoured a federal solution, arguing that there was no need for haste. See *The Karamanlis Archives*, Vol. 8, pp. 122-123. In the 1980s he even accused President Spyros Kyprianou, who had made it a habit of rejecting one sound resolution plan after another (the ABC Plan and the various De Cuellar Plan), for being too soft on the Turks and Turkish-Cypriots. See Greek-Cypriot press of the time.

17. According to fairly reliable information, the Simitis Government was losing its patience with Papadopoulos but in its last months in office was pushing him less than before, to the annoyance of the Greek-Cypriot leaders who were sticking their neck out for a solution. This lax on the part of Athens was obvious from the eve of the New York meeting onward, making Papadopoulos feel more comfortable than previously with the Simitis Government.

18. Based on a series of interviews of this author with officials who prefer to be left unnamed. I have written extensively in this vein in the Greek Press. See e.g., Heraclides, A. *Ta Nea* (3 October 2002, 20 February 2003, 22 May 2003, 4 March 2004, 26 April 2004), *Eleftherotypia* (28 March 2004).

19. Groom, A. J. R. (1993) 'The Process of Negotiation, 1974-1993' in Dodd, C. H. (ed.), *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*. Huntington, The Eothen Press, p. 21.

20. This was precisely the advice put forward to President Papadopoulos by various well-known analysts of the blunt version of realism in international relations in Cyprus and Greece.

21. A characteristic recent article which follows this misleading approach is Kentas, G. I. (2003) 'A Realist Evaluation of Cyprus' Survival Dilemma as a Result of the Annan Plan', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol.15, No. 2.

22. See Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, M. and Trigeorgis, L. (1993) 'Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 2. For the positive sum approach to conflict resolution see John W. Burton's classic works.

23. This part of the jigsaw puzzle is based on interviews by the author with participants who for obvious reasons do not want to be named.

24. See Heraclides, A. 'Den arkei o aftomatos pilotos' [the automatic pilot does not suffice] *Ta Nea* (4 March 2004).

25. Incidentally Ottoman rule was far from repulsive as painted by today's Greek-Cypriots and by their dominant national narrative. Under Ottoman rule the Church grew in stature with the Archbishop of Cyprus as the *Milletbashi* (the leader of the Greek Orthodox *mi/le* . See Markides, K. C. (1977) *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*. New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 3-5; Pollis, A. (1973) 'Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 582-583.

26. Heraclides, A. (2002) op. cit., p. 98.

27. *Annan Report*, pp.1-2.

28. Taken from the sub-title of an edited volume on Cyprus, see Calotychos, V. (ed.), (1998) *Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997*. Boulder, Westview Press.

# SAYING YES TO EU ACCESSION: EXPLAINING THE TURKISH CYPRIOT REFERENDUM OUTCOME

Tozun Bahcheli

---

## Abstract

*What accounts for the decisive Turkish Cypriot endorsement of the Annan plan in the referendum on 24 April 2004? In spite of considerable reservations, most Turkish Cypriots supported it and the prospect of imminent EU citizenship. Offering better economic prospects and an end to their isolation in the midst of an economic crisis, the Annan plan's prospects were considerably enhanced. Also, even as the plan foreclosed independent statehood, most Turkish Cypriots were satisfied with the wide measure of autonomy that they would be able to exercise in the envisaged constituent state in northern Cyprus, and the fact that Turkey would retain its status as guarantor.*

*Furthermore, by endorsing the Annan plan, Tayyip Erdogan's AK party government in Turkey influenced the referendum outcome in an important way; emboldening those who favoured the plan to overcome the opposition led by veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.*

---

## Introduction

On 24 April 2004, while their Greek Cypriot counterparts overwhelmingly rejected the latest version of the UN (Annan) plan for a settlement of the Cyprus issue, sixty-five per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted to endorse it. Although this was the first time Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line cast votes in a referendum, two recent Cypriot elections can be said to have been referenda on the merits of the Annan plan.

In the presidential election on 16 February 2003 in the Greek Cypriot-administered part of the island, Greek Cypriots replaced Glafkos Clerides who declared his receptivity to the UN plan, with Tassos Papadopoulos who rejected it. By contrast, in the 13 December 2003 parliamentary elections in the Turkish Cypriot-administered north, the pro-Annan parties did well, although the number of seats they won (25 out of 50) fell short of an overall majority.<sup>1</sup>

The solid victory of the 'yes' camp in the Turkish Cypriot referendum is only partly attributable to the terms of the settlement contained in the Annan plan that provided for the reunification of the island as a loose federation and simultaneous accession to the European Union (EU). Indeed, although their objections to the plan were evidently not as strong as those of their Greek Cypriot counterparts, many Turkish Cypriots were unhappy about some key provisions of the plan.

In particular, they objected to the proposed settlement of tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots in the envisaged Turkish constituent state; the recognition of Republic of Cyprus title deeds in north Cyprus; and the resettlement of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots with the return of territory to Greek Cypriot control. Turkish Cypriot negotiators failed to satisfy a key demand on permanent derogations on Greek Cypriot settlement and purchase of property in the envisaged Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and had to settle for transitional arrangements for the application of EU law in north Cyprus. The opponents of the plan - including veteran Turkish community leader Rauf Denktaş who led the 'no' camp in the campaign leading to the referendum - sought to capitalise on these concerns and the fact that acceptance of the UN terms meant forsaking the *Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus* (hereafter the TRNC). Ultimately, in spite of considerable reservations, a majority of Turkish Cypriots endorsed the Annan plan. The prospect of imminent EU citizenship seemed to represent a better prospect for their future than continuing on with the existing state of affairs.

Security in its broad sense has been the overriding concern for both Cypriot communities. The problem that has confounded both Cypriots and third party intermediaries in settlement endeavours over many years has been that satisfying the security needs of one community tended to negate those of the other. For Greek Cypriots security meant removing Turkey's military presence on the island. Indeed, security has been the overriding Greek Cypriot motive in pursuing EU membership. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, have tried to shield themselves from the Greek Cypriot majority, and to retain Turkey's security commitment: hence their demand for self-government within a federal/confederal framework, and that Turkey should remain a guarantor under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.<sup>2</sup>

### **The Positives in the Annan Plan**

From the Turkish Cypriot position, the acceptance of the TRNC as a sovereign state and its parallel accession to the EU along with the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus would have represented an ideal solution. But after two decades of separation no state other than Turkey had granted recognition to the TRNC. Greek Cypriots made it clear that, even in return for substantial territorial adjustments, they would refuse recognising a separate Turkish Cypriot state and thus accept the partition imposed by Turkish force of arms in 1974. EU states too



repeatedly warned the Turkish Cypriot leadership not to expect the recognition of the *TRNC*'s sovereignty. By the time the Annan plan was introduced in 2002, Turkish Cypriots no longer harboured any hopes that other states would recognise the *TRNC*. Although the Annan plan fell short of satisfying Turkish Cypriots' aspiration for a separate state, it went a long way to satisfy two key objectives, viz. the desire for self-government and the continuation of Turkey's guarantor rights.

The UN plan has been aptly described as providing a loose federal settlement by many observers. It conferred a great deal of authority to the two envisaged constituent states, and provided safeguards to ensure a Turkish majority in northern Cyprus. Moreover, it affirmed the political equality of both communities. In spite of reservations concerning the risks of reunification, these features appeared reassuring to many Turkish Cypriots. Except for the recognition of separate sovereignty, numerous key provisions of the Annan plan reflected key demands that Turkish Cypriot leaders regularly made throughout the intercommunal negotiations of the previous two decades. Thus Article 2 (1a) of the plan states that:

The United Cyprus Republic is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish Cypriot state. Cyprus is a member of the United Nations and has a single international legal personality and sovereignty. The United Cyprus Republic is organised under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of the constituent states<sup>3</sup>

The constituent states would "sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government," and "there shall be no hierarchy between federal and constituent state laws." Article 2 (2) states:

... the constituent states shall participate in the formulation and implementation of policy in external relations and the European Union affairs on matters within their sphere of competence, in accordance with Cooperation Agreements modelled on the Belgian example. The constituent states may have commercial and cultural relations with the outside world in conformity with the Constitution.<sup>4</sup>

During the course of the intercommunal negotiations spanning many years the Turkish Cypriot leadership, together with Ankara, insisted that the retention of Turkey's rights as a guarantor was a *sine qua non* of any acceptable settlement. Accordingly every UN-sponsored settlement proposal has provided that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee shall be retained. While unhappy over this, Greek Cypriot leaders tried to ensure that the guarantor powers (read Turkey) be constrained from

acting unilaterally, as happened in 1974. Furthermore, they argued that no Turkish or other foreign troops be allowed to remain on the island, even as they accepted that the withdrawal of Turkish troops (estimated at 35,000 in 2004) would take place over several years. In addressing Greek Cypriot concerns, the Annan plan provided several restrictions on the Turkish (and Greek) contingents that would be stationed on the island and provided for the continuing stationing of the UN Peace Force with additional duties to monitor the staged withdrawal of Turkish and Greek forces.<sup>s</sup> In the final analysis, while the Annan plan fell short of satisfying Greek Cypriot security needs, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were prepared to accept its security provisions.

### **Saying No to Turkish Influence**

Although keen to retain Turkey's security blanket, many Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' in the 2004 referendum partly because they hoped EU membership would diminish their heavy dependence on Turkey, and thereby reduce Ankara's influence in the Turkish community. Many Turkish Cypriots have complained that Ankara has been directly involved in formulating policy and has interfered in the administration of the *TRNC*. Ankara has been widely blamed for the policy of allowing Turkish citizens to enter the *TRNC* without passports, which resulted in the arrival of thousands of poor unemployed Turks into the *TRNC* in search of employment. Most Turkish Cypriots believe that this influx has spawned many social problems including an increase in the incidence of crime in northern Cyprus. Labour groups have complained that the willingness of mainland Turks to accept lower wages than the local population has undercut the employment of Turkish Cypriots in the service and construction sectors of the economy.

Similarly, there have been misgivings regarding the authority of the Turkish military stationed on the island. For instance, in voicing a perennial grievance of many Turkish Cypriots, the centre-left parties have periodically called for an end to the military's control of the *TRNC* police force. Before the controls on movement of Turkish and Greek Cypriots across the Green Line were lifted in April 2003, Turkish Cypriots who wanted to participate in bicommunal activities and visit the south complained of excessive restrictions imposed on them by the Turkish military authorities. As a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit put it in 2000:

Although the administration of President Denktash firmly supports the Turkish presence and accepts Turkish guidance in many aspects of domestic policy affairs, opposition to Turkish involvement in the Turkish Cypriot society at large, as epitomised by the slogan 'This Land is Ours' is considerable.<sup>6</sup>

For some Turkish Cypriots, the authority exercised by Turkish governments and the military has been all the more unpalatable because of the latter's almost unflinching support for the policies of President Denktash and centre-right parties that

have dominated coalition governments. The close relationship between Ankara and Denktash has generated substantial controversy among Turkish Cypriots. The centre-left parties, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP), have regularly criticised the seemingly unqualified support of Ankara for the *TRNC* leader.

### **Erosion of Support for Denktash**

Denktash has led the Turkish community for nearly forty years. He has been the intercommunal negotiator since 1968 and has won six consecutive presidential elections (as president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1976 and 1981, and as president of the *TRNC* in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000). His charisma, strong nationalist credentials, and political skills helped him forge a strong consensus in the Turkish community over many years, and retain Turkey's support for his policies. It was upon his initiative that the *TRNC* was founded in 1983, and he has ardently sought to achieve its recognition.

However, Denktash's political support declined even before his last election as president in 2000. Growing opposition to his policies became especially pronounced since the UN Secretary-General submitted his settlement plan for Cyprus in November 2002. Although he declared himself to be above party politics, most Turkish Cypriots associated Denktash with the centre-right parties that led the government in the *TRNC*.<sup>7</sup> The centre-left parties argued repeatedly that Denktash was not interested in achieving a federal solution and that he was bent on integrating the *TRNC* with Turkey. His frequent arguments that geopolitical interests of Turkey should be protected in any agreement provoked criticisms among many Turkish Cypriots that he was more interested in Turkish rather than Turkish Cypriot interests.

When the Annan plan was submitted at a time of imminent EU accession many Turkish Cypriots worried that their president's refusal to accept it would close the doors to their EU accession. Denktash's stance provoked unprecedented demonstrations among Turkish Cypriots in favour of EU membership and calls for his resignation as the negotiator for the community. Since the introduction of the Annan plan, some influential long-time backers of Denktash joined his critics in castigating him for his obduracy during the negotiations on the Annan plan. The influential Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Kıbrıs*, traditionally a strong supporter of the Turkish Cypriot leader, was among those who declared their support for the Annan plan as opposed to Denktash's policy. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, long a bastion of Denktash loyalists, played an energetic role in promoting the benefits of the Annan plan. In one of the largest demonstrations, an estimated 60,000 Turkish Cypriots (almost a third of the entire Turkish community)

marched on 14 January 2003 calling for negotiations based on the UN plan and Turkish Cypriot accession to the EU.<sup>8</sup> It is widely believed that the *TRNC* government's surprise decision to *remove* restrictions on Turkish and Greek Cypriots for travel across the Green Line was a gambit intended largely to relieve the political pressures on the Turkish Cypriot leader by the pro-Annan opposition. Denktash's diminished political influence became apparent again when a substantial majority of Turkish Cypriots rejected his warnings and *voted in favour* of the Annan plan in the April 2004 referendum.

### **Justice and Development (AK) Party's Cyprus Policy**

The pro-Annan groups in the *TRNC* were greatly encouraged by the policy change that Ankara adopted with the election of the Justice and Development (AK) party in *November* 2002. Before the AK party assumed power, Denktash could count on Turkish governments to support his policies. He was particularly successful in forging a close working relationship with such Turkish leaders as Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit who led several governments in Ankara. The coalition government that Ecevit headed prior to the AK party assuming power, tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Brussels from proceeding with Cyprus' accession by warning that granting membership prior to a settlement would close the doors to future possibilities of reuniting the island.

However, when the AK (Justice and Development) Party came to power in Turkey on 3 *November* 2002 with a comfortable parliamentary majority, it signalled a serious intention to achieve Turkey's EU membership and that it would pursue a different Cyprus policy than its predecessors.<sup>9</sup> Thus Ankara responded mildly when the EU Copenhagen summit in December 2002 ignored Turkish entreaties and endorsed Cyprus's membership. In a bid to improve prospects of securing an early date for Turkey's accession talks with the EU, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the AK Party, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Denktash to accept the plan that UN secretary-general Kofi Annan presented to the parties on 11 *November* 2002. Predictably, Denktash was unwilling to sacrifice the *TRNC* and insisted that the Turkish Cypriot constituent state envisaged in the Annan plan should be entitled to exercise sovereignty: this was unacceptable to Greek Cypriots.

The stage was set for a contest of wills between the Erdogan government and the Turkish Cypriot leader. As leader of an unrecognised small state sustained by Turkey, Denktash might have been expected to accede to the wishes of the Erdogan *government*. However, as in previous dealings with Ankara, his supporters within the Turkish political establishment strengthened his hand with politicians and high-level bureaucrats who might apply pressure on him. In Turkey, Denktash has enjoyed enormous prestige as a vigorous defender of Turkish Cypriot rights and of

Turkish interests. He has cultivated political ties with influential Turks in many walks of life, including the military, the foreign policy establishment, political parties, and the media.

Given Denktash's strong backing in Turkey, Erdogan had to tread carefully in challenging him, but a change in Cyprus policy also meant confronting long-held assumptions in Turkey. For many years Turkish governments emphasised the island's proximity and strategic significance as a key consideration for Turkey: the powerful military were reported to be reluctant to withdraw the large military contingent on the island and forsake a military advantage *vis-a-vis* Greek Cypriots and Greece. In addition, the Turkish political establishment and public opinion have traditionally viewed the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights as a national imperative. Indeed previous governments in Ankara were accused of abandoning Turkish Cypriots and the interests of Turkey whenever they contemplated policy compromises.

In spite of the political risks in changing course on Cyprus, Erdogan succeeded in overcoming the Turkish Cypriot leader's opposition to the UN blueprint. In February 2004, he compelled Denktash to resume negotiations with his Greek Cypriot counterpart based on the Annan plan, and to accept the binding arbitration of the United Nations Secretary-General if no agreement could be reached. In spite of the declaration of neutrality by Ankara in the course of the referendum campaign in the *TRNC*, there was no doubt that – unlike Denktash – the Turkish government preferred a 'yes' vote.

By charting a different course on the Cyprus issue, and prevailing over Denktash and opponents of the Annan plan in Turkey, Erdogan won considerable acclaim internationally. He was also able to weather domestic criticism that he was sacrificing vital national interests and betraying Turkish Cypriots in return for the uncertain prospect of EU accession for Turkey.

It must be stressed, however, that unlike his predecessors, Erdogan's hand was strengthened by several factors. To begin with, his government was the first in more than a decade that commanded a parliamentary majority. This enabled him to act with greater confidence than former coalition governments that shuffled in and out of office regularly. Secondly, Erdogan's party forged a stronger consensus on the desirability of pursuing EU accession than its predecessors. Thirdly, the AK party assumed power at a time when the Turkish public's support for EU membership was high. In a survey conducted in 2002 in the midst of a major economic crisis that began two years earlier, seventy-four per cent of the respondents stated that they would endorse Turkey's membership should a vote be conducted on the issue.<sup>10</sup> Fourthly, the AK party's rise to power coincided with a weakening of Denktash's

stature not only in the *TRNC* but also in Turkey. As the prospects for Turkey's EU path improved, criticisms of Denktash became commonplace, with numerous commentators complaining that the Turkish Cypriot leader's rejection of the Annan plan was hurting the vital interests of Turkey. Finally, and most importantly, for all the resentment it caused by its policy that appeared to favour Greek Cypriots, the EU enhanced Turkey's prospect for EU membership at its summit meetings in 1999 and 2002, and thus provided the Erdogan government with a powerful incentive to pursue EU membership.

### **Economic Problems and Anticipated EU Benefits**

The economy has always been the Achilles heel of the *TRNC* even though its economic performance has not been uniformly poor. Bolstered by generous Turkish subsidies, the north's economy did well enough for *TRNC* officials to boast that the \$4000 per capita GDP of Turkish Cypriots in 2002 represented a threefold increase since 1977.<sup>11</sup> The main problem for the *TRNC*, however, has been its failure to achieve sustained levels of economic growth as the economy alternated between periods of growth and recession. Additionally, with its currency pegged to the Turkish lira, north Cyprus experienced similarly high levels of inflation that has characterised the Turkish economy for many years. Poor employment prospects prompted thousands of Turkish Cypriots to emigrate, and more recently, seek employment in the south. By contrast, Greek Cyprus has had to import labour from overseas for its thriving economy and Greek Cypriot per capita income is four times higher than that of Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish Cypriot officialdom routinely blames the economic embargo and boycott by the Greek Cypriot government for the adverse economic conditions in the *TRNC*. The economic and trade boycott has certainly hampered their economy, particularly its citrus exports and, especially, the more promising tourist sector. The Turkish-Cypriot administered area has some of the most attractive coastline on the island; unlike the south where intensive hotel development has blighted the coastal environment, the north boasts of an unspoiled habitat. However, the boycott of the Turkish Cypriot airport by virtually all airlines because of the political ban on scheduled flights to the *TRNC* has taken a heavy toll. In 2000, the north received 433,000 tourists (of whom 348,000 were from Turkey), compared with 2,686,000 in the south.<sup>12</sup>

Yet, while blaming the embargo, many Turkish Cypriots have also castigated their governments for the poor handling of the northern economy. Their dissatisfaction became increasingly manifest as north Cyprus experienced a major economic downturn in late 1999 at about the same time as the EU appeared determined to proceed with the island's EU accession. As the *TRNC*'s economic

crisis deepened in 2000, increasing unemployment levels and sharply reducing the purchasing power of Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot confidence in the ruling centre-right parties weakened. In a timely demonstration of EU benefits that would be available to Turkish Cypriots, on 30 January 2002 the EU Commission proposed to allocate 206 million euros, for 2004-2006, in order to help northern Cyprus reduce the economic gap with the south.<sup>13</sup> Having had to contend with high levels of unemployment, young Turkish Cypriots voted for the benefits of EU citizenship, particularly greater job prospects and greater mobility. According to Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay, a disproportionate number of young Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' in the 2004 referendum.<sup>14</sup>

### **Intense Debates of the Annan Plan**

From the time that the UN plan was introduced in November 2002, the Turkish Cypriot media, political parties and civil society organisations became immersed in a thorough discussion of its provisions. As Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay reported:

The Turkish Cypriot community started to seriously engage with the Annan Plan at a much earlier stage than the Greek Cypriots. There are several reasons for this but one of the most important was the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections held in December 2003. The elections had been staged as a pre-referendum on the Annan plan and the intrinsically linked issue of EU membership. The Annan plan/EU factor dominated the election campaign, producing two camps: rejectionists and advocates<sup>1,5</sup>

Jakobsson Hatay further stated:

By the time of the 24<sup>th</sup> of April referenda the Turkish Cypriots had already been on an educational journey pertaining the Annan Plan for at least six months. In the immediate weeks leading up to the referendum, Turkish Cypriot radio and television channels broadcast debates and question-and-answer sessions on the Annan Plan several days of the week.<sup>16</sup>

It should be noted that the Annan plan was by no means the first comprehensive settlement proposal that Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities were required to consider for endorsement. However, it was by far the most detailed and can be said to have addressed all of the issues that mattered to the two communities. Its presentation followed years of patient effort by United Nations mediators, and influential third parties (viz. the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States) joined in the diplomatic effort to secure its endorsement by Cypriots of both communities. Indeed, the US, UK, and EU emissaries who actively encouraged the endorsement of the plan were accused by anti-Annan groups on both sides of interfering in the internal affairs of their community.

Not the least, in an unprecedented development, both Ankara and Athens supported the plan, although in the latter case the New Democracy government of Costas Karamanlis (elected to office a mere six weeks before the referenda in Cyprus) did not endorse it with the same enthusiasm as its predecessor. In the past, rejection of the UN-sponsored plans for settlement did not mean that radical consequences would follow. By contrast, much more was at stake for the Cypriots in the referenda held on the Annan plan. The requirement to submit the plan to referenda was meant to prod the Cypriots to carefully consider their options.

In the Turkish Cypriot case, there was very considerable anxiety that forsaking the Annan plan for EU accession would shut them out of the EU and deny membership benefits, thereby relegating them to an uncertain and bleak future. Aware of the strong Greek Cypriot objections to the plan on the grounds that they are too favourable to the Turkish community, most Turkish Cypriots were convinced that if the Annan plan was not endorsed, Greek Cypriot leaders would insist on much tougher terms (than those in the UN plan) before supporting future accession of northern Cyprus. It is also possible that in the April 2004 referendum some Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' strategically, as they fully expected Greek Cypriots to reject the Annan plan. But one should note that a majority of Turkish Cypriots had already shown their receptivity to the plan by casting their votes for pro-Annan parties in the parliamentary elections in December 2003.

### **Conclusion**

The strong Turkish Cypriot endorsement of the Annan plan is explainable by a convergence of factors. The referendum of April 2004 was held during a period of considerable Turkish Cypriot pessimism concerning the future economic viability of the *TRNC*. Offering better economic prospects and an end to their isolation, in the midst of a major economic crisis, the attraction of the Annan plan was considerably enhanced. However, although the lure of economic prosperity as EU citizens was a major factor, Turkish Cypriots also calculated that they would be able to enter a new era on the island without greatly sacrificing their security. While foreclosing independent statehood, the plan offered Turkish Cypriots a credible alternative. Thus, the abiding merit of the Annan plan for many Turkish Cypriots was that they could avail themselves of the anticipated material benefits of reunification and EU citizenship while exercising a wide measure of autonomy. Last but not least, by endorsing the Annan plan, Tayyip Erdogan's AK party government in Turkey influenced the referendum outcome in an important way, emboldening those in the Turkish Cypriot community who favoured the plan to overcome the opposition led by veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.



**Notes**

1. For a useful study of the elections see Ali Carkoglu and Ahmet Sozen 'Turkish Cypriot General Elections of December 2003: An Appraisal' (translated for publication in *South European Society and Politics* in fall 2004).
2. Greek Cypriots object to what they believe confers the right of unilateral intervention to guarantor powers. The Turkish government relied on the following provision of the Treaty of Guarantee to justify its military intervention (or invasion, according to Greek Cypriots and Greece): "In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty". For the text of the Treaty of Guarantee, see Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959 (London: H. M. Stationery Office), 1964.
3. See the (revised) UN plan, < <http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org1> >.
4. *Ibid.*
5. See 'Matters to be submitted to the UN Security Council for Decision' in the UN plan.
6. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus*, December 2000.
7. Centre-right parties either formed governing coalitions or became senior partners in coalitions with centre-left parties.
8. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus*, 31 January 2003.
9. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared: "I am not in favour of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years... We will do whatever falls on us. This is not Denktash's private matter." *New York Times*, 2 January 2003.
10. The same survey reported that Turks expect EU membership to usher a higher standard of living. Carkoglu, A. and Kirisci, K., *'Turkiye Dis Politikasi Arastirmasf* (Survey of Turkish Foreign Policy), The Departments of Politics and International Relations, Bogazici University, March 2002.
11. *Financial Times*, 11 December 2002.
12. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus*, December 2002.
13. Commission of the European Communities 2002, *Regular Report on Cyprus' Progress Toward Accession*, at <[Www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/cy\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/cy_en.pdf)>.
14. Ann-Safi Jakobsson Hatay "'Oxi" and "Evet": the People Deliver Their Verdict on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus, 29 April 2004', *TFF Forum* (Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research), 12 May 2004.
15. Ann-Safi Jakobsson Hatay 'Popular Referenda and Peace Processes: the Twin Referenda on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus Put in Perspective', *Turkish Daily News*, 4 May 2004 (Internet edition).
16. *Ibid.*



# CYPRUS – THE REFERENDUM AND ITS AFTERMATH

Van Coufoudakis

---

## Abstract

*The paper analyses the process that led to the 24 April 2004 referendum on 'Annan-5' and its overwhelming rejection by the Greek Cypriot community. The essay asks how we got to the referenda, why the insistence to have the 'Annan Plan' approved by referendum, what motives guided American, UN and EU initiatives, and the lessons learned from this process. The essay concludes with questions about the day after the 24 April vote and the future.*

---

## The Diplomatic Background of the 'Annan Plan'

The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus brought about a series of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions,<sup>1</sup> resolutions by other international and regional organisations, mediation initiatives by UN and other Western diplomats, and important precedent setting court cases by international and other national courts.<sup>2</sup> These actions reflected the policy of the government of Cyprus which relied on the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem and sought the involvement of the United States to reverse the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion. The involvement of the United States, at the highest level, was seen as necessary because of Washington's influence in Ankara. By the spring of 2004, the government of Cyprus realised the limits of this policy.

Over the last thirty years, high level meetings between successive presidents of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, proximity talks, plans by various UN and other emissaries, proposals for confidence building measures and continuous rounds of negotiations under the 'good offices' of the UN Secretary-General failed to produce results. This can be attributed to the failure to implement UN Security Council resolutions; the prevalence of strategic, economic and political considerations over a functional and viable solution; the intransigent and consistent policies of successive Turkish governments that were based on the assumption that the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974; the political conditions existing in both Cypriot communities, and spasmodic external diplomatic initiatives.

The negotiations were also affected by the fact that all major concessions came from the Greek Cypriot side. In order not to be accused of intransigence, Cypriot governments continued to negotiate on the basis of the principles agreed on in 1977, while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots regularly changed the bases of the negotiations.<sup>3</sup> No Cypriot government had the political courage to call for negotiations from a zero base. Every time a new round of negotiations began, the United States and the UN called on the government of Cyprus to make concessions to 'bridge the gap' between its positions and those of the Turkish Cypriot side, and to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to return to the negotiation table. There was no reciprocity by the Turkish Cypriot side. In addition, they took for granted all concessions made to them.

The end of the Cold War affected the Cyprus problem as well. The United States was left as the only superpower. The crisis in the Balkans and Yugoslavia's disintegration set a bad precedent for Cyprus. For the first time since the end of WWII, partition and ethnic separation were considered acceptable solutions to ethnic problems. Cyprus also applied for membership in the EU. This provided new opportunities to address intractable aspects of the Cyprus problem like human rights and security, but it also became a new method of political pressure on Cyprus.

Traditionally, the United States had opposed the involvement of the EEC/EU in the Cyprus problem. This changed during the Clinton presidency. The American representative to the United Nations Richard Holbrooks, with support from the United Kingdom, advocated the solution of the Cyprus problem prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. This was not required by the EU. The accession of Cyprus to the EU was the priority of Cypriot policy. Linking the solution to the accession would increase the political pressure on the government of Cyprus. Holbrooks also saw this as an opportunity to advance Turkey's EU aspirations. Both actions gave Turkey an indirect veto over the Cyprus problem while increasing American credibility in Ankara.

Additional regional developments increased the urgency of a solution of the Cyprus problem in the latter part of the decade of the 1990s. Problems in South-eastern Europe and the Middle East pointed to the importance of stability in this vital region. Managing and stabilising Greek-Turkish relations was an American priority in the aftermath of the near war crisis between Greece and Turkey in 1996 over Greece's Imia islets. This was followed by the conflict over the placement of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system in Cyprus, and the Greco-Turkish crisis in the spring of 1999 over the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya. Improving Greek-Turkish relations was expected to have a positive effect on the Cyprus problem. This opportunity came with George Papandreou who became the new Greek Foreign Minister in the aftermath of the Ocalan affair. The 'earthquake

diplomacy' between Greece and Turkey in the summer of 1999, created a new positive climate in bilateral relations and improved the prospects for new initiatives on Cyprus.

The growing American interest in a Cyprus solution was reflected in Holbrooke's visit to the island in May 1998. There, he proposed a compromise solution to the Turkish Cypriot demand for recognition. He proposed that the government of Cyprus should 'acknowledge' the existence of a Turkish Cypriot political entity that represented the Turkish Cypriot community through legitimate procedures and institutions. A corollary was that the government of Cyprus did not speak for the Turkish Cypriots. Holbrooke's approach was based on the 1993 Oslo 'acknowledgement' of the PLO by Israel.

The next American action was to bring the Cyprus issue to the G-8 meeting in Cologne, Germany, on 20 June 1999. The G-8 called on the parties<sup>4</sup> to engage in sustained talks without preconditions; to conduct negotiations on all issues; to continue talks in good faith until a solution was found, and to keep the talks in the context of UN resolutions and other international agreements on Cyprus. The G-8 'formula' on Cyprus was adopted days later by the Security Council in resolutions 1250 and 1251. The significant influence of the American views on Cyprus was reflected in the evolving position of the Secretary-General on the Cyprus problem. In a letter to the Security Council dated 22 June 1999, for the first time he formally called for consideration of the political status of the Turkish Cypriots.

Washington argued that a solution ought to look to the future and not to the past, that the parties ought to avoid legalistic debates on federation/confederation, that the extent of constitutional concessions would be influenced by territorial trade-offs, and that the issue of the settlers was 'humanitarian' and not political. In view of the Turkish Cypriot demand for recognition, Washington considered the 'acknowledgement' of the Turkish Cypriot 'state' as *de facto* recognition without other legal consequences. *De jure* recognition could only be the outcome of negotiations. Washington urged the Greek Cypriots to recognise the 'legitimate concerns'<sup>5</sup> of the Turkish Cypriots along with the 'reality' created on Cyprus since 1974. This meant the acceptance of a constitutional solution containing elements of 'legitimised partition' in the interest of stability on the island. Washington agreed with Ankara that the parties ought to move to settle issues of 'borders', property and resettlement, while defining the limits of the 'three freedoms'.<sup>6</sup> Finally, Washington advocated that when a comprehensive solution was agreed upon, there would be a 'momentary suspension' of the Republic of Cyprus in order to be succeeded by a new state of affairs established between two equal component states. For all practical purposes, this meant the end of the Republic of Cyprus that was created in 1960.

### **The Genesis of the 'Annan Plan'**

The American influence on the Secretary-General was manifested in his 12 September 2000 opening statement at the talks held in New York between president Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. In that statement he called for negotiations "in which each represents its side – and no-one else as the political equal of the other." This was the first time in which the Secretary-General publicly equated the internationally recognised government of Cyprus to that of the illegal regime of the occupied areas. Alfred Moses, President Clinton's emissary on Cyprus, spoke of the "deliberate ambiguity" of this statement which was intended to bring the Turkish Cypriots to the negotiating table. He also indicated that this was done with the knowledge and the support of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

The talks initiated in New York on 12 September 2000 ended in deadlock in Nicosia in January of 2001. Despite the deadlock, I consider these talks to be the foundation of a new process that led to the first 'Annan Plan' that was presented to the parties in Copenhagen in November 2002. I base this conclusion on the following reasons: (a) the decision by the United States and Britain to engage in a sustained negotiating initiative in cooperation with the Secretary-General. This was significant because previous Anglo-American initiatives were spasmodic and were frequently undermined by discord with the Secretary-General; (b) the opportunity for a solution prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU; (c) a new negotiating process involving the preparation by the UN of 'non-papers' on all aspects of the Cyprus problem, instead of relying on exchanges of documents and position papers prepared by the parties. Lord David Hannay of the UK and Tom Weston of the United States Department of State and their staffs were active participants in the preparation of these 'non-papers'. Through shuttle diplomacy in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia, the two diplomats prepared the ground for Alvaro de Soto, Kofi Annan's Cyprus mediator; (d) the fundamental principles espoused in these 'non-papers' became the foundation of the comprehensive proposals incorporated in all five versions of the Secretary-General's plan. These proposals involved derogations from the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, from the *acquis communautaire*, and from the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and other European courts. This is why the mediators sought an agreement prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU; (e) the decision by the Secretary-General that the comprehensive agreement should be submitted for approval in separate referenda "to ensure the democratic endorsement, legitimisation and ratification by each community...".<sup>8</sup>

The rather extensive background analysis in the first two sections of this article was intended to show that the five plans presented by Kofi Annan between November 2002 and March 2004, should not have come as a surprise to anyone in Cyprus. They were the product of concessions made by successive Cypriot

governments in their willingness to seek a negotiated solution. In addition, significant sections of 'Annan-4 and 5' were the result of the change in the role of Kofi Annan. Without authorisation by the Security Council, but with support from the United States and the United Kingdom, he assumed the power of binding arbitration. This became a precondition for the acceptance of his invitation of 4 February 2004, for a new and final round of talks. Until then, the Greek Cypriots had not faced the reality of Annan's proposals because of the intransigence of Rauf Denktash and Turkey. All this changed in New York with Kofi Annan's ultimatum like invitation of 4 February 2004, and the political conditions created by the new consensus that emerged in Turkish-American relations under the leadership of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan.

### **The US, the EU and 'Annan-5'**

After a slow start in foreign policy issues the Bush administration, in the aftermath of 9/11, moved to address the Cyprus problem. The Bush approach was based on the new directions set by his predecessor. Washington encouraged new initiatives by the Secretary-General and raised the stakes on the consequences of failure in Cyprus. Through the Fall of 2001 and into the Summer of 2002, Washington argued that the accession of Cyprus to the EU without a solution would (a) undermine Greco-Turkish relations; (b) raise the threat of conflict in the Aegean and in Cyprus; (c) contribute to the alienation of Turkey from Europe; (d) increase internal tensions in Turkey; (d) formalise the partition of Cyprus, and (f) prove disruptive in the front against terrorism.

Washington also urged Turkey to push Rauf Denktash to new talks because: (a) the deadlock gave the political advantage to the Greek Cypriots; (b) it raised doubts about Turkey's sincerity; (c) the economic cost of assistance to the Turkish Cypriots and of maintaining the Turkish forces in Cyprus worsened Turkey's economic conditions; (d) the Turkish Cypriots would be in a better bargaining position before the accession of Cyprus to the EU; (e) absence of Turkish initiatives would hinder Turkey's EU prospects, and (f) Turkey should abstain from any actions likely to increase tensions in the Aegean and in Cyprus. Otherwise, Turkey would affect its EU prospects and undermine its domestic stability. Such problems, in an already troubled region, would also weaken the front against terrorism.

The EU was intentionally kept at arms length during the UN sponsored talks that started in January 2002. Reluctantly, and only near the end of the negotiations in Buergerstock in the Spring of 2004, Washington and Kofi Annan brought in the EU. The purpose was to legitimise the major derogations from the *acquis communautaire* and from European law included in 'Annan-4 and 5'. The move was also intended to pressure the Greek Cypriots on the eve of accession to the EU,

and to gain Turkey's support of Annan's latest plan. Turkey, the United States and Kofi Annan only agreed to an observer role for EU officials at the Buergenstock negotiations. The EU was expected to accommodate what either the two communities agreed on, or what the Secretary-General stood ready to impose through his binding arbitration. Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus to the EU contained a clause accommodating a future settlement as long as it complied with the principles on which the EU was founded. EU officials were hard pressed to rationalise their willingness to accept the derogations contained in 'Annan-5'.

There are at least two reasons why they did so. The first was that the EU accepted these derogations in return for not inheriting a protracted international problem, for moderating Turkey's behaviour, and hoping that the EU environment could reduce the negative consequences of these derogations. The second reason has to do with the state of transatlantic relations. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, a solution of a protracted European problem through the UN, with the cooperation of the EU and the United States, would be an important first step in restoring credibility and harmony to the UN and to transatlantic relations. Cyprus, a small and relatively weak prospective EU member, could become such a test case. A solution would also help improve the climate of European relations with Turkey and its future prospects in Europe. At the risk of compromising its principles, the EU chose limited influence than its complete marginalisation.

While actively supporting Kofi Annan's 2004 initiatives, Washington intentionally kept a low profile. This would shift responsibility for any failure in the talks to the parties and to the Secretary-General, if necessary, but not to president Bush on the eve of his re-election campaign. Clinton's failure in the Middle East peace process, on the eve of the American presidential elections in the Fall of 2000, was still fresh in the minds of Bush campaign advisors. The behind the scenes initiatives of Secretary Powell, Tom Weston and others were visible enough so as to claim credit if the talks succeeded. By acting behind the scenes the president could be protected if the talks failed. Supporting the UN in a European problem would go far to restore credibility to American foreign policy in the aftermath of Iraq. It would also be proof that Bush's foreign policy activism produced positive results.

These initiatives strengthened Turkey's image as a source of regional stability, democratisation and reform, and Erdogan's image of being a promoter of democratic pluralism in an Islamic country. This was an important goal in Bush's foreign policy in the aftermath of the Iraq war. In addition, a Cyprus solution could be used as a model for other cases of ethnic conflict and division, as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Nagorno Karabagh. In view of these objectives, it is not surprising to see Washington's negative response to the rejection of 'Annan-5' by the Greek Cypriots.



### **Why the Referendum? Why the Greek Cypriots said 'NO'**

One of the new elements in the Secretary-General's negotiating strategy starting in the fall of 2000 was his insistence for approval and legitimisation of the comprehensive settlement by simultaneous and separate referenda in the two Cypriot communities. There were at least three reasons behind the demand for approval by referendum. First, it removed the stigma that the final settlement was imposed on the Cypriots through the Secretary-General's binding arbitration. Annan wanted to avoid the precedent of the 1959 Zurich and London agreements Greek Cypriots had complained that these agreements were imposed under the threat of the partition of Cyprus. Second, it legitimised and affirmed Turkey's intervention rights. Under 'Annan-5' Turkey would retain these rights even after its entry in the EU. The Greek Cypriots had questioned the legality of Turkey's intervention rights and the use of force in 1974 under the 1959 agreements. Approval by referendum would remove any future legal questions. Third, all derogations from EU law would also be legitimised. This would make difficult any future demand for changes in these derogations.

It has now become almost a cliché in Cyprus that the rejection of 'Annan-5' by nearly 76% of the Greek Cypriot voters was not a vote against reconciliation or reunification as some have claimed. It was a rejection of a process that led to a one sided plan perceived harmful to Greek Cypriot interests and to the survival of the Republic of Cyprus.

Alvaro de Soto, in recent interviews and lectures,<sup>9</sup> said that he was not surprised by the Greek Cypriot rejection of 'Annan-5', but by the "vehemence" of the campaign against it. He was also astonished by the "galvanizing effect" of President Papadopoulos' 7 April 2004 speech to the nation against 'Annan-5'. However, public opinion polls showed 70% public opposition to the plan even before the president's speech. The 76% of Greek-Cypriots voting against 'Annan-5' came from all political parties, ages, and gender. In contrast, nearly 65% of Turkish Cypriots followed Ankara's lead and supported 'Annan-5'.

The Turkish Cypriot vote is easier to explain. 'Annan-5' maintained the Turkish Cypriot 'state' while removing the isolation it faced since 1983. The Turkish Cypriot 'component state' would remain under Turkey's protection while acquiring significant veto powers in Annan's new republic. With Turkey's policy shift, Denktash' near dictatorial powers were marginalized. Finally, the promise of significant economic assistance from external as well as domestic sources and the benefits of EU accession may have been the biggest selling point of 'Annan-5' for the Turkish Cypriots.

The Greek-Cypriot perception of 'Annan-5' was quite different. Starting with Kofi Annan's ultimatum like invitation of 4 February 2004, the parties were confronted with rigid negotiating deadlines and no real time for discussion of a most complex document running in the thousands of pages. In addition to discussing new security arrangements, Greece and Turkey were to have a voice on constitutional issues left unresolved by the two communities. This had clear reminders of the 1959 Zurich and London agreements. All issues not resolved by the parties, or by Greece and Turkey, were to be addressed through Kofi Annan's binding arbitration. The whole negotiating effort aimed at approval on 24 April 2004, so that the 'new state of affairs' would take effect prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Greek Cypriot suspicions were increased by threats of 'serious consequences' if they rejected the plan in the referendum,<sup>10</sup> and by the last minute attempt to bring together a donors conference for pledges to support the economic cost of reunification,<sup>11</sup> which was a major Greek Cypriot concern.

Promoters of 'Annan-5' questioned why the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots did not pay greater attention to the positive elements of the plan.<sup>12</sup> The simple answer is that had 'Annan-5' been approved by the referenda, it would have been applied as a whole. Whatever positive aspects may have been included in the plan for Greek Cypriots, the totality of the plan was seen as negative to their interests.

Some of the reasons for the Greek Cypriot vote include: (a) Major derogations from the European Covenant of Human Rights that deprived all Cypriots of fundamental rights. Agreement prior to 1 May would secure these derogations. This is why Kofi Annan pressed for the ratification of his settlement prior to that date. Under these derogations, Cypriots would become second class citizens in their own country. Other EU nationals would enjoy in Cyprus rights that Cypriots would not. (b) The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus would be dissolved and replaced by a loose confederation of two largely autonomous states. The new polity would be confederal in character due to the absence of a hierarchy of laws and the fact that the powers of the central government emanated from the component states. (c) The functionality of the new state was questionable in view of the provisions on the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches, the presence of minority vetoes, and of non-Cypriot third parties casting deciding votes. (d) The economic cost of reunification<sup>13</sup> and the vague pledges of external assistance<sup>14</sup> meant that the Greek Cypriots would bear the economic cost of reunification. (e) Security issues involving the gradual reduction and continuing presence of Turkish troops with expanded intervention rights, even after Turkey joined the EU. Cyprus was excluded from the common European defence policy and would be totally demilitarised. Cyprus would become a subordinate, dependent state within the EU. (f) Issues of citizenship definition and the future of the Turkish

settlers. Most of the settlers would remain in Cyprus as citizens. (g) Unilaterally, under his binding arbitration, the Secretary-General deleted the internationally acknowledged Cypriot ratification of the 1936 Montreux Treaty on the navigation through the Straits. This was important as Cyprus possesses one of the largest commercial fleets in the world. Turkey, in recent years, has been trying to remove all peacetime restrictions on her control of the Straits. Kofi Annan's action raised questions about his accommodation of Turkey's demands, but also about his role as the guardian of international law. (h) The same can be said of the accommodation of Britain's demand that it be granted rights on the territorial waters and the subsoil of Cyprus, rights that Britain did not enjoy under the 1959 agreements. This was the result of evidence of gas and oil deposits on the Cypriot continental shelf. Neither the issue of the Montreux Treaty nor the new British claims have anything to do with the settlement of the constitutional problem in Cyprus. All this shows that 'Annan-5' was a Christmas tree loaded with gifts for everyone but the Greek Cypriots.

### **The Lessons Learned**

The process that started on 12 September 2000 in New York ended in Nicosia on 24 April 2004. The lessons learned from this process are important for any future attempt to reunify Cyprus.

The Secretary-General and his interlocutors presented the referendum as the democratic affirmation of the outcome of their mediation/arbitration. The referendum would remove the stigma of a settlement imposed by the Secretary-General through his binding arbitration. If external interlocutors believe in the democratic process, then they should be willing to accept and respect its outcome. Even though they have made such statements, UN and American spokesmen have repeatedly called on the Greek Cypriots to rethink their vote and accept the plan as it stands especially because of the unconditional acceptance of 'Annan-5' by the Turkish Cypriots. The same diplomats insist that, other than some cosmetic clarifications on security and economic issues, no renegotiation of the comprehensive settlement was possible. Such absolute positions show how far removed from Cypriot reality are some of the foreign interlocutors. In view of the provisions of 'Annan-5' and the post-referendum response of the United States and the United Nations, one wonders whether these interlocutors were ever serious about seeking a settlement acceptable to both sides.

The last phase of the negotiation process that started with the Secretary-General's 4 February 2004 ultimatum like invitation and culminated in the talks at Buergenstock, will become a classic study of how not to negotiate. Leaving aside the content of 'Annan-5', the combination of threats, of unrealistic deadlines

amounting to an ultimatum, propaganda, last minute financial promises, attempts to by-pass the legitimately elected government of an internationally recognised country, and external interventions in the politics of both Cypriot communities, backfired at the end of the day. Only in the case of a small and weak country would such tactics have ever been attempted. In the case of Cyprus they failed and rightly so. Time has come for external interlocutors to reflect on their actions that led to the outcome of 24 April, instead of blaming those who voted 'no'. The question should be asked of Alvaro de Soto and Kofi Annan to assess what they may have done wrong in this negotiating process. Was there any miscalculation on their part or on the part of their staff? What could they have done differently? Alvaro de Soto and Kofi Annan have had time to reflect on these issues. Will they have the political courage to talk about their actions?<sup>1s</sup>

Another sign of the desperation of American and UN mediators, as public opinion polls in the Greek Cypriot community accurately predicted the outcome of the 24 April referendum, was their last minute attempt to gain the endorsement of 'Annan-5' by the EU and by the UN Security Council. They also called a last minute draft pledge conference to entice Greek Cypriot voters with vague offers of future financial assistance. Greek Cypriots saw through these tactics and responded appropriately. At the Security Council, the Russian Federation had the political courage to cast what has been described as a 'technical veto' to stop the charade. Washington and London attempted to play by seeking the Council's endorsement of 'Annan-5' on the eve of the referendum.

In the final analysis, this is not the time for spasmodic reactions and punitive moves against the Greek Cypriots for exercising their democratic right. Attempts to upgrade the Turkish Cypriot pseudo-state in violation of unanimous Security Council resolutions, unanimous EU decisions, actions by other international organisations and decisions of British, American and European courts will destroy the credibility of American and EU 'objectivity' in any future mediation. Hiding behind alleged humanitarian motives toward the Turkish Cypriots in order to secure Turkey's strategic cooperation in the Middle East, will come back to haunt Washington, London, Brussels and New York.

### **The Task Ahead for Cyprus**

What needs to be done in Cyprus to counter developments since 24 April? The post-referendum situation requires long term planning and the development of a national consensus as to where Cyprus wants to go after 24 April, and what role it expects the EU and the UN to play in the resolution and reunification process. This requires a clear understanding of what is a viable and a functional solution in the aftermath of EU accession, and not waiting for '*deus ex-machina*' to bring forward

another plan. This also requires a clear strategy addressing the broader political environment in which Cyprus operates.

Cypriots, in the post-referendum environment, will need to look beyond petty partisan domestic political games. As the dust settles down from the fall out of 24 April and from the partisan manoeuvres of the European Parliament elections, Cypriots will need to separate domestic partisan bickering from the future of their country. Diversity of opinion is the essence of democracy and Cyprus is a democratic country. However, partisanship and partisan gain should be separated from the search for a viable, functional solution protecting the rights of all Cypriots. Domestic partisan differences must not provide outsiders venues for determining the future of Cypriot Hellenism. Past experience with external interventions and political machinations validates this point.

Cypriots, not just the external interlocutors, will need to think critically about the future of 'Annan-5'. Is this plan 'dead on arrival' in the aftermath of 24 April? If not, what is salvageable from this plan that can be used as a foundation in the reunification process? The Greek Cypriots cannot be entrapped in the politically convenient rhetoric of 'negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan' as it happened in February 2004 at the New York meetings.

What role does Cyprus expect the EU to play in the resolution of the problem? What will be the role of Cyprus in the EU? There is no doubt that the Cyprus problem is in the EU now, but it is not of the EU. Cyprus is in the EU and will need to develop and define issue oriented alliances that may also influence the Cyprus problem. However, looking at the EU as another tool in the Cypriot diplomatic arsenal against Turkey will backfire and will undermine the credibility of Cypriot motives for seeking membership in the EU. What can the EU do for Cyprus in the political arena? The best Cyprus can hope for should be the harmonisation of any future settlement to European laws and to the *acquis communautaire* from the very beginning of any talks. Cyprus must avoid any last minute accommodation like the one Kofi Annan and Guenther Verheugen attempted to impose prior to the accession of Cyprus. However, Cyprus should have no illusions about bold political initiatives on the part of the EU for one of its members. One needs to consider the reluctance and/or the inability of the EU to get involved or to even discuss other long standing EU ethnic and political division problems. At least four such problems readily come to mind: Northern Ireland, the Basque region of Spain, Corsica and Gibraltar.

Now, more than ever before, the need for long term planning is evident. Political leaders and diplomats do not have the time, the knowledge or the resources to engage in long-term analysis and planning. This is a most propitious time for turning

some of this urgent work to a non-partisan independent think tank to study alternatives and to engage in contingency planning. Successive Cypriot governments have resisted this idea. The post-referendum environment requires that policy makers rethink this issue.

### **Confronting Negative Scenarios**

Since the beginning of 2004 and the new climate in Turkish-American relations,<sup>16</sup> Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan engaged in an intensive public relations campaign capitalising on his image of America's loyal Middle East ally and as the Islamic, democratic, pluralist leader who would "stay a step ahead" in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. In return, Washington fully endorsed Turkey's European vocation and took the leadership, in the post-referendum period, in ending the "isolation of the Turkish Cypriots". Let us look briefly at this issue.

The so-called 'TRNC' was illegal and remains illegal because of unanimous decisions by the Security Council, the EEC/EU, decisions of courts in the UK and by the European Court of Human Rights. All court decisions reflect the fact that the 'government' of the occupied areas is nothing more than 'a subordinate local administration to Turkey'. Approval of 'Annan-5' by the Turkish Cypriots does not change that reality. EU members take pride in the fact that they have a community where law is supreme. Cyprus, as an equal member of the EU, will exercise its legal and political rights, whether alone or in coalition with others, in order to protect the institutional integrity of the EU.

The US and some other EU members have shed crocodile tears about the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and their economic disparity. Conveniently, in order to appease Ankara, they lay the blame on the doorstep of the Greek Cypriots. It was the Turkish invasion and continuing occupation of Cyprus that brought about international actions that led to the ghettoisation of the Turkish Cypriots. The economic disparity issue is real. However, Turkey's friends should look at the consequences of Turkey's actions in Cyprus. Turkey brought in the settlers; it introduced the Turkish lira in the occupied areas as the official currency in 1983; and it brought Turkish bureaucrats to manage the Turkish Cypriot economy. Having seen on numerous occasions the near bankruptcy of the Turkish economy, it is small wonder that we talk about the economic disparity between the free and the occupied areas of Cyprus. 'Annan-5' absolved Turkey of all financial liability for its actions in occupied Cyprus. Instead, it placed the burden on the Greek Cypriots and on the international community.

With the connivance and tolerance of Turkey, Washington, since January 2003, has proceeded with another little noticed 'regime change' operation in the occupied

areas of Cyprus. We are now told that Rauf Denktash is in the dustbin of history as 'president' of an unrecognised country. In contrast, Mr. Talat is now promoted as 'Mr. Prime Minister' and as the person that will lead the Turkish Cypriots into a new European era. But, isn't Mr. Talat the so-called 'prime minister' of the same unrecognised entity whose 'president' happens to be Rauf Denktash? Shedding crocodile tears may serve Washington's regional strategic objectives but will not change the reality of what exists in the occupied areas. Any moves leading to the *de facto* recognition of the occupied areas will undermine regional stability, will set a dangerous precedent for situations as that of Kosovo, and will not lead to the reunification of Cyprus. Statements on behalf of Mr. Talat by the United States and Britain will enhance Mr. Talat's intransigence and will destroy any semblance of objectivity for both countries in any future attempt to resolve the Cyprus problem. The same holds true for the UN.

Various scenarios leading to the upgrading, if not also the *de facto* recognition of the occupied areas, have been making the rounds since the referendum. Advocates of the Annan plan are accusing those who voted 'no' of contributing to the *de facto* recognition of the 'TRNC'. Although this risk exists, approval of 'Annan-5' would not have spared Cyprus of that reality. On the contrary, the powers granted to the Turkish Cypriot component state and/or a collapse of the 'United Republic of Cyprus' would have left the reality of two states on Cyprus which would have *de facto*, if not also *de jure*, existence in the EU. At least now, Cyprus can fight actions leading to the *de facto* upgrading of the 'TRNC'. This includes any international economic assistance to limit the economic disparity between the occupied and the free areas of Cyprus. Measures must be taken to assure that the administration of aid programmes does not lead to the *de facto* recognition of the Turkish Cypriot regime. The World Bank has already warned that before any assistance is extended to the so-called 'TRNC', it must reform its banking system, combat corruption and the illicit transfer of funds. It must also improve its accounting procedures. This is why assistance from the EU and the US will be better monitored if channelled through the government of Cyprus. Otherwise, Western assistance will be lost to operators like Asil Nadir. Nor should international assistance be allowed to attract new settlers in Cyprus.

A variety of scenarios to upgrade the status of the Turkish Cypriots and break their economic isolation have been promoted by the United States and the United Kingdom. These include ideas for expanding trade and travel opportunities for Turkish Cypriots, in addition to financial assistance to narrow the economic gap with the free areas. Each scenario<sup>7</sup> has serious legal and political implications for the Republic of Cyprus and for any future efforts for the reunification of the island. This is why independent think tanks and the legal services of the Republic should be studying these issues. This is how the Republic can avoid surprise moves by

external actors and be ready to seek appropriate legal remedies available to EU members.

The next few months will prove critical for Turkey's European aspirations.<sup>18</sup> In addition to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, the issue of Turkey's relations with the Republic of Cyprus cannot be avoided. Some have expressed concern that Cyprus would veto a decision on Turkey's accession. Political reasons<sup>19</sup> suggest that this is unlikely to happen. However, the fact remains that Turkey, since 1974, does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus which is an EU member that will cast a vote on Turkey's accession prospects. Instead, Turkey is the only country recognising *de jure* the so-called 'TRNC'; a political entity created by secession from the Republic of Cyprus. The EU and all of the international community recognise the Republic of Cyprus as created in 1960, even though the government of Cyprus cannot exercise its authority in the occupied areas. Prime Minister Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of the recognition of Cyprus. This raises a whole host of legal and political questions<sup>20</sup> in view of Turkey's continued recognition of the so-called 'TRNC'.

A few months have passed since the referendum and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. It is clear to this author that the Greek Cypriot 'no' vote was not a rejection of reconciliation or reunification. Instead, it was a rejection of a subjective process. This is why the next few critical months will require retrospection by all those involved in the search for a solution. Retribution, or actions having the appearance of retribution, in response to a democratic decision will set back the peacemaking process and will undermine even further the already weakened credibility of foreign interlocutors.

Prior to the referendum and immediately afterwards, American and UN spokesmen characterised 'Annan-5' as the 'last opportunity' to solve the Cyprus problem. They also claimed that the international community would lose interest in the Cyprus problem, and that there would never be another comprehensive plan for Cyprus. Based on my experience in international politics, there are never 'last opportunities'. Good, credible and effective diplomats never say 'never'. What we need now is a calm reassessment of where we are, how we got here, and where do we go from here.

---

### Notes

1 Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office (1994) *Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations on the Cyprus Problem 1964-1994*, Nicosia, PIO.



2. Coufoudakis, Van (2003) 'The Cyprus Question: International Politics and the Failure of Peacemaking' in Theodore A. Couloumbis, et.al., *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, London and Portland OR, Frank K. Cass, pp. 111-135.
3. For example: The 1983 Turkish Cypriot UDI and the proclamation of the so-called 'TRNC'; the abandonment of the principle of federation in 1994, etc.
4. Press Release, 'Declaration on Regional Issues', 20 June 1999, p. 3.
5. Security, economic viability, limitations to the three freedoms, etc.
6. The 'three freedoms' were a core Greek Cypriot demand.
7. Alfred Moses at the American Hellenic Institute in Washington DC, 24 October 2000. AHI Press Release 54/2000.
8. Point 6 of the comprehensive document submitted to the parties by Kofi Annan in November 2000.
9. Characteristic is his 23 May 2004 interview with Elena Marouletti on New York's 'Aktina-TV'. Transcript published by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations in New York on 24 May 2004.
10. See Tom Weston's arrival statement at the Larnaca International Airport on 29 February 2004. Similar statements were made by Alvaro de Soto and others.
11. The conservative EU cost estimate for the first five years was approximately \$2.5 billion. This was much lower than the estimate of the government of Cyprus that placed the cost closer to \$14 billion. At the preparatory donors conference on 15 April 2004, the United States pledged \$400 million, the United Kingdom nearly \$37 million, while the EU pledged nearly \$360 million over three years.
12. The gradual reduction of Turkish troops, gradual return of territory and resettlement of displaced Greek Cypriots, etc.
13. Costs of reunification included convergence, reconstruction, property compensation, compensation to settlers, monetary policy.
14. For example, the American pledge of \$400 million would have to be approved by the US Congress. The cost of the Iraq war and Congressional attitudes on foreign assistance raised questions about the reality of that pledge.
15. After lengthy diplomatic manoeuvring, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the Security Council on 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437). Facing the possibility of another veto, the United States, the United Kingdom and Kofi Annan gave up on the idea of a Security Council endorsement of this report. The report praised Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and placed the blame for the failure of 'Annan-5' on the president of the Republic of Cyprus. President Papadopoulos responded in detail on 7 June 2004. His detailed rebuttal was contained in a seven page letter and a thirteen page addendum on the allegations in Annan's report.
16. During the course of 2003, Turkish-American relations had deteriorated because of Turkey's refusal to support the American invasion of Iraq. Paul Woitowitz and other traditional friends of Turkey in Washington had complained about Turkey's betrayal of the US. All this changed following the Erdogan Bush meeting in January 2004.
17. The Brussels based Centre for European Policy Studies has advocated dealing with the 'TRNC' as an 'autonomous entity of the EU'. Others have suggested the 'Taiwan model' or a possible variation of the 'Kosovo Free Trade Area', an agreement signed between Albania and Kosovo's self governing authority. Retired Cypriot Ambassador Nikolas Makris has studied the latter two models.
18. In October 2004, the Commission is expected to rule on whether/when Turkey can

## THE CYPRUS REVIEW

---

start accession negotiations. The Council will decide this issue in December 2004.

19. Prior to 1995, Greece had been accused of being the obstacle to Turkey's accession process. Since the lifting of the Greek veto, the issue of Turkey's membership in the EU has become a European problem. Greece cannot be used as a convenient excuse.

20. The 'Armenian model' has been suggested as an alternative. Turkey recognises the Republic of Armenia but has no diplomatic relations with it. However, the application of this model is complicated by Turkey's continued recognition of the 'TRNC'.

---

# CYPRUS AFTER THE REFERENDA OF APRIL 24: WHAT NEXT?

**Thanos Veremis and Philippos Savvides**

---

## **Abstract**

*Since April 2004 and Cyprus's accession into the EU, important developments have been taking place on the island. In addition, there have been noticeable changes in the ways in which the international community is now approaching the two communities of Cyprus. There is generally a more positive attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot community and a more sceptical one towards the Greek Cypriot one. These developments have created a new climate in the island and have influenced international perceptions significantly. The current state of affairs and the prospects for a solution must, therefore, be reassessed. This paper offers an evaluation of current developments as well as an assessment of the prospects for a solution in the near future. It concludes with some proposals for action in order to keep the prospects for a solution alive.*

---

On 24 April 2004 the two communities of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, were asked to determine via two separate and simultaneous referenda whether or not they would accept the comprehensive solution presented to them by the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan. The Greek Cypriot community rejected the proposed plan, by a majority of 76%, whereas the Turkish Cypriot community accepted it by a majority of 65%.

In the meantime, the Turks made efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria in order to secure the agreement of the European Council in December 2004, to the opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Turkey's European orientation has been the single most important factor that led to the domestic reforms of the last two years.<sup>1</sup> Tayyip Erdogan's decision to demonstrate that his government was ready to accept the solution to the Cyprus problem presented by Kofi Annan in March 2004, improved Turkey's credibility in Europe and strengthened its case for opening accession negotiations.

Since April 2004 and Cyprus's accession into the EU, important developments have been taking place, especially with regard to the property and the settlers' issues in the northern part of the island. In addition, there have been noticeable changes in the ways in which the international community is now approaching the

two communities of Cyprus. There is generally a more positive attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot community and a more sceptical one towards the Greek Cypriot one. These developments have created a new climate in the island and have influenced international perceptions significantly. The current state of affairs and the prospects for a solution must, therefore, be reassessed.

In the following pages we aim at providing an evaluation of current developments as well as offering our view for the prospects for a solution in the near future. We, also, conclude with some proposals for action in order to keep the prospects for a solution alive.

### **Towards the Referenda of 24 April 2004: A Short Review**

December 2003 was a critical month for the Cyprus problem. Since the end of the UN General Assembly meetings in September 2003, the US and the EU were becoming more energetic on Cyprus. All actors involved, however, expected the outcome of the Turkish Cypriot elections before they could reach solid decisions about the initiatives they would undertake in order to re-energise the process of negotiations for a final settlement. The Turkish Cypriot 'elections' of 14 December 2003 produced a new leadership that was viewed as more conducive to finding a settlement.<sup>2</sup>

The final results of these 'elections' produced the following power balance within the Turkish Cypriot community:

Turkish Republican Party	(CTP-Mehmet Ali Talat): 35.18% and 19 seats.
National Unity Party	(UBP-Dervis Eroglu): 32.93% and 18 seats.
Peace and Democracy Movement	(BDH-Mustafa Akinci): 13.14% and 6 seats.
Democrat Party	(DP-Serdar Denktash): 12.93% and 7 seats.
Solution and EU Party	(CABP-Ali Erel): 1.97% and 0 seats.

According to these results the opposition to Rauf Denktash received 50.29% and 25 out of the 50 seats in Parliament.

Following the Turkish Cypriot 'elections' Mehmet Ali Talat began the efforts to form a new 'government.' He was faced with the following dilemma: either to form a 'government' in which at least one of the pro-Denktash parties would participate or to give up all efforts and allow Dervis Eroglu to resume his position as 'Prime Minister' in a pro-Denktash administration. The distribution of the seats did not give Talat the chance to form a coalition with Mustafa Akinci's party which would have been the best possible scenario for the opposition forces.

Increasingly it became obvious that Ankara favoured a 'mixed coalition.' That is, one that would combine both opposition and pro-Denktaş forces. Ankara believed that such a coalition was easier to control and could better serve the tactical and strategic goals of the Erdogan government. On the other hand, a Talat-Akinci coalition could jeopardise the fragile domestic modus operandi between the AKP government and the 'deep state'. Similarly, a pro-Denktaş coalition could strengthen the hardliners and their approach towards the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations in general.

After many discussions and meetings both in Ankara and in northern Cyprus, Mehmet Ali Talat formed a coalition, albeit a fragile one, with the Democrat Party of Serdar Denktaş. In a joint statement they declared their commitment to a resolution of the Cyprus problem and accession into the EU. The declaration was, however, vague and open-ended. It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent weeks the coalition 'government' collapsed and Mehmet Ali Talat resigned from his position as a 'Prime Minister.' It seems that new 'elections' will probably be held at the beginning of 2005 to avoid escalation of the political crisis within the Turkish Cypriot community.

The results of these elections were not the best possible outcome for the opposition but dealt Denktaş's policies a blow and it allowed Erdogan freedom of movement in pursuing his own policy in search of a solution to the Cyprus problem. In other words, it demonstrated that the majority of the Turkish Cypriots were in favour of a solution of the Cyprus problem based on the Annan Plan and accession of Cyprus into the EU.

After the end of the elections the international actors involved, especially the US and Great Britain, re-energised their efforts to find a solution.<sup>3</sup> The EU asked the two sides to accept the conditions laid down by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for restarting negotiations; namely, (a) to accept the Annan Plan as the basis for negotiations, (b) to accept that if in the process of negotiations the two sides were unable to agree on certain provisions, the UN Secretary General would be able to fill the blanks of the Plan and (c) to ensure that the agreement would be submitted to separate but simultaneous referenda on a specific date.

On 4 February 2004 the Secretary General of the UN delivered a letter to the leaders of the two communities inviting them to return to the negotiating table based on his plan, provided they accepted the conditions set-forth in his invitation. In his letter the Secretary General outlined specific dates, the most important of which was 21 April 2004, for the separate but simultaneous referenda to approve or reject the plan. He, also, invited the two leaders for a meeting in New York on 10 February 2004 to begin the negotiating process. As he pointed out in his letter, "I would take

your acceptance of this invitation as a commitment to finalize the plan (without reopening its basic principles or core trade-offs) with United Nations assistance by 31 March 2004, and to put the finalized plan to separate simultaneous referenda as provided for in the plan on 21 April 2004".<sup>4</sup>

As already suggested, the victory, albeit a narrow one, by the opposition to Denktash made the resumption of negotiations possible. Not only the US – which was already very active – but Britain and the EU, and of course the UN, assumed a central role in these efforts. There was what has been called 'constructive pressure'<sup>5</sup> exercised both on Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to enter into final negotiations based on the Annan Plan. The Greek Cypriot leadership and President Tassos Papadopoulos specifically had two choices: either to work substantively and constructively for a solution based on the Annan Plan, or assume full responsibility for leading this effort to another dead-end with severe implications on Cyprus' European aspirations. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had to deliver on the promise to negotiate a solution based on the Annan Plan. The ability of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to deliver was, of course, contingent upon Ankara's decision to take the necessary steps towards this direction and its ability, in close cooperation with the leadership in northern Cyprus, to minimise the capacity of Rauf Denktash to undermine or hijack the efforts for a solution.

On 10-12 February the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan invited the parties to resume negotiations, and after four days of intensive talks in New York the leaders of the two communities of Cyprus agreed to do so. Even though President Papadopoulos was resistant to the idea that, if the two sides did not reach an agreement, the UN Secretary General would 'fill-in-the blanks', at the end he was forced by developments to accept the Turkish proposal which adopted the Secretary General's conditions plus one: namely, the direct involvement of the two 'motherlands' in the negotiating process. In other words, their agreement presumed that the parties accepted the UN conditions of using the Annan Plan as the basis for negotiations "without reopening its basic principles or close trade-offs;" letting the UN Secretary General fill in the blanks of the plan if the two sides – assisted by Greece and Turkey – failed to agree on certain provisions and committing themselves to put the final agreement to separate but simultaneous referenda on 21 April 2004.

In February and March negotiations took place in an effort to reach an agreed solution based on the Annan Plan. These negotiations were intensive and difficult as the mistrust of the sides towards each other, as well as towards the UN was prevalent. The last week of March 2004 the two sides, as well as Greece, Turkey and representatives from the EU, Britain and the US, met in Buergerstock, Switzerland for the final round of negotiations. At the end of the process the UN

Secretary General presented to the two sides the fifth and final version of his plan for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. The two sides agreed to bring the plan to two separate but simultaneous referenda on 24 April.<sup>6</sup> The leaders of the communities, Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktash, asked the members of their respective communities to reject the plan whereas the opposition in both communities campaigned hard for a 'yes' vote. At the end of the day, the Greek Cypriot community gave a strong 'no' whereas the Turkish Cypriot community gave a strong 'yes'. In light of these results, what are the features of the new environment in Cyprus?

### **The Current Environment and the Prospects for a Solution**

The day after the referenda found the Greek Cypriot leadership defending a strong 'no' to the solution proposed by the UN and the EU. The international community put the blame for the failure to reach a solution squarely on Greek Cypriot shoulders. Whether fair or not, Greek Cypriots found themselves isolated and are to this day facing the implications of their decision to reject the Annan Plan. They are witnessing the changes on the ground in the areas under the control of the Turkish army as well as the ways in which the international community has responded to the referenda results. These realities have led the Greek Cypriot community into a period of introspection and evaluation of the implications of its decision.

The EU was the first international actor to examine the new situation and take measures. Its effort has been to put an end to the political and economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots without, at the same time, violating the principles under which the Republic of Cyprus became a full member of the EU on 1 May 2004. With the agreement of the Papadopoulos government, the EU finalised the regulations governing the 'Green Line'. These regulations created a new 'legal framework' for domestic trade between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as for the communication between the two sides. Under this new state of affairs, for example, there are no restrictions to any citizen of Europe (including Greeks and Cypriots) who want to travel to northern Cyprus allowing, therefore, for the promotion of tourism in that region. It is not surprising, therefore, that Greek Cypriot tourist operators have already initiated cooperation with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts.

At the same time, relations within the Greek Cypriot community have been strained by internal tensions. The divisions between those who supported the 'no' and those who supported the 'yes' have been growing. The absence of a consensual position the day after the referenda, makes the emergence of a joint front to face the new challenges and opportunities the more difficult.

One of the most disturbing developments in the post referenda Cyprus, is the 'construction boom' taking place on Greek Cypriot properties in northern Cyprus. Specifically, the Kyrenia district has been characterised as a 'huge construction site'. According to latest data collected, the construction development in Kyrenia is up to 62% compared to other areas of the island that are under Turkish control such as Morphou (which according to the Annan Plan was going to be put under Greek Cypriot control). In Morphou the percentage is only 0.03%. It is important to point out that between November 2002 and today more than 2006 permissions for construction were issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. It is, also, interesting that most of these permissions were given not to Turkish Cypriots but foreigners. According to collected data, in 2000 the number of applications for permission by foreigners was 227. By August 2004 this number rose up to 1,528. Turkish Cypriot estimation suggests that in the last few months the Greek Cypriot land sold is worth more than 2 billion dollars.

The construction boom is not taking place only for residential reasons but also for the development of tourism. The Turkish Cypriot press has published ample information suggesting that permissions for construction were given to foreign corporations in order to build a marina and develop golf fields in the Kyrenia district and on Greek Cypriot properties. In addition, there are plans to build new hotel and hotel apartment complexes in order to develop the tourist industry. Tourism in northern Cyprus is projected to increase dramatically in 2005. Hence, the goal is to increase the number of hotel beds from 10,000 to 50,000.<sup>7</sup>

These dramatic developments are obviously changing the facts on the ground with regard to the issue of property which is also one of the most sensitive aspects of the Cyprus problem and which can 'make or break' a final settlement. If the construction boom continues under its current pace, the most likely scenario is that the delicate property balance incorporated in the Annan Plan will be reversed against Greek Cypriot interests.

In addition, the construction boom has created new demand for labour. Hence, increasingly new labourers are being brought to the island in order to cover these needs. This new wave of settlement is exacerbating the demographic transformation of the island further complicating the prospects for final arrangements on the issue of settlers. According to a latest estimate there are about 10,000 Turkish Cypriots working in the areas controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus.<sup>8</sup>

The aforementioned are taking place under an unclear political and legal base which undermines the prospects for a unified society and economy. In other words, increasingly one can see the emergence of a 'Taiwan' in the eastern Mediterranean.



That is, the emergence of an entity that even though it is not internationally recognised as an independent state, it has contracted international political and economic relationships<sup>9</sup>. Interestingly enough, this seems to be the model that the Turkish side wants to promote as the new status quo. In a recent lengthy article, Ergun Olgun, 'Undersecretary to the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' and the most important adviser of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team, urged the EU and the member-states to "establish contacts with North Cyprus." He further argues that, "Strictly speaking... the emergence of the TRNC has been the result of necessity and, as such, recognition is the right of the state that emerged, resting on the free and democratic choice of the Turkish Cypriot people. But this is not the issue here. The issue is that the Greek Cypriot side does not have the right to be the government of the Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus and therefore, a formula has to be found to allow for direct contacts with, and equal opportunities to, the Turkish Cypriot polity, without subordinating it in any way to the Greek Cypriot polity. The non-recognition of the TRNC should not therefore prevent direct contacts with the Turkish Cypriot side. In fact, in the case of Taiwan, the EU had developed modalities through contacts at the 'administrative level' to facilitate trade."<sup>10</sup> It is evident that, the primary aim of the Turkish Cypriot leadership today is no longer recognition but the creation of conditions reflecting the 'Taiwan model.'

These processes are taking place at a time when relationships between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been deteriorating. Since the day after the referenda, relations between the two communities have come under strain. Turkish Cypriots display their deep disappointment due to Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan. At the same time, though, contacts between the two communities continue as before. There is, however, a growing disillusionment regarding the prospects for a solution in the near future. Hence, these contacts are expedient but not substantive. Some political forces within the Greek Cypriot community have noticed these worrisome signs. Thus, the Democratic Rally (DISY) party followed by the Communist AKEL party, have taken the initiative to begin a dialogue between the two communities in order to mitigate the mistrust and the negative feelings created by the rejection of the Annan Plan. At the same time, civil society organisations are also working towards this end even though the political climate, especially within the Greek Cypriot community, is not very warm at this point for such initiatives.

Under present circumstances the probability for a solution by the end of the year seems remote. No initiative has been undertaken either by the government of Cyprus or the UN or by the other actors involved for a solution. Furthermore, Greek Cypriot public opinion has not been prepared for a 'second referendum.' Most likely, it will take some time before a serious attempt is made and it will depend both on the international circumstances and, especially, on developments in the domestic

front of Cyprus. Early next year there might be new parliamentary 'elections' in northern Cyprus and in April 2005 presidential 'elections' are scheduled to take place within the Turkish Cypriot community. The results will shape to a great extent the new dynamics within the community. Similarly, in May 2006 there will be parliamentary elections for the Greek Cypriots which could potentially transform Cyprus's political scene.

Time, however, is not working in favour of unification. On the contrary. The passage of time is cementing the partition of the island to the detriment of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. What is needed, therefore, are initiatives to prepare the ground so that a new effort for a solution can be successfully undertaken. These initiatives must come primarily from the government of the Republic of Cyprus and supported by the UN, the EU, Great Britain and the US as well as the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the government of Turkey.

### **As a Conclusion: What needs to be done?**

Currently the challenge we face is two-fold: (a) to create the conditions within the Greek Cypriot community to approve a 'bizonal-bicommunal federation' as a solution to the Cyprus problem and, at the same time, (b) to avoid the disillusionment of the Turkish Cypriot community and preserve its volition for a solution. This is not an easy task as the two processes must be undertaken in parallel without undermining each other. What kind of initiatives must be, therefore, undertaken?

It is generally accepted that the Annan Plan remains the basis for a solution to the Cyprus problem. At the same time, however, it needs to be adjusted in order to reflect the realities created by the accession of Cyprus into the EU as well as the new dimensions introduced in the framework of the European Constitution. Specifically, one needs to consider new timetables for the return of land and properties and for the withdrawal of troops as well as some additional guarantees by the EU and the UN Security Council providing for the implementation of the solution. Moreover, further changes can be introduced by mutual agreement between the leaders of the two communities as a result of the negotiations. In general, any changes will remain peripheral without altering the philosophy and the balance of the plan as a whole.

The two sides should clarify their positions with regard to the changes they want to bring about on the Annan Plan. At the same time, Greek Cypriots should initiate an 'exploratory dialogue' with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in order to prepare the ground for substantive final negotiations based on the Annan Plan.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership should put a break on the uncontrollable construction boom on Greek Cypriot properties in the Kyrenia district and elsewhere as well as on the new wave of settlers. This is important in order to prevent the Greek Cypriot community from becoming totally alienated. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot leadership can take the initiative to put an end to the practice of requesting identity cards and passports from Greek Cypriots and others who want to cross to the northern part of Cyprus. Such a gesture, as well as agreeing with the opening of additional crossing points, will undermine any efforts in the Greek Cypriot community to associate the current Turkish leadership with the policies that had been followed by Rauf Denktash.

The economic, social and political development of the Turkish Cypriot community is of vital importance. The EU has taken the necessary steps toward this end. More can be done in order to facilitate domestic and foreign trade of Turkish Cypriot products. However, it will prove counterproductive for all efforts to reach a solution if any measures introduced lead to a situation where the status quo is cemented. In other words, the creation of another 'Taiwan' in the eastern Mediterranean will undermine the prospects of unification and peaceful coexistence.

In conclusion, the main actors involved and the international community as a whole can exercise 'constructive pressure' to both sides in Cyprus to take initiatives in order to re-start final negotiations based on the Annan Plan. The key to keep the prospects for a solution open is to avoid measures and policies that solidify the status quo. The challenge is to keep the desire for a solution alive in both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

---

### Notes

1. For a good summary of these reforms see, Nathali Tocci, 'Anchoring Turkey to the EU: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead' in Nathalie Tocci and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *Towards Accession Negotiations: Turkey's Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead* (Florence, EUI, 2004), pp. 193-206.

2. For the importance of these 'elections' see: Ayla Gurel, 'Turkish Cypriot Elections and Turkey's Cyprus Problem', in *Ibid.*, pp. 175-183.

3. The new effort was initiated after President Tassos Papadopoulos delivered, in December 2003, a letter to the Secretary General of the UN requesting the resumption of talks under his auspices.

4. UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan letter to His Excellency Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, 4 February 2004.

5. For an explanation of the notion of 'constructive pressure' see: Philippos Savvides [Φίλιππος Σαββίδης], 'The European Union as a "Catalyst" for the Resolution of the Cyprus

Problem' Panayiotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy*, Volume II. (Athens: I. Sideris, 2003), pp. 227-273 [Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως "Καταλύτης" Επίλησης το Κυπριακού Προβλήματος', Παναγιώτης Ι. Τσάκωνας (επιμ.), Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική, Τόμος Β', (Αθήνα: Ι. Σιδέρης, 2003), σελ. 227-273.

6. Report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 3 June 2004. For President Tassos Papadopoulos' response to the Secretary General's report, see his lengthy letter of 7 June 2004.

7. This information is a summary of data published in *Politis* and *Phileleftheros* since July 2004.

8. *Ibid.*

9. For further development of this argument see: Philippos Savvides [Φίλιππος Σαββίδης], 'Towards "Taiwanization" of the Cyprus Problem', *TO VIMA*, 29 May 2004 [Έπος "Ταϊβανοποίησης" το Κυπριακού, *ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ*, 29 Μαΐου 2004].

10. M. Ergun Olgun, 'Cyprus: Objective Realities, Validity of Greek Cypriot Objections to the Annan Plan and the Way Forward,' Part 111, *Turkish Daily News*, 21 October 2004 (electronic edition).

### Selected Bibliography

Anagnostopoulou, Sia [Αναγνωστοπούλου, Σία] (2004) *Turkish Modernization: Islam and Turkish Cypriots within the Turbulent Course of Kemalism*. Athens: Bibliorama [Τουρκικός Εκσυγχρωτισμός: Ισλάμ και Τοθροκύπριοι στη Δαιδαλώδη Διαδρομή του Κεμαλισμού, Αθήνα, Βιβλιόραμα].

Veremis, Thanos [Βερέμης, Θάνος] (2003) *The History of Greek-Turkish Relations 1453-2003*. Athens: ELIAMEP/I. Sideris [Ιστορία των Ελληνοτοθροικών Σχέσεων 1453-2003. Αθήνα, ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ/Ι. Σιδέρης].

Yiallourides, Christodoulos [Γιαλλουρίδης, Χριστόδουλος] (2003) 'Political System and the Republic of Cyprus's Foreign Policy Orientation: From Zurich to the Athens Summit (1959-2003)' in Panayiotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy*, Volume II. Athens: I. Sideris, pp. 159-226 [Πολιτικό Σύστημα και Εξωτερικός Πολιτικός Προσανατολισμός της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας: Από τη Συρίχη στη Σύνοδο των Αθηνών (1953-2003) Παναγιώτης Ι. Τσάκωνας (επιμ.), Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική Τόμος Β'. Αθήνα, Ι. Σιδέρης, σελ. 159-226].

Coufoudakis, Van (2003) 'The Cyprus Question: International Relations and the Failure of Peacemaking' in Theodore A. Couloumbios, et. al., (eds.), *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London, Frank Cass, pp. 222-235.

Diez, Thomas (ed.), (2002) *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Droutsas, Dimitris, P. and Tsakonas, Panayiotis (2001) 'Turkey's "Road Map" to the European Union: Implications for Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue,' *Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 71-100.

Emerson, Michael and Tocci, Nathalie (2002) *Cyprus as a Lighthouse of the Eastern Mediterranean*. Brussels, CEPS.

Heraclides, Alexis [Ηρακλείδης, Αλέξης], (2002) *Cyprus Problem: Conflict and Resolution*. Athens: I. Sideris [Κυπριακό: Σύγκρουση και Επίλυση. Αθήνα, Ι. Σιδέρης].

Couloumbios, Theodore [Κουλουμπής, Θεόδωρος], (1996) *Cyprus Problem: Mistakes*,

*Lessons and Prospects*. Athens: ELIAMEP/1. Sideris [Κυπριακό: Λάθη, Διδάγματα και Προοπτικές. Αθήνα, ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ/Ι. Σιδέρης].

Couloumbis, Theodore, Ntokos. Th. and Kintis, A. (eds.), [Κουλουμπής, Θ., Θ. Ντόκος, και Α. Κιντής, (επιμ.)], (2001) *Anaskopisi 2001: Greece and the World 2000-2001*. Athens: Paratiritis/ELIAMEP [Ανασκόπηση 2001: Η Ελλάδα και ο Κόσμος 2000-2001. Αθήνα, Παρατηρητής/ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ].

Savvides, Philippos [Σαββίδης, Φίλιππος] (2003) 'The European Union as a "Catalyst" for the Resolution of the Cyprus Problem', Panayiotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy*, Volume II. Athens: I. Sideris, pp. 227-273 ['Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως "Καταλύτης" Επίλυσης του Κυπριακού Προβλήματος', Παωαγιώτης Ι. Τσάκωνας (επιμ.), *Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική*, Τόμος Β'. Αθήνα: Ι. Σιδέρης, σελ. 227-273].

Savvides, Philippos (2003) 'Cyprus-From Copenhagen to the Hague: What Next?' *Defensor Pacis*, No. 13 (July), pp. 59-70.

Suvarierol, Semin (2003) 'The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union,' *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 55-78.



# THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

George Vassiliou

---

## Abstract

*In the first part the author presents the arguments as to what membership would imply.*

**Supporters** considered that with accession we could address the two major worries of Greek Cypriots: (a) the functionality of the solution, (b) the threat from Turkey. **Opponents** believed that: (a) Cyprus will enjoy the full support of the EU but instead, the EU's main objective now is how to help the Turkish Cypriots and not to 'punish' the Greek Cypriots as they now claim, (b) There will be prospects for a 'European' solution. The EU disagrees; it considers the Plan compatible with the *acquis* and made it clear that it will not take any initiative to help solve the problem.

*We need to take action now, before and not after the December Council, says the author. We need at last to spell out what we want and never forget Makarios' doctrine to demand what is feasible to achieve and not what we desire. We cannot afford not to take action now; the Union can afford to wait but not Cyprus. In twenty years' time, when Turkey might be joining we may end switching from the de facto to the de jure partition.*

---

Cyprus is a full member of the European Union since 1 May 2004. This is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of the Republic of Cyprus since independence. We are a full and equal member of the European Community; we can take advantage of the many opportunities membership offers and for the first time since the invasion in 1974 feel really safe.

Practically every Cypriot supported the accession mainly for political but also for economic reasons. The reasons for support, however, were not necessarily identical. There were many common elements but also many differences.

Probably the most important difference was the assessment as to what accession to the Union would mean in terms of a solution of the Cyprus problem, i.e., whether

- (a) we could reject the Plan at the referendum and expect that as full members

- of the Union we could achieve a better solution, or
- (b) support the Annan Plan knowing that accession to the Union would contribute to the success of the proposed solution while rejection of the Plan would create problems in our relations with the Union and offer no guarantees whatsoever of a better plan with the EU's help.

Let us look at the arguments of both sides.

**Supporters** of the Annan Plan pointed out that membership of the Union would help address the two major worries of the Greek Cypriots: firstly, the functionality of the solution; second, the threat from Turkey. Let us consider these issues in some more detail.

- (a) Within the EU the functionality of the solution would be ensured. The two communities would be encouraged to cooperate as the Union itself is based on the principle of compromise. As a rule, whenever a controversy arises, after some initial period, a compromise is always reached acceptable to all parties involved. It is for this reason that the supporters of the Plan considered that whatever the differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots within the Union they would end up cooperating. Even if they were to continue disagreeing, however, the Union would still take its decisions, which Cyprus would have to implement, whether they like them or not. Faced therefore with the perspective of implementing resolutions in the taking of which we would not participate we will realise that it is to our advantage to reach our own compromises.
- (b) The role of Turkey in Cyprus would change now that Turkey has decided that its future lies in the EU. Prior to that there were several efforts by the Turkish governments to create a new world centre based on Turkey and incorporate some of the Arab countries and the Republics with Moslem population of the ex-Soviet Union. All these efforts failed and Turkey recognised that only by acceding to the Union can its future development be ensured. The best example of this attitude is the recent controversy concerning the adoption of the new criminal code. The Turkish government wanted to include a clause making adultery a crime and the Union reacted strongly to these intentions. Despite statements to the contrary the Turkish government realised that it had no option but to call an urgent meeting of the National Assembly and adopt the criminal code as the Union prescribed and not as the political leadership of Turkey wanted.

The road towards membership to the Union implies the democratisation of Turkey, the full respect of human rights of all, including rights for religious



minorities, the subordination of the military to the political leaders, the adoption of a friendly policy towards neighbours, etc. This is why Greece, realising that this ambition of Turkey served Greece's national interests, has wholeheartedly supported granting a date for the beginning of negotiations with Turkey. In the same way for Cyprus, the fact that Turkey was now determined to do everything possible in order to join the Union, was the best guarantee that it would end up in normalising relations with the Republic and support the creation of a genuine federation.

**Opponents** of the Annan Plan also used the prospect of membership as probably the strongest argument in favour of the rejection. They claimed that:

- (a) The Republic of Cyprus will be stronger after it joins the Union. Nobody will be able to challenge its independence and sovereignty and will have a veto, in the same way as the other members, on all issues and particularly on issues relating to Turkey.
- (b) The accession to the Union will make the Annan Plan obsolete and lead to a 'European solution' of the problem, with EU initiative, in other words the immediate free settlement of all refugees, withdrawal of all foreign troops, repatriation of settlers, etc.
- (c) The accession of Cyprus to the Union will oblige Turkey to change its attitude realising that Cyprus is not alone anymore. Furthermore, the desire of Turkey to join the Union will make it liable to pressures by the EU in order to accept aspects of a solution that it was not prepared to accept before.

The above arguments had a significant influence on the attitude of Cypriots, they undoubtedly influenced the results and contributed towards Cyprus joining the Union without a solution.

We are now six months after accession and the key question is how membership is influencing the perspective of a solution of the Cyprus problem. We will examine in sequence:

- Attitude of the Union towards Cyprus after the referendum
- The prospects of a 'European solution' and of an EU initiative
- The perspective of the EU exercising pressure on Turkey concerning Cyprus.

#### ***Attitude of the Union Towards Cyprus After the Referendum***

The first reaction of the Commission after the results of the referendum were made known was one of anger. Both the Commission and the various members of the

Council made it abundantly clear that they felt they were let down. The Helsinki Summit's decision in 1999 was taken based on the facts of the continuous Turkish objections to a solution. On the other hand, the EU members were convinced and had assurances all along that the Greek Cypriots would support the efforts of the UN's Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, - an expectation that did not materialise.

It is not important, in relation to this article, to prove whether, in addition to President Clerides, President Papadopoulos also made such a commitment or not. The fact remains that the Union was under the impression that Greek Cypriots would accept the UN proposals and therefore they felt let down. As a result we witness a negative attitude and a tendency to isolate or ignore Cyprus in the Union.

Many Greek Cypriots believed that the Union wanted to 'punish' us for our negative vote in the referendum. In my opinion this has never been the case. It is true that they were upset with the results, but they respected the outcome. At the same time, however, they made it clear that they wanted to help the Turkish Cypriots who had voted 'yes' and who were until that moment isolated and received no help whatsoever. The desire to help the Turkish Cypriots was expressed through the decision to provide an initial financial assistance of 256 million Euros for the years 2004-2007. The Union's officials insist that they do not even consider recognising the 'North'. They are fully aware, however, that the Turkish Cypriots have a much lower standard of living than the Greek Cypriots and are suffering as a result of their isolation for so many years. Thus the EU attitude is not 'to punish' the Greek Cypriots but to help the Turkish Cypriots. The fact that some supporters of the 'No' vote try to present this EU attitude as 'punishment', is not in anyway affecting the determination of the Union to find ways to support the Turkish Cypriots.

### ***The Perspective of a 'European' Solution and an EU Initiative***

Several politicians promoted the idea that accession to the Union would lead to a radical overhaul of the Annan Plan, to the abolition, for example, of all constraints on the return of refugees, etc., thus ensuring a 'European' solution. We are now six months after the accession and there is no indication whatsoever that the EU is trying to promote a 'European' plan or any plan at all. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly pointed out that, as far as the Commission is concerned, the Annan Plan is indeed a European plan, as there was no contradiction between the various points of the Annan Plan and the basic concepts of the Union. Even on issues for which a derogation was requested originally, the Commission insisted and the UN agreed to change its position and make no provision for permanent derogations. It is significant in this respect that in Protocol 10 of the Agreement it is clearly stated that "... the European Union is ready to accommodate the terms of such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded ...".

Coming now to the issue of a European initiative the truth is that there has never been such a perspective. The EU as a matter of policy avoids getting involved in national conflicts. Thus the Union never tried to solve the Irish or the Basque problem or interfere in the conflict between the UK and Spain on Gibraltar. France was one of the founders of the Union but still there has never been an effort on behalf of the Union to contribute towards addressing the conflict between Corsican nationalists and the French government.

The EU therefore is not and will not take any initiative to help solve conflicts of member countries. Furthermore, they made it clear that the Union is firmly against nationalist policies. There are two recent examples to this extent: those of Slovakia and Croatia. In both countries their nationalist leaders - Meciar and Tujman - followed policies that were not considered compatible with the Union's principles. The EU isolated them and waited until there was a change in policy before Slovakia was accepted in the Union and Croatia was considered as a possible candidate for opening negotiations.

In the case of Cyprus, the EU has clearly pointed out that it is not happy with the impasse, that they would like to see a solution, but at the same time they are insisting that it is not their job to solve the Cyprus problem. They say that it is up to the Government of the Republic to state the points they wish to see modified on the Annan Plan and try to secure the support of the United Nations for a new round of negotiations if that is possible. In such a case, the EU is willing to support a UN effort but under no circumstances would they take the initiative. The ball therefore is in our yard, it is our responsibility to start the effort and it is an illusion to think that if we do nothing the Union will interfere in one way or another.

### ***The Union Will Now Exercise Pressure on Turkey to Solve the Cyprus Problem***

This is probably the greatest illusion and has been very cruelly demolished by the statements of Commissioner Verheugen in Ankara and the position the Commission is taking towards Turkey's application. The reactions of some of the Cyprus media and politicians expressing their clear dissatisfaction with the position taken is the best proof that it was a grave miscalculation to think that the Union would try to oblige Turkey to solve the problem. The Union was exercising pressure on Turkey to accept the Annan Plan which was considered fair. To that extent they made everything possible and conveyed a very clear message to Turkey that without a change in policy they should not hope to get a favourable position by EU members. From the moment however, that Turkey accepted the Annan Plan and advised the Turkish Cypriots to vote favourably, which they did, Turkey is claiming that it has fulfilled its obligations. Thus, whenever, on our side, a statement is made that the EU should press Turkey, the answer by Turkey is that they did everything they were asked to do and that it is now the Greek Cypriots' responsibility to act.

It is not surprising therefore that it was repeatedly clarified that the solution of the Cyprus problem was not part of the Copenhagen criteria. The Commission, in its Report published on 6 October, proposed the start of accession negotiations with Turkey with the Cyprus problem unsolved. It is significant that in its reference to Cyprus it makes a specific reference to the European Council's 18 June Decision which "... welcomed the positive contribution of the Turkish Government to the efforts of the UN Secretary General to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem". Furthermore, in its recommendations to the Council and the Parliament it highlighted that "... Turkey has and continues to actively support efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem; in particular Turkey agreed to the solution put forward in the peace plan of the UN Secretary-General."

### **What Should be Done and When?**

In the preceding pages it has been demonstrated that membership in the Union is not changing the facts on the ground. The EU is prepared to leave things as they are, will not take any initiative on its own, nor exercise any further pressure on Turkey, it will certainly cooperate with the UN, however, if and when a new initiative begins.

Let us now examine the perspectives of a solution and the options available to us, taking into account the fact that we are now full members of the EU.

Practically everybody on our side keeps repeating that the rejection of the Annan Plan does not in any way imply that the Cypriot people do not wish a solution of the problem. If we therefore acknowledge the desire of the great majority for a solution, the question is: what should be done and when?

If anything, membership in the Union increases the pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to do something as early as possible. The financial assistance and the prospects of direct trade with the Turkish Cypriots, in one way or another, clearly indicate the position of the Union. Furthermore, the regulations on intra-Cyprus trade through the 'Green Line', the free movement of EU citizens all over the island, even if they arrive through unauthorised points of entry, contribute to the need for action.

Immediately ahead of us we have the perspective of the Council's December decision on whether to give a date for the commencement of negotiations with Turkey. The Cyprus government considers that if there is going to be any initiative it should be after December and not before. On the contrary, my opinion is that these next few months are ideally suited for raising the problem of Cyprus and insisting on a positive attitude by Turkey. This however implies that we should have

specified clearly what we want and ensure that these requests are more or less acceptable to the international community. In such a case we would have had a good chance of securing a positive reference to the Cyprus problem in the Council's resolution in December. We could justifiably expect that guarantees for the implementation of any agreement and the aspects of security would be adequately spelled out. Unfortunately, if we want to be realistic the Government does not seem willing to make any move in this direction at present. Therefore, most probably, no developments must be expected before next year, which means that we will have lost this unique opportunity of December.

The only option left, therefore, is to specify clearly what we want so that negotiations can take place. In such a case we must never forget the famous statement by Archbishop Makarios that there is a difference between what we '**desire** to achieve' and what we '**can** achieve', i.e., what is feasible. The speech by President Papadopoulos at the General Assembly of the United Nations outlining what Greek Cypriots desire, made no reference to the Annan Plan. The Turkish Cypriots, however, have clearly stated that they accept the Annan Plan, but might be willing to consider a number of modifications that would not affect the substance of the Plan. The fact that we are members of the Union is not making the prospects better. The EU insists on remaining neutral and they keep repeating that "they have accepted the Annan Plan; if we wish to make any changes we are free to do so as long as the two sides agree to that". Whichever way we look into the subject therefore it is obvious that the responsibility to take an initiative lies with us.

The final question that we have to answer is: when is the best time to move? This is related to the assessment of **whether time works in our favour or against**. In other words, whether, having succeeded in becoming members of the Union we can wait, hoping that later Turkey will change its attitude and be willing to accept a solution that will be radically different from what has been offered.

I am afraid that this would be wishful thinking as time works against us and not in our favour. Already, since the accession, we have seen an unprecedented increase of construction activity in the occupied areas and what is even more important is the readiness of foreigners to purchase properties in the 'North'. We have complained and protested but it is doubtful whether all these protests will have any effect. If nothing happens in the immediate future then the construction boom will continue and this will dramatically change the basic facts concerning the Greek Cypriot properties in the occupied areas. At the same time an effort is being made in the North to build new hotels and develop their ability to attract tourists. There is no doubt that if things remain as they are the number of beds in the occupied areas will increase at a dramatic pace and instead of cooperation between the Republic and the occupied areas we will have fierce competition which will hurt us all. At the

same time the number of settlers will keep on increasing while many Turkish Cypriots, particularly well educated young persons, may take advantage of their EU citizenship and move on to the European member countries.

We should also point out the great significance of the recent decision by the Cyprus High Court to order the return of the property of a Turkish Cypriot that is at present occupied by Greek Cypriot refugees. In the pre-referendum period it had been repeatedly pointed out by the supporters of the 'Yes' vote that in the case of a 'No' vote, there was a real danger of while Greek Cypriots will remain refugees, Turkish Cypriots would be entitled to return to their properties and take possession thereof. This danger was ignored but the recent decision by the High Court completely changes the situation. The danger of a very serious social upheaval is becoming evident, despite efforts to overcome the recent High Court decision.

All the above clearly indicate that time is not working in favour of Greek Cypriots and what is even worse is that both the international community but also many Cypriots get used to the realities of the status quo. The argument by some, that Turkey needs to solve the Cyprus problem, if she wants to accede to the Union, is not a consolation, because the perspective of Turkey being ready to join the Union is at least fifteen to twenty years away. It is very difficult to imagine that in about twenty years from today, if we leave things as they are, there would be a possibility for a solution other than the legalisation of partition.

If we want to reunite the island we have to do something now; in the next months, at the very latest in the next year. Otherwise, we are simply accepting the *de facto* and later the *de jure* partition under the worst possible conditions. The fact that Cyprus is a member of the Union does not eliminate this perspective.







# Papadopoulos Has Saved Us from Our Complex

**Mehmet Ali Birand**

In order to evaluate, from the point of view of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the point where we stand today, we have to go back a little.

Although by reviewing without prejudice and fanatical nationalism the situation for the Turks, and by stressing Turkish intellectual's and elite's points of view, I can summarise it in a sentence, **'Disappointment, furthermore betrayal.'**

The Turks have considered that the events that took place before 1974 were the endeavours of the Greeks to throw them out of the island, or at least make them totally ineffective and by this route, annexing the island with Greece. In my belief this bears a great deal of truth. In the years of EOKA these intentions were bluntly exercised and repeated many times. The attacks organised on the Turkish villages were concrete indications of this. The coup d'etat led by Sampson, which was backed by the Greek Junta, was the final drop. If we take into consideration the international conjecture; what was going on both in Cyprus and Greece, and the strategic balance in the Aegean during that time, we can easily understand that other than intervention, there was no alternative option for whoever was in power in Turkey.

It cannot be denied that not only in Turkey or in the opinion of the international public but also among certain circles of Greeks and Greek Cypriots, the common opinion is that **'The most important element which forced Turkey's military intervention was the Greek Junta.'**

As the years passed by after military intervention, although possibilities for a solution arose on many occasions, a solution was not reached, and in time everything started to change.

Faith in **'justness'** among the Turkish communities gradually began to fade away. The belief slowly gained strength that the real intention of the governments both in Turkey and *TRNC* was not to solve the problem but to settle in the north. The balance in the Aegean changed in the 1980s following the accession of Greece to the EU. The deterrence of the Turkish military dominance was not present any longer. For this reason Ankara began to view Cyprus as her **hostage**.

As time went by, however, it became apparent that this kind of approach was not viable. On the one hand there was Turkey's vision for accession to the EU. On the other hand the basic prospect of the Cyprus problem had been changed by the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the cold war. In Turkish communities, amidst influential circles, Cyprus was no longer considered to be a strategic necessity. It had become a humanitarian issue and the cost of not being able to resolve the Cyprus problem increased.

During this period the desire for a solution gained power within Turkish public opinion. I very clearly remember when the Greek Cypriots demonstrated saying, **"We desire to live together with Turkish Cypriots and share this island with them."** At that time there was support from the international fora that deemed this to be 'right'. Every national and international parliament stood poised to help in any way and the Turkish side was excoriated. In the world media Turkey was portrayed as a monster who wanted to swallow up an innocent island. At international conferences it was impossible to respond to the Greek Cypriots' justifications. Certain sections of the Turkish community when observing this course did, amongst themselves and sometimes openly, admit that the Greek Cypriots had justified points. The criticism levelled at the Turkish side which was against a solution, intensified to such a high degree that a complex was almost felt.

Rauf Denktaş was now viewed as a symbol of 'no-solution' and came under harsh severe criticism. Denktaş the hero, who was once carried shoulder-high, started to be pressurised.

The AKP's rise to power was the turning point. If the coalition government of Ecevit-Bahçeli-Yılmaz had remained in office, it would not have stepped back from its current stance *even* though the process of securing a date to begin negotiations with the EU might have been endangered. The AKP took a great deal of risk and succeeded in breaking a taboo. Despite the military and conservative officials, they accepted the Annan Plan.

The conservatives in Ankara were creating a far greater problem than the Greek Cypriots for the pro-solution sectors within the Turkish communities.

Could the Annan Plan bring an ideal solution?

No. It was acknowledged that these kinds of solutions cannot be measured by any means of scale and the Turkish side was, therefore, encouraged to be flexible and make concessions.

So this was the climate during the 24 April referenda.

The result has mostly shocked the people who for years believed that what was being said by the Greek Cypriots was sincere and true. They now feel betrayed. Today, the people who were criticising Denktash when he exclaimed **"The Greek Cypriots are lying don't believe them. They don't want a solution, they want the whole island"**, are granting him a right.

Papadopoulos, and especially AKEL with their policies, preferred risky politics. After securing full EU membership they have come to realise that they will not suffer any further losses other than the Annan Plan itself. They thought that they might achieve further new concessions from Turkey who also wishes to be a member of the EU, but they did not wish to be known as the leaders who gave up the North. They estimated that by spreading the solution process, they might in time be able to achieve new ratifications in the Annan Plan. Furthermore, there would be no change in their present status - while being rich, they might become even wealthier. No-one would be able to apply force after their seats had been secured within the EU mechanism and they could prevent the isolations imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots being lifted. For the time being it seems that some of these estimations have come true.

The Turks (especially those who were supporting the solution) now taste the flavour of betrayal. They have not received the responses they expected from either the EU or the UN. As the time passes their impression grows stronger that what has been said by the Greek Cypriots in the past has not been sincere or true, and that the actual will of the Greek Cypriots is not to share the island. And, for the Greek Cypriots, the biggest danger starts from this point on.

#### FROM NOW ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE ISLAND IS VERY MUCH HARDER

Although one must be in the field of fortune-telling to make predictions about what lies ahead, we can discuss the important changes within the Turkish communities which will impact on future developments likely to arise.

If we evaluate the results of the referenda only from Turkey's point of view, we can easily see that both the governments of Turkey and *TRNC* have benefited.

- The unsettlement has postponed all the major problems which might have arisen in the case of a solution, especially the problematic issues concerning the refugees who would have been dislocated. The functioning of the newly established state would have brought new significant problems, but they have rid themselves of these problems.
- Pulling the military out of the island might have created new tensions both in *TRNC* and Turkey between the AKP and in conservative circles.

Furthermore this might have evolved into big political crises.

- The unwanted events that might have been created by fanatics on both sides who would have used the advantages of rapprochement have been prevented.
- The pressure put on Turkey by the international community and the political arena has been lifted. Turkey has rid itself of this burden without forsaking anything. The Greek Cypriots have lost their plausibility.
- Bearing in mind that in midterm the embargoes imposed on *TRNC* in one way or another will be less and the Turkish private companies will be able to invest more easily and light-heartedly in the North, we could say that the losses of the Turkish Cypriots would decline to a lesser extent.

What can clearly be seen from this perspective, and the most common evaluation being made by the Turkish Cypriots, is that following the referenda, Cyprus has been divided forever and can no longer be unified. From now on whatever kind of government takes office in Turkey, it will be unable to secure the support that the Annan Plan received. Whatever the plan - Annan Plan or another plan in a different name which might be proposed - it is not foreseen to bring about the unification of Turks and Greeks.

If the Greek Cypriot leadership is predicting that **"When Turkey comes to the point of full EU membership we could get what we want"**, we can immediately confirm that they are very wrong. Turkey could agree on some minor changes to the old Annan Plan, but these would not go beyond **"cosmetics"**. I could have imagined almost anything, but I would never have conceived how closed Papadopoulos' and Denktash's basical approaches could be. One wants the annexation of the North with Turkey and the other one wants to control the whole island.

In this whole struggle we have suffered so much. We are the really disappointed ones who are living with the taste of betrayal. The moderates have lost instead of the marginals.

NB. The English translation of Mr Birand's text has been provided  
by *The Cyprus Review* journal

# Twenty-one Years with Cyprus

**Keith Kyle**

I first came to Cyprus in 1983. At the time I was on the staff of Chatham House (a London think tank whose formal title is the Royal Institute of International Affairs) and on the board of the Minority Rights Group. Until the previous year I had also worked as a reporter and presenter for BBC Television, specialising in international problems. But these various commitments had never until then taken me to Aphrodite's isle. What did take me there was an issue within the Minority Rights Group, whose principal activity lies in the publication of monographs discussing clearly and dispassionately situations of ethnic friction around the world. Briefly the problem we then faced was that when it came to Cyprus one draft study was held by some members of the Group to be too pro-Turkish and another draft was held to be too pro-Greek. I was appealed to as a person who was accustomed to explicating difficult problems but who had no previous track record on Cyprus to fill the void.

I was greatly helped in approaching this task by my friendship with a Chatham House member, the late Nancy Crawshaw, whose lengthy study of *The Cyprus Revolt* was an excellent way into the subject and who supplied me with many useful contacts. Similarly my longstanding friendship with Costa Carras, one of the founders of the Friends of Cyprus organisation in London, was and is of great assistance. I decided at the outset that my instincts as a former BBC reporter and the character of MAG required me to deal evenly with Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots despite the awkwardness that the Turkish Cypriot north was, in the perspective not only of Greek Cypriots but also in that of the international community, Turkish occupied territory. To carry out my research I visited the two parts from London separately.

I made wide contacts in both parts of the island. The name of my publishers, stressing minority rights in a manner which in most situations but not in Cyprus (nor in Sri Lanka) would be recognised as friendly to the smaller community, was going to be a problem in the north. Fortunately I had read enough of Mr. Denktash's speeches to come to him forearmed for the challenge he threw out to me at once when we first met. When I came to write my report I was careful to spell out near the beginning of it that the rejection by the Turkish Cypriots of the concept of minority rights was of the essence of the problem.

My report was published early in 1984 and it was a matter of some satisfaction that, insofar as I was aware, no one regarded it as being biased in either direction. But I was not finished with Cyprus, not by a long chalk. Though many Cypriots feel that the world is insufficiently aware of the Cyprus Problem my experience has been that once anyone has become engaged with it he is liable to be hooked. It owes its strong drawing power to the fact that, although it concerns the fate of less than a million people, it involves issues and interests that are fundamental to the relations between peoples. Also Cypriots (of both kinds) are prodigious generators of paper and sponsors of conferences and seminars. My own files on Cyprus reach up to the ceiling and have frequently visited the island. To my delight as an historian I also find most books on the subject to be enormously rich in appendices, containing the full text of (selected) documents.

Costa Carras observed to me when I first became involved with Cyprus that demographically it was unfortunately placed. If the smaller community had numbered five per cent or less minority rights (which are by now fairly well defined) would clearly be the answer, as appears to be the case in respect of the Armenians, Latins and Maronites. If the Turkish Cypriots had amounted to forty per cent there would clearly have to be a partnership state. An 18:80 ratio is awkwardly in between; it broadly resembles the position of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the position the Irish Protestants would be in if there were to be a united Ireland. As it is in Northern Ireland the Roman Catholics are forty per cent plus and ever since the Good Friday Agreement the British have been attempting to assemble a regime based on there being two equally valid communities; we in Britain are painfully aware of the inherent difficulties and dangers of such a project.

It is understandable that Greek Cypriots should have very real difficulty in accepting the full implications of 18 being equal to 80 in so many respects within a united island. There is a habit in international circles of speaking of reaching a 'fair and just solution' of whatever may be in contest. But the plain fact is that such a solution regardless of regional strategic context is normally not on offer. Does anyone suppose, to take one other case, that any available solution to the Palestine problem will be 'fair and just' to the Arabs, who used to be the majority population of Palestine? In the case of Cyprus the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 established a framework – a bizonal, bicomunal federation – which would seem to represent a recognition by the larger Cypriot community of geostrategic realities. But what attempt was made to educate the population about the tough implications of what had in principle been conceded? To be blunt Turkey's military success was not going to be forcibly reversed by the UN or the US or anyone, anymore than was Israel's in the case of Palestine. Therefore the fairness and justice of any solution would need to be conditioned by what Turkey could be induced by political pressure to give up.

Although there were possibly two occasions when greater flexibility on the Greek Cypriot side could conceivably have led to a breakthrough, it is in general fair to ascribe to Mr. Denktash (and his personal influence with the Turkish establishment) the primary responsibility for the repeated failure of the UN Secretary-General's exercise of 'good offices'. But the very fact that this generally left the Greek Cypriots in occupation of the moral high ground seems to have enabled them to avoid close examination in public of what a bizonal, bicomunal federal system would actually involve. Specifically it requires a two-component federation on an ethnic basis. This is a notoriously difficult proposition in the absence of mutual goodwill and a determination to make the system work through informal channels. Michalis Attalides, in his paper on 'The Political Process in Cyprus and the Day After the Referendum' has been the latest to point out that 'this aspect of a proposed federation in Cyprus has never been the object of extensive public discussion.'

The Annan Plan was an attempt to spell out in thousands of words what the long-agreed formula would mean. It was not by any means the UN's first such attempt but it is probably true to say that, in its various formulations including its fifth and last it was the version which showed the most consideration for Turkish Cypriot and Turkish viewpoints. But Annan was clearly being influenced by constructive developments on the Turkish side, resulting in the marginalisation of Mr. Denktash, and also by Cyprus's rapidly approaching membership of the EU, which seemed to make the satisfaction of certain Turkish requirements much less significant.

In my opinion the UN Secretariat and other mediators (primarily the US and the UK) had become so focused on the task of outmanoeuvring Rauf Denktash that they had taken their eye off the Greek Cypriot ball. They assumed that the two main parties, representing seventy per cent of the electorate, could be relied upon to deliver a pro-Annan result in the referendum. That was clearly a mistake. The volume and intellectual vigour of Greek Cypriot criticisms of the Plan from the time of the publication of its first version should have given warning of the coming *debacle*.

The authors of the plan made some mistakes. It was surely inadvisable to churn out hundreds of pages of the final version only days before the vote, giving the impression of a desire to bounce the electorate into accepting the small print. The economic provisions were unimpressive, suggestive of expensive bureaucracy and also on other grounds open to responsible criticism. Some of the last-minute concessions to the Turks and Turkish Cypriots, of which the continuation indefinitely of the Treaty of Guarantee was a prime example, offered a cloth ear to well-known Greek Cypriot sensitivities. But, in the public statements of President Papadopoulos there are suggestions of a more fundamental challenge. 'The functionality and workability of the new state of affairs', a phrase he has used more than once to sum

up his opposition to Annan 5, sounds very like an objection to the logical consequences of any two-part federation, which if tested to breaking point will break. Similarly 'the just resolution of land and property issues in accordance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights' would mean that any number of Greek Cypriot property-holders in the North could take advantage of the precedent of the Loizidou decision to render meaningless any provision to reassure Turkish Cypriots that they will not find themselves outnumbered in their unit of the federation.

The President is right: a bizonal, bicommunal federation does not sit well with the principles of European law. But yet the EU agreed with Annan in being prepared to go remarkably far (farther than I had expected it to go) to accommodate a Cyprus settlement.

Contrary to the impression that is sometimes given of wilful external interference, it has always been the strategy of the Government of Cyprus to involve other countries and international institutions in the attempt to solve the Cyprus Problem. These have done their best by their own lights, even at some sacrifice of legal principle. The Greek Cypriots, who after all have to live with any solution, have decided, as is their privilege, that their best is not good enough. The EU may, as the Friends of Cyprus have advocated, offer to help improve the economic aspect of the Annan Plan. The FOC plan for use of a system of cross-voting – whereby Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would have the same agreed percentage input in each other's elections for federal bodies – might be looked at again as an aid to preventing intercommunal gridlock under a new federation. But basically it is now for local political leaders, Turkish Cypriot as well as Greek Cypriot, to show what they can do without outside input. Outsiders like myself will wish them well.







# **The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise**

**Andreas Theophanous**  
**Intercollege Press, (Nicosia, 2004) 218 pp.**

Students of the Cyprus problem and of the accession of Cyprus to the European Union cannot afford to ignore *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise* by Andreas Theophanous. And this because it sets out an effective and comprehensive analytical framework for examining the complex and sometimes tortuous interrelation between the contemporary historical development of the situation in Cyprus ('the Cyprus problem'), the historical confluence of factors and the specific human efforts setting Cyprus on an accession course to the European Union, international interests and divergences in interests surrounding these two developments, the actual content of the 'Annan Plan', and the possible future developments. This work has cleared analytical ground, accurately mapped out the relevant historical factors, and has created a framework which needs to be tackled by those writing about the Cyprus problem and the European accession of Cyprus. By implication, it highlights the shortcomings of those approaches which, for the sake of analytical rigour, abstract a variety of factors from the situation.

This is not to say that it is impossible to disagree with various elements in this book. It is to say rather that it sets out the terms on which disagreement or agreement needs to be set out. For example, it is not really possible to meaningfully write about the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot community in April, 2004, and not to try to understand the meaning that this plan had in political, economic and legal terms, and also to try to explain the differential interests and involvements of a variety of international actors.

The author does not attempt to in any way conceal his own view-point, clearly placing himself with those in Cyprus who said no to the Annan Plan. But in contrast to the rather purposeless, sometimes petty, and frequently backward-looking arguments that have been going on in Cyprus since the referendum, this book uses the analysis of past developments in order to attempt an estimate of where Cyprus currently finds itself, and the possible future developments. This is the approach Cypriots need to take if they are to follow Anna Diamantopoulou's wise advice on a recent visit to Nicosia to the effect that everyone must realise that we are all now under the constellation of 'No', but equally we must re-interpret this 'No' in a way that brings us together, that is 'No to non-solution.'

One of the ways of doing this is to focus, as part of this book does, on the strengths of the situation that Cyprus now finds itself in, including the value of Cyprus and of a solution of the Cyprus problem to the European Union, and to others. This reviewer would have preferred to see a little more on the demands now incumbent on Cyprus as a small, active EU member state, pursuing a European Union agenda, as well as a Cyprus problem agenda.

The author presents strong arguments illustrating the injustice, and, perhaps more importantly the fragility, of a number of elements of the Annan Plan. Reading Chapter V, in which the author lists a series of suggestions for ways in which the Annan Plan should be modified, it is difficult to avoid the thought that the changes proposed would make the plan quite similar to the proposals which the Greek Cypriot side put forward in 1989, after unanimous approval by the National Council. And of course which Greek Cypriot would claim that those proposals are not better than the Annan Plan. Certainly not this reviewer.

Nor is it easy to disagree with many of the shortcomings of the Annan Plan as analysed by the author, shortcomings with a clear and orthodox basis in political and economic theory. The fact that the Government at the time took a position against acceptance of the plan by the Greek Cypriots, does not obviate the need for an objective analysis of the plan, nor does it mean that the government's negative position was the only reason for the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots.

What is less clear is that the author fully takes into account the fact that though Greek Cypriots are now under the constellation of 'NO', and can develop strong arguments for the reasons for this, Turkish Cypriots are in fact under the constellation of 'Yes', and that for them the rational arguments for the Greek-Cypriot 'No' have the emotional weight of a rejection. Though it is true that the new situation offers opportunities, part of the difficulty of the situation is that pro-solution Cypriots on both sides now feel that they have legitimate reasons for grievance: the Turkish Cypriots for the Greek 'No', and the Greek Cypriots for the building boom in the occupied area on Greek Cypriot land, and the renewed flow of settlers from Turkey.

It is also true that there is a tendency for Turkey to try to say that the Annan Plan is the end of the road and that its acceptance of that model for a solution finally absolves it from any further obligation towards Cyprus. This is one reason that I find this book's analysis of the Helsinki deal unsatisfactory. In reality the rights and obligations imposed by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 are general and long-lasting and without direct links to the Annan Plan, which did not then exist. Cyprus was absolved from a condition of an antecedent solution of the Cyprus problem before accession, but not from the obligation to continue efforts towards a solution. Turkey was promised equal consideration as a candidate to EU

accession, but was accorded a political obligation to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem. This cannot be satisfied by a take it or leave it attitude to the Annan Plan.

I do not think that the characteristics of the Annan Plan which made it unacceptable to the majority of Greek Cypriots were related to failures of either the PASOK foreign policy of Greece or with European Union policies. These policies were very successful and among other achievements, contributed to altering the Ecevit government Turkish foreign policy ("The Cyprus problem was solved in 1974", "If Cyprus joins the EU our reaction will have no limits") to the Erdogan foreign policy. (These are not sufficiently distinguished in the book). The Annan provisions which were judged unacceptable by the Greek Cypriot majority have their origins rather in the cruel and unnatural conditions in which constitutional negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem took place since 1974, and which formed the antecedents of the Plan.

Finally I should mention that the book is well written and easy to read and avoids the jargon and illegibility which sometimes seems to accompany writing with claims to scientific status.

**Michalis Attalides**

## Call for Submissions

*The Cyprus Review* invites submissions for papers, which may address any topic relevant to Cyprus. We also welcome critical reviews of recent scholarly books of interest to the Island. We are interested in topics relating to the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus.

Scholarly essays should be written in English and range in length between 4,000 and 7,000 words. The use of graphics or illustrations is supported where appropriate.

Please send four copies of the manuscript together with a 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word and saved as rich text format, with the author's name deleted from two copies, to

The Editor  
The Cyprus Review  
Research and Development Centre  
Intercollege  
PO Box 24005  
1700 Nicosia  
Cyprus

For more information

Tel: +357 22-353702 ext 301  
Fax: +357 22-353682  
E-mail : [cy\\_review@intercollege.ac.cy](mailto:cy_review@intercollege.ac.cy)