THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic
and Political Issues

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Cyprus Review is an international bi-annual refereed journal which publishes articles on a range of areas in the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus. As such it aims to provide a forum for discussion on salient issues relating to the latter. The journal was first published in 1989 and has since received the support of many scholars internationally.

Articles should be original and should not be under consideration elsewhere.

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(i)   Articles should range between 6000-9000 words.

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The Cyprus Review uses British spelling, '-ise' endings (e.g. 'organise' and 'organisation').

As manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page. The author's full academic address and a brief biographical paragraph (approximately 60-100 words) detailing current affiliation and areas of research interest and publications should also be included.

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(v)   Quotations must correspond to the original source in wording, spelling and punctuation. Any alterations to the original should be noted (e.g. use of ellipses to indicate omitted information; editorial brackets to indicate author's additions to quotations). Single quotation marks (' ') are to be used to denote direct quotes and double (" ") to denote a quote within a quotation.

(vi)   Footnotes should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes (see vii below) and should be numbered consecutively in the text. Acknowledgements and references to grants should appear within the footnotes.

(vii)   References: As *The Cyprus Review* is a multi-disciplinary journal, either of the following formats are acceptable for references to source material in the text:
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        Books, monographs:
        James, A. (1990) *Peacekeeping in International Politics.* London: Macmillan.
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        Foley, C. and Scobie, W.I. (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus.* Starpod, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Articles and chapters in books:
Jacovides, A.J. (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed.* Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, pp. 13-68.
Journal articles:
McDonald, R. (1986) 'Cyprus: The Gulf Widens', *The World Today,* Vol. 40, No. 11, p. 185.

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(x) **Essays and Research Notes**. Essays on subjects relating to Cyprus should be unreferenced and range between 2000-4000 words in length. Research Notes should be in the region of 5000 words.

(xi) **Bibliography: Research and Publications on Cyprus:** new books, articles, book chapters, documents and PhDs are published annually in the Spring issue of the journal.

(xii) **Book Reviews** are normally 2000 words maximum in length. Headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, ISBN registration, e.g. *Cyprus and International Politics,* Essays by Van Coufoudakis, Intercollege Press (Nicosia, 2007) 306 pp. ISBN: 978-9963-634-45-3. The reviewer's name should appear at the end of the review plus a brief biographical paragraph (60-100 words). Guidance notes are available for book reviewers. This section also hosts reviews of publications in Greek and Turkish to help facilitate cross-linguistic referencing and research awareness. Alongside attention to the specificities of the locality the journal deals with, there is also a geographical aspect to the section's broadening of scope. It strives to review publications of thematic relevance to Cyprus studies, even if the focus of the works is not necessarily Cyprus *per se.* The editors hope to enable the opening up of new avenues of intervention by Cyprus scholars in wider academic debates (as well as the awareness of such intervention amongst Cyprus-focused researchers). Suggestions for publications that should be featured in the section are welcomed and can be sent to bookreviews.tcr@unic.ac.cy.

(xiii) Each author will receive two complimentary copies of the issue in which their paper appears in addition to a pdf to use for additional reprints.

(xiv) Articles submitted to the journal should be unpublished material and must not be reproduced for one year following publication in *The Cyprus Review.*

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INTRODUCTION

Cypriot In-dependence and the Problem of Sovereignty

Costas M. Constantinou

States have strange beginnings; more so postcolonial ones.

They can begin as settlements of incarceration for criminal Europeans (Australia). Or as projects of restorative justice making up for racist criminality and mass extermination (Israel). Or as sites of repatriation for emancipated Africans after centuries of slavery, rehabilitating through intra-colonialism (Liberia). States can come into being within imperial spaces of control, within territories and borders imagined by others (the case with most African states). States can succeed colonial rule over disparate lands and islands, tasked to govern a diverse pool of ethno-cultural communities (e.g. Indonesia, Philippines, Burma and Papua New Guinea). Or they can be conceived as strategic cartographies, carvings out of wider land and sea regions to ensure long term control over oil resources (e.g. Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Brunei). Or dreamt as dependencies and profiteering entities so as to establish favourable conditions for plantation economies or to share in the spoils of contraband trade (a number of Caribbean states). Or to built and secure a canal (Panama), or a railway line (Kenya), or a neutral buffer (Uruguay), or a trading and military base (Djibouti), and so on and so forth.

The Republic of Cyprus also has strange beginnings. Brought into being on an island that was rented by one empire to another, it was a state that was not supposed to be. None of the local communities demanded it and would simply not exist today if the locals got their way. At the time before independence, most Greek Cypriots wanted union with Greece (*enosis*), most Turkish Cypriots partition (*taksim*), and most other Cypriots from the smaller minorities the continuation of colonial rule. This meant that the newly established Republic of Cyprus begot considerable ambivalence at independence. It was invariably described as a 'realpolitik compromise', a 'reluctant republic', a 'self-determination substitute', an 'unwanted child', a 'sham' and other more or less felicitous terms that turned into sound bites and historical clichés. Furthermore, the independence of the Republic has been subjected to 'significant constitutional and treaty limitations': be it in the form of the right of intervention of the so-called Guarantor Powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey); or the inability to change the basic articles of the Constitution; or the presence of foreign troops securing the new state of affairs; or the existence of sovereign military bases and 'retained sites' on the island. The Cypriot postcolony was nominally a sovereign independent state, but in practice nothing less than a state of *in-dependence*.

The Cyprus question thus entailed from the very inception of the Republic a complex sovereignty problem that was to intensify in the years to come. It concerned the logic of constricted

sovereignty that was granted to the Republic, how that sovereignty was exercised by those who had it or claimed it or sought to split it, and how competing claims and exercises of sovereignty by the interested parties inevitably clashed. The public discourse of sovereign statehood was undermined by a range of old and new dependencies (political, juridical, military, ethno-cultural, etc.) and unreflectively followed the European, colonial conception of sovereignty that features a specific imaginary and a selective ethic of responsibility. I examine these issues which constitute the legacy of the Republic of Cyprus in more detail below while in parallel I introduce the different contributions of this Special Issue.

Before I do so, a brief comment on what it means to 'possess' or 'be' in a sovereign state today. State sovereignty is a core principle of the modern international system but it is rather ambivalent in the political states it brings about than conventionally accounted for in the literatures of international law and politics.[1] Beyond the standard rhetoric of political gain and liberty accompanying the creation of modern states – highlighting national fulfilment, self-determination and self-government, the ability to fully engage in international relations and organisations, and to join on 'equal' footing the international society of states – a more subtle loss always accompanies the advent of statehood. The state, *every* state, I have argued elsewhere, is always already a sedition to another state of being, a betrayal of another possible 'imagined community' or territorial organisation of power.[2] State legitimation and allegiance works by systematically trying to hide this 'other possibility' as well as the initiatory and/or continuous violence and exclusivist rhetoric that keeps that 'other possibility' at bay. Of course, this erasure is sometimes done for good reasons of maintaining social order, especially if the new state has come into being after many years of political division, violent struggle and disorder. Yet, the point I wish to underscore here is that whereas the existence of a state, on the one hand, symbolises the separateness and 'sovereignty' of a people, on the other hand, it limits the horizon of political community and possibility. Or differently expressed, 'the other to come', be it an *other* democracy, equality, justice and so on is 'an event that is necessarily without horizon', a 'weak force' that requires a priori 'a certain unconditional renunciation of sovereignty'.[3] To that extent, modern state sovereignty constitutes both an expression and a suppression of political possibility.

The existence of the Republic of Cyprus typifies this paradox of expression/ suppression of political possibility. Furthermore, the messianic utopia *(enosis* or *taksim)* that mobilised the

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1 For a range of critical reviews see J. Bartelson (1995) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds.) (1996) *State Sovereignty as Social Construct,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; S.D. Krasner (1999) *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, and R.B.J. Walker (2010) *Before the Globe/After the World,* New York: Routledge.

2 I have argued this point more extensively in C.M. Constantinou (2004) *States of Political Discourse: Words, Regimes, Seditions,* London: Routledge.

3 J. Derrida (2005) *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason,* translated by P-A. Brault and M. Naas, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. xiv.

struggle of the two main Cypriot communities became a constitutive Other *ab initio* – the *raison d'être* for having a new Republic – and something that was supposed to have been defeated, though in practice, for many, just pragmatically deferred. Cypriot public discourse at independence fully reflected the frustration with the messianic denial, the missed opportunity of the Cypriot people to redeem themselves and join those great idealised communities they have been spiritually prepared for (i.e. 'mother' Greece or 'mother' Turkey). The 'simple, unpretentious and to a large extent improvised' celebrations on the 16th of August 1960, the Day of Independence, marked the advent of an obscure state of being and indeed reflected a deep communal split. The event was perceptively – if on occasion ideologically – narrated by the Acting UK Representative for the inauguration of the Republic in a confidential report, which is introduced and discussed by Holland and Faustmann in their article and reproduced at the end of this Special Issue:

> 'People turned out to celebrate in great numbers, although it was not always evident what they were celebrating, for the birth of the Cyprus Republic attracted far less enthusiasm than, on the one hand, the return of the EOKA exiles or, on the other hand, the arrival of the Turkish army. The Cyprus flag was little in evidence. Street decorations, according to the area, were either of Greek or Turkish flags. The only non-communal decorations were those on the Shell garages. It was perhaps a happy coincidence that at approximately the same hour on the 16th of August each community had its separate focus of celebration in different sectors of Nicosia.'

The political elites were also not interested (some from the start, some later on) in enhancing the status and legitimacy of the new state, which they simply saw as either transitional or co-opted. Typically, the commemoration of the Cypriot independence was hardly ever celebrated in subsequent years, until it was sanctimoniously re-introduced for political reasons by Greek Cypriots in the post-1974 period, as recalled and reflected upon by Yiannis Papadakis in his contribution to this Special Issue. Greek and Turkish Cypriots, however, commemorated and continue to commemorate the independence struggles of their respective 'motherlands', the idealised states they sought to join but ultimately failed.

It is important to note, however, that due to different reasons and socio-political developments, this loss of *enosis* or *taksim* is not something Cypriots necessarily lament nowadays. The betrayal of the 'other possibility' progressively morphed into ethnic rather than civic understandings of local statehood. This brought about empowerment for domestic strands of sovereignty that became highly contested, incompatible and inhospitable to ethnic difference.[4] After the outbreak of the 1963-1964 intercommunal violence, Cypriots became increasingly in tune – mentally and

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4   On the political implications of ethno-nationalist claims in Cyprus, see for example N. Kizilyürek (1993) *Cyprus Beyond the Nation,* Nicosia; C. Mavratsas (1998) *Aspects of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus* [in Greek], Athens: Katarti.

psychologically if not always in discourse – with the 'present possibility' of separation and as such with exercises of sovereignty and states of exception that have been established in support of ethnic exclusion or division.[5] To that extent, their normative aspirations are not negotiated through reflective engagements with the logic of sovereignty but rather through pronouncements, claims and promotions of *local* sovereignty, which is presented as either quintessentially unitary or quintessentially divided.

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The Cyprus Republic constitutes an exception to the colonial transfer of full sovereignty. It has been described as a re-branding of the concept of internationalised territory, which is based on such legal constructs as the International City of Tangier, the International Settlement of Shanghai, and the Free Cities of Trieste and Danzig. This legal rationale was obviously not publicly pronounced at independence, but was meticulously enshrined in the Zürich-London Agreements (1959) and the Treaties that followed. As James Crawford – the foremost legal expert on state creation and periodically advisor to the Republic of Cyprus – put it, 'the various limitations on Cypriot sovereignty in effect introduced a form of internationalization by the back door'.[6] The front door proclaimed national independence and displayed all the façade and symbols of a single nation-state but in reality other nation-states were allowed to infiltrate the Republic through back legal and political channels. The peculiar sovereignty of the Republic rendered it an 'internationalized' state, under external supervision and guarantees, purportedly aimed to maintain a balance between competing local, regional and international interests.

It is important to note that the case of Cyprus goes beyond the usual postcolonial problems of sovereignty that have been described in the literature as being the result of the lack of positive sovereignty (e.g. limited or no governmental capacity and economic dependence). Robert Jackson usefully reflected on the distinction between *negative* and *positive* sovereignty to describe the status of many Third World states that may have formally achieved decolonisation and gained legal independence (i.e. negative sovereignty) but lacked the capability to exercise effective governance, transfer allegiance to the state, regulate borders and enforce central laws and regulations within their dominion (i.e. positive sovereignty).[7]

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5   C.M. Constantinou (2008) 'On the Cypriot States of Exception', *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 145-164, and N. Trimikliniotis (2010) *The Dialectic of the Nation-State and the State of Exception* [in Greek], Athens: Savallas.

6   J. Crawford (2006) *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 244.

7   See R. Jackson (1990) *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and for applications to the Cypriot case M. Constantinou (2006) 'Reasons of State and the Constitutional Logic of Quasi-Stateness: The Post-colonial Contradictions of Cyprus's Integration in the European Confederation', *Postcolonial Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 295-310.

Though the Republic of Cyprus may have exhibited a few problems of positive sovereignty itself, negative sovereignty has been the real problem. Specifically, who got the right to ultimately exercise it, under what conditions and under whose authorisation? This is something that became a bone of contention *between* the Greek and the Turkish communities of Cyprus, culminating in the intercommunal violence of 1963-1964, but also an issue *within* communities. Indeed as Diana Markides shows in her article for the Special Issue, within the Greek-Cypriot community, the Zürich-London Agreements created deep internal divisions that were mediated through a 'politics of honour', and in the end brought about a series of political contests and paramilitary violence between those who saw *enosis* as the continuing guiding light of the anti-colonial struggle and those who saw *enosis* as increasingly non-feasible in a postcolonial era.[8] The latter group saw the need progressively to enhance local sovereignty whereas the former the need to ultimately abolish it. The situation was not dissimilar in the Turkish-Cypriot community between the ethno-nationalist group that was committed to partition and those that displayed civic allegiance to the new Republic.

Furthermore, the Cypriot decolonisation process has remained incomplete at independence and this functioned as a legitimating pretext and discourse for new liberation struggles and (in)security schemes. Legally and politically the Republic had not gained the necessary degree of autonomy and independent decision making power granted to other, though certainly not *all,* postcolonial states. Vassilis Fouskas in his contribution for this Special Issue argues that the Republic of Cyprus constituted a typical 'garrison-prison state' which was meant to work for the security interests of imperial powers in the region rather than those of the Cypriot population.[9] Fouskas suggests that subsequent plans to settle the Cyprus problem, including more recently the 'Annan Plans' (2003-2004), far from reversing this imperial/neo-colonial state of affairs actually reinforced it by leaving intact the triarchy of guarantors as well as ethnic segregation.[10]

I have examined elsewhere the imperial subtext of the Republic's Treaty of Establishment and how certain aspects of the neocolonial transcript were not only left intact but re-packaged and camouflaged in the 2004 Annan Plan.[11] Having said that, how soon and at what cost the Cypriot Republic can get rid of this imperial package is a crucial political question and predicament that not only Cyprus but many a postcolonial state face nowadays. Let us recall that even the very idea

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8   Further on this see M. Drousiotis (2005) *The First Partition: Cyprus 1963-1964,* Nicosia: Alfadi.
9   Further on the strategic interests of the main powers and how they were pursued and clashed in Cyprus, see B. O'Malley and I. Craig (2001) *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion,* London: I.B Tauris; cf. J. Asmussen (2008) *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis,* London: I.B. Tauris, and A. Constandinos (2009) *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure,* Bloomington: AuthorHouse.
10   See further, V..K. Fouskas and A.O. Tackie (2009) *Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution,* London: Pluto Press.
11   C.M. Constantinou and O.P. Richmond (2005) 'The Long Mile of Empire: Power, Legitimation and the UK Bases in Cyprus', *Mediterranean Politics,* Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 65-84.

of the state is a colonial inheritance – and a bitter inheritance for many other states besides Cyprus – that had to be accepted by the colonised for political 'emancipation' to take place. A complex array of inherited routines, but also improvisations, has been intertwined with banalities of power and is never easy to disentangle in the postcolony.[12] This certainly demands that local state structures and their functioning need to be looked at much more carefully and indeed more holistically, as Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt suggest in their paper for this Special Issue. Specifically, the authors highlight the need to conceptualise state formations and competing practices of sovereignty in Cyprus through the lens of the changing imperial, regional and global settings. But also to look at the power implications of Cypriot regimes as exercised through an alliance between local nationalisms and doctrines of necessity.

There is always suspicion with politics, exacerbated in the postcolony and/or in protracted conflicts, that things are other than they appear or are supposed to be, given the range of real or imagined imperial infiltrations, international complicities and hidden agendas. This has created considerable mistrust for foreign peace interventions to solve the Cyprus Problem, including UN mediation and arbitration efforts that proved extremely unpopular for one or the other community at different periods after March 1964, as Farid Mirbagheri shows in his article for this Special Issue. This mistrust can certainly be exploited by politicians on either side to support ethno-nationalist agendas. But note that in Cyprus, and on the basis of the neocolonial potentate in place, there is ample room for imperial possibility as there is for postcolonial critique. Consider, for example, the militarization of space and the kind of rights that the UK has not only *within* but also *beyond* the 99 square miles of the territory of its two sovereign bases; i.e. rights that it enjoys both in the UK territory in Cyprus *and* in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Specifically, with respect to the latter, the right of the UK to retain additional military sites (to those of the British bases in Cyprus), and in times of emergency to have unobstructed use of Cypriot air space, some airfields and power stations, all the ports and harbours on the island, and if and where necessary the right to run them.[13] And because neocolonialism cannot be left to chance, the following quite revealing provision was ensured:

> 'The Government of the United Kingdom shall have *the right to obtain*, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, *the use of such additional rights* as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its Sovereign Base Areas and installations in the Island of Cyprus.' (Treaty of Establishment, Annex B, Part II, section 9; emphasis mine).

A right to more rights; unspecified and to be declared as one deems necessary. The potential of one state to acquire such rights (i.e. to take liberties) in the dominion of another 'after

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12   See A. Mbembe (2001) *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
13   For a longer discussion, see Constantinou and Richmond 'Long Mile of Empire'.

consultation'; the sovereign right to exceptionalise Cypriot space, if one so wishes, and predicated on a colonial jurisprudence of emergency that remains unchallenged despite Cypriot independence and EU accession.[14] So if one thinks that the issue of sovereignty in Cyprus has been settled through formal power transfer in 1960 or is simply a Greek-Turkish contest, it is imperative that one reads carefully and soberly the publicly forgotten annexes of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment.

It befits the irony of Cypriot statehood that its exceptionality was drafted by proponents of the 'total state'. One of the main authors of the Cypriot constitution was Ernst Forsthoff, a student of Carl Schmitt – known for his controversial work on sovereignty as the regulation of the exception. Ironically, the Republic itself started as a state that other sovereigns treated as an exception. From a juridical and political perspective, it was meant to *totally* lack the features and authority of the 'total state' that Forsthoff theorised in his writings, i.e. the pre-constitutional persona that encapsulated decisionism, that could exercise sovereignty, absolutely and authoritatively from a single source.[15] The international Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance that constricted Cypriot sovereignty, became the basis of the Cypriot constitution and the framework of political possibility in Cyprus. By contrast to the 'manly states' of the modern international system, the Republic of Cyprus was effeminised or castrated.[16]

Further to political incompleteness, culturally decolonisation remained incomplete, bearing similarities to other postcolonial experiences,[17] as Vassos Argyrou argues in his article for this Special Issue. Specifically, Argyrou suggests that the spell of western European modernity – the 'spectre of Europe' – played a hegemonic role in the newly independent Cyprus and in the formation of Cypriot subjectivity that remained subservient to colonial ideas and ideals. More controversially, Argyrou argues that publicly the pursuit of western, European modernity has also been used to divide rather than unite the ethnic communities in Cyprus. Given the domestication and ethnicisation of European modern aspirations and the new hierarchies this created, it has become impossible for the Cypriot mind to be (fully) decolonised. The best hope for redemption is to learn to live with this cultural paradox and tragic condition and to find ways to minimise its negative impact.

Arguments about the quintessential exceptionality, bicommunality and internationality of

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14   N. Hussain (2003) *The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law*, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

15   See E. Forsthoff (2000) 'The Total State' an extract of which can be found in A.J. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds.), *Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis*, Berkley: University of California Press, pp. 320-323.

16   On castration and phallocentricity in state discourse, see C. Weber (1999) *Faking It: US Hegemony in a 'Post-Phallic' Era*, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press; C. Hope (2001) *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations and Gender Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

17   Among other works, see J.N. Pieterse and B. Parekh (eds.) (1995), *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power*, London: Zed Books.

the Republic of Cyprus were extensively appropriated to build the case for the major challenge to the Republic's sovereignty that came in the form of the Turkish-Cypriot secession and unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.[18] The TRNC was declared 'invalid' by the UN Security Council Resolution 541 and, with the exception of Turkey, has remained internationally unrecognised. It has been recently suggested by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo that, by contradistinction, the Security Council in Resolution 1251 (1999) on Cyprus has established 'restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory', meaning that, unlike the case of Kosovo, the future State of Cyprus should have 'a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded'.[19] In short, this is meant to provide the fixed parameters within which the Cypriot sovereignty issue ought to be negotiated.

However, as suggested by both sympathisers and critics of this position, the issue of Turkish-Cypriot secession is bound to re-emerge and be hotly re-contested – and possibly reversed or 'Taiwanized' given that state recognition is not just a legal but a political decision – if there is no comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Problem in the near future. The issue also reveals continuous divisions of principle or degree within the Turkish-Cypriot community about the value and status of TRNC. And it also refers back to the complex relationship between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as developed since 1960; specifically the diverse experiences of the enclave period, the militarization of lives and habitats before and after 1974, the Turkish settlement and migration policies, the political contestations before and after the Annan Plan referendum, including the relationship of Turkish Cypriots to the Republic of Cyprus, and more recently the question of Turkish and EU financial support.[20]

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18   On the legal rationale used to support the TRNC declaration, see M. Tamkoc (1988) *The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination,* London: Rustem. An issue that has become rather sensitive but something of a false dilemma in my view is whether to put TRNC in inverted commas or not. Personally – and for scholarly reasons that demand the recognition of plural perspectives – I do not use inverted commas when referring to the TRNC as I would not do when referring to other *de facto* states such as Ahkbazia, Transnistria, Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh or the Republic of China (Taiwan). The absence of inverted commas in scholarly or non-official writings does not elevate a *de facto* state to a *de jure* state, nor does it entail recognition or approval of the regime and its policies. The situation is of course different for the officials of governments and international organisations with ability to grant international legal recognition, though there are also limits to implied recognition as extensively registered in international law but often unacknowledged in Cyprus problem discussions. On this point see further, C.M. Constantinou and Y. Papadakis (2001) 'The Cypriot State(s) in Situ: Cross-Ethnic Contact and the Discourse of Recognition', *Global Society,* Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 125-148. Further on the wide range of issues surrounding unrecognised states see T. Bahcheli, B. Bartmann and H. Srebrnik (eds.) (2004) *De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty,* Oxford: Routledge.

19   Par. 114 of the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo at: [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf].

20   On identity politics, patterns and transformations within the Turkish Cypriot community, see H. Larcher and E. Kaymak (2005) 'Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus', *Mediterranean Politics,* Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 147-166; M. Hatay (2008) 'The Problem of Pigeons: Orientalism,

Being the intervening 'saviour' for most Turkish Cypriots (though also 'occupying force' for a rather small but vocal minority of them), Turkey currently exercises *de facto* sovereignty in the northern part of Cyprus as far as international law is concerned. Although who owns that *de facto* sovereignty may be clear in international law, it is not a settled issue within the Turkish Cypriot community. On the one hand, proclaimed independence has been lamented by many left-wing parties who saw it as complicating and in the long term undermining the reunification of the island. On the other hand, it has been viewed as a tactical move by right-wing parties either to ensure parity over the exercise of sovereignty *vis-à-vis* the Greek-Cypriot community, or as a stepping stone to eventual partition and the integration of the north into Turkey. However both left-wingers and right-wingers would seek to defend the independence, autonomy or integrity of the Turkish-Cypriot community and/or the TRNC, if they perceived the policies of the Turkish government to run contrary to local demands and aspirations. As Bahcheli and Noel show in their article for this Special Issue, the proclamation of the TRNC brought about both intended and unintended consequences, and this ambivalence is reflected both on party politics and intra-community relationships as well as on relations with Turkey.

The relations of Greek Cypriots with Greece have been equally complex. The 'natural' or 'unfeasible' goal of *enosis* has begot divisions within the Greek-Cypriot community and led to constitutional crises, assassination attempts against the President and finally the July 1974 coup that led to the Turkish military intervention and division of the island. Greece was discredited but to a large extent redeemed itself with the Helsinki strategy that led to Cyprus' accession to the EU without the settlement of the Cyprus Problem as prerequisite, as outlined by Michalis Attalides in his article for this Special Issue. In a visit to Cyprus after the Copenhagen EU Summit where the accession deal was sealed, the otherwise careful and low-profile Prime Minister of Greece, Kostas Simitis, ambivalently announced that *enosis* (union) was achieved. Hardly anyone missed the nuance that this was not just 'union' with the EU but the longed-for union with Greece through the EU. Of course this kind of *enosis* was in effect very different than what was imagined in the 1950s, given the multilayered governance and division of sovereignty that exists within the EU. Similarly any form of partition would be very different, if both sides effectively remain within the EU; that is, it would be very different than what was imagined in the 1950s or 80s.

All in all, Europeanization has brought about interesting developments and ambiguous effects with regard to the Cyprus conflict as Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci suggest in their article. Clearly, top-down attempts at conflict transformation have not worked as intended and currently rather than Europeanization in a single direction we see a degree of 'Cypriotization' of European

Xenophobia and a Rhetoric of the "Local" in North Cyprus', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall), pp. 145-171, and Y. Navaro-Yashin (2003) 'Legal/Illegal Counterpoints: Subjecthood and Subjectivity in an Unrecognized State' in R.A. Wilson and J.P. Michell (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Perspective: Anthropological Studies of Rights, Claims and Entitlements*, London: Routledge, pp. 71-92.

policies.[21] Whether this will continue or not remains to be seen. But in any case it directly speaks to the elevation of Cypriot statehood and sovereignty that James Ker-Lindsey outlines in his article, though it is not at all certain how this will play out in the future. From a traditional geopolitical perspective the Republic can indeed be seen to be flexibly moving or 'upgrading' itself from the 'non-aligned movement' to the 'western alliance' with consequences for its political status and security. This is something that raises new questions about the moral and political limits of sovereignty as well as on how it should be exercised on the island.

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Sovereignty as an 'authorization of authority' has been used to legitimate a wide range of political orders and power regimes across the globe. As a territorial ideal, it has been employed to organise power and monopolise legal force spatiotemporally, over a wide range of citizens and 'others'. As a prime source of law, it has begotten rights within its dominion and shown that it can − if reasons of state so demand − legitimate the illegitimate. Although this positive law doctrine has been challenged with the rise of natural law and human rights, the notion of going beyond 'the law', the dark side of sovereignty remains a core feature of the modern European understanding of sovereignty. Sovereignty has been too often crudely understood as having 'the power to sin'.[22]

The Western classic account of sovereignty is provided in the sixteenth century writings of Jean Bodin. Bodin is generally credited for defining sovereignty as 'the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth'.[23] But his crucial reflections on the anomic potential of sovereignty are often missed by contemporary theorists; specifically how, for Bodin, to be a sovereign also meant to be exempted from the laws of one's predecessors and not to be obliged to follow one's own laws (key aspects of the modern theory of sovereignty that were later developed by Carl Schmitt).[24] Bodin was influenced by an extremely patriarchal and problematic understanding of law and authority, specifically recalling the right over life and death that early Roman men had not only over their slaves but over their children and women (in the case of women the Law of Romulus

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21   On the potential of the EU for conflict transformation see T. Diez, M. Albert and S. Stetter (eds.) (2008) *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; T. Diez and N. Tocci (eds.) (2009) *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, and G. Christou (2010) 'The European Union, Borders and Conflict Transformation: The Case of Cyprus', *Cooperation and Conflict,* Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 1-24.

22   G. Bataille (2001) *The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge,* translated by M. Kendall and S. Kendall, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, p. 198.

23   J. Bodin (1955) *The Six Books of the Commonwealth,* Book 1, Chapter 8, available at: [http://www.constitution.org/bodin].

24   C. Schmitt (1988) *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,* translated by G. Schwab, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

allowed the husband to kill his wife if she committed adultery, for being habitually drunk and for having duplicate keys). Bodin actually wanted that right to be brought back to contemporary society and to be extended so that the husband could be the absolute ruler over all affairs in the family.[25] In similar fashion, the sovereign king ought to be, for Bodin, an idealised *pater familias* or a god on earth.

Bodin's notion grounded sovereignty as an absolute authority putatively settling all issues and conflicts yet itself remaining unchallenged and unaccountable. Though one can see the historical circumstances in Europe that led to such extreme conception (i.e. the need to emancipate the political community from ecclesiastical and imperial authority), alternatives of sovereignty as ethical conduct, conducive to good governance were sidelined; including the idea that the sovereign is someone who uses appropriate means not simply someone who achieves appropriate ends. Though a softer and participatory version of sovereignty was implicit in the project of the European Enlightenment and contractual theories of statehood, in the colony the harder and darker version of sovereignty was applied. As Achille Mbembe argues, state sovereignty in the colony entailed both a weakness of rights (for the natives) and an inflation of rights (for the colonisers and their privileged associates). It was also based on a range of violent acts; conquests, extra-legal authorisations and daily rituals of banalised violence and rights to dispose.[26] Exercises of western notions of state sovereignty both in Europe and beyond remained on the whole reflexively unaware of the shifting meaning of legitimate authority, the changing realities, interests and histories that constantly problematise notions about 'who is Same and who is Other', who is – or ought *not* to be – the subject or object of one's authority.[27]

I engage in this historical detour because I think it is important to recall the negative inheritance of sovereignty, which entails *inter alia* the ability to go beyond the law yet to remain within the law, or to legislate exceptions that justify state action contrary to previous laws or simply so as to escape the responsibilities of an inconvenient legal regime. Cyprus is unfortunately a good case study of that, because of the employment of rationales to exceptionalise spaces and people in ways that are ethically dubious, yet progressively naturalised and normalised through claims to sovereign authority. Consider for example: (1) how the British sovereign can insist that the territory of the Bases in Cyprus will not be part of the EU, even though the Republic and the UK is, and only reluctantly and partially accepted referral to the European Court of Human Rights after 2004; (2) how the Republic of Cyprus can suspend basic articles of its Constitution after 1963 and develop new laws and institutions under the doctrine of necessity that excluded Turkish Cypriots from sharing power; and (3) how the Turkish-Cypriot regime in the north can claim

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25   See *The Six Books of the Commonwealth*, Book 1, Chapter 2-5 available at: [http://www. constitution.org/bodin].
26   Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, pp. 25-35.
27   Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty.*

sovereignty to legalise exclusion and ethnic cleansing as well as the mass expropriation of Greek-Cypriot property.

Equally disturbing are the silences and denials that accompany these problematic exercises of sovereignty. As Rebecca Bryant shows in her article for this Special Issue, this is for many the bitterest aspect of the conflict. The encounter across the divide with people who are only vocal about one's own injury, or deny the other's publicly known injury, or treat it as irrelevant or inconsequential. Following from Stanley Cohen's work,[28] Bryant shows both in her article and more extensively in her recent book,[29] how socially disturbing and politically problematic are the explicit and implicit denials of responsibility or acknowledgements of harm. The daily 'little' injuries and humiliations remain a collateral of sovereignty, whose representatives only tend to highlight the necessities of 'high politics', rhetorically utilising injuries against 'us' while forgetting those of 'others'.

The spatial segregations that have taken place in 1963-1964 and 1974 have exploited exclusive or nascent sovereignty claims to break cross-ethnic bonds of solidarity and allegiance in Cyprus. They have also made it difficult for inter-ethnic encounters to occur, beyond the officially sanctioned collaborations that putatively ensured against the recognition of ethnicised sovereignty, and which castigated the unauthorised ones as being at best risky and at worst treacherous. To that extent, Cypriots found it difficult to inhabit or establish a 'third space' beyond the Greek and Turkish *ethnoi*. This third space was nonetheless possible in 'zones of indeterminancy'. As Julie Scott shows in her article for this Special Issue, gambling spaces could function as potential spaces of agency that 'counter the polarising tendencies of the Cypriot public sphere'. In other words, and contrary to the popular critique levied against the dubious character of such encounters, she highlights the hidden political possibility that comes within such spaces, specifically in restoring the cultural intimacy destroyed by crude practices of sovereignty.

In supporting problematic practices of sovereignty, conflict communication and the role of the media have been crucial. As Christophoros Christophorou shows in his article for this Special Issue the alliance of the media and the ruling elites has had adverse implications on the democratic deficit of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, it has impacted on how the Cyprus Problem is popularly perceived as a series of betrayals, conspiracies, compromises and co-optations. Rather than controlling the power holders, the mass media has for the most part worked to support the discourses and policies of the power regimes within which they operated.[30] Educational policy and history textbooks have also been complicit in this regard as shown by Philippou and Klerides in

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28   S. Cohen (2000) *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering,* Cambridge: Polity Press.
29   R. Bryant (2010) *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
30   See also C. Christophorou, S. Şahin and S. Pavlou (2010) *Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem,* Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre.

their article for this Special Issue. Specifically they suggest that Greek-Cypriot education since independence veered 'between discourses of Hellenocentric, Cypriocentric and Helleno-cypriocentric identity at different historical periods' following the dictates of hegemonic discourse and changes in the dominant ideology. Turkish-Cypriot education demonstrates a similar pattern of discursive shifts at different historical periods along a Turkish *vis-à-vis* Cypriot axis. The socio-political implications of such educational practices are tremendous and can only be reversed through sustained pedagogies of reconciliation.[31]

The exercise of an ethnocratic form of sovereignty – with the people or the demos progressively defined in terms of a single ethnicity – had adverse effects not only for the 'enemy' ethnicity but also for the various ethno-cultural groups that were caught in between the Greek-Turkish divide.[32] The situation of the latter is described by Andrekos Varnava in his article for this Special Issue as a problem of 'internal-exclusion' whereby minorities experience strong policies of assimilation and discrimination.[33] Arjun Appadurai suggests this fear of the minority as being based on an 'anxiety of incompleteness',[34] which can further explain identity politics and the dominance of bi-communalism in Cyprus. Not a minority in a numerical sense, but certainly a subordinate and disadvantaged group are Cypriot women. Although there have been advancements in women's rights across the ethnic divide since independence, Hadjipavlou and Mertan argue in their article for this Special Issue, that women are marginalised because of a patriarchal discourse that has assigned specific gender roles and tasks and which are especially entrenched because of the ethnic conflict and militarization of society. In this respect, ethnocentric exercises of sovereignty have been closely allied with androcentric ones.[35]

The role that the Orthodox Church in Cyprus has played in domestic politics should also be addressed. The Church was declared autocephalous (or ecclesiastically autonomous) centuries

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31 See S. Philippou (2007) 'On the Borders of Europe: Citizenship Education and Identity in Cyprus', *Journal of Social Science Education*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 68-79; S. Philippou and A. Varnava (2009) 'Constructions of Solution(s) to the Cyprus Problem: Exploring Formal Curricula in Greek-Cypriot State Schools' in A. Varnava and H. Faustmann (eds.), *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 194-212; Y. Papadakis (2008) 'Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus', *History and Memory*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 128-148, and M. Zembylas (2008) *The Politics of Trauma in Education*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

32 C.M. Constantinou (2007) 'Aporias of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity and the "Cyprus Problem"', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 247-270.

33 See further A. Varnava, N. Koureas and M. Elia (eds.) (2009) *The Minorities of Cyprus: Development Patterns and the Identity of Internal Exclusion*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

34 A. Appadurai (2006) *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, Durham: Duke University Press.

35 See C. Cockburn (2004) *The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus*, London: Zed Books, and M. Hadjipavlou (2010) *Women and Change in Cyprus: Feminisms and Gender in Conflict*, London: I.B. Tauris.

before Cyprus as a polity became 'independent'. Since 1960, what has proved especially controversial was the continuation of ethnarchy in the Republic of Cyprus, that is, the political role that the Archbishop maintained in a formally secular, multi-religious state and which made it possible for Archbishop Makarios to be President from 1960 until his death in 1977. This symbolism was unacceptable not only to many Turkish Cypriots but also to some Greek Cypriots who saw in his rule an abuse of both religious and political office. An interesting and revealing issue that has recently resurfaced and currently debated is the status of contracts that Makarios signed between himself, i.e. as President of the Republic and as leader of the Church, and now seen as blatantly favouring the latter. Yet as Marios Sarris shows in his article for this Special Issue, it would be wrong to see the Orthodox Church in Cyprus as a monolith. It is a complex polymorphous organisation, combining a variety of strands, and even though the ethnarchic strand seems to be more vocal in the news and with strong or hard line views on the Cyprus Problem (mainly through the current Archbishop, Chrysostomos II) this strand is certainly not unchallengeable from within the Church and its views are not necessarily the 'view' of the Church which is only officially represented by decisions of the Synod. The interventions of the Orthodox Church in Cypriot politics thus need to be properly contextualised.

A lot of the legitimacy that the Church has – and also a lot of its illegitimacy – derives from the religious/political patronage it exercises. Its ability to do favours, secure jobs, influence appointments certainly makes it a powerful institution. But on this point it is certainly not as powerful as Cypriot political parties. As Hubert Faustmann shows in his article for this Special Issue, the culture of patronage and nepotism has been a distinctive feature of the history of the Republic of Cyprus from the start. Interestingly, even attempts at more transparency and accountability for the governmental and semi-governmental boards in the 1990s have ended up in re-legitimising party politicisation, i.e. specifically with an agreement to share positions among all the major parties rather than allowing the monopolisation of appointments by the political party or parties in power. This can explain why political parties retain such a prominent role in Cypriot social life (e.g. with separate coffee-houses in most villages on the basis of party affiliation) while Cypriots remaining very distrustful of politicians and publicly critical of the *rusfeti* culture.

Overall this Special Issue raises questions about the local exercise of power in postcolonial Cyprus and the dominant discourses that have supported regimes of sovereign power, and which in turn authorise the kind of exclusions, discriminations and abuses of rights described above and seen as the privilege of sovereignty. To that extent, there is need for less policy-oriented and more reflective approaches to statehood, sovereignty and authority. To utilise ancient Greek philosophy for such reflection, it has been suggested that the ancient Greeks envisioned the necessity of *theoria* when they realised that their polis was not eternal but a finite and perishable entity.[36] Note that for

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36   H. Arendt (1958) *The Human Condition,* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

them, the polis was not a mere city-state or territorial regime of power but actually *the gathering of the many in deliberation over affairs they held in common.*[37] The polis was therefore lost, its legitimate authority and power was lost, **not only** when a foreign power occupied the city or took over its decision making processes, **but also** – and this is very important – when the polis was debased, when it no longer served its deliberative and reflective purpose, which, for post-Socratic philosophers, was not order and the maximisation of power, but primarily justice and spiritual happiness.

This more reflective approach to political activity and power radically opposes Bodin's understanding; it views legitimate authority or sovereignty not as absolute and perpetual power, but as conditional and ephemeral power. Sovereignty is seen not as a mere right granted to a certain collectivity to indiscriminately act in whatever way it sees fit but as something one has to continually struggle to earn and retain, through reflection, deliberation, good governance and just exercise of power (through *eunomia*). This more philosophical 'other sovereignty' is not a mere privilege but entails a challenge to transform law and rights into justice and peace; to exercise authority in a spirit of fairness and solidarity to all concerned.

Fifty years after Independence, Cypriots still have quite a long way to go before they exercise enlightened authority and fair governance. Since the establishment of the Republic they have squandered and alienated part of their already partial sovereignty in the way they claimed and practised it. To be sure, foreign practices of sovereignty are also to blame though this should not serve as an alibi for non-responsibility and non-reflection by the locals. In the end, I do not know whether the strange beginning of the Republic fifty years ago will have a happy or unhappy end. But I do know that no matter what kind of settlement we end up having in Cyprus, Cypriots will not regain any of that 'other sovereignty', unless they learn to exercise power and authority carefully, sensitively and ethically.

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37   Of course one needs to register here the crude ideological biases of the ancient Greek polis, namely the exclusion of women, slaves and permanent foreign residents from political affairs.

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ARTICLES

PART A

THE STATE OF INDEPENDENCE

Independent Cyprus?
Postcoloniality and the Spectre of Europe

Vassos Argyrou[*]

Abstract

This essay reflects on the postcolonial condition in Cyprus and argues that political independence does not mean the end of colonialism. Power is not merely what prevents people from doing what they wish to do but also, and more importantly, what colonises the mind and predisposes them to think and act in specific ways. The main contention of the essay is that 'independent' Cyprus is ruled by the idea of Europe and the desire to be recognised and confirmed as a modern European society. The essay further argues that it is largely because of this idea that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have not managed to live together on this island. They have been trying to reach this phantom destination – modernity – travelling apart.

Keywords: colonialism, postcolonialism, Europe, modernity, European hegemony, ethnic conflict

The Colonised Mind

In a well-known book on subjection Judith Butler (1997) begins her discussion on the topic by pointing out that power is usually understood as something exerting pressure on the subject from the outside, preventing it from doing what it wishes to do or forcing it to do things that it does not wish to do. This is both the commonsense experience of power and the liberal conception of it but this modality, which is no doubt real, does not exhaust either what power is or what it does. If one were to follow Foucault, Butler says, one would have to acknowledge the existence of another form and function of power, namely, as that which is '*forming* the subject as well … providing the very conditions of its existence and the trajectory of its desire' (1997, p. 2). The consequences of this understanding of power are far-reaching. If it is power that forms the subject, if there is no subject without power, anything that the subject does, including resisting power, is bound to reproduce it. We live in 'postliberatory times', Butler says (1997, p. 18) in her book. If we do, it is because the subject (whether individual or collective) is beyond liberation.

The choice of Foucault as the leading authority on the question of power is understandable but it is important to bear in mind that the substance of his argument if not the medium through which it is expressed is hardly new, let alone 'postmodern'. That the subject is formed, that it is the

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product of historical, social and cultural conditions is a fundamental sociological premise whose development can be traced from Marx and Durkheim to Mannheim and Bourdieu, to mention only a few key figures. Related to this is the equally fundamental question of the liberation of the subject from social conditioning, which is to be achieved though 'socio-analysis', that is, by making conscious the unconscious in history, society and culture, thereby bringing motivation and action under rational control. Let us also note here that this premise forms the basis of the sociological distinction between the modern and the traditional, Europe and non-Europe, in effect between supposedly reflexive, rational and free societies and those in which the social is experienced as immutable nature.[1] I shall return to this division in due course.

It should be apparent that the conventional political discourse ('political' in the narrow sense of the term) which equates independence with the end of colonial rule operates with the commonsense, liberal conception of power. But there is another much broader sense of the political – what is often called the 'politics of culture' or identity – and another story to be told about power, namely, as that which colonises the mind and rules the subject from within. As Talal Asad points out, this other story 'tells of European imperial dominance not as a temporary repression of subject populations but as an irrevocable process of transmutation, in which old desires and ways of life were destroyed and new ones took their place' (1991, p. 314). It tells of the postcolonial condition and presents us with the paradox in which apparently independent, self-determining *nation-states* conform freely to the dictates of European power. If this story can be told at all, it is precisely because power can be conceptualised as that which forms subjects, a way of life that generates specific desires and accounts for specific actions. And if this story were to be told from the beginning, one would have to start with the most fundamental manifestation of European power and the most burning desire that this power generated in the colonies. This is none other than the desire to become like European societies, which meant, first and foremost, nation-states in their own right. 'One is tempted to say', says Zizek (2000, p. 255) in his discussion of this modality of power, 'that the will to gain political independence from the colonizer in the guise of a new independent nation-state is the ultimate proof that the colonized ethnic group is thoroughly integrated into the ideological universe of the colonizer'. Nationalism then, becomes the mark of a fundamental complicity with the colonisers, their mode of thought and way of being in the world.

This tacit recognition of the coloniser as the source of all legitimate signification about what it means to Be – a person, an ethnic community, a society – is completely lost in the politics of independence, nowhere more so than at the 'moment of manoeuvre', as Chatterjee (1986) calls the time of anti-colonial struggle. For this is the time when a critique of European modernity becomes necessary for the mobilisation of the colonised. Chatterjee uses the case of Gandhi to illustrate this point. As is well-known, Gandhi produced a sweeping critique of European modernity but one thing he could not reject was the idea that the only way to be an ethnic community was in the

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1   For a recent reiteration of this Eurocentric view see, among others, Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992).

form of an independent nation-state. Without taking on board this modernist assumption, he would have no grounds to struggle against British colonial rule and to call for independence. And because he did take this assumption on board, he ended up slipping into modernist thinking more and more. As Chatterjee points out, when Gandhism was forced to deal with practical organisational issues of what was after all a bourgeois political movement, 'it would argue in terms of categories such as capitalism, socialism, law, citizenship, private property, individual rights, and struggle to fit its formless utopia into the conceptual grid of post-Enlightenment social-scientific thought' (1986, p. 112). No doubt, the case of Gandhi is a limiting case, but no less instructive for this reason. To paraphrase Bourdieu (1984) who raises this issue in another context, because the opponents agree sufficiently on the stakes to fight for them, it makes little difference whether one emphasises the disagreement that divides them in complicity or the complicity that unites them in disagreement.

Cyprus and the Spectre of Europe

This brief commentary on how power may be conceptualised beyond its commonsense experience and liberal understanding, sketches the context in which I wish to discuss the 50 years of Cypriot 'independence' from British colonial rule which is currently upon us. It is true, of course, that independence was not the first choice of Greek Cypriots. As is well known, the anti-colonial struggle was fought in the name of union with Greece. It is true also that Cyprus is now a member of the European Union. But neither of these factors takes anything away from the fact that 50 years down the road Cyprus remains a post colony, a society formed during the colonial period and hence a society also that cannot not reproduce the colonial power that formed it. What has been ruling Cyprus during these 50 years was not Cypriots themselves but rather, through them, the idea of Europe, a spectre that accounts for the nationalist nightmares experienced in this country during its recent history.

As I argued elsewhere (Argyrou, 1996), the Greek Cypriot desire to make Cyprus a Greek province rather than an independent country presupposes a set of fundamental Eurocentric premises. The first is the premise taken on board by all colonised societies that strove for independence – the division of the world between civilised and primitive societies or, as in the post World War II lexicon, between the modern and traditional, which is to say, 'backward'. This is also the premise taken on board by all those peripheral societies, such as Greece and Turkey, whose vision of the world has been colonised by the idea of Europe, even though they have never been colonies in the formal sense of the term. The second premise is the European claim that ancient Greece was the cradle of civilisation, which is to say, according to this logic, post-Enlightenment European culture – the culture of democracy, rationality, science and so on.[2] This premise gave

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2   For a discussion of the European invention of ancient Greece as the cradle of civilisation see Bernal (1987).

Modern Greek identity a unique advantage over all dominated identities in the world (Arab, Oriental, African, Indian and so forth). The best any post colony could ever hope for was to modernise and become *like* Europe – similar but never quite the same, as Bhabha (1994) says. By contrast, Greece and to a lesser extent Cyprus could claim to be part of Europe already – for historical and cultural reasons, it is often said – despite the fact that they were still lagging behind it. Although still modernising, which in this case meant de-Ottomanising, they had the right to claim European identity on account of being Greek. It is in this context that the Greek Cypriot desire to unite with Greece rather than become an independent country should be understood. Being at best in the margins of Europe, at worst in the Middle East or the 'Levant', as the British called it during colonial times, and having its Hellenic credentials often questioned by the British,[3] Greek Cypriot society opted for the cultural security provided by the 'cradle of civilisation'. Independence was not its choice and when it came in 1960 it took a long time to find support. It was not until well after 1974 and the division of the island that the idea became widely accepted but even then the implicit understanding was that Cyprus would be another Hellenic state and hence a society that, as I have been arguing here, could claim by right to be part of Europe or more broadly the West. The political realities notwithstanding, this compromise seems to have become possible partly because Greek Cypriots had by this time come to see themselves as more modern and European than mainland Greeks – because of a better functioning bureaucracy, for example, and no doubt also because of the unprecedented affluence that was achieved by the late 1980s.

In 2004 Cyprus was admitted to the EU and the fact was celebrated with all the necessary fanfare. The decision to join the EU, it is often said, was guided by pragmatic considerations, political as well as economic. I underline the word 'decision' because the pragmatic people who argue in this way imply a voluntarism that has no basis in reality. To begin with, they imply that the EU was ready to embrace Cyprus with open arms should it decide to join. They also imply that there was considerable scepticism in the country about the prospect of joining, in which case all the pros and cons would need to be debated and taken into consideration; or that a different historical alternative to being (or claiming to be) European – which the EU membership formalised – was ever seriously considered so that a decision had to be made as to which way to go. On this last point, it is instructive to note that although Cyprus was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has never considered itself to be part of the 'Third World'. On the contrary, being 'third-worldly' *(tritokosmikos)* is for Greek Cypriots synonymous to being 'backward'. An index of the importance of the country's European credential over whatever ties and affinities it maintained with the rest of the world is the fact that when it was asked to relinquish its Non-Aligned membership as a condition for joining the EU, no one in the country seems to have considered this an issue. Indeed, no one in government considered this an issue to be communicated to the wider public, and most people are ignorant of it to this day. A

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3   See Hill (1952) and commentary by Papadakis (2006) on the uses of Aphrodite by Greek Cypriots.

friend of mine who found out accidentally during a training session on EU matters for civil servants and enquired about it could not get an answer. The academic expert training them had no answer and could not see the point in my friend's question. As far as he was concerned, it was a technical matter. The idea that it could have something to do with the incompatibility between a European and a 'Third World' identity and concern about the contamination of the former by the latter does not seem to have crossed his mind.

But to return to the scenarios just mentioned, none of them is remotely realistic. The idea that Cyprus was Greek and therefore historically and culturally European developed long ago and was to become widespread with the passage of time. It developed first among the educated elite and subsequently captured the imagination of the general population which, as many commentators have pointed out, eventually learned to think on the basis of ethnic and cultural rather than religious categories – not as Christians but as Greeks. As for the readiness of the EU to accept Cyprus, it is indicative of the hurdles involved that when the country finally joined, the event was heralded by politicians both in Cyprus and Greece as the greatest victory of Hellenism in the twentieth century. This is not to deny that there were also political and economic considerations involved in the 'decision' to join – the security, for example, that membership of the EU would provide *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Rather, it is meant to highlight the wider cultural context in which such pragmatic considerations become relevant and meaningful. The traumas of the Turkish invasion notwithstanding, one would be hard pressed to deny that fear of Turkey is ultimately fear of Turkification, which is to say, fear of being taken over by the 'barbarian' Other.

Yet the most glaring manifestation perhaps of how much the Greek Cypriot mind has been haunted by the spectre of Europe is not the fact that the country is now a member of the EU. It is partly how it deals with it and above all its status as a dismembered member. Its dealings with the EU are a classic example of symbolic domination or hegemony, which is to say, rule by consent. With the single exception of the legalisation of homosexuality and the introduction of civil marriage, both of which were fought by the Church, there has been no other noticeable reaction to the EU directives. Unlike people in other member states, such as Britain, Greek Cypriots do not feel that they are ruled by Brussels. What others experience as imposition that should be resisted, they experience as natural and necessary, a step towards full Europeanization. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the most effective way to legitimise new legislation is to let the public know that it is an EU requirement. The public may not like it very much but few people would doubt its necessity. As for the status of Cyprus as a dismembered EU member, for the colonised mind that operates with the Eurocentric vision of the world, this was perhaps inevitable. Unlike most European societies, for whom the problem until recently was how to manage the other without, for Greek Cypriots the problem has always been how to manage the other within. When the issue was the union of Cyprus with Greece, the problem was how to prevent Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) from preventing it. When the issue became the unification of Cyprus itself, the problem was how to prevent Turkish Cypriots (and Turkish settlers) from contaminating the purity of the image that Greek Cypriots have about themselves.

A recent example illustrates this quite well. One of the proposals in the current round of negotiations to unify the island is the rotation of the presidency between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Many Greek Cypriots reject the idea as an abomination, so much so that in a local TV programme a well-known nationalist politician said that he was prepared to accept a Turkish settler as vice-president provided that the president would always be a Greek Cypriot. The comment caused a stir and in a qualifying statement he complained that he was deliberately misrepresented: he did not want a settler to occupy any political office in a unified Cyprus because he did not want any settlers to remain in Cyprus after a solution (*Politis* newspaper, 24 December 2009). As everyone knows however, Turkish settlers – considered by Greek Cypriots to be even more Other than Turkish Cypriots – will stay in Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot side announced that it is prepared to accept 50,000). The choice for this man (and all those who think like him) was therefore clear. If neither Turkish Cypriots nor the settlers can be excluded, it would be a lesser evil to have an Other-Other as vice-president than to have an Other as president. To his mind the office of the president is a key symbol of the country and represents Cyprus both to itself and more importantly to the outside world, while the office of the vice-president has no such signifying power. An arrangement of this sort would convey to all concerned the right message: although the Other is within, it takes second place and is under control. Such is the extent of the cultural contamination that the nationalist (because colonised) mind is prepared to tolerate. Failing that, total exclusion of Turkish Cypriots would be preferable. Cyprus would remain divided but the part that counts would at least be purely Greek (and European) – which, as opinion polls suggest, seems to be what the majority of Greek Cypriots want if their ideal solution cannot be implemented.

I have been talking about the colonised mind with reference to Greek Cypriots but this is only part of the story. Turkish Cypriots suffer from the same affliction, perhaps more so than Greek Cypriots since for them the Other that they have to deal with is themselves. A few examples should suffice here to illustrate the point. I have already suggested that for Greek Cypriots (and mainland Greeks) modernisation (or Europeanization) inevitably meant de-Ottomanisation. Such however, was also the aim of the founder of modern Turkey and 'father of the Turks', Mustafa Kemal, whose vision of Turkishness was warmly embraced by Turkish Cypriots and is diligently upheld today despite the pressures exerted on them by the rise of Islamism in Turkey. For instance, a proposal to establish Islamic schools in northern Cyprus was condemned by Turkish Cypriot parties and trade unions across the political spectrum. I have also suggested that for Greek Cypriots the Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus epitomise otherness. But such is also the way that many Turkish Cypriots view them, particularly those that come from Anatolia – as an Other that spoils the European image they have about themselves (Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Hatay, 2008). I have argued that for Greek Cypriots joining the EU formalised the claim they have always made about themselves, namely, that they are modern European people. But such is also the claim that Turkish Cypriots (and mainland Turks) make about themselves and the way in which they strive to

legitimise it. As is well known, the Turkish bid to join the EU is driven by this claim and finds support in many EU member states. As for the Turkish Cypriots, it is now widely recognised that the catalyst for voting overwhelmingly in favour of the United Nations peace plan for Cyprus in 2004 (the so-called 'Annan Plan') was the prospect of becoming formally European, since Cyprus was to become an EU member-state in the following month.

These are well-known historical events and on public record. But there are countless other examples of the Turkish Cypriot infatuation with the modern and the European that, being ordinary everyday events, do not make the headlines. They are no less important. Here I shall mention only one example, partly because I was initially puzzled by this event and partly because it reminded me of a popular ethnography about village life in Egypt written by an Indian anthropologist and novelist whose work I admire. During the summer of 2003 when many Turkish Cypriots rebelled against the regime in the north and rallied in favour of the United Nations peace plan, I met several people with whom I became friends. One of the things that struck me in our conversations was their claim that unlike Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots were deeply religious. This, my Turkish Cypriot friends pointed out, was one of the major differences between the two communities. I found the comment puzzling and, as it was repeated on several occasions, annoying as well. What if Greek Cypriots were more religious (if they were) than Turkish Cypriots, I thought to myself? Religion has not been an issue in the conflict between the two communities; ethnicity has! It then occurred to me that perhaps this claim was not related to the prospects of unification, which was the main topic of our conversations and the issue on most people's mind at the time. Perhaps my Turkish Cypriot friends were trying to tell me something else. As is well known, secularism is supposed to be one of the hallmarks of modernity, since it is inextricably associated with rationalism, the disenchantment of the world, science, the triumph of knowledge over ignorance and superstition. It seems then, that what my Turkish Cypriot friends wanted to say was that contrary to what Greek Cypriots thought about them, they were modern European people – more so, in fact, than Greek Cypriots who still clung to religion. This interpretation also explained my annoyance with them. Deep down, I was caught in the game of playing modern and European myself.

This ordinary event reminded me of an incident that Amitav Ghosh describes in his ethnography of village life in Egypt – a quarrel with the local Imam for whom the Indian practice of 'burning the dead' and 'worshiping cows' was primitive. Having argued with him bitterly as to whose country was more modern and civilised, Ghosh reflects thus: 'At that moment, despite the vast gap that lay between us, we understood each other perfectly. We were both travelling, he and I: we were travelling in the West' (1992, p. 236). So too, I thought, was I and my friends, Greek and Turkish Cypriots in general. We have been travelling in Europe all these years of 'independence', towards the same phantom destination but apart, and because of this we have never managed to live together on this island.

Concluding Remarks

Because the foregoing may suggest that I am envisioning the possibility of a de-colonised Cypriot mind and perhaps also a future in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots would live in perfect harmony – like 'brothers', one often hears – I would like to close this paper with a few qualifications. It is certainly the case that autonomy is one of the most fundamental premises of European culture. It is its definition of what it means to be a subject, whether individual or collective – a person, a society, a nation. It should suffice here to point out that this premise is enshrined in the motto of the Enlightenment: 'think for yourself'; it constitutes the basis of the institution where European thought reaches its highest summits, namely, the university; and it circulates widely in everyday life and ordinary discourse. As I have suggested at the beginning of this paper, it is also the case that at this historical conjuncture European thought is beginning to recognise, which is not to say accept, that achieving autonomy through independent reflection is not possible. For no one can think *ex nihilo*. Even the most reflexive subject must take something for granted in order to think at all, the limiting case being the Enlightenment directive to think for oneself. Even if this was the only thing that one had to accept without questioning, one would still be dependent on someone else – the 'guardians' as Kant called them, which in this case would make *him* a 'guardian', or, thinking more sociologically, on one's society and culture. With this recognition, whether acknowledged or not, European culture comes full circle: from pre-liberatory times when the subject was (supposedly) not yet thinking for itself and was therefore subject to the powers that be to post-liberatory times when thinking for oneself leads to the realisation that one cannot think for oneself and that therefore the subject is beyond liberation. But with it, we come full circle ourselves, those of us at any rate who have been following Europe closely in this journey that leads back to the point of departure, which is to say, nowhere. Whether we like it or not, we are forced to admit that autonomy is a figment of the European imagination which the most credulous among us took for a real thing.

I do not think that minds can be decolonised. Nor do I think that postcolonial societies like Cyprus can exorcise the spectre of Europe. But perhaps this realisation is not as pessimistic as it may appear at first sight. We may not be able to put spectres at rest, chase the shadows away and construct a world suffused with light but perhaps we can learn to live with them, become so familiar that, if nothing else, they no longer cause the kind of nationalist nightmares that Cypriots know only too well. At a time when the two communities are considering – yet again – whether it would be possible to live together on this island instead of travelling apart in Europe, this thought may prove of critical importance.

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Independence Day through the Colonial Eye:
A View from the British Archive[1]

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Abstract

The confidential report of the Acting United Kingdom Representative in Cyprus, Ian F. Porter, to the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations from September 1960s gives a detailed account of the actual events on Independence Day. Discovered in the British archives[2] and reproduced at the end of this Special Issue, this document is of high historical value for the history and historiography of Cyprus. For a better understanding of the document the account of Independence Day in Cyprus is put into its wider historical setting and located within the context of other independence days within the British Empire.

Keywords: Independence Day, decolonisation, British Colonial Rule

On 1 October 2010, the Republic of Cyprus celebrated the 50th anniversary of its independence. When the year began only few Cypriots were aware that for 47 years they had been commemorating the birth of their republic on the wrong day. Cyprus had in fact become independent on Tuesday, 16 August 1960 but in July 1963, the Cypriot cabinet unanimously moved Independence Day away from the summer heat and main holiday season to the more convenient but rather arbitrarily chosen 1 October.[3] This change already indicated the low esteem Cypriots felt for that day ever since independence. But if things had gone the way they were originally intended, this change would have not been necessary. At the time of the London conference in February 1959, the decision was taken to grant Cyprus its independence exactly one year after the end of the conference on 29 February 1960. However, things did not go as planned. In particular, the negotiations about the British military bases and other military requirements had resulted in repeated postponements. When Cyprus finally became independent, hardly six weeks had elapsed since the end of the long and intricate negotiations.[4] Only since July had it become

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1   Parts of this text are based on: R. Holland (forthcoming, 2011) 'Off to a Good Start?: The Birth of Independent Cyprus, 16 August 1960' in A. Theophanous and N. Peristianis (eds.), *The Republic of Cyprus at Crossroads: Past, Present and Future*. Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press.

2   FO 371/152834. Report entitled 'Cyprus: Inauguration of the Republic' from I.F. Porter 7 September 1960.

3   'What's in a Date, a Flag and a Tune?', *Sunday Mail*, 26 September 2010.

4   For an analysis of the negotiations and the repeated postponements of independence see: H. Faustmann (1999) *Divide and Quit? British Colonial Policy in Cyprus 1878-1960. Including a Special Survey of the Transitional*

clear that independence was imminent and that it would be granted on 16 August. The Independence Bill was passed in the British House of Commons on 29 July 1960. Therefore, there had been no time for large-scale preparations of the celebrations which turned out simple and improvised. Foreign guests were not pouring in the island to mark a day hardly anybody wanted to celebrate anyway since it marked the emergence of a state nobody had really wanted. The four year anti-colonial struggle of EOKA (1955-1959), the Greek Cypriot right wing guerrilla organisation, had succeeded in ending British rule but had aimed at the union of Cyprus with Greece and not independence. The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey had been trying since 1956 to partition the island, whose two parts were then supposed to unite with their respective 'mother countries' after massive resettlements. Britain had originally tried to hold on to Cyprus indefinitely and then shifted from a policy to hold Cyprus permanently as a base to two permanent bases in Cyprus. The final outcome of this dispute, the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus minus two sovereign British military bases was a compromise that ensured that none of the sides but Britain got what they wanted. Even Britain feared beneath the surface that independence was the worst of all solutions, worse even than *enosis*, because a fully self-governing Cyprus was likely to be one governed by their old opponent, Archbishop Makarios. Neither Greece nor Turkey gained territory or citizens in Cyprus. Instead, they became guarantor powers of the new state and obtained the right to station small military contingents on the island. Moreover, the constitution established the 18% Turkish minority on the island as a second almost equal community with far reaching veto rights and other privileges, which made this new state even less attractive for the Greek Cypriot majority. Consequently, this 'fettered' independence was for many on both sides at best acceptable as an interim arrangement but not as a permanent state of affairs. Clearly in the eyes of those present there was not much to celebrate in August 1960 and the somehow muted celebrations 50 years later still reflect some elements of the frustration and non-identification with the Republic from 1960. It is rather telling that 1 October was only made a public holiday in 1979 while the 16 August date is largely forgotten.[5] Since the late 1960s and in particular since the division of the island through the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Greek Cypriot majority has grown to identify with the Republic of Cyprus, which they exclusively control since the bicommunal violence of 1963. For many Turkish Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus had ceased in effect to be their state, some of the resulting vacuum being filled by the so-called (and unrecognised) 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' declared in November 1983. Suggestively there has been no official commemoration of the 50th anniversary amongst the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Period: February 1959-August 1960 (e-book). Available at: [http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/verlag/diss /faustmann/Abstractfaust.html], Mannheim: Mateo, and H. Faustmann (2002) 'Independence Postponed: Cyprus 1959-1960', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall), pp. 99-119.

5   'Our Pride in the Republic Comes 50 Years too Late'. *Cyprus Mail*, 1 October 2010.

But also in a comparative perspective, Cyprus' actual Independence Day was a rather muted affair. One reason for this was the fact that it differed from established patterns of British departure from a colony. Ever since independence day in India, the ritual or 'invented tradition'[6] of departing from a colony was based on celebrations shared by all involved, the former colonial subjects and the former colonial ruler alike. At least the facade was maintained, that the regime change was welcomed by both, Britain and the respective colonial people. Within this context the British self-image of its own imagined history based on reconciliation, compromise and bloodless evolution was tacked onto the newly independent state on its independence day. But such carefully orchestrated moments need a smooth and largely unchallenged narrative, sufficiently recognisable and mutual on all sides to fit a rough consensus. In Cyprus in the period leading up to 16 August 1960 there were no such overlapping versions of recent history.

The fact that none of the sides involved considered independence really desirable explains also the character of Independence Day. The Greek Cypriots wanted a low key, truncated and non-celebratory event or in the words of Archbishop Makarios a 'business handover'. But also Britain opposed anything excessively pictorial or enthusiastic. It is telling that the original suggestion for a minimal programme came from Governor Sir Hugh Foot to the Archbishop, not the other way around, as one might otherwise have expected. In detailing to Makarios what he had in mind during November 1959, Foot pared it down in advance to the necessary inauguration of a Parliament, the immediate signing of the Treaties prescribed under the Zurich-London accords (the immediacy arising from the need to give absolutely no opportunity for second thoughts), his own private farewells as Governor at Government House, the welcoming of the Greek and Turkish Army contingents at Famagusta, and, Foot hoped, ceremonies of thanksgiving in the Orthodox Churches and some suitable sign of satisfaction in the Turkish quarters.[7]

Notably, the bit of this sequence which Foot intended to make the most of was the formal induction of the foreign military contingents (that is, the bit which was least Cypriot of all). His conception was that in Famagusta there should be a formal ceremony in the moat, so that when British troops had taken up the lead position, dutifully followed by Greek and Turkish formations, the Union Jack should be run *up* (not down, as was usual in Independence rituals) the flagpole, and then the colours of Greece and Turkey on either side. At the end of this part of the proceedings the new flag of Cyprus should be raised in lonely isolation high up on the ramparts. This was to be, Foot felt, 'an occasion not for sadness at the end of a regime but rather rejoicing at the creation of an independent Republic in full allied agreement. We shall go out with flags flying'.[8] The last point – the parting flourish of the Union Jack itself – was almost the most vital point, as the snappy wording itself suggested. Finally, the Governor suggested, the Republic of Cyprus could

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6   E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7   CO 926/763. Note on Foot–Makarios Meeting 16 November 1959.

8   Quoted in R. Holland (1998) *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 335.

hold an Independence celebration itself, perhaps a year or so in the future, inviting whomsoever one then wished. Foot did not add the rider, if the new polity actually lasted long enough for such an event to take place, but it might all too easily have slipped off the tongue. At least according to the report of I.F. Porter, in the first weeks after independence, Makarios still harboured the idea for a more elaborate and high profile celebration in the Spring of 1961. However, these plans – and therefore an alternative date to replace the 16 August as national holiday for Independence Day – never materialised.[9]

A striking omission from the start of British planning for Independence Day in Cyprus was any arrangement for a special representative of Her Majesty the Queen. Such a representative would normally have been a member of the Royal family. That this was not the case was probably inevitable in the circumstances. 'So far as I am aware' one official in Whitehall remarked with a hint of sarcasm 'there have been few manifestations of loyalty to the Crown from the island'.[10] Even the Queen's coronation in 1953 had been marked by a student disturbance. Although there is no overt mention, there was almost certainly a fear on the British side that any Royal presence might meet with some embarrassment in Cyprus, especially in light of the absence of any pardon in the case of those individuals executed for EOKA-related offences in 1956-1957. As for manifestations of loyalty, the fact was that Cypriots, of whatever ethnicity, had not been given much of a chance to display such sentiments over a prolonged period, even had they been inclined to do so, since no British Royal apart from the Duke of Kent in 1942 had visited the island since it had become a 'real' colony in 1925. By the time Queen Elizabeth attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Limassol in 1992, not without some local controversy, the last royal English presence on the island, that of Richard I in 1191, seemed very distant indeed. Overall, the absence of British royalty in Nicosia was reflective more than anything else of the somewhat idiosyncratic, even slightly *abandoned*, character of Cyprus as a British colonial possession.

In fact more telling than the non-attendance of Royalty was the fact that there was no ministerial or senior political representative of Her Majesty's *Government* in Nicosia on Independence Day. After all, Royalty at bottom simply sprinkles stardust on an event; a Government Minister implies commitment of a more practical kind. In early July 1960, when the date of Independence was finally set for Cyprus, an experienced official in Whitehall pointed out that if any agreements had been signed in connection with the transfer of sovereignty, it followed that a Minister should be present to mark the fact.[11] In the case of Cyprus the logical person was the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, because he had been so closely involved in those international negotiations which were the hallmark of Cyprus' approach to statehood. 'It would surely be a little odd' this official sought to clinch his case for at least a junior minister to be given the task 'if ... we

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9   FO 371/152834. I.F. Porter report entitled 'Cyprus: Inauguration of the Republic' 7 September 1960.

10   CO926/763. J. Piper minute 5 July 1960.

11   FO371/152849. J. Chadwick minute 12 January 1960.

were to show through the non-attendance of any UK minister that we were somewhat more tepid in our attitude towards Cyprus'.[12] It is clear, however, that such a contention got short-shrift from those higher up the chain of command. One slightly petulant scribble in the Foreign Office, 'Why cannot the Governor sign?', echoed the general mood,[13] whilst the conclusion of the discussion was that Sir Hugh Foot was 'our man for the dotted line'.[14] Again, the breezy and nonchalant style was suggestive. From this decision flowed the prominence of Sir Hugh Foot on Independence Day, doubling up the roles of departing Governor and Representative of the British Government. Though easily overlooked, this was in fact not normal at all. By the time *colonies* arrived at Independence, Governors were invariably very much pushed to the sidelines. In the case of Cyprus, as we shall see, Foot kept himself very much in the limelight. In this spirit *Our Man for the Dotted Line* might have provided a more intriguing title for his later memoirs than the more banal *A Start in Freedom*.

Local sensitivities and the legacy of the EOKA struggle also played an important role in the planning for Independence Day. Makarios' potential vulnerability within Greek-Cypriot politics was central to an imponderable: the return of EOKA exiles from abroad, mainly from Athens. Tensions here would almost certainly have been eased if these individuals had come back *before* August 16, and in ones and twos. Just as getting the leader of the EOKA struggle, Grivas, *out* of the island without detriment to British military 'honour' in the immediate aftermath of the Lancaster House Agreements had been a crucial consideration,[15] so Foot was adamant that permits would not be issued for any EOKA re-entry *prior* to the ending of British responsibility in the bulk of the island.[16] Pride was the driving force here. This made it certain that the exiles would come back on Independence Day itself, with all the distraction this ensured. According to rumours reaching the British, Makarios and his advisers carefully scrutinised the list of intending returnees to see who might be excluded as constituting a danger to the settlement. Various names were mentioned, including Renos Kyriakides and Sophocleous Rossides, the latter now finally split off from the Archbishop, but the critical decision concerned Nikos Sampson. Again, information reaching Whitehall – doubtless from Makarios circles – was that Sampson had become 'completely unbalanced'.[17] In the same way, however, that the Archbishop had taken as inclusive a delegation as possible to London in February 1959, so in this case he decided that Sampson could do more damage if he were kept out of Cyprus than if he were allowed to come back in. However accurate this might have been as a piece of political calculation, it illustrates that although

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12   *Ibid.*
13   FO 371/152854. See annotation on 'Cyprus: Arrangements for the Transfer of Sovereignty and the Inauguration of the Republic' January 1960.
14   FO 371/152833. Minute 5 July 1960.
15   See Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 278.
16   See the discussions on this matter in CO 926/1472.
17   CO 926/1472. Foot telegram to Colonial Office 5 August 1960.

Makarios, with more or less undoubted sincerity, spoke of a 'golden bridge' between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the bridge he had above all to guard was one between Greek-Cypriots themselves. Much in the future hinged on whether these two bridges pointed in the same direction.

Claims concerning victory, defeat and the moral high ground also vibrated throughout the run-up to Cypriot Independence. In Whitehall consideration was given to the commissioning of a history of the recent Emergency that would put British actions in the best light. Identifying the 'soundest' person was not easy. Figures like Lawrence Durrell and C.M. Woodhouse were considered before being cast aside – the latter, for example, was 'too Hellenic', and the former, one imagines, simply too much of a loose cannon.[18] In the end no such book appeared. But there was also the question of who had actually won the confrontation in the island. Just like the French Army command in Algeria at the same period in regard to its own insurgency,[19] the British Army in Cyprus, and above all, General Darling, was determined to claim that EOKA had been on the verge of defeat when the politicians at Lancaster House had cut their deal. In the Colonial Office it was reckoned that Darling was the source of the suggestion that a Thanksgiving Service for British army personnel who had lost their lives in Cyprus should be held at about the same time as Independence Day in Nicosia.[20] The proposed venue was St. Martin-in-the-Fields in Trafalgar Square, with its intimations of worthwhile sacrifice. In Whitehall, however, the whole idea was quietly squashed. This was at least one matter on which the argument that nothing should be done to make the Archbishop's job in Nicosia harder than it already was gained some traction.[21] But anyway it was much better for the British Government that Cypriot independence should come and go with their own public, still sensitive to any reminder that British soldiers had died to seemingly very little purpose so far as national interest was concerned, hardly even being aware of it. This is what happened, as the very cursory coverage in the United Kingdom press indicates. In truth, neither the British nor the Greek-Cypriots had 'won' in Cyprus; they had merely succeeded in hurting each other, though this was too damning for Darling on the one side, or the champions of EOKA on the other, ever to admit.

When August 16 finally dawned in Cyprus, the exiguousness of high-level British representation, Foot apart, meant that the main eye-witness report on the event was that by Ian Porter, an official of the Commonwealth Relations Office who was Acting United Kingdom Representative in Cyprus at the time of writing in early September 1960.[22] It is, in its way,

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18   For this discussion see the material in CO 926/1076.
19   For a comparison see R. Holland (1995) *Dirty Wars: Algeria and Cyprus Compared, 1954-62,* Paris: Karthala; C.-R. Ageron and M. Michel (1995) (eds.), *L'ère des décolonisations.* Paris: Editions Karthala, p. 46.
20   CO926/1668. Higham minute 18 July 1960.
21   CO926/1668. Meville minute 8 August 1960.
22   FO 371/152834. I.F. Porter report entitled 'Cyprus: Inauguration of the Republic' 7 September 1960.

intriguing that none of the senior Colonial Office figures in Whitehall, like Sir John Martin, whose involvement in Cypriot affairs went back many years, and even decades, did not out of sheer curiosity turn up to see how things went. In truth, for outsiders it was a day to hold at arm's length, not to embrace at all closely. As Porter recounted, the ceremonies were 'simple, unpretentious and to a large extent improvised. This was in tune with the rather muted and uncertain feeling which prevailed generally in the final few days before Independence'.[23] Such mute unease had prevailed in the initial period after Lancaster House, and the fact that it still existed was testimony to the failure to create a better mood during the extended interval that had followed. This was a failure, perhaps, of circumstances, but it was also one of policy, and a reflection that the Lancaster House 'settlement' was always more of a truce, or holding action, than a lasting dispensation.

At the stroke of midnight on a new day and era in Nicosia Archbishop Makarios, Kucuk, the Ministers in the transitional Government, members elect of the House of Representatives, the Consuls-General of Greece and Turkey, and of course Sir Hugh Foot gathered in the Council of Ministers building. A large crowd of up to 20,000 Cypriots from all communities stood outside, huge loudspeakers transmitted to the crowds what was happening inside.[24] Foot duly inaugurated the new Constitution, anomalous though it was for an ex-Governor so to do. The announcement was followed by a 21-gun salute fired by a troop of the 42 Field Regiment Royal Artillery. There then followed a one-hour period during which all the necessary signatures on the dotted lines of the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee were secured. Following the speeches, Foot was the last to read out messages by the Queen and the Prime Minister. He then added his own good wishes to the Republic and the proceedings closed. The only discordant note during the ceremony, according to Porter, had been that of the Greek Consul-General who 'addressed his audience with a rhetoric which would have been more appropriate at an election rally'. The prejudice in this description is transparent. Nevertheless, it rings true in one important respect. If, bases apart, the British wanted to keep the consummation of Cypriot independence at a certain distance, even delicately holding their nose in doing so, this was even more true of the Greeks. Ever since Foreign Minister Averoff had his famous conversation with Zorlu in New York during October 1959, the Greek Government had done everything it could to see that the Cypriots were fitted, however reluctantly into a Turco-Greek-British grand compromise.

Only when the Lancaster House Agreements were absolutely irreversible did the representative of Greece suddenly go off on a tangent so as to indicate that the responsibility for what was happening had nothing to do with that country. One curious aspect of Cyprus' Independence Day was that at no point was the Union Jack actually *lowered* in a formal and public arena. The Union flag over Government House − the Presidential Palace to be − was lowered as usual on the evening of 15 August, and simply not raised again. The dipping of the

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23   *Ibid.*
24   'The Republic is Born. Proud, Historic Day, Says the President'. *Cyprus Mail*, Tuesday 16 August 1960.

British colours, and the elevation of those of the new state, a ritual that was to be the centre-piece of the iconography of independence in so many venues, never actually happened in Cyprus. The ceremonies at Government House immediately after the signing ceremony and then in the morning were purely private, in keeping with general obliqueness of the whole event. At the end of the brief ceremonial leave-taking at Government House in the morning the British National Anthem was played for the last time in the eighty-two years and one month of British rule over the island.[25] Then Foot left for Famagusta. There he made a final troop inspection before he boarded the HMS *Chichester* and 'as the ship cast off Pipe-Major Rodden played a bagpipe lament followed by his own composition, "Sir Hugh Foot's Farewell to Cyprus"'.[26] British rulers in their empire had habitually arrived on ships, as General Wolseley had arrived off Larnaca on HMS *Himalaya* in 1878, and they invariably left on ships as well, even in the age of aviation. Whilst Foot was clambering up the gangplank, back in Nicosia the House of Representatives was formally inducted. Mr Glafkos Clerides was elected as President of the House, Dr Orhan Muderrisoghlou as Vice-President whilst the President and Vice-President of the Republic were both invested with their offices and duties. As the climax of this sequence, the flag of the Republic was itself at last raised for the first time on the mast-head above the Councils of Ministers building, though, suggestively, without the representatives of foreign governments being there to pay respects. Then Makarios proceeded to the Phaneromeni Church were at a Te Deum service, he gave an address, pledging that he would devote himself for the service of the Cypriot people.[27]

No 'allied' ceremony at Famagusta to welcome the guarantor powers, as Foot had hoped, in the end took place, if only because Greece demurred. Instead, the Greek and Turkish contingents disembarked and immediately took different routes to their allocated camps once they arrived in the afternoon. According to Ian Porter's description, there was a clear difference in the receptions given by the respective Cypriot communities. The Turkish-Cypriots were warm in their response to the presence of Turkish soldiers, whereas the Greek-Cypriot crowd that gathered to see the progress of the Royal Hellenic troops was small, and appeared 'mild and reserved' in attitude. Insofar as this was true, it was anyway in line with the evolving dynamic of relations between Cypriot communities and their external sponsors or 'Motherlands'.

Mild reserve was not a description that could be given to what for Greek-Cypriots was the most popular part of Independence proceedings: the return of the 21 EOKA exiles from Athens. Unsurprisingly and in line with his superiors in London it is here, that Porter's otherwise largely neutral and descriptive account (with the notable exception of the jibe against the speech of the Greek Consul General above) changes tone bearing the marks of a British colonial official writing about his adversaries. Referring to the EOKA 'heroes' in inverted commas (though is not clear

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25   'Flag of Freedom Unfurled. Independence Day Will Live in Memory of Cyprus'. Cyprus Mail, 17 August 1960.

26   FO 371/152834. I F. Porter report entitled 'Cyprus: Inauguration of the Republic' 7 September 1960.

27   *Ibid.*

from the text if the inverted commas are simply a reference to the Greek Cypriot terminology used at the airport or an ironic comment) he describes them as 'men with particularly vicious records who only had been released from custody after the conclusion of the Zurich and London Agreements on the understanding that they would go to Greece and not return to Cyprus until so permitted by the Cyprus Government. Among the most dangerous are Nicos Sampson, a young journalist, who is believed to have been responsible for at least 24 murders (and is proud enough of the fact to boast of it)'.[28] The group arrived at Nicosia airport at 5.30 p.m., and they were carried shoulder-high to the airport lounge. They were then transported to the main Stadium in the town, with a garlanded Sampson in the lead vehicle. Inside the Stadium the Archbishop gave an address in which he skirted round the outcome of the recent upheavals with the delicacy that was increasingly second-nature to him. The rhetorical skills of Sampson in his reply are acknowledged by Porter: 'The content of what he had to say was not extraordinary, but he spoke with power and authority, and handled his crowd skilfully'.[29] The British eyewitness reckoned that his listeners were more pro-Makarios than pro-'Dighenis', though how this might usefully be measured is unclear; on this particular day there was an emotional overload that probably made the distinction even less meaningful than usual, at least at this stage in Cypriot political development. Of all the differences from norms elsewhere marking Independence Day, however, the fact that the most warmly greeted event was not part of the transfer of power as such, and indeed had little or nothing to do with Independence, is arguably the most striking.

Ian Porter's conclusions on the inauguration of the Republic as a whole for his superiors back in London were finely balanced. There had been at least a glimmer of celebration amongst ordinary Cypriots or as Porter put it a 'good deal less apathy among the general public when the day came than had earlier seemed likely',[30] though what was being celebrated was not entirely clear – perhaps just the usual human hope that the future might be better than the past. There had been no disorder, and especially no clash, or even tension, along inter-communal lines. Both Makarios and Kucuk had been punctilious in carrying out their parts of the formal proceedings. The Cyprus Police, controlling order for the first time without British colleagues, had been wholly efficient at the job. Against these good points, there were some on the other side. The Cyprus flag had scarcely been in evidence beyond the usual public edifices. Whilst there was no actual clash, ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots had 'welcomed' the new regime solely within their own communities, and according to their own reservations and concerns. This separateness but in particular the role of the press in the three weeks that had passed since Independence Day deeply concerned Porter:

> 'The communal nature of the celebrations is not surprising. The Cypriots have been conditioned to think of themselves not as Cypriots, but as Greeks, Turks or Armenians and

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28 *Ibid.*
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Ibid.*

> the local Press are quick to jump on any public figure who is rash enough to imply that Cypriots might now develop some sort of national consciousness as Cypriots'.

While, according to Porter, Makarios and Turkish Vice-President Kutchuk were co-operating sincerely to make the 'rigid and artificial Constitution work as best as it can', a look at the press, he noted, 'is sufficient to show how uncertain are the foundations on which rests the Archbishop's policy of establishing a responsible Government in co-operation with the Turkish Cypriots'. [...] 'The Greek and Turkish newspapers snipe at each other continuously. They will seize on any straw to work on the feelings of communal hostility and mistrust that exists so close to the surface'.[31] Clearly, three weeks into independence in both communities there were those already working hard to destabilise the basis on which that Independence had come. The Archbishop had already taken a crucial action to limit this process by inducting senior EOKA figures into his own Cabinet, though this held dangers of its own. Porter's parting estimation may be left to speak for itself. He stated:

> 'In summary, it can be said that the Republic has got away to a good start; that the President and Vice-President are, at the moment, jointly prepared to do all they can to build up the authenticity of a new state and to make the Constitution work as best it can and to govern in a responsible and sober manner, but that the tensions and emotional strains of the last few years are still very close to the surface'.[32]

In assessing Independence Day and its surrounding context in Cyprus, a degree of proportionality is required, not least when comparing with other examples within the canon of British decolonisation. Because the most suitable analogue would surely be in the Mediterranean, the case of Malta comes readily to mind. During the summer of 1960 it was Malta, not Cyprus, which was characterised by recurring riots and demonstrations, and about whose stability the British had become deeply worried. Indeed, in the run-up to Maltese Independence in September 1964 Whitehall had visions of outright civil war in the island;[33] and although those celebrations were finally attended by the Duke of Edinburgh, there was a fear that he might be caught in the cross-fire of an assassination attempt on Borg Olivier, the Prime Minister.[34] At least in Nicosia on 16 August 1960 there had been no fear of shots being fired at those dignitaries who were present. Furthermore, the same doubts about the reality of newly-gained independence felt amongst Cypriots were equally strongly entertained by many Maltese four years later, not least because a British military presence was to continue in Malta without any apparent date for termination. In other words, Cyprus was certainly always different, but other decolonising states in the region had anxieties and difficulties that were comparable. In this vein the Republic of Cyprus setting off on

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31   *Ibid.*

32   *Ibid.*

33   CAB163/34. Civil War in Malta: Internal Security.

34   Visit by the Duke of Edinburgh to Athens and Malta CAB 121/5971.

its journey was surely not doomed at birth, whatever the real disadvantages under which it had to labour. Finally, Sir Hugh Foot's suggestion that the Republic should after an interval hold a *real* Independence Day, pomp and all, was quickly forgotten.

Yet, in retrospect, indeed, much more might have been done in the long interval since the Lancaster House conference to push the existing strains on and over the island further beneath the surface than ultimately proved to be the case. The reasons why this had not been achieved may be found amongst all the protagonists, the tell-tale signs of failure being the muteness and unease of Greek-Cypriots, the suspicious introspection of their Turkish compatriots, the desire to keep as much distance as possible from the Cypriot transition in Athens, the absolute determination in Ankara that Cyprus should be 'Greek-Turkish' *a la* Zurich rather than become truly Cypriot, and the 'somewhat tepid' feeling of the British that has been sufficiently evoked in this account. The real danger after 16 August 1960, however, was that such shared tepidness might spread not just to the ritual aspects of Independence, but to the authenticity of the new state itself. The general awareness about this danger was expressed in the - necessarily optimistic - farewell radio address of Governor Foot to the people of Cyprus on the night of August 15:

> 'What of the future? It is for you to answer that question. A few dismal commentators say that the people of Cyprus will destroy each other. They say that you will tear yourself to bits - Greek against Turk and Left against Right. There are a few who say that the Island will go down in a sea of blood and hate.
>
> It could be – but I don't believe it. People who have been to the brink of hell don't want to go over the edge. I know the difficulties and dangers as well as anyone, but I myself have faith in your ability, and in your good sense too. I believe that the forces of moderation and tolerance and compassion, and the desire to serve all the people of Cyprus well, and an overwhelming wish for peace, will prevail'.[35]

Unfortunately for Cyprus the 'dismal commentators' would be proven right. In retrospect, Independence Day was not the end but just the beginning of another phase in the Cyprus problem.

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Reflections on the 1st October Commemoration of the Independence of Cyprus

Yiannis Papadakis

Abstract

This essay examines the politics of commemoration with reference to the celebration of the independence of Cyprus. The adventures of this 'historical date' reveal some of the key changes in the political orientations of the two major communities since 1960. This is a commemoration that was forgotten by all for many years; it was remembered by Greek Cypriots as late as in 1979 when it was first declared a public holiday; Turkish Cypriots now scorn this date, even if they are the ones who demonstrated more enthusiasm at the time.

Keywords: Commemoration, parades, independence, Cyprus

My first encounter with the commemoration of October 1st was a rather confusing experience. It was 1 October 1990 and I, a Greek Cypriot born in 1964, was ready to begin my research for my PhD in Cyprus. Since October was the month that university began in the UK where I was enrolled for my PhD, I thought this would be a good time to start. I was in the house I had rented in Nicosia, full of hope. At this time of day, the streets would be busy, so I hoped to be able to meet people living in that area and talk to them about their relations with Turkish Cypriots. I stepped outside. All quiet. No one was in the vicinity. I turned round, went back in, and closed the door behind me. I collapsed on a chair: So much for the triumphant beginning of my research. I turned on the radio. It was a national holiday, the anniversary of the independence of Cyprus in 1960. How could I possibly not have known this?

On reflection, I felt sure that when I was growing up in Cyprus, the anniversary did not exist. I left Cyprus when I was nineteen to study abroad. Now coming back, aged twenty-six, there it was on television, celebrated in all its glory with flags, parades, music and crowds. In my absence an anniversary had been born. The odd thing was that Cyprus actually began its independence on 16 August 1960. But today was the 1st October! So we were triumphantly celebrating our anniversary on the wrong date. Outside, the main roads were full of flags – not just our state flag, the flag of the Republic of Cyprus. The flag of another state, Greece, was hanging next to ours. Another national anthem was playing, the Greek one. Ours was nowhere to be heard. Come to think of it, that was because we did not even have one. And this was supposed to be the anniversary of the *independence* of Cyprus. So, we forgot the anniversary of our birth for many years, and then about 30 years later we remembered it. Why?

When I looked a bit deeper into it, I realised how problematic commemorations are. I provide two examples, one from Greece and one from Turkey. Ataturk came to claim that the 19th of May was his birthday. As no records were kept at the time of his birth, it was not possible to know. The choice of his birthday was made late in his life by Ataturk himself because the 19th May (1919) was the day when Ataturk and his forces landed in Samsun (Mango, 2000, p. 26). This date is commemorated in Turkey as the beginning of the War of Independence. This choice made his life appear as a higher act of destiny. The birth of the Father of the Turks (which is what Ataturk means) was made to coincide with the struggle for the birth of the Turkish nation-state. He would become for many Turks their only Creator due to his secularising reforms aiming to eradicate the worship of God. He also attempted to create a cult of worship around his own persona as the one and only true Father and Creator.

Did the 'Greek Revolution against the Turks', as it is usually called, start on the 25th of March? No, this date was chosen later (Koulouri, 1995), to make it coincide with the religious holiday of the Annunciation: when the Holy Mother miraculously conceived Christ while, of course, remaining Virgin Mary. By putting the two days together it was as if the beginning of the new state coincided with the beginning of the life of God on earth. Even the manner in which it is called is highly misleading, for at the time neither 'Greeks' nor 'Turks' existed (Skopetea, 1988). A better way to put it would be the revolution of the *Romioi* against the Ottoman authorities, since the Greek and Turkish national identities were forged later.

Greek Cypriots tried to go one-up on the Greeks. If the Greek day of Independence combined two meanings, they would try for three. According to Greek Cypriot historian Panteli (1985, p. 271), Makarios wanted the EOKA [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters] movement to start on 25th March 1955 – the beginning of the Greek War of Independence, the beginning of the life of God on earth, and the beginning of the Struggle for Union with Greece, all in a single day: an admittedly hard to beat symbolic combination. Due to unforeseen events, it had to start a week later. A stroke of bad luck then, made this commemoration coincide, out of all days, with April 1st, a date famous worldwide for rather less glorious reasons.

How come then the commemoration of the Independence of Cyprus was moved from 16th August to 1st October? It was moved to a day within the school-calendar so that, like it or not, there would be a captive audience. Commemorations, despite their usual celebratory intentions, are often sad days for me. I find them sad due to the violence, in fact, several kinds of violence, that they entail, one being violence towards schoolchildren, a point I return to later. Another type of violence is violence towards history. Why celebrate this day, a day which for both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots then spelled defeat – the defeat of *enosis* and *taksim*? It is only retrospectively in 1979 that one community chose to remember this day, after decades of trying to forget it, while for the other community this date is not commemorated and thus of no importance. This brings me to the second type of violence towards history, what I would like to call the violence of imposed forgetting. Any commemoration is not so much a call to remember as an effort to forget: To forget all other days which are deemed unimportant. To forget, in other words,

all other historical events which are destined for the rubbish bin of history. This is the problem with memory, and that is why remembering is always political. Memory is by definition selective as it is impossible to remember all, and what is chosen to be remembered is inevitably chosen for political reasons.

Memory may in fact reveal more about the future than the past. It is the Greek Cypriot desire for a future reunited independent Cyprus, that has made Greek Cypriots retrospectively decide to commemorate the independence of Cyprus, when it emerged as the 1960 unitary state. It is highly doubtful if at the time, there was any sense of glorious rejoicing about the granting of independence to Cyprus. Its symbol, the republic's flag that is now venerated was then scorned by Greek Cypriots who much preferred the flag of Greece. This is what prompted ex-President Clerides to allegedly remark that: 'Our flag in Cyprus could be the best in the world because no-one is prepared to die for it'.

Commemorations often entail violence towards the dead by distorting the meaning of their struggles. This is a quote from a Greek Cypriot politician who spoke on TV after the grand parade of 1st October 2009: 'Many people gave their lives so that we would live in an independent state (*Polloi anthropoi edosan ti zoi tous gia na zisoume se ena anexartito kratos*)'. This is a distortion of the aim of EOKA which was union with Greece, not independence. Nowadays one often hears of the struggle of EOKA being referred to as the struggle for the independence of Cyprus (*agonas gia tin anexartisia tis Kyprou*).

While on the issue of parades, I would also like to state in no uncertain terms that I always disliked parades. I disliked parades even before discovering that it was the dictator of Greece, Metaxas, who instituted the tradition of the military parade there, which Greek Cypriots later adopted. As far as I can remember, the student parades had boys in front, girls at the back. At the time, this did not bother me. I thought it was simply natural. Something else bothered me. I was not a particularly well-built boy, and in the parade it was always the well-built, tall, good-looking boys that had to be in the front. The shorties, the fatsoes, the weaklings, myself – the bodily-challenged, in short – were clearly a problem to our teachers. That we were clearly a problem was something our teachers made no effort to conceal from us. The solution, I remember, was to hide us somewhere towards the back and in the middle of the group. Do anything to make us disappear. Evidently, we were something shameful to be hidden. But there was some consolation. We were not the worst. Some were left out altogether. I remember how much we all used to laugh at the poor boys and girls who found it difficult to synchronise during marching. I remember how they were paraded again and again in front of us, each one alone, sweating, swinging wooden-like arms and legs from the tension and the stress of being publicly humiliated, before they were dismissed altogether. The affinities of these practices to certain notorious ideologies based on the worship of the healthy, athletic and coordinated body are clear. The European Court of Human Rights recognises the violence entailed by the obligatory participation of students and teachers in parades and has condemned this practice in various countries, including Greece (Gousetis, 2008, p. 31).

But when it came to the actual day of the parade, I found myself secretly envying the ones who would not parade. They had the day off, whereas we had to gather early, all spick and span, shoes, hair and teeth all brushed and shiny, and wait endlessly for our turn to come. These considerations explain the reasons for the change of date from 16th August to 1st October: the fear that no-one would bother with it given that it was right in the middle of the holiday period when the capital is totally empty. The sight of a military parade taking place on 16th August among empty streets in Nicosia would indeed be one to behold. The obvious advantage with that date would be that the authorities would not need to cordon off any street; they would be empty anyway. In my personal view, a public demand should be voiced for the anniversary of our birth as a state to be moved back to its true, authentic, historic date. It could be argued that it is disrespectful and historically inaccurate to commemorate this most important day on the wrong date. For how will students ever come to respect history and historical facts, if we cheat on the very anniversary of our own independence?

It is, in my view, both sad and fearful for any state to mark its most important historical day with a military parade. Is this the best it can do? Are guns what these people are most proud of? Do they have no other things to show for themselves? In parades, the nation appears synchronised, equal, united, strong, and of course male, all walking in the same direction, with the same rhythm towards the same future, blatantly worshiping its guns. Man and machine blend, with man having become the ultimate killing device. A common argument is that these are only meant for defence, but here in Cyprus one becomes well aware when looking at the guns of those on the other side, that they do not appear so innocently defensive.

During the inevitable public broadcast of the parade, the commentators on television and radio constantly remind the people of what the parade demonstrates. If we are to believe them, the parade demonstrates the high level of readiness of our army and the high fighting spirit of our soldiers, as though they are just brought to parade one day out of the blue, and they have not been practicing for this for weeks on end; as if they were there out of their own free will.

The serious atmosphere that surrounds these days is indicative of yet another kind of violence. There is something almost holy in the seriousness with which these days are treated. Durkheim described ritual as society worshipping itself, through the worship of its totem. In our case, we do not even need the totem, we are perfectly happy to directly worship ourselves. But this has to be done with serious religious-like reverence and any attempt to perhaps also laugh a bit at ourselves seems like an act of sacrilege. Politicians may use grand, glorious and grave words to mark the day, but for most people its meaning lies in the happy occasion to miss work or school.

What are we to make then of this day? – A day with meaning on one side, without meaning on the other: A day whose interpretation has changed on both sides. As Attalides (1979, pp. 50-51), a Greek Cypriot sociologist, suggests, independence was received as a defeat by Greek Cypriots but as a victory for Turkish Cypriots (even if this was not their primary aim). Yet, it is Greek Cypriots who commemorate and celebrate it after having ignored it for decades, while it is Turkish Cypriots who totally ignore it. Greek Cypriots started to commemorate the 1960 independence of Cyprus

only in 1979, as part of a more general effort that began after 1974 to symbolically emphasise the presence of the Republic of Cyprus due to the threat placed by the (non-recognised) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.[1] This was why the independence of the Republic of Cyprus started to be commemorated, and its flag – that was drawn by a Turkish Cypriot – while previously scorned, now came to be used more widely. Related to this was the Greek Cypriot policy of preventing the participation of Turkish Cypriots (under the auspices of the TRNC) in any international forum. This entailed use of the flag of the Republic of Cyprus as representing the only legitimate state in Cyprus, while before 1974 Greek Cypriots were often happy to relinquish their statehood in favour of appearing as part of Greece. During the Olympic Games, for example, the Greek Cypriot athletes appeared as part of the team of Greece. These general considerations provide ample ground for reflection both on commemorations and on historical interpretation.

The same religious-like reverence I previously described, often accompanies the teaching of history. History is presented as a holy truth whose questioning is an act of sacrilege. I have demonstrated already that in history there can be different perspectives related to the meaning of the same historical date, and that social agents may later even change their own minds about them. We endlessly debate in Cyprus on whose history is correct, ours or theirs, the Left's or the Right's, and what we miss in all this, is the most obvious. That history is and can only be an open and continuing debate among informed perspectives. This does not mean that anything goes for this should be dialogue among *informed* perspectives and what the rules of history as an academic discipline try to determine is what will count as *informed*. I take it that the role of history educators should be to provide students with the tools to reach such informed perspectives, not to tell them what to believe. I often feel that the problem in Cyprus is the outright dismissal of all other perspectives apart from one's own: In other words, the lack of true dialogue among various perspectives.

On rereading this, I noticed that I have used a 'we' that is often problematic. This is the 'we' that Greek Cypriots use, when they talk of themselves as Cypriots, which inadvertently excludes Turkish Cypriots from the category of 'Cypriots'. Yet, it is in use daily both in ordinary conversations as well as in politicians' public discourse.

Cyprus, 'the reluctant republic' (as a book title goes), has also been compared to a child that no-one wanted. Its birth was contingent, in the sense that no-one had actually planned for an independent Cyprus to emerge, and clearly the two larger communities were not aiming for this. Our own lives too are the greatest contingency. We have nothing to do with being alive. We did not will our birth. Our very existence has not been an act of our own will. Yet, we celebrate our birthdays. Celebration alone, however, may not be the appropriate manner to engage with a commemoration like this. Commemorations are days of historical reflection *par excellence*, and

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1   Although the northern part of the island is referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

this commemoration provides ample grounds for historical reflection, including reflections on its own history, which starkly expose the predicaments of commemorating. One of which, as the street artist suggests is that it may be simply too late: το πουλλίν επέτασεν (the bird has flown). This commemoration harks to the past in order to celebrate the emergence of a unified state, while it also espouses the creation of a unified Cyprus in the future. Yet, given the successive failures of diplomatic efforts, it is uncertain if this will ever be achieved. The Turkish expression 'bayramdan sonra' (after the celebration), which now only some elderly Greek Cypriots may understand, also means 'it is too late' aptly joining the two notions – celebration and belatedness – together.

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Shifting Alignments:
The External Orientations of Cyprus since Independence

JAMES KER-LINDSAY

Abstract

Just as the domestic political environment in Cyprus has changed dramatically over the past fifty years, so too has its relationship with the wider world. When the island achieved statehood, the European empires were in decline and the Cold War was at its height. In this geo-political climate, the Republic of Cyprus opted to join the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, it is a member of the European Union. This has undoubtedly given it a degree of political security. However, questions remain as to whether the EU can really deliver on expectations. Thus the question of whether Cyprus should pursue closer relations with NATO is increasingly gathering attention. But behind this examination of how Cyprus has aligned itself on the world stage since independence lies a far more significant story of growing autonomy for the people of Cyprus. Having been a colony of one or other of the countless empires that had dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, independence has given Cyprus a degree of freedom to choose its orientation that has never been known before. That the Republic of Cyprus could effectively choose whether to join NATO or the Non-Aligned Movement, and that it has been able to accede to the European Union, highlights the degree to which it has been able to develop its own place in the world over the past fifty years.

When Cyprus became independent in 1960 it rapidly sought to establish its presence within the international community of sovereign states. Within months it had become a member of the United Nations. Likewise, it also joined the Commonwealth, thus retaining a link to the United Kingdom and the other former colonies of the British Empire.[1] Still, with the Cold War at its peak, the island was also faced with a choice about its fundamental strategic orientation and its overall political-military alignment on the world stage. The eventual decision to reject membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and pursue Non-Alignment would shape the

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1   As Makarios stated on his first visit to London after independence, 'in spite of the differences and bitterness of the past, our relations with the United Kingdom are now very good. We shall do our utmost, in a spirit of goodwill, further to strengthen our relations with the UK as well as other participants in the Commonwealth ... The past is forgotten'. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 18-25 March 1961, p. 17987.

island's ties with the rest of the world for the next three decades. This changed in 2004 when the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union and was required to leave the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Interestingly, though, although the Cypriot Government insisted that it wished to retain close ties with the NAM, EU membership has in fact reignited the debate on the island's relationship with NATO.

NATO Rejected

The first key strategic choice facing the new state was whether or not to join NATO. In many ways, the option of joining the alliance, and thereby become a full part of the West, perhaps seemed to be the most obvious direction for the new republic to take. After all, Britain, Greece and Turkey – the three Guarantor Powers vested with responsibility for ensuring the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the new state – were all members of the Organisation. Nonetheless, this did not happen. The idea of joining the Western alliance was strongly opposed from various quarters. For a start, within the Greek Cypriot community there was deep concern about the implications of such a move. As far as Archbishop Makarios and other leading political figures were concerned, Cyprus would necessarily be of secondary importance to Turkey. In the event of any confrontation between Cyprus and Turkey, or between Greece and Turkey, NATO would always be inclined to take Ankara's side by virtue of its strategic significance as the only non-arctic route into the Soviet Union. [2]

Interestingly, the Turkish Government was also opposed to the prospect of the island's membership of NATO. In Ankara the prevailing view was that if Cyprus were to join NATO then its own ability to intervene, even though this right was enshrined in a legally binding treaty, would be limited. The idea of one NATO member invading another, and the consequences of this on alliance unity at the height of the Cold War, would almost certainly ensure that the United States and other NATO members would step in to prevent full scale hostilities from occurring. To this end, Ankara saw a tactical advantage to keeping Cyprus outside of the organisation.[3] Therefore, and albeit for very different reasons, opposition to NATO membership was one of the few issues of agreement between the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Turkish Government in the early years of independence.

The Non-Aligned Path

Rather than NATO membership, Makarios instead chose to follow a path of non-alignment. As with the question of NATO membership, his decision was opposed by vice-president Kuchuk.[4]

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2   G. Clerides (1989) *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. 1, Nicosia: Alithia Press, pp. 124-126.
3   *Ibid.*
4   Dr N. Ertekun, interview with the author, September 1996.

But, once again, he was persuaded not to use his veto over the matter by the Turkish Government.[5] In many ways, this actually marked a far more logical and natural direction for the island; marking as it did a continuation of an orientation that had evolved over the previous few years of the anti-colonial struggle. Throughout the 1950s, as the political and then military campaign to end British rule in Cyprus grew, Makarios managed to form close relations with the leaders of a number of developing countries and post-colonial states around the world. Indeed, in 1955, he had even attended the Bandung Conference, which set out an agenda for Afro-Asian co-operation in the face of Western imperialism − either of the capitalist right and communist left.

Given the opposition to NATO membership, and in view of the fact that alignment with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was out of the question, it hardly seemed surprising that this sense of cohesion with the Third World, most of which was made up of former colonial possessions like Cyprus, should therefore continue after independence. In 1961, Makarios was one of the leaders of twenty-five states that attended the summit of leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in Belgrade; thus becoming a founder member of the Movement.[6] In the years that followed, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement served the Government of Cyprus well on a number of occasions. For example, in 1964, albeit with a strong intervention by the Soviet Union, it prevented attempts by Britain and the United States to establish a NATO-based peacekeeping force following the first outbreak of inter-communal violence.[7] More recently, following the invasion and division of the island, the Movement, which includes many Muslim states amongst its members, played a vital part in Greek Cypriot efforts to prevent the recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. To this extent, active participation in the Non-Aligned Movement has been extremely beneficial for the Cypriot Government.

Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War at the start of the 1990s naturally raised questions about the continuing relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement, both in a general sense and in relation to Cyprus. At an international level, the very idea of non-alignment appeared to be redundant with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Instead, the Movement appeared to become more focused on development issues relating to the Global South. This shift in focus made Cypriot participation appear particularly incongruous. Meanwhile, although the Cypriot government still cultivated good ties with its partners in the Movement, even in the late-1980s it was becoming increasingly obvious that its ties were now shifting increasingly northwards and westwards in focus − towards Europe and away from Africa and Asia. In the early 1990s this trend accelerated as the post-Cold War project to unify the European continent gathered pace. As Greek Cypriot officials emphasised, accession to the Union now

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5   Clerides, *Cyprus*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

6   'The the Non-Aligned Movement and the Cyprus Question', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus.

7   These events are covered in J. Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964*, Mannheim/Möhnesee: Bibliopolis.

became the 'prime foreign policy objective' of the Cypriot Government.[8] In the end, Cyprus in fact had to leave the Non-Aligned Movement as a requirement of its accession to the European Union. Membership of the NAM was considered to be incompatible with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[9]

A European Direction

While EU membership may now be seen as an obvious outcome for the island, it was not always the case. As already noted, when Cyprus became independent its political orientation was clearly focused away from Europe and the West more generally. Significantly, though, it was Britain's decision to apply for membership of the EU that promoted the Cypriot Government to apply for an association agreement with the Union. Fearful that this could see Cyprus lose its main trading partner, it felt it had no option but to follow suit. But when the United Kingdom's application was vetoed by the French Government, the Republic of Cyprus withdrew its request.[10] Likewise, with Britain's accession to the EU in the early 1970s, Nicosia once again reactivated its own links. This resulted in the signing of an association agreement that envisaged the creation of a customs union by 1982. Such plans were, however, short-lived. The Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 necessarily delayed the implementation of the agreement until 1987. Three years later, the Republic of Cyprus officially applied to join the Union – despite the strong opposition of the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This request was officially accepted in 1994, despite some serious misgivings about the impact of accepting a divided island into the Union. Ten years later, in May 2004, and after further unsuccessful efforts to reunify the island and with the strong support of the Greek government, it became a full member of the Union.[11]

As had eventually been the case with membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, membership of the European Union came to be seen as a way of pursuing a narrow set of policy objectives. Accession seemed to be less about validating a European identity for Cyprus than about offering security and furthering the cause of reunification. Indeed, on both fronts EU membership was deemed to be particularly advantageous. Given the stand that Cyprus had joined as a united

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8   'The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cyprus Question', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus.

9   Nevertheless, Cyprus has retained a status within the movement as a Special Observer, and has said that it will try to act as a bridge between the European Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. Whether this will be the case has yet to be seen.

10   See A. Sepos (2008) *The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity Policies and Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

11   For an account of the accession process and efforts to resolve the division of the island, see J. Ker-Lindsay (2005) *EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; and, N. Tocci (2004) *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus?*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

entity, and that the TRNC[12] was deemed illegal under Security Council resolutions, the EU was – legally and, at least, officially – entirely on the side of the Cypriot Government in terms of its attempts to repudiate the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Notwithstanding perceived pressures from certain EU members to push for reunification on terms more favourable to the Turkish Cypriots, Nicosia's view was that its position would nevertheless in fact be significantly strengthened by membership. It seems highly unlikely that a third party country would recognise the north if this could incur possible sanctions from the Union or, at the very least, find that elements of its relations with the European Union would be obstructed by the Cypriot Government. At the same time, the prevailing view amongst Greek Cypriots was that EU membership would give the Republic of Cyprus an unparalleled degree of security in the face of a perceived threat from Turkey.

NATO Reconsidered

Interestingly, Cypriot membership of the European Union has reopened the question of whether or not the Republic should pursue closer relations with NATO. Although the Cold War is long since over, it remains an extremely contentious issue. Despite leaving the Non-Aligned Movement, the Cypriot Government has nevertheless maintained its clear distance from NATO. And while membership of NATO is not a requirement for EU membership, most EU members are part of the alliance. Indeed, Cyprus and Malta were the only two entrants in 2004 that were not members of the organisation.[13] Notably, even those EU members that officially maintained a policy of neutrality in their external relations have opted to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), a programme designed to promote co-operation with third countries.[14]

In contrast, Cyprus chose not to do so. In large part, this reflected the long-standing mistrust of NATO in Cyprus. However, this position is now being increasingly questioned by parties across the political spectrum. DISY, the main opposition party, as well as DIKO and EDEK, all favour PfP membership.[15] The lone exception is AKEL, which refuses to countenance any move that would bring Cyprus closer to an organisation it fundamentally mistrusts.[16] But even if

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12   Although the northern part of the island is referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

13   The only countries that were not members of NATO were Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. For more on relations between NATO and the EU see 'NATO's relations with the European Union', NATO: available at [http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html].

14   For more see 'The Partnership for Peace', NATO: available at [http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html].

15   'DISY pushes for Partnership for Peace entry', *Cyprus Mail*, 28 January 2009; 'Parliament calls on government to join PfP', *Cyprus Mail*, 3 April 2009.

16   In explaining its opposition, Aristos Damianou, a member of AKEL's Central Committee, stated, in the context of the new talks between the two communities, which were launched in 2008, 'We would therefore be giving the wrong messages to the international community if at the same time we start negotiating entry into a military

Nicosia were to change its mind, any decision to move closer to NATO would also require Turkish acceptance. This is unlikely for as long as the Cyprus Issue continues. Indeed, as has been seen, Turkey's opposition to possible Cypriot participation in EU peacekeeping missions has already held up an important agreement allowing the EU to draw on NATO assets.[17]

Conclusion

Just as the domestic political environment in the Republic of Cyprus has changed dramatically over the past fifty years, so too has its relationship with the wider world. When the island achieved statehood, the European empires were in decline and the Cold War was at its height. In this geo-political climate, the Cypriot government opted to join the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, European imperialism amounts to a few vestigial holdings here and there and the ideological confrontation between East and West is all but a memory. Instead, new world powers are emerging. In this context, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union. This has undoubtedly given the Greek Cypriots a degree of political security that they so craved. It has certainly made it more difficult for the TRNC to gain international recognition as any decision would undoubtedly have an impact of the recognising state's relations with the EU, which regards the whole of the island as a member – even if the effective control of the Cypriot Government over its entire territory is limited.

Questions, however, remain as to whether the EU can really deliver on expectations in terms of regional security. Is it really in a position to provide the protection that Greek Cypriots have long believed it could? Also, there seems to be a growing perception amongst many Greek Cypriots that Cyprus needs to anchor itself more firmly within western political structures. To this end, the question of whether Cyprus should join NATO has re-emerged. Whether it chooses to pursue closer relations with the Western alliance is a question that will have to be addressed in the years ahead. But it will also be dependent on how the current phase of talks progress. Without a solution, it seems that any discussion will remain in the realms of the hypothetical. Turkey will remain in a position to block such a development.

Moreover, there is also the possibility that any failure in the talks will also run the risk of bringing about an unpleasant and unwelcome shift in the security and support offered by the EU. The European Union's patience with Cyprus may start to wane if a solution is not found. If the Greek Cypriots are held responsible for any failure to reach a solution, key players within the EU may start to push more seriously for steps to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. There is also

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organisation. Second, we should also analyse international political developments, our capabilities as a small state and what role we could play in such an organisation. This body functions as a gateway to NATO, where Turkey plays a significant role. Thirdly, we should not forget the role which NATO played in Cyprus, in the events of 1974', 'DISY pushes for Partnership for Peace entry', *Cyprus Mail*, 28 January 2009.

17   For a discussion of this see D. Hannay (2005) *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution,* London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 116-118.

the possibility, especially after Kosovo, that any decision by a third party state to recognise the TRNC would not elicit the same degree of opposition from the EU as a whole as in the past. Certainly, the Cypriot Government could make things difficult in terms of relations between that state and the EU, but after the Lisbon Treaty, Nicosia's scope to block actions may well be more limited than in the past. Meanwhile, as a member of the EU, the Cypriot Government will have little chance to appeal to its old allies in the Non-Aligned Movement for help. Any dispute will undoubtedly be seen by the outside world as an EU issue. No one will want to intervene in a family dispute − especially when that dispute involves a family that is becoming ever more significant in world affairs. To this extent, EU accession may have strengthened the Republic of Cyprus in the short term, and while the Greek Cypriots are seen to be co-operative in terms of reaching a solution. Despite this, one can certainly see the ways in which membership may undermine its position in the future.

Be that as it may, for the moment the situation should be viewed in positive terms. Behind this examination of how Cyprus has aligned itself on the world stage since independence lies a far more significant story of growing autonomy for the Republic of Cyprus. Having been a colony of one or other of the countless empires that had dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, independence has given the government a degree of freedom to choose the island's orientation that has never been known before. The fact that the Republic could effectively choose whether to join NATO or the Non-Aligned Movement and that it has been able to accede to the European Union highlights the degree to which the Republic of Cyprus has − despite the constitutional limitations imposed on it at independence and the subsequent division of the island − nevertheless managed to forge its own individual sovereign identity over the past fifty years.

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The Realism of Utopia:
Towards an Anti-Nationalist Critique
of Imperial Policy in Cyprus, 1960-2010

Vassilis K. Fouskas

Abstract

Two Marxian categories/imperatives are employed here in order to examine critically the fundamentals of the Cyprus issue over the last fifty years: the imperative of anti-imperialism and that of anti-nationalism. But by not confining itself within Marxian discourses by applying the concept of 'garrison-prison state' (Harold Lasswell) to the case of Cyprus, this article advances the thesis that at least since 1960 the Cyprus issue has been ruled by a regime alien to the interests of Cypriot society. This regime refers to the ('paralegal'/illegal) set of Treaties and agreements, whether in force or not, violated or not, that have produced from the late 1950s to the present day and which pertain to a 'garrison-prison state' of affairs – primacy of hard security interests as against that of human security, of NATO powers as against that of Cypriot political forces. Every negotiation that is taking place within this framework does not lead to a new Cypriot polity freed from nationalist bureaucratisation of the political game and imperial interference in it. Instead, the article proposes, a new approach is necessary by way of launching a new constituent phase on the island, dissolving both political entities, thus disentangling Cypriot society from the evil forces of imperialism and nationalism. This is a tall order for sections of Cypriot society, both Turkish and Greek, which still want to believe in the realism of utopia.

Keywords: nationalism, imperialism, 'garrison-prison state', NATO

Introduction

A Marxian, anti-nationalist critique of international policy in Cyprus is long overdue. Past agreements or drafts of them that have failed to come into force, such as the 'Set of Ideas' by Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992), have either been criticised on nationalist grounds or, those embracing them, could hardly escape the class boundaries of political liberalism and NATO bias. This is certainly a defect of Cypriot Left forces, both Turkish and Greek, inasmuch as over the last 50 or so years have accommodated themselves with the ruling security system of the Eastern Mediterranean, underestimating such powerful forces as those of domestic nationalism and foreign imperialism.

But a Marxian critique of nationalism and imperialism in Cyprus is necessarily a critique of realism/neo-realism in IR theory: for an island so heavily securitised by three NATO forces

(Britain, Turkey and Greece) and so much watched by nuclear Mediterranean powers, such as the USA and Israel, it is necessary to redress this balance of power by bringing Cypriot society and class struggle at the heart of any analytical or political undertaking. Notions of *human security* could also be deployed in order to facilitate an understanding of the Cyprus issue on the basis of a people-centred analysis of conflict, suffering and healing. Yet any undertaking of the kind does not necessarily dictate fixation to a strictly Marxian theoretical apparatus. On the contrary, critical scholarship in general benefits from the operationalisation of concepts that draw from other schools of thought and theoretical traditions, including that of realism/neo-realism, insofar as the framework in which they are deployed is historically and theoretically coherent. We will be drawing upon a non-Marxian concept, that of the 'garrison-prison state' – first developed by sociologist Harold Lasswell in the late 1930s – in order to advance an anti-nationalist and anti-imperial critique of international policy in Cyprus over the last fifty years or so. We will come to realise that more than a time-frame figuring an anniversary, let alone a landmark, those last fifty years of the Republic of Cyprus are rather consubstantial with a *regime*: the regime of the primacy of imperial/NATO interests over the interests of the Cypriot people via fomenting domestic nationalism. Here, one issue stands out: whereas imperial interests can very well accommodate and absorb nationalist politics and vice versa – in this instance nationalism and imperialism feed each other – a coherent critique of them, let alone a real Left political project operationalising this critique, is bad news for both reactionary projects. A Left project in general should aim at that, and the Cypriot Left in particular should take stock of this.

First, we will define the concept of the 'garrison-prison state' and examine the way in which this can be applied to the case of Cyprus. Second, we will shed light on the Annan Plan, showing that it was a project that could hardly go beyond liberal consociationalism, while simultaneously serving the hard security interests of NATO powers – including those of Greece and Turkey – thus ignoring the vital interests of Cypriot people as a whole. Finally, we shall be making some suggestions outlining certain principles upon which a new, post-imperial and post-nationalist, democratic Cypriot polity can be built.

A 'Garrison-prison State' Endorsed by the UN

The break-up of the Soviet Union had given rise to a set of USA policies leading to the setting-up of *garrison-prison states* in East-Central Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East/Caucasus zones.[1] Not that this trend is a parthenogenesis pertaining to the end of the Cold War – far from

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1   On the concept of the 'garrison-prison state', see Harold Lasswell, *Essays on the Garrison State*, edited and with an introduction by Jay Stanley, New Brunswick 1997. The concept was put forward by Lasswell in the late 1930s in an essay entitled 'Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State', and was further elaborated in his 'The Garrison State' essay, published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in January 1941. Lasswell develops the thesis that 'perpetual crisis is likely to reverse the trend of historical development *from* progress toward

that. In essence, it is a modern historical trend, which for the eastern Mediterranean region could be said to have been inaugurated in 1948 with the recognition of Israel, a garrison-prison state *par excellence*. It then followed 1960-1963 Cyprus – some could say in 1958 with the Macmillan plan[2] – and, in a more incisive and pervasive manner, in 1974 with the security formation of northern Cyprus in the wake of Turkey's two military advances and the permanent stationing of its troops there. These types of state, whose formation is conducive to an organic and perpetual crisis caused by a complex articulation of external and internal agencies, are considered to be as much ethnically pure and militarily strong as possible. A garrison-prison state highlights the position of 'the experts on violence' against that of the 'experts on business', to use Lasswell's terminology. In this respect, one could see the USA as a state with 'garrison-prison state' tendencies itself, particularly during historical periods in which security branches of the state (i.e. the Pentagon) dominate over those of diplomacy (i.e. the State Department). Arguably, such a period was that under the Bush junior administration (2000-2008). In post-Cold War settings, this line of thinking is deemed to serve the USA and Israeli security interests in creating a range of buffer zones/enclaves regulated by friendly garrison-prison states surrounding Russia and China, thus interposing between Russia and the French/German axis, on the one hand, and between Russia and China in Central Asia, on the other. We should also mention the most recent attempt to fragment the greater Middle East – two such cases being Afghanistan and Iraq – thus additionally serving Israeli interests, simply because territorial fragmentation of the Middle East further impedes Arab unity, while facilitating the stationing of US military bases and other agencies of control and manipulation of those states by the USA. Iran and/or Pakistan may also follow suit. The post-Cold War predilection for garrison-prison states only seems to be realised if the regime/state in question (e.g. Saddam's Iraq, Milosevic's Serbia) disobeys the suggestions of the global security master, i.e. the USA. Turkey might also become a target of this USA power calculus, given its large Kurdish population and its periodical opposition – at times really courageous – to USA/Israel ventures in Mesopotamia, Persia and the Levant. In our view, Cyprus falls within this analytical framework and historical trend: 'consociationalism', 'partnership states' and other such etiquettes are but intellectual exercises aiming at a sophisticated legitimisation of neo-imperial and neo-nationalist policy which, in a curious way, Israel/Palestine and Cyprus inaugurated for the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War. It is not Turkey or Greece, Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots that favour such 'liberal' solution to the Cyprus issue. It is Anglo-Saxon neo-imperial security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean that pushed and keeps pushing this 'liberal' policy in Cyprus *via* Turkey and other NATO powers, such as Greece. Here, wrongly, societies are viewed as appendages of business and

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a world commonwealth of free men, *toward* a world order in which the garrison-prison state reintroduces caste bound social systems'.

2   We would like to point out that the Macmillan Plan was quickly rejected by Makarios, describing the idea of 'partnership' at the state level as imposition of a 'triple condominium' on Cyprus. It is also significant to remember that the Labour opposition at the time criticised the plan as deeply divisive.

political elites serving especially the agendas of those elites, whether imperialist or nationalist, or even both.

It is perhaps crucial here to point out that imperial powers, with varying degrees of success, have always recruited local political and business elites to carry out their regional security and class policy. This is especially the case with Greece, a weak social formation with a large comprador bourgeoisie and without its own industrial-productive base, and with a political class ready to serve great power interests.[3] As the late Peter Gowan points out, the contribution of world system theorists, but also of Trotski and Braudel, to understanding this type of imperial-comprador-political relations is paramount: 'This insight', Gowan says, 'is fundamental for an understanding of the history of imperialism, including the history of British imperialism. One simply cannot begin to grasp how this small island of Britain managed, for example, to dominate a country like India, without understanding this massive cooption of Indian social elites into the system'.[4]

The legal trajectory for a solution to the Cyprus issue since 1958-1960 has been characterised by great power interference and imposition of illegal schemes alien to the interests of Cypriot society. In pedigree, the inserted constitutional triarchy (the three guarantor powers) in the arrangements of 1959-1960, was merely a reflection of the British imperial policy of 'divide and rule' on the island during the EOKA struggle. The Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee contravened the very charter of the UN. Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed on 16 August 1960, states that 'in the event of a breach of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to consult together (...). Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserve the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty'. But this provision contravened article 2.4 of the UN Charter and was completely overridden by article 103. Article 2.4 states that 'all members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN'. Article 103 also affirms that 'in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter still prevail'.

Moving forward in time, the Ghali 'Set of Ideas' of 1992 was a step further to legitimising the partition work the British had begun in the 1950s. And the five Annan plans were the crowning of all such illegal efforts. Having reinforced the Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee, Annan-V was over 9,000 pages long, complicated and muddled, and a true legal labyrinth

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3   On this subject, see my 'The Left and the Crisis of the Third Hellenic Republic, 1989-1997' in D. Sassoon (ed.) (1997) *Looking Left*, London: I.B. Tauris.

4   P. Gowan (2010) 'Interview' (with M. Newman and M. Bojcum) in his *A Calculus of Power*, London: Verso, pp. 233-234.

poisoning the Cyprus *acquis* with all conceivable previous illegalities.[5] The plan legitimised Britain's and NATO's colonial rights in and around Cyprus, while legally embedding Turkey's and Greece's security interests there. The Cypriots themselves were left separated into two garrison-prison statelets – what Annan, rather euphemistically, called 'constituent states of the United Cyprus Republic'. In this forty-five year old (il)legal trajectory and international imbroglio, only one UN plan made serious sense: that produced by UN mediator Galo Plaza in 1964-1965. Turkey argued that it was pro-Greek Cypriot, which is absolutely true, but if it had been supported by Britain and the USA, it could have given a politically functional and socially anti-racist solution to the island's problem of central governance, excluding both *enosis* and *taksim*, thus facilitating the mingling of the Cypriot population. More to the point, the Plaza blueprint would not have contravened the charter of the UN, something which all schemes since 1959 have been doing, the Annan plan being the most outrageous and illegal of all. In other words: the Cypriot *acquis* over the decades has gone from bad to worse and it has taken on the characteristics of a *regime* constraining all social forces that opt to operate within its analytical or political boundaries. It is little wonder that some have even tried to blend it with the European *acquis*, by way of legitimising substantive derogations.

The Annan Plan(s) Reinforced the 'Garrison-prison State' of Affairs in Cyprus

The Hellenic plan was to achieve Cypriot EU membership, regardless of whether a solution to the island's division was found beforehand. Yet Cyprus' entry to the EU could have been delayed until such time as Turkey received satisfaction on Cyprus, including its own EU membership. But Greece, breaking with its post-war subservient conservative traditions, threatened to veto the EU's eastward enlargement, so the thought was ruled out. This left one course open for the Anglo-Saxons: to use the UN to supervise talks between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, a process that kicked off at a G8 summit in summer 1999. It pointedly ignored both the legal (Greek)-Cypriot government and the UN Security Council itself. The Security Council simply came to rubber-stamp an Anglo-Saxon decision, committing Annan to initiate, oversee and conclude the process. Thus, in November of that year,

> 'Kofi Annan presented the two sides with a twenty-point "non-paper" containing fundamental principles to guide the resolution of the problem. This "non-paper" included the commitment that the comprehensive solution would be presented for ratification by separate and simultaneous referenda in both communities. The referenda would provide through democratic means the legitimisation and approval of the comprehensive solution. The idea of the referenda was not new. It first appeared in 1992 in the secretary-general's "set

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5   Same as the European *acquis*, the Cypriot *acquis* can be seen as the accumulation of all legal documents, international Treaties and other legal material, whether bilateral or not, concerning the Cyprus issue and which has been accumulating from the 1950s onwards.

of ideas". The referenda would be held on the outcome of the negotiated agreement on the Cyprus question. In 2004, however, the matter that was presented to the referendum vote was the disputed product of the secretary general's arbitration and not the product of negotiations between the parties. [the shift] in the secretary-general's role from the offer of "good offices" to arbitration was not apparent at the time'.[6]

Strict timelines were set, the aim being to sort out Cyprus before it became a member of the EU.[7] The first plan was produced punctually by David Hannay and Tom Weston (the State Department's special coordinator on Cyprus), just a few weeks before the EU summit in Copenhagen (December 2002) – the venue where the EU would assess the outcome of negotiations with the Greek-led Republic: A UN Peruvian functionary by the name of Alvaro De Soto fig-leafed the whole operation. The coordination among them was perfect – 'not a cigarette paper could have been slipped between their positions', Hannay said self-indulgently – but they miscalculated the responses from the Cypriot society.[8]

Annan-I became Annan-II and then Annan-III in a bout of horse-trading that was becoming increasingly internationalised in the run up to the war against Iraq. The Greek Cypriots accepted all three plans, but not Denktash – who at some point was unwell and had no credentials to endorse or sign – and Turkey. With its Middle Eastern role looming large, and with its generals restless not to concede more to the pro-European bloc led by Erdogan, Turkey's deep state realised that it was a good time for bargaining.

Turkey, under the new leadership of Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, gave a new impetus to Turkish European diplomacy and vocation, presenting a mild, democratic and serene profile, as opposed to the macho politics of its previous, more or less, pro-Kemalist elites. This began winning over the Europeans, as the new ruling group in Turkey appeared willing to launch – and did – the kind of liberal reforms the Europeans wanted, particularly on human rights issues. Erdogan wanted a diplomatic solution to the Cyprus issue and appeared to be drifting away from the maximalist security positions of Denktash and the Turkish military. The Europeans liked it a lot, particularly the Left, but at the same time Turkey was under pressure from the USA to concede to American troops the right of passage, and flight from its South-eastern provinces to attack Saddam from the north. This Turkey opposed through a lack of votes in the Grand Assembly, but

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6   V. Coufoudakis (2006) *Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 28-29. Coufoudakis, despite giving powerful arguments in favour of the plan's rejection, he fails to put forth a post-nationalist comprehensive alternative *outwith* the historical imperial perimeter crystallised in the plan.

7   We follow here the narrative by C. Palley (2005) *An International Relations Debacle; The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1999-2004,* Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 23 ff. This account, deeply pro-Greek, is nevertheless accurate in its blow-by-blow description of events and remains the only available for consultation in English to date.

8   Hannay's version of events is deeply flawed and one-sided – see his *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution,* London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

there was an overall Turkish strategic calculus for this stance. The USA-UK, having enforced two no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq in the 1990s, had at the same time assisted the Kurds in building their institutions in their northern regions, something that was anathema to the Turkish Kemalist elite. With the victorious Anglo-Saxon troops in Northern Iraq in alliance with the Kurdish anti-Saddam forces of *peshmerga*, the Turks rightly changed their minds. The worst scenario for Turkey would have been the initiation of a messy war, and a process whereby Iraqi Kurdistan could receive state recognition around a territory encompassing the oil-rich zones of Kirkuk and Mosul. It was a time of hard bargaining for Turkey, which at the same time wanted to streamline its financial crisis by seeking an IMF loan. Cyprus, once again, was used as a bargaining chip. State Department official Daniel Fried, in the presence of his colleague Mathew Bryza, spoke as follows to an audience of Greek Americans in Washington DC on 12 June 2003:

> 'When we were trying to persuade Turkey to allow the passage of our troops through its territory into northern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives: several billion dollars in grants and loans and Cyprus in the form of the Annan plan'.[9]

Yet, despite the compromising stance of the Greek Cypriot side, none of the three plans satisfied the Turkish overall strategic calculus. Indeed, Denktash turned down all three versions, disappointing Clerides, the liberal-conservative President of the Greek-led Republic. Clerides accepted Annan-I as a basis for negotiation and indicated that he would be willing to accept Annan-II prior to the Copenhagen EU Council in December 2002. Annan-III came into being after Papadopoulos won the elections, against Clerides, in February 2003. It expired at The Hague the following month, again because of Denktash's intransigence. On 10 March 2003, Annan himself announced, 'we've come to the end of the road'. Well, not quite.

With the Greek-led Republic on the threshold of the EU, the Annan conception and its international cohort began to move once more. Papadopoulos' nationalist politics seize the opportunity by sending a letter to Annan asking him to become involved yet again, so that Cyprus can join the EU as a united country. But the international cohort was assisted by the toppling of Denktash, giving hope to the Turkish Cypriots – and Erdogan – that the Annan conception and its accompanying benefits could be endorsed. This, it should be noted, was strengthening Erdogan's democratic hand against Kemalism, certainly a highly desirable development for regional, European and global politics, but the Annan plan was supposed to solve the Cyprus issue, not the Turkish one.

But thus far, no serious negotiation had taken place between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots; the UN arbitration was binding and all three plans were concocted; and this all was happening without any authorisation from the Security Council. As far as the EU was concerned, its influence in steering the various exogenous actors involved, such as De Soto, was non-existent,

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9   *Cyprus Weekly,* 5-11 August 2005, p. 3. These are the words by Bryza himself.

despite the fact that all versions of the plan circumvented the European *acquis*, thus requiring insertion of unusual derogations – such as on freedom of settlement. Time was running out for Erdogan, who had made entry of Turkey into the EU the top priority of his cabinet. Yet, he had received two pledges from Prodi, who had visited Ankara on 15 January 2004: a) Settling the Cyprus problem is not a precondition for Turkey's EU accession negotiations; b) whether a settlement is reached or not, the next step would be the lifting of the embargoes against the TRNC[10,11]

The Guarantor powers (Turkey, Britain, Greece) and their poor relatives, the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, were summoned to the White House. Thus, a fourth edition of the plan was finalised by the Americans, while last-minute adjustments took place after the Bürgenstock meeting in Interlaken, Switzerland. There, Constantine Karamanlis junior, the nephew of Karamanlis who negotiated the 1959-1960 settlements, met with Papadopoulos and one must be naive to assume that Karamanlis said to Papadopoulos nothing or that he should not accept the plan (Papadopoulos, the new President of the Greek-led Republic, was a Makarios loyalist in the latter's cabinets of the 1960s). Thus, on the last day of March 2004, we arrive at Annan-V, a non-negotiable item, which was to be tested with the two separate referenda on 24 April, before the official entry of the Republic into the EU on 1 May. So much for procedural matters. Substance was just as bad.

On the very day of the working class, 1 May, which coincided with Cyprus' EU entry, the Greek-led Republic would have had to abolish itself and change its name, which was tough for Papadopoulos and Christophias alike, the latter being his powerful Communist ally, leading the AKEL party, which once opposed the EC/EU as a capitalist club. In its stead, two constituent states of 'equal status' would be formed – one Turkish and one Greek Cypriot – subject to no hierarchy of laws and administrative/executive units. The two states would be called 'United Cyprus Republic' – as in a Spanish wedding, the new appellation did not replace the old but encompassed it.

The senate (the upper house) would be equally divided, 50:50, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (this and many other points came straight from Ghali's 'Set of Ideas'). At the component level state, the lower house, seats would be 'distributed on the basis of the number of persons holding internal component state citizenship of each component state', provided that each such state 'shall be attributed a minimum of one quarter of the seats'.[12] That meant that the Turkish

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10   See Palley (2005), fn. 7.
11   Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.
12   K.A. Kyriakides (2004) 'Legitimising the Illegitimate? The Origins and Objectives of the Annan Plan' in V. Coufoudakis and K.A. Kyriakides, *The Case Against the Annan Plan*, London: Lobby for Cyprus, p. 25. Kyriakides' criticism of the illegalities of the Annan schemes is one of the most accurate accounts available to date – the author teaches Law at the University of Hertfordshire.

faction would be not less than 25% of the total. Annan's scheme provided that parliamentary (lower house) decisions, in order to be valid, needed the approval of both houses, with simple majority of members present and voting, including one quarter of senators present and voting from each constituent state. For particularly specified matters, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting senators, from each component state, would be required. Thus, as Kyriakides pinpoints, 'although the word veto does not appear in the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriot members of parliament will effectively have a veto over all legislative decisions if they voted *en bloc*'.[13] In this context, it is legitimate to argue that Turkey, via the political services of its Turkish Cypriot component state, could lay claims on the policy of Cyprus as a whole. But this was an Anglo-Saxon and, indeed, NATO arrangement: no such claim could be laid by Turkey on Cyprus, had it not been previously agreed by the USA serving her specific policies in the region at any given conjuncture.

There would be no President or Prime Minister, but a 'Presidential Council' composed of four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots. They would have to be elected by a 'special majority', requiring two-fifths of each half of the senate. The rotating President of the Council would have no casting vote, carrying no special status as President of the Republic. All Council members 'shall be equal' and if they failed to reach consensus, then the Council would make decisions by simple majority, which in all cases must comprise at least one member from each component state. Time and again, and although the word 'veto' does not appear anywhere in the plan as in the 1959-1960 constitutional arrangements, the Turkish members of the Council would effectively have had a veto if they voted *en bloc*. Disagreements and proceedings following vetoed items would be delegated to foreign arbitration: a Supreme Court, composed of three Turks, three Greeks and three foreigners would have to approve and decide upon a course of policy action.[14] There is no face-saving wash here – did anybody say that neo-colonialism cannot be so openly crude?

These deeply dysfunctional, cumbersome and destabilising provisions, encouraging all sorts of ethnic rancour and religious separatisms to flourish again and again, and aiding all kinds of wheeling and dealing between the regional powers and the Anglo-Saxons in the ultimate service of neo-imperial arrangements, were topped up with the reinforcement of the illegal Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee, which, among others: a) concede the right to the Guarantor powers (Turkey, Britain and Greece) to intervene in the internal affairs of each constituent state; b) concede the right to Britain to unimpeded access to the waters corresponding to the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) – these 'trampolines for Iraq' – as Perry Anderson called them – as well as in, around and over Cyprus; and c) concede the right to Turkey and Greece to have permanently stationed troops on the island, with no guarantees for the enforcement of the

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13   *Ibid.*

14   Other key institutions in which foreign nationals would have had important powers included the Reconciliation Commission, the Central Bank, the Relocation Board, the Property Court and the organs of the Property Board.

provision for the withdrawal of the bulk of their troops over a period of years, in case they had refused to do so for whatever conceivable reason – for instance if the Europeans blocked Turkey's EU membership.

The Force of Utopia: Founding Principles for a New Cypriot Polity

Cypriot society has been and is being ruled by a *regime* that pertains to a 'garrison-prison state' of affairs in which the security interests of NATO powers prevail massively over any other interest. This regime is regulated by a rather 'paralegal' set of Treaties and agreements, whether in force or not, violated or not, and for which we reserved here the term 'Cypriot *acquis*'. The first task of the Cypriot Left, both Turkish and Greek, is to opt out of the logic of this regime and denounce the Cypriot *acquis* as a security construction which undermines the fundamental freedoms of the Cypriot people, such as that of movement and settlement.

The second task of the Cypriot Left is to initiate a massive educational campaign for all peoples of Cyprus in order to deconstruct the superstructures of nationalism, separatism, ethnic segregation and imperialism at all levels, socially, culturally and, above all, politically. This is a tall order, as the myth that there exist 'two nations' in Cyprus, a notion so dear to nationalists on both sides, has to be demolished. Yet this second task should be seen *pari passu* with a third one, namely with the materialisation of the arduous project of the dissolution of both bureaucratic entities on the island as the *conditio sine qua non* for a post-nationalist, post-imperial new polity. For this to happen, a prolonged *constituent phase* is necessary advancing internationalism and class solidarity against nationalism and nationalist education, and popular unity and Cypriot 'Constitutional patriotism' – a Habermasian phrase often used in the scholarly work by Niyazi Kizilurek – against imperial interference.[15] We put the issue this way because the anti-nationalist (liberal) Left in Cyprus and elsewhere forget the villain of imperialism, whereas the anti-imperial (conservative) Left in Cyprus and elsewhere forget the evil of nationalism. In this respect, the so-called issue of settlers and refugees is not a huge problem to tackle inasmuch as the central issue is not that of separation into two states, but rather that of unification, democratisation and social solidarity and mingling of people.[16] But the issues of the British bases, of the Turkish army and security personnel, as well as of the Greek air base in Paphos and perhaps other forces that Greece may have on the island, are issues about which the Cypriot Left must deal with in an uncompromising manner during the proposed constituent phase. In other words, the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and

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15 For a scholarly discussion in this direction see the excellent collection of articles on a Cypriot Constitutional Convention edited by Andreas Auer for the *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2009.

16 Towards this analytical perspective one should read the excellent text by A.M. Agathangelou and K.D. Killian (2009) 'The Discourse of Refugee Trauma: Epistemologies of the Displaced, the State, and Mental Health Practitioners', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 19-58.

Establishment should be scrapped once and for all, and that is something worth fighting for. Put another way, the constituent phase towards a new Cypriot united polity should be seen as a radical departure from the regime of subsumption to foreign imperialism and domestic nationalist forces, while simultaneously designing the new democratic contours of it. Time and again, this is a tall order, not least because the locomotive that feeds the two political bureaucracies that exist on the island are precisely a multiple combination of imperial/NATO backing, nationalist ideology and comprador interests. In this respect, when all is said and done, it may well be reminded – with apologies to Marx and Lenin – that what we have called here *Cypriot regime/acquis* cannot be reformed. Indeed, as Marxian utopias dictate, it can only be smashed.

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Rethinking Cypriot State Formations

Nicos Trimikliniotis, Umut Bozkurt

Abstract

This paper evaluates and critiques the current state of knowledge on the theorisation of the Cypriot state formations and the nature of the conflict in the country. It aims to provide a prolegomenon for the re-conceptualisation of the Cyprus state formations as enmeshed in the 'Cyprus problem' within its regional and global settings. We examine the two main approaches theorising the Cypriot state formations, namely Weberian and Marxist inspired accounts and locate some of the problems and gaps. We argue that the current conjuncture is marked by significant social transformations both internally and adjacent to the country, which require a fresh perspective on 'the Cyprus problem'. Such a perspective is based on the premise that we must go beyond analyses that focus exclusively on either of the two competing dimensions of an unintuitive binary, either as global/regional geopolitical, or a local ethno-national identity conflict. These 'common sense' readings of the Cyprus problem, which can be referred to as the liberal conflict resolution model and the global/regional geopolitics model are not only limited theoretically but their contestation leads to a political cul-de-sac. Moreover, such perspectives in turn dis-empower the social and political forces within Cyprus to actively engage in bringing about an end to the partitionist divide in a country which is one of the most militarised zones in the world. The shortcomings of these approaches in making sense of the state formation and the dispute itself, underlines the necessity of a multi-faceted theoretical framework that assesses the role of class and other social forces as well as changing regional and global contexts which shape both the nature of the so-called Cyprus problem as well as the peculiar fragmentary state formations.

Introduction

Apart from the past ten years the question of Cyprus has received little attention for over fifty years in international (essentially Anglophone) literature. After all, neither the size of this island state nor its lack of natural resources make Cyprus intrinsically significant;[1] any imperial interest in the country derived purely from its geographical position, and its usefulness as a pawn in imperial

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1   At least this was the case before the recent discovery of potential oil reserves.

games.[2] This interpretation was candidly admitted by a former governor of Cyprus, Sir Ronald Storrs, who said that the British 'occupied Cyprus for strategic and imperial purposes'.[3] Western intelligence services showed some interest in the 1960s and 1970s, commissioning a number of studies on Cyprus and communism.[4] In those days when policy-makers and USA and NATO intelligence services feared the possible ascendancy of Communism in Cyprus, operations were initiated to monitor the country;[5] hence the references to the danger of Cyprus becoming a 'Cuba of the Mediterranean'.[6] With few exceptions, primarily by Cypriots or researchers with some connection to Cyprus, little academic or research interest can be recorded until recently.

The situation has, however, drastically changed over the last ten years, as can be observed by an invigorated interest in both the country and the conflict in the run up to, and later rejection of, the UN plan in 2004 to resolve the Cyprus problem – known as the 'Annan' plan.[7] The transformations within Turkey, Turkey's EU accession process and its new Cyprus policy since 2002 have opened possibilities for reaching an agreement on Cyprus. There has also been a new momentum in the search for a solution to the problem, following a stalemate in the immediate aftermath of the election of Dimitris Christofias, the leader of the AKEL party, as the only communist head of state in the EU. For two years Christofias negotiated with Mehmet Ali Talat,[8] the left-wing Turkish Cypriot leader of the (unrecognised/illegal) break-away Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.[9] Renewed hopes then emerged that a settlement was within grasp, but time seems to be running out. Disillusionment amongst the Turkish Cypriots, who did not see the promises of accession/reunification materialise or the divisions narrow within the broad social/political movement that brought Talat to power, led to the replacement of the left-wing leader in the elections of April 2010. The new Turkish Cypriot leader – the veteran right-wing Derviş Eroğlu – was marginally elected in the first round with 50.3%. Nevertheless, the hopes for

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2   See A. Varnava (2006) '"Cyprus is of no use to anybody": The Pawn 1878-1915' in H. Faustmann and N. Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus, Colonialism and Post-colonialism 1878-2006*, Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, pp. 35-60.

3   In Storr's book *Orientations*, p. 488.

4   See T.W. Adams (1971) *AKEL: the Communist Party of Cyprus*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press; T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrell (1968) *Cyprus between East and West*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. Adams is the author of the US Army Area Handbook for Cyprus.

5   Various anti-communist funds were channelled, particularly via the Greek junta for this purpose.

6   Nixon is alleged to have referred to Makarios as 'Castro in a cassock', see R. Dunphy and T. Bale (2007) 'Red Flag Still Flying?: Explaining AKEL – Cyprus's Communist Anomaly', *Party Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 287-304, p. 293.

7   See A. Varnava and H. Faustmann (eds.) (2009) *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I.B. Tauris.

8   He headed the Turkish Cypriot sister-party of AKEL, Republican Turkish Party (CTP).

9   Although the northern part of the island of Cyprus is referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

reunification have not been eradicated: following his electoral victory and contrary to his pre-election pledges, Eroğlu stated that he accepts what his predecessor has earlier agreed and vows to continue on the same route, seeking a solution by the end of 2010. Moreover, Erdoğan's Ankara, in the aftermath of AKP's victory in the recent referendum on constitutional reform, seems more confident than before to proceed with a settlement. Yet, nothing is certain; it is a struggle to the bitter end.

Beyond the issues relating to the specific context and conjuncture, there are important theoretical questions that have crucial political consequences. One particular issue that we would like to engage in this article is the question of whether the theorisation of the state form in Cyprus, in the context of conflict, is adequate against the backdrop of watershed transformations that took place a decade earlier, setting the world geographical scene.

We contend that the question of how to read the case of Cyprus has been opened up in ways which illustrate how much it reflects and can be read simultaneously as a site which lends itself to novel readings of current worldly political affairs and its crises: a country with strong communist loyalties (see Panayiotou, 2006). Its curious divisions and odd Cypriot state formations in its conflict-ridden context have lent it to alternative and/or complementary interpretations. Does it constitute an 'anomaly' (Dunphy and Bale, 2007), and/or a 'state of exception' (C.M. Constantinou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010b), and/or 'a postcolonial quasi-stateness' (M. Constantinou, 2006), and/or is it yet another dimension of a modern state system (Navaro-Yashın, 2003, 2006, 2009)? These are but some formulations of the state/conflict situation in Cyprus, which we intend to scrutinise. Nearing the end of the current conjuncture, which began to take a specific form in the Cypriot context with the new millennium but was most probably initiated within the watershed of transformations that took place on the world geopolitical stage a decade earlier, we question here whether the theorisation over the Cyprus case *[state form plus conflict]* is adequate.

Theorising the State Formations in Cyprus within their Regional and Global Settings

Peter Worsley (1979, p. 10) reminded us that Cyprus was *not* perceived by the British as an economic asset due to the islands national strategic significance in the Eastern Mediterranean. He borrowed from the Nixon era the term 'benign neglect' to describe the colonial period. But thirty years on, a new generation of scholars, based on historical readings, can refer to the island as a 'mere pawn' for the British (Varnava, 2006), contrary to popular perceptions in Cyprus which ascribe a crucial significance to our small country for British colonialists then. As we approach the present, its importance is assumed to have increased over time for the global powers that be, in what is described as 'imperialism of our time'.[10] Yet, it accurately considered that the island's worth

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10   See the volume, L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds.) (2004) *The Socialist Register 2004, The New Imperial Challenge*, Athens: Savalas Publications.

assumed greater value in 1950 with the advent of the Cold War and the rise of the USA as leader of the world capitalist camp and the decline of the British Empire. Britain's new role as a junior partner in a worldwide system meant that Cyprus was caught in Cold War games between the superpowers, because the near Middle East was a contested region.

Post independence Cyprus was a newly established state under a 'guarantor system' of three NATO 'allies' which oddly belonged to the non-aligned movement. On the international stage, the President of the country, archbishop Makarios, played one superpower against the other to outmanoeuvre successive efforts to shed this strip of land between two expansionist mother-countries, which threatened the stability of the eastern flank of NATO. Internally, the fine balance contained in the power-sharing consociation collapsed by 1963 and ethnic conflict tore the country apart: the Greek Cypriot power elite conquered the bicommunal state, as the Turkish Cypriot chauvinist elite imposed its siege mentality in the enclaves it controlled. Those who defied the ethnic division and insisted on intercommunal cooperation in a common state were silenced, murdered or ignored. By 1974, the Greek coup and Turkish invasion completed the *de facto* partition of a fragmented island, which has remained in a state of limbo until today. Soon after the 1974 disaster, Tom Nairm (1979) wondered whether two factors could shift the sand: firstly, the realisation by the Turkish Cypriots that their interests diverged from Turkey's as the Greek Cypriots came to realise in the 1960s with respect to Greece. Secondly, the role of the European Community presented itself as a possible outside force which might alter the relations in the triangle of Turkey-Greece-Cyprus and create conditions for a settlement. These two factors did indeed materialise and produce powerful results, but have not yet resulted in a solution. Together with Turkey's internal transformation and the regional/global context these factors are operative today, and are pushing history forwards. We cannot predict the outcome of this historical process but we do know that the coming reality will not resemble the current one.

In order to make sense of *Cyprus within the world*, particularly in relation to theorising the state form in Cyprus, we need to map the parameters of what is acknowledged by many scholars, historically speaking, as 'the peculiarity of Cyprus, 1878-1931'.[11] They start their account with a Colonial office minute 28 November 1901 'we are hampered on all sides by the peculiar position of Cyprus' (Holland and Markides, 2008, p. 162). These authors refer to 'the unusual limitations in the age of decolonization' imposed on the Republic and they trace the roots of a different historical path when compared to Greek islands which united with Greece. The story for Holland and Markides stops in 1960 as the travails of the resulting Republic are not their concern; they refer to the fact that 'the island was always surrounded by externalities, uncertainties and ambiguities'. We venture to propose that the big research political question for the current conjuncture lies precisely in bringing the story to the present; the idea is to re-evaluate such contentions *today*. The so-called 'peculiarity' entails one of the theoretical and ideological traps:

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11   See for instance the chapter by Holland and Markides (2008).

'*exceptionalism*', which blurs our conception of political reality as part of the world at large. The argument which we dispute is one that takes this 'peculiarity' as a given without questioning it: 'our case is so sui generis that makes it incomparable to anything else', hence the defensive line hinders any potential for learning by comparison.

State Theory: Conceptualising the State in its Global Context

A Note on Theorising the Cypriot State Today

This article aims to address the state question in Cyprus as a specific instance, reflective of a broader regional and global reality. In that sense, it takes Bob Jessop's conclusion that there can be no general theory of the State:[12] 'states in capitalist societies will necessarily differ from one another' as its main reference point.[13] Hence, we are of the view that we must resist the analysis that perceives the Cyprus case *exclusively as an 'exception to the norm'*, whilst simultaneously refusing to succumb to the exact opposite trap, i.e. the typical assumption that *Cyprus is but an instance of geopolitical interests where all is played at a global/regional map, where Cypriots have no role or significance*.

Overall, we aim to illustrate that there has been a long-standing difficulty in *theorising* the state formation(s) in Cyprus. This is hardly surprising. It was Louis Althusser,[14] who, many years ago, wrote about the inherent difficulty of moving from what he called a *descriptive theory* to *a genuine theory of the state*. The *descriptive theory* is but 'a phase in the constitution of theory' (Althusser, 2001, p. 93), whereas a 'theory as such' requires deeper insights into the apparatus of the state, or to go further using Althusser's terms, 'in order to understand the mechanism of the State in its functioning'. Since then, of course, we have witnessed the radical reshaping of the world as well as the mass expansion of theories of the state in different directions. We argue, however, that the 'nuts and bolts' or the foundations for such a theorisation were laid by what has become *classical twentieth century readings of the state*. Moreover, when dealing with the specific context of Cyprus, whilst there has been massive advancement in empirical studies of the Cypriot state formation(s), we can state that the theory of the Cypriot state formation(s) still remains at the descriptive phase with some notable exceptions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer an alternative theorisation; a task of this magnitude requires much more depth than we can provide in this article.[15] What we provide here is an appraisal and critique of the current level of knowledge

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12   We use a capital letter for 'State' whenever we want to emphasise it or when it is a subject of enquiry, unless it is quoted otherwise.

13   B. Jessop (1990) *State Theory*, Pennsylvanian University Press, p. 44.

14   In his famous article 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes towards an Investigation)', pp. 92-94, see L. Althusser (2001) *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays*, Monthly Review Press.

15   We have tried to flesh out such a theorisation, but it is by no means complete. We do, however, have two chapters in which we elaborate our position in a forthcoming edited volume (see Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt, 2011 forthcoming).

as well as presenting a *rudimental* basis for a theorisation, in what might be called a prolegomena to a theorisation of the state formation(s) in Cyprus.

Hence the classical readings of the state will guide us in our attempt to conceptualise the state. Two broad theoretical approaches that inform the theories of the state can be cited: firstly, the Weberian or organisation-analytic approaches and secondly, Marxist or class-analytic approaches.[16] Weberian or organisation-analytic approaches emphasise the ways in which states constitute autonomous sources of power, and operate on the basis of institutional logics and dynamics with variable forms of interaction with other sources of power in society. Marxist or class-analytic approaches anchor the analysis of the state in terms of its structural relationship to capitalism as a system of class relations (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

This Weberian conception of a state as an autonomous apparatus that should not be imprisoned by social forces strongly informs the literature on Cyprus. Even so, 'the state as a neutral, liberal arbiter and autonomous source of power never emerged in Cyprus. Rather than being the functional substitute for vanishing communal solidarities and traditional forms of consensus, the post-colonial state became their direct and contradictory embodiment. It therefore did not quell intercommunal conflict but exacerbated it by becoming itself an additional bone of contention' (M. Constantinou, 2006, p. 296). In her article on the civil service in the TRNC, Navaro-Yashın reaches a similar conclusion. On the basis of her discussion of the Turkish Cypriot case, she argues that bureaucracy needs to be studied not as a practice which counters or extinguishes affect, but as one which produces and incites specific modes of affectivity in its own right. Her starting point is the Weberian ideal type of legal-rational state that study bureaucracy as a rationalising apparatus, instigating discipline and organising audit procedures, with no room for affect. Though Yashın is only critical of the so-called lack of affect within bureaucracy, she maintains that she does not contest the other aspects which relate to bureaucracy being a rationalising apparatus that instigates discipline (Navaro-Yashın, 2006, p. 282). It can be observed in both cases that whether the state structures in Cyprus are taken as examples of 'a postcolonial quasi-stateness' (M. Constantinou, 2006) or another dimension of a modern state system (Navaro-Yashın, 2003, 2006) the state is perceived as an apparatus that acts autonomously from social forces.[17]

An overall assessment of the literature cited reveals a fundamental problem regarding its theorisation of the state. First of all, most of the theorising on the state in Cyprus is made in terms of contrasts with ideal-typical forms. The Cypriot state formation(s) is/are mostly criticised for not conforming to these ideal types. On the one hand, this position glosses over the fact that the

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16 The variety of conceptualisations of the state mostly draws on one of these two main approaches.

17 We deal more specifically with the peculiarity of the unrecognised state formation of the TRNC: overall, the literature produced on the state structure in northern Cyprus is very limited. Apart from a few exceptions, it would not be wrong to say that the general tendency, in a way echoing the literature on the Republic, is that the state has not yet acquired the bureaucratic logic of the 'rational-legal' paradigm due to its 'deficient modernisation'.

Weberian ideal type is a mental construct, and treats the ideal type of Western capitalist state (i.e. legal-rational state) as though it corresponded to the empirical reality of developed capitalist societies (Yalman, 1997, p. 91). But on the other hand, the alleged non-conformity of the Cypriot formation to Weberian ideal types leads to the conception of the state as a *sui generis* reality. What is more, the state is seen as a neutral arbiter, a neutral agent of social transformation, independent of social classes. This approach presumes that a strong bureaucracy, expected to develop and implement policies at the expense of dominant societal interests, is the manifestation of the state's autonomy. Third world nation-states, post-colonial state formations, and the state formations in Cyprus are criticised on the basis of this Weberian ideal. The state, rather than acting as the liberal, neutral arbiter has given in to societal interests, thereby becoming compartmentalised among conflicting interests.

We now proceed to examine how the *'institutional materiality'* of the Cypriot state formation via its different shapes, forms and phases in transition, reflect various struggles/conflicts. When examining the part the Cypriot state formation and its colonial predecessor played in the ethnicity-class conflict and anti-colonialism, the State's constitutive role is particularly relevant. This dynamic perception provided by Poulantzas is later used to consider the construction of the Cypriot State.

This basic notion of post-coloniality was taken up explicitly and implicitly in describing and theorising the 'moments' or aspects of Cypriot administrations and power structures. Literature written in the immediate post-1974 period up until the early 1980s, mainly from Greek Cypriot scholars, viewed the Cyprus problem in a critical manner, and especially so in relation to the role of NATO, British policies and the role of British colonialism. Additionally, some Turkish Cypriots reached similar conclusions (see Salih, 1978), however most Turkish Cypriot scholars originally treated the advent of the Turkish army and partition with relief. Their approach was to try to assert Cypriot independence from western dependency, promote reconciliation between the two communities, and link Cyprus to the Non-Aligned Movement in line with the post-colonial and 'Third Worldist' tradition. The works of Attalides (1977, 1979); Kitromilides (1977, 1979, 1982, 1983); Markides (1977); Coufoudakis (1976); Salih (1978); Pollis (1979, 1998); Hitchens (1997); Anthias and Ayres (1978, 1983) and Anthias (1987) have all been considered. These works are amongst the most insightful and creative works undertaken that have provided the basis for the rethinking of policy on Cyprus. Some of the texts placed emphasis on internal dynamics of Cypriot society, without ignoring the international factors. Other works that look at the role of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Cyprus, over and above those mentioned, are works by Loizos (1974) and Stavrinides (1976).

Kitromilides (1979) wrote on the 'dialectic of intolerance' as a post-colonial remnant. He also noted that the legacy of colonialism was the ideological framework of political life, which was characterised by an absence of serious dissent that would challenge the dominant social and political life of Cyprus and result in a weakening of social critique (Kitromilides, 1982, pp. 451-453). The later versions of theorising of 'state and society' refer essentially to the Greek Cypriot

controlled state and society. Ierodiakonou (2003) wrote about the undemocratic elements and the deficiencies in observing the constitution, whilst Mavratsas (2003, pp. 119-157) attributes 'the atrophy of civil society' and 'clientelist neocorporatism' to be key characteristics of Greek Cypriot society. Similarly, Attalides (2006) in a recent review article makes similar observations. There are strong elements from 'modernisation' theory, many with a Weberian-derived logic – this circular argument that the state has not [yet] acquired the bureaucratic logic of the 'rational-legal' paradigm is due to the inherently insufficient and institutionally deficient modernisation of the state/country. According to the argument, accession to the EU will eventually achieve this. Philippou, in his *Foucaultian* reading of the 'austere Cypriot enclosure', drawing on Kitromilides (1998-1999) who refers to the 'sickliness of Greek Cypriot political thought' that ideologically entraps politics in a conventional and cyclical perception of the political problem, leads to a similar conclusion: A system which survives by suppressing questioning, concealing any potential for reflexivity, and by recycling clichés without reappraisal, dogmatic thinking and meaningless sound bites (Philippou, 2005, p. 70). As mentioned elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2006, 2010a) the above critiques do not properly capture and fully assess the complexity of Cypriot society, as though it were a large homogeneous space which is somehow 'weak' or 'unable to produce critical thinking'.

Gramsci's contribution to the study of civil society provides a different approach to the dominant western advances (Gramsci, 1982) which has proved quite influential and innovative in the development and renewal of Cypriot sociological thought. A number of studies which open up accepted wisdom contra the dominant Weberian-pluralist model have drawn on Gramscian thinking. The essential features of the difference contained in Gramscian and other radical points of view is that such frames of reference are *critiques* to the dominant perspectives, in their liberal and conservative variants, from the vantage point of drawing out the potential for, or the structural constraints to, radical social transformation. Reading Gramsci has been instrumental in opening routes for rethinking and activating social and political transformation via merging politics to economics and culture, empowering the subaltern, renewing radical thought and praxis as well as liberating it from reductionist and dogmatic (mis)readings of Marxism, dominant in the Stalinist era. Such readings are particularly fruitful when trying to rethink the state and the global: there is a vast literature along with different disciplines from social history to cultural, subaltern and post-colonial studies to international political economy.[18]

In the context of Cyprus, Gramscian-inspired critiques led to a variety of ideological and political orientations and approaches from Marxist, to anarcho-syndicalist to post-structuralist and post-colonial readings. A few examples include the following: Kattos (1999) uses all the basic Gramscian conceptual tools to advance his reading of the state, labour and capital in Cyprus;[19]

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18   The oeuvre of Gramsci has penetrated diverse thinkers such as Eric Hobsbawn, E.P Thompson, Edward Said, Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, and Robert Cox.

19   We are referring to his PhD thesis, which unfortunately has not been published but is the basic underpinning of his weekly columns in the popular *Politis* newspaper. He has, however, published various other articles in journals.

Niyazi Kızılyürek's work (2009) on the conflict in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey has strong Gramscian influences; Anna Agathangelou's global political economy of sex draws on neo-Gramscian thinking; Rolandos Katsiaounis' brilliant study of labour, class and politics in the late nineteenth century Cyprus, which is influenced by E.P. Thompson's classic *The Making of the English Working Class*, plus one of the current authors has also drawn on Gramsci.[20] Moreover, Andreas Panayiotou (1999, 2005, 2006) adopts a Gramscian reading of Cypriot context in what is the most comprehensive study on the role of the Left *within civil society*, and sketches out an alternative view of understanding civil society, modernisation and the development of Cypriot/Greek Cypriot political culture. The Left has historically played a crucial role in Cyprus' own route to modernity in the twentieth century, but the contest for hegemony between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot elite resulted in a distorted public sphere and shaped civil society accordingly. Others also have been influenced by Gramsci.[21]

Another type of theorisation can be considered as deriving its inspiration primarily from critical and post-colonial theory. Vassos Argyrou (1994) offered a post-colonial anthropological reading that aimed to counter Eurocentric biases, whilst Marios Constantinou (2006) advanced the notion of quasi-stateness as the central element of his post-colonial sociological theorisation of the Cypriot state, and Costas Constantinou (2008) presented a critical post-modern reading of a post-colonial state. Papadakis (2007) narrates this post-colonial condition as an ethnographic personal journey in his 'echoes from the dead zone'. These are Greek Cypriot readings of the Republic of Cyprus – the 'stronger' state of a 'weak' post-colonial regime.

The problem, we argue, regarding the lack of theory of the Cypriot state formations, as exemplified in the studies of the Republic of Cyprus, is even more acute in the way the TRNC is described, whether by those who add the adjectives illegal/unrecognised or those who consider it a legitimate state.

On the Cypriot States of Exception: New Insight into Theorising the State in Cyprus?

Costas M. Constantinou aptly refers to 'the Cypriot states of exception'[22] to exemplify the multiple exceptionalism that defines the political-legal order of Cyprus, where one exception generates another. This brings us to the heart of 'the Cyprus problem', which cuts across the country and naturally intersects with the operation of the *acquis* in a *de facto* divided country. The invocation of exception blurs the distinctions between legality and illegality, normality and abnormality and opens up 'opportunities' for those in power to extend their discretion in what Poulantzas referred

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20 See Trimikliniotis, 2000 and 2010a**.**
21 For instance Marios Constantinou's post-structuralist and post-colonial work on the state, federalism and conflict on Cyprus and the works of C.M. Constantinou's post-colonial/post-modern readings of Cyprus and Europe have Gramscian leanings.
22 C.M. Constantinou, 2008, pp. 145-164.

to as *authoritarian statism* – as Carl Schmitt long established, the regimes of exception allow the sovereign to decide *when* and *how* to invoke the emergency situation. In this sense, Cyprus is a bizarre case particularly where the distinction between the 'exception' and the 'norm' is not easy to decipher. When 'norm' and 'exception' are so intertwined and interdependent, the edges of the 'grey zones', or what is assumed to be the edge, becomes the core. Agamben (2005, p. 1) advocates that if current global reality is characterised by a generalised state of exception, then we ought to examine the intersection between norm and exception in the specific EU context: 'the question of borders becomes all the more urgent', indeed. The reference here is to the 'edges' of the law and politics where there is an 'ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection between the legal and the political'.[23] The analytical insight into the ambiguity and uncertainty of 'the no-man's land between the public law and political fact' and between the judicial order and life, must move beyond the philosophical and the abstract to the specific legal and political context if it is to have a bearing on the socio-legal and political reality that is currently reshaping the EU.

There is an abundance of literature – essentially apologetics of each of the ethnic states of exceptions – following the collapse of the bicommunal regime in 1963-1964. It was this collapse which generated the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) state of exception, known as 'the doctrine of necessity'. This doctrine was legitimised via the Supreme Court in the famous case of Mustafa Ibrahim whereupon the court considered this extraordinary excerpt to be so significant that it was included as part of the summary judgement:[24]

> 'This court now, in its all-important and responsible function of transforming legal theory into living law, applied to the facts of daily life for the preservation of social order, is faced with the question whether the legal doctrine of necessity discussed earlier in this judgment, should or should not, be read in the provisions of the written Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Our unanimous view, and unhesitating answer to this question, is in the affirmative', p. 97.

Apologist-type studies are often, as Costas Constantinou, 2008, points out:

> 'legalistic in character, safely assuming the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine, and simply looking at its interpretations and applications. Such works take the Roman maxim salus populi suprema lex (people's safety is the supreme law) for granted, without being concerned with "whose safety" is secured and at what price'.

Greek Cypriot apologist accounts, which argue that the 'doctrine of necessity' is a valid system of law,[25] are equivalent to Turkish Cypriot accounts which argue the complete opposite for the

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23 Agamben here quotes Fontana (1999, p. 16).
24 The attorney-General of the Republic *v. Mustafa Ibrahim and others*, Criminal Appeals No. 2729, 1964 Oct. 6, 7, 8, Nov. 102734, 2735, (1964) CLR 195.
25 We are referring to the Greek Cypriot legal scholars such as G. Tornaritis (1982a) *Cyprus and Its Legal and Constitutional and Other Problems*, Nicosia: Public information Office; (1982b) *Το πολιτειακό δίκαιο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας* [Constitutional Law of the Republic of Cyprus], Λευκωσία; K. Chrysostomides (2000)

doctrine of necessity but are apologist accounts for the TRNC.[26] Regardless of opinion, a number of critical studies are making their appearance.[27] The fact that a number of critiques to the state of exception in Cyprus have appeared in the public domain and are beginning to have some influence in the public debates opens up ways of viewing the state in Cyprus in a more critical manner. Costas Constantinou was correct to note that the case was overstated, 'the end of the road for the de-legitimization process of the law of necessity has been reached'.[28] Costas Constantinou's (2008, p. 145) starting point is:

> 'Certain states of exception are more comfortable than others. Even while they appear problematic or absurd to those experiencing them they can still be judged preferable — less bad, less risky — than available alternatives'.

Our argument is that the dice has yet to be cast. The basic argument elaborated elsewhere is that the Cypriot states of exception, in the forms of the Greek Cypriot 'doctrine of necessity', the 'TRNC', the British 'sovereign bases', and the 'Green line' are undergoing a process of long-term erosion and de-legitimisation, in spite of the efforts to re-legitimise them, an aspect C.M. Constantinou perhaps over-states. We may begin to talk about an 'organic crisis of the Cypriot state of exception'[29] but as Gramsci would have it 'the old is dying but the new is yet to be born'.

The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; G.M. Pikis (2006) *Constitutionalism – Human Rights – Separation of Powers, The Cyprus Precedent*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Z.M. Necatigil (1989) *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; L. Papaphilippou (1995) *Το Δίκαιο της Ανάγκης στη Κύπρο*, Λευκωσία [Law of Necessity and Constitutional Order in Cyprus], Nicosia: SEK; S. Soulioti (2006) *Fettered Independence: Cyprus 1878-1964, Vol. 1: The Narrative*, Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs; C. Schmitt (2005) *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

26   For instance M. Tamkoc (1988) *The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination*, London: Rustem; Z.M. Necatigil (1989) The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press; M. Moran (1999) *Sovereignty Divided: Essays on the International Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem*, Nicosia: CYREP; K. Özersay (2005) 'The Excuse of State Necessity and Its Implications on the Cyprus Conflict', Perceptions: *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 31-70. The latter is certainly more critical but it remains within the same school of thought.

27   Apart from C.M. Constantinou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010a, 2010b.

28   See Trimikliniotis (2007, p. 40) 'Το Κυπριακό «δόγμα της ανάγκης»: Μια (μη-)δημοκρατία σε κατάσταση εξαίρε-σης' [The Cypriot 'Doctrine of Necessity': A (Non-)Democracy in a State of Exception?], *Περιπέτειες Ιδεών*, Τεύχος 15, *Πολίτης*, 2 September 2007.

29   Elsewhere it has been argued that there is a long-term process of the demise of the Cypriot State of Exception and argued that the organic crisis may lead to transcendence of the 'doctrine of necessity'. See Trimikliniotis (2010b) 'Η παρακμή του Κυπριακού καθεστώτος εξαίρεσης: Από την οργανική κρίση στην υπέρβαση του «δόγματος της ανάγκης»;' [The Demise of the Cypriot State of Exception: From Organic Crisis to Transcendence of the "Doctrine of Necessity"?], chapter in C. Perikleous (ed.), (2010) *Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία 50 Χρόνια Επώδυνη Πο-ρεία* [Cyprus Republic 50 years of Independence], Athens: Papazizi, pp. 209-234. A similar argument was made in Trimikliniotis (2010a), chapter 3.

A Note on Theorising the TRNC

What is a lacuna in the theory of the state form in Cyprus, is the failure to *theorise* the unrecognised and, according to international law, illegal TRNC: the result of having such polarised approaches to the regime in the northern part of the country either as 'the embodiment of self-determination' for the apologists of the self-declared independence, or the 'pseudo-state' as Greek Cypriots love to call it, is that the issue is mystified even further and the development of a proper 'state theory' within the specific context is obscured. Greek Cypriot accounts tend to present the TRNC as a mere 'puppet' of Ankara[30] and the Turkish Cypriots are depicted in a recent documentary as the 'the other enclave/captive persons'.[31] The Turkish Cypriot equivalent depicts the TRNC as a normal functioning state.[32]

Although a number of valuable works have been produced on the infamous Cyprus problem, the literature produced in Turkish and English is largely predominated with empirical findings with little theorisation of the state. The authors who provide theorisation are few. Costas Constantinou offers a critical post-modern reading of a post-colonial state where he defines the TRNC as a 'state of exception' (C.M. Constantinou, 2008). This is a useful starting point before attempting to decipher the extent to which there is 'relative autonomy' of the unrecognised/illegal TRNC from Turkey and, more importantly, the question of actual political autonomy of Turkish Cypriot politics (see Trimikliniotis, 2010a, 2010b). Yael Navaro-Yashın depicts the TRNC as a form of legal-rational state (2006, p. 282). Sertaç Sonan depicts the system in northern Cyprus as 'constituency clientelism and patronage' (2007). Kızılyürek, on the other hand, defines the system of the Turkish Cypriot community as a *sui generis case*. Due to this 'bizarre modernity', there is no bourgeoisie or 'free market' within the Turkish Cypriot community as one would expect to observe in advanced capitalist states. Kızılyürek shares Sonan's assessment in categorising the system as a patronage system (2009).

It can be observed overall that Weberian conceptions of the state strongly inform the literature on Cyprus. And, it can be argued that the general tendency, in a way echoing the literature on the Republic, is that the state has not yet acquired the bureaucratic logic of the 'rational-legal' paradigm due to its deficient modernisation. In exceptional cases such as Yashın, the TRNC is not taken as an anomaly that counters the valid procedures of modern and legal states in its entirety (Navara-Yashın, 2006). Furthermore, in both cases, whether the state is viewed as

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30   See C.P. Ioannides (1991) *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, New Rochelle, NY: A.D. Caratzas Publisher; C. Yennaris (2003) *From the East: Conflict and Partition in Cyprus*, London: Elliot and Thompson.

31   The above words are translated from «Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι: οι άλλοι εγκλωβισμένοι» [The Turkish Cypriots: The Other Enclaved], which was the title of the documentary series of Costas Yennaris «Ανοικτοί Φάκελοι» [Open Folders], 11 June 2008, the state channel CyBC.

32   See C.H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, Huntingdon, UK: Eothen Press.

another dimension of a modern state system, or exhibiting clientelist characteristics due to its deficient modernisation, the state is perceived as an apparatus that acts autonomously from social forces.

The problems associated with this perception have been drawn out earlier in this article. Henceforth, the lesson derived in the previous section cannot be underlined enough in relation to the state decisions that are taken at any particular moment in history, reflecting a particular solution to conflicting class interests and the interests of other internal and external actors at that particular conjunction. The TRNC is not an exception to this rule and the state decisions that are taken at various conjunctures are not the result of a so-called potent state apparatus acting autonomously from the point of view of class interests and external actors (in this case Turkey). Rather, they reflect the particular solution in the interests of domestic and external factors. Although we agree with Kızılyürek's statement that the context is very different from advanced capitalist states, we do not share his analysis that the Turkish Cypriot community is a *sui generis case* which does not permit a class analysis.[33]

We would like to close this section, which merely opened the discussion and set out some key questions[34] that would serve as enquiries for further developing a *theorisation* of the TRNC, irrespective of questions of legality and non-recognition, where there have been some contributions:[35]

a.   What is the socio-political nature of the TRNC? What sort of 'State' are we dealing with?
b.   To what extent is there autonomy of the TRNC from Ankara?
c.   What are the social, economic and political and class parameters in the TRNC?
d.   To what extent can Turkish Cypriots genuinely and authentically exercise power given the overwhelming presence of Turkish troops and settlers?

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33   A detailed genesis of state and class formation of the Turkish Cypriot community is undertaken in Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt (eds.), 2011 forthcoming.

34   A rudimental analysis based on these questions has been set out in the following section 'The transformational "mother country", the Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus Problem: Towards the theorisation of the Cyprus Problem' in Trimikliniotis, 2010a, An updated version is available in the forthcoming ΘΕΣΕΙΣ 114 journal. «Σημείωση για την Μη Αναγνωρισμένη 'Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας της Βόρειας Κύπρου' ΤΔΒΚ Ταξικές Παραμέτρποι» [Note on the Unrecognised "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Class Parameters], pp. 137-158.

35   Some legal work has been undertaken, see Trimikliniotis 'Exceptions, Soft Borders and Free Movement for Workers', P. Minderhoud and N. Trimikliniotis (eds.), *Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: The European Challenges Ahead*, University of Nijmegen, October 2009, pp. 135-154; *Free Movement of Workers in Cyprus and the EU*, Vol. 1 of *Studies on Fundamental Rights in Cyprus*, published by the Centre for the Study of Migration, Inter-ethnic and Labour Rights, University of Nicosia and PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2010c; P. Athanassiou (2010) 'The Status of the "TRNC" through the Prism of Recent Legal Developments: Towards a Furtive Recognition?', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 15-38.

Placing State Formations in the Context of the Cyprus Problem:
Geopolitics vs. Ethnic Conflict

We now proceed to discuss the particularity of the Cypriot state formation(s), which essentially relate to how the role of the State formations are located in their different mutations, fragmentations and transformations within the so-called 'Cyprus problem', i.e. the conflict in and over Cyprus. To this end one must enquire how the conflict in and over Cyprus is perceived so as to place the State formation question within it.

Despite their very different ideological and methodological outlook, many perspectives on the Cyprus problem can at least complement one another and set out various aspects, albeit in a fragmental manner, and provide the basis for theorising the particularity/globality dialectic of the Cypriot post-colonial condition. Be that as it may, what is missing is *the holistic reading* that would try to critically string such perspectives together in a manner that would properly grasp the vitality and actual agency of the *local* dynamic and potential for social-political action. Most readings are not concerned with such issues, as they are either interested in recording the *specificity* within the 'global' or 'regional' aspect, or cannot go beyond the fact that the situation in northern Cyprus is so fundamentally different in terms of the unrecognised state formation, highly dependent on Turkey, which fail to grasp the wider processes within which to locate this state formation.

We argue that the 'Cyprus problem' consists of multiple sets of conflicts and is riddled with local, regional and international contradictions. It is a condensation of a complex set of local/global factors, which cannot be reduced to one-dimensional readings but must be understood as a systemic whole, i.e. it must be read as *a local problem within the global/regional context*. An assessment of the 'common sense' readings of the Cyprus question which are reproduced by textbooks, journalistic and other studies leads us to two sets of readings that are often juxtaposed as two alternative theorisations, which are locked within a counter-intuitive binary logic of perceiving the problem as one of two possibilities. Cyprus is either perceived as a problem of historic enmity between Greeks and Turks, manifested as an identity conflict over control of a state, or as the manifestation of geopolitical conflicts reflected in the externally-imposed rigid constitutional structure which imploded into fragments due to foreign machinations. The first approach represents the failure to properly address the various interconnected dimensions of the problem and is thus an illustration of a theoretical crisis relating to the conceptualisation of the international system of states, as explained by its liberal and conservative apologists. Let us call this the *liberal conflict resolution model*. The second approach reflects a crisis of some dominant strands within radical thought: it can be read as a crisis of anti-imperialism in addressing the 'national question' in the so-called globalisation era. Let us call this the *global/regional geopolitics model*.

Both approaches contain some elements of truth, but they ultimately fail to capture the essence of the 'Cyprus problem' in a holistic manner, particularly as it unfolds in the current conjuncture. Even more sophisticated approaches, which do attempt to synthesise both dimensions, ultimately, have one of the two as 'dominant' and the other as 'subordinate', or 'main

cause' and 'effect', or as the 'core' and 'epiphenomenon'. Moreover, most approaches fail to provide any real insight into a political strategy that would, in the current real world, allow for the transcendence of the current partitionist cul-de-sac. The policy implications of the thinking produced by both schools of thought contain implicit assumptions about the power relations of the global/regional system and what Cypriots must do, and this perception leaves little room for manoeuvre or choice in terms of the struggles for a common future that transcends the ethnic/state divide and the partitionist *status quo*. Without a radical transformation of the balance of global/regional geopolitical forces, any resolution of the problem would inevitably reflect and condense these wider forces which the people of Cyprus are essentially powerless to do anything about. For the *liberal conflict resolution model* it is a matter of fine-tuning the demands of the two sides to reach an optimum outcome; for the *global/regional geopolitics model* the genuine concerns of Cypriot independence would be subordinated either by accepting their subordination to 'Empire',[36] or rejecting it, which would also mean accepting the power of 'Empire', via the consolidation of partitionism. We advocate that both schools of thought are disabling and contain falsities in their assumptions and political implications which undermine the real potential available.

Let us start by critiquing the first approach, the *liberal conflict resolution model,* which is the dominant liberal and conservative approach in international relations and conflict resolution schools as regard the Cyprus question.[37] The 'Cyprus problem' is often depicted as a classic example of identities in conflict, a case of a generic ethnic enmity since time immemorial: the main 'contradiction' here is merely an internal one and everything else is essentially adjacent to it. This is a theoretical and political trap which overplays the generic ethnic antagonism at the expense of the international geopolitical conflicts as well as the 'internal' non-ethnic factors (i.e. intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic) class and political/social relations and polarisations. Also, sometimes such perspectives may, by default, consciously explain away, or even may justify *status quo* the *de facto* partition as 'inevitable' or 'necessary'.[38] In addition, such approaches often obscure the geopolitical interests and historical role of the imperial forces/powers, particularly the UK, the USA and NATO, as well as the role of so-called 'mother countries', Greece and Turkey. The unique geopolitical conditions surrounding the Cyprus problem, which created the conditions that provided for such a 'fettered' or 'restricted independence' in the Zurich – London accord must be

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36 We use the term 'Empire' critically; hence we place it in inverted commas. For a useful critique of M. Hardt and A. Negri's noteworthy book *Empire*, see the book edited by G. Balakrishnan (2003) *Debating Empire*.

37 To a large extent this is the approach taken by Sir David Hannay in his book *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. For a critical review see N. Trimikliniotis (Spring 2005) 'The Cyprus Problem: An International Relations Debacle or Merely An Unclimbed Peak?', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 144-153; also see Trimikliniotis (2000).

38 See for instance V.D. Volkan (1998) 'Turks and Greeks of Cyprus: Psycho-political Considerations', in V. Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and Its People, Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1995-1997*, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 277-300.

properly connected to imperial interests or designs, the various attempts to destabilise the newly independent country, and the various partitionist plans and designs proposed by Turkey, Britain and America between 1956 and 1974 to 'accommodate' the two NATO allies in order to maintain the integrity of the southern flank of NATO.[39] Despite the radical transformation of the world order in the post-Cold War era, Cyprus by and large is still seen as 'an unsinkable aircraft carrier' by the regional and international powers. As an astute Turkish journalist points out: 'Cyprus is still a giant aircraft carrier, just like it was from the 1950s to 1980. Whichever side maintains authority on this aircraft carrier will take this strategic point in the Mediterranean under its control'.[40] The role of Greece, which first tried to keep Cyprus under its wing as a 'second Greek State', but then destabilised it and finally instigated the coup with its local Para fascist groups, is often underestimated. Finally, the current *reality* of the Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus[41] is often obscured; Turkey, as the regional superpower is ultimately backing (economically, militarily and ideologically) the regime in the north.

Within the last decade Turkey has been undergoing a significant transformation and the most important actor responsible for this transformation is the European Union. This does not, however, mean that the EU has been the principal explanatory variable of Turkey's domestic metamorphosis as wider international changes as well as internal dynamics are crucial in determining domestic trends in Turkey. Nevertheless, EU relations are important due to the ways in which they impact on the positioning of domestic actors in Turkey. Trying to understand the Turkish policy on Cyprus requires that we go beyond an analysis of diplomatic relations by assessing the role of social forces that form and transform Turkish policy on Cyprus.[42] That being said, it is misleading and patronising to ascribe Turkish Cypriots with no agency, role, autonomy or power in the north. In fact, understanding the extent of autonomy of Turkish Cypriots within the unrecognised TRNC is both a theoretical and an empirical question which has received very little attention so far.[43]

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39 Most widely known are the Macmillan plan 1956 (UK) and various versions of the Acheson plans in 1964 (USA). These are well documented: See C. Hitchens (1997) 'Afterword' in *Cyprus: Hostage to History, Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*, 3rd edition, London: Verso; B. O'Malley and I. Craig (1999) *The Cyprus Conspiracy – America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, London: I.B. Tauris; N. Christodoulides (2010) *Τα σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού 1948-1978* [The Plans for Solution to Cyprus], Athens: Kastaniotis.

40 M.A. Birand (1998) 'Consequences of the Cyprus Problem', *Sabah*, Internet Version 2 April 1998.

41 Since 1974, the northern third of the island, or 3,367 sq km (1,300 sq miles), has been under the *de facto* control of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State (proclaimed in 1975), which on 15 November 1983 proclaimed its independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; the southern two-thirds (5,884 sq km/2,272 sq miles) are controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. A narrow zone called the 'green line', patrolled by UN forces, separates the two regions and divides Nicosia, the national capital.

42 See chapter 3 in N. Trimikliniotis and U. Bozkurt (2011).

43 An exception is the work of Yael Navaro-Yashın (2003, 2006, 2009); an endeavour is made by one of the authors to study the 'relative autonomy' of the unrecognised TRNC: see Trimikliniotis (2010a), but there is a distinct lack of literature.

The second approach, the *global/regional geopolitics model* is essentially a geopolitical reading of the problem. There are 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' versions: often the 'left-wing' version is a mirror image of the international relations model, which takes for granted the basic assumptions of the neorealist model and is dressed as 'anti-imperialism'. The right-wing versions are often legalistic,[44] international relations and/or political works,[45] or journalistic types of best seller conspiracy theories.[46] A recent example of a left-wing version of this school of thought is the paper of Perry Anderson[47] and others (e.g. Fouskas and Tackie, 2009). Such readings fail to grasp the complex interaction between the 'local', the 'regional' and the 'global', and they undervalue the significance of political and class relations and contradictions that exist within Cyprus, which are connected to regional and global class interests. History is the result of fierce contestations; nothing is predetermined even if there is disequilibrium of forces. The notion of collective communal victimhood may act as an obstacle both to a fair historical understanding of the past as well as the prospects of reconciliation in the future.

The 'Cyprus problem' is a combination of multiple sets of conflicts and only via a multi-faceted and complex theory that assesses the role of 'imperialism' today,[48] alongside nationalism, class and other social conflicts, inter- and intra-regional state projects and rivalries can we gain insight to appreciate it and devise the necessary strategies and tactics. There is a delicately balanced equation to be observed in such an analysis that can easily be 'tilted over' should we over-stress one side of the equation at the expense of the other. A crucial element in this 'equation' is the 'internal' versus 'external' components of the 'Cyprus problem' – both of which are of equal importance and priority. In reality the history of the country illustrates that 'internal' political, economic, and social dynamics have historically co-determined the outcome of events together with regional, global and other 'foreign' factors. Any other reading leaves people, classes, political and socio-economic forces within nation-states, even if these are 'small states', with no agency or contribution to the making of history; such forces are reduced to empty vessels of global geopolitics, or 'puppets' of

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44   See C. Palley *An International Relations Debacle. The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*, Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.

45   See for instance V. Coufoudakis (Fall 2004) 'Cyprus – The Referendum and its Aftermath', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 67-82. He has subsequently reproduced the same basic argument elsewhere.

46   Greek Cypriot society has been bombarded with the mass production of magazines, journals, books demonising the Annan plan as an 'Anglo-American and Turkish conspiracy'; a 'classic' is the best-seller of Ignatiou, Venizelos and Meletis, with the telling title *The Secret Bazaar*. The book repeats all the myths, exaggerations, even fabrications about 'the Turks taking all they asked for in the final stages of peace talks' (see M. Ignatiou, C. Venizelos and M. Meletis (2005) *Το Μυστικό Παζάρι, 129 μέρες που συγκλόνισαν τον ελληνισμό* [The Secret Bazaar, 129 Days which Shocked Hellenism], εκδ. Α.Α. Λιβάνη).

47   See Perry Anderson's commentary 'The Divisions of Cyprus', *London Review of Books*, 24 April 2008.

48   See A. Ahmad (2004) 'Imperialism of Our Time', 'Preface' in L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds.), *The New Imperial Challenge*, Athens: Savalas Publications.

imperialism.[49] Moreover, by undervaluing the importance of class struggles and local political contestations *within* Cyprus between various alternative forces of the Left and Right, obliterating in effect these historical struggles by default or design, the story is depicted as a simplistic and one-sided history that suits nationalist mythologies of Greek Cypriot and Greek chauvinist historiography, which today masquerades as 'anti-imperialistic'.[50] There are equivalent Turkish and Turkish Cypriot approaches: it is no coincidence that the fears of '*Enosis'* (union with Greece) and *Turkish expansionism* are what one scholar aptly refers to as 'mythical realities' within an ideological system of nationalists of both sides which confirm each other's myths.[51]

On a theoretical level, it is apparent that in analysing the relation between 'nation' and 'state', the 'national question' cannot ignore the internal configuration of social/political forces as well as the various expressions and *alternative* nationalisms, as though 'all nationalisms are good' as long as they are in conflict with 'imperialism'. The outcome of the 'national question' is not teleological, but it is the result of a struggle between the social, economic, political, and ideological forces: The 'ideological and political ingredients' are in the making during the ongoing struggles. This framework can be thought of in terms of the late Althusser, 'necessity of contingency'.[52] During an epoch marked by significant social transformations, both internal and adjacent to the Cypriot context, critical thought must rethink the current conjuncture to provide new insights in devising political strategies for transformations of the future. Cyprus is a post-colonial divided small state which has always been a *border society* at the crossroads between East and West, between Europe, Africa and Asia.[53] The island is a multi-ethnic and multicultural society in the Eastern Mediterranean that is characterised by its plurality, contrary to nationalistic and orientalist readings of a romanticised or vilified 'Cypriot Levant', which (re)produces 'ancient hatreds' of Greeks versus Turks. Cypriotness, as a political cultural space, has the potential of becoming a

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49   For a discussion on this issue see Trimikliniotis (Spring 2006) 'A Communist's Post-modern Power Dilemma: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward, "Soft No" and "Hard Choices"', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 37-86.

50   The works of N. Psyroukis and his heir is an example which was critiqued by one of the authors of this article. See N. Trimikliniotis (2010a). Other examples can be found in the Greek edition of Monthly Review, D. Konstantakopoulos (2009) «Κυπριακό: η γεωπολιτική συμπύκνωση του 'ελληνικού προβλήματος'» in the collective volume Κύπρος, *Γεωπολιτικές εξελίξεις στον 21ο αιώνα* [Geopolitical Developments in the 21st Century], edited by B. Chorafas and L. Rizas, Monthly Review, Athens.

51   Y. Papadakis (1996) 'Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythic Realities?' in V. Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and Its People, Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1995-1997*, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 69-86.

52   See his later text 'The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter' in L. Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter, Later Writings, 1978-1987*, edited by F. Matheron and O. Corbet, London: Verso, 2006.

53   Despite accession to the EU, Cyprus remains a 'border society' as it links these continents and it retains extremely important relations with them. Moreover, the reference to Cyprus as a border society is a sociological observation regarding Cypriot society and its challenges.

significant third space, which opens up the possibility for plurality, non-essentialism and authenticity of a historic bridge culture located at the crossroads of civilisations and power interests. At the same time the historical shortcomings and failures of such ventures cannot be overlooked, as the history of the country is far from some idyllic scenario: the short life of 'independence', which is itself a limited independence marked by a turbulent geopolitical and ethno-national conflict, a coup, and war, which has resulted in a barbed wire division across the country. In that sense it is not surprising that, at least today, Cyprus, despite its negligible size, is one of the most militarised zones on the planet, [54] with four foreign armies and two large British bases used to spy in the region.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to review, locate the gaps in knowledge, and critique the approaches to the theorisation of State formation in Cyprus. It offered a rudimental frame with the intention of making State formations in Cyprus more understandable, arguing for the need to further elaborate on a theorisation of the state in Cyprus beyond the descriptive and empiricist accounts. It then placed the theorisations of the state formations within the conflict in the country. It challenged widespread but problematic one-dimensional contentions of the Cyprus conflict by countering such approaches on empirical grounds and presenting thorough theoretical and contextual alternative explanations. To this end, the paper aimed to illustrate that the interest in the case of Cyprus is not confined to its contextual specificities of area studies because it lends itself as an interesting instance in comparative politics, state formation and the international political economy of a localised abridgment of local, regional and global conflicts. The case of Cyprus is a subject of study that extends beyond local interest, not so much in the divisions of the past, but in the processes unleashed currently which create the potential for a *new* Cyprus emerging from the lessons of past fragmentations.

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54 According to point 28 of the UN Report of the Secretary-General on Cyprus *7 June 1994* S/1994/680: 'It is estimated that in recent years there have been in the northern part of island a little less than 30,000 members of the armed forces of the Republic of Turkey (Turkish Forces), making it one of the most highly militarised areas in the world in terms of the ratio between the numbers of troops and civilian population'. Available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/237/70/IMG/N9423770.pdf? OpenElement].

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PART B

CONFLICTS, INTERVENTIONS, CONTESTATIONS

The State of Cypriot Silences

Rebecca Bryant

Abstract

This paper argues that rather than disappearing, Cypriot silences about inconvenient histories have in fact become 'louder' since the 2003 opening of the checkpoints. The paper uses Derrida's analysis of the border as that which can but should not be crossed to explore the new silences that emerged in Cypriots' encounters with each other and with the past in the wake of the 'opening'. That opening, the paper attempts to show, not only transformed the unrecognised 'border' (Green Line, ceasefire line) into something more closely resembling a border through the problematic act of crossing, but it also made the Cyprus Problem increasingly aporetic, a space that cannot be crossed even when there is no 'border'. Denial arises in this space where the 'border' disappears, making crossing a non-passage even in the era of an open border.

If all histories are constituted both by what is remembered and what is forgotten, they are also shaped by what is vocalised and what is left in silence. Although both pairs are characterised by recognition and denial, what is covered over in silence may not always be the same as what is forgotten. Looking at the historical record, it is easy to see that in Cyprus, the period about which one side in the conflict has been the most vocal is the period about which the other side has maintained relative silence. These are periods that one side recognises as a moment of collective suffering, a rupture or turning point in history. While the ways that Cypriots deny or cover over certain histories are in some senses well known, what is perhaps more puzzling is the complicity of scholars and scholarship in maintaining relative silence about these subjects. The periods about which Cypriots are silent are also the periods that scholars tend to leave unexamined, so that dark holes appear in the historical record, and casting light into them falls to investigative journalists. Indeed, this is a common theme in many conflict situations: the tacit complicity of academia in silencing histories that scholars may want to know more about but do not dare to touch.[1]

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1   Perhaps the best known example is the case of Israel/Palestine, where the role of Israel Defence Forces in evicting Palestinians from their homes was covered up even as it was happening and was covered over in taboo until investigative journalist Benny Morris began to publish on the topic fifteen years ago. This was, importantly, a critique from within, and one that gave blow-by-blow documentation of the ways that Palestinians were driven from their homes. A subsequent flood of scholarship has emerged to document the expulsion of the Palestinians (Pappe, 2007), the cover-up of that expulsion (Esber, 2008), the mechanisms of their dispossession (Fischbach, 2003), and the subsequent Judaization of Israel (Abu el-Haj, 2002; Benvenisti, 2002; Yiftachel, 2006).

This essay, however, will touch only tangentially on academic complicity. Instead, I will briefly deal with an equally puzzling phenomenon: namely, the way in which silence has become 'louder' in Cyprus since the 2003 opening of the checkpoints. A historical silence is only a silence, after all, in the face of those who consider it a form of denial. Silence and denial are forms of non-recognition, a refusal to 'see' the other. As long as the actual geographical boundary that partitions the island was closed, there was no need to think of these silences as silences, because the persons to whom they applied in any case could not be 'seen'. The simultaneous knowing and not-knowing that constitutes denial was not visible, because there was no reason to become consciously aware of those parts of the past that one might simultaneously feel compelled to suppress. The persons about whom one might deny certain parts of the past were beyond 'the border', which was also the limit of imagination. As a result, Cypriot silences became 'silences' only in the period when 'crossing' was possible, in other words only when other histories were presented to one in visible and tangible ways. Crossing presented the possibility of an impossibility: namely, another history that one had always known while not knowing, and so a history that had to be resisted and denied.

I want to use the border (that is not a border) as both a metaphor for and an actor in the silencing of Cypriot pasts. The border is not simply a convenient intellectual trope but I believe is key to understanding the way that silences work today. And in order to avoid the usual objections, let me say from the start that I choose the word 'border' not for its political implications but because of the way that any sort of border – the border of a painting, for example – demarcates a space and hence defines an inside and an outside. Indeed, any definition is determined by borders: 'To define something is to mark its boundaries', notes Eviatar Zerubavel, 'to surround it with a mental fence that separates it from everything else' (Zerubavel, 1991, p. 2).

It is this sense of demarcating both geographical and mental space that I wish to employ here. In sum, I wish to see history in Cyprus as a type of border, and the border as a history. In Derrida's masterful analysis of the border (Derrida, 1993), he notes that the border is defined by the simultaneous capacity to cross it and knowledge that one should not cross it. Using the example of illegal immigrants, he notes that borders may also become problematic when one crosses them when one should not. But he uses 'problematic' in a special sense, referring to the Greek etymology of 'problem' as both pro-ject and pro-tection, both something to be accomplished and something that shields. Derrida implies, then, that borders are primarily about inclusion and exclusion, delineating between 'us' and 'them'. Already in Derrida's discussion, then, is the recognition that borders are both mental and physical – an overlap that he describes as that between 'problematic closure', or the borders between domains of discourse, and 'the anthropological border', or the actual physical geographical line that separates us. These two types of border may mutually define each other, as well as what may be crossed or 'transgressed'. And in Cyprus, too, for almost three decades that 'line' was visible in the figure of the line partitioning the island, which came to bear a great historical weight. The border came to represent ruptured histories, injured communities, and an 'other' on the opposite side of the barrier. The border was both symbol and proof of what 'they' had done to 'us'.

History, then, is defined by ways of delineating it, by deciding whose history is included and whose excluded, and hence by a border. But the idea of a 'problematic closure' implies that domains of discourse are never fully sealed, are always threatened by what has been refused. In the case of Cyprus, 'the refused' is not only a particular version of history but also those persons who refuse one's history by remaining in one's house, by living beside desecrated churches, by occupying a state that should have been shared. While this dynamic is most likely common to all conflict zones, indeed to all contested histories, Cyprus is unusual in that refused histories may also be represented territorially, as something found on the other side of a dividing line. At the same time, this is a dividing line that is itself threatened or refused: while Greek Cypriots reject or refuse it as a border, Turkish Cypriots have insisted on a border that is also in daily life unrecognised and so refused.

At this point, however, we may also see where Derrida's thought about borders may lead us, in thinking about Cyprus, in different directions. Because in Cyprus the border (what Derrida would call the anthropological border) is a 'border', i.e. it is a dividing line that is also unrecognised, threatened, and threatening. For in Cyprus the 'border' has come to stand for the Cyprus Problem, a form of 'problematic closure' that has to be resolved and whose resolution would presumably result in the dissolution of that same 'border'. I wish to suggest, then, that for quite a few decades in Cyprus, the Cyprus Problem has in fact been the 'real' border, the line that one can cross but should not, while the 'border' (ceasefire line, Green Line, Atilla Line) only stood for it in some figurative way, eliminating the necessity of turning the Cyprus Problem into a 'problem' in Derrida's sense, i.e. a problem created in the act of crossing.

If we turn this analysis to the opening of the Cyprus checkpoints, we may see that the 'border' was reconstituted as border – or one might even argue that for the first time a ceasefire line was actually constituted as a border – when crossing it became a 'problem' (see also Demetriou, 2007). In other words, in the period of the closed checkpoints, one was not confronted with the 'problem' of whether or not to cross; the indivisible line that marked the division of the island was simply impenetrable. If a border becomes a border through the possibility of crossing it, the 'problem' created by the crossing was also a recognition of this, in that many of those who refused to cross were those who feared that crossing would constitute a tacit 'recognition' of the ceasefire line as a border. And so while most Greek Cypriots imagine that there is no border, in order to maintain that belief in the non-border, they must, paradoxically, remain in their 'own side', whether physically or mentally, even in the act of crossing. And while most Turkish Cypriots imagine that there is a border, this is a border always threatened by non-recognition and so one that can only be maintained by a refusal of non-recognition, or again by a refusal to 'cross' into the other's history.

But if the 'border' became something more closely resembling a border through the problematic act of crossing, the Cyprus Problem, I wish to suggest, has become increasingly aporetic. In his analysis, Derrida poses the border in tension with the aporia, the space of non-passage, the point from which crossing is impossible despite there being no 'problem', no border between us. The aporia is, one might say, the mystery of that which separates us when there is no visible line to divide us. The aporia is 'the difficult or the impracticable, here the impossible, passage,

the refused, denied or prohibited passage' (Derrida, 1993, p. 8). Cypriot silences, I wish to suggest, are a form of aporia, what Derrida calls 'a space of nonpassage', that is in tension with the figure of the border.

If the aporia is the impossible possibility, I interpret that here as the impossibility of 'crossing' into the other's history. For once the 'border' becomes something more closely resembling a border – i.e. something that one must choose to cross or not – it becomes clear that the Cyprus Problem becomes a space of non-passage, i.e. a space where crossing must be refused and denied. In other words, denial arises in this space where the 'border' disappears, and so history in Cyprus becomes aporetic, the impossibility of a possibility, that makes crossing a non-passage even in the era of an open border.

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My research on the opening of the checkpoints began in the summer of 2003, but it was early 2004 before I went on a visit with Greek Cypriots to the homes that they had lost. I was conducting research on Lapithos, what was once a large, prosperous town on the north coast of the island with a predominantly Greek Cypriot population and a Turkish Cypriot minority of approximately 12%. Turkish Lapithiotes had fled the town in January 1964 and lived in tents and makeshift housing in Turkish Cypriot enclaves for a decade. Greek Lapithiotes fled the town in 1974 and had been scattered throughout the island. I went on a visit to the town with a couple that I call Maroulla and Vasillis, who had been the children of land-owning families and had lost much in 1974. They are now in their mid-sixties, and Vasillis had been a strong supporter of the Annan Plan primarily because he thought it would return him to his home.

On that first day, I picked them up and drove them in my car across the checkpoint. As we wound up through the mountains and began the descent into Kyrenia, Maroulla leaned forward and grabbed my arm and began describing her first visit. 'Can you imagine what it's like to go back to your home after so many years? The home that you left without even a handkerchief? I cried and cried all the way there'.

They were silent for much of the ride along the coast road, but when we reached the turning into the town, they began immediately to point out the houses of relatives and friends, commenting on the changes in them. Many of the refugees, in returning to their homes, found them shabby and untended. Many had puzzled over it, asking me, 'Why is everything so dirty? Why have they not cared for things?'.

Maroulla also asked me this question during that first trip there, as we stood by the spring known as Koufi Petra, today only a trickle, and gazed out over the neighbourhood below, now occupied by settlers from Turkey. 'Why have they not cared for things?' she asked. As though in explanation of her question, Maroulla described to me how she and Vasillis had built their house, as so many villagers do, first as one floor but with the possibility of adding a second. Like many villagers, they had built the original house with a flat roof that sprouted supports for what would

later be an apartment on the floor above, and the possibility of building stairs to one side. According to Maroulla, it had taken them many years to put aside the money to build the upper floor, and they had completed it only a short time before the war that forced them to flee. 'We had a renter', she told me. 'He was going to move in on that same day, the day of the invasion. Everything was there. It had new furniture, new curtains. It had everything, right down to dishrags and tablecloths. Right down to the sponge for washing dishes'.

We left the spring that day and made our way to the top of the town, in the mountains, to survey some land that used to belong to Maroulla's family. It was at the highest point in the town, where the mountain plateaus in an open stretch of field, that day covered in white and yellow spring daffodils. A portion of the field had been inherited by Maroulla; on that day it stood empty apart from a small shelter, though since then two large villas have been built at the edge of the open plateau, overlooking the sea.

From there we could see Maroulla's childhood home below, and as we stood gazing down at the white house of Maroulla's memories, a police car unexpectedly bounced down the mountain path and slowed to a stop near us. Vasillis approached the car and leaned in to talk to the driver, immediately understanding from the thick accent with which he spoke Greek that he was from Paphos. Vasillis soon learned that this Turkish Cypriot policeman was originally from Kouklia, near where they now live. When Maroulla heard that he spoke Greek, she also leaned into the car, and they began asking him what Greeks he remembered from Kouklia, trying to establish some link with him.

The policeman was polite but reticent. Finally, Vasillis straightened up and asked with a sigh the inevitable question: 'Wouldn't it be better if we could just go back to the way things once were?'. I had heard this question many times, an expression of a core axiom of Greek Cypriot politics, namely that the Cyprus Problem is not one between Cypriots but a problem of invasion and occupation by Turkey. I had come to see, though, that this is also a core belief for many Greek Cypriots regarding their own pasts. The policeman, in response, bent toward the steering wheel and gave a slight, reluctant nod of the head. He could not acquiesce, but he also did not want to offend.

I realised in that moment that even though the checkpoints had opened, so little had really changed. Even at the level of simple, interpersonal interaction, Vasillis' insistence and the policeman's resistance maintained two parallel worlds. Vasillis might see the Paphian policeman as acquiescing, admitting that they should return to the past. The policeman, in turn, might see Vasillis as trying to impose a Greek version of history upon him. As far as I could tell, each turned away from the encounter with the sense of his own world reinforced. And those worlds were reinforced just at the moment when they should have been open to disruption.

The problem was not only that the policeman refused to accept Vasillis' version of the past, but that in keeping silent, he also refused to accept that Vasillis might understand his own. It was an encounter I would see repeated often, as Cypriots discovered not only that the other might see the past differently, but also that seeing it differently had shaped their lives in the present and given

them different hopes for the future. Before the opening of the checkpoints, I heard Turkish Cypriots repeat again and again, 'France and Germany put aside their differences, and we can, too': But the opening of the checkpoints, and especially the Annan Plan referendum, changed things. Many Turkish Cypriots expressed to me the sense that even though they spoke to their former neighbours, there remained a rupture between them, a rupture of experience, and one that had been reflected in the referendum's lopsided results. One older Turkish Cypriot, a retired policeman who now works in construction in the south, told me, 'We eat and drink together, but there's a vacuum between us. Things can't be the way they once were'. I would hear this again and again: 'We used to have neighbours, and they even looked after my mother when she was sick', one Turkish Cypriot woman originally from Paphos told me, 'but you don't know what they're thinking'. 'Eskisi gibi olamaz. Things can't be the way they once were'.

After the checkpoints opened, then, the buffer zone that divides the island came to stand for more than a political division and began also to symbolise a rupture. On either side of the ceasefire line, new worlds had been created, and at the juncture where these worlds now meet, silences have arisen. These are sometimes silences that express a lack of words, and they are often silences that express that the words at one's own disposal no longer fit, no longer allow one to grasp the thing at hand. Sometimes these are silences that hide open secrets. More often, though, like the policeman's bowed head, they are silences that express that the other simply cannot understand.

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Not long after my first trip to Lapithos with Vasillis and Maroulla, I decided to go there with a Turkish Cypriot friend who had once taught in the town's Turkish high school. I wanted to go to the mayor, a former student of hers, to ask him about a şehitlik, or memorial to Turkish Cypriot 'martyrs', which graces a roundabout in the centre of the town. Although it was the Lapithos, or Lapta, şehitlik, the twenty-one names inscribed on it had places of birth and death elsewhere in the island. The mayor, in common Greek Cypriot parlance, is the 'pseudo-mayor', the one whose existence cannot be recognised and who is illegally occupying the municipality. He is also a refugee from the Paphos district and had followed his family to Lapithos when they fled their own village in the south.

When we arrived, the mayor offered us coffee, while his assistant Hasan, also a former student of my friend, hovered about. Hasan, it turned out, was the nephew of one of two young men whose murder on Christmas Day in 1963 sparked the Turks' exodus from the town. They explained to us that the monument honoured not only Turks originally from the town who had been killed, but the relatives of all those now living there.

'We erected it a couple of years ago because of pressure from the Cypriot martyrs' families', the mayor explained. 'Afterwards, the Turks from Turkey who had lost relatives wanted their own memorial, but we decided to wait to see what's going to happen'. The *Türkiyeliler*, or Turks from Turkey, to whom he referred were all those families who had lost sons during the Turkish military intervention of 1974 and who had been given property in the town.

This led us to a discussion of the upcoming referendum, scheduled for only a couple of weeks later. Both were wary, Hasan saying that he expected his family would lose quite a bit of property if the plan passed. The mayor, in turn, said that they had owned a lot of land in Paphos and had never been fully compensated. 'I went to England to work when I was eighteen', the mayor told me, 'and I wrote to my father often. You know, I used to see how well the English would treat their dogs, and I thought about the kind of life my family was living in Cyprus. And I'll never forget, I wrote to my father saying, "If only I'd been born in England, and I'd been born a dog". Can you imagine writing that? "If only I'd been born in England, and I'd been born a dog."'

Hasan turned to me then. 'So what do you think is going to happen in the referendum?'

I told them what they already knew, which was that the prospects for the plan passing looked pretty bleak.

And then the mayor faced me with the inevitable question, the one that everyone invariably asked: 'So what do they say? Do they want to come back?'.

By this time I had discerned that the mayor was fairly nationalistic, following a party that preferred a permanent partition, and so I hesitated in my reply. 'Almost all the ones I've talked to want to come back', I finally answered. 'Not all the refugees want to come back, but the ones from Lapta do. I've tried to ask them why that is, but they can't really explain it to me. They're very attached to the place'.

The mayor and his assistant exchanged glances, and then the mayor leaned forward, his face dark. 'Do you want to know why they're so insistent about coming back?' he asked rhetorically. 'It's because they worked so hard to rid the town of the Turks, and now they can't stand to see it in Turkish hands'.

The mayor's reply startled me, not because I had not heard it before, but because I had heard it from a close friend only the previous day. She had told me, 'Do you know why Lapta is a symbolic village for the Greeks? Because in 1963, when all of the Turkish Cypriots left the village, it was seen as a big victory. And after that, when that victory was taken from them in 1974, they were devastated'. Indeed, this same answer was one that I would later hear again and again. I would hear it from an old mason as we sat in the garden of his home. I would hear it from a younger friend, a graphic artist, as we had lunch. I would hear it from another schoolteacher about ten years my senior as she described the enclave period of her youth. In reply to the question, 'Why do they want to come back?', then, this was the answer that so many people gave. Like Vasillis' question, it was a sentence that encapsulated a particular version of the past and projected it onto an uncertain future.

Both Vasillis' wistful question and the mayor's harsh explanation would recur like refrains throughout my research, staccato answers to complex melodies. These phrases seemed a type of shorthand that encoded complicated histories of friendships and betrayals, of fear, and of loss, in ways that those who had shared these histories would immediately understand. And it was also a way of excluding other histories, of shutting them off. It was a way of wrapping up history into a neatly sealed phrase and trimming off anything that seemed to dangle at the edges.

But unlike Vasillis' question, the mayor's answer required no affirmation. And that, too, made me uncomfortable – this too-neat statement that sealed off all possibilities for loss, for longing, for dreams damaged or deferred. Because encoded in the mayor's neat summary was not only a refusal to see the other's suffering, but also an explanation for why they refused to see. The mayor, and the mason, and all the other people who summed up Greek Cypriots' longing in this neat phrase knew very well what their former neighbours had lost, and how they had lost it. They knew very well about all those who had died in the war, and all those who had never been found. They knew very well about damaged churches, gutted cemeteries. They knew about communities scattered.

They knew about all those things, and yet the mayor's remark still circulated as an explanation for Greek Cypriot longing. And while it acknowledged their longing, it also undermined it, denying their right to *be*long. It imbued that longing with misplaced pride and thwarted ambition, as well as a fair share of frustrated enmity. And that formulaic sentence stumped me in its decisiveness, because even as it raised other questions, it simultaneously sealed the passage to the past, leaving the questions on my lips with no way to ask.

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What are denied in these brief phrases that recurred throughout my research are histories that are in many ways visible and well known. Both Greek Cypriot official histories and much Greek Cypriot public discourse deny that the period between 1963-1974, which Turkish Cypriots remember as a period of fear and struggle, was that at all. Whereas Turkish Cypriots describe fleeing their villages in fear during this period, Greek Cypriot histories – both official and oral – of the period describe the retreat to enclaves as a plan by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to separate the communities and pave the way for partition. While it may *also* have been that, the common discourse of 'peaceful coexistence', or the idea that all Cypriots lived happily together until the unprovoked Turkish invasion of 1974, clearly denies the daily humiliations and fear that Turkish Cypriots experienced over a decade.

Similarly, but at a different level of denial, while Turkish Cypriot histories may acknowledge that Greek Cypriots fled for their lives, that they abandoned their homes and ancestral villages and have experienced traumatic loss, both official histories and public discourse tends to minimise or even erase the importance of this. 'They deserved it', is what these histories say, in sum. This is why, for so many years, Turkish Cypriots were able to live in Greek Cypriot houses, or to live side-by-side with gutted churches and devastated cemeteries: because those buildings or objects left by Greek Cypriots were reminders of a history that had come full circle, that seemed to have been completed.

In a groundbreaking work on the social processes of denial, Stanley Cohen makes distinctions between our different ways of denying harm that we have done to others. The insistence on a period of 'peaceful coexistence' is what Cohen would call a denial of injury, or refusal to see the hurt done to others. This, he notes, may often be a blindness even at the moment of injury, when one simply cannot recognise the hurt done to others. 'Dramatic atrocities', he remarks, 'are felt less

acutely than the daily indignities, petty harassment and minor humiliations of road blocks, restrictions on movement, stop-and-search procedures and curfews. Just as sensitively as these minor injuries are felt – an old man being searched and verbally abused in front of his granddaughter – so are they utterly invisible to the powerful' (Cohen, 2001, p. 96). It is this sort of injury – the injury of enclave life – that is so powerfully etched in the memories of many Turkish Cypriots today and whose denial is expressed by Turkish Cypriots as an inability of Greek Cypriots to 'see'. 'The Greek Cypriots didn't know anything, they didn't see anything', one old Lapithiote woman told me, echoing what so many others would say. When that injury was visible, as in the case of persons actually killed during clashes in the 1960s, it tends to fall under what Cohen calls a 'denial of responsibility', in that even at the moment when the clashes were happening, responsibility was placed on Turkish Cypriots themselves, who were portrayed in the media of the time as 'rebels'.

The denial so prevalent in Turkish Cypriot history and public discourse, on the other hand, constitutes what Cohen would call a 'denial of the victim'. It is what Mahmood Mamdani summarises as 'when victims become killers' (Mamdani, 2001), though as both Mamdani and Cohen stress, one's victimhood may be structural, or part of imagined and reconstructed collective memory (e.g. Serbian 'victimhood' at the hands of Ottoman Muslims in the fifteenth century), rather than 'real' or immediate. 'This is your destiny', remarks Cohen. 'You must get rid of your enemies – the aggressors who started everything – and live in peace and security with your own people. A collective memory that denies full humanity to the out-group allows for various shades of "getting rid of" – from forcible segregation to ethnic cleansing or mass deportation ("transfer") to even genocide' (p. 97).

While these forms of denial may have constituted histories on either side of the 'border' before its opening, they became visible as forms of denial and audible as loud silences when it became possible to cross to the other side. A refusal to acknowledge that 'everything should go back to the way it once was'; a refusal by an other to leave the house one knows as one's own; or a knock at the door that indicated that the past had not come full circle, indeed had not yet been completed – all these became ways of breaking down the border that also presented one with other histories that were known but refused, present but also impossible.

This aporia – the impossible possibility of both knowing and not-knowing – is however, difficult to live with. This, I wish to suggest, is one very important reason for a growing refusal to cross, as well as for the growing popularity of permanent partition on both sides of the island. After all, a border makes it possible to refuse 'their' history, to leave it on 'the other side'. As long as a border exists, 'their' history has no possibility of contaminating or confusing one's own. It may, in fact, be the case that we love the border in order to not hate the Other ('Good fences make good neighbours'). Silence, in other words, stops at the border, but the ultimate, unfortunate result of silence may be to leave the border intact.

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The Politics of Honour
and the Greek Divide at Cypriot Independence

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Abstract

This paper will look at developments concerning the EOKA leader, George Grivas, right at the end of what the British called 'The Emergency'. Although his actions at this point had no bearing on the substance of the settlement, they could affect its successful implementation. An examination of accounts and discussions surrounding these developments provides an eye-opener into the damage limitation exercise the handling of events was for all participants. The purpose of this paper is not to assess the accuracy of the conflicting accounts, but to examine the circumstances and discussions surrounding the manner of the departure of the EOKA leader from Cyprus in the aftermath of the Zurich and London Agreements and their connection with the delicate balance required by the key players to maintain as positive an atmosphere as possible towards the Cyprus settlement and the forthcoming independence. The importance of honour and prestige in the process, and its relation to the political future of the parties involved, resulted in attempts to manipulate events in a way that would satisfy all parties. Such manipulation proved impossible. While the Grivas legend became a central part of Greek Cypriot collective memory, his differences with Makarios created the most potent divide in Greek Cypriot politics for years to come.

Keywords: Grivas, EOKA, Makarios, Averoff, Macmillan, Zorlu, Honour, AKEL, *Enosis*, Greece, Turkey

As the representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey, the future guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus, gathered in London on 17 February 1959, their chief preoccupation was to secure the acquiescence of Archbishop Makarios, the inscrutable Greek Cypriot political leader, to the Greco-Turkish deal on the Cyprus issue. It was only after Makarios reluctantly signed the Agreements that their interest turned to the possible reactions of George Grivas, the legendary leader of EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), who was still at large on the island. He had been briefed, but had not been seriously consulted on the Agreements because his reaction would have been predictably negative. This paper will examine the developments concerning the EOKA leader right at the end of what the British called 'The Emergency'. Although it was the spectre of

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strife *beyond* rather than *in* the island, that finally swept aside the insurgency, and with it, the brand new irregular techniques of British counter-insurgency, and although the actions of George Grivas at this point had no bearing on the substance of the settlement, they could still affect its successful implementation.

An examination of accounts and discussions surrounding these developments provides an eye-opener into the damage limitation exercise the handling of events was for all participants.[1] The importance of honour and prestige in the process, and its relation to the political future of the parties involved, resulted in attempts to manipulate not only the way in which Grivas left Cyprus and arrived in Athens, but also his subsequent career. He must be honoured to appease the Greek sense of victory, so vital to acceptance of the London and Zurich Agreements, but not so honoured as to outrage Macmillan's opponents. He must be allowed some sort of career in Greece as a way of diverting him from dabbling in Cyprus, but not one that would make him a threat to the Karamanlis Government. Such manipulation proved impossible. While the Grivas legend became a central part of Greek Cypriot collective memory, his differences with Makarios created the most potent divide in Greek Cypriot politics after independence. The EOKA leader haunted the Cyprus problem beyond his death in January 1974, while EOKA B, the group with which he turned against the Archbishop, and President of the Republic, was in 1974 to provide a Trojan horse for the island's dismemberment.

But first let us take a brief look at the events of the immediately preceding years. By the autumn of 1955, six months after the start of the violent Greek Cypriot struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece, the British governor, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, embarked on talks with Makarios in a bid to bring violence to an end through limited political concessions. After the failure of these talks in March 1956, a British policy which sought to end violence through political negotiations was replaced by the conviction that EOKA must be defeated before any renewal of negotiations could be contemplated.[2] The hasty despatch of the Greek Cypriot Ethnarch to the Seychelles and the ordering of the first executions signalled a new phase in 'The Emergency'. The popular indignation aroused by these and by the Archbishop's deportation fuelled vociferous

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1   Key accounts examined: G. Grivas (1984) *Απομνημονευματα Αγωνας 1955-1959* [Memoirs of Struggle], Athens; C. Foley (ed.) (1964) *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, London; Gen. Sir Kenneth Darling, 'Cyprus: The Final Round', unpublished film script completed in April 1979; Gen. Sir Kenneth Darling: Papers relating to Cyprus, Imperial War Museum (IWM) 05/41/1; A portrait of George Grivas put together by G. Prendergast referred to in Darling Papers 05/41/ and carried in CO926/1125, National Archives. A. Azinas (2001) *50 Χρονια Σιοπης: Η Ωρα της Αληθειας* [Fifty Years of Silence: The Hour of Truth] (Vol. II), Nicosia and E. Averoff-Tossizza (1986) *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question 1950-1960*, New York.

2   For analyses of the Makarios-Harding Talks, see, for example, R. Holland (1998) *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959*, Oxford, Chapter 4, N. Kranidiotis (1987) *Οι Διαπραγματευσεις Μακαριου-Ναντιγκ 1955-1956* [The Makarios-Harding Negotiations 1955-1956], Athens and D. Weston Markides (Sept 1995) 'Britain's New Look Policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding Talks', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 23, No. 3.

popular civil disobedience in the towns. At the same time, Makarios' removal from the scene endowed Grivas with a new autonomy to which the marked change in the tone and direction of the EOKA campaign bears witness.[3]

The political revolution in the towns was, by 1957, acknowledged as the greatest potential danger to British sovereignty on the island. The authorities' recognition of the participation of a broad spectrum of the population was reflected in punitive measures aimed at collective responsibility: snap curfews, collective fines, house-to-house searches and the detaining of large numbers of people, described privately by the British as 'man-in-the-streetish', in special detention centres. Nevertheless, the elimination of the core of EOKA and, more particularly, Grivas himself, was perceived as the quickest way to put an end to escalating urban violence and the confrontation of a growing number of troops with civilians.[4] No amount of verbal denigration of EOKA and chocolates for the kiddies could counteract the growing Greek Cypriot perception of the British as a brutal occupying force. With Makarios removed, the British commanders were convinced that the elimination of the legendary Dighenis would have a 'terrific impact' on the dynamics of the Greek Cypriot revolt.[5] By destroying the carefully cultivated image of a mysterious and unassailable leader – 'Ο Αρχηγος' – they were confident they would take the heart out of the popular revolution. At the same time, the personal control exercised over every detail of the EOKA campaign by Grivas, led to hopes that his elimination could not but emasculate it.[6]

The radical mountain sweeps of 1957 were carried out to this end but Dighenis once more slipped the net. Tracking down the EOKA leader was taking too long. Nevertheless, the tremendous personal kudos of Field Marshal Harding and the sense, through 1957, that the security forces were on the brink of success, tended to delay any radical change in British military tactics. Not even the governor's resignation in October 1957 brought much shift of emphasis. On the contrary, the security forces' fierce loyalty to the Field Marshal created problems for his successor, Sir Hugh Foot, whose attempts at a lighter and more politically-oriented touch were bedevilled by bristling military disapproval.[7]

In the autumn of 1958, the fierce EOKA response to the stated British intention to go ahead with the unpopular Macmillan Plan, regardless of Greek objections, provoked a change of guard.

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3   E. Hatzivassiliou (2005) *Στρατηγικες στο Κυπριακο: Η Δεκαετια του 1950* [Strategies on the Cyprus Problem: The Decade of the 1950s], Athens, pp. 270-273.

4   *Ibid.*, pp. 233-273 for an interesting discussion of the 'revolutionary' aspect of the 1953-1959 Greek Cypriot campaign.

5   See Darling, 'The Final Round' p. 10. 'Dighenis' was figure of Byzantine legend who defended the marches of the empire.

6   See generally Foley (ed.), *op. cit*, Grivas-Dighenis, *op. cit*, and J. Prendergast's portrait of George Grivas, especially part VI, pp. 13-25. Prendergast also develops the concept of the EOKA leader's step-by-step approach. See also Georgos Grivas-Dighenis (1962) *Αγων ΕΟΚΑ και Ανταρτοπολεμος* [The EOKA Struggle and Guerrilla Warfare], Athens, pp. 37-40.

7   See, for example, R. Holland, *op. cit.,* esp. pp. 223-224.

It became clear that the guerrilla fighters had regrouped after the severe dents created in the organisation by Harding the previous summer. The point was made by the powerful bomb that almost blew up General Kendrew, the Officer in command of the Security Forces, in his car on 28 September.[8] EOKA's renewed assault required a new approach.

With the new Commander of the Security Forces in Cyprus, General Sir Kenneth Darling, came alternative methods of achieving what he described as his 'only worthwhile military target, eliminating Grivas and his immediate entourage'.[9] On his arrival in mid-October 1958, he submitted radical proposals to the governor for an overhaul of the clumsy intelligence machinery. It would be concentrated in a team that was independent of the police, which was heavily infiltrated by EOKA.[10] The Foreign Secretary, Lennox Boyd, had recommended John Prendergast, who had distinguished himself in intelligence work against the *Mau Mau* in Kenya, as the best man to head this team. Darling duly requested his transfer to Cyprus. Prendergast was to be given complete authority over all intelligence work, his title being adjusted for this purpose from 'Director' of Intelligence to the more autonomous 'Chief' of Intelligence. His brief was to concentrate on pinning down Grivas.[11] MI5 which had wanted to be involved in the hunt for Grivas as early as 1956, was now called in to help with 'Operation Sunshine'. Peter Wright, one of the MI5 team recalls, 'From the start we were in a race. Could we find Grivas before the colonial office stitched up a ramshackle deal?'[12]

Building up the logic of his 'success' in 'The Final Round', a film script completed some years after the end of the 'Emergency', Darling pinpointed the wide use of helicopters, for immediate access to the men in action on the ground, as giving him the edge over the EOKA leader, whose campaign was carried out entirely by correspondence from a hide-out in Limassol.[13] In contrast, piecing together for posterity his 'success' in evading Darling's clutches and continuing to operate, Grivas denigrates Darling and his 'schoolboy' stealth methods.[14] Prendergast, the brain behind the new intelligence network, is given no mention.

The purpose of this paper is not to assess the accuracy of the conflicting accounts, but to examine the circumstances and discussions surrounding the manner of the departure of the

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8   Grivas described it as 'the biggest mine ever made by EOKA', Foley (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 164.
9   Darling, 'The Final Round', p. 9.
10   For the infiltration of the Cyprus Police by EOKA, see D.M. Anderson (1994) 'Policing and Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency 1954-1956' in *Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945*, London, pp. 184-186.
11   Prendergast did not arrive in Cyprus until 21 November 1958. See 'Final Round', p. 20 section on 'Re-organisation of Intelligence' written by J. Prendergast.
12   P. Wright (1987) *Spycatcher*, New York, p. 196. Wright does not mention Prendergast. Were they working in separate cells like EOKA?
13   *Ibid.*, p. 14.
14   Foley (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 164 and pp. 171-175.

EOKA leader from Cyprus in the aftermath of the Zurich and London Agreements and their connection with the delicate balance required by the key players to maintain as positive an atmosphere as possible towards the Cyprus settlement. Marginalised by the international bargaining that brought about Cypriot independence, Grivas remained the loose cannon with the capacity to blow the settlement sky high.

The British Government had also been marginalised by the Greco-Turkish initiative which, with the discreet encouragement of the United States, proceeded at an accelerated pace through December and January 1958-1959. Much to Macmillan's annoyance, his government was kept in the dark as to the progress of the secret talks on the future of the colony.[15] If they succeeded, they would render the role of British 'arbitration' between the two communities and between Greece and Turkey – Harold Macmillan's formula for retaining sovereignty over the island – redundant. The British Prime Minister's preferred method was to bypass the need to confront violence by refereeing an international settlement. The international bargaining he had so assiduously encouraged was now slipping beyond his powers of manipulation. It therefore became more important to use whatever remaining military leverage existed on the island in pursuit of purely British interests. On 31 December 1958, he urged the security forces in Cyprus to do all they could to break up EOKA, using effective *but subtle* measures that would not disrupt the international climate.[16] Although Macmillan indicated that the need to continue operations against EOKA arose because the talks were unlikely to succeed, the equally important need was, in fact, to improve the British negotiating position if the talks did succeed. [17] It became even more important to gain the military initiative – to be perceived to be making gestures from a position of strength.

The final hunt for Grivas incorporated all the complex pressures created for the British Government by the Cyprus Problem. Their particular need to retain influence in Ankara was reflected in it. The Turkish Foreign Minister himself asked specifically, as late as January 1959, for the counter-insurgency campaign to be stepped up.[18] More generally, they were egged on by the perception that in an era of decolonisation and dwindling prestige, a base in the Eastern Mediterranean was essential to Britain's continuing role in the big power stakes. If they were not to retain sovereignty over the whole island, Britain wished to ensure sizeable bases and access to military facilities and installations beyond them. Macmillan's need to retain sovereignty over part of the island was dictated by domestic political concerns, as well as strategic need. Two 'Gibraltars' must be salvaged from a colony that had long been slipping beyond British control.[19] Like his

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15   R. Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 306.
16   Note by the Prime Minister, 31 December, Gen. Sir Kenneth Darling: Papers Relating to Cyprus 1958, 05/41/1, IWM.
17   See, for example, Darling to Nancy Crawshaw, 2 June 1979, 05/41/1 IWM.
18   D. Weston Markides (2001) *Cyprus 1957-1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis,* Minnesota, p. 35.
19   R. Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

predecessor Eden, Macmillan was under the constant scrutiny of the powerful right wing of the Conservative Party. Hackles were easily raised on his back benches by anything that smacked of defeat. The colonial government therefore rejected the truce offer made by EOKA in December 1958. The prospect of EOKA re-emerging to harass British bases in a post-colonial Cyprus was an added incentive to keep up the pressure. Macmillan was firm on this point. EOKA was not to be parleyed with.[20]

The British army proceeded to carry out 'phantom' operations in areas where they knew EOKA was not active.[21] This was a bizarre move to demonstrate that the pressure was still on, without engaging in action which might have a negative effect on the talks, but it was also intended to divert attention from the very serious intelligence operation still underway under the new Chief of Intelligence. The objective of hunting Grivas down was pursued with tenacity right up to the eve of the Lancaster House Conference summoned, on 17 February to ratify the Zurich Agreements. As the interested parties gathered, Prendergast was despatched post-haste to London to inform the Prime Minister personally that he believed he had achieved his objective. He was to ask, as Darling put it, 'whether Grivas's head was required on a charger or whether he was to stew in his own juice'.[22] While neither Darling nor Prendergast would be drawn on the specifics of the whereabouts of the EOKA leader, even twenty-five years after the event, there is little doubt that they were confident that they were in a position to go in and get him (dead or alive) in mid-February 1959.[23] Writing to his father on 23 February, Darling divulged that they now had Grivas 'by the scruff of the neck'. The comment that follows – 'I wish I could wring it', speaks volumes for the British general's frustration that the long-awaited moment had come too late.[24]

The prize considered for so long by the British to have been the key to their regaining control of the situation, politically as well as militarily, had indeed come too late: A successful Cyprus settlement now hinged on Greco-Turkish agreement, rather than British arbitration. When Macmillan asked for the opinion of the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff, on the eve of the Lancaster House Conference, he was warned that it would be politically impossible for the Greek Government to continue negotiating if Grivas were 'run to ground'.[25] A Greek walk-out in such circumstances would signal destabilisation of Greco Turkish relations *beyond* the island. An attack on the ever-vulnerable Greek minority in Istanbul could trigger regional instability on a

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20 Note by the Prime Minister, 31 December, IWM 5/41/1.
21 Darling, 'Final Round', pp. 23-24.
22 *Ibid.*, p.26.
23 See, for example, Darling to Norma Percy, Granada Television 28 January 1983 and Prendergast to Darling 22 May 1983 IWM 05.41/1.
24 General Darling to Mr. G.K. Darling 23 February 1959, IWM 05/41/1. P. Wright, whose account of the political developments is more than a little hazy, simply records exasperation at operation Sunshine being aborted by the London Agreements and that Grivas emerged, 'from the precise area we had foreseen'. See P. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
25 Averoff Tossizza, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-360.

grand scale. It has been suggested by the most authoritative historian of the period that Macmillan's decision to deny the military in Cyprus their quarry at this point was the most statesmanlike gesture made during his handling of the Cyprus problem.[26] International considerations now entirely dominated the Cyprus issue.

In his memoirs, Grivas records ignoring the urgent warning from Averoff that the British knew where he was. He was convinced, he said, that it was an Anglo-Greek bluff – a contrivance to pressure him into accepting the Zurich Agreements.[27] He argued that 'there was no reason whatsoever for the British to follow [his] men since the agreements had already been signed [in Zurich]'.[28] Darling's papers indicate, as we have seen, that on the contrary, the prospect of an agreement, if anything, made the hunt for the EOKA leader more urgent.

While the substance of the agreement was in no way affected by the delicate developments surrounding Grivas on the island, his attitude to the talks, the Greek Government's behaviour towards him and the perception of a victorious outcome to the EOKA struggle were all delicately linked to Greek popular acceptance of the Agreements and the survival of the Karamanlis Government. The fragile Greco-Turkish *détente*, which had been the main purpose of the agreement, would be affected by what the EOKA leader decided to do next. Therefore the colonial government found itself having to parley, indirectly at least, with Grivas both as to the terms of amnesty and about the timing and manner of his departure from the island and to do so in spite of the fact that he had instructed EOKA to ignore the ceasefire ordered by Foot on 28 February 1959. By then, the governor had already met with the Bishop Anthimos of Kition (an ecclesiastical go-between) for 'first consultations on the best means of encouraging Grivas to leave the island with the minimum of fuss *and no honour from us*'.[29] While Foot's concern was for the British military reaction on the island, at this late stage, Macmillan's mind would necessarily focus on how the final round was going to play out in British public opinion, but more immediately in parliament.

Though he could not, at this stage, risk challenging the substance of the settlement, Grivas gained maximum leverage from his knowledge of how anxious both the Greek and British Governments were to get him off the island. Averoff argues in his memoirs that Grivas had, at the time, indicated 'wholehearted' acceptance of the agreements and is at pains to explain that the EOKA leader adjusted his position much later in readiness for a political debut against the Greek Government in Athens.[30] Grivas' acceptance, such as it was, could not be described as wholehearted. He was careful to distance himself from them and made the most of the fact that an

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26   Holland, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-314.
27   Foley (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 194.
28   *Ibid.*, p. 197.
29   Foot to Lennox Boyd 26 February 1959, CO926/1124, National Archives (henceforth NA), Kew.
30   Averoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 378-379.

official EOKA delegate had not been included amongst the clutch of representative Cypriots Makarios had summoned to London to share the burden of acceptance. Particularly for this reason, the Archbishop must also have been anxious to see the EOKA leader go with no fuss. Although the Greek Foreign Minister, straining every nerve in Athens to present the settlement as a unifying victory, announced that 'the whole of Cyprus, with Dighenis at its head, is gathering to hail Makarios, the creator of the independent state', Grivas, in fact, pointedly avoided any participation by EOKA in the massive demonstrations that attended the return home of the Cypriot Ethnarch. 'I did not', he later recorded, 'even send a representative to bid him welcome'.[31] The colonel's delay in ordering a ceasefire and the uncertainty surrounding his departure became a source of 'mounting anxiety' all round.[32]

It was not until 9 March, three weeks after the London Conference that Grivas finally announced that he was 'obliged to order a ceasefire'. In the EOKA leaflet announcing it, he described the settlement simply as 'preferable to the national division' that would follow a rejection on his part. In a letter to EOKA members he elaborated on the need to avoid 'civil discord' which would 'raze everything to the ground'.[33] Dighenis seems here to be 'protesting too much' about his concern for national unity. More to the point, his experience told him that, cut off from Athenian support, he could not easily and quickly dominate an inter-ethnic conflict. In his Memoirs he ponders:

> 'The prospect of civil war among the Greek Cypriots was a nightmare; yet if Cyprus had offered more space for manoeuvre and easier communications with the outside world for arms supplies I would have seriously considered turning Greek against Greek in the confidence that I should quickly master the situation. Unhappily, I had to decide that as things were, the odds against carrying on the war in Cyprus were overwhelming'.[34]

His main concern was to extract the fullest amnesty from the British for his men and to avoid any *humiliation* for them or for himself in the manner of their release and in the laying down of their arms. He warned the Greek Government that he would 'go on fighting' rather than accept

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31 Foley (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 198.
32 Crawshaw, *op .cit.*, p. 347.
33 Foley (ed.), *op .cit.* Appendix 6, 'EOKA leaflet ordering a ceasefire, 9 March 1959' and Appendix 7, 'Letter sent by General Grivas to all EOKA fighters on the declaration of a cease-fire on 9 March 1959'. See also the position of Averoff on this matter in Averoff, *op. cit.,* pp. 356-358. Averoff argues that, at the time, Grivas was satisfied with the settlement and points out that in replying to a congratulatory radio message from Karamanlis during his flight from Nicosia to Athens on 17 February, he talked of the 'hard struggles of the Cypriot people' being 'vindicated', Averoff, *op. cit.,* p. 379.
34 Foley (ed.), *op. cit.,* p. 199. In the original Greek version of the Memoirs, Grivas lays more emphasis on the certainty that Makarios had planned to neutralise him if he attempted to continue the struggle and that somehow Makarios too was implicated in the 'feigned' British knowledge of his whereabouts. See Grivas-Dhigenis, Απομνημονευματα ... ., p. 402.

humiliating surrender terms. Since the British 'wanted [him] out of the island more than ever before, they would have to pay the price'.[35] By threatening to stay in the island for at least two months or until the last EOKA member had been satisfactorily liberated, he was able to force the British into agreeing to a full amnesty.

Following the EOKA leader's lukewarm response to the settlement, British reactions and decisions regarding Grivas were focused on the important relations between the Greek Foreign Minister and the EOKA leader. Averoff had been the key architect with Zorlu of what later came to be generally known as *'ο οδυνηρός συμβιβασμός* (the painful compromise)*'.* He was also the Greek minister who communicated directly with the leader of EOKA under the pseudonym, 'Isaakios' and had cooperated in the smuggling of arms to the island.[36] These facts and the strong defence of EOKA he had undertaken at the United Nations made Averoff the member of the Greek Government with whom Grivas was most at home.[37] That it was Averoff, the protagonist of international compromise who cooperated with EOKA's ordinance man, Andreas Azinas, in gun running, is perhaps no more extraordinary than the fact that it was through Azinas, among others, that he conveyed reports to Grivas on the progress of the Greco-Turkish talks.[38] Having summoned Azinas on 22 December, for the purpose of sending a report to the EOKA leader on his talks in Paris with Zorlu, he was careful to enquire first as to the progress of a consignment of sten guns being hidden for despatch to Cyprus in 100 gas cylinders. This was, perhaps, another way of maintaining the confidence of, as well as keeping tabs on, the EOKA leader. The cylinders arrived in Limassol on 7 February, the day agreement was reached in Zurich between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on a settlement of the Cyprus issue.[39] The cylinders evaded detection by the security forces and were stored in Nicosia for future contingencies.[40]

Averoff had suffered the brunt of the opposition's attack on the Government on the Cyprus settlement in the Greek parliament. The leader of the opposition Liberal party, Sophocles Venezelos, had already described the Zurich Agreement as a 'national humiliation'.[41] Now Grivas was complaining bitterly that he had not been consulted in advance of the Agreements and questioning the accuracy of Averoff's briefing notes.[42] It was essential for purposes of his personal

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35   Foley (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 199.
36   Azinas, *op. cit.*, pp. 553-571.
37   For Averoff's defence of EOKA at the United Nations General Assembly on 5 December 1958, See Foley (ed.), *op. cit.*, Appendix 3. It is a Churchillian response to Darling's repeated denigration of EOKA as 'gangsters' and 'terrorists'.
38   Azinas, *op. cit.*, pp. 757-772.
39   Azinas, *op. cit.*, pp. 746-777.
40   According to Foley and Scobie, this consignment was not handed over in the decommissioning process. See Foley and Scobie, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
41   The Turkish Government, on the contrary, succeeded in presenting the Cyprus Agreements as a major diplomatic triumph. See Nancy Crawshaw (1978) *The Cyprus Revolt*, London, p. 345.
42   Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, 16 March 1959, CO926/1124, NA.

survival as a politician and the survival of the settlement, that the London Agreements should be presented as a vindication of the EOKA leader's heroic struggle and that Averoff's name should be linked *with* that of Grivas not in juxtaposition to it. The leader of the military struggle would arrive hand in hand with the diplomat, who was able to make the most of his efforts in the field of international politics.

To this end Averoff went as far as suggesting to Macmillan that he should rekindle the dying embers of Anglo-Greek friendship by providing a British guard of honour to see Grivas off at Nicosia airport.

> 'The guard of honour can present arms and Grivas can inspect them and shake hands with their commanding officers before boarding the aircraft'.[43]

Neither this, nor the prospect of the Greek Foreign Minister flying to 'British soil in order to do honour there to Grivas by fetching him away personally', was ever on the cards for the British Government although they understood how important it was for the Greek Government 'that Grivas should know that they [the Greek Government not the opposition] wanted to do him honour'.[44] Nevertheless, the dilemma of how to cope with this hated enemy, without ruining the prospects for a settlement remained acute for those immediately responsible. Other considerations apart, collapse as a result of British action would severely displease the United States Government, a factor which, given his post-Suez inheritance, Macmillan could never afford to ignore.

The wording used by Foot in conversation with the Greek Consul and the Bishop of Kitium on the organisation of the EOKA leader's departure is indicative of the embarrassing dilemma the British military now faced. On the one hand, he said, 'it was completely unacceptable for Grivas either to make an appearance or remain in the island and that he must leave as quickly and as secretly as possible'. On the other hand 'There was no question of imposing on *Col.* [my italics] Grivas anything which could be taken as either humiliating or dishonourable'.[45] The governor's difficulties were compounded by the problems of communication with the EOKA leader whom Andreas Azinas has since described as being 'semi-hidden' at this point.[46] A measure of the uncertain ground Foot was treading as he edged his way towards a compromise formula is indicated by his wishful communication to London on 9 March, the day of the EOKA ceasefire, that 'we have one or two pointers that Grivas may already have left Cyprus on his way to Athens. One report said he would be in Athens by midnight tonight'.[47] Foot had never succeeded in overcoming the hostility created in British military circles simply by the fact that he had replaced

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43   Averoff, *op. cit.,* p. 160.
44   Allen to Selwyn Lloyd 25 February 1959, CO926/1123, NA.
45   Meeting between Sir Hugh Foot, the Bishop of Kitium and the Greek Counsul, Aristos Frydas, 27 February 1959, 05/41/1. IWM.
46   Azinas, *op. cit.,* p. 787.
47   Foot to Lennox Boyd 9 March 1959, CO926/1123, NA.

their beloved Field Marshal. Now it fell to him to secure the EOKA leader's departure – if not with honour bestowed by the British, at least with no dishonour.

General Darling departed for England on leave, thus ensuring that he would not be available to bid Grivas farewell at the airport, a prospect that he would have found unbearable. 'For my part', he wrote twenty years later, 'I must record for posterity the fact that we ended by running EOKA into the ground and by having Grivas at our mercy. In comparison anything else is of minor importance'.[48] He found the 'perfect' man to do the job.

> 'At six foot four inches, immaculately turned out *and unarmed,* [Lieut. Col. Gore-Langley] would be able to gaze down, *perhaps with disdain,* on Grivas from a considerable height. But the strongest point in his favour was that he had no right arm, having lost it in the war, and no offence could be interpreted if he did not salute' (author's italics).[49]

To the end, each side acted out its own part for its own audience. For his part, Grivas had made it clear that he did not want any British person anywhere near him during his departure.[50] Averoff's vision of an escort of Blues (Royal Guards) would have been as misplaced in the EOKA leader's view as in that of Darling's. It was important for him to leave Cyprus with his revolver at his hip in EOKA uniform. Nancy Crawshaw's description of him during his arrival at Athens airport, 'looking wan and emaciated, still clad in his guerrilla's outfit' quite misses the point. Charles Foley, a journalist on far more intimate terms with the EOKA leader, is more convincing. Grivas was perpetuating a carefully cultivated image. At a first meeting before a select group of Greek Cypriots in Nicosia, 'he appeared in a doorway, dressed in a guerrilla suit *that had been specially prepared for him by the women of EOKA* – knitted jersey, breeches, bandolier and beret; on his hip, a revolver'. Far from being 'wan and emaciated', Foley described him with 'a sheen of health on his dark olive features.'[51]

This appearance took place soon after the equally stage-managed start of the collection of weapons, or 'the decommissioning of terror', to use a modern term. Enough weapons were handed over in a manner that would 'satisfy protocol' – no hint of surrender, no overt British participation.[52] The more substantial and worrying conclusions that could be drawn from this procedure that took place on 13 March 1959 were that EOKA was by no means on its knees, that only some EOKA weapons had been handed in and even fewer *Turk Mukavamet Teskilati*

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48   Darling to Norma Percy, 28 January 1980, 95/41/1 IWM.
49   Darling, The Final Round, p. 27.
50   Foley (ed.), *op. cit.,* 'Letter from Grivas to Frydas, 28 February 1959', Appendix 5, p. 214.
51   C. Foley and W.I Scobie (eds.) (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus,* Stanford, California, p. 158 and *Times of Cyprus* 18 March 1959, cited in R. Holland, *op. cit.,* p. 326.
52   Foley and Scobie, *op. cit.,* p. 158. For an interesting account of the problems of arms collection during the Transition, see E. Hatzivassiliou (1993) 'Post-Zurich Cyprus, 1959: Arms Smuggling and Confidence Building', *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali,* Vol. 9, pp. 71-93.

(TMT) weapons. The greatest incentive to press on with the implementation of a settlement, which offered little satisfaction to any of the parties on the island, was fear of a relapse into chaos. The ex-fighters created a vociferous elite in the fledgling state. Those who, for one reason or another, were left out of a share of power, responded to the unsettled field of political competition by appealing to Enotist patriotism and, in some instances, indicated a readiness to use violence.[53]

In the war of nerves surrounding the disposal of Grivas in March 1959, new British concerns focused on the extent of triumphalism that would attend the arrival of the EOKA leader in Athens and, more specifically, its effect on the debate on the Cyprus settlement in the House of Commons scheduled for 19 March. British and Greek Government requirements at this point were in direct contradiction. British diplomacy now pulled out all the stops to limit the celebrations and honours. 'The more any impression was given that Grivas had 'won' against the British, the more awkward the ramifications would be in Westminster'. Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary reminded Averoff that 'in recent days the British Cabinet had helped the Karamanlis ministry by keeping quiet about those features of the Agreements which could be represented as a British and Turkish triumph over the Greeks'.[54] Now it was the Greeks' turn to restrain themselves. Averoff made a few gestures in this direction, the EOKA leader being promoted to General rather than the more elevated Marshal.[55] There was no advanced advertising of 'the arrival' which was organised at civic level. Nevertheless, the Greek Government and the King could not but be prominent in honouring the man Athenians regarded as a victorious hero.[56] The lack of notice did not stop them pouring on to the streets to greet him.

Averoff had refrained reluctantly from flying to Cyprus in the Royal Hellenic Dakota that brought the EOKA leader back to Athens and Grivas' departure from Nicosia which took place on 17 March, just under a month after the signing of the London Agreements, had been as low key as the British could have wished. Makarios had been there to see him off and a small group of friends and colleagues had flown over to escort him to Athens. Andreas Azinas, who had acted as go-between for Averoff with Grivas, was among them. But as soon as Grivas touched Greek soil, Averoff made sure he was standing beside him. He was still there as, crowned by the Archbishop of Athens with a wreath of silver laurels, the EOKA leader turned to acknowledge a crowd that roared its enthusiastic welcome 'Di−ghe−nis'. The Greek Parliament declared him 'a glorious and heroic officer worthy of the fatherland'.

The debate in Westminster was not, in fact, unduly affected by the adulation in Athens of Britain's 'terrorist' adversary. The subject was, deliberately perhaps, avoided on both sides of the House. The debate focused on empire and honour, on the dilemmas of decolonisation. Labour pounded the government benches with accusations of the pointless sacrifice of British lives. It was

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53   For developments during the Transition, see Markides, *Cyprus 1957-1963 …* . Chapter II.
54   R. Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 325.
55   Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, 17 March 1959, CO926/1124, NA.
56   Allen to Addis, 5 March 1959, CO926/1124, NA.

left to Enoch Powell on the Conservative back benches to summon his extensive powers of rhetoric in defence of the government's record. Concentrating on the problems that arose from the fact that while 'the reality inside our sovereignty had been hollowed out', responsibility remained, 'responsibility for minorities, for peace, for well-being, for those who served the crown', he argued that 'whereas the Conservative Party was prepared to make sacrifices to meet those responsibilities, the Labour Party was not … . Those civilians and those in the Queen's uniform died no less certainly for Britain's honour than if they had fallen in the field of battle in our campaigns of imperial expansion'.[57] For the soldiers on the island there was no alternative to extracting the maximum amount of honour – or the minimum amount of dishonour from the peace settlement. As the transition period proceeded, the climate improved. 'There is no animosity now', Darling wrote to Harding in December 1959, 'and my bet is that by February, we will be the most popular people in Cyprus'. They were popular, of course, because they were leaving. Similar transformations of Hellenic feeling had been experienced by earlier generations of British soldiers finally leaving the Ionians in 1864, Crete in 1909 and Rhodes at the end of World War II.[58] For Macmillan, whose immediate preoccupation was his imminent and controversial breakthrough visit to Moscow to consult Nikita Khrushchev, Agreement to grant independence to Cyprus meant one problem less to juggle with. There had been little British input in the essentially Greco-Turkish accord. What remained to be secured in Cyprus were bases and extensive military facilities. With the threat of partition removed by the Agreements, the difficult bargaining for Britain was still to come. In broader terms, the Cyprus issue loomed large for a relatively brief period, a small area in their larger concerns over decolonisation and over a painful reassessment of their world role.

The consequences of a wrong move were more serious for the Greek Government. A wrong move on the most emotive national issue would cause its downfall. Nevertheless, there was no artifice in the placing of the EOKA struggle firmly within its Greek context. It was the survival of the mythical *Dighenis* more than anything else that quickened the subsequent perception of an *unfinished* struggle – a struggle that was seen in Greece as 'a further stanza in the national epic along with Thermopylae, Mesolonghi and Souli'. The EOKA leader was able to claim that the sacrifices of the Greek Cypriots had been 'crowned with victory' because they would now be interpreted as simply the *first* phase in the *last* of many such struggles. By July 1959, Grivas was beginning to attack the London and Zurich Agreements in an unsuccessful bid to enter Greek politics. His festering differences with Makarios found fertile ground in his native island where dissatisfaction with the new *status quo* could so easily serve the frustrated political ends of those left on the sidelines in the new Cypriot polity.

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57   See R. Holland, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-329 for an astute analysis of this debate.

58   For a comparative study, see R. Holland and D. Markides (2006) *The British and The Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1854-1960*, Oxford.

Thus for the Cypriots the impact of the way the EOKA struggle ended had chronic implications. To a large extent the Grivas–Makarios divide defined Greek Cypriot politics in the new Republic. Divisions resulted not only from personality cults and tiny power struggles. The overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots considered the struggle *unfinished,* but they were divided over tactics required to achieve completion and the extent of completion achievable. Neither the communist left nor the extreme nationalist *Grivikoi* could gain power without the support of the more moderate nationalist *Makariakoi* who held the middle ground. Initially Makarios tried to create a right-wing grouping, EDMA, which would contain the *Grivikoi.*[59] The controversial appointment of EOKA members in his first embryo cabinet was a gesture in this direction – a move, incidentally, resented by Grivas as an attempt to weaken his [Grivas'] influence. His failure to do so made him strongly reliant on the Communist Party, AKEL, who became the king-makers in Greek Cypriot politics by wooing the *Makariakoi* against the *Grivikoi.*[60]

Now that, years after the deaths of the two leaders, the *Makariako–Grivikoi* divide is not so clearly definable AKEL is having to re-invent itself to attract the necessary nationalist votes. A discernable attempt is being made to reconstitute the image of the Communist Party during the 1950s struggle. More is heard about the exoneration of AKEL 'traitors' assassinated by EOKA and in the last electoral campaign for the presidency, the AKEL leader, Demetri Christofias, appeared on television unveiling a hide-out used, not by *Dighenis,* but by the AKEL leader's predecessor, Ezekias Papaioannou, to avoid arrest by British security forces during 'The Emergency'.

In the final analysis the most telling impact of the complex 'Final Round' was on the heightened sensitivity it created in all the political players to their domestic constituencies. In Athens this very Greek struggle found enough popular resonance to threaten the Karamanlis Government. In Britain, for a while, it stirred the prickly and powerful ranks of British imperial Conservativism, but, inevitably, the deepest and most chronic impact was in Cyprus itself. The intensity of the divide within the Greek Cypriot community tended to encourage a competitive enotist patriotism that influenced the posturing of the political leaders and subsequently the inter-communal dialogue itself.

This competitive nationalism was encouraged, not only by the continuing involvement of the EOKA leader in Cypriot politics, but by an injection of Cold War priorities. Although the Zurich

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59   Markides, *Cyprus 1957-1963 ..., op. cit.,* pp. 53-54.

60   In 1959, during the Transition period, AKEL joined Themistocles Dervis, the dynamic mayor of Nicosia, in supporting the candidacy of John Clerides for president. Their failure to defeat Makarios resulted in their forming an alliance with the Archbishop and newly elected president in the subsequent elections for the House of Representatives. The only Presidential election in which the AKEL-backed candidate was defeated, after the creation of the Republic, was in 1993 when ex-presidents Glafkos Clerides (heading the largely *Grivikoi* party, Democratic Rally) and Spyros Kyprianou (heading the largely *Makariakoi* party, DIKO) combined to oust George Vassiliou who had taken the foolhardy step of going it alone. The AKEL candidate, George Iacovou, was also defeated.

and London Agreements had been welcomed as a means of retaining Cyprus for the West, the republic was not specifically aligned, while the Americans had failed to prevent the legalisation of AKEL during the transition. They now feared that the respectability the communist party derived from legality would be boosted by their electoral alliance with Makarios and that the communists would be in an exceptionally strong position to come to power through the ballot box. The presence of a large Soviet diplomatic mission that cooperated closely with AKEL and the proliferation of scholarships for young Cypriots to study behind the iron curtain, seemed to be displacing the old British connection. Complications in approaching inter-communal issues arose, from a shift of emphasis in diplomatic efforts, after 1961, to anti-communist tactics, but also from the extremism in intra-communal politics they inevitably encouraged. The trappings and ceremonial of Greek nationalism, the natural vehicle of the extreme right, were not conducive to the growth of inter-communal confidence and understanding.

With the exception of the left-wing trade union, PEO, which sought members across the communal divide, there had never been much Greek Cypriot interest, during British rule in political developments in the Turkish Cypriot community. This lack of interest was now encouraged by a constitution that did not allow a politician from one community to have any constituency in the other. Consequently, in order to stay in power, politicians were obliged to accommodate and appeal to the nationalist tendencies in their own community. These had been strongly cultivated in the previous years and would not suddenly vanish because of an agreement made by third parties elsewhere.

There is no doubt that it was important to Ankara that the island should be perceived as 'Greek-Turkish' rather than Cypriot. This perception was central to the maintenance of a separate political identity for the Turkish Cypriot community on which the Turkish Government's political leverage on the island depended. Extremism was therefore not restricted to the Greek Cypriot community. On 26 April 1962, for example, the editors of *Cumhuriyet,* a Turkish Cypriot newspaper promoting cooperation with the Greek Cypriots, were murdered. The Greek Cypriots turned a deaf ear to the significance of such acts and more perilously to the implications of Ankara's chronic involvement in Turkish Cypriot affairs. They remained apparently oblivious to the fact that demonstrative Greek nationalism provided the Turkish Government with the pretext it required to tighten its hold on the island's Turks. No serious Greek Cypriot attempt was made to influence the evolution of Turkish Cypriot politics.

Any political interest beyond the Greek Cypriot community, tended to be devoted to Athens or to the international strategy of the Cold War powers. Thus the cooperation of the Cyprus Government's Ministry of the Interior in the anti-communist drive, in spite of Makarios' alliance with AKEL, together with visits to the United States and Europe, to balance those to Egypt and India, were intended to retain the support of the West, the assumption being that the Western Powers would automatically restrain Ankara. An ostensibly successful state visit by Makarios to Ankara in the summer of 1962 fed into this assumption.

In social terms, the Greek Cypriot educational model, which had been integrated with that of

Athens since the nineteenth century, ensured an automatic popular conformity to the enotist ideal or vision, but it was the incestuous absorption with competitive Enotist politics within the Greek community after independence, which fed into a devastating neglect of political developments within the Turkish Cypriot community, more especially since these themselves reflected the limitations of Ankara's tolerance. Thus, for example, in December 1961, the shift in power to the partitionists in the Turkish Cypriot community was obscure to the Greek Cypriots who were, at that time, engaged in the divisive political drama created by the publication of the memoirs of George Grivas. These contained sensational allegations regarding the role of individual Greek Cypriots in the anti-colonial struggle. The stereotype images of 'the other' served up to the members of each community by a politically loaded and sensational press were read and believed, insofar as there was any interest. Real interest was always focused on the more immediate drama of politics within their own community. The fact, within the Greek Cypriot community, that lip service was always paid by non-communist politicians, to the nationalist ideals of the struggle of the previous decade can be attributed, at least in part, to the efforts made in the immediate aftermath of the settlement by all concerned to extract themselves from a complex and less than satisfactory situation with their honour and the Agreements intact.

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The Political Evolution of Northern Cyprus and its Effect on Turkish-Cypriot Relations with Turkey

Tozun Bahcheli, Sid Noel

Abstract

While ethnic kinship and perceived commonality of interests have ensured close relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the political ties between them have changed significantly over time. From a community that once dutifully followed Turkey's lead in all matters of political significance – their relationship with Turkey being essentially one of client and patron – Turkish Cypriots have evolved into a community with a distinct political identity, its own democratic institutions, a well-developed sense of its own interests, and leaders who represent and articulate a Turkish-Cypriot point of view. Though heavily reliant on Turkish financial assistance and other forms of government-to-government support, those leaders nevertheless display considerable confidence regarding their capacity to manage their own affairs. In consequence, Turkish-Cypriot relations with Turkey have grown progressively more complex and nuanced, and in certain respects more distant.

Introduction

Our aims in this paper are, first, to trace the evolution of Turkish-Cypriot political institutions and processes since the collapse of bi-communal government with particular attention to the growth of democracy, drawing briefly on the theoretical literature on democratic consolidation, and second, to show how this evolution has affected relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.

Unpromising Beginnings

Until the mid-twentieth century Turkish-Cypriot political activity remained essentially pre-democratic, with political leadership exercised by a small class of notables whose authority to speak on behalf of the community was rarely contested. It was not until the 1940s and 50s that organised political parties appeared. These parties, however, were basically reactive and defensive, driven less by the pull of democratic ideas than by the push of threatening circumstances. The first such parties – KATAK (Association of the Turkish Minority in the Island of Cyprus), formed in 1942, and KTP (Cyprus is Turkish Party), formed in 1955 – were ethnically-based umbrella parties

whose commitment to democracy was instrumental and secondary. Their main purpose was to rally popular support for a unified Turkish-Cypriot position.[1]

In the late 1950s, however, as communal conflict escalated, parties of the KATAK or KTP type began to seem ineffectual, resulting in a shift of Turkish-Cypriot support towards more militant organisations that combined political representation with the promotion of Turkish nationalism and the sponsorship of armed militias. Foremost among the latter was TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation), formed in 1958 with covert aid from Turkey. Militarily, its aim was to counter EOKA; politically, its aim was to counter the Greek-Cypriot demand for *enosis* with an equally inflammatory demand of its own: for *taksim*, or partition. The internationally imposed solution to these incompatible goals was independence accompanied by a system of democratic bi-communal government, which soon collapsed. By the end of 1963 communal conflict had resumed, this time on a scale surpassing any that had previously been experienced. For the Turkish-Cypriot minority, the consequences were catastrophic: they managed to hold on to a few scattered pieces of territory, which prevented their total defeat, but the dislocation suffered by the civilian population who had relocated to these enclaves was severe (Bahcheli, 1990, pp. 60-70).

The Emergence of Party Politics

The Turkish Cypriots organised a makeshift civil administration in the enclaves and in addition an armed military force, led by officers from Turkey, assumed responsibility for defence and exercised considerable general authority (Patrick, 1976, p. 84). At first the need to maintain communal solidarity was imperative, but life in the enclaves was meagre and full of hardship for most residents, their complaints multiplied, and the argument that their security required a united front began to seem unconvincing. The first sign that political divisions of a traditional ideological kind were re-emerging was the founding of the opposition Republican Turkish Party (CTP) in 1970. The CTP was a party of the left that espoused views similar to those of Greek-Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL). However, it was not until after the momentous events of 1974 and the partition of Cyprus that Turkish-Cypriot political parties began to proliferate, offering voters for the first time a variety of political choices. A constituent assembly elected to draft a new constitution for northern Cyprus included critics of the existing administration whose influence in shaping the new 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' was considerable. A second opposition party, the Populist Party, which espoused a moderate, social democratic agenda, emerged in August 1975. It was soon followed by a new governing party of the right, the National Unity Party (UBP), led by the President, Rauf Denktash. While generally right of centre on questions of social and

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1   The roles of KAYTAK and KTP were circumscribed by the general lack of a democratic environment under British colonial administration and specifically by the suspension of democratic elections between 1931 and 1943 because of the Greek-Cypriot revolt. Both organisations advocated greater democratisation of the political system, without notable effect.

economic policy, the UBP above all espoused a nationalist agenda and close relations with Turkey. In the following year the Populists split, with a breakaway faction forming yet another left-of-centre party, the Communal Liberation Party (TKP). In an increasingly crowded field, the TKP positioned itself somewhat to the right of the CTP on social and economic issues (Dodd, 1993, p. 109).

In the 1976 elections, the first after the division of the island, Denktash and his UBP scored easy victories. But in 1981, a reinvigorated left opposition succeeded in humbling both Denktash and the UBP (*ibid.,* p. 120). Denktash barely managed to hold on to the presidency, while the UBP clung to office by forming a weak coalition government with two splinter parties. This was the first coalition; and ever since coalitions have been a regular feature of Turkish-Cypriot politics.

The gains made by the parties of the left in 1981 were made by exploiting economic and social issues, where the UBP was vulnerable. The main strengths of the UBP resided in its leadership, above all in the person of Denktash, who remained a widely revered figure despite the decline in his electoral support, and in its virtual 'ownership' of the national question. On that question, it was the leftist parties that were vulnerable, particularly the CTP, and to a lesser degree, the TKP. The charge that was regularly levelled at them by their opponents was that they were insufficiently patriotic, or even – the worst insult of all – 'pro-Greek'. It is no wonder, therefore, that the national question was not their preferred field when it came to fighting elections. And it is equally no wonder that it was exactly the field where Denktash and the UBP preferred to fight.

The TRNC and the Development of the Party System

The declaration of the TRNC[2] may be variously understood. Ostensibly, it was a move designed to strengthen the Turkish-Cypriot case in the international arena, following a series of setbacks,[3] by asserting the Turkish Cypriots' right to self-determination and their own separate state. In effect, the Turkish Cypriots were claiming an international status equal to that of the Greek Cypriots – a point not lost on the south, where it provoked an immediate and furious response. But the declaration could also be understood as a move on the chessboard of Turkish-Cypriot internal politics and its timing placed in the context of the delicate left-right party balance after 1981, which it had the potential to disrupt.

Those on the far left of the ideological spectrum rejected the whole idea of independence out of hand as a right-wing nationalist trick designed to prevent the 'working classes' (Turkish-Cypriot

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2   Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey (editor's note).

3   In particular, resolutions were passed in international forums that Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) viewed as threatening, such as United Nations Resolution 37/253.

and Greek-Cypriot) from uniting. One young leftist at the time – Mehmet Ali Talat – later revealed that he had wept when the TRNC was declared (Guven, 2009, p. 131).[4] Others took a less extreme view but were naturally suspicious that Denktash – who was the driving force behind the declaration – would use it to revive his and the UBP's sagging electoral fortunes. For if he succeeded in once again moving the national question to the forefront of politics, this would likely undercut the left's appeal to the electorate on mundane bread-and-butter issues. They were also alarmed by the possibility that in the process of writing a new constitution Denktash would try to secure additional powers for the presidency. Ultimately, the latter fear proved groundless: the combined weight of the opposition parties was sufficient to block major changes and in the end Denktash and the UBP had to be content with a document that was little changed from the one it replaced. The main institutional change was to increase the number of seats in the legislature from 40 to 50. In a referendum held on 5 May 1985, 70.2% of the electorate voted in favour of the new constitution (Dodd, 1993, p. 131).

In the following presidential and parliamentary elections, which were held on separate dates in June, Denktash's revived reputation as the guardian of Turkish-Cypriot rights ensured his election as president by a wide margin: in an election which saw a remarkable turnout of 85.7%, he received 70.2% of the vote while his nearest rival won only 18.3%. Denktash thus regained nearly all of the support he had lost in 1981. Yet his party, the UBP, failed to make a similar recovery. While it finished well ahead of the CTP and TKP, it won only 24 of 50 seats, forcing the formation of another coalition government. The opposition as a whole, however, was more fragmented than ever and the need for a coalition ended abruptly when the UBP increased its number of seats to a majority owing to defections from other parties (*ibid.*, pp. 131-133).[5]

In later elections it became evident that the existence of the TRNC did in fact affect the Turkish-Cypriot political dynamic in ways that the left opposition had feared: it did reinvigorate the national question and it did revive Denktash's electoral fortunes. It also stopped the erosion of UBP support and took away the momentum of the left-of-centre parties, though this was not altogether clear in 1985. Since then, however, although the UBP has at times been forced to form coalitions with smaller partners, and has tasted electoral defeat, it has remained overall the most formidable party in the TRNC and the only party (thus far) able to form single-party governments. Its greatest asset is its large and generally solid base of nationalistically inclined centre-right voters, which it assiduously cultivates. Its ideological appeal, moreover, is bolstered by able leadership, efficient organisation, effective advertising and messaging, a strong list of candidates, and not least, its use of patronage to reward party service. Of all the Turkish-Cypriot

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4   In the end the left-wing parties reluctantly voted in favour of the proclamation, including the CTP, the party Talat supported and eventually came to lead.

5   The appearance of a new party, Yeni Doğuş Parti (New Birth Party), which found a constituency among settlers, contributed to the fragmentation of the opposition. In 1993 the YDP merged with the Democratic Party.

parties, it is the one that most resembles the 'electoral-professional party' (Panebianco, 1988, p. 264).

By 2005, however, there were signs of a possible realignment of partisan allegiances. Between 1993 and 2005 the UBP and CTP had alternated in office in a series of coalition governments, with one issue – the UN-sponsored Annan Plan for reunification – dominating the political agenda and putting the UBP, as the main anti-Annan party, on the wrong side of public opinion. In 2003 the CTP won more seats than the UBP but its gains were inadequate to form a stable coalition government, thus necessitating another round of elections in 2005.[6] These elections – which followed the 2004 referendum in which Turkish Cypriots had resoundingly endorsed the CTP stance on the Annan plan – were crucial for the UBP (which was in opposition at the time) and potentially disastrous. In the event, the UBP managed to hold its ground, winning 19 seats. But it was no match for the CTP-led coalition government, which won 30 seats (CTP 24, Democratic Party 6) and thus a clear majority. The CTP benefited from being in office during a time when the TRNC economy was enjoying a period of exceptional growth, but it benefited most of all from a carry-over effect from the referendum. It also ran an effective campaign, downplaying its left-wing programme and emphasising instead its reputation as the pro-EU party, which contained an implied promise of future prosperity, and the international acclaim accorded its leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, who was prominently pictured in campaign ads in the company of high EU officials and other world leaders (Sozen, 2005, pp. 468-471).

The carry-over effect gave the CTP an opportunity to make permanent the realignment in the party system that appeared to be taking place. But, for a number of reasons, it signally failed to do so. The favourable treatment that the EU had promised (and the CTP had prematurely anticipated) turned out to be illusory, inflationary public sector wage increases were widely resented, the economy turned sour and, under growing pressure, the coalition disintegrated. In the parliamentary elections of April 2009, the voters who had drifted away from the UBP returned en masse to their former allegiance, giving the party an absolute majority of 26 seats, on 44.1% of the vote. The CTP fell back to its more customary level, with 15 seats on 29.2% (Sozen, 2009, p. 346). Hence, viewed from the perspective of a widely used typology of elections, the 2003 and 2005 elections turned out to be 'deviant' rather than 'realigning' (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). The year 2009 saw the UBP restored to its place of pre-eminence in the party system and once again able to form a single-party government.

Apart from CTP policy missteps and economic problems, one of the factors that contributed to the UBP victory was that it had made use of its period in opposition to moderate its position on the national question, which had been a major handicap in the two previous elections. This in turn led to its adopting a new rhetoric of moderation that was strikingly reflected in the design of

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6 In 2003 the CTP expanded its name to 'Turkish Republican Party–United Forces' (CTP-BG) in a bid to attract voters who traditionally supported centre-right parties. For consistency, we use 'CTP' throughout.

its 2009 election campaign. The UBP remained proudly nationalist – projecting an image of itself as the party that had declared the TRNC and stood for 'national unity' (its election slogan) – but gone was the intransigent rhetoric that had put it out of step with the mainstream of Turkish-Cypriot opinion. Where previously it had stood for 'no' to the Annan plan, 'no' to federation, and 'no' to anything except separate statehood, now it campaigned as the party that responsibly supported the ongoing negotiations to find a solution, as long as Turkish-Cypriot interests were adequately safeguarded. For the UBP, this also had the happy result of aligning its position more closely with that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey (Sozen, 2009, p. 349).

Democratic Consolidation

In retrospect, it can be seen that neither the hoped-for external gains from the TRNC's creation, nor the dire consequences that opponents feared, actually materialised. Yet it did have important unanticipated consequences. Notwithstanding some setbacks and some persistent shortcomings, the general course of Turkish-Cypriot political development after the coming of the TRNC has been towards the consolidation of democratic principles and practices and a generally enhanced quality of civic life. These, of course, are concepts that require further elaboration. Following the conceptualisations of Juan Linz and Alfred C. Stepan (1996), we define the path of development under the TRNC as one of 'consolidation' rather than a 'transition' to democracy (such as took place in Eastern Europe, for example), because the shift that took place was not from a prior undemocratic regime to a democratic one, but rather a process of building on pre-existing foundations.

According to Linz and Stepan, consolidation takes place when three 'layers' of change – behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional – combine and interact to make democracy 'the only game in town'. Genuinely competitive elections are central to the process of consolidation. But consolidation depends also on the growth and entrenchment of other factors, including a well-developed civil society, 'autonomous and valued' political bodies, such as parliaments and parties, the rule of law, an 'institutionalized economic society', and a bureaucracy capable of providing needed state services (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 5-15). Democracies vary considerably in the way they mix these factors, and no democracy may be said to perfectly exemplify all of them, but they are nevertheless useful criteria of evaluation.

Any application of these criteria to the TRNC must begin with the question of whether democracy is 'the only game in town', since that is fundamental. The TRNC record over the past quarter-century strongly suggests that it is. The political behaviour of Turkish Cypriots exhibits a degree of attachment to democracy that is similar to that found in other well-established democracies. Voter turnout in TRNC elections is high by international standards, as is the rate of citizen participation in political parties (Siaroff, 2000, p. 25). Elections are vigorously contested, with no major barriers to new entrants, as the number and variety of minor parties indicates.

Election outcomes are close and typically produce both an effective government (often a coalition) and an effective parliamentary opposition, with a lawful and orderly change of governing party (or parties) if necessary. The details of election rules may at times be hotly disputed since in closely contested elections even the smallest change in the rules can be consequential, but the overriding requirement is that elections must be free and fair. Turkish Cypriots have absorbed those norms into their political culture. Though problems of inefficiency and corruption persist, these have come under increasing critical scrutiny by opposition members and the media and appear to be in decline. On the whole, when it comes to delivering services to its citizens, the governmental performance of the TRNC is rather plodding and unremarkable – much like other small democracies.[7]

Identity Politics and Relations with Turkey

Turkish Cypriots feel the tug of ethnic kinship with mainland Turks, with whom they share bonds of language, culture and religion, and few would deny their debt to Turkey for defending them during past communal conflicts and supporting them afterwards. Their gratitude is deep and genuine, and the events that inspire it are faithfully commemorated. But at the same time they do not for the most part see themselves as singular or 'unhyphenated' Turks, indistinguishable from their mainland kin (Ramm, 2006, pp. 528-531; Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, pp. 159-160). Their cultural identity inescapably reflects the complex reality of Cyprus. And that reality, in the twenty-first century, has resulted in perceptual and attitudinal shifts that have reshaped their relations with Turkey. Two key historical events made these shifts possible and perhaps inevitable. The first was the 1974 division, as a result of which Turkish Cypriots became physically concentrated in one area and hence better able to preserve their identity and culture and govern themselves. And as their institutions of self-government expanded and developed so too did their confidence, their faith in their own leaders, and their sense of distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* mainland Turkey. The second was the creation of the TRNC which, by proclaiming their separate statehood, provided them with both a powerful incentive and new state instruments for democratic development, identity formation and the articulation of their national interests.

These changes, it must be emphasised, were unintended. As originally envisioned, the TRNC was meant to strengthen the *Turkish* identity of Turkish Cypriots (thus implicitly foreclosing

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7   The treatment of non-citizen ethnic and religious minorities is also a measure of democracy. According to the UN Secretary General's report on the United Nations peace operation in Cyprus dated 28 May, 2010, there are 361 Greek Cypriots and 128 Maronites (UN Security Council, 2010, p. 3), living in isolated villages in the Karpas peninsula and Kormatiki respectively, who face numerous restrictions on the education of their children, the use of their land and properties, and access to the courts (Constantinou, 2008, pp. 158-159). The decision of the TRNC government to allow unrestricted travel across the Green Line in 2003 eased the isolation of these communities but their overall treatment represents a weak point in Turkish-Cypriot democracy.

further processes of identity formation), and promote closer ties to Turkey. Denktash and the UBP thus made the promotion of a common Turkish nationalism and national identity a high state priority.[8] However, their efforts were very largely in vain, for the contradiction between asserting a distinctive Turkish-Cypriot statehood while at the same time promoting a singular Turkish nationalism was impossible to reconcile. And it was equally impossible to keep the identity question out of partisan politics. The party lines were soon clearly drawn: the UBP became the standard bearer of Turkish nationalism and a 'Turks in Cyprus' identity while the CTP became the main standard bearer of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and a unique Turkish-Cypriot identity. Their alternation of office naturally caused some confusion, but over time and under pressure of events the parties' outlooks have tended to converge – though important differences remain. The differences are perhaps most evident in their respective approaches to the Turkish settler question. The UBP takes the view that Turks who settle legally in the TRNC are assets to Turkish-Cypriot society who should be welcomed, treated equally and fairly, and protected against discrimination. It is the party of full, unqualified integration and this has earned it a large base of electoral support among the settlers (Hatay, 2005, pp. 23-47). The CTP and other left-of-centre parties generally take a more negative view, seeing the settlers as an obstacle to reunification and a source of social problems. Though not against integration, one of their concerns is to impose tighter restrictions on the entry of new migrants.

Lack of space precludes a discussion of the many ramifications of the settler question. In our view, the balance of evidence suggests that Turkish Cypriots – while by no means unanimous, on this as on other issues – have for the most part pragmatically made the necessary social accommodations and have been able absorb a large influx of settlers with relative ease. This is not to say that there have been no problems, but compared to those experienced by many European countries when faced with much smaller numbers of immigrants relative to their population, the problems have been manageable. One of the reasons for this is that Turkish Cypriots have grown accustomed to having an inclusive, 'permeable' and layered identity – linguistically Turkish, culturally Turkish-Cypriot or 'island Turkish' and, among the young (somewhat ironically) 'European' (Ramm, 2006, pp. 537-539).

Politically, relations with Turkey were long complicated by the UBP-CTP cleavage in the TRNC. Governments in Ankara – almost invariably right-wing, nationalistic, and inclined to view Cyprus as a 'security matter' – were strongly supportive of Denktash and the UBP, whose views they shared, and equally strongly biased against the CTP, whose leftist policies they disliked and whose pro-unification stance they distrusted. The CTP, therefore, had every reason when in power to stress the point that Turkish-Cypriot interests were not the same as Turkey's and to defend their aim to build better relations with Greek Cypriots, with the eventual goal of

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8 For example, pictures and statues of Ataturk proliferated in public places and many streets were renamed in honour of Turkish heroes.

reunification. The CTP's dilemma was that it could not go very far in asserting a distinct Turkish-Cypriot national interest without provoking criticism that it was jeopardising Turkish financial support. But in 2002 that concern was suddenly removed by the election in Turkey of the AKP government. Avid for EU membership, and wishing to remove the Cyprus issue as an obstacle, the AKP found the CTP position on reunification much to its liking. It therefore signalled its support for CTP leader Talat, who as prime minister led the Turkish-Cypriot side in negotiations leading up to the Annan plan. It also gave the plan its endorsement, which helped the CTP-led yes side to win the 2004 referendum (Bahcheli and Noel, 2009, pp. 244-247). But since then Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish politics have gone their separate ways. Alignment with the AKP failed to help the CTP in the 2009 elections, which were won by the UBP, with the AKP playing no role. Beset by problems closer to home, and with its EU aspirations fading, the AKP government continues to support the TRNC financially but shows little interest in its domestic affairs.

Conclusion

Within the constitutional framework of the TRNC there has developed a competitive multi-party system in which two main parties (UBP and CTP, one centre-right, one centre-left) tower over the rest. No government can be formed without the participation of one or other of them. On the whole, this pattern of electoral politics resembles the pattern found in many other democracies. The major difference is that the normal pattern of party competition in the TRNC is prone to give way to plebiscitary voting when the one overriding issue is the recurring national question – but even in that respect the TRNC is by no means unique, as citizens in places such as Catalonia or Scotland or Quebec might readily attest.

Identity formation is always a complex process and, for the Turkish Cypriots, the process has taken them far from the simplistic official formulations of the early TRNC era and towards a more plural, outward-looking and culturally inclusive national consciousness.

This change developed symbiotically with other changes, the most important of which was the creation of the TRNC, which set in motion developments in the party system, in the institutions of government, and broadly in the political culture. Taken together, these developments constitute a sustained process of democratic consolidation.

The effects of this on TRNC-Turkish relations have been significant. At the popular level, while the bonds of language and culture remain strong, politically Turkish Cypriots have grown accustomed to their own way of practicing democracy, which is different from the Turkish way. Quite apart from the huge disparity in scale between the two systems, there are institutional and behavioural differences that are fundamental. The respective party systems, for example, have few if any parallels and the issues that stir Turkish voters (such as the 'headscarf' issue) have practically no resonance in the TRNC. Its parties and voters prefer instead to focus on their own affairs – however parochial these may seem from a Turkish perspective. Moreover, since the 2004 referendum on the Annan plan, the perennial national question has come to be seen by Turkish

Cypriots as primarily a matter of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot economic and political relations that can only be settled in Cyprus – where their interests are democratically represented by the TRNC. Once one referendum has been held, for all practical purposes it becomes impossible to proceed to a settlement without another. That leaves the EU and Turkey still prominently in the larger picture, but with neither the desire nor the capacity to impose their wishes.

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The United Nations and the Cyprus Problem

FARID MIRBAGHERI

Abstract

Both communities in the Cyprus dispute have at different times objected to the intervention of the United Nations when in their view mediatory function was somewhat replaced by more forceful methods resembling arbitration. In 1965, the UN Mediator, Galo Plaza, issued a Report that met outright opposition from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on the grounds that the mediator had acted as an arbiter. In 2004, the Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots feeling that the kind of settlement proposed was an imposition by the outsiders.

This short paper aims to assess the intervening role of the UN in Cyprus in respect of peacemaking and peacekeeping from 1964 to the present day. Both the traditional nature of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus UNFICYP as well as the oscillating diplomatic efforts of the organisation to bring about a settlement have been discussed. The attitude of the belligerent parties to the UN involvement, their concerns and expectation as well as the influence of the major powers through the organisation to tailor a solution has accordingly been analysed.

It was in the 1950s when the Cyprus problem was first introduced to the General Assembly of the United Nations. At that time, the issue was that of self-determination for a colony of the United Kingdom. Greece as the 'motherland' of the majority community on the island, Greek Cypriots, had decided to pursue the matter internationally despite the wishes of the British government to the contrary.[1] The Cold War, the pre-eminent feature of global politics then, however, meant that the fulsome and wholehearted support of the Western superpower, the United States, for self-determination in Cyprus was contingent upon other factors, i.e. making sure that such an eventuality would not lead to a Communist penetration of the island. The mere presentation of the case in the world body in itself had already risked embarrassment for Washington, which considered both Greece and Turkey, 'motherlands' of the two Cypriot communities, as well as Cyprus within the Western Camp. It was thus deemed best to try and resolve the issue within the

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1   D.S. Bitsios (1975) *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic.* Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, note 30, p. 40.
2   U. Nasuh (2003) *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish – American Relations 1959-2003.* New York: Nova Science Publishers, p. 33.

Western family and outside of the United Nations, where the Soviet influence could have perceivably complicated matters for the West.[2]

And that is how the matter proceeded. A deal called the London-Zurich Agreements that went against the wishes of Greek Cypriots to achieve *enosis* (union with Greece) was struck in 1959-1960, whereby both union with any other country or partition (as had been advocated by many Turkish Cypriots) were excluded. Thus in 1960, Cyprus became what was at times referred to as a reluctant republic.[3] The bi-communal power-sharing arrangements that were said to have been institutionalised in the new Republic's constitution to ensure a harmonious beginning to the politically independent life of Cyprus and Cypriots, however, failed to fulfil their goal. Within three years hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots broke out over thirteen amendments to the Constitution that Makarios as the head of state had unilaterally proposed but had expectedly faced stern opposition from Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. In order to contain the conflict and prevent its escalation into a Greco-Turkish war, both members of NATO, the United Nations agreed to the despatching of a peacekeeping force to the island. Thus Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, adopted by the Security Council, authorised the stationing of such a military force named The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) as well as the appointment of a mediator by the Secretary-General to seek an agreed solution to the problem confronting Cyprus. The Mediator, the former Ecuadorian President Galo Plaza, issued his report one year later wherein he appeared to endorse the position adopted by the government of Cyprus, now fully under Greek-Cypriot control after the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from all organs of the administration.

Both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots rejected the report of the UN mediator. This marked a significant shift in the United Nations peacemaking role on the island as mediation was then replaced with the Secretary-General's good offices mission (never mentioned specifically in the UN Charter but utilised often), effectively replacing active with passive mediation. It would be sometime before active mediatory intervention was again adopted on the Cyprus problem, principally in the aftermath of the events of 1974 and perhaps most poignantly in the prelude to the Annan Plan in 2004. In between those years numerous representatives of Secretaries-General produced plans of their own as a half-way between the two sides' positions but were always rebuffed by one or the other of the parties. Intercommunal negotiation, which was the main mechanism through which a solution was being sought, proved ineffective in finding an agreeable solution to this protracted problem. The failure reflected, to a degree, the inconsistency between the UN's diagnosis of the problem and the remedy it prescribed for it. Resolution 186 of the Security Council, noted above, did state in particular that a solution was to be found with the agreement of the Guarantor Powers (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom), the government of Cyprus and the two Cypriot communities. In effect, therefore, two internal and external aspects were noted by the UN to be the integral part of the Cyprus problem and its settlement. Why else should a

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3   S.G. Xydis (1973) *Cyprus: The Reluctant Republic.* The Hague/Paris: Mouton.

solution have the agreement of parties inside and outside of the country as stipulated specifically by the resolution? But the mechanism of intercommunal negotiation, which has been the main means of searching for a solution, only deals with the internal element. Overlooking the external factor represented a serious flaw in efforts trying to bring about a Cyprus settlement. However, the inconsistency between diagnosis and remedy may not explain the unwillingness of the parties themselves at various stages to reach an agreement but it could possibly suggest the difficulty in getting all internal and external players to agree to a plan at any given time.

When the intervention of outside powers, including the Guarantor Powers, was ensured to weigh heavily in favour of a settlement thus bringing due pressure upon the internal factors, as was the case in the Annan Plan, a settlement still proved elusive due to the unwillingness of local parties, in this instance that of Greek Cypriots. International pressure, therefore, was shown not to be a sufficient condition for a Cyprus solution as had been thought by some. Both domestic and outside factors, each necessary but not sufficient in themselves, are to work in parallel if prospects for a settlement are to be enhanced.

Peacekeeping

Initially formed of contingents of seven countries (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and numbering about 6,114 in total the UN Force on the island has now shrunk to around 857 that represent Argentina, Austria, Canada, Hungary, Peru, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. After much chagrin in the 1990s over the expenses of the force the Cyprus government accepted to bear a substantial part of the cost. Dubbed as one of the more successful cases of traditional peacekeeping by the United Nations, UNFICYP has managed to fulfil all items in its mandate but one, which relates to restoring normal conditions on the island. In that regard a brief analysis of the relationship between UNFICYP in its peacekeeping function and the diplomatic efforts of the UN may be useful.

Three possible and unintended side-effects – removal of urgency, arrival of complacency and untying the hands of belligerent parties – may have been adverse effects of UNFICYP on diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement. In the first instance the automatic stationing of a neutral force in between the warring factions eased off tension and reduced the risk of an escalation into a Greco-Turkish war. As the UN force appeared more and more able in fulfilling its function (without the obvious exceptions of 1967, 1974 and 1997, where the force still played a part in protecting non-combatants and de-escalation but failed to prevent the recurrence of hostilities) the Cyprus problem ceased to be a priority issue on the world's conflict agenda. After all, when guns fell silent and people were not killed attention was axiomatically shifted to more urgent and pressing cases, where lives were being lost. In consequence of the removal of urgency a state of complacency may have arrived to prevail upon the world misleading global leaders to believe that there was really not much danger in the *status quo*. Only periodic tragic incidents such as the Dherinia incident in 1997 suddenly shocked the international community back to the reality of

the situation. Thirdly the space provided by the UNFICYP may have at times tempted the local parties not to be too eager on diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement if the suggested plan fell short of their ideal solution. As the parties may feel immune to the consequence of their own intransigence, due to the presence of UNFICYP, a misguided belief that time is on their side might have come to prevail upon them dissuading them from full cooperation with mediatory efforts until such time that they could achieve their desired solution. This, however, it should be noted, appears to have been more the case with the Turkish Cypriots particularly during the years of Mr. Denktash's leadership and, excepting the tenure of president Christofias, with the Greek Cypriots (the Government of Cyprus) after the EU accession in 2004.[4]

Notwithstanding the above, the valuable work of UNFICYP cannot be overstated. Even though some unintended consequences may have hampered the peacemaking function of the Organisation on the island, there can be little doubt that the withdrawal of the force would probably only worsen the situation, exposing the militarily weaker party to the demands of the stronger one.

Peacemaking

In spite of the very many initiatives including the one outside of the UN system (the American-British-Canadian plan known as the ABC plan in 1978), the most internationalised proposal, offered in 2004, was the Annan Plan, named after the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Many, however, believe that a large part of the plan was in fact written by others (Lord David Hannay is one name mentioned in particular in this regard) and only presented as a UN-drafted proposal. After many rounds of negotiations outside of the island leading to various drafts of the proposal, eventually both parties agreed to submit the plan to separate referenda in Cyprus.[5] The newly elected president of Cyprus at the time, Late Tassos Papadopoulos, was, however, unwilling to lend his support and in a televised address urged the Greek Cypriots to reject it. In the end an overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots (around 75%) voted against the Plan whereas around 64% of Turkish Cypriots endorsed it. The result was a staggering blow to the mediatory efforts of the UN, whose frustration over the outcome was thinly-veiled in its report to the Security Council. After the initial shock and a lull in diplomatic activities, hopes began to surface after the election of President Christofias, whose campaign promised reinvigorating efforts towards the reunification of the island. With Christofias and Memet Ali Talat, the new Turkish Cypriot leader, and a conciliatory figure for a solution, it seemed that there might be a real chance, once again, to strike a deal. Despite previous records (where on many an occasion both Mr. Denktash, and less

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4   F. Mirbagheri (2006) 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Example of Cyprus', *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 288, No. 1680, pp. 37-46.

5   For a fuller account of developments regarding the Annan Plan and the internal and external parties' reaction to it see James Ker-Lindsay (2006) *EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

frequently Cypriot Presidents (Greek-Cypriot leaders) had managed to thwart international efforts) there now appeared a very rare instance when both leaders seemed genuinely keen for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Eager to fully exploit the situation, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, appointed the former Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Alexander Downer, as his special envoy on the island. Mr. Downer's mandate is 'to assist the parties in the conduct of fully-fledged negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement'.[6] That marks a shift from the previous peacemaking attempt carried out by Kofi Annan and his envoys, where the UN was an active mediator. During the current phase (era of passive mediation), some progress was achieved before the victory in Turkish–Cypriot elections in 2010 opened the way for Mr. Dervish Eroglu to assume the leadership of his community. The latter is known, not all that unjustifiably, for his hard-line and uncompromising policy on the Cyprus problem. It now remains to be seen whether or not his approach will herald a change from his record and in the direction of a solution.

The United Nations, being the world's diplomatic body, should in a sense always imbue optimism even when it may not appear wholly justified. That has been the trend thus far. The real substantive question for the UN, however, is its ability to engage and interact with the local as well as international actors on this issue. In 1965 the UN failed to win the support of all outsiders, namely Turkey, as well as the Turkish Cypriots and thus did not secure a settlement. Strangely enough the UN mediator had decided to hand in his report when there were no indications that all sides would agree. In 2004, the UN appeared to have won the endorsement of all international actors but the local factor led to the demise of its efforts. In between, initiatives such as the Gobbi Initiative or the Draft Framework Agreement of 1980s were unable to elicit the support of the two communities. Therefore, in view of the history of the problem for nearly half a century, one may be tempted to conclude that the heavier burden of the problem, at-least in the past decade or so, may have fallen on the internal players. Though there is a considerable influence of outside factors, there seems little doubt that in the final analysis the solution to the problem of Cyprus will in the main depend on Cypriots themselves.

The United Nations and the International Aspect of the Cyprus Problem

The UN, as an international organisation, consisting of states, cannot act in an independent manner that would defy the wishes of its members. In other words the UN is only as effective or as ineffective as its members, and particularly its stronger and richer members, wish it to be. It may decide, for instance, to apply the doctrine of collective security in the case of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 but not in other similar cases in the Middle East or elsewhere. Much perceived strategic and political interests may well stand in the way of that. The question of the protracted

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6   Security Council Resolution S/RES/1847 (2008).

problem of Cyprus thus can only be considered and dealt with in the context of such international coordinates of power and interest. Any expectation that the UN can manipulate international actors on the Cyprus issue without the support of its key members may appear unrealistic.

Turkey with around 40,000 troops in Cyprus is a key international player on the Cyprus problem. Already a Guarantor Power Ankara significantly increased its military and political influence on the island after the 1974 invasion of the country. It has since used this leverage tactically in its international dealings and in particular with regard to its European ambitions. Though Greece can also be viewed as having exploited the situation in Cyprus, in terms of battering Turkey in international fora, Cyprus may have proved more of an asset to Ankara than Athens. As a strategic island and a focus of global rivalry during and after the Cold War Cyprus has in a sense been a victim of interplay of competing international forces. The problem of Cyprus can thus be viewed by some as a convenient barrier to Turkey's European aspirations. For others it may just be the opposite: the Cyprus problem delays Turkey's joining the European Union thus putting at risk Turkey's Western vocation in the long run.

The United Nations, with no tools to reward or to punish, is hardly in a position to influence the behaviour of international – or internal for that matter – players on the Cyprus problem. Nor can it wield any magic tool to alter their perceptions. Such shortcomings in reward and punishment are serious impediment to its peacemaking endeavours; but it can be used as the most legitimate vehicle to pursue international diplomatic efforts for a solution. The legitimacy of the UN and the unique multilateral context it affords for acknowledgement of rights and obligation of the states has been an effective tool for the Cyprus government to keep the problem alive in the context of the breach of its territorial integrity by the occupying Turkish forces. For instance, in 1974, in the aftermath of the Greek-staged coup and the subsequent Turkish military intervention and invasion, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the resolution 3212 (XXIX) asking for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island. Not wishing to be in the embarrassing position of minority of one against all other states Turkey also voted in favour of the resolution. That was an illustration of how the world organisation can bring into focus the principles of international life however inconsequential they may prove to be.

Therefore, the impact of the United Nations on states involved with the Cyprus problem, directly or indirectly, is very limited. There have been the obvious behind-closed-door meetings of the secretariat with interested parties, but that has been rather informational and procedural rather than effecting any real change in the approach of international players. Beyond that, the key players in the UN must be willing to turn the screws in a sufficiently powerful manner and in the right direction on the relevant countries to produce the kind of results that are sought by those interested in a Cyprus solution. And that may have to be adopted, if at all, at certain diplomatic and political cost, which may in itself prove a deterrent.

The United Nations and the Internal Aspect of the Cyprus Problem

Beyond the regular resolutions of the Security Council extending the six-monthly mandate of UNFICYP there have been the reports of the secretary-general that aim to describe the situation on the ground and the state of diplomatic efforts. These reports have at times hinted at one or the other of the two internal parties for their perceived lack of cooperation and their negative impact on peacemaking. In the 1960s, U Thant, then Secretary-General, reported that the Turkish Cypriot leadership had imposed a policy of self-isolation not allowing any interaction with Greek Cypriots. That rebuffed claims that Greek Cypriots were responsible for the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.[7] However, in the same report U Thant did acknowledge the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots stating that at times and in places some of them were in a state of starvation.[8] Three decades later, then UN secretary-general Boutros Ghali, indicated the negative impact of the Turkish Cypriot leadership's stand on the peacemaking process in Cyprus. That was in the aftermath of his proposed Set of Ideas and a suggested series of Confidence-Building Measures, which did not come to fruition. More recently, in the wake of the Annan Plan and the rejection it received from the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Greek Cypriots in general, the Secretary-General's report pointed the finger in the direction of the Cyprus government, which had successfully exhorted its people to decline the proposal.

The above goes to show that the behaviour of the internal parties in Cyprus is noted by the world and if deemed necessary the UN will attribute responsibility for negative developments on peacemaking as it sees fit. This rather open approach has never been adopted *vis-à-vis* outside powers and their impact upon peace efforts in Cyprus. In 1974 after the UN suffered tens of casualties, some of them fatal, Kurt Waldheim, then Secretary-General, had no hesitation in pointing out that Greek Cypriots had attracted the fire of the invading Turkish forces to the UN personnel by taking positions near them. Such accounts narrated by the world's top diplomat, against either of the two parties, can in the very least prove embarrassing and worse it can be consequential. For instance, viewed as less than constructive in the report of the UN (and by the US and European powers) the attitude of Greek Cypriots towards the Annan Plan,[9] there has since been some talk of opening direct trade between the European Union and the Turkish Cypriots in effect bypassing the government of the Republic. Vehemently opposed by the Cyprus

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7 S. Kyriakides (1968) *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 115.

8 R.A. Patrick (1968) *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971*. Waterloo, Ontario: Dept. of Geography, publication series no. 43, University of Waterloo, p. 108.

9 For instance, the oral reports of the UN representative in Cyprus Mr. de Soto, and Mr. Prendergast to the Security Council can be cited as examples. Also note the following: 'The Secretary General applauds the Turkish Cypriots, who approved the plan notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it entailed for many of them'. (UN Under-Secretary General Prendergast's briefing to the UN Security Council on 28 April 2004).

government, such moves indicate the kind of possible consequences if the parties perceivably fall short of the expectations of the international community on peacemaking in their country. In this sense, the leverage of the UN is perhaps somewhat greater amongst Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots as they, representing the state of Cyprus, may have more to defend, and more to lose, than their fellow Turkish Cypriots. The counter-argument that the Turkish Cypriots' suffering, due to the embargo and isolation, has made them eager for change also rendering them vulnerable to pressure by the UN should also be noted.

It is at times perceived by some that the views of the two communities have usually reflected the views of their 'motherlands' albeit to varying degrees.[10] Accordingly it is alleged that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leadership each subscribe to the opinion of Athens and Ankara. It would perhaps appear more plausible to state that the Turkish Cypriot leadership has perhaps been the subject of such influence more than the Greek Cypriot one. To lend support to this one can cite the rejection of the Report of Galo Plaza in 1965 by Turkey before Turkish Cypriots (the latter, however, followed suit) and the almost identical lines of Mr. Denktash, during his long tenure as the leader of his community, with those of Turkey. Nevertheless this relationship was perhaps more dyadic than appreciated by many in that Mr. Denktash was at times able to convince Ankara to support his line on Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot leadership, however, appears to have openly defied Athens in various stages since 1960. First the 1963 constitutional proposals that Makarios submitted were against the advice of Greece; second, the constant chasm between Nicosia and Athens between 1967 and 1974 when the Greek military was in power led to an assassination attempt against the Cypriot president; and third the difference of opinion between the Greek leaders and Cypriot President on the Annan Plan in 2004 was also evident.[11]

Some Concluding Remarks

Throughout the past half a century or so, the United Nations has been trying to break the log jam and introduce a settlement to the Cyprus problem. Through its peacekeeping operation it has been reasonably successful in the maintenance of the ceasefire and containing the conflict. The solution has thus far proved evasive despite the variety of mechanisms employed by the world body. Starting by active mediation in 1964, moving on to the passive good-offices approach of the secretary-general, continuing with the presence of special representatives, who intermittently came up with different proposals of their own for a solution and culminating with an all-active internationally supported and comprehensive plan in 2004 there is now little that has not been

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10   F. Mirbagheri (1998) *Cyprus and International Peacemaking.* London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd, p. 159.

11   N. Panagiotou (2006) *The Role of the Greek Press in Greek – Turkish Rapprochement: The Coverage of the 'Annan Plan' for the Settlement of the Cyprus Conflict,* RAMSES Working Paper 6/06, September 2006 European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, p. 9; see [http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/ramses/panagiotou.pdf], accessed on 24 November 2010.

tried and tested in Cyprus by the United Nations. The willingness of the local parties together with the support of international players, principally Turkey in this instance, are the two necessary conditions for a settlement. In the absence of either of them prospects for a breakthrough appears dim and unrealistic.

However, as politics is full of surprises, the fast changing environment in international relations may produce an instance of such convenience when both internal and external conditions for a settlement would appear ripe. Many independent variables, however, as noted above, would have to come into play before such an outcome could be envisaged. Turkey's European aspirations as well as trends in its domestic politics together with other regional developments will undoubtedly have bearings on Cyprus. So will of course the political aspirations of Cypriots themselves as to their desired outcome on the *de facto* partition of their country. The United Nations can and will continue to facilitate a settlement but only in the context of such factors. It is not equipped to provide a new context of its own.

Naturally one is tempted to share the optimism of professional peacemakers on the island; particularly that the long history of failures together with the continuing cost of UNFICYP may gradually give weight to the cynical belief that there can be no solution in sight in the foreseeable future. Such an eventuality, however, would have far-reaching consequences beyond the shores of the island. At a time, when cultural polarisation is relatively more prominent than in recent history, permanent political separation of the two Cypriot communities may produce the wrong kind of message for a world that needs more than ever before to come together in order to meet challenges that threaten humanity as a whole.

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The Accession of Cyprus to the EU and the 'Acquis' of the Intercommunal Negotiations[1]

Michael Attalides

Abstract

The complex interrelations between Cyprus membership of the EU and processes connected with the ongoing attempts to reach a solution of the Cyprus problem are central issues in the contemporary Cyprus political scene and have become issues for the European Union. In this paper it is argued that the main parameters of these issues were set by developments between 1999, with the decisions on Cyprus and Turkey of the Helsinki European Council, and 2004, with the referenda in Cyprus on the Annan Plan. It is argued that accession to the EU was made possible by the processes which were set in train by the Conclusions of the European Council of Helsinki in December, 1999, and that despite the fears and criticisms expressed from many sides, the complex of events and processes form an instance of a degree of Europeanization of a conflict situation. Despite this, accession did not result in a solution of the Cyprus problem. The reasons for this include difficulties connected with the frequently overlooked factors that Turkey only agreed to effective negotiations after the Cyprus accession treaty was signed, and also because of the ongoing survival of the 'acquis' of the intercommunal negotiations since 1974, which seems to have been specifically exempted from Europeanization.

Keywords: Cyprus, Turkey, negotiations, European Union, accession, Europeanization, conditionality, *acquis*

Introduction

Cyprus is a member of the European Union in the unusual situation that part of its territory is occupied by Turkey, a country which is a candidate to join the European Union. This fact and the ongoing attempts to solve the problem through negotiations are a central issue in the politics of the Republic of Cyprus, but is also an important issue for the European Union as it crucially effects one of its members but also the accession negotiations of Turkey. The roots of this situation, as well as the insights for understanding the situation lie in the processes that interlinked the Cyprus problem, Turkey's interest in becoming a candidate, and the European Union.

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1   A previous version of this paper was presented to the Conference organised by the Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia, Symposium on the Fifty Years of the Republic of Cyprus, *The Republic of Cyprus at Crossroads: Past, Present and Future*, 18-19 February, 2010.

The strategy of utilising the accession course of Cyprus towards membership of the European Union as well as Turkey's relations with the EU, as a 'catalyst' for the solution of the Cyprus problem, was put into political and diplomatic practice by the Government of Greece, and, mainly after 1995, of Cyprus. The sub-text was that the catalyst effect involved changing Turkey's extremely hard stance on Cyprus both through a carrot offered to Turkey through the possibility of becoming a candidate for accession, but also the threat that Cyprus might become a member of the European Union on terms which could not be influenced by Turkey. A significant milestone was a revision of Greek foreign policy initiated by the socialist Government of Costas Simitis in Greece,[2] which initially established a linkage between setting a date for the beginning of accession negotiations for Cyprus and the lifting of Greek objections for the implementation of the Turkey-EC Customs Union.[3]

It was significant and relevant that during the same period of time the United States foreign policy in the area changed, it is widely thought under the impact of Richard Holbrook's analysis, with a shift of view from that which tried to marginalise the significance of the Cyprus problem for Greek-Turkish relations, to a view that this effort was unrealistic, and which recognised that the normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations presupposed a solution of the Cyprus problem. This point of view in the US also saw positive synergies between a solution of the Cyprus problem and support for the accession of Turkey to the European Union. The other positively interrelated idea was one that Europeans had not entertained so far, and nor had many Cypriots, which was that Cyprus could become a member of the European Union.[4] This nexus of events created a set of circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean which included the initiation of a tendency towards the Europeanization[5] of an area of tension and potential conflict.

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2   The adoption of this policy is described in C. Simitis (2005) *Policy for a Creative Greece 1996-2004* [in Greek], Athens: Ekdoseis Polis.

3   For academic work expounding this analysis see among others, P.I. Tsakonas (2003) 'Socializing the Opponent. Greek Strategic Balancing of Turkey and Greek-Turkish Relations' in P.I. Tsakonas (ed.), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy* [in Greek], Athens: Sideris; P.K. Ioakimides (2003) 'The Participation of Greece in the European Union: Development, Contradictions, Consequences' in P.I. Tsakonas [in Greek], *op. cit;* T.P. Dokos (2003) 'Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting' in A. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis and F. Bellou, (eds.), *Greece in the Twentieth Century,* London: Frank Cass Publishers; T.A. Couloumbis (2003) 'Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities' in A. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis and F. Bellou (eds.), *op. cit;* P. Savvides (2003) 'The European Union as a "Catalyst" for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem' in P.I. Tsakonas [in Greek], *op. cit.*

4   J. Reuter (n.d.) 'Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments Before and After the EU Summit in Helsinki', *Eliamep Occasional Papers.* See also D. Hannay (2005) *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution,* London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 76-77, and C. Pericleous (2009) *The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan,* London: I.B. Tauris.

5   The term Europeanization is used broadly within the context defined by L. Quaglia *et al.* (2007) 'Europeanization' in M. Cini (ed.), *European Union Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. In that context it is recognised that '... the concept remains contested ...' (p. 406) while at the same time *one* of its broad definitions is cited as '... the development of common norms at the European level ...' (p. 407). In relation to enlargement, which is our context

Accession negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union actually started in 1998, but some within the European Union, including important governments, considered that they would never conclude successfully unless the Cyprus problem were previously solved. How complex the situation was is indicated by the counter-argument of Cypriot and Greek diplomacy that there should be no such conditionality as it would prove counter-productive. It would provide a motive for Turkey to impede a solution of the Cyprus problem and also hand that country a veto over the entry of Cyprus to the Union.

Helsinki and its Consequences

The levers for the successful accession process of Cyprus were put in place at the European Council of Helsinki in December, 1999.[6] However, for different reasons the strategy and the

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here, the authors make the following analytical observations which are useful for our purposes: (1) 'There is now substantial evidence to support the view that Europeanization effects are felt beyond the current member states', (2) That candidate countries experience of Europeanization '... is derived from the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and those states that wish to join the Union'. (3) That in fact candidate states '... have a stronger incentive than existing member states to implement EU policies' (p. 416). The use of the term here is also consistent in a general sense with the use of the term by R. Landrech (1994) 'Europeanization of Domestic Policies and Institutions: The Case of France', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 69-87, who refers to Europeanization as 'an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national logic of national policies and policy-making' (p. 70).

6   Y. Kranidiotis, *Speech Delivered at the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik*, Bonn, 17 November 1997 and J. Reuter (n.d.).
     The provisions of the Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council which refer to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey are in the first chapter under the title 'the enlargement process'. The main conclusions having an impact on Cyprus and Turkey are the following:
     1.   In paragraph 4 and paragraph 12 it is recognised that the enlargement process is inclusive in nature and now comprises 13 candidate countries within a single framework and that Turkey will be a candidate country.
     2.   Paragraph 4 emphasises the obligation of all candidate states to share the values and objectives of the Union, including the peaceful settlement of disputes, and sets the end of 2004 as the time limit for settlement of outstanding disputes, (in the Aegean), after which their settlement should be promoted through the International Court of Justice.
     3.   Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a precondition for the opening of negotiations (par. 4).
     4.   The European Council welcomes the launch of talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York (par. 9(a)).
     5.   Underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of 'all relevant factors' (par. 9(b)).

decision were criticised by the 'realist' school in Greece[7] and Cyprus, by a number of European analysts[8] who feared either conflict or complications for the European Union or that it would remove incentives for a solution of the Cyprus problem, and by Turkish political leaders, who initially wished to accept only the part of the conclusions which suited them while threatening dire consequences from the part which concerned Cyprus. The worries in Greece and Cyprus included widely disparate and sometimes contradictory issues: That Turkey had been given a clear route to accession without any clear return for the Greek and Greek Cypriot side; that the decision would result in instability and conflict, or that it would lead to a bad solution of the Cyprus problem from the Greek Cypriot perspective. It is sometimes asserted by Cypriot politicians and commentators of the 'realist school' that the Helsinki European Council eliminated any connection between the Cyprus problem and European processes and at the same time secured for Turkey an unencumbered (as far as Cyprus was concerned) accession course.[9]

As with many other political decisions, this one is a complex one, and included some opaque points. But two issues are clear: Firstly, the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council made the accession of Cyprus to the EU possible without an antecedent solution of the Cyprus problem. Secondly, it politically connected the accession course of Turkey to the EU with the solution of

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6.   Paragraph 12, which is often overlooked by Greek Cypriot and Greek critics of Helsinki provides that 'Turkey ... will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 (a)'.
     See Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, *Presidency Conclusions*.

7   V. Greco (2002) 'Schools of Thought and Greek Foreign Policy' [in Greek], *Eliamep Occasional Papers*.

8   See for example, K. Featherstone (2001) 'Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization: Strategic Usage, Structural Transformation and Institutional Adaptation' in K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds.), *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery*, London: Frank Cass Publishers. Featherstone observes that '... the major European governments view it *(author's note: Cyprus)* as abusing the EU framework and that they believe that the Cyprus problem is too "hot" to touch', and that 'In short the security dimensions of the Cyprus application creates major anxieties among EU governments'. Specifically he lists among others the following worries: Risks for the CFSP, the liability for the EU to be drawn into a conflict on Cyprus, the fact that Cyprus is not a member of NATO, and the argument that the *status quo* is 'less threatening than the risks involved in a bold new intervention' (pp. 145-146). See also T. Diez (2002) 'Last Exit to Paradise? The European Union, the Cyprus Conflict and the Problematic "Catalyst Effect"' in T. Diez (ed.), *Cyprus and the European Union: Modern Conflict - Postmodern Union*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

9   For an indicative example see the comment 'Crisis and Partition', [in Greek] *I Simerini*, 23 June 2002. 'Finally Helsinki did not limit Turkish aggressiveness. And neither did it open up for us a road to Europe without hindrances. All these were "words in the wind", the alibi for Greek retreat, through which and by our signature the door of Europe was opened to Turkey'. For more measured later comment see C. Iacovou (2009) 'The Failure of the Helsinki Strategy' [in Greek], *Politis*, 8 November 2009 and C. Iacovou (2009) 'The Chronicle of a Pre-announced Failure' [in Greek], *Politis*, 13 December 2009, p. 12. In both texts the author argues that the Helsinki Strategy 'led to the Annan plan with all the negative consequences for the Greek side'.

Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean and with the solution of the Cyprus Problem.[10]

One significant source of criticism of Helsinki, particularly in Cyprus, derived from the fact that it did not have an immediately pacifying influence on Turkey's behaviour. To the contrary, in the immediate aftermath, there was an increase of provocative Turkish actions in the Aegean and in Cyprus.[11] But the written evidence of one of the protagonists of the processes surrounding the Cyprus problem at this time, David Hannay,[12] bears witness to a significant change in Ankara's attitude to the Cyprus issue.

During his first visit to Ankara, in June 1996, after his appointment as UK special representative for Cyprus, according to his own account, David Hannay had met Bulent Ecevit (who was the prime minister of Turkey during the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and was to return to the prime-ministership in 1999), who repeated during their meeting what he had often publicly stated, which was that the 'the Cyprus problem had been solved by him in 1974 and that nothing remained to be done except for the rest of us to come to terms with that'. He was to maintain that view when he became prime minister again.[13]

This was implicitly and explicitly the Turkish position during the time of the Ecevit-Denktash cooperation from 1999 until the election of the AKP government in Turkey, at the end of 2002.[14] They would refuse even proposals which had been designed to take into account almost all their demands.[15]

The winter of 2002, brought two significant developments additionally to the electoral victory of the AKP of Tayip Erdogan. The first was that the Copenhagen European Council decided that Cyprus, even with the Cyprus problem unresolved, would sign the EU accession Treaty with the other nine candidate countries in April 2003 and would become a member of the

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10   Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, *Presidency Conclusions*. The reference to Turkey which is sometimes overlooked is in para. 12 and links the 'political criteria for accession' with 'the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a)'. Para. 9(a) are the provisions on Cyprus, referring to 'The European Council welcomes the launch of talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion'. Para. 9(b) states that 'The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors'.

11   It was in July 2000 that the 'Strovilia' violation of the cease-fire line by Turkish troops occurred.

12   Hannay (2005), *op. cit.*

13   *Ibid.*, p. 63.

14   'Neither Denktash nor Ecevit had ever really been committed to a negotiation in good faith for a settlement …', *ibid.*, p. 143.

15   '… the Turks had no excuse if they did not understand that the structure of a strengthened and open-ended Treaty of Guarantee, a continued Turkish troop presence on the island and a removal of all the existing Greek Cypriot troops and their weapons was potentially on offer', *ibid.*, p. 139.

Union on the 1st May 2004. This must have had a significant impact on the new AKP Turkish government.[16]

It can be hypothesised that the threatening stance of Turkey between 1999, the time of Helsinki, and 2002 was probably due to the feeling of the army that it was in danger of losing control of developments around the Cyprus problem and that it resorted to threatening behaviour in an effort to deter the undesired eventuality of Cyprus joining the EU before a solution.[17] This was succeeded by a period of indecisiveness between December 2002 and April 2004, due to lack of certainty that Turkey would actually get a date for the initiation of accession negotiations, and perhaps while the new Islamic and European oriented government in Turkey was grappling with policy formation in an internal political environment of coups threatened by the army against itself.[18] The issue that clearly finally emerged however was that by not agreeing to a solution of the Cyprus problem, Turkey could no longer impede the accession of Cyprus to the EU, but would merely damage its own European perspective. This was clearly a product of the Helsinki conditionalities.[19] What lent added force was that the AKP government perceived the perspective of joining the EU as assuring it increased security from coups threatened by the army.

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16   David Hannay described 'turmoil in our meeting' when, in June 1996 he pointed out to the Turkish Foreign Minister Imre Gonensay that if the Turkish side continued to be negative it was pretty well certain that in due course a divided Cyprus would be admitted to the Union. Hannay considers that 'No one else in Europe had told them that', *ibid.,* p. 61. The AKP government in 2002 was faced not just with the estimate of a British envoy that a divided Cyprus would join the EU, but with the finality of European Council decisions about the entry of a divided Cyprus.

17   It was during this time that the Ecevit government in effect threatened war saying that if Cyprus joined the European Union Turkey's reaction would have no limit. *Anatolia News Agency,* 2 November 2001, reported by Republic of Cyprus, *Turkish Press and other Media,* No. 211/01, 3-4-5 November 2001, reported Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem as stating that 'The problem between the EU and ourselves arises from the EU's preparing to take as a member the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, as if it were the representative of the entire island … then Turkey will be obliged to take a very serious and very fundamental action against this. We have said this very clearly. And in fact, on one occasion, when the question was asked "what will be done?" I replied that "There is no limit on this"'. The Turkish Government also threatened at this time to annex the occupied part of Cyprus, *ibid.,* reporting on an article by F. Bila (2001) 'Tough Message from the Prime Minister regarding the Future of Cyprus', *Milliyet,* 4 November 2001.

18   Various such coups were later reported to have been considered between March 2003 and May 2004. For the interlinked conspiracies see for example accounts of the 'Ergenekon' case in D. Bilefsky 'The Black Past of Turkey may be Revealed', reprinted in Greek in *Politis tis Kyriakis,* 3 January 2010, p. 17 and about reports of coup plots by the army against the Turkish Government see M. Drousiotis (2010) 'Three Planned Coups for the Annan Plan' [in Greek], *Politis tis Kyriakis,* 24 January 2010, p. 8, and 'The Turkish Army: Coups Away' (2010) *The Economist,* 13 February 2010, pp. 32-33.

19   The term conditionality is used in the sense of '… a powerful strategy of … transformation aiming at policy change and convergence … with the norms and practices of the European Union'. O. Anastasakis (2008) 'The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a More Pragmatic Approach', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* Vol. 8, No. 4 (December), pp. 365-377. Anastasakis also makes the useful distinction between

One other significant series of events of the winter of 2002-2003 were the impressive mass demonstrations of the Turkish Cypriots against their long-time virtually undisputed leader Rauf Denktash. The timing and the slogans used during the demonstrations indicated that the content and motivation of the demonstrations involved a protest against the fact that the Denktash policies would leave them outside the European Union. So indirectly they were also related to the Helsinki process and to the impact of enlargement and the Europeanization process. The opposition of the Turkish Cypriots and no doubt also the disapproval of the AKP government in Turkey, led to Denktash's electoral defeat in December 2003.

A few months after the signature of the Accession Treaty in April 2003, the Turkish army reacted to the pressure of the reactions of the Turkish Cypriots and to the certainty of Cypriot accession to the Union by engaging in the 'European' gesture of allowing, for the first time since its army seized northern Cyprus in 1974, the movement of Cypriots through the 'Attila line'. Up till that time Turkish Cypriots were prevented from moving south and Greek Cypriots from moving north. Of course the division of the island was not reversed by this limited and controlled change. However, together with the departure of Denktash from the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community, one of his founding myths, that is that the members of the two communities were dangerous for each other, also lapsed in the process of Europeanization.

In conclusion it can be said that quite clearly the Helsinki strategy and the processes that it set into motion introduced elements of thaw, mobility and some small degree of flexibility, in a situation which had remained frozen since 1974. The thaw had induced, among other mobilities, the entry of Cyprus into the European Union, as after the signature of the accession Treaty in April 2003, Cyprus joined with the other nine countries on the 1st May 2004. The realist threat of the Greek parliament that it would never ratify an enlargement which did not include Cyprus was of course an additional safeguard. But basically it was the conditions created by the Helsinki Conclusions which allowed Cyprus to join the Union, despite its circumstances. The circumstances were that the Burgenstock negotiations had followed the tardy Turkish decision to try to forestall the entry of a divided Cyprus through a negotiated solution, and of course the rejections through the referendum in April 2004 of the 5th version of the Annan plan by the vast majority of Greek Cypriots. It could be added that in addition to the internal political conjuncture,

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acquis related and political conditionality, with the latter referring to '... commonly accepted political standards, norms and practices ...' More specifically we use the term conditionality as '... the core strategy of the EU that begins to take effect even before candidate countries enter the EU, as they have to take on the obligations of EU membership', as defined by L. Quaglia *et al.* (2007), *op. cit.* Very useful for our purposes here is also, the observation of B. Steunenberg and A. Dimitrova (2007) 'Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of Conditionality', *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 11, 22 June 2007, to the effect that conditionality is particularly effective at the initial stages of accession negotiations and that its effectiveness decreases sharply when the accession date is set.

one of the bases which made the rejection of the Annan plan possible was the certain prospect of EU accession.

If something had failed, it was not the Helsinki strategy followed by Greece and Cyprus, but Turkish policy which until the signature of the Accession Treaty, wrongly wagered that it could prevent the accession of Cyprus without an antecedent solution of the Cyprus Problem.[20]

The 'Acquis' of the Intercommunal Negotiations 1974-2004

The signature of the Accession Treaty of Cyprus had taken place according to the conclusions of the European Council of Helsinki which stated that 'If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above *(author's note: that is a solution of the Cyprus problem)* being a precondition'.[21] The signature had been a natural consequence of the reasonable and flexible attitude which had been exhibited by President Clerides, in the negotiations which had started a few days before the Helsinki European Council, in New York on the 3rd December, and the absolutely negative attitude of Ecevit and Denktash in the talks. As early as during 2001, informed opinion in the European Union was coming to the conclusion that accession of a divided island was 'virtually a foregone conclusion'.[22] For the Cyprus Government the reference of the Conclusions to 'all relevant factors' was known as 'the tail' of the Helsinki decision which demanded that the Cyprus Government have a clean certificate as far as willingness to reach a solution was concerned. And this willingness was clearly and actively made manifest. Many in Cyprus however viewed this process with a heavy heart, since the contents of the 'Annan Plan' as it evolved through five successive versions was laden with a great deal of the *'acquis'* of the successive negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem as they had rolled on since 1968, and particularly in the highly unequal negotiating conditions that followed the Turkish invasion in 1974.

This *'acquis'* had been moulded by the overwhelmingly powerful position of Turkey, the conditions enforced on the ground in Cyprus after the invasion, and the uncompromisingly separatist positions of the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in the negotiations. As mentioned above, in essence the Turkish view, which was carried over into the negotiations, was that the Cyprus Problem had been solved in 1974, and that the negotiations were about formalising the fact.

A parenthesis should be added here to note that as is normal in negotiations, they were conducted over the years with the method of diplomatic secrecy, a method which was encouraged

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20 Interestingly the assertion of the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat 'that the Turkish side committed mistakes which permitted the Republic of Cyprus to join the European Union' became the object of disputation with the Turkish Cypriot leader at the time, Rauf Denktash. *Kibris newspaper,* 13 November 2009, reported in Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office, *Turkish Press and Other Media.*

21 Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, *Presidency Conclusions,* para. 9(b).

22 Hannay (2005), *op. cit.,* p. 147.

by the United Nations Secretariat, under whose good offices they were conducted. While secrecy is a known and accepted diplomatic technique for aiding flexibility in negotiations, there is always the issue of the 'moment of truth' when the contents of negotiations are offered to the public.[23] The problem is a particularly significant one when the issues being negotiated are not just issues on which national prestige is attributed, but that they are actually understood as life and death issues. For many years, even before 1999 'the moment of truth' was continually postponed due to the impossibility of coming to any agreement. Generally not only public opinion, but also the political elites, considered a solution unlikely. Under these conditions it was possible for political elites to follow a safe policy based to some extent on patriotic slogans, which implied that it was possible through peaceful means, or through merely 'avoiding a bad solution', to achieve withdrawal of the Turkish occupying army, the return of all refugees to their homes, and the removal of the mainland settlers.[24]

Apart from the above issues, it appears that the Greek Cypriot political leaders were not in a position to fully comprehend the implications and changes that would be brought about by the combination of the conditionalities of the Helsinki strategy, and the new perceptions of the Islamic oriented Erdogan government in Turkey. And from its point of view, if its aim was to avoid the Annan plan,[25] which seems very likely, the Papadopoulos government appears to have committed a number of diplomatic errors, commencing with addressing a request to the UN Secretary-General to reopen negotiations for a solution to the problem in December 2003, eight months after accession had been assured, with the signature of the relevant Treaty, and six months before the moment of accession. A second error was committed in New York, in January 2004, with the failure to understand that not only was there a new government in Turkey, but that it had a very different agenda to the delaying tactics of the Ecevit government and Denktash. In New York, President Papadopoulos agreed to the United Nations Secretariat arbitrating all differences between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions, and to holding a referendum before the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.[26] In this way, and for reasons which are difficult to understand, he placed himself securely in a trap which had been laid not for him, but to catch the elusive and rejectionist Rauf Denktash at the time of Clerides proven good will on the Greek Cypriot side.

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23   G.R. Berridge (2007) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25-87.

24   See T. Hadjidemetriou (2006) *The Referendum of the 24 April 2004 and the Solution of the Cyprus Problem* [in Greek], Athens: Ekdoseis Papazisis. For a collected reference to the positions expressed by the different members of the political elite see *The Cyprus Problem Today: Addresses at the University of Patras* [in Greek] (1999) Patras: Ekdoseis Panepistimiou Patron.

25   The reference is to the government of President Papadopoulos who was elected in February 2003 and not to the outgoing Clerides government.

26   For a detailed account of the negotiations from the point of view of the Cyprus Government see C. Palley (2005) *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*, Oxford: Hart Publishing.

With the signature of the EU-Cyprus Accession Treaty in April 2003, the Turkish government would have been compelled to incorporate into its calculations that it was now inevitable that Cyprus would join the European Union, and that failing drastic action, it would do so without the participation of Turkish Cypriots in its government, an eventuality that was likely to have negative consequences for its own ambition to join. For, firstly on the record to that stage, Turkey would be considered responsible by the Europeans for the accession of Cyprus without a solution, a situation that was not considered a positive one in European capitals. Secondly, Cyprus with only Greek Cypriots participating in its government would be one of the EU member states and would be participating in making decisions about the Turkish candidature. So, by the time of the New York Cyprus negotiations meeting, in January 2004, the government of Turkey had 'resolved its own internal contradictions[27] and concluded that an early settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan offered a potentially acceptable outcome and the only sure way of furthering its major policy objective of getting a green light for the opening of its own accession negotiations with the EU at the end of 2004'.[28] Hence the surprising to the Cyprus Government, acceptance of the Secretary general's arbitration in New York.[29] But this may be seen as another result of the Europeanization process.

Once these decisions were taken the main worry of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leaders was the possibility that no matter what was agreed in the negotiations, the EU *acquis* would overturn parts of the agreement after the accession of Cyprus to the EU. But some in the EU had already been working on safeguarding the 'Cyprus *acquis*' against Europeanization for some time. At the General Affairs Council meeting on 10th December 2001, and at the Seville European Council, the European Union referred to its readiness to accept any solution of the Cyprus problem which was agreed by the two sides, formalising the statements that had been made in the past by European Commissioners such as Van Den Broek to the Cypriots,[30] since the late 1990s, that the EU would find ways of making anything agreed in the intercommunal talks compatible with the Community *acquis*.

27　Though it was initially believed that the armed forces had acquiesced to the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan Plan, (see S. Aydin and E. Fuat Keyman, 'European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy', Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, *EU-Turkey Working Papers, No. 2, August 2004*), there is now evidence that military coups had been considered at the time to stop the negotiations (see 'The Turkish Army: Coups Away', *The Economist*, 13 February 2010, pp. 32-33), which were prevented by the chief of staff, General Hilmi Ozgok, because it would end Turkey's prospect to join the EU. (See N. Kadritzke 'Cyprus – Kypros or Kibris or Both? Border Crossing is a Hope not a Promise', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English edition, 4 August 2008).

28　Hannay (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 242.

29　There were probably other reasons as well. In the previous months Prime Minister Erdogan had met with the UN Secretary General in Davos and with President Bush in Washington, and probably indicated serious intentions to proceed to a solution, and may have demanded and received assurances in return.

30　At at least one European Parliament – Cyprus House of Representatives Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting at which the author was present.

The political decisions by the EU governments made it possible for members of the European Commission to intensify their contacts with the members of the United Nations negotiating team, with the aim of making sure that the terms of any settlement could be accommodated by the EU through the 'necessary transitional arrangements and derogations'.[31] The general aim according to David Hannay was for the EU to accept provisions of the Annan Plan which violated its *acquis* so that the *acquis* could not later be used to reverse provisions of the plan[32] as many Greek Cypriots hoped and some in Athens assured would be the case. For these and also for other reasons, the plan that was on offer for the solution of the Cyprus problem at the time of the accession of Cyprus to the EU, on the 1st May 2004, or rather a week before, on 24th April 2004, was clearly a bearer of the '*acquis* of the intercommunal negotiations'.

This *'acquis'* was formed in the period between 1974 and 1999 through a series of 'Plans', 'Ideas' and 'Indicators' of the United Nations. All were products of mediation efforts of the representatives of the United Nations Secretary General, who doing the thing which mediation does most easily, often proposed the mid-point between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions.

In the course of the many years of negotiations there had been slippage towards the Turkish positions, due to the vast power disequilibrium between the two sides. One example, described by Glafcos Clerides,[33] is the development of the concept of 'equality' in the negotiations. In European political discourse the normal meaning of equality within states is that of the basic democratic notion of the equality of citizens. However in discussions in the UN General Assembly in 1974, and specifically in resolution 3212, it was used as 'equal footing' of the two communities in the negotiations, to be transformed later on, in Security Council Resolutions to 'politically equal communities', though with the clarification in the Galli Report[34] and in UN Security Council Resolution 750 of April 1992, that this does not imply numerical equality of representation. In the negotiations, Clerides notes, his efforts to show that component equality in federal systems is expressed by equality of representation in the upper house and not in the federal executive, was not successful.

David Hannay himself refers to the 'dog days' and to the unequal conditions in which negotiations were conducted and their *'acquis'* was cemented. He is also in a position to give an account of the positions of the two sides when the last series of negotiations started and led to the Annan Plan. President Clerides presented as his positions according to David Hannay the 'High Level Agreements' of 1977 and 1979. These agreements themselves represented early compromises between the two communities. Rauf Denktash, according to Hannay, presented even harder

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31 Hannay, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
32 *Ibid.*, pp. 168-177.
33 G. Clerides (2007) *Documents of an Epoch* [in Greek], Lefkosia: Ekdoseis Politeia, pp. 275-279.
34 U.N. S/23780.

positions than the very hard positions he had presented in negotiations with President Vassiliou in 1992. According to Hannay, '... his thinking ... basically amounted to two separate states linked by a little more than a permanent diplomatic conference in which each side had a veto on any decision of substance or procedure. He insisted that all property claims must be settled by compensation and that no Greek Cypriots (or Turkish Cypriots for that matter) should have a right of return'.[35]

In June 2002, Hannay pointed out to the Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand the great degree to which the emerging solution had moved in the direction of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot pursuits. Cyprus, he pointed out, would have a new flag, a new national anthem and a new name, and would in effect be the new partnership which they had been seeking.[36] At the end of 2002 before the Copenhagen European Council where Denktash and Turkey would once more reject everything, Hannay impatiently notes that '... the Turks had no excuse if they did not understand that the structure of a strengthened and open-ended Treaty of Guarantee, a continued Turkish troop presence on the island and a removal of all the existing Greek Cypriot troops and their weapons was potentially on offer'.[37]

One cannot but conclude that it was not merely the refusal of President Papadopoulos to accept the 'Annan 5' plan, but also the exemption of the content of what was offered to each side from the process of Europeanization, which had an impact on the outcome of the referendums of 2004 and energised the provision of the Helsinki conclusions, which allowed Cyprus to enter the European Union without a solution to the Cyprus problem. Perry Anderson notes that 'When the votes were counted the results said everything: 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted it, 76% of Greek Cypriots rejected it. What political scientist, without needing to know anything about the plan, could for an instant doubt whom it favoured?'[38]

Conclusions

The consequences of these events condition important factors in the current political situation in Cyprus. The part of the Helsinki strategy which was related to the accession of Cyprus succeeded and that is why Cyprus is today a member of the European Union, having passed from the world of insecurity to a condition which provides a modicum of security. Further, the Republic and its citizens enjoy all the benefits of membership of the EU.

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35   Hannay, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.
36   *Ibid.*, p. 167.
37   *Ibid.*, p. 159.
38   P. Anderson (2008) 'The Divisions of Cyprus', *London Review of Books*, 24 April 2008. Anderson's conclusion is cited as a pithy expression and support of what was argued in the preceding paragraphs and not as a claim that the results of referenda always correspond with 'objective interests' of the participants.

The part of the strategy which linked the accession process of Turkey with the solution of the Cyprus problem, failed before the accession for two reasons. One was that Turkey in effect refused to cooperate until after the signature of the accession treaty of Cyprus, and the other was that the content of the Annan Plan included a great deal of the *'acquis'* of the intercommunal negotiations, which, particularly in view of certain accession, was judged unacceptable by the Government of Cyprus and the great majority of Greek Cypriots.

It was possible that after accession, a strengthened Republic of Cyprus could have been in a position to re-negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem which would be less unequal. The degree to which that opportunity still exists is however unclear, despite the undoubted fact that the Republic is a member of the European Union, while Turkey is a candidate. The conditionality involved in Cyprus and Greece supporting the accession process of Turkey only under the condition that this course would lead to the substantial Europeanization of Turkey, including the solution of the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean, could still have been utilised after accession. However, the clever and effective complex of conditionalities which composed the Helsinki Strategy were abandoned after the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. The European Commission retroactively (to the signature of the accession treaty) concluded that it had been tricked by the Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriots[39] and perhaps as a consequence seemed to concentrate on 'bringing the Turkish Cypriots out of isolation', an issue which was not connected with the solution of the Cyprus problem as normally understood. For fear of the return of the Annan Plan, and perhaps misunderstanding the relation between the Helsinki conditionalities and the *acquis* of the intercommunal negotiations, the Cyprus government actively sought the delinking of Turkish accession to the Cyprus problem.[40] Some European analysts perceived that their fears that the Helsinki strategy would result in the accession of Cyprus to the EU without a solution were validated.[41]

For these reasons all the Cypriot and European actors allowed the opportunities at various stages for linking the accession course of Turkey to the solution of the Cyprus problem to pass by

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39 See speech by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen at the European Parliament on 21 April 2004. Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20040421 +ITEM-001+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN], accessed on 1 December 2010.

40 See statement by President Tassos Papadopoulos. Press and Information Office, University Information Bulletin Ar. 89/05, 23-29 September 2006, *President Papadopoulos has returned to Cyprus* [in Greek], 'As we have repeatedly stated, we do not seek to achieve a crisis between Turkey and the European Union, but we insist equally emphatically and decisively that the obligations of Turkey towards the European Union cannot be combined with the developments in the Cyprus Problem' (author's translation). See also the statement of the government spokesman Christodoulos Pasiardis with the title 'The Cyprus Problem is not connected with the European Obligations of Turkey' [in Greek] in the London Cypriot newspaper *Eleftheria,* 6 July 2006.

41 For example, International Crisis Group, 'The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?', *Europe Report* No. 171, 8 March 2006, p. 10.

without their utilisation. The first of the important stages, all with Cyprus Government participation, was at the Council of Ministers meeting on 26 April 2004, where the Council certified that the positive contribution of Turkey to the solution of the Cyprus problem had already taken place. The other two stages were the European Council of December 2004, which decided the initiation of the accession negotiations with Turkey, and the Intergovernmental Conference of October 2005, which adopted the Turkey Negotiation Framework.[42]

The acceptance of the Annan plan by Turkey in 2004, in combination with the lack of an EU conditionality relating to its accession negotiations (and other factors not related to the current analysis), have allowed this country, and others, to attempt to limit its liability in relation to the Cyprus problem, even in relation to its accession negotiations with the European Union. So the only lever which proved capable of moving Turkish policy in relation to the Cyprus problem since 1974, may now have been substantially weakened. On the other hand, the *acquis* of the Cyprus negotiations and 'efforts to bring the Turkish Cypriots out of isolation' remain as factors in the current situation.

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42 Gunter Verheugen in an interview in 2009 implied that the Cyprus Government had acquiesced to Turkey negotiating to join the Union without a condition relating to the situation in Cyprus. Asked 'Do you consider it rational that a candidate country is occupying the territory of a member country ...', he replied 'The Situation was very well known when the decisions to start negotiations were taken. All the member governments knew the issue, and if I am not mistaken, the decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey was taken after the accession of Cyprus, and with the support of the Cyprus Government' (author's translation). *Politis tis Kyriakis,* 21 June 2009.

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The Cyprus Conflict and the Ambiguous Effects of Europeanization

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Abstract

The traditional literature on Europeanization conceptualised the phenomenon as a one-sided socialisation process in which EU rules, norms and policies trickled down to member states. This was especially true for new member states. In the case of Cyprus, this interpretation has been particularly obvious, and not only among academics. Among politicians as well there was a view, even after the Annan Plan had failed, that Cyprus could be socialised into a particular mode of 'European thinking', much like Greece had experienced over the decades of its membership, which would allow for a solution to the conflict in the medium- to long-term. While it is empirically too early to say whether this view was right or wrong, the present signs are far from encouraging, and may even point in the direction of a reverse socialisation effect, whereby several member states appear to have internalised the logic of the Republic of Cyprus in its approach towards Turkey's accession negotiations. Indeed the fact that almost half of the substantive chapters in Turkey's accession negotiations have been blocked due to the Cyprus impasse cannot be viewed as being the responsibility of the Republic of Cyprus alone, but rather of other — often Turkey-sceptic — member states that have been willingly socialised into accepting the Republic's discourse over the link between the conflict and Turkey's accession. At the same time, the one-sided, top-down version of Europeanization has come under intense theoretical debate, and authors increasingly stress the ambiguous nature of Europeanization. In this article we will review this debate in order to demonstrate that the integration process did have an impact on Cyprus, but that this impact changed the political terms of the debate without imposing a particular way forward towards conflict transformation. It has enabled political actors to alter and strengthen their arguments both in favour and against a solution and allowed the Republic of Cyprus to influence the EU's stance towards the conflict. This makes the Cyprus conflict a prime example to warn against unidirectional conceptualisations of Europeanization, whether in academia or politics.

Keywords: Europeanization, EU-ization, Cyprus conflict, Cypriotization, Turkey, accession negotiations, conflict transformation, socialisation

Introduction: The European Union and Change in Cyprus

A decade ago, Kevin Featherstone argued 'that the stimulus from the EU represents the most important transformation of Cypriot society in four decades of independence' (Featherstone, 2000, p. 160). The challenges Featherstone referred to affected a broad range of actors within the

Republic of Cyprus, but of course the main debate at the time concerned the Cyprus conflict: Would the Europeanization of this conflict help to bring about a solution? A particularly prominent argument was that accession negotiations would act as a 'catalyst' towards a solution (Diez, 2002). Featherstone himself, incidentally, seems to have been sceptical and considered ' "Europeanizing" the problem' to be 'hazardous' (Featherstone, 2000, p. 161). Yet the vast majority of commentators were a lot more optimistic. Indeed, until today Europeanization is often seen as the panacea to heal the wounds of Cyprus. In a recent book on the conflict, Harry Anastasiou (2006), for instance, pitches the ills of nationalism against the promise of Europeanization.

In our view, this is a too unidirectional view of the EU's impact, which is in line with simplistic notions of Europeanization as they dominated the literature until recently. In these conceptualisations of Europeanization, placing a country within the EU context would transform domestic policies, politics and societies, albeit to different degrees. We will shortly summarise this literature and derive from it expectations about the Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict. We will then develop a more complex notion of Europeanization, before discussing two central aspects in relation to Cyprus: we will ask who is Europeanizing whom, and discuss the way in which the concept of Europe has enabled different parties to the conflict to reconstruct, but not fundamentally transform, their positions. In the conclusion, we ask whether our sceptical assessment is due to the early stage at which we are writing this article – only six years after EU membership – again, we take a more sceptical view. Before we start, we should note one caveat: Our discussion focuses on the Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict and not on broader political or socio-economic changes within Cypriot society. The latter would no doubt also be highly interesting, but would require a more in-depth analysis that we cannot perform in the space provided for this special issue.

The Traditional Conceptualisation of Europeanization

An initial and still widespread use of the concept of Europeanization, especially in relation to enlargement, regards it as the adaptation of national policies to EU standards, or what Frank Schimmelfennig and Uli Sedelmaier (2005, p. 7) call 'rule adoption'. Some authors have therefore suggested that in fact, it should rather be called 'EU-ization' (e.g. Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, 2005, p. 2; Quaglia et al., 2007, p. 407; Mörth, 2003, p. 159). This has resulted in a debate about the conditions of Europeanization. While on the one hand, the 'goodness of fit' argument (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001) suggests that Europeanization is successful if national policy norms are compatible with EU norms, on the other hand, it is also recognised that a certain degree of misfit is needed to provide the initial incentive for change (Börzel and Risse, 2000). This shows that Europeanization is no automatic response to developments at the EU level, and that both local actors and circumstances play an important role in determining the specific path of change. By and large however, the initial conceptualisation saw Europeanization as a process induced by European governance and therefore as a 'top-down' process.

A number of authors have suggested that this narrow conception of Europeanization needs to be widened to take account of the variety of changes taking place in the context of Europeanization. The first conceptualisations of Europeanization developed out of policy studies and consequently focused on policy change (Featherstone, 2003; Haverland, 2003, p. 203). We can thus refer to the associated processes as 'policy-Europeanization'. Yet EU member states and arguably non-member states to the extent that they are affected by the various forms of EU 'external governance' (Lavenex, 2004) undergo more profound transformations in the context of European integration.

A second change considers not only adaptations of policies, but predominantly transformations in the broader political system (e.g. Goetz and Hix, 2001), which we therefore call 'political Europeanization'. These range from changes in ministerial structures to account for the EU decision-making process to changes in the structure and strength of civil society through the addition of another layer of political decision-making in a 'multi-level' system (Marks *et. al.,* 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). For instance, EU law requires the involvement of private actors insofar as direct financial assistance is channelled to non-governmental bodies in the context of structural funds, research framework programmes or contractual arrangements. Hence, it is not only the product of the legislative process that changes, but also the process as such.

The transformation of civil society through Europeanization is then also linked to a broader societal change, or 'societal Europeanization', which goes beyond the political process to include the 'construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings' (Cowles and Risse, 2001, p. 219). Such changes can involve the self-conceptualisation of individuals engaged in EU institutions, including their personal political views, what they consider standard behaviour for example in bureaucracies, and their notion of identity (Olsen, 2002). They can also involve the re-articulation of broader societal identities, for instance through situating national identities in a broader EU context (Risse, 2001, p. 202; Wæver, 1998, 2008), or through moving away from a purely national identity to a multi-layered or 'marble cake' identity (Risse, 2008, p. 153).

A fourth type of Europeanization, 'discursive' Europeanization, can be distinguished from those surveyed so far because it focuses less on substantive changes towards a European standard but rather on changes to the way in which the broader public debate operates. Such research investigates the degree to which media discourses in EU member states reports about developments in other member states, refers to actors from other member states, uses similar argumentative tropes, and therefore establishes a European public sphere (e.g. Koopmans and Pfetsch, 2006; Trenz, 2004). This type of Europeanization is more clearly 'bottom-up' than most versions of policy-Europeanization at the other end of the spectrum. Its main mechanism is not independent of, but does not require activities on the EU level.

Cypriot Expectations

How does Cyprus, and particularly the Cyprus conflict, fit into this picture? What is the relationship between Europeanization and the evolution of the Cyprus conflict? The answer to

these questions depends of course on whose articulation we look at. The expectations of what the EU can 'do' to Cyprus differed from those seeing it first and foremost as a change in the strategic environment to those who were hoping for a fundamental change in the construction of what it means to be 'Cypriot'. Bearing this in mind, all four notions of Europeanization played a role in these expectations.

To start with, the Greek and Greek-Cypriot politicians who advocated Cyprus' EU membership as a means to strengthen the Greek Cypriot strategic position were primarily seeking a change of Turkish policies towards the conflict and thus a form of 'indirect' policy-Europeanization. To the extent that Turkey also has the ambition to become an EU member, Turkey would have to meet EU demands that Greek Cypriots would be able to shape. The reversal of Turkey's Cyprus policy at the turn of the century in support of a federal solution in Cyprus suggests that policy Europeanization in part took place. In the literature, this is also known as change induced by conditionality (Tocci, 2007, pp. 13-15) or as the 'compulsory' impact (Diez, Stetter and Albert, 2006, pp. 572-573). There was, however, also the expectation that in the course of accession negotiations, Greek Cypriots too would have to change policies to less hostile ones through the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* (Diez, 2002, p. 145). By and large, this strategy was less successful, mainly because of the decision to ignore northern Cyprus in the negotiations which had the effect of bracketing the conflict.

The expectation of political Europeanization also came in different variations. Aimed at Turkish Cypriots, the hope was that the potential benefits of EU membership would strengthen the hands of civil society actors and the opposition movement – an expectation that to some extent came true (Balkır and Yalman, 2009), but required first a banking crisis followed by the formation of a wider opposition movement, which then used the EU as a reference point in their demonstrations and political claims. It also required the launch of Turkey's accession process which provided the necessary security reassurances for the Turkish Cypriot opposition. Moreover, the effects of Turkish Cypriot political Europeanization have not consolidated (Kaymak and Vural, 2009) as signalled by the resurgence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in the 2009 parliamentary elections and 2010 presidential elections. As far as Greek Cypriots were concerned, the hope was that the control of the political elite over the political process would slowly be weakened, and a stronger civil society independent of political parties and the church would form, which had been more or less absent in Cyprus. In this respect, it is too early to come to a final assessment, although our impression is that civil society has certainly been strengthened since accession (Heinrich and Khallaf, 2005, p. 12).

Societal Europeanization involves a change in identities and interests, and thus is most directly related to conflicts in that such a change also alters the basis of a conflict, which consists of an incompatibility of these very identities and interests. We have elsewhere referred to this process as a form of social learning (Tocci, 2007, pp. 15-16) or the 'constructive impact' of integration (Diez, Stetter and Albert, 2006, p. 574). Thus, there was an expectation that the catalyst of EU

membership would lead to a change in the preference structure of Turkish Cypriots who would subordinate concerns about their identity and security to the pursuit of material benefits or realise that their security, especially in terms of individual rights, can be better guaranteed within an EU framework. Our assessment in this respect is mixed: with the regime change in northern Cyprus, there was also a shift in state interests, which have made a solution much more likely (as evidenced by the acceptance of the Annan Plan). Furthermore, individual rights are now taken more seriously in northern Cyprus (Özersay and Gürel, 2009) as evidenced for example by the establishment of the Immovable Property Commission, which in March 2010 was deemed as an appropriate domestic remedy to handle property cases by the European Court of Human Rights. At the same time, however, we would argue that identity and security concerns still play an important role and have not been wholly subordinated to the target of EU membership (on the role of security in the Annan Plan referendum, see e.g. Lordos, 2009). Likewise, change among Greek Cypriots is still in its infancy, to say the least. The picture still prevailing is that on the societal front the degree of Europeanization in Cyprus is relatively low (Axt, Schwarz and Wiegand, 2008, pp. 121-164). Given the experience in other member states so far, the time that has lapsed since the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member is probably too short to come to a concluding assessment on societal change. However, and more worryingly, the empirical evidence on identity change in the course of European integration is also rather mixed.

In contrast to the first three forms of Europeanization, expectations regarding discursive Europeanization were limited. One could argue however that there is a considerable degree of self-centredness in Cyprus as the world is mostly seen through the eyes of the conflict. When it comes to the coverage of the conflict in public discourse and the media on both sides, discursive Europeanization also appears to be circumscribed (Bailie and Azgin, 2009). In that sense, a discursive Europeanization would certainly also help to transform the conflict through a change in the discourse that sustains it. This is an area that certainly ought to be addressed much more often in future studies.

Revisiting the Concept of Europeanisation

All in all, the catalyst of EU membership, at least so far, has only partially met expectations. Above all, the Annan Plan failed and the conflict persists. The negotiation process launched in 2008 while applauded at home and abroad has failed, to date, to gather momentum let alone yield a breakthrough. In part, this is due to a lack of consistency on behalf of the EU, in particular regarding the lifting of the condition of a settlement before membership, which meant that the EU gave away the main instrument to enforce policy Europeanization in relation to the conflict (Tocci, 2007, pp. 46-47). However, the failures of the EU in Cyprus also alert us to severe problems related to the one-sided conceptualisation of Europeanization that prevails in the literature.

There are two major problems with the image of Europeanization as a top-down process that are of direct relevance to Cyprus. The first problem lies with the unidirectional conceptualisation

that it implies. What 'Europe' stands for, what its norms and values actually are is also determined by its member states, and not only the other way round. Member states, and especially new member states, can change the outlook of other member states and EU actors, and often 'Europeanize' their problems by bringing them onto the EU level. In fact, a considerable number of EU laws originate in proposals floated initially by specific member states.

The second problem lies with a highly simplified understanding of the role of local actors and how they respond to developments in the EU. The identity of Europe and its norms and values are often construed by local actors in ways unforeseen in Brussels and other EU capitals. In addition, these constructions of Europe and its norms and values can be used to legitimise and reinforce national and local identities and interests, rather than changing them, as the notion of societal Europeanization would expect.

Below, we want to outline how these problems have played a major role in Cyprus. The Cyprus conflict has indeed been 'Europeanized', alas not in the way originally expected by those hoping for a swift resolution in the context of the EU.

Who is 'Europeanizing'?

In Cyprus, rather than a unidirectional Europeanization of the conflict, there appears to be a parallel opposing trend at work too: the 'Cypriotization' of EU policies towards the conflict and Turkey. Since its entry in the EU, member state Cyprus has acted as a formidable break on EU policies towards northern Cyprus and Turkey.

Following the failure of the Annan Plan, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon the international community to eliminate economic restrictions on north Cyprus (UN Secretary General, 2004). This position was endorsed both by the European Commission and the EU Council of Ministers on the eve of the May 2004 enlargement (Council of Ministers, 2004). The logic underpinning these calls was that the referendums created an obligation to compensate the Turkish Cypriots and invalidated the logic that normalising economic relations with the north would assist secession. It was also felt that lifting the isolation would support reunification insofar as it would help to bridge the economic gap between the two sides (Watson, 2009). In the spirit of these arguments, two measures were proposed by the European Commission on aid and trade respectively.

The more significant Commission initiative was on direct trade between northern Cyprus and the EU. To overcome the problem of origin certificates, the Commission proposed that certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce could be accepted on the grounds that the Chamber had been lawfully set up under the 1960 arrangements. The Republic of Cyprus adamantly resisted this regulation, insisting on its sole right to certify and verify origin of Cypriot exports. Moreover, it objected to the use of Turkish Cypriot ports, arguing that this would be illegal because the government of Cyprus is unable to control them. Politically, it claimed

that direct trade would induce a creeping recognition of northern Cyprus as the 'TRNC', and thus significantly change its present legal standing.

The wrangling over this regulation has been symptomatic of reverse Europeanization of EU policies towards the conflict and Turkey. The Greek Cypriots, supported by the Council's legal service, successfully argued that the direct trade regulation required unanimity. Having established its right to veto, the Greek Cypriot government has blocked all initiatives to approve and implement the regulation. Despite successive efforts by the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005, the British Presidency in the second half of 2005, and the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006, the direct trade regulation remains pending, although it has acquired some new life with the Lisbon Treaty (see below). When in 2006 the Finnish Presidency turned its attention to the problem, it sought to secure the direct trade regulation alongside Turkey's implementation of the Additional Protocol to its customs union agreement with the EU allowing Greek Cypriot-flagged flights and vessels into Turkish air and seaports. With the failure of the initiative, Turkey's EU accession process has also become victim of the conflict. In 2006 eight chapters in its accession negotiations have been frozen, following a further six chapters in 2009.

These developments beg the question: who is Europeanizing whom? Cyprus' EU membership, to date, has not fundamentally altered Greek Cypriot attitudes towards northern Cyprus and Turkey. Unlike the Commission and most member states, the Republic of Cyprus claims that the international isolation of northern Cyprus should persist. Greek Cypriot attitudes towards Turkey's EU accession process have also remained unaltered. While favourable in principle to Turkey's membership, the Republic of Cyprus acts in the belief that Turkey's accession negotiations must be conditional to Ankara's concessions on the conflict. When outside the EU, the Greek Cypriots argued that Cyprus membership would catalyse a solution on the island insofar as it would strengthen the Republic's bargaining hand and induce policy Europeanization in Turkey. Inside the EU, the Greek Cypriots have used their acquired leverage to shape EU policies towards northern Cyprus and Turkey. In other words, rather than a unidirectional Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict, the conflictual dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean have made their way to Brussels.

What explains this 'bottom-up' trend? The ability of Cyprus, with its less than a million citizens, to dictate EU policy towards Turkey and northern Cyprus is perplexing at first sight. Yet the overbearing presence of the conflict in Cypriot politics has rendered Cyprus a 'single issue' member state, which uses the limited leverage exclusively in relation to EU decisions on northern Cyprus and Turkey. This, alongside the principle of solidarity amongst member states and the low political salience of the Cyprus conflict in European (and international) politics, goes far in explaining Cyprus' ability to exercise veto power when it comes to EU policies towards the conflict. Indeed on the few occasions in which another member state has attempted to reinsert the direct trade regulation on the Council's agenda for example, the Republic has gone up in arms, summoning and lecturing that member state ambassador on the inadmissibility of the

proposition, inducing the latter to back down.[1] Much like Greece during the first two decades of its EC membership (Tocci, 2004, pp. 119-143), the Republic of Cyprus has acted as a single issue member since its entry in the Union in 2004.

Notwithstanding Cyprus' 'single-issue' character and the solidarity of fellow member states, it would be unimaginable that the Republic of Cyprus, alone, would be able to impose its will against all member states regarding EU policies towards Turkey and the conflict. The Cypriotization of EU policies cannot be understood without bearing in mind the explicit or implicit resistance of a number of other member states against Turkey's EU accession process. Indeed, the Cyprus conflict has acted as the official shield behind which other member states have hid their broader concerns regarding Turkey's EU membership. The 'Cypriotization' of EU policies has acted as a welcome break to Turkey's accession process. Particularly since the opening of Turkey's accession negotiations, several member states have voiced their concerns regarding Turkey's EU entry (Tocci, 2008). Key personalities in France have aired their fears that Turkey's entry would imperil the EU's deepening integration and push the EU's borders into the volatile Middle East and Eurasia. Actors in Germany, France, the Netherlands and Austria have argued that Turkey's economic development would entail excessively high levels of redistribution of EU funds to Anatolia, bankrupt the Common Agricultural Policy, and lead to an invasion of 'Turkish plumbers' into the Union. Across the EU, many have questioned Turkey's membership on the grounds of identity, culture and religion. Speaking about 'Cypriotization' does therefore not mean that Cyprus alone is to blame for the course of events, but that the agenda has changed in such a way that it is not the transformation of Cyprus politics that is at the centre, but the infiltration of EU politics by the Cyprus conflict. To the extent that this involved a re-articulation of conflict positions and a re-aligning of conflict parties, there has of course been a degree of Europeanization; yet this has taken a very different and much more complex form than the standard account of Europeanization would have it.

Cyprus and the Struggle over 'Europe'

The limits of top-down Europeanization are also due to a second problem: the appropriation of the language of 'Europe' in order to rearticulate and legitimise unchanged local positions. The pleas of the Greek Cypriot leadership for a 'European solution' in accordance with EU values and the *acquis*, for instance, use a new and more appealing language to persuade the international community and fellow member states of the desirability of its (unchanged) preferred solution to the conflict regarding provisions on governance, property and freedoms (Richmond, 2006, p. 157). 'Europeanization' in this view is taken to mean above all the unrestricted implementation of the four freedoms (of goods, services, capital and labour) and the notion that a divided island would not be in the spirit of the integration project (Demetriou, 2008; Gürel and Özersay, 2006, p. 366).

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1   Interview with Commission official, Brussels, March 2010.

For Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, the Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict provided the possibility to find a solution that guaranteed a degree of recognition in a federal solution within the context of the EU, as foreseen in the Annan Plan. This would have required transition periods and derogations from the *acquis* but emphasised the broader norm of peace in the European integration process. Alas, following the entry of Cyprus in the EU and the slowing down of Turkey's accession process, disillusionment among Turkish Cypriots with the EU has run high. Europe has become associated with a complication of the Cyprus problem: the EU is seen as the prime cause for the persisting conflict. In other words, rather than rearticulating their positions in line with EU norms and values, 'Europe' has been written off as a constructive force for the resolution of the conflict by many in Turkey and northern Cyprus. Were a solution to be reached, they would claim, it is in spite rather than because of the EU. Whereas slim majorities in Turkey and northern Cyprus remain committed to a federal solution on the island, they rarely articulate this support in 'European' terms, largely in view of the sharp decline in the legitimacy and reputation of 'Europe' in their eyes.

These instances do not simply represent different instrumentalisations of 'Europe' but also a struggle over the meaning of Europe (Diez, 2001). The Europeanization literature often presumes that such a meaning exists. Yet Europe is an 'essentially contested concept' (Connolly, 1983). This enables local actors to construct 'Europe' in a variety of ways that may well reinforce rather than overcome their conflict positions. The importance of local actors has also been stressed in research on the EU and conflict resolution (see e.g. Stetter, Albert and Diez, 2008, p. 234). In that sense, Europeanization not only depends on the credibility of the EU, but also on ways in which local actors engage with the integration project. One of the problems in Cyprus is that from the start, EU membership was understood by some as an instrument to reinforce one side's strategic position, while for others it meant a path towards changing their own political (and economic) situation. These different constructions and instrumentalisations of the EU and European integration remain under-studied and thus call for further research.

Conclusion

In this article, we have explored in what ways the concept of Europeanization is relevant to the Cyprus conflict. The literature on Europeanization often viewed the process as unidirectional: European (or rather EU) standards, norms and values are expected to trickle down to national and sub-national levels. We have problematised this notion, arguing that Europeanization can work in both directions and the idea of Europe does not always induce a re-articulation of conflict positions in a manner conducive to resolution. The case of Cyprus is emblematic in this respect. While there have been instances of top-down Europeanization, to date the reverse trend seems predominant. Greek Cypriot attempts to use the EU arena to gain strategic leverage on Turkey and rearticulate old conflict positions in European terms has been largely successful. To date, this has led to a 'Cypriotization' of EU policies towards northern Cyprus and Turkey. Consequently, since the EU

entry of Cyprus and the slow-down in Turkey's accession process, Turks and Turkish Cypriots have been increasingly disillusioned with the EU. Hence, the lukewarm and uncommitted Turkish support for the peace processes since 2008. At the same time, 'Europe' seems to mean very different things to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and these meanings have reinforced rather than weakened conflict positions.

This said, it is too early to pass final judgement on the Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict. The fate of the Direct Trade regulation is a case in point. As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, this regulation can be seen as falling within the requirements of the co-decision procedure, which foresees that a proposal from the Commission is concomitantly sent both to the Parliament and the Council. However, the parliament's legal affairs committee decided that the Regulation was not for the EP to debate. On one hand, this is a case that further illustrates our argument of 'Cypriotization'. Yet on the other hand, the very fact that the dust had once again been swept off the regulation testifies to the fact that the dynamics underpinning the Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict has no foretold conclusion. Furthermore, in the long-term, Cyprus' position towards Turkey is not set in stone. The precedent of Greece suggests that when Europeanization does occur, it is as real and meaningful as it is painfully slow and reversible. The same is likely to hold true for Cyprus and Turkey, provided that Greek Cypriot Europeanization gains ground before Turkey's accession process is indefinitely shelved.

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PART C

THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS

Organisation and Divisions in the Orthodox Church in Cyprus: Post-Independence Events and Changes in Context

Marios Sarris

Abstract

This paper provides an analytic framework through which one can make sense of events and changes that took place in the Orthodox Church in Cyprus after 1960. It deals, primarily, with events in the post 1973 period and, more specifically, the twenty first century. The paper addresses the historical context of these developments in order to illuminate the logic of Orthodox Church organisation. Moreover, it delineates the boundaries of groups involved in shifting alliances both within and outside the enlarged Synod and identifies the causes of internal division. The paper seeks to strike a balance between the standard ethnographic strategy of maintaining the anonymity of actors and the need to make the text meaningful to an otherwise informed readership.

Introduction

Western analysts and diplomats often have difficulties understanding the role that the Orthodox Church plays in Cypriot politics. Based on western assumptions, they mistake the views and acts of the archbishop with those of the Church and they treat the body of the Church as a monolithic entity. The aim of this paper is to explain the logic of Orthodox Church organisation and to illuminate the context in which events and changes in the Orthodox Church in Cyprus took place after 1960.[1]

The paper incorporates a rather extensive section on the historical background to post-independence events. Its primary aim is to help the reader contextualise developments after independence. A thorough analysis of the all important institution of the ethnarchy is beyond the

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1   I would like to thank Hubert Faustmann, Andreas Panayiotou and Rita Severis for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. Constantinos Varravas provided valuable assistance in tracing some of the dates that appear in the text. I am also indebted to the two anonymous referees and the guest editor for their constructive remarks. Special thanks go to Christina McRoy for proofreading the material. Responsibility for the views expressed here is, of course, entirely mine.

scope of this paper. The section that deals with post-1960 events does not concentrate on the controversial rule of Makarios III and his political role in the 1960s. Instead, it shifts its emphasis to the period after 1973 and seeks to illuminate the current context of Church politics. This is covered in the more substantial ethnographic part that appears at the end of the paper. A note on the very name of this Church is also included at the beginning of the paper. It might help dissolve some of the ideological clouds of the present.

The Spell of Nationalism(s)

Official references to the 'autocephalous *Greek* Orthodox Church of Cyprus' [my emphasis] that appear in the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus echo nineteenth century Greek nationalism. The use of the adjective 'Greek' is particularly problematic in view of the fact that, currently, the Orthodox population of Cyprus is predominantly but not exclusively Greek. Increasing numbers of Russian, Arab and other Orthodox people who officially make the body of the island's Church can vote in ecclesiastical elections. The same applies to smaller numbers of late converts to Orthodoxy who belong to various national groups and qualify for membership. It is, however, a standard and rather old scholarly practice to name 'Greek' all Orthodox Churches that use the Greek rite, and not just the ethnically Greek ones, in order to distinguish them from the 'Latin' Church. To this day, the Arab Orthodox community of Lebanon is officially designated as 'Greek Orthodox' in the Lebanese constitution.

In recent years, an increasing number of people in Cyprus employ the term 'Cypriot Orthodox' or 'the Church of Cyprus' in order to identify the local Church. Some of the scholars who opted for the latter designation have been taken to task by Schabel for implying that the other Christian Churches of Cyprus (such as the Latin Church) are somehow not so 'Cypriot' (Schabel, 2001, p. 43). Indeed, Cyprus has no State Church in the sense that England does.[2] Many of late attempts to brand the island's Orthodox Church as 'the Cypriot Church' reflect the emerging forms of Cypriot nationalism that grew particularly strong in some quarters of the Greek community after 1974.

The same applies to the designation 'Cypriot Orthodox' which is no less suspect. The use of the adjective 'Cypriot' conceals allusions to an *ethnically* Cypriot Church – a construct to which Cypriot nationalists are ideologically committed in varying degrees. In this regard, the term is as much a nationalistic label as the adjective 'Greek' when used by Greek nationalists to describe the same Church. The alternatives 'Cypriot Eastern Orthodox Church' or 'Eastern Orthodox Church of Cyprus' pose problems of a different sort. As Ware (1963, p. 16) points out, the Orthodox Church is truly ecumenical and can not be limited to the 'East' or to 'eastern people'.

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2   For a brief exposition of the legal position of the Orthodox Church in the Republic of Cyprus, see Tornaritis (1990, pp. 2-12).

In view of the above, it might be useful to examine how the Orthodox Church views itself. In the Orthodox Tradition that precedes the advent of modern European nationalisms (ethnic or civic), autocephalous or independent Churches are viewed as *local* and not as national associations (*ibid.*, p. 15). The testimony of the local Church is seen as the manifestation of Orthodox Christianity in a certain region. In the light of this, it is much more appropriate to describe the island's Church as, simply, the 'Orthodox Church *in* Cyprus'. For the purposes of this paper, I am adopting this term of reference to the Church knowing that it is not exactly amenable to the taste of either Greek or Cypriot nationalists.

One can make a particularly strong historical case for this choice of term in the Cypriot context. The situation in Cyprus differs markedly from that in the Balkans where modern states created their respective national Churches to serve their nation-building purposes. The Orthodox Church in Greece, for example, is a by-product of nineteenth century Greek nationalism.[3] In the case of Cyprus, however, the Church predates the modern State by fifteen centuries. If anything, an ancient Church created a modern state in Cyprus, and not *vice versa*. In the fifth century AD, when Orthodox hierarchs in Cyprus made history by gaining the autocephaly of their Church, neither the modern Greek nation nor the modern Cypriot state existed on the map. This was an achievement that the smart head of a small island Church masterminded through dreams, miraculous discoveries and skilful diplomacy.[4] It was certainly not a national aim that he attained after reading the scrolls of Greek or Cypriot nationalists. To reduce the Orthodox Church in Cyprus to a 'Greek' or 'Cypriot' national Church is to project the competing ideologies of the present into the past.

The Historical Context

Two main layers of administration marked civic life in the eastern Mediterranean in Hellenistic times. The imperial structures of Alexander and his epigones ranked supreme to all other forms of authority. At a lower level of governance, the independent city-states of the classical era were allowed to confederate and maintain most of their civic functions. These regional associations came to be known as 'Commons' (Κοινά) and could be found all over the Greek-speaking world. Their responsibilities extended to coinage, athletic games and religious festivals among other things. The creation of the 'Common of Cypriots' (Κοινό Κυπρίων) marked the time when Cypriots entered world history as a unified polity.

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3   For a discussion of how nineteenth century Balkan nationalists employed religion in the process of nation-building, see Castellan, 1984 and Roudometof, 1998. On the relationship between nationhood and Church in Europe, see Hastings, 1997.

4   For a discussion of the historical context in which events and deliberations leading to the confirmation of Cypriot ecclesiastical independence took place, see Hackett, 1901, pp. 13-32 and Englezakis, 1996, pp. 57-69.

This decentralised model of local government extended to the Roman period, when Christianity started spreading to the Greek world. As a result, the organisation of the early Church was modelled on that of the existing civic structures and developed to resemble the con-federal arrangement of the Commons. This was bound to occur since early Christianity did not grow in a socio-cultural vacuum. Doctrine gradually emerged to legitimise the essentially 'con-federal' and democratic character that Orthodox Church Synods acquired at both the local and ecumenical levels. In the Orthodox iconographic depiction of the feast of Pentecost, the Holy Spirit appears in the form of tongues of fire which are 'cloven', descending *separately* upon each of the apostles (Ware, 1963, p. 246). In Orthodox symbolic terms, this is equal to a divine maxim granting equal voting rights to all members of a Synod, irrespective of the size of the flock that each hierarch shepherds. An extreme manifestation of this principle can be seen in the Ecumenical Synod where the voting power of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia(s) equals that of the Head of the autocephalous Church of Sinai – an abbot managing a handful of Greek monks in the desert. In this essentially 'con-federal' arrangement, the sheer logic of the 'one-man-one-vote' principle informs what the Greeks call 'synodical democracy' and safeguards against the possibility of a big Church dominating the small ones.

In the Orthodox Tradition, a Church is granted autocephaly on the grounds of its apostolic foundation. On this premise, an autocephalous Church remains in communion and doctrinal agreement with other Orthodox Churches but it can run its own affairs independently. It can do so as long as it maintains a minimum of thirteen bishops in accordance with the apostolic precedent of Jesus and his twelve disciples. As for the Head of the Orthodox Church, local or ecumenical, he remains 'first among equals'. His privileges are generally reduced to the rights of convening and representing his Synod.[5] In most other respects, he remains equal to the other bishops or patriarchs. The Head of the Church is subordinate to his Synod in the same spirit that the Synod is subordinate to him. This means that the Head can not take decisions without the consent of the majority in the Synod, and the majority of Synod members can not take decisions without the consent of the Head. The Head's views on key issues express the views of his Church only to the extent that they have been approved by majority vote in the Synod. Once decisions are reached by majority rule in the Synod, the minority has to abide by them in both word and deed.[6]

Latin attempts to introduce the *filioque* into the Creed were dismissed in the Greek East as an expression of the Pope's ambition to abolish synodical democracy and to dominate the Church. The *filioque* represents a modification in the way the Trinitarian doctrine is formulated, especially in relation to the role which the Holy Spirit is theologically assumed to play. The original passage

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5   In Cyprus at least, the archbishop's privileges extend to the rights of presiding over the Synod, ordering the consecration of bishops, officiating all over the island without the local bishop's permission, and sending encyclicals to all the island's churches.

6   The minority has the right to register its disagreement in the minutes of the Synod's proceedings.

in the Creed according to which the Holy Spirit 'proceeds from the Father' was altered in the West with the addition of the phrase 'and the Son' (*filioque*, in Latin). The Greeks objected to the insertion of the phrase and to the idea of the Spirit proceeding from the Son. They allegedly saw in it an implicit attempt to subordinate the Spirit to the Son. Disagreement over those three very small words sparked a doctrinal dispute which culminated in the Schism of 1054.[7] From the Greek clerical standpoint, however, the abstruse semiotics of the wording could have immense implications for Church politics and organisation. In Catholic thinking, as perceived by the Orthodox, the Head of the Church represents Christ on earth, while the Holy Spirit guides the formulation of doctrine. To subordinate the Spirit to the Son, as the Greeks had alleged, was synonymous to granting the Pope the exclusive privilege of arbitrating over Christian doctrine. This led to yet another authoritarian doctrine in the West which asserts the 'infallibility of the Pope'. The latter was proclaimed in July 1870 by the Vatican Council convened by Pope Pius IX. The pronouncement of the Pope's infallibility when speaking on matters of faith and morals *ex cathedra* was a reaction to the loss of temporal power that the Vatican suffered as a result of the advent of modern Italian nationalism. Papal infallibility survived the humanism of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and was re-affirmed in July 1973 by the Vatican's Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. In general, the Catholic Church maintained a centralism of authority and organisation which is completely unknown in the Orthodox East. The religious cult figure that makes the Pope is nowhere to be found in the surroundings of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. The 'charisma' of any Orthodox patriarch, bishop or priest is incessantly and relentlessly contested by the competing charismas of a number of his equals.[8]

In recent years, a number of historians of the Latin period in Cyprus shifted their emphasis from conflict and the higher clergy to patterns of actual co-existence, accommodation and cultural exchange between Greeks and Latins on the island (Coureas, 1997; Schabel, 2005; Carr, 2005).[9] Arguing against perceived wisdom, Schabel (2001, pp. 34-86, 2005) contested the view that the Orthodox Church in Cyprus was persecuted and suppressed by the Latin Church.[10] It is, however,

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7   For a historically and theologically informed treatise on the breach in Christendom, see Sherrard, 2002 [1959].

8   This is a *structural* feature of Orthodox Church culture. It manifests itself most vividly in the association of twenty principal and independent monasteries on Mount Athos which mirrors the organisational structure of the Orthodox Church. While monks of one monastery celebrate the 'magical charisma' (Weber, 1993 [1922], pp. 2-3) of their elder-abbot through references to his feats of spirituality, the monks of a neighbouring monastery dismiss his qualities as a mere *plani*, illusion or delusion, which they consider to be the work of the devil. The theological definition of *plani* refers to 'error, beguilement, the acceptance of a mirage mistaken for truth' (Palmer, 1979, p. 362). For an analysis of the mechanisms through which spirituality is constructed and contested on Mount Athos, see Sarris, 2000.

9   For earlier works and views, see Hackett, 1901 and Englezakis, 1996, pp. 305-314.

10   On a brief deconstructionist note, Cyprus' accession to the European Union and gradual incorporation into western political structures marks the emergence of a 'revisionist' approach to Latin rule in Cyprus.

accurate to say that the authority of the Orthodox Church was much reduced during Latin rule. The Latin rulers of Cyprus reduced the Orthodox Synod to four bishops whom they forced to establish bishoprics in rural centres. It is my contention that the adversity of the measures taken against the Orthodox Church owed less to the religious hostility that the Latins felt towards the local Greeks and more to the politics of administration. The relatively democratic, con-federalist and decentralised nature of Orthodox Church organisation was compatible with a system of small land-holding but not with the large estate feudalism that the Latins introduced to Cyprus after the twelfth century. The partial displacement and subordination of the Greek clergy to the Latin Church in Cyprus re-addressed the relationship between the island's economic infra-structure and its political supra-structure.

This is not to deny the fact that a Byzantine land aristocracy existed on the island before the arrival of the Latins. Nicolaou-Konnari admits that the historical record is silent on the extent to which the new feudal structures super-imposed by the Latins caused a complete break with established Byzantine social and institutional arrangements, especially in rural areas (2005, pp. 13, 28-29, 31-32). Both Nicolaou-Konnari and Schabel, however, stress that the subordination of the Orthodox clergy to Latin bishops aimed at controlling the numbers of Greek serfs who opted for either priesthood or monkhood in order to achieve emancipation and redeem themselves of their manorial obligations (Nicolaou-Konnari, 2005, p. 34; Schabel, 2005, pp. 191-193, 200). This lends additional support to the claim that the measures taken against the Orthodox Church were rooted in the new economic structures.

As in other parts of their empire, the Ottomans restored the Orthodox Church in Cyprus to its former position and endowed it with secular powers as well. Significantly, this coincides with the abolition of the feudal system and the re-distribution of land to both Christian and Muslim peasants. With time, the Orthodox archbishop of Cyprus, assisted by the bishops and the abbots of principal monasteries, acquired the right of collecting the empire's taxes from the Christian subjects and assumed extensive administrative responsibilities. In return, they became responsible for the orderly behaviour of their flocks and acted as security against popular insurrection. The organisation of religious groups into communities (known as *millets*) whose leaders acted as political representatives (or *ethnarchs*) to the authorities became a key feature of the Ottoman political system. The archbishop rose to political power and even gained the rights of appointing the Dragoman of the Saray, the highest office in the Governate, as well as communicating directly with the Porte. With money flowing into the coffers of the Church, the Ottoman era became, quite literally, its golden age.[11]

However, it would be too crude an argument to say that the Church acted as a mere instrument of control and collaborated with the Ottomans in plundering its people. Islam had

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[11] For more information on the Ottoman period in Cyprus and the position of the Orthodox Church, see Hackett, 1901, pp. 190-237; Luke, 1921; Hill, 1952, pp. 305-400; Philippou, 1975; Gazioglou, 1990; Jennings, 1993.

already established a presence on the island and the Church could not reduce the Greek peasants to destitution. Mass conversions to Islam could mean not only the loss of Christian souls to the infidel but also reductions in the tax revenues of the Church. Afterall, the archbishop and his suffragan bishops were officially acknowledged to be both representatives *and* guardians of their flocks. In their latter capacity, at least some took the responsibility to protect their flocks seriously. They stood up to rapacious Ottoman governors against government malpractice and *excessive* taxation (Hill, 1952, pp. 310, 316-317). Rather than viewing the Church as an exploitative institution of indirect ruling, it might be more appropriate to see it as an intermediary force that was 'sandwiched' between the demands of the Ottoman government and the need to maintain its grip on the Christian subjects.

The Orthodox bishops were allowed to return to their old towns but the Synod was not restored to its former membership. At the onset of Ottoman rule, the hierarchy was composed of the archbishop and three bishops. With time, occasional additions to the Synod were made as convenient and these included the abbots of Kykko and Machaera as well as the archimandrite and the exarch of the Archbishopric (Hill, 1952, pp. 312, 315, 579). In fact, the system remained in a state of flux for many years making it difficult for the Church to manage its own affairs and to practically defend its autocephaly. Whenever trouble arose in the ranks of the incomplete local Synod, the Cypriots referred to outside ecclesiastical authorities to adjudicate on the matters at dispute (*ibid.,* pp. 313-316, 327, 332). This situation continued during the British period and gave rise to the so-called 'archiepiscopal question' – a contest between two bishops of the Church that led to the archiepiscopal see remaining vacant for nine years (1900-1909).[12]

The Period after Independence

Given the logic of Orthodox Church organisation described above, the Latin measures had immense repercussions on the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. Since then, the island's Orthodox Church remained autocephalous only *in name*. On major issues concerning the Church, the Synod could not take decisions as it had not been a 'Full Synod' (Πλήρης Σύνοδος) of at least thirteen member bishops. On some occasions in the post-independence period, archbishops convened a 'Greater Synod' (Μείζων Σύνοδος) in order to resolve matters that threatened stability in the Church. Hierarchs from other Greek Churches and Patriarchates were invited to participate in the Cypriot Synod in order to have a quorum of at least thirteen members. In a situation like this, the archbishop invites the Heads of the ancient Patriarchates to send three individuals of their choice each to man the Greater Synod. Combined with the archbishop's privilege of determining the timing of the Greater Synod, this gives him a relative advantage in influencing the outcome of the Synod's proceedings. This may well explain why successive archbishops since the end of Latin

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12   For a detailed discussion of the 'archiepiscopal question' in Cyprus, see Hill, 1952, pp. 577-603.

rule lacked the incentive of restoring the Synod to its former membership. Schabel's implicit suggestion that a larger number of bishoprics would have made the Church less viable economically (2001, p. 57) is, in my opinion, much less plausible an explanation.

The first time that the need for a 'Greater Synod' arose was in 1973 when the bishops Anthimos, Gennadios and Kyprianos rebelled against archbishop Makarios. They proceeded to dethrone the archbishop on the (rather sound) theological argument that his role as an Orthodox hierarch was not compatible with the office of state president. The motivation behind the three bishops' act was fundamentally political. After independence, Makarios established a regime of power based on an extensive system of political patronage. Parts of the Right which were excluded from the state's clientelistic relations were radicalised enough to become Greece's long arm in Cyprus.[13] The ecclesiastical dispute over the archbishop-president's twin identity represented an attempt by the Junta then ruling Greece to undermine Makarios. The latter was quick to respond by convening a 'Greater Synod' of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. For this purpose, he invited a number of hierarchs from the Greek Patriarchates of the Middle East that rested beyond the political reach of the Junta in Athens. This 'full' Synod declared the rulings of the 'lacking' Cypriot Synod invalid, reinstated Makarios and, in turn, dethroned the three dissenting bishops. Nine years later, the dethronement of Gennadios and Anthimos was revoked at the initiative of Makarios' successor, Chrysostomos I, who convened a Greater Synod for the purpose.

The Church's inability to take decisions was manifested again in the late 1990s. Amidst accusations of the Church becoming too 'worldly' and overtly 'political', a charismatic monk called Athanasios arrived on Cyprus from Mount Athos at the invitation of the archbishop. Athanasios' return to his native country was bound to stir controversy in local Church politics. He had a massive appeal to the public, and especially to young people. The speeches that he made in a chapel at the University of Cyprus attracted scores of students. His sermons lacked the pomp which people learned to associate with Orthodox preachers. His appeal to *spiritual values* marked a contrast to the nationalistic or puritanical discourses of other clerics. Athanasios employed an idiom that made key ideas in Greek patristic literature accessible to those who were not theologically inclined. A revival of monastic life on the island was partly attributed to him, although not always uncritically. In February 1999, despite Communist Party (AKEL) opposition, he was elected bishop of Limassol, a stronghold of popular left wing support since the 1930s. The charismatic monk's popularity and success were bound to provoke the reaction of established authorities and bureaucratic structures within the Church; especially in view of forthcoming electoral contests in the Church. Soon after, some of the country's media thrived on explicit accounts of homosexual liaisons that the young bishop was allegedly involved in. This was too serious an accusation to level against a bishop of the Church even by Cypriot standards.

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13   For a discussion on disaffected groups forming the opposition to Makarios' rule at national level, see Attalides, 2003, pp. 52, 125, 127. For an analysis of the same process at village level, see Loizos, 1981, pp. 55-61.

Archbishop Chrysostomos I, who had succeeded Makarios in November 1977, was sympathetic to the young Athanasios. He convened a 'Greater Synodical Court' (Μείζον Συνοδικό Δικαστήριο) in November 2000 and invited clergymen from abroad to attend. The evidence produced in the Synod was overwhelmingly in favour of Athanasios' innocence. The decision to acquit him of all charges was unanimous.

Both incidents highlight the difficulties that the Church faced as late as modern times recovering from the blow that it suffered to its structures in the twelfth century. Whenever the Church faced a controversy, the archbishop called the shots by convening a Greater Synod and inviting outsiders to attend. This state of affairs was a far cry from the 'synodical democracy' of the Greeks, and did little to enhance the independence of the local Church. Chrysostomos II will go into the history books as the archbishop-reformer who, upon his election to the throne in November 2006, re-instituted all the bishoprics that the Latins had abolished. By March 2008, when the last bishop was consecrated, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus could boast a full Synod of seventeen bishops. In doing so, Chrysostomos enjoyed the support of the rest of the Synod. If there is one thing that all Cypriot bishops agree upon, it is their resentment of outsiders meddling in their own affairs. The enlarged Synod is a fully functioning body in need of no external assistance. More importantly, perhaps, it grew sufficiently big to allow for internal cleavage.

Cleavage and Factionalism

In December 2009, a hacker was reported breaking into the computer records of the UN special representative to Cyprus and releasing their contents to the Greek Cypriot media. Among other things, the records appeared to contain an analysis of the power dynamics in the Synod. According to the reports, bishops were divided into 'liberals' and 'conservatives' on the basis of their views on the Cyprus dispute. Advisors to the UN representative could, perhaps, do with the briefing of an expert or two. This analysis, if true, oversimplifies the situation in the Synod. It fails to grasp the complexity of permuting alliances within the Synod as well as the ways in which these strategies interact with national politics. Divisions within the hierarchy of the Church result from three different causes. Each cause or principle produces a typology of division which cuts across the other two.

The first principle is a form of cleavage that manifests itself in almost all Orthodox Churches in which the clergy is predominantly Greek. It leads to the internal fragmentation of the clerical establishment into three main *ideological currents*: the *ethnarchikoi*, the *organosiakoi* and the *paterikoi*. Each of these groupings takes a radically different position on a number of key issues. The most important of these concern the relationship of the Church to the State, its openness to social otherness, and its involvement in inter-religious dialogue.

In Cyprus, the *ethnarchikoi* trace their modern ideological ancestry to Makarios III and make the dominant group in the Synod. They remain strong defenders of the ethnarchic role of the Church. This role is no longer understood in its historic sense in which the archbishop acted

as the political representative of the religious community. It rather pertains to the right of the Church to actively interfere in political developments concerning the 'national issue'. Consequently, the *ethnarchikoi* believe that the Church should maintain a strong involvement in the economy that would empower it to perform this role. Excessive engagement in business activities is often justified by them on these grounds. On social issues, they retain a conservative outlook which, in its moderate form, verges on constructive indifference. Although they often adopt a largely pragmatic approach to social issues, few resist the temptation of sticking their noses into people's bedrooms. On matters of inter-faith dialogue, they fervently advocate regular communication and better relations with the other Christian Churches, especially when political gains are at stake. Over the years, the Cypriot *ethnarchikoi* have been consistent supporters of their Church's participation in the World Council of Churches.

The *organosiakoi* form a minority in the Synod. They represent an established movement of active religious groups and organisations which are devoted to home missionary and educational work. They publish a number of periodicals and books, provide catechism classes and run programmes of youth work. Although they cooperate with Church authorities, their organisations spring from private initiative and maintain certain autonomy from Church structures. It is a form of religious activism that draws its inspiration from Christian saints such as St. Basil. St. Basil had established an elaborate complex of religious and welfare institutions in Cappadocia in order to tend the needy among his flock. Very much like the *ethnarchikoi*, the *organosiakoi* defend the Church's role in national politics. Unlike the *ethnarchikoi*, they oppose its openness to other religious groups. Their rejection of the Catholic and Protestant Churches can often be expressed in terms which have been described as absolute and dogmatic. They also endorse an exclusively intellectualist approach to matters of theology. On social issues, they are by far the most conservative group in the Church. They adopt a strict moralist approach to Christian life and have specific expectations about how people (and especially women) should look, dress and conduct themselves in their private lives. A lower middle class ethic informs their attitudes to social issues and, in some quarters, they can occasionally display strong puritanical tendencies.

The *paterikoi* represent the latest and most controversial addition to the Synod. This group espouses a return to the mystical theology of the Greek Fathers of the Church. They advocate a spiritual apprehension of truth and resent the scholastic and intellectualist approach to theology that many modern Greek scholars adopted over the years as a result of studying in the West and, more specifically, Germany. They consider this a digression from the Orthodox patristic tradition in which theology was never divorced from the monasteries. In fact, the *paterikoi* are part of a wider revivalist tendency that aims at reversing the effects of Western Christian influence on all aspects of Orthodox life. As early as the 1960s, an artistic movement led by Photis Kontoglou in Greece started the process of displacing the Italian Renaissance style from Orthodox iconography in favour of the old and more 'spiritual' Byzantine style.

On the relationship between Church and State, the *paterikoi* is the group least likely to encourage an active involvement of the Church in politics. On some occasions, they stress that the

primary obligation of the Church is to shepherd its flock and not to lead the nation. Bishops belonging to this group spend more time listening to people's confessions than doing business. They draw their inspiration from members of the Hesychast monastic movement of the fourteenth century AD who sought to attain a mystical state of 'inner stillness' *(hesychia)* through the renouncement of the world rather than active involvement in it. The most important figure in this tradition is Saint Gregory Palamas (1296-1359), bishop of Thessaloniki. However, what makes the *paterikoi* stand out from the rest is their liberal latitude on social issues which is quite unprecedented for modern Orthodox standards. The *paterikoi* dwell upon the stress which the Fathers of the Orthodox Church laid on the 'uniqueness of each person'. They appeal to this principle in order to justify their own readiness to accept an individual's unique characteristics and to accommodate his or her idiosyncratic nature. Among the circles of the *paterikoi*, one can experience the rather striking sight of young men with pony tails, Lennon style glasses and worn-out jeans serving in church. This may not be much of a novelty in the twenty first century, (in fact, it is quite old fashioned), but it is certainly a far cry from the spectacle of Orthodox women wearing long skirts and cuddling up together at the rear of the temple. Despite their openness to social otherness, the *paterikoi* remain less enthusiastic on matters of inter-faith dialogue. Their lukewarm attitude to the religious other has led to accusations of the *paterikoi* being 'fundamentalists' and 'religious fanatics'. Yet, their reluctance to embrace a spirit of reconciliation with the Catholic and Protestant Churches is expressed in less uncompromising terms than those adopted by the *organosiakoi*. The *paterikoi* argue that they embrace the representatives of those Churches in a spirit of Christian love, but they would refrain from any activities that could imply acceptance of their 'heretical' views. In fact, the misgivings that the *paterikoi* have about inter-religious dialogue owes a lot to the scepticism with which they view Western Christianity. In many respects, they are much more open to Islam than they are to Western Christianity.

In the last few years, the *paterikoi* made inroads into the young and most educated sectors of Greek Cypriot society.[14] Their growing appeal to large sections of the population gave rise to controversies. When a bishop attempted to replace village church icons painted in the debased westernised style with ones belonging to the Byzantine tradition, he met resistance by locals. Some of these icons were donated to churches by people whose descendants still lived in the villages. From the point of view of the local Church, both the icon-painter and the donor ideally remain anonymous in the Byzantine iconographic tradition. From the point of view of some of the locals, the icon acted as a reminder of their ancestor who donated it to the church, and celebrated his lineage in the village. So when the bishop stepped on his descendant's toes, they were up in arms. On other occasions, a bishop found himself accused of 'brainwashing' people when a number of university graduates under his spiritual influence joined monasteries and convents on the island.

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14   As early as 1993, Peristianis (1993, p. 261) predicted a revivalist tendency in Cypriot Orthodoxy but he did not expect it to happen in the direction of the historic Church.

From the point of view of some other bishops and their representatives in the media, a young person should not join a monastery without his parents' consent. From the point of view of those defending the act, the bishops levelling these accusations, like all higher clergy in the Orthodox Church, came from the ranks of the monks themselves. The debate highlighted differences in the ways monastic life is construed, pertaining to a rather artificial split between Athonite and local Cypriot monasticism. In short, the *paterikoi*, or at least some of them, will continue being the subject of controversy for as long as they pose an ideological threat to established elites, both within and outside the Church.

These three trends partly shape the complicated picture that the Church currently presents at the higher echelons of administration. Alliances within the Synod permute depending on the topic that is being discussed. When the subject in question concerns the Church taking positions on matters political, the *ethnarchikoi* side with the *organosiakoi* and outvote the more reluctant *paterikoi*. When social issues are addressed, the *ethnarchikoi* (usually) stand by the *organosiakoi* and marginalise the more liberal *paterikoi*. And when matters regarding inter-faith dialogue are raised, the *paterikoi* enjoy the solidarity of the *organosiakoi* but fail to outnumber the more constructive *ethnarchikoi*. The permutation is not perfect for, as I shall demonstrate, other factors come into play to make the situation even more complex. If, however, one suspends consideration of the other variables, the net effect is a Church which favours engagement in national politics, remains conservative or indifferent to social challenges, and supports inter-faith dialogue. The extent to which the positions taken by the three groups comply with the norms of a pluralistic society and a democratic secular state varies accordingly. The overall picture is summarised below in the form of a matrix. The plus (+) signs stand for positions which are conducive to a secular and pluralistic environment while the minus (-) signs stand for the opposite. The signs in the matrix represent an evaluation of their respective positions from a liberal standpoint. If one wishes to take a conservative line, one only needs to reverse the signs.

	Ethnarchikoi	*Organosiakoi*	*Paterikoi*
Involvement in politics	-	-	+
Openness to social otherness	-	-	+
Support to inter – religious dialogue	+	-	-

The second (and currently more important) cause of division in the Synod is a by-product of the archiepiscopal elections held in 2006. The three candidates in the election (bishop Athanasios of Limassol, bishop Nikiforos of Kykko and bishop Chrysostomos of Paphos) remain the key leading figures in the Synod, each backed by a group of other bishops. Chrysostomos of Paphos won the election despite enjoying an electoral support of less than ten per cent. His success owes much to the peculiarities of a complex electoral system, as well as to his ability to outmanoeuvre the two leading candidates by playing one off against the other. Immediately after ascending to the

throne, Chrysostomos started the process of re-instituting the old bishoprics. Interestingly, his choices of new bishops strengthened the Athanasios group in the Synod. This surprised many observers as Chrysostomos is the man who had propagated the accusations against Athanasios in the past. The archbishop's move, however, is a purely strategic one and makes perfect sense in the light of the power dynamics that developed in the Synod. By strengthening Athanasios' hand in the Synod, Chrysostomos sought to counterweight the influence of the all powerful bishop of Kykko, Nikiforos. This leaves him and his team occupying the 'middle ground' in the Synod and determining the outcome of the vote. While the Athanasios and Nikiforos camps carve their respective territories up, the archbishop sits on the fence and runs the show. This is how he controls the Synod for he has only a thin majority in it.

The third cause of division in the Synod can be traced in the interplay between Church and national politics. Factions within the Church may occasionally strike alliances with political forces, especially during electoral contests that take place in either domain. The extent to which these alliances are formalised depends largely on the political culture of the parties involved and their readiness to respect the boundary between religion and politics. In the last archiepiscopal elections, for example, the Communists became the only political force to officially back a candidate, following a legacy of interference in Church affairs that dates back to the 1940s. The heads of other political parties directly or indirectly expressed a personal preference for one candidate or another, but stopped short of making it party policy. Once again, the Communists exhibited their inability to observe a most fundamental norm in secular democracies regarding the separation of the two realms. This denied them any moral ground to level criticism against the archbishop for interfering in the presidential elections of 2008. Their complaints (however justified currently and historically) had lost all political legitimacy as a result of them lapsing into the same sin only two years earlier.

Nikiforos continues to enjoy the staunch support of the Communist Left and the tacit approval of the Liberal Right. These forces are usually designated as 'moderate' in their readiness to accept some of the Turkish conditions on a settlement to the Cyprus dispute. The archbishop is flanked by the parties of the Centre which take a 'harder line' in rejecting these terms. In the event of a political settlement, Nikiforos will support it only if he feels that it has a good chance of surviving the referendum. The archbishop will oppose it by all means and at all costs. This makes Athanasios the *key man* in the Synod. His symbiosis with a Communist mayor in Limassol has been free of any conflict during the last three years. At the same time, he maintains good relations with some of the more radical forces in the Right. As to what his political leanings on the Cyprus dispute might be, this could be the subject of another paper.

Conclusion

Cypriots entered world history as a unified polity with the formation of their 'Common' in Hellenistic times. The early Christian Church on the island developed structures in parallel to

those of the Common. As a result, Orthodox Church organisation in Cyprus, as in other parts of the Greek world, acquired a confederal-democratic character. This system of Church governance gained theological legitimacy through the adaptation of doctrine to existing institutional arrangements. It was abolished after the arrival of the Latins in the twelfth century AD who reduced the bishops to four, and subordinated them to the local Latin Church hierarchy. The re-institution of the abolished bishoprics in 2008 marks a turning point in the modern history of the Church. With a full Synod of seventeen bishops, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus regained its autonomy not only in name, but also in practice.

Alliances within the enlarged Synod shift in accordance with a number of criteria. Each produces a different typology of groupings that cuts across the other. Two *paterikoi* bishops sharing the same ideological outlook on matters political, social and doctrinal, may participate in two different bishop-led factions of the Synod, and seek different alliances with political forces outside the Church. Despite the shifting nature of alliances, the Synod remains a democratic body in which decisions are taken by majority vote. On key issues, the views of the archbishop reflect the views of the Church only to the extent that they have been sanctioned by majority rule. Whenever a controversial issue comes to the fore, local analysts and foreign diplomats should not jump into conclusions about what the position of the Church *is*, or what it *might be* in the future, on the basis of public statements made by the archbishop to the press. The Synod of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus is far from being a monolithic body.

Secularisation is another area in which developments have occurred since 1960. Makarios III became the last archbishop to act as both religious leader and political representative of the Greek community. His death in 1977 marked the end of the institution of the ethnarchy only technically. The Church redefined its ethnarchic role after 1977 and continues to pursue it to the present day. The ethnarchic strand remains the dominant force in the Synod but, as I have tried to show in this paper, it is no longer unchallenged within the Church.

Opposition to the ethnarchic tendencies of the leadership originates from both within and outside the Church. The Communists' rise to state power in 2008 and Cyprus' accession to the European Union in 2004 constitute landmark events in this respect. Their combined effect can only further the process of secularisation in the Republic. Upon taking office, the Communists broke a long established norm of Cypriot political culture and appointed a minister of Education and Culture without seeking his prior approval by the Church. On a second front, that of taxing the Church, they were forced into retreat as a result of mishandling the affair and underestimating the ultimate protection which the constitution offers to the Church against the confiscation of its properties. On their part, European bodies have established a record of judicial decisions which favour the separation of Church and State, although the matter largely remains the prerogative of member states. Their rulings on the saga concerning Greek identity cards and religious symbols in Italian schools bear testimony to this fact. It remains to be seen how the Church will respond to the combined pressures of the European Union, the ruling Communists and an increasingly secular Cypriot public.

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The State of Cypriot Minorities: Cultural Diversity, Internal-Exclusion and the Cyprus 'Problem'[1]

Andrekos Varnava

Abstract

This essay argues that Cypriot national minorities suffer from 'internal-exclusion' because the clash of foreign nationalisms (Greek and Turkish) and imperialisms (British, American, Greek and Turkish) in Cyprus has resulted in the domination of the 'Greeks' and 'Turks' despite the historical presence of other communities. This has also resulted in the failure to develop an indigenous Cypriot identity, one that crosses religious difference and has as its base the idea of Cyprus as a secular homeland that includes all its disparate national groups who call themselves 'Cypriots'. Not only have both Greek and Turkish Cypriot elite, by focusing on their inter-communal problem, practised assimilation into the majority of the minority since the independence of the island from British rule in 1960, but the institutional structures from which assimilation could be implemented were imbedded into the Constitution. In the Constitution the national minorities[2] were termed 'religious groups' and forced to become members of either dominant community. Thus, by being denied their place as 'national' minorities and regarded as religious sub-groups of one of the two dominant communities, they have suffered 'internal-exclusion'. This has had adverse effects on their rights as well as their position in Cypriot society.

Keywords: Cyprus, historical diversity, national minorities, Cyprus Problem, multiculturalism, identity

Introduction

Cyprus has been religiously and culturally diverse since at least medieval times – multi-religious, even multi-cultural.[3] Greeks, Turks, Maronites, Armenians, Latins, Orthodox Christians,

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1   This essay was presented at the *Tenth International Conference on Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations*, Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland, 19 to 21 July 2010 with the title 'Cultural Diversity in Cyprus: National Minorities as an Internal-Exclusion'.

2   I mean 'national' in the context of homeland; rather than 'ethnic', which in my view is one way of distinguishing national identities, but by no means the exclusive way, as the national minorities of Cyprus were actually distinguished by their religion.

3   Without its contemporary connotations relating to diasporic communities in multicultural societies such as those in Australia and Canada.

Muslims, Catholic Christians, Jews, Gypsies, Lino-bambaki, and others, including Cypriots, exist with distinct identities during modern times, although religious, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, civil and other types of labels confuse and confound the scholar. Through integration and assimilation, but primarily through the development of ethnic national identities, a rigid ethnic national identification and separation has evolved into Greeks, Turks, Maronites, Armenians, Latins, Gypsies, which is only challenged by those who believe themselves to be Cypriots and by those who cross the inter-religious boundaries of Christian and Muslim, such as the Lino-bambaki and those who inter-marry, or the intra-religious Christian boundaries, again through inter-marriage. Because of the encouragement of Greek and Turkish ethnic nationalism during the British period, replacing the primarily religious and regional identities,[4] the two main demographically represented inhabitants, the Eastern Orthodox Christian Cypriots and the Muslim Cypriots, became 'Greeks' and 'Turks' respectively. And because this was inspired by foreign (European Enlightenment views on ancient and modern Greece) identity constructs (that is, a past and language largely alien to the island) and within the context of the Greco-Ottoman/Turkish conflict – again largely alien to the island[5] – two distinct political demands evolved within the elite of both Cypriot communities, which not only were mutually exclusive of each other but excluded the national minorities of the island. The increasing political modernisation of Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites, especially in terms of nationalism, resulted in Greek Cypriot nationalists organising a terrorist organisation to challenge British rule in favour of union of the island to Greece, or *enosis*.[6] This development along with British and Turkish government encouragement incited the Turkish Cypriot elite to organise their own terrorist group. The resulting clash compelled all parties to reluctantly agree to a compromise, accepting to share power in an independent republic in

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4   A. Varnava (2009) *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 152-201.

5   For various examples and explanations see, *ibid.*, pp. 152-201.

6   My position on 'terrorism' broadly agrees with that of Alex P. Schmid: 'Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought'. A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman *et al* (1988) *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Group. In my view, the 'Cyprus Emergency' reveals group based terrorism from EOKA and TMT, as well as state terror from the British. That EOKA was running an 'anti-colonial' struggle or that TMT was a 'defence organisation' – claims which are both debateble – are unrelated to the label 'terrorism' because the term itself does not take into account the aims of the political violence itself.

exchange for the termination of British rule. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was born in 1960, recognising two communities, the Greek and the Turkish, and three 'Religious Groups', the Maronite, Armenian and the Latin. According to the first census taken in 1960, the Armenian Cypriots number just over 3,600, the Maronite Cypriots just over 2,700 and the Latin Cypriots over 4,000; now the estimates differ with the Maronite in the majority.[7] The island's minorities were not only entirely excluded from the process but compelled to choose to belong to one of the two main and constitutionally equal communities. Nationalist discourses suppressed Cyprus' cultural diversity, militarised society and excluded national minorities.

Cultural Diversity and Historiography

Cyprus, recent scholarship has shown, is a religiously and culturally diverse place since the medieval period and since the Ottoman period various historical minorities (mainly Christian, but also Muslim) have been largely excluded and pressured to assimilate into the 'Greek' Cypriot community, thus suffering internal exclusion (during Ottoman rule there were sometimes pressures on Christians to assimilate into the Muslim community).

Cyprus: Society and Culture, 1191-1374 totally revises the pre-existing fallacies that the rule of the Catholic Frankish Lusignan dynasty, from the late twelfth to the fifteenth century, was oppressive for the majority of the population, which was Eastern Orthodox Christian. The book provides ample evidence of a religiously and culturally diverse cosmopolitan Cyprus.[8] Under the Lusignans, the Catholic Church and nobility allowed the Eastern Orthodox Church to function, albeit subordinated to Rome.[9] Only one serious incident resulted from a clash between the Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church.[10] Moreover, the island, particularly Famagusta, was extraordinarily diverse, with 'Romiee (Romans)' or 'Greeks' (Greeks to the Franks, Romiee to themselves), Nestorians, Armenians, Maronites, Jacobites, Georgians, Copts, Melkites, Nubians, Indians, Ethiopians, Jews, Arabs, Turks and Egyptians, the last three often Christian converts, as well as western Europeans.[11] Economically the island prospered becoming (from the second half of the thirteenth century) an 'entrepot in the carrying trade between Western Europe and the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East'.[12] Ultimately, economic growth

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7   A. Varnava (2009) 'The Minorities of Cyprus in the *History of Cyprus* Textbook for Lyceum Students', in Varnava, A., Coureas, N. and Elia, M. (eds.), *The Minorities of Cyprus*, p. 303.
8   A. Nicolaou-Konnari and C. Schabel (eds.) (2005) *Cyprus – Society and Culture 1191-1374*, Leiden: Brill.
9   N. Coureas (1997) *The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1195-1312*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
10   Schabel, C. (2005) 'Religion' in A. Nicolaou-Konnari and C. Schabel (eds.), *Cyprus – Society and Culture 1191-1374*, Leiden: Brill, pp. 157-218; Schabel, C. (2010) 'Martyrs and Heretics, Intolerance of Intolerance: The Execution of Thirteen Monks in Cyprus in 1231', *Greeks, Latins and the Church in Early Frankish Cyprus*, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 1-33.
11   *Ibid*; C.F. Beckingham (1957) 'Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus', *Die Welt des Islams*, pp. 65-83.
12   N. Coureas (2005) 'Economy' in Nicolaou-Konnari and Schabel (eds.), *Cyprus ...*, pp. 103-156.

and prosperity, coupled with the cosmopolitan society, broke the rigid social hierarchy that the Lusignans imposed producing 'Kypriotes', a political, cultural (including linguistic) and regional (not ethnic as Nicolaou-Konnari argues) identity.[13] This state of affairs continued until the end of Latin rule (the Venetians replaced the Lusignans in the fifteenth century).

This integrated society changed under Ottoman and British rule. The Ottoman millet system had integrationist – even assimilationist structures. Cyprus' religiously diverse yet relatively homogenous inhabitants were divided along religious lines, with emphasis now on the elevated Eastern Orthodox Church and its role in governance with the Muslim administrative and military elite. Despite recent publications on Ottoman Cyprus,[14] the least is known about the minorities during Ottoman rule. What happened to the Jacobites, Georgians, Copts, Melkites, Nubians, Indians, Ethiopians? Did they migrate, or integrate, or had they been integrated earlier and therefore the distinctions no longer applied? The first British census of 1881 found that aside from Eastern Orthodox Christians and Muslims there were Maronite, Roman Catholic and Armenian Christians. The British helped create the space from which the previous religious identity of the inhabitants could develop into an ethnic national identity by applying their own ideas of ethnicity and race, which were informed by one aspect of the island's past – its Hellenic – thus allowing for the local elite to become Greeks and Turks respectively.[15] Unlike the previous religious identity, ethnic national identity divided Cypriot society, especially because the two main communities had 'motherlands' to whom they looked to, and in the Greek case, demanded to unite with. This alienated the Muslim Cypriots, as well as the Christian minorities, who felt threatened by the possibility of Greek rule.[16]

Little has been published on the three national minorities that 'survived' Ottoman rule, let alone on minorities such as the Jews,[17] 'Lino-bambaki'[18] – publicly Muslim, but privately Christian – and Arabs (counted in some British censuses as Muslims and subsequently considered as Turks, or as Armenians in the case of the Copts). In English there are two books and five articles to consider. Susan Pattie's ethnographic/anthropological study explores the relationship between religion and nationalism for Cypriot Armenians, showing how nation and homeland

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13   Nicolaou-Konnari, 'Greeks', *ibid.,* pp. 13-62.

14   M. Michael, M. Kappler and G. Eftihios (eds.) (2009) *Ottoman Cyprus: New Perspectives*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

15   Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus …*, pp. 152-201.

16   G.S. Georghallides (1979) *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926*, Nicosia, pp. 353-354.

17   Unfortunately very little has been written on the Jews. Stavros Panteli's account, despite being informative and makes use of extensive archival research, lacks the wider imperial context, as well as colonial dynamics as played out in Cyprus. S. Panteli (2003) *Place of Refuge: A History of the Jews in Cyprus*, London: Elliott and Thompson.

18   The most interesting article on the Lino-Bambaki was that written by Roland Michell, District Commissioner of Limassol, 1879-1911. R.L.N. Michell (1908) 'A Muslim-Christian Sect in Cyprus', *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. LXIII (May), pp. 751-762.

evolve in a space where a conflict between two larger communities predominates.[19] Caesar Mavratsas then published two articles: one on Armenian identity within the context of Greek nationalism; and the other a comparison of Armenian and Maronite Cypriot assimiliation into the dominant Greek Cypriot society.[20] Mavratas' main argument is that Greek Cypriot ethno-nationalism encourages Armenian ethno-nationalism and therefore distinctiveness from Greek Cypriot society, whereas this is not the case for Maronites, who are progressively assimilated into Greek Cypriot society. Although Mavratas offers various reasons as to why this might be the case, the main reason in his view is the Armenian communities' sense of belonging to a wider Armenian Diaspora, whereas for the Maronite Cypriots, their belonging to a wider Maronite Diaspora is more symbolic than practical and their identity is centred on Cyprus. Mavratsas provides some interesting observations to account for this, but one reason he does not mention is the fact that the connection of Armenian Cypriots with Cyprus begins with their survival of the Armenian Genocide, while the Maronite Cypriots date back to the Medieval period and so have a much longer and more deeply rooted connection to Cyprus. Subsequently, two articles appeared, one on the Maronites and the other on the Latins, in 2002 and 2005 respectively. The article on the Cypriot Maronites uses western sources to show that the Maronites were numerous during the Latin period, but reduced in size during the Ottoman period. Their presence stabilised under British rule as they grew in importance in public life. The British tried to manipulate them against the Greeks in the inter-war years when the British finally decided to tackle the Greek Cypriot elite's *enosis* demand.[21] The Maronites opposed *enosis*, along with the Armenians, Latins and Turkish Cypriots, fearing Greek domination.[22] Nicholas Coureas' article on the Latin community demonstrates that the presence and profile of the Roman Catholics in Cyprus – the 'Latins' (mostly Venetians) – was reduced under the Ottoman millet system, but not entirely eradicated, as religious representatives and services continued, as did the movement of Roman Catholics to (and from) the island. Consequently, the current Latin community evolved from the Ottoman period. During British rule, the Latins further evolved, like the Armenians and Maronites, into a distinct group, but not along ethno-nationalist lines: rather, composed of French, Venetian, Ragusan, Italian, Maltese, and Spanish, along religious national lines.[23] Costas Constantinou's

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19   S.P. Pattie (1997) *Faith in History: Armenians Rebuilding Community*, Washington/London: Smithsonian Institute Press.

20   C. Mavratsas (2000) 'Armenian Identity and Greek Nationalism in Cyprus', *Travaux de la Maison de l' Orient Mediterranean*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 197-205; C. Mavratsas (2003) 'The Armenians and the Maronites of Cyprus: Comparative Considerations Concerning Ethnic Assimilation', *Travaux de la Maison de l' Orient Mediterranean*, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 205-210.

21   See A. Varnava (2002) 'The Maronite Community of Cyprus: Past, Present and Future', *Al-Mashriq: A Quarterly Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2 (September), pp. 45-70, 48.

22   *Ibid.*

23   N. Coureas (2005) 'The Historical Development of Cyprus' Present-Day Latin Community', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 149-166.

more analytical article of 2007 focuses on identity politics and the hybrid nature of Cyprus' society. Constantinou went beyond the 'known' minorities to discuss Gypsies and Lino-bambaki. The latter is particularly interesting since Constantinou shows that Lino-bambaki were not simply crypto-Christians, but a cross-religious and cross-ethnic community, with different rationales, circumstances and development depending on their origins and location. Nevertheless, because of bicommunalism, they have virtually disappeared and remained largely misunderstood. Bicommunalism, Constantinou points out, was a product of the British modernising of the Ottoman millet system – that is, nationalising the religious classification of the millet system. This contributed to the creation of 'Greeks' and 'Turks', and the Cyprus Problem, and also excluded other minorities and identifying labels, whether ethnic, religious or otherwise, such as Maronites, Armenians (mostly belonging to the Apostolic Church, but also the Catholic and Anglican churches), Latins, Christian and Muslim Gypsies, Jews, Old Calendar Worshippers, Jehovah's Witnesses, Babis (Azalis), Baha'is, and various heterodox Muslim groups, such as the Bektashis.[24]

Lastly, in 2009, the first book on the minorities of Cyprus appeared, based on the conference 'Minorities of Cyprus: Past, Present and Future' held at the European University – Cyprus on 24 and 25 November 2007.[25] After lectures and a symposium in September and earlier in November 2007 dealing with minority rights and especially the Maronite Cypriot communities struggle to protect, promote and have recognised their distinct Cypriot Maronite Arabic (CMA), the 'Minorities of Cyprus' conference broadly dealt with the past, present and future of the three minorities recognised as religious groups in the 1960 Constitution (with presentations also on the Roma and the Anglicans). The historical context of these communities and of the island, which have been separated in nationalist narratives of Cyprus' past, came together. For the Maronites, the knowledge that they do not originate from the Lebanon or Syria, was a new development. They had to come to terms with the reduction to their numbers during Ottoman rule and the lack of knowledge to answer for this. Also they had to come to terms with the domination of the Cypriot Orthodox Church during Ottoman rule, their opposition to union with Greece, and the requirement of them to choose to belong to a community in 1960, the Greek or the Turkish, when they did not want to belong to either. For the Armenians, they had to confront the evidence that their historical presence on the island has fluctuated without sources to account for this. They had to deal with the evidence that Armenians participated in the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus in 1570.[26] Armenians must also deal with the fact that some of their community evolved out of the

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24   C. Constantinou (2007) 'Aporias of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity and the "Cyprus Problem"', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. XLII, pp. 247-270.

25   A. Varnava, N. Coureas and M. Elia (eds.) (2009) *The Minorities of Cyprus: Development Patterns and the Identity of the Internal-Exclusion*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

26   A. An (2009) 'The Cypriot Armenian Minority and their Cultural Relationship with the Turkish Cypriots' in Varnava, Coureas and Elia (eds.), *The Minorities of Cyprus…*, pp. 283-284.

1915 Ottoman genocide and that it is difficult to determine the continued presence of earlier members of the community.[27] For the Armenians, choosing to belong to the Greek community was not as traumatic as it was for the Maronites due to the Ottoman Genocide of Armenians as many Armenians lived near the 'Turkish' quarter in Nicosia and Larnaca and spoke Turkish rather than Greek or Armenian.[28] For the Latin Christians, their presence is the result of various settlements before, during and even after Ottoman rule. One significant difference is that they are clearly a religious rather than an ethnic and/or religious national community, so they have the problem of not being as homogenous as the Maronite and Armenian communities. More specifically, at the last session of the conference, a round table discussion included the leaders of the three communities (Latins, Armenians and Maronites), Professor Constantinou, and a lively audience, who addressed the numerous problems that the minorities faced either individually or collectively.

National Minority Issues and Policy Changes

At the conference various issues confronting the minorities were raised and debated. It is difficult to understand the issues of communities which are not organised, such as the Roma and migrant workers. Migrant workers are well represented by the NGO Κίνηση για Ισότητα, Στήριξη, Αντιρατσισμό (Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism) or KISA, which has been unjustifiably maligned in both the media and some political circles, namely the nationalist parties, DIKO, EDEK and EVROKO. The Roma rely on local activists. As for the officially designated 'religious groups', the Maronites, Armenians and Latins, have representation in the House of Representatives, and they have formed community groups and NGOs (especially so for the Maronites and Armenians, who have traditionally been organised around various associations and clubs, and more recently pressure groups).

 The national minorities have been the victims of the Cyprus Problem in many different ways from the protagonists of that problem, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Exclusion, institutional assimilation, cultural and linguistic neglect, and, like Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots they have been victims of violence and displacement. The official designation 'religious groups' was perhaps because ethnic national identity did not apply to Cyprus (beyond a handful of elites) during Ottoman rule, developing after a period of decades when British policy, institutions, Greek nationals, and Hellenised Cypriots spread Hellenic identity to the island, to which Muslim elites, influenced by Ataturk's reforms, reacted in kind to advocate Turkish national identity.[29] Another reason for the 'religious' identification being applied to the national minorities was perhaps the

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27 Varnava (2009) 'The Minorities of Cyprus in the *History of Cyprus* Textbook for Lyceum Students', pp. 310-311.
28 An, 'The Cypriot Armenian Minority...', 288-289.
29 Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus* ..., pp. 152-201; A. Nevzat (2005) *Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus*, Oulu.

unwillingness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites to recognise any other ethnic national identities. To them, Cyprus is an island of Greeks and Turks and the Cyprus Problem is between Greeks and Turks. This notion was institutionalised when the constitution compelled the three 'religious groups' (Armenians, Maronites and Latins) to hold a vote on which community they wished to belong. This satisfied the bi-communal institutional structures of the state so as to facilitate electoral, tax and other responsibilities, but it has also had unintentional consequences which have been propelled too by the Cyprus Problem, namely the assimilation of the minorities into the Greek community (which they 'chose' to 'belong') as a subgroup of that community.[30]

It was not only Cyprus' constitutional framework which disempowered the national minorities, but also the actions of both the Greek and Turkish communities in trying to destroy the republic, culminating in the 1963-1964 civil war, which produced inter-communal violence and massacres. The three national minorities all suffered displacement, particularly Cypriot Armenians who fled their quarter of Old Nicosia in 1964, and Cypriot Maronites who fled their villages after the Turkish army intervention in 1974. But the impact has not simply been in terms of casualties and displacement.

The three 'religious groups' are of course 'represented' in Parliament. These representatives initially belonged to the Communal Chamber established as part of the 1960 Constitution. But the Constitution collapsed when the Greek Cypriot elite set up the Akritas Organisation (and several other paramilitary groups in the wake of the splintering of EOKA after 1960), which aimed to remove − through diplomacy or violence − the rights of Turkish Cypriots as an equal community.[31] This played into the Turkish Cypriot elite's aims of partition, and consequently, after Akritas' false-flag operations, clashes erupted in December 1963, resulting in massacres and violence into the middle of 1964, and necessitating the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP).[32] The result was that the Turkish Cypriots were able to justify their removal from the organs of the state, but failed to prevent the international community from recognising the Greek Cypriot leadership as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. With the Turkish Cypriots out, the Greek Cypriot elite changed the state's functioning. These changes not only cemented the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots, but further excluded the national minorities ('religious groups'), all of whom had voted to belong to the Greek community. The Communal Chamber was dissolved and its Greek Cypriot deputies were integrated into an enlarged House of

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30 In a referendum held on 14 November 1960, 1,077 Armenians, 1,046 Maronites, and 322 Latin-Catholics voted to 'belong' to the Greek community, with only five Armenians and one Roman Catholic voting in favour of adhering to the Turkish community. A. Emilianides (2009) 'The Legal Status of the Latin Community' in Varnava, Coureas and Elia (eds.), *The Minorities of Cyprus*, p. 230.

31 R. Patrick (1976) *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971*, Ontario: University of Waterloo; M. Drousiotis (2006) *The First Partition*, Nicosia: Alphadi.

32 *Ibid.*

Representatives with full powers. The three representatives of the 'religious groups' joined them, but without the same rights, only with 'observer' status. This obvious discrimination continues until this day, thus reflecting the Greek Cypriot elite's ingrained Greek ethnic nationalism and exclusion of other communities.

Societal exclusion and discrimination is one of the major grievances of leaders of the Maronite, Armenian and Latin communities in Cyprus. Not only are various policies and laws enacted and funds allocated in the House of Representatives which impact upon the national minorities as they do Greek Cypriots, but there are those policies and laws that only affect national minorities. Their representatives have no way of formally influencing these votes, but rather are forced to rely on Greek-Cypriot representatives contacting them for information and their views before voting. In education, the national minorities are virtually excluded from the curriculum bar a meagre mention at the very end of the *History of Cyprus* textbook for lyceum students. This section, if the students are taught it, isolates the national minorities from the main ethno-nationalist narrative the students are taught.[33] Is it any wonder that during the conference many members of all three communities, but especially those of the Latin and Maronite communities (because the Armenians, with their Armenian names, are more visible), expressed their disgust at how Greek Cypriot friends did not even know that Cyprus society included Maronite and Latin Christians, nor even who they were?[34]

For Cypriot Maronites, the RoC government's refusal to recognise CMA, spoken by villagers from Kormakitis, was considered both insulting and a reflection of the government's nationalist, exclusionist and discriminatory approach to non-'Greek' Cypriot Christians. Cypriot Maronites saw the injustice as part of a policy of assimilation into the Greek Cypriot community and a denial of their cultural and linguistic heritage. When the Council of Europe had first raised the issue of recognising the language, Papadopoulos' government denied its existence. Then, when a Council of Europe 'committee of experts' strongly urged reconsideration, the government countered with the erroneous claim that only a handful of elderly Maronites living in 'Turkish occupied northern Cyprus' spoke it and so they were beyond government control. Whether the RoC has access to the speakers is irrelevant; but in any event displaced Kormakiti community members speak CMA across the island. Scholars led by Alexander Borg devised an alphabet for CMA based on the Latin script and it was introduced in December 2007. The language is taught to Maronite Cypriots, no thanks, however, to the Papadopoulos government, which refused to allow its teaching during school hours at the Maronite state school (St Maron in Lakatamia, Nicosia), insisting that only the official state languages, Greek and Turkish, can be taught (although Turkish is not taught and

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33   Varnava, 'The Minorities of Cyprus in the *History of Cyprus* Textbook ...', pp. 299-313.
34   There is no empirical data to support the claims of the communities beyond their stories shared during the question, comment and answer sessions of the conference.

English is). Those pupils wishing to learn the language must attend lessons after hours. To the credit of the students and their instructors, by the end of 2009, they were performing plays in CMA.[35] Currently, the Ministry of Education and Culture is considering permitting the teaching of CMA as part of the curriculum at St Maron.[36]

Despite the interest of the academic community and community groups, and the election of a pro-reunification president in February 2008, many of the issues of the national minorities have not been adequately addressed. As has been the case in the past, issues other than the Cyprus Problem are relegated to the back of the filing cabinet or even the dustbin. One issue, after much pushing from the Maronite Cypriot community and academics, was however satisfactorily resolved, when in November 2008 Christofias' government recognised CMA as a Minority Language within the meaning of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. As Constantinou stated in his CMA Policy brief this decision signified a complete reversal with the Papadopoulos government's discriminatory policy.[37]

CMA's recognition reflected the cultural sensitivity of the Minister of the Interior, Neoclis Sylikiotis, and of the Minister of Education, Andreas Demetriou. In March 2008, at a seminar on immigration and those seeking asylum at the European University – Cyprus, Sylikiotis declared that 'Cyprus was and always will be multicultural because of its geographical position', and that 'Cypriots must change their perception of diversity' and 'understand that "different" people enrich a society'.[38] Demetriou, a Professor in Psychology, soon announced that the government intended to revise the history textbooks, making them more inclusive and that the 2008-2009 school year would have the theme 'reconciliation'.[39] Such views and policy initiatives met with vociferous disapproval from the nationalist parties closely aligned with the Church, namely DIKO and EDEK, despite these parties belonging to the coalition government. In the end, few policies have been implemented to alleviate the formal and informal exclusion and discrimination of members of the national minorities, owing to the focus on the reunification of the island via the direct bi-communal talks (between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders).

Epilogue

The talks have generated some anxiety for the national minorities; largely because of the previous blue print for the 'comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem', which Greek Cypriots voted down in a referendum in April 2004, but which Turkish Cypriots approved. There are a number

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35 *Koinotiko Vima* [Community Step], No. 63, December 2009, p. 23; *Ibid.*, No. 64, December 2009, p. 23.

36 Correspondence with the secretary of the Cypriot Maronite Parliamentary representative, 11 and 20 January 2010.

37 C. Constantinou (2009) 'The Protection and Revival of Cypriot Maronite Arabic', PRIO Cyprus Centre, Policy Brief, January.

38 *Cyprus Mail*, 22 March 2008, internet edition.

39 *Ibid.*, 6 July 2008; *Ibid.*, 29 July 2008.

of significant points regarding the national minorities of Cyprus and the five versions of the so-called Annan Plan: 1) in earlier versions, the national minorities were referred to as 'religious and other minorities', but because Greek and/or Turkish Cypriot elites did not like the reference to 'other minorities' this was removed;[40] 2) the rights of these 'religious minorities', given as Maronite, Latin and Armenian (in version three Gypsies were mentioned – see point below), were enshrined in the 'fundamental rights and liberties' article of the constitution, and were to be safeguarded according to 'international standards' (subsequently clarified in Article 11 where reference is made to the 'European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities') and would encompass cultural, religious, and educational rights, as well as representation in federal and constituent state parliaments; 3) in version four of the Annan Plan, the Roma were included as 'religious minorities', but in version five they were 'removed', no doubt, as Nicos Trimikliniotis and Corina Demetriou have claimed, because of Greek and/or Turkish Cypriot elite objections;[41] 4) the inclusion of the Cypriot Maronite villages in the Greek Cypriot constituent state.

The last point has created some ripples amongst Cypriot Maronites and their advocates. Reacting to hearsay that in a reunified Cyprus the Maronite villages in northern Cyprus today would be in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, Alkan Chaglar, a postgraduate student at the School of Oriental and African Studies, condemned Christofias. He claimed that the Maronite villages should form a third federal zone, to encourage integration and potentially lead to a 'Cypriotist' federal zone(s). Ironically, however, Chaglar's view is also separatist, potentially further enshrining differences rather than commonalities through ethnically separate constituent states.[42] Yet he raises important questions. How in a reunified Cyprus can the Maronite villages be best protected from assimilation? Should a reunified Cyprus promote a Cypriot identity? If so, why and how?

The first three points relate to the unwillingness of Greek and Turkish Cypriot elite to recognise the national minorities of Cyprus as 'national' or even as 'ethnic' minorities instead of religious 'groups' or simply 'minorities'. The word 'national' as opposed to 'religious' or 'ethnic' is important for various reasons: 'national' reflects historical longevity on the island and a shared past; it goes beyond religion (and race and ethnicity) as the basis of identification, recognising linguistic, cultural and social differences, as well as commonalities; it goes further, beyond ethnic national identity because of the civic responsibility of each citizen to the Cypriot state; but, most importantly, because 'national minorities' is used internationally and in the European Framework

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40   I am basing this claim on the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites did not like the reference to Roma as a 'religious group'. N. Trimikliniotis and C. Demetriou (2009) 'The Cypriot Roma and the Failure of Education' in Varnava, Coureas and Elia (eds.), *The Minorities of Cyprus*, p. 243, fn. 12.

41   *Ibid.* Constantinou, 'Aporias of Identity ...', pp. 249-250, 264.

42   *Cyprus Mail*, 9 May 2009.

Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. For various reasons, but especially legal, appropriate legal terminology and labels affects groups and individuals. There is also an unwillingness to recognise the Roma as a national minority in the Constitution, reflecting how prejudices cross communal boundaries (although, as a first step, Christofias' government has implicitly recognised the Roma in its 2009 Report to the Council of Europe).[43]

More broadly, this unwillingness to recognise national minorities goes to the very heart of the Cyprus Problem and to reunification. Moving beyond simply 'Greek community of Cyprus' and 'Turkish community of Cyprus' is important in order to recognise the diversity and multiple identities that exist, even a Cypriot identity. How can Cypriots retain their national identities, determined by cultural, religious and linguistic differences, while also coming closer together as Cypriots through understanding their shared past, social, cultural and even linguistic similarities, and through a civil identity that requires a responsibility and loyalty to the federal Cypriot state? Although the bi-zonal and bi-communal nature of any new Cypriot state does not automatically lend itself to encourage a Cypriot identity, institutional mechanisms, such as cross-voting, an inclusive education system, and emphasis on secularisation, would go some way in encouraging the recognition and thus benefits of Cypriot diversity.

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On Continuity and Change in National Identity Construction: An Initial Note on Greek-Cypriot Education, 1960-2010

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Abstract

In this paper, and in the context of this special issue on fifty years since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, we present an initial historicisation of Greek-Cypriot education since 1960 using, as a narrative and intellectual device, constructs of national identity. We argue here that four different historical moments in terms of national identity construction may be extracted from the available body of scholarship – the first years of Independence (1960-1974), the early post-74 period (1974-1994), the period between 1994-2003, and, the period between 2004-2010. In these different historical moments, education appears to have been given a major role in either restructuring or reaffirming and maintaining identities, and, as a result, ethnonational identities were in flux, veering between discourses of Hellenocentric, Cypriocentric and Helleno-cypriocentric identity.

Introduction

In this short article, and in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic of Cyprus, we present an initial historicisation of Greek-Cypriot education since the establishment of the Republic in 1960. In its current form, this historicisation is the product of both our systematic and critical engagement with the existing academic literature on the history of Greek-Cypriot education and our imaginative attempt to reinterpret and reconstruct this available body of scholarship using, as a narrative and intellectual organising device, different and often competing discourses of national identity. It is our assumption that the analytical powers of this theoretical framework have not been adequately explored as the existing literature more often than not tends to provide rather broad, descriptive and often atheoretical overviews of this period. It is our contention that these theoretical lenses can open up novel ways of understanding the first fifty years of education in the Republic of Cyprus.

In particular, we argue here that four different historical moments in terms of national identity construction can be constituted out of the available body of scholarship. In these moments – i.e. the first years of Independence (1960-1974), the early post-74 period (1974-1994), the period between 1994-2003, and, the period between 2004-2010 – education was given a major role either to restructure or to reaffirm and sustain existing identities. As a result, the overall picture of an

emerging field of academic inquiry suggests that during the past fifty years, national identities articulated for children were characterised by fluidity.

The available literature (see, e.g. POST Research Institute, 2007; Vural and Özuyanik, 2008; Papadakis, 2008; Latif, 2009) also suggests that Turkish-Cypriot education over the past fifty years shared similar features and predicaments to Greek-Cypriot education, oscillating between different discourses of identity. Due to space constrains, however, our focus in this article is only the domain of Greek-Cypriot education.

The article is divided into three sections. In the opening section, we outline, firstly, the main theoretical premises upon which our critical reading and restructuring of the literature is based and, secondly, the colonial educational legacy for the making of postcolonial identities in education. The second section takes on the task of defining the different identity discourses employed in this article to understand and narrate the first fifty years of Greek-Cypriot education, while the third – and the largest – is a sketch of the four different historical narratives of identity-making. In the conclusion, we seek to address several gaps we notice in the existing literature suggesting some areas for further research. In an attempt to construct and solidify a newly emerging field of study – the field of education and identity construction – these gaps and many others are sought to be filled in an ongoing study exploring national identity in Greek-Cypriot education policy, curricula and textbooks during the British and Independence periods.

Education and National Identity Construction

In part the article is grounded on theoretical premises drawn upon from social constructionist approaches to identity and education. It begins with our assumption that 'national identity' is not an essentialist and unchanging concept; rather, we construe it as a socially-situated discursive construct, that is, an artefact that is dependent on the socio-political and cultural contexts in which the making of identity takes place (see, e.g. Calhoun, 1997; Wodak *et al.*, 1999; Sutherland, 2005; Klerides, 2009a). Similarly, we define 'education' in terms of policy, curriculum and schoolbooks viewing them also as socio-political, ideological and cultural texts which more often than not serve political ends (see Ball, 2001 on policy; Apple, 2004 on curricula; Klerides, 2010 on textbooks).

It is also grounded on the idea that the formation of nation-states has often been based on an ethnocultural model of community formation (Habermas, 1996), a model that sought to draw a direct, causal link between culture and an ethnos (Cederman, 2001). In this project, the nation-state, as political scientists (e.g. Anderson, 1991), historians (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1994) and comparative historians of education (e.g. Green, 1990; Nóvoa, 2000) have argued, mobilised education – along with the media and other state mechanisms – to create, disseminate, sustain and perpetuate shared national myths, heroes, symbols, ideals, values and historical narratives, upon which notions of state authority and legitimacy as well as national belongingness and identification were rested.

The Republic of Cyprus does not fit well into this general view as the 1960 Constitution

allocated educational matters not to the Central Government but instead to the Greek and Turkish chambers, which sought, in turn, to maintain and perpetuate Greek and Turkish national identities, respectively, on the island (Kizilyürek and Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1997). According to the literature (see, e.g. Kitromilides, 1994; Charalambous, 1997, 2001; Bryant, 2004; Varnava, 2006; Persianis, 2006, 2010), the construction of a Greek national identity in Cyprus began towards the end of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century. Being perceived as an unredeemed part of the imagined community of Hellenism, Cyprus experienced the penetration of Greek irredentist discourses of identity during this period. Education was a key mechanism through which these discourses were transferred from Greece to Cyprus (Klerides, 2009b) and disseminated to the masses. During the period of the relatively *laisser-faire* education policy of the colonial government (1878 until about the 1920s), Greek-Cypriot education became actually a site of the production and re-production of national subjectivities loyal to Greece, the Greco-Christian culture and the ideal of *Enosis* (union with Greece). From the early 1930s and onwards, as the British authorities of Cyprus sought to increase their control over educational matters on the island, it further became a terrain of conflict: the Greek-Cypriot educational, ecclesiastical and political authorities interpreted and reacted against every colonial decision or initiative for education as an attempt of 'de-Hellenisation' and of imposing a Cypriot identity in order to perpetuate the colonial rule (Gregoriou, 2004a; Persianis, 2006, 2010).

Competing Discourses of Identity

To analyse Greek-Cypriot education in the period of Independence we mobilise as analytical tools three concepts of identity which have dominated Greek-Cypriot politics and society over the last century.

The first is *Hellenocentrism* emphasising the Greekness of Cyprus and its people (Loizos, 1974; Kitromilides, 1994; Bryant, 2004; Loizides, 2007). Having been articulated in Greece during the later parts of the nineteenth century first and then moved to Cyprus, as we noted above, this discourse promotes the membership of the Greeks of Cyprus or the Cypriot Hellenism to the wider imagined community of Hellenism or the Greek nation on the basis of ethnocultural criteria of national belongingness – common descent and culture defined by religion, language, customs and arts – and excludes the 'Turks of Cyprus' (and other Cypriot ethnic communities). This discourse, prevailing in the political, popular and intellectual spheres during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, serves to legitimise *Enosis*, and has been mainly supported by the teachers and their union (Charalambous, 2001), the political right and the Church of Cyprus.

The second is *Cypriocentrism* which has been mainly supported by the political left in both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities (Spyrou, 2001; Papadakis, 2006; Peristianis, 2006) and non-governmental organisations such as the New Cyprus Association (Peristianis, 1995; Mavratsas, 1998). It speaks of 'an "imagined community" of Cypriots' (Papadakis, 1995, pp. 362-363), thus stressing the Cypriot identity the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot

communities share and setting Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots apart from the Greeks and the Turks as citizens and inhabitants of Greece and Turkey respectively. Although this discourse tends to define identity along political-legal and territorial factors – i.e. a shared *patria* of laws and institutions, a common territory, citizenship, and, a civic religion understood as a body of political objectives, traditions and values common to all nationals – it also makes use of cultural elements, such as common traditions, customs, arts; but not religion, language and descent (Attalides, 1979; Mavratsas, 1998).

The third is *Hellenocypriocentrism* which signifies and interprets Cyprus and its past, present and future, from a purely Greek-Cypriot perspective, and which seems to have emerged in a sharp form after 1974. It represents Cyprus as a monocultural state inhabited by citizens of Greek origin and of Orthodox religion; those who identify with this discourse perceive themselves as descendants of the Mycenaeans and, though they have no political agenda for *Enosis* with Greece, their representation of Cyprus tends to exclude Turkish Cypriots as 'Others-Enemy' – albeit not always – and more often than not includes only the part of Cyprus that is under the control of the Republic of Cyprus (Pachoulides, 2007; Kazamias, 2010; Psaltis, 2008). In other words, it may be seen as an 'in-between' discourse of identity depicting Cyprus as politically, territorially and socio-economically different from Greece but similar in terms of culture, tradition and race.

In this article, we attempt to understand Greek-Cypriot education after independence as a social arena in which these versions of identity struggle for supremacy, arguing that ethnonational identities constructed for children were in constant flux, veering between discourses of Hellenocentric, Cypriocentric and Hellenocypriocentric identity even within the same period. In different historical times different identities tended to prevail in this arena; their hegemony, however, was not unchallenged.

The First Years of Independence (1960-1974)

Hellenocentrism, having been formed and having prevailed in the British period, continued to dominate Greek-Cypriot education in the first years of Independence, although its dominance, as we also suggest here, was contested by forces and voices who favoured Hellenocypriocentrism as a means to modernise Greek-Cypriot society and economy. Continuity in the dominance of Hellenocentrism in education during this period lies to some extent at the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus, since the 1960 Constitution defined each community (Greek and Turkish) clearly in terms of ethnic origin, language, culture, and religion (Appendix D: Part 1 – General Provisions of Constitution, Article 2). The provisions of the Constitution drew quite distinct categories of Cypriot citizenship, projecting a political/state Cypriot identity which was not as emotionally appealing as ethno-cultural identities – Greek and Turkish. The Constitution thus contributed to the persistence of the *Enosis* ideal which meant, especially in the immediate post-1960 years, that the Republic was just an intermediate step toward union with Greece (Xydis, 1973; Patrick, 1976).

Likewise, the educational system remained segregated in structure and was further used as the cornerstone of both national ideologies by Greece and Turkey to increase their influence and widen the gap between the two communities (Kizilyürek and Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1997). In Karagiorges' words (1986), 'the Independence times resulted in the educational system, which should have promoted co-operation and trust, remaining outside the sphere and responsibility and control of the Central Government. The two Communal Chambers, the Greek and the Turkish, under which the education system of the newly born republic functioned, looked towards their respective mother countries for educational policies, objectives and orientations' (p. 152). Thus, the cultivation of a common Cypriot identity remained an undesirable aim and policy orientation for Greek-Cypriot education (Persianis, 1996; Koutselini-Ioannidou, 1997) and instead 'the full identification of [Greek] Cypriot education with that in Greece' was espoused by the Greek Communal Chamber (Karagiorges, 1986, p. 37). This orientation, grounded on the underlying assumption of the Greek identity of the Cypriot Hellenism and thus of their membership to the Greek nation, became especially salient in 1965 with the unilateral establishment of a Ministry of Education that catered for the ideological needs of Greek-Cypriots (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007).

At the same time, however, underpinning the rhetoric of state officials, especially the Minister of Finance, R. Solomonides, the Minister of Labour, T. Papadopoulos, and the Minister of Trade and Industry, N. Demetriou, who were calling for changes in education to meet the emerging needs of the newly-established and fast developing Republic, was a subtle version of Hellenocypriocentrism. Since the socio-economic needs of Cyprus were different from those of Greece, these officials argued, education should also diverge in content – but not in its broader philosophical orientation which was to remain Hellenocentric (Persianis, 1996; Koutselini-Ioannidou, 1997). This argument gained its legitimacy from the belief that although Cyprus and Greece shared the same culture, they were different societies with different economies. It occurred when support for Independence, perceived by certain political circles as the only 'feasible' situation, started to win ground at the expense of the ideal of *Enosis*, which was now articulated as the 'desirable' situation (Patrick, 1976; Attalides, 1979).

Perhaps the most noticeable exponent of a Hellenocypriocentrist identity in education during this period was F. Petrides. As a headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, Petrides criticised Greek curricula and textbooks as failing to follow acceptable pedagogical principles and as focusing on teaching the glory of the past and the achievements of ancestors, whilst neglecting the social and economic needs of everyday modern life (Karagiorges, 1986). During his short term in office as Minister of Education (1972-1974), he initiated the collection of '[Greek] Cypriot material that will be incorporated in Greek text-books at both primary and secondary levels' (cited in Karagiorges, 1986, p. 56); this also evokes the Hellenocypriocentric discourse of identity as 'everyday life' as another domain that differentiates the Greek-Cypriots from the mainland Greeks (Mavratsas, 1999).

The Early Post-74 Period (1974-1994)

We suggest here that during the period between 1974-1994, especially the years 1976-1980, the hegemony of Hellenocentrism in education was challenged by an emergent Cypriocentrism. This was a period when Greek nationalism and *Enosis* were discredited amongst Greek-Cypriots and a Cypriot ideology projecting a multiethnic Cypriot people and stressing loyalty along state lines dominated Greek-Cypriot politics (Peristianis, 1995; Mavratsas, 1998). The focus of such political discourse stemmed from the need to form dialogue with the international community and the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of reunifying Cyprus. To this end, the terminology of collective identification began to change: 'Greek-Cypriots' and 'Turkish-Cypriots' started to be used as identity labels (Gregoriou, 2004b) rather than the 'Greeks' and 'Turks' (of Cyprus) used in the Constitution and during British rule. This hyphenated terminology acknowledged both ethnic background and the common Cypriotness necessary to back up the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus.

A key voice challenging the dominance of Greekness and its Hellenocentric educational form was Ch. Sofianos, Minister of Education from 1976 until 1980, who advocated changes in education along Cypriocentric – as well as Hellenocypriocentric – lines (Kazamias, 2010). During his term in office he introduced radical changes, such as the institutionalisation of the teaching of the 'History of Cyprus' and civics in secondary education and the production of curricula and textbooks in Cyprus (see Sofianos, 1986), which can be interpreted as modes of setting the Greek-Cypriots apart from the Greek nation but not necessarily closer to the Turkish Cypriots. For example, although the textbooks of History of Cyprus produced during the periods 1976-1980 and 1990-1993 contain explicit traces of Cypriotness depicting, for instance, the two Cypriot groups as 'compatriots' (Koullapis, 1998-1999) and as living peacefully and brotherly together in mixed villages (Klerides, 2008), they are not written on the whole from an inclusive Cypriot perspective but from an exclusive Greek-Cypriot angle (Papadakis, 2008).

In addition, the aim of education during the period between 1974-1994, as stated in official policy documents and in the new primary curricula (1981), no longer had as a prerequisite to reproduce and cultivate Helleno-Christian ideals and values, which placed Cyprus within the symbolic boundaries of the Greek nation; on the contrary, it stressed the preparation of democratic citizens, the preparation for occupations and life, the enhancement of Cyprus as an independent state, the promotion of tolerance and respect for Cypriot cultural diversity and the cultivation of friendship among the various communities on the island, especially Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (Sofianos, 1986; Koutselini-Ioannidou, 1997; Kazamias, 2010).

However, despite the rise of Cypriocentrism in Greek-Cypriot politics and society after 1974 and attempts to modernise and democratise education by Sofianos and others, substantial changes in the content of education did not take place and Hellenocentrism continued to prevail in policy, curricula and textbooks in varying degrees. As Koutselini-Ioannidou (1997) notes 'the curriculum continues to preserve its national humanistic character and supports the pervasiveness of a

supremacist national ideology' (p. 407). Continuity can be partly explained by the strong reactions against the 1976-1980 reforms by 'conservative forces', to use Sofianos' terminology (1986), such as the Right Party of Cyprus, the right-wing government of Greece and conservative circles within the Church of Cyprus and the Ministry of Education, arguing that educational differentiation between Greece and Cyprus would lead to cultural differentiation, would undermine the Greek identity of Cyprus and would create Cypriot consciousness, leading eventually to the annihilation of Cypriot Hellenism (pp. 144-146).

In a context of state formation and the legitimacy of independence (Persianis, 2004), post-1974 education seems to have become a key ideological mechanism of the state to educate the younger generations of Greek-Cypriots into Hellenocypriocentricism. Two examples can be extracted from the existing literature to back this claim. The first is socialising with the official Greek-Cypriot historical narrative that suggests a particular version of the Cypriot past and functions implicitly to justify a particular vision for the future – of a reunited Cyprus. Papadakis (1995) points out that according to this narrative, which was articulated in the early post-1974 years, the beginning of the past is the peaceful symbiosis of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Ottoman and British Cyprus. The natural and definitive end of this symbiosis should be the creation of a shared state. In 1955, always according to the official narrative, a struggle started for independence and, following a four-year struggle against the British, the island became autonomous in 1960. From then on it was independent until 1974, when the coup gave Turkey the excuse it always wanted to capture Cyprus. A few days after the coup, the Turks invaded the island, destroying independence and interrupting the coexistence of its people. This account of the past is present, for instance, in various forms in the history textbooks that were written in the early 1990s and are still in use in secondary education today (Klerides, 2008); clearly it is constituted from the Greek-Cypriot point of view, as Turkish-Cypriot readings of the past often emphasise conflict instead, in order to justify the current division and the creation of two separate states (Kizilyürek, 1999); and more importantly, it does not contradict the thesis of the cultural Greekness of Cyprus.

The second example of Hellenocypriocentrism in education is the cross-curricular theme entitled 'I know, I don't forget, and I struggle' (see Christou and Philippou, 2010). Being also projected from a Greek-Cypriot perspective, this theme was mobilised to instil the desire for the reunification of the island by constructing memories of the occupied areas so that the 'fighting spirit' of the pupils was kept alive (Christou, 2006). The same spirit was also found to be an emphasis of civic curricula (Koutselini and Papanastasiou, 1997). However, Christou (2006) concludes that 'the national goal of the post-1974 curriculum is discursively empty; it falls short of constructing an imagination of what the future will look like in a reunified Cyprus' (p. 3). This discursively empty curriculum goal ultimately leaves identity void of any Cypriocentric content that would relate with a reunified Cyprus. Indeed a recent study of Greek-Cypriot primary and secondary curricula and textbooks for history, geography, and civic education indicated that these

texts did not address the political foundations upon which a solution to the problem had been at the political level in 1977 (which is a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality for the two communities). Instead, the solution was portrayed, again, from a Hellenocypriocentric angle, as a simple matter of 'return' of the Greek-Cypriots ('victims') to the occupied north, depending on Turkey's ('victimizer') political will to resolve the problem (Philippou and Varnava, 2009).

The Period between 1994-2003

Hellenocentrism and Hellenocypriocentrism in education continued to prevail after the rise of the Right in power in 1993 and its re-election in 1998. Many of the textbooks which have been cited in the previous period as enhancing Hellenocypriocentrism continued to be used, even though new curricula were introduced in 1994 for primary education and slightly revised in 1996 (Ministry of Education and Culture of Cyprus (MoEC) 1996). The aim of developing a Greek national identity featured quite prominently in this and other documents, reflecting the broader political climate of the 1990s marked by the return of Greek national ideology in Greek-Cypriot politics, albeit in a form which excluded *Enosis* (Peristianis, 1995; Mavratsas, 1998). The curriculum also included the need to prepare children for the 'European orientations' of Cyprus in its main aims; however this was not conducted in ways which challenged or revisited Hellenocentric or Hellenocypriocentric discourses of national identity but rather re-inforced them, since 'Greekness' was perceived as a medium for 'Europeanness' (Philippou, 2004). The educational policy of 'Greece-Cyprus Unified Education' which was put forward (see Koutselini and Michaelidou, 2004) is another example of the strong attention to the national role of education during this period and 'hellenocentric education' was in fact the term used to characterise its philosophy and priorities. At the same time, shortly before EU accession and due to increasing immigration in the 1990s, the MoEC introduced the rhetoric of multicultural education (Memorandum for the Beginning of the 2001-2002 school year to acknowledge that Cypriot society was 'becoming multicultural' due to the influx of numerous economic immigrants (MoEC, 2002; Angelides *et al.,* 2004; Zembylas, 2010). However, this formal recognition of multiculturalism as a new (rather than old) phenomenon avoided framing the Cyprus problem from the Turkish-Cypriot perspective as a problem of ethnic violence and national anxiety that has historically marked difference in Cyprus (Gregoriou, 2004a). It reiterated a representation of Cyprus as 'recently multicultural' rather than 'historically multicultural' and a perseverance of a representation of Cyprus as 'historically Greek'. These points signify a failure to acknowledge 'old' and 'recent' diversity in Cyprus, veering between Hellenocypriocentrism and Hellenocentrism, as, for example, Philippou (2009) and Philippou *et al.,* (2008) have shown occurs in civics and geography curricula and textbooks of this period (and still in use today): Cypriot citizenship as a legal-political identity is emphasised as a means to legitimise the Greek-Cypriot perspective on the Cyprus problem as a violation of an internationally recognised state by a Turkish invasion and occupation. During this period, therefore Greek-Cypriot education seemed to be both 'attached' to

the one of 'motherland' Greece and 'appropriated' in monological ways which negated or silenced Cyprus' historical diversity.

The Period between 2004-2010

Let us begin our analysis of this period by noting that this is quite provisional as it is a very complex period where there is an educational reform in progress; it is not clear at the moment where it will lead in terms of national identity discourses – depending on the outcome, perhaps in the future, this period will be examined as part of the previous one, for example. This is a period during which the co-existence of all Hellenocentric, Cypriocentric and Hellenocypriocentric discourses is a key feature, against a background of a highly contested and ongoing Educational Reform initiated in 2003. One of the key documents which have been produced for this reform by the Ministry of Education and Culture is a Report produced by the Educational Reform Committee, a document which castigated both Helleno- and Hellenocypriocentrism and called for an ideological turn away from them and towards Cypriot and European citizenship and identity to address the challenges of the twenty first century (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2004; Kazamias, 2010). It has caused heated public debates and has been heavily criticised on a number of points (e.g. Open University Group of Academics, 2004), but mainly for its ideological positions with regards to national identity, favouring Cypriotness at the expense of Greekness. It remained at the margins of the education reform process until the summer of 2008, following the rise of the Left to government in March 2008, who saw education as a crucial site of mobilising support for the reunification of the island and legitimising and circulating to society their historically-marginalised perspectives on past, culture and identity (Klerides, in press). At the moment this reform process involves the development of new curricula for all subject-areas in both primary and secondary education, which are expected to be gradually implemented to all schools beginning in 2010.

The ideological shift is evident also in other documents where Cyprus is constructed to some extent as historically multicultural and deviates from the construction of Cyprus as recently multicultural and historically Greek (encountered in the Memorandum for 2001-2002 of the previous period). For example, Stylianou (2008), the General Director of the MoEC notes in her greeting for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue:

> 'It is the wish of us all to elevate [anadeiksume] the Republic of Cyprus to a model of harmonious symbiosis of the cultural elements of the local communities as well as those of the immigrants, but also as a bridge of communication of the cultures of Europe, the region and the world … . To this we expect that a just and viable solution of the political problem of our island will contribute, so that the vision of *together in diversity* becomes a tangible reality in our place [topo mas]' (emphasis in original).

Along similar lines, the Circular introducing the three key aims for 2007-2008, the first of which is intercultural dialogue, states: 'Cyprus, even though it has always been at the crossroads of

diverse civilizations and despite the fact that it had always had *elements of a multicultural society*, it experiences today *an unprecedented presence* of foreigners, workers, visitors, even permanent residents' (MoEC, 2007, p. 1; emphases added). However, though these narratives acknowledge diversity in Cyprus as a matter of local (and therefore historical) diversity and not only as that 'imported' by immigrants (as the 2001-2002 Memorandum does), they make no reference to the past failure of these diverse communities to peacefully live together, a vision anticipated to unproblematically occur in Ministry rhetoric once a 'just' solution is found.

This changes in the school years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, when one of the official aims for Greek-Cypriot public education became 'the cultivation of a culture of peaceful co-existence, mutual respect and cooperation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots aiming at ending the occupation and reuniting our homeland and our people' (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2009). Again, this aim produced various reactions from numerous sources, including educators, parents, academics and others, with some arguing that this aim should follow a solution to the Cyprus Problem, whilst others supporting this aim as a means towards a solution; in a number of cases, this aim was viewed as a 'threat' to national Greek identity and as incompatible with the cross-curricular theme of '*Den Ksehno*' which is still expected to be implemented in various ways in Greek-Cypriot education (e.g. Aggelidou, 2008).

Conclusion

In this article we argue that three discourses of national identity in Greek-Cypriot education have been developing in parallel, in complex, shifting and conflictual ways. More particularly, between 1960-1974 Hellenocentrism continued to prevail, as during the British period, but its hegemony was contested by socio-economic voices. After 1974 it was challenged for a very brief period by an emergent Cypriocentrism and was coupled with Hellenocypriocentric discourses which sought to support the representation of Cyprus as an independent republic invaded by another country. The 1994-2003 period enhanced both Hellenocypriocentrism and Hellenocentrism with new curricula and policies, despite emerging discourses of 'multiculturalism' and a 'European dimension'. Debates and discussions around identity have been a continuous key feature over the last fifty years; however, multiple or conflicting discourses have been especially salient since 2004, when an Educational Reform process was initiated. Though a turn to Cypriocentrism appears in the latest Educational Reform process (e.g. through a direct recognition of Cyprus as historically multicultural; a direct aim for reconciliation anticipated to feed into a reunified, independent Cyprus; and a castigation of ethnonational approaches to policy, curricula and textbooks), it remains to be seen whether or how this will be educationally endorsed, as it is not unaccompanied by discourses of both Helleno- and Hellenocypriocentrism.

From an epistemic perspective, we seek in this short article to map out and contribute to the making of an emerging academic field of study that engages with the construction of identity in and through Greek-Cypriot education over the first fifty years of the Republic of Cyprus. In

revisiting existing primary and secondary sources we provide an overview of the existing lines of scholarship on education organised in a particular historical order, using different discourses of identity as a narrative and intellectual device. Yet, this initial historicisation of education needs to be tested more rigorously by additional empirical research and, if necessary, to be reconstructed along new evidence. For example, and in addressing some of the gaps identified in the literature, we suggest that there is an urgent need to examine how the Hellenocentric policy discourse of the period 1960-1974 was implemented in actual praxis; how the 1976-1980 reforms are related to an emergent Cypriocentrism in society; and how Cypriocentrism influenced the curricula and textbooks that were produced in the first post-1974 years. We also need some detailed work on teachers' and students' discourses of identity, on state officials' rhetoric challenging the dominance of Hellenocentrism in the 1960s, as well as on the biographies of key actors in policy-making such as Spyridakis, Sofianos, Aggelidou and many others, if we are to understand the complex relation between education and identity construction over the last fifty years. It is also necessary to expand and broaden our research on curricula and textbooks to include studies on their usage in classrooms and on such neglected subjects as religion, geography, civics, literature and language. Indeed the scope of our broader ongoing study from which this article draws upon is an in-depth exploration of national identity in Greek-Cypriot education policy, curricula and schoolbooks during the British and Independence periods. Still, the intellectual challenges emerging out of these periods can only be dealt with collectively and in a series of studies, including comparative studies with Turkish-Cypriot education, if we are to gain a better understanding of Greek-Cypriot education in the first fifty years of the Republic of Cyprus.

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Greek Cypriot Media Development and Politics

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Abstract

The article examines the factors and conditions that influenced the development of the Greek Cypriot media in Cyprus. On the one hand it traces the link between changes in the media landscape and on the other it pursues the relationship between politics, technology and economy. It appears that the course of political life contributed to either the increase or decrease of the number of newspapers in connection with their political and ideological positions. Information from power holders or elite groups about conspiracies was often uncritically published and while pluralism does exist, extreme polarisation is observed on critical issues, which limits public debate.

Keywords: Press, media development, politics, Cyprus

> 'The public opinion must learn the truth and the Interior Ministry would facilitate this by issuing an official statement. The people need to know the truth, which will enable them to disapprove in the stronger terms possible those who believe that they could make plans to trouble this country's peace, but also in order to apportion responsibilities and ask that sanctions be imposed on those competent persons, whoever they are, in case all that [information] about a conspiracy would prove just bubbles [groundless]. It's the government's duty to explain immediately and at the same time announce sanctions against the ones and the others according to the results of the investigation on the conspiracy' (Ελευθερία [Eleftheria], 10 August 1960).

The excerpt quoted here summarises the reaction of the newspaper *Eleftheria* to information leaked by official sources to the media about a conspiracy to cause trouble and 'bloodshed' on the day of the declaration of Cyprus Independence, on 16 August 1960. In fact, it highlights the paper's perception of the role of the press. First, the people have the right to know the truth; second, by knowing the truth, the people can position themselves on the specific subject; third, they can on the one hand impute responsibility and, on the other hand ask for the punishment of officials spreading unfounded information. In a single, albeit long sentence, the newspaper laid down the fundamental principles that should govern the relations between the media, the public and the power-holders. In the background of this reaction was the question of the role of some newspapers as mere disseminators of leaked 'information' by official sources. It raises two questions related to the extent to which the principles laid down were properly applied and respected by the press as well as to the nature of relations entertained between the press and the power holders.

The aim of this article is to briefly examine Greek Cypriot media development and interaction with authority, i.e. power holders and elite groups. More specifically, it examines the development of the media in association with politics, political power and other factors that influenced its course. This is a first attempt to delineate the subject, since more extensive research is needed to present a complete account. For obvious reasons due to the language barrier, accessibility, and deeper knowledge of the subject, I could not include in this study the Turkish Cypriot press. The main argument here is that the development of Greek Cypriot media and politics appears closely linked, with the media adequately responding to their watchdog and fourth estate roles in rare cases only.

As in most aspects of the life of the Republic of Cyprus the media developed mainly in two phases, namely the Makarios and post-Makarios eras. The first one began after the Agreements leading to independence (February 1959) and extended through to 1980; the second phase developed from 1980 onwards. Makarios' combined offices as Archbishop and President of the Republic, and his charisma imposed him above all people and institutions (Markides, 1977). This even extended beyond his death in 1977; he turned into the main reference figure, a target or a source of legitimation for the media. Each of the two phases can be divided into specific periods within which media development displays different characteristics. But note that no clear cut boundaries can be set between these periods as the passage from one period to the next is gradual.

Media Development

The state controlled broadcasting channels of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (*Ραδιοφωνικό Ίδρυμα Κύπρου* – RIK[1]) monopolised the airwaves for 30 years; private broadcasting first started operation in 1990 (radio) and 1992 (television), which is a turning point in media development. Both the landscape and RIK were to change fundamentally in the years that followed.

The press operating at the time of the London-Zurich agreements that led to Cyprus independence was to undergo significant changes in interesting ways. Features of its development can be deduced from the study of data relating to new titles published and the life duration of each publication. It is noticeable that three of today's daily newspapers, six Greek plus the only English language daily, were first published before 1959.[2] No old weeklies have survived, other than mouthpieces of trade unions.

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1   Established by the British as Cyprus Broadcasting Service (1953 – Radio, 1957 – TV) changed to Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation upon Cyprus independence.

2   Today's dailies by year of publication: *Cyprus Mail* (English, 1945), *Αλήθεια* [Alithia] (1952 weekly, 1982 daily), *Φιλελεύθερος* [Phileleftheros] (1955), *Χαραυγή* [Haravgi] (1956), *Σημερινή* [Simerini] (1976), *Μάχη* [Machi] (1994 – second period) *Πολίτης* [Politis] (1999).

The study of *Table 1* provides us with interesting data regarding the evolution of the press:[3]

- More than 90 daily and weekly newspapers were published over a 30-year period (1960-1990); three per year on average, but only one in three survived for more than two years. The year with the highest number of new titles per year is 1981, with nine, followed by 1974 with eight, 1985 with seven, and 1964, 1982 and 1987 with six. Interestingly the biggest number of first time publications over a three-year period occurred from 1980 to 1982 with 18 titles, followed by the period 1974 to 1976 with 15 titles.

- In some cases, the proliferation of new titles was accompanied by the disappearance of others that had published for many years; this closing down was not always simultaneous, it could precede or follow by one year.

- A closer look at the development of the press reveals that these phenomena, i.e. the massive arrival and survival or conversely the disappearance of newspapers coincided with significant events, political, social, economic or other.

Significant political events can be associated with changes in the media landscape. Some of the existing media ceased publication, for various reasons, because they could no longer sustain enough audience to justify their existence. Conversely, new media could represent new ideologies and respond to the need to voice and circulate new ideas. In most cases, newspaper enterprises were family businesses, and the launch of a new title could also mean an attempt by the publisher to promote his ideas or gain political influence and authority.

Thus, only four publications (the daily *Μάχη* [Machi], 1960, and weeklies *Εθνική* [Ethniki], 1959, *Θάρρος* [Tharros], 1961, and *Συναγερμός* [Synagermos], 1962) out of those that appeared between 1959 and two years after Cyprus independence survived through to 1974. All four publications were supporters of the pursuance of *enosis*, union with Greece; this pro-*enosis* trend was strengthened by another two dailies, *Αγών* [Agon] and *Πατρίς* [Patris], as this goal from 1964, became the choice of the Greek Cypriot leadership following the collapse of bi-communality in Christmas of 1963. Equally, six newspapers with a 10 to 38-year-long history, ceased publication in between 1960 and 1964, of which *Χρόνος* [Chronos] and *Παρατηρητής* [Paratiritis] had been publishing in Limassol since 1925 and *Αγροτική* [Agrotiki] in Athienou. It seems that after independence the periphery started losing ground to the benefit of news distributed in the capital and eventually echoed island-wide concerns and ideas. The case of *Έθνος* [Ethnos] is also an interesting one as this daily, founded by 'the father' of the traditional right, Themistoklis Dervis, initially supported Yiannis Clerides in the first presidential elections of December 1959. It quickly shifted support for Makarios' candidacy to rally the new power, but this did not help, as it became the first paper to lose the battle for survival only weeks after independence.

In 1964, along with pro-*enosis* titles one populist daily *Τελευταία Ώρα* [Teleftea Ora] and one satirical weekly, *Σατιρική* [Satiriki], also appeared to voice anti-imperialist and anti-*enosis*

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3   The table was compiled from data in Christophorou, 1993 and further research for the period after 1985.

positions. *Τελευταία Ώρα* [Teleftea Ora] published daily to alert news of developing Anglo-American devilish conspiracy plans and imminent Turkish invasion activity. For some months it became a supporter of the Athens dictatorship, that seized power in April 1967, but it ended publication in December 1969 and was immediately replaced by *Μεσημβρινή* [Mesimvrini].

Other kinds of political events and processes that affected the course of the press were the reshaping of the political and party landscape. It began in 1968 after the pronounced shift by Makarios to the pursuance of independence instead of *enosis* and the ensuing creation of the first post-independence political parties. *Γνώμη* [Gnomi] (1968) and *Τα Νέα* [Ta Nea] (1969) were the first post-independence party mouthpieces, of DEK (National Democratic Party – *Δημοκρατικό Εθνικό Κόμμα*) and EDEK (Unified Democratic Union of the Centre – *Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου*). During this period, two new apolitical weeklies were also published for the first time, i.e. Ασύρματος [Asyrmatos] and Φακός [Fakos]. Attempts for a new daily (*Πρωινή/Νέα Πρωινή* [Proini /Nea Proini]) representing the voice of terrorist EOKA B were short lived, contrary to the fate of the more pro-Makarios evening paper *Απογευματινή* [Apogevmatini] (1972), published for more than 30 years. The same phenomenon of the publication of new press titles was repeated after the collapse of right wing parties *Ενιαίον* [Eniaion] and *Προοδευτική Παράταξη* [Progressive Front] and the formation of new parties, the centre DIKO (*Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα* – [Democratic Party]) and conservative DISY (*Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός* – [Democratic Rally]) in 1976, along with the emergence of a new pro-Makarios power team to replace the conservatives. These changes in the party landscape following the blow of the coup against Makarios and the invasion of the Turkish Army, as well as the ousting of Glafcos Clerides from power were accompanied by the gradual disappearance of pro-*enosis*, opposition to Makarios titles that appeared from 1959 to 1964 or later, including the conservative newspaper *Ελευθερία* [Eleftheria]. In the landscape that emerged both the old and the newly published newspapers Ελεύθερος Λαός [Eleftheros Laos], Δημοκρατία [Dimokratia], Δημοκρατική [Dimokratiki], Ελευθερωτής [Eleftherotis] and Ελεύθερη Κύπρος [Eleftheri Kypros] supported Makarios. More important changes were brought about by the reshaping of politics in 1980 after the death of President Makarios. Without his uniting authority, the camp of his supporters fragmented and gave birth to new parties, NEDIPA (*Νέα Δημοκρατική Παράταξη* [New Democratic Front]), PAME (*Παγκύπριο Ανανεωτικό Μέτωπο* [Pancyprian Renewal Front]) and EK (*Ένωση Κέντρου* [Union of the Centre]). More importantly, politics evolved away from the Late President's omnipresence and influence, and genuine party competition started in earnest. The publication of party mouthpieces and other press organs raised the number of daily and weekly newspapers in 1981 to 32, the highest ever recorded (see further Christophorou, 1993).

Along with the above phenomena, the prospect of elections especially after 1980 offered an opportunity for the publication of new dailies or weeklies. Additional publications typically

occurred in the year prior to elections or in the year that the elections took place, but after the elections were over the major part of this press usually disappeared. Such examples were *Ελευθεροτυπία* [Eleftherotypia] of DIKO in 1980, *Κήρυκας* [Kirykas] of EK and *Κυπριακή* [Kypriaki] of PAME in 1981. When elections coincided with the emergence of new political forces, as they did between 1980-1983 and 1987-1988 the increase was even sharper. *Οικονομική* [Ikonomiki], *Επίκαιρη* [Epikeri], *Ελευθερία της Γνώμης* [Eleftheria tis Gnomis], *η Ώρα* [I Ora], *Παρασκήνιο* [Paraskinio], and *Εμπρός* [Embros] were all published in 1987. Similarly, many ceased publication during the same periods. The changing political environment was a contributory factor on the one hand to this proliferation of new titles, while on the other hand the possibility of acquiring public funds for the publication of electoral rolls played a part.

Technological developments together with the cost of modernisation and the benefits that came with it also affected the press. Thus, the dailies gained advantage from the ease that phototypesetting offered and in 1981-1982 they increased publication to seven times a week instead of six, filling the gap of 'dailies-free' Monday. The initial inclusion of 'Monday edition' below the daily title was soon to be removed. The 7/7 decision of the dailies was a deadly coup for all the weeklies as they could ill-afford the competition of papers that disposed more resources and had a regular, daily readership. Eight weekly and one daily newspaper – the more prominent of which were liberal *Κύπρος* [Kypros] (1952), *Σατιρική* [Satiriki] (1964), and *Ασύρματος* [Asyrmatos] (1968) – ceased publication and pluralism received a serious blow. Contrary, however, to several aborted attempts in 1984 and 1985, new weeklies published in 1987 (*Επίκαιρη* [Epikeri], *Ελευθερία της Γνώμης* [Eleftheria tis Gnomis], *Παρασκήνιο* [Paraskinio], and *Εμπρός* [Embros]) had a somewhat better fate, with *Paraskinio* circulating for eleven years and the others for three to four years.

Major changes in the 1990s were linked not only to technological advancement (computers, satellites, the Internet) but also to changes in the media landscape, namely the privatisation of broadcasting and the creation of commercial radio and television stations. Commercial broadcasting was introduced as a result of pressure by social forces and local authorities as well as the general climate in regard to technological progress and changes in European media policies. In the press sector, enterprises had already started shifting from family businesses to corporations and, when cross media restrictions were eased early in the millennium, some became all-media corporations. During the earlier period 1959 to 1964, all pro-*enosis* newspapers that survived beyond 1974 were owned by EOKA fighters (N. Sampson – *Μάχη* [Machi] and *Θάρρος* [Tharros]; F. Constantinides – *Συναγερμός* [Synagermos], and N. Koshis – *Αγών* [Agon]). Publishing offered the opportunity to capitalise on influence and authority gained through the owner's participation in the anti-colonial struggle. On the other side of the press landscape, *Εθνική* [Ethniki] and *Πατρίς* [Patris] were the mouthpieces of EOKA fighters also, promoting their radical support for *enosis*. Today, Dias Publishing and Alithia are all-media (Radio, Television and Press) companies, and Phileleftheros is owned, or affiliated to radio and press media.

The competition and the need for investment in technology together with other factors made it almost impossible for a new daily to survive. *Politis*, which was founded early in 1999 is the last daily newspaper to be added to the existing ones, however, the number of dailies was reduced from ten in 1990 to only six in 2010.[4] Newspapers became more than just papers, resembling supermarket multimedia packages; in addition to more pages and a more diverse content, special supplements and magazines, they offer CDs and DVDs as well as more traditional items, such as books. Supplements rarely cover social or political issues, historical events or other. The dominant subjects of publications normally include television programmes, cooking, and lifestyles and are mostly Cyprus editions of magazines published in Greece. It appears generally that the weight of the packet is more important than the content. In addition to the above, the connection of media content to corporate interests and editorial promotion of businesses has since become more than visible.

While the decline of partisan press continued, most of the dailies since the late 1980s have adopted a pluralistic approach in their selection of published political views and in their editorials (Ierodiakonou, 2003; Hadjikyriakos and Christophorou, 1996). That being said, this approach suffered when the issue treated related to the Cyprus Problem and in particular to that of the solution and the way to reach it. A stronger blow hit pluralistic content and positions following the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 and the subsequent polarisation between supporters and opponents of the proposed settlement (Christophorou, 2007). Most surprising in the ensuing situation is that following the election of Demetris Christofias to the Presidency, *Phileleftheros* abandoned its traditional choice, to support the governing team, irrespective of who was in power, and since 2008 has been active as an opposition newspaper.

Changes in the broadcasting sector started earlier than privatisation, in 1985, with the enforcement by law (initiated by DISY and AKEL) of fair coverage of political activity by parties and candidates on the public broadcaster, RIK. While in some respects the regulation violated editorial independence, it nevertheless was a pioneer measure as it changed fundamentally the rules of public debate; views other than those of the governing team and parties gained access to the airwaves on almost equal footing (Christophorou, 2003).

The operation of private channels in the early 1990s took place in an almost fully deregulated environment; the laws that allow their establishment provided only the basic framework for licensing and operation and proved insufficient to deal with the complex issues of commercial broadcasting. This made hard the task of the Cyprus Radio Television Authority, established by a new law in 1998, because the regulator had to cut back on broadcasters' practices and 'acquired' privileges that they viewed as their legitimate rights. The enforcement of rules on content aiming at the protection of minors, the audience or consumers, incorporated in Cyprus laws from EU

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4   The Number of daily newspapers was further reduced to five following *Máxn's* [Machi] decision to publish weekly (27 June 2010).

directives, faced resistance on behalf of broadcasters as being excessively strict. In spite of regulation gaps, the lack of regulation experience and tradition, the new media landscape launched Cyprus into an era of televised democracy (Mavris, 1996).

Media, Power and Elite Groups

Eleftheria's comment at the beginning of this article shows that the relations between the power holders and the press in the first years of independence were marked by incidents that cannot be enviable either by democratic power or by decent media. In fact, the dissemination and publication of rumours in an uncritical manner started during the transitional period,[5] as early as in summer 1959, which marked also a first rift between the Makarios and Grivas camps (Ierodiakonou, 2003). Conspiracy theories in relation to internal politics or the Cyprus Problem or other issues have since then been abundantly published or aired. Even single democratic procedures and candidacies to political offices were connected to conspiracy and dark forces aiming at the destruction of the island. The fear of losing power led Spyros Kyprianou in 1978 to the 'disclosure' of a conspiracy against him and Cyprus, claiming a link between Tassos Papadopoulos, then Greek Cypriot negotiator in the inter-communal talks, a foreign diplomat and others. Similarly, in the year 2006, the press published information – first appeared in Athens and indirectly endorsed by the government spokesman about a conspiracy to oust Tassos Papadopoulos through the candidacy of Demetris Christofias.[6] On many occasions as was the case during the first years of independence, information originated in 'official' or government sources, but on other occasions the media created their own stories and theories. A prominent example was the 'discovery' by media in 1994 of the so-called 'Oxford group' – Greek and Turkish Cypriot academics and others – presented as secretly working to impose a solution in Cyprus against the interests of the people. Political leaders followed the media in denouncing this small group, implying that a handful of persons could promote and even impose a solution.[7]

The publication of conspiracy theories and similar information, particularly in times of scarcity of information sources, would create among the public a feeling, or the certainty that the leaders, the state and eventually Cyprus were threatened by some specific or vague or mysterious forces; political opponents were often the targets when the issue was about internal politics, sometimes with connections to dark outside forces, privileged targets as well. Even the European Union and its officials were often, both before and after the accession of Cyprus, presented as conspirators or enemies of Cyprus (Christophorou *et al.*, 2010).

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5   The transition to independence started in April 1959 with the formation of a transitional government and ended on Independence Day, 16 August 1960.
6   See newspapers, 27 June 2006.
7   ANT1 television channel broadcast the 'news' and almost all newspapers followed. See, newspapers, 27 September 1993.

In earlier years, the dissemination of such information by the press was most often built up on the initial 'news' which made the threat bigger and the danger imminent, often leading to popular mobilisation in support of the leaders. Publicity on telegrams and messages sent massively in support of the power holders (Ierodiakonou, 2003) further created a snowball effect with the ball being large enough to smash the whole island.

No doubt, several plans combined in some cases with underground activity have been developed in the 50 years of Cyprus independence. The phenomena described in the previous paragraphs, however, contributed to turning the grim atmosphere of Cyprus politics into a chaotic one. Demonising the other or their views led to a culture of non-tolerance and unavoidable conflict.

With regard to support for *enosis* or to Makarios in the 1960s, press positions were rather antagonistic, with media and groups of people each trying to prove that their support only was genuine. Personal or group interests and ideologies developed into polemics and enmity, while initial support to Makarios by *Agon* and *Machi* for example was opportunistic in order not to oppose the popular leader and lose readers.

The press generally supported the positions of the government on important issues, denying or refuting in some cases fundamental rights of the people, groups or individuals. For example, such was the case in connection with holding elections and the right of citizens to be candidates in opposition to the governing team or the leader. In the Republic's former years and in 1976, in the name of 'unity', the press supported that elections should be avoided, to the benefit of course of those in power, or that some people and formations had no right to be candidates (Hadjikyriakos and Christophorou, 1996). Even in recent years, contesting elections has been surrounded by suspicion in media reports as to the reasons behind it or its purpose.[8] On another note, the official views and positions have often been adopted as the only existing and acceptable truth and those that dare to object to it could face persecution.[9] The media not only tolerated such behaviour by power holders but they even endorsed it, simply denying freedom of opinion.

Under the above circumstances, a very strong pressure for consensus has been developing, crushing in some cases and silencing dissident or moderate voices (Christophorou, 2008, pp. 96, 97).

Conditions favouring or pressing for unanimity and one voice, until the 1980s, led to polarisation (see also Kitromilides, 1981), where a marginal role was left to one or two newspapers that would articulate different views or act as opposition to the government. Those newspapers, consistently expounding a negative editorial style and tone had never allowed a creative or

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8   Such was the case of Christofias' presidential candidacy, presented as the means to oust Papadopoulos and make possible a solution against the interests and will of the people.

9   The most recent example is the amalgamated presentation of the supporters of the Annan Plan as people who were bribed by the Americans to promote the Plan, a claim put forward by former President Tassos Papadopoulos in 2004.

productive exchange of views or ideas – a true dialogue (Ierodiakonou, 2003). Thus, the most prominent feature of media has been an account and reflection of the picture of political forces, enhancing polarisation and strained relations, mostly leading to polemics (on polemics, see Foucault, 1984) rather than to a productive exchange of views and ideas. Today, with the abundance of media and pluralism, polarisation between official and opposing views has been modified. While pluralism is evident at first view, a closer look reveals that on core issues polarisation prevails. True political forces have access to the media to voice their views and positions; however the selection of news, or persons that speak or are invited, or excluded, all reveal that media follow agendas of their own, favouring persons or elite groups with similar or identical positions to theirs and/or including token opposition (Christophorou *et al.*, 2010).

Some media or journalists were paid by internal or foreign sources. Such examples were newspapers receiving funds from Athens to promote *enosis* in the 1960s and early 1970s. The creation and publication of *Patris* was funded by the Greek Government of the time, of Georgios Papandreou.

Conclusion

Media, as an agent which contributes to and is also dependent on social processes, developed in close relation to politics and major events. In the years up to the mid-1980s, political processes, such as elections, and developments that had an impact on the course of the island had a greater influence on media life. Since the mid-1980s, economy and technological advancements increased their role and influence and along with the decline of ideologies led to the disappearance of many newspapers, particularly the party mouthpieces and the weeklies.

Media practices turned them into propagators of power or elite group views, at times promoting designs targeting their opponents through the dissemination of unfounded information and conspiracy theories. This resulted in extreme polarisation and ultimately led to conflict.

The imposition through law of obligations to RIK to offer access to parties and candidates (1985) and the end of its monopoly on broadcasting in the 1990s increased dramatically the flow of information and dialogue. Moreover, the lack of substance and real debate is a major shortcoming.

It is undeniable that the early years of physical attacks against journalists and newspapers have gone since the 1960s. Information flow and dialogue on daily, mostly 'inoffensive' issues are normally taking place, in a decent and honest manner. When, however, the issue at stake is a 'significant' one or involving important interests, calm and critical approach of information usually fails, and is replaced by extremism and the will to annihilate opposing views and, if possible, opponents as well. Conditions of polarisation prevail and reflective views are crucially absent or drowned in the cacophony.

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Table 1:		Number of Newspapers Published or Closing Down		
Year	Start	Two years or more lifespan	End	Two years old or More
1959	3	17, 2	0	
1960	3	16, 20	4	14, 11
1961	1	19	1	
1962	4	13	4	37
1963	3	2,	3	12, 38
1964	6	6, 30+, 20, 12	2	15
1965	3		5	
1966	1		1	
1967	0		1	
1968	3	16, 6, 3	0	
1969	4	20	4	6
1970	2		2	2
1971	2	9	0	
1972	3	25+ Apogevmatini	3	
1973	1		2	6
1974	8	16, 2, 17, 7, 8, 4	5	68, 23, 19
1975	4	5	2	26, 12
1976	3	35+ (Simerini)	5	
1977	2	4	1	
1978	0	4	2	4
1979	1	31	0	
1980	3	16, 20	4	9, 19, 20
1981	9	2, 10	7	6, 4, 7
1982	6	15+ (Romiosyni)	4	8
1983	1		5	2, 2, 31, 15
1984	1		2	20
1985	7		1	
1986	0		4	
1987	6	3, 5, 5, 10, 4	1	
1988	3		2	
1989	2		2	20, 16
1990	0		3	5, 3, 4
1996 - 8	n.a	n.a.	Eleftherotypia (16), Agon (24), Paraskinio (11)	
Table compiled by Christophoros Christophorou, 2010.				

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Cypriot Feminism: An Opportunity to Challenge Gender Inequalities and Promote Women's Rights and a Different Voice

MARIA HADJIPAVLOU, BIRAN MERTAN

Abstract

The 1960s and the 1970s in Western Europe, America, Canada and elsewhere gave rise to women's liberation movements, peace movements and discussions on environmental issues. Feminists started questioning established norms and 'essentialisation' of women and men; they demanded changes in gender roles, the elimination of the separation of private and public spaces; questioned patriarchy and sexism, classism and racism as conditions leading to discrimination. In the 1980s and the 1990s to this day the feminist discussion has moved to issues of gender in international politics, sexualities (queer studies) post colonialism and post modernist questions about multiple subjectivities and women's experiences in conflict societies, third world feminisms, and trafficking of women in a global neo-liberal economy. In 1960 Cyprus was semi-decolonised (still 99 square miles are sovereign British territory) and gained a 'qualified' independence and its people – Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and Latins – had to adapt to a new nationality, the Cypriot (as opposed to being British subjects) and to new ways of relating. The women of Cyprus did not participate in the global women's movements of the 1960s onwards but instead experienced ethnic nationalism, militarism and sexism both prior and after independence. Cypriot women had to deal with the consequences of the armed struggle in the mid-1950s despite the fact that they were excluded from the centres where these decisions were taken or when the independence agreement was signed. Half a century later women of Cyprus have moved ahead especially in the education and employment sectors though they are still struggling to raise their voices on social and 'national issues'. In this paper we argue, among other things, that both patriarchy and the 'national problem', i.e. the Cyprus conflict, have dominated public debates and that one sustains the other to such an extent that social issues including women's issues and needs have been marginalised. The majority of Cypriot women's organisations have traditionally been part of the mainstream male-dominated political parties and did not have the opportunity to develop a different women's voice on women's rights. No independent feminist movement has been established, but now at the beginning of the twenty first century some attempts promote such a need. Women today are more empowered to challenge patriarchal structures, and draw connections between Cypriot women's oppression and nationalism, militarism and sexism which kept certain agendas marginalised while making others visible.

Keywords: patriarchy, militarism, Cyprus conflict, nationalism, gender roles, peace, feminism

Introduction – The Context

> 'Women have been totally "hidden" from Cypriot history and it is only through reading between the lines of textbooks by eminent male historians that even superficial information surfaces. Ironically there has not yet been any single academic publication on the Cypriot woman from a historical perspective- least of all from a feminist perspective' (Vassiliadou, 1997, p. 97).

The establishment of the 'reluctant' Republic of Cyprus (Xydis, 1973) was preceded by two competing ethnic nationalist movements that were conceived of, executed by and led by men – the EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) and the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation – Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı). Women were excluded from the centres where the decisions to launch an armed struggle or later to reach a peace agreement were taken. There was no common anti-colonial struggle launched by all Cypriots for independence from the British colonial rule. Ethnic nationalism led to competing visions *(enosis* or *taksim)* which were fully male-led, exclusive, and sexist operating on a patriarchal island in which women had to follow and become involved but only in the roles that men had assigned them which were subordinate and auxiliary. In fact, women were being used by men and gradually they, too, became absorbed by the national struggles that completely disregarded their own social position and interests as women in a sexist, traditional and agrarian society of the 1950s and early 1960s (Vassiliadou, 1997, 2002; Hadjipavlou, 2010). However, in the post-1974 period, Greek Cypriot women mobilised and voiced their concerns and needs in peaceful demonstrations and demanded that barbed wires and military lines be removed. Women refugees participated in the employment sector and as heads of households when the men went abroad to work (unemployment in 1974 reached 35% in the Greek Cypriot community).

The presence of three foreign armies – Greek, Turkish and British – marked the new State in 1960. In our view complete decolonisation of Cyprus has not taken place due to the kind of treaties attached to it (the presence of the two British sovereign bases is a constant reminder (Kyriakides, 1968). In addition, separatist provisions constructed separate national identities, citizenship as a common identity and unifying factor was not promoted. No particular attention was paid to gender equality issues or women's social rights in public life despite the fact that elsewhere in Europe feminist movements and women's issues were being promoted. Emphasis was put on the bicommunal nature of the Republic with the ethnic component being very strong. Due to this emphasis, strict bicommunality with the two dominant communities was defined by their language, cultural traditions and religion when in fact other minorities lived on the island such as Armenians, Maronites, and Latins, defined as religious groups, who had to choose which community they wanted to belong to. All three chose to belong to the Greek Cypriot community except the Roma who joined the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, the male framers of the Cyprus constitution had adopted exclusionary, undemocratic (no mention of ethnic or national minorities) and hierarchical criteria. Both the agreements that established the 'independent'

republic in 1960 were a series of concessions that satisfied neither of the Cypriot parties, and were gendered documents in the drafting of the constitution which contributed very little to the independence of women. The women were given the right to vote (no suffragettes' movement in Cyprus) in 1960 but they were stereotyped as housewives to help the men who were the ones in control (Vassiliadou, 1997; Pyrgos, 1993).

A culture of honouring heroes and martyrs ensued in each community and a narrative of ethnic patriotism, stressing the Greekness and Turkishness led to rigidification of ethnic identities. A culture for inter-ethnic tolerance and respect for differences and a willingness to cooperate at the elite levels was not encouraged. Ethnic identities were further reinforced by two separate educational systems as was provided for by the constitution; something that established close cultural and educational links with the 'motherlands' — a factor that continues to this day.

Half a century later the irony is that the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic — which lasted only for three years — has been designed by Greek Cypriot male governing elites reminding us of the original profile of the 1960s. So what is being celebrated? Do the Greek Cypriots celebrate the three years of the partnership Republic plus the forty-seven years of the Greek Cypriot-run Republic which is recognised internationally and has been a member of the European Union since 2004? What is the relationship of the Turkish Cypriots to this Greek-Cypriot-run Cyprus Republic? What do they feel or think about this fiftieth birthday? What is the meaning of these celebrations in the context of the continuing inter-communal negotiations to establish a new state of affairs — a bicommunal, bizonal federation? Are women included in these new processes fifty years later? Why has the Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on 'Women, Peace and Security' which calls for the participation and inclusion of women in peace negotiations and all peacebuilding reconstruction, not been adhered to by the leaderships in both communities? What are the main obstacles to include women? These are, for us, legitimate questions.

For decades a conflict culture and ethnic polarisation has dominated the lives of Cypriots — Greeks and Turks as well as mistrust, fears and suspicion of the other. Between 1967 and 1974 the penetration of the Greek junta fascism into the Greek Cypriot community — National Guard, education (textbooks sent from Greece), and the EOKA B terrorist activities — led on 15 July 1974 to the coup d'état against the democratically-elected Makarios' government. Five days later the Turkish military invaded and split the island into north and south with subsequent ethnic separation. Women, as elsewhere in ethno-national conflicts have suffered the consequences of both the armed violence and all that this entails — militarism, masculinism, displacement, rape, unwanted pregnancies, abuse, domestic violence and fear for the future. Women, however, were not only victims but exhibited agency as we shall show later on in this article (Agathangelou, 2003; Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2006).

One of the main questions we discuss is whether the dominance of the 'national problem' has marginalised all other issues including women's equality issues and rights, minority rights, health

and environmental issues, and violence against women. In this respect we note how the structure of patriarchy becomes mediated with nationalist politics to keep particular agendas visible while marginalising others (Anthias, 1989; Vassiliadou, 1997; Agathangelou, 2003, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010). Consequently, public discussion and research on such issues has been scant and delayed compared to the plethora of books and articles produced on the 'Cyprus conflict' as well as about the international proposed plans to resolve it. Another observation is the predominance of male authority over the political scene in all institutions where decisions are being made affecting the whole of the population. We view such situations as omissions of democracy. These two observations lead to our third question regarding the absence of a feminist movement on the island in the 1960s and 1970s which could have networked with women's movements in the region and elsewhere to promote women's human rights. The reasons for this absence are historical, (colonialism, nationalism, and national problem), political, cultural and social (Hadjipavlou, 2010). The article is structured as follows: We first provide the context; a theoretical framework then follows in which we will locate our analysis; and in the third section we give a historical evolutionary overview of Cypriot women's social position through a comparative lens, highlighting similarities and differences in the two communities. Our own experiences and positionality impacts the writing of this article. We conclude with some general observations. Secondary sources are used as well as data from research on women that we each conducted in our respective communities and, of course, personal experiences and observations.

Theoretical Framework

As Vassiliadou reminded us, the history of the women of Cyprus has not yet been written. In every official history account produced on each side and written by male historians the women are missing as though they did not contribute to history-making. Historiography globally has silenced the experience of one half of humanity until feminists raised the issue (Hannam, 1997). 'It is not the lack of information and sources about women but the under-valuation of this information and the belief that women should not be of concern to History. This is the perception that needs to change' (Gasouka, 2010).

Within this context, Cypriot women's views, needs or concerns have had little space to be articulated in a dominant patriarchal, nationalist and militaristic environment. No feminist analysis of gender power relations as being a significant factor was discussed publicly by women's political party organisations, and neither was the fact that women's lives differ characteristically from those of men because of their different experiences (Anthias, 1989, 1992; Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2009). Instead, Cypriot women's pain and suffering have been instrumentalised and often exploited by the State to promote its own political project and its own form of masculinity and femininity (Anthias, 1992; Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2006). In conflict situations human pain and suffering are gendered and feminised and particular forms of masculinity are promoted whereby 'honour' and the 'ideal soldier who is brave to die' are a man's things. 'There is

much evidence that national and ethnic groups use women and gender relations to purse specific ethnic political strategies. For example women may be urged to have more children as part of a demographic race'. (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989), they may become symbolic of the purity of the group and promoted as 'mothers of the nation' or the 'mothers of patriots' (Anthias, 1992, p. 79). For instance, the grieving mothers of the missing persons in both Cypriot communities who demanded their right to know what happened to their beloveds for decades, has been politicised not only at home but in international forums. Thus many women had to serve both as mother and father to their children as if they were neutered individuals (Sant Cassia, 2005).

Human experience is gendered and this understanding is central to the radical implications of feminist theory which emerges from and responds to the lives of women in many countries. The recognition of the impact of gender and an insistence on the importance of the female existence has provided the vital common ground for feminist research and thought. Listening to the women's voices, studying women's writings and learning from women's experiences have been crucial to the feminist reconstruction of our understanding of the world. Women's personal narratives are, among other things, stories of how women negotiate their exceptional gender status as well as other identities both in their daily lives and over the course of a lifetime (The Personal Narratives Group, 1989; Belenky *et al.*, 1986; Hadjipavlou, 2009).

By 1974 while modernisation was spreading especially in the Greek Cypriot community – urbanisation, light industries, building construction, modernising agriculture, tourist industry, and rise in educational standards – this was interrupted when the island was *de facto* partitioned. Feminism and women's liberation movements did not reach the island. In traditional societies as Cyprus had been, both prior to and in the early 1960s, we note a sharp separation between the private and public spheres of life which meant a separation of gender roles, gender expectations, and opportunities for self development. There existed a separation of professions based on gender thus Cypriot women were either housewives whose labour was unpaid or nurses, secretaries, teachers or worked in agriculture and factories. Actualisation of gender desires was contingent upon biological differences. Feminists, whether liberal, radical or socialists, conversely challenged these socially constructed dichotomies and promoted the view that gender inequalities are part of historical, cultural and patriarchal structures and need to change both in the private sector, i.e. the family and the home, and in public life, i.e. male-dominated politics and the employment sectors (Bryson, 2003; Millett, 1985; Friedan, 1997). Some feminists have also called our attention to the historical, socio-economic and cultural conditions that give rise to gender separation and gender discriminations. Radical feminists also promoted the view that the 'personal is political' thus bringing issues into public debate that were social taboos such as wife beating and abuse, abortion, contraceptives, divorce, domestic violence, and prostitution. Feminists considered these issues as shared women's experiences and called for women's sisterhood and solidarity struggles demanding legal and cultural changes (Morgan, 1978, 1984). The debates over self actualisation and collective action, and the politics of difference and gender equality which dominated most feminist debates

in the 1970s and 1980s, were not discussable issues in Cyprus where the 'national issue' took precedence. Kağıtçıbaşı (1996, 2010) noted that traditional societies emphasise the collective self and undermine the value of the individual. As a consequence, the individual experiences of the women are subsumed in the collective, and often viewed as genderless. The same assumption is often made with regard to issues of war and conflict when we know that this is not the case. A trans-national feminist literature over the last twenty-five years has generated a sizeable volume of empirical findings and theories on the gendered nature of militarism, political conflict, war-making and peace processes world wide (for example Enloe, 2000; Giles and Hyndman, 2004; Moser and Clark, 2001; Cockburn and Zarkov, 2002; Cockburn, 2004, 2007; Hadjipavlou and Cockburn, 2006; Agathangelou, 2003; Sharoni, 1995; Killoran, 1998; Anthias, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Goldstein, 2006; Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009).

According to Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989), in national struggles and wars, women's involvement and participation take the following forms: biological reproducers of members of ethnic groups, and participating both in the ideological reproduction of the ethnic collectivity and transmission of its culture. For instance, in the case of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was urging women to give birth to many children to fight the 'enemy'. In their view the perceived enemy was the Greek Cypriots who schemed to destroy the Turkish community. Recently, the Greek Cypriot leadership has also been concerned with the low birth-rate, promoting programmes to give incentives to young couples so as to increase the number of children to serve the country but also out of fear of the increase of Turkish settlers who have large families. We find similar policies elsewhere, like in Israel and Palestine (Sharoni, 1995).

Cynthia Cockburn (1998) informs us about the gendered aspects of ethno national conflict whereby men are the soldiers and fighters while women undertake a primarily humanitarian role (securing food, shelter and health) as well as trying to heal themselves and others of psychological traumas and wounds. Different constructions of masculinity and femininity are being promoted. In Cyprus we have examples of these gendered roles whereby in between 1963 and 1974 Turkish Cypriot women who lived in enclaves and Greek Cypriot displaced women in post-1974 who lived in refugee camps took care of the children and the elderly and the family, as well as provided solidarity and helped them to recover psychologically. The role of men during the same period of displacements was different. The men were the soldiers who had to protect the women and children and after the fighting ceased the majority of the Turkish Cypriot men immigrated to Turkey or elsewhere seeking employment as did the Greek Cypriot men who went to the Arab and former Socialist countries.

Militarization and Daily Life

As an illustration of the gradual militarization of the island and its impact on daily life, we provide below our own personal experiences. One of the authors of this article, Biran, lived in the Turkish part of divided Nicosia/Lefkosha, across the Green Line (this was drawn on the city map by a

British commander using a green pen in the first inter-communal violence in December 1963). In order to cross to the other side Biran had to go through different military check points:

> 'After the primary school, in early 1970s I was attending St Joseph French School which was situated in the southern part of Nicosia where Greek Cypriots were living. While the civil war was continuing, I was living on the north side of town and I had to cross on my bike to the southern part. In order to do so, every day I had to go through three military barricades namely Mücahits (Turkish Cypriot soldiers), United Nations soldiers and Greek Cypriot soldiers. From [a] very early age we became accustomed to seeing soldiers and men in uniforms as part of our daily landscape. As a school girl there was a cultural imperative to protect myself from male strangers. This included the soldiers from all three groups. At the same time, however, I was living a contradiction. While I had to protect myself from all these uniformed men, I was also supposed to accept Mücahits – the soldiers from my in-group, as protectors. At that young age it was very difficult to make the distinction between men as protectors and men as predators/aggressors, especially due to the conflicting messages I received from society'.

The co-author of this article, Maria, came from the northern part of Cyprus but also had a house in one of the suburbs of southern Nicosia where her family lived. In 1963, she was a student in the Greek Gymnasium (secondary school) and she remembers:

> 'My father was a business man and had many Turkish Cypriot customers. Some of them were family friends and used to come to our house and bring us delicious deserts and cookies and sometimes they stayed to dinner. Suddenly they stopped coming and I asked my father why they did not visit us any more. He told me there was an "insurrection", *(antarsia)* that the Turks left the government and their leadership did not allow them to come to our side. I then asked my father to take us to visit them instead, and he told me we were not allowed to visit them either. This was very confusing to me but I knew something was really wrong. I was afraid and unhappy. At school they told us that the Turks will invade and attack us and we had to stay together. We lived close enough to Omorphita to hear gun shots and smoke in the sky but no one told me that Greeks killed Turkish Cypriots and that Greek Cypriots still wanted "enosis". Riding my bike along Ermou street and at the end of Ledra street I could see the barbed wires, sandbags and uniformed soldiers and the UN soldiers. Then the convoy began when we wanted to go to Kyrenia via Nicosia. I felt the men knew it all but not my mother or us, the four sisters. I was told the soldiers who wore blue berets came to protect us. From what, I asked. No one explained … '.

Such memories become part of a collective history and point to the issues of insecurity, male dominance and control, an atmosphere of hiding and blaming the 'other' and creating an environment of an imminent danger. As girls we were expected to be taken care of, protected and silenced. Father was the head of the family (as was the head of state) and his command and word were to be heeded. The men were in charge and women were subordinate and our questions remained unanswered. Militarization and gun shots were men's 'businesses'. In fact, this secrecy and *aphasia* or half truths became part of the historical and political landscape in each community

and grew in intensity after 1974 when the island was split into two parts (Mylona *et al.*, 1981; Hadjipavlou, 1987). Both a patriarchal and confrontational culture prevailed of 'us and them' whereby people had to choose their side for 'their own good' since ambiguities and complexities caused uneasiness and confusion. Barbed wires and militarism prohibited inter-ethnic contacts giving rise to increased fears, suspicions and stereotyping or simply ignorance. Gradually two separate realities were created through a male understanding of politics.

Let us now examine briefly the social position of women in both communities through a historical lens.

Historical Evolution of Cypriot Women's Social Position

According to research carried out by the Women's Organisation of United Democrats in 2006, during the British period there existed 'absolute male domination and oppression of women in both the private and public space' and one could add 'structural violence' (Manzura and McKay, 2001; GOED, 2006) in that the social organisation of society in Cyprus excluded women and girls from many opportunities. For instance in 1931, 54% of the people in Cyprus were illiterate – mostly women and working class men. Young people aged between 15 and 19 years old had not attended schooling, especially girls (48%) and boys but only 17.1%. Women were viewed as a means for men's sexual satisfaction and 'machines for reproduction' and as such were men's 'possession'.

Girls learned early on to set marriage as the paramount goal of their lives and the parents of girls had to provide a dowry. Men also reached manhood when they married (now they reach manhood when they go to the army!). In the power hierarchy of the family, men often felt they had the right to humiliate women or beat them up for trifle misconduct (Anthias, 1992).

Some of the male interviewees in the same research mentioned that even at table the men sat separate from women and the same was true in the church or mosque. Women were not allowed to wear pants or smoke and could not drive a car or tractor. The working class women engaged in agriculture in the fields but the money was controlled by the husband or father. Very few women had secondary school education and had no say in public affairs or the right to vote. Women were dependent on men (GOED, 2006; Cockburn, 2004). The social perception of women was closely linked in a traditional society with religion that demanded that a woman be moral, absolutely loyal and submissive to her husband ('ston kirio tis'/to her master/efendisine). This cultural understanding of the role of women influenced the girls' education in the Cypriot society and how much schooling they ought to have. There existed the perception that if girls attended schooling this would mean delaying their 'natural' 'destiny' which was marriage at a young age, thus parents did not invest in their daughters' education but in their sons' (Persianis, 1988).

Women began demanding their right to education in the mid-eighteenth century (Wollstonecraft, 1792) and, according to the United Nations, centuries later the global female illiteracy rate is 34%, i.e. 640 million women are illiterate. The liberal feminists regarding gender

inequalities promoted the women's right to vote and to education and stressed that the role of education was also for self-fulfilment irrespective of gender. It also urged women to work and encouraged girls to follow non traditional exclusively feminine professions. The Marxist-socialist feminists promoted the view that schooling reproduces class relations, gender stereotypes and capitalism; the radical feminists spoke about women's oppression due to patriarchal structures as the system that penetrates all levels of social activities including education. The school is not neutral but reproduces the patriarchal structures. In Cyprus, from the beginning of the century to the mid-1950s only well-to-do families could afford to educate their daughters and if there were also sons, then the latter were the priority and had the advantage of further education, good employment opportunities and travel abroad. Men and women had unequal opportunities. In both communities the socialisation and education of boys and girls were gendered and so were the school curricula. Class stratification also played a role in what women did and how much education they received or did not receive. For instance, women's roles in the cities were to be good wives (evgenis despines/hanım kız) and good mothers, support their husbands and if they were working prior to marriage they had to stop afterwards so that they could dedicate themselves to the role of wife and mother. In the rural areas women engaged in agricultural work and farming in addition to doing all the housework and caring for the family, thus they had a double work-load compared to that of male workers. The working class women played a crucial role in the family unit production and maintained the needs of the household. This imbalance in sexual division of labour was part of the socialist feminist critique in the 1960s and continues to this day. Women from the lower- middle-class worked as dressmakers, embroiderers, weavers or handicraft makers in their homes and earned some money which provided them with an air of 'controlled independence'. (Persianis, 1988; Kağıtçıbaşı, 2010).

As mentioned earlier, with the establishment of the Republic, women, according to the constitution, were given the right to vote. Hence, Cypriot women did not have to struggle to gain this right as women did elsewhere which meant engaging in a process of politicisation and raising gender consciousness awareness. Women started to find their voice in decisions concerning family affairs (GOED, 2006). With democratisation and modernisation which included urbanisation processes by the mid-1960s, primary education and secondary education up to the age of 15 gradually became compulsory for boys and girls in both communities. Moreover, by the mid-1960s democratisation of education spread little by little and schools became co-ed, nonetheless textbooks were promoting gender stereotypes and separate girls' and boys' activities. In 1960, according to statistical data, only 1% of the people, mainly men, in the Greek Cypriot community were university graduates. Today we have close to 70% attending tertiary university education with men and women almost equal in numbers in the Greek Cypriot community (The Statistical Portrait of Women in Cyprus, 2008). Also the recent establishment of universities in the Turkish Cypriot community has given more and more female students the chance to attend the universities and the proportion of male and female students is almost equal (Mertan, 2000).

During this modernisation period and the rise of capitalist economy girls received more

education than their mothers and grandmothers did and research informs us that women started to find 'a voice' in family affairs, especially in urban areas (GOED, 2006). Women began working in paid jobs outside of the house but although they gained some economic independence due to the capitalist market, the patriarchal ideology led them into 'double bind roles' with more duties and responsibilities than before. '... apart from traditional roles as wives, mothers and house-carers they are now required to be labour workers, stay attractive and sexy for men's satisfaction, and financial supporters of the families' (Stavrou, 1997). Women had no involvement in political and public life. For instance, in the Greek Cypriot community, Stella Soulioti, a lawyer from an upper-middle-class family of lawyers was the first woman appointed Minister of Justice by President Makarios in the early 1960s and later also appointed as Attorney General. Being a woman in a high position does not mean much in terms of promoting women's agenda and issues. In this case Soulioti became part of the prevailing male-dominated system which she reproduced. Research tells us that women in high positions should have a gender and feminist consciousness in order to promote women's issues and bring about social change (Hooks, 2000; Hadjipavlou, 2010). On the other hand an educator, Kadriye Hacıbulgur, in the Turkish Cypriot community, also from an upper-middle-class family, was appointed as a member of the Turkish Communal Chamber (1960). She graduated from, and worked for a while at Victoria School for Girls (Professional School for Moslem Girls). The school offered instruction in handicrafts, reading the Koran, writing and English language lessons with the aim of raising a generation of skilled women who would be ready to contribute to the family income. She was the principal of several primary schools in different towns; was also active in teachers' rights; served as a role model for other women especially in regard to further education, and she also challenged the gender traditional roles of women (Cahit, 2009).

The separation between the private and public realms of life which liberal feminists challenged was well adhered to in Cyprus. In the first parliament of the Cyprus Republic all the members were male — many of them ex-EOKA fighters or TMT-fighters. And there was no female member of parliament (MP) in the Greek Cypriot community until 1982 when Rina Katselli became the first woman MP from the Democratic Party. She was not a feminist and was promoted and supported by her influential family. Politics was still a man's domain. Women usually voted as their husbands instructed them to because it was men's opinion on politics that mattered — women were viewed as apolitical. Women's organisations were weak politically and were there to serve political party agendas; other organisations for women were philanthropic associations, helping the poor and the sick. The early women's magazines stressed female roles and hegemonic types of femininity (cooking, baking, sewing, knitting and childcare) and philanthropy, but there was no discussion on social or reproductive rights or gender equality rights. Thus, sex stereotypes and social prejudices were reproduced by women, too. These gender role separations limited both men's and women's full development and partnership connections. In the Turkish Cypriot Community, it was even later in 1990 when the first two women — one a medical

doctor, Ruhsan Tuğyan, and the other a dentist, Gülin Sayıner – were elected as MPs in the Turkish Cypriot parliament. Both women were members of the conservative National Unity Party (UBP) and as health professionals had direct contacts and relations with clients prior to being elected so they had formed their own clientele which was then converted into votes. None raised women's agenda. Even today the majority of members of Parliament in the Turkish Cypriot (TC) community are health professionals, including female members of parliament, and have strong nationalistic ideologies. However, the female ratio has never exceeded more than 8% of the MPs and 16.5% in the Greek Cypriot (GC) parliament.

The Politics of Separation and Partition

With the 'fall' of the bicommunal Republic in 1963 (Kyriakides, 1968) and the ensued inter-communal violence, the TCs had to abandon their villages and neighbourhoods which meant a break down of community life, family structures and relationships. What then became known as the 'Cyprus problem' began affecting people's lives. The GCs had similar experiences a decade later in 1974 when almost one-third of the population became displaced and thousands lived in tents before they were relocated to temporary housing. From 1964 to 1974 more than one-third of the TCs lived in enclaves mainly in the northern part of Nicosia. When these families left their homes they were not able to stay together but were scattered in different locations. While the women and children sought refuge in camps or the enclaves, the men were sent off to defend their community from 'the enemy' on the front lines. This meant the collapse of community life and traditional connections. These experiences had a tremendous impact on the roles of men and women in the Turkish Cypriot society. Traditionally, men had been the primary protectors and providers for their families while women had been the primary caretakers. During that period women were undertaking double-duty, assuming not only their traditional roles but also the roles usually filled by men. These women suffered many hardships as the primary caretakers, protectors, and providers for their families while at the same time they were also anxious for the male members of their families who were recruited as fighters as well as worrying about the community at large. In this way many TC women acted as psychological shock-absorbers in the conflict, providing some sense of stability for those left behind. Decades later, we can still see the psychological scars left by the trauma of the prolonged stress of the violence on some of the women who lived through this period.

During this decade TCs perceived themselves as abandoned by the rest of the world and they believed that no one was interested in their living conditions. This feeling of isolation had two outcomes. Firstly, some members of the Turkish Cypriot Community developed stronger ties with the 'motherland' Turkey, and for them Turkishness became their main identity (Vural and Rustemli, 2006). Secondly, because of the painful memories and the socio-economic and political instability, other members of the community decided to abandon their homeland and immigrated to other Commonwealth countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia. In the absence of their

husbands the Turkish Cypriot women had to bring their families together, organise schooling for their children and create safe and comfortable homes (Bryant and Hatay, 2008). As mentioned above, the Cyprus Republic, run exclusively by Greek Cypriots and the presence of the UN peacekeeping force on the island – all males – is proof of the international recognition of the state. This year for the first time the UN chief of the mission in Cyprus is a woman who is also very gender conscious.

In the same period the GC community put much effort into economic development which raised their standard of living and opened up opportunities for both men and women in the employment sector while the TC community suffered under-development and increased dependency on Turkey. This rate of unequal development drew the two dominant communities further apart, a reality that persists to this day. Many Greek Cypriots experienced prosperity and modernisation and began to travel abroad. Educated women started to work outside of the home mainly in female jobs and consequently contributed to the State economy. We note that Greek Cypriot women's employment in the non-agricultural sector grew by 80%, one-third in trade, one-quarter in manufacturing and one-fifth in services (Stavrou, 1997). Though we witness an increase in the educational level (today there are six universities in the Republic of Cyprus and more are planned) and in economic development, this has not necessarily coincided with social change in terms of new attitudes, gender roles and a decreasing of the patriarchal and sexist mentality. For instance, the dowry custom continued and we find no women's organisations in either community to challenge this practice of objectifying and humiliating women or to protest women's subordinate role in the marriage contract. Hadjipavlou's research in 2004 indicates that many Cypriot women from all communities (the majority of TC educated women) still accept arranged marriages – a restriction on women's choices as well as social pressure (the dowry practice was abolished by law in the 1980s). Other social issues such as contraceptives, abortion and homosexuality are still social taboos in both communities. Abortion is illegal in both communities except in certain circumstances.

The Post-1974 Period

> 'In Pafos today (1975) where some 500 Turkish Cypriots were being transferred to the north, the main square resounded with the sobbing and wailing of elderly women abandoning their homes after a lifetime. Greek and Turkish Cypriots mingled easily with no apparent hostility toward each other. Many of the departing Turkish Cypriots handed over the keys of their homes to the Greek Cypriot refugees with apparent pleasure 'to look after them' as one said. Thus partition was gradually being consolidated' (Washington Post, 11 August 1975 quoted in Hadjipavlou, 1987 p. 196).

The 1974 war has impacted the lives of all the communities in Cyprus (see: Evdokas *et al.,* 1976; Loizos, 1981; Volkan, 1979; Papadakis, 2005; Hadjipavlou, 2004, 2006). Thirty-six years later there still exist two distinct ethnically separated parts with dividing lines everywhere being guarded by

men who are socialised within a masculine political and military culture. The stakes in the conflict have been posed in quite masculine terms: status, stature, sovereignty, revenge, heroism, honour, patriotism, (Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010). The *Washington Post* extract is part of the unrecorded oral history and the pain and sorrow of women having been ordered to abandon unwillingly their homes for 'national security' reasons or for their 'own good'. Partition was not a 'natural' process but a political strategy which was imposed from above. It was a military orchestrated process to break up relationships and yet contrary to this 'strategic agenda' these elderly TC women in a mutinous gesture to defend their neighbourly relations handed over their house keys to their GC neighbours for safe-keeping until their return. During this period there were many such examples which exhibited both the weakness of the state to grant the necessary security but also the helplessness and fear of citizens to protest such imposition from above. The 'women's sobbing and wailing' became a female 'trademark' in Cypriot politics.

Additionally, in times of ethno-national conflict nationalism reinforces the power and privileges of patriarchal institutions (such as family, church, schools, political parties, etc) and it is achieved through psychological pressure on women to demonstrate their loyalty to these institutions and turn them into symbols of national collectivities (Hadjipavlou, 2006). A number of years ago various studies were carried out among the GC refugees and in the TC community (for a review of these studies see: Hadjipavlou, 1987, chapter 4). None of those studies examined women's experiences separately from those of men and no policies or support systems were enacted to address women's needs.

While before and during the conflict women are used as symbols and reproducers, after warfare women are called upon to reconstruct society, though as Harding (1986) and Hynes (2004) inform us, the victimisation of women does not cease after warfare. Widows and women heads of families are viewed as a threat to changing social traditions, which bolster male supremacy and promote women's subordination. The lives of GC displaced women and others, such as Maronites, Armenians and Latins as well as of Turkish Cypriot women changed drastically in that, apart from being called to undertake the rebuilding of broken communities, safeguard the family cohesion, and offer psychological support, they were also called to contribute to the economy of the country. Many women, especially from the rural areas, sought work in factories, in farming or later in the tourist industry, thus gradually acquiring a sense of economic independence and agency. This gave the women a moral authority over their victimhood. Women's involvement and participation, however, at decision-making levels was extremely limited. Women's organisations attached to political parties engaged mainly in material or social support and avoided discussing gender issues as these intersect with patriarchy, militarism, conflict and nationalism.

Women's Agency

There were, nevertheless, women's groups and organisations who became active for a while in making their voice heard regarding their desire for peace, demilitarisation and reconciliation.

Greek Cypriot women in the late 1970s and 1980s organised three *'Women Walk Home'* events in 1975, 1987 and 1989 in which thousands of local and foreign women participated. They walked along the military lines wanting to cross to the other side to invite Turkish Cypriot women to join in the struggle of 'going home'. It was a cross-section of women from different ideological backgrounds. Some women were arrested by the Turkish military in their effort to cross the lines. As is often the case such civil society initiatives were politicised and exploited as a propaganda tool by the state and some male politicians who demonised the 'evil other'. Still, women made their presence felt and received a great deal of international coverage at the time. It could have been more powerful had these events been organised jointly with TC women, but at the time this was impossible due to militarism, and an enforced communication embargo. This bicommunal networking would occur much later from the late 1980s and 1990s to the present, initially via the help of third parties. Today, inter-communal women's reconciliation efforts and collaboration have increased but not adequately enough to form a joint women's feminist movement yet.

Furthermore, research in recent years has shown that social stereotypes, prejudices and gender roles have not weakened and women still use the male model as their reference point regarding styles of thinking (i.e. she is so good, she thinks like a man!), and professional success, something that marginalises women's differences. Feminism does not want women to become men; this is far from gender equality. Moreover, due to higher university education more women have become gender conscious and aware of male dominance in our society recognising their responsibility to become change agents (GOED, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2004, 2010; Cockburn, 2004; Mertan, 2000). Although Cypriot women from all communities (Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite and Latin Cypriots) have multiple roles and social positions as Hadjipavlou's research has shown, women find themselves in a transitional phase between traditionalism and modernity as the patriarchal structures remain unchanged with many women still facing the dilemma of either 'career or family' (Hadjipavlou, 2004, 2010).

In one other research when Greek Cypriot women were asked to prioritise their interests they placed 'Family' first, then 'Home', then 'Work' and they placed 'participation in Public life' last, which shows that GC women still perceive their involvement in politics presents too high a price to pay and so they prefer to stay away. They do not realise that this attitude does a disservice to participatory democracy and to the exclusion of half of the population from the centres where decisions are taken to impact on their lives too (GOED, 2006). Biological differences are often used to justify this social exclusion and reproduce the gender stereotypes. Such (mis) perceptions exist in both communities.

Thus patriarchy which is fed by the conflict and *vice versa* is still prevalent in the Cypriot society and the male understanding of politics, development and security continues to dominate. The Cypriot media in both communities are not gender sensitive and this is apparent in the radio and television programmes on current political and financial affairs where the invited discussants are exclusively men. Also, the state is still reluctant to appoint women in important public positions (See Iacovou-Kapsali *et al.*, 2008)

There are very few women occupying the important roles of the State; in areas of economy and industry, as well as in leadership roles in trade unions and political parties. Women are under-represented in electoral structures (see: The Statistical Portrait of Women in Cyprus, 2008). The latest statistics inform us that we have only 16.3% of Greek Cypriot women in the legislature in the Republic of Cyprus – an increase from 5.1% in 1991. We have two female ministers out of eleven. Yet, there is some progress. We note an increase to 38% in women judges and an increase from 2.05% in 1990 to 26.8% in 2006 in senior civil servants. In the municipal councils – local government – out of 414 members only 84 were women in 2006. For the first time in the history of Nicosia (south) we have had a woman mayor. The wage gap is still the highest among European countries with 25% less for women. We are still a long way from achieving gender equality and gender equity. Many women from all communities had hoped that the entry to the European Union would have made a difference for women's lives especially on social issues but this has not been the case up till now and it needs to be studied further. Research has also shown that women across the Green Line share a number of common issues and challenges such as their desire for participation in public affairs and the peace process, gender equality at all levels of life, and visibility in local and national forums. They share concerns on issues of domestic violence, wage-gap, inequality in the labour market, sex trafficking, women's health issues, migration, and gender discrimination. These shared issues open up spaces for networking and joint women's solidarity campaigns.

The position of educated TC women in the northern part of Cyprus has improved in recent years due to the increasing number of recently established universities (Mertan, 2000). We detect the benefit of higher education opportunities not only in the number of female university graduates which doubled from 7% to 14.7% in a decade (DPÖ-State Planning Organisation Statistics, 2006) but also in the rate of female participation in the labour market which increased from 27% to 29.1%. That being said, these universities are mostly run by male professors and the senior executive members are men in the majority. In the local government we note the following: among the existing 28 municipalities none of the mayors are female. In local governments only 43 out of 234 members are women (18.37%). For the first time in 2009, Turkish Cypriots appointed the first female Head official for the Famagusta district. During Talat's term in office the position of Turkish Cypriot women improved for a while. For example, the rate of women in the higher decision-making bodies increased to 17%, a female MP became Speaker of the Legislative Assembly for the first time and a female Minister of Education was also appointed for the first time. Additionally, in the Supreme Court two of the eight judges were women (25%). It seems that for short periods we can observe women occupying high positions and having responsibilities in different professional and political organisations. These changes, however, do not reflect a more permanent change in the cultural and social attitudes towards women in the TC Community as is the case with the GC women. Both TC and GC women share the view that women's issues have been under-played in the political agenda due to the predominance of the 'national political problem' where the visible role of women has been missing (Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010).

The 1990s and Beyond:
Cypriot Women in Solidarity for Peace and for UNSC Resolution 1325

In this section we briefly discuss the work of some pioneer independent bicommunal women's groups which have made interventions in the rapprochement, peacebuilding and reconciliation processes challenging the mainstream male discourses, the construction of the enemy culture, and militarism as an ideology and culture. We will discuss only the most recent of these women's groups: *Hands Across the Divide* (HAD), which is a registered non-governmental organisation; *Metamorphosis Cypriot Women's Group* (MCW), *the Gender Advisory Team* (GAT), and the newly found *Turkish Cypriot Feminist Movement*. All of these are independent of political parties and party agendas. Our discussion is informed by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Plan of Action in 1995, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000, and the European Parliament Resolution on 'Women and Peace and Security' of 2000. These documents, all of which the Cyprus Republic signed, recognise that women should participate in and have a significant role to play in the process of prevention, resolution of conflicts, in peace building and the peace negotiations. It is also acknowledged that women and girls experience conflict and war differently and need different policies and support systems.

Hands Across the Divide (HAD) is the first bicommunal, independent non-governmental organisation established in 2001 (for details see; Agathangelou, 2003; Cockburn, 2004; and Hadjipavlou, 2006, 2010). The underlying shared world view of HAD is that 'we believe in the values of participatory democracy, which for us means an open market of ideas, equal representation of women, equal access to resources and opportunities and we aspire to live in a reunited island'. HAD, organised many conflict resolution workshops addressing issues of peace, security, militarism and violence and how to deal with the past. HAD, stresses the fact that all forms of violence, whether domestic, social, institutional or inter-national are inter-connected. All violence stems from the imbalance of power and resources that prevail in a male-dominated world which suppresses women's participation and perspectives on the vital issues of peace making and peace negotiations. HAD members, were the only ones who analysed the latest UN peace Plan (the Annan Plan) from a gender lens and produced a document about how to integrate a gender perspective in the future agreements. Other activities included: a letter handed to the two Cypriot leaders, Mr D. Christofias and Mr M.A. Talat in 2008, reminding them of UNSC Resolution 1325. This is a resolution that directly concerns us here in Cyprus. It calls, among other issues, for the participation of women in peace negotiations, and in the post conflict reconstruction. It calls upon states to incorporate a gender perspective in the negotiations, and in all implementation mechanisms. Furthermore, it stresses that all actors should implement measures that ensure the human and social rights of women and girls as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the security and the judiciary. Despite having ratified it, Cyprus has not yet developed a national plan on the implementation of resolution 1325.

Other HAD projects include the 'Peace Bus' project whereby women visit mixed villages in the north and south to create networks of reunions of women who lived together before the conflict to share hopes and fears and develop new connections for reconciliation. To mark the tenth anniversary of the UNSC resolution 1325, HAD, in cooperation with the *Gender Advisory Team* (GAT) organised public events in September, one being a lecture by Martha Jean Baker on how Cypriot women can become mobilised to promote the implementation of the resolution and the other being the placement of bill boards at the end of Ledra Street in divided Nicosia inviting passers-by to write 'what does peace mean to me'. The response was overwhelming.

The *Gender Advisory Team* (GAT) consists of women from both sides of the divide, women activists and scholars who have been meeting since 2009 and have been in contact with the UN good offices in Cyprus and the UNDP-ACT personnel, the aim being to both identify ways in which gender considerations can be integrated into the Cyprus peace process in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1325. GAT believes that the issues under discussion between the two Cypriot leaders – governance, security, property and relations with the European Union – concern women as well and their needs and concerns should be heard. GAT has already submitted to Christofias and Talat a document with key recommendations and principles related to the governance issue. On his visit to Cyprus in February 2010 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon made special mention and praised the efforts and work of GAT. In collaboration with two other partners, GAT has submitted a project proposal to carry out research among women across the divide and gather data on women's views and needs on the four main issues under discussion at the macro level. The purpose is to produce a comprehensive document on women's views and concerns and submit it to the leaders and their working teams to ascertain that gender equality provisions and women's social rights are incorporated in any future agreement. GAT will collaborate with women's party organisations and other influential women from both communities so as to mobilise from below and increase sensitivity on gender awareness.

Another women's group which is working on a different agenda is the *'Metamorphosis Cypriot Women's Group'* (MCWG) which was created in July 2000, when twenty Greek Cypriot and twenty Turkish Cypriot women received AMIDEAST scholarships to be trained on Domestic Violence and Business Leadership at George Washington University in the USA. The group was composed of professionals working mainly in education, psychology and business.

Women's solidarity and networking campaigns challenge the conflict culture and the dychotomies of 'us' and 'them' so the MCWG, like HAD, offered several bicommunal seminars and workshops in Cyprus and abroad. The meetings organised by MCWG encouraged Cypriot women to share common goals, mutual understanding and respect for each other and to bond with one another across ethnic, class and age differences. Moreover, as a result of this mutual sharing, they were motivated to undertake a project on 'Successful Cypriot Women'. In November 2002 they obtained a year's funding from the EU Civil Society Programme in Cyprus and run workshops about what a 'successful woman' is from a feminist perspective. The group produced a 66-minute documentary on 'Successful Cypriot Women' in three languages – Greek, Turkish and

English. It was conceived by women, and produced by a bicommunal team of film directors and crew. The documentary features three TC and three GC women of different generations who tell their personal life stories, struggles, hopes, dreams and aspirations, and also the obstacles and difficulties they faced in a conservative patriarchal society. Each one of them had made a significant social intervention within the context of their reality on gender stereotypes and social taboo issues. They contested patriarchal structures and social prejudices. The documentary has been shown at both bicommunal events, conferences (Iacovou-Kapsali and Mertan, 2004) and in the respective communities and abroad (Mertan, 2003, 2004; Mertan and Iacovou-Kapsali, 2004; Iacovou-Kapsali *et al.*, 2008). In each screening of the film, the audiences have strong emotional responses and many women connect with the experiences of women in the documentary and feel empowered to struggle for social change.

A newly-found group in the TC community is the *'feminist movement group'* which was established in May 2010 and comprises mainly young educated women of whom some took gender studies and call themselves feminists. Their first activity was a public protest against militarization and for demilitarization of the whole island. They connect militarization to patriarchy and nationalism. The group 'thinks globally but acts locally' as they explained in interviews. They link social women's issues with feminism and regional and global women's issues. They believe that women in their community choose compromise instead of asserting their rights as women which informs us about women's oppression. The group is open to cooperate with GC women and promote co-existence and reconciliation.

It seems to us that all these independent women's groups provide the foundation and resource for a future feminist Cypriot movement for gender equality and a different voice in the Cypriot society. The Mediterranean Institute for Gender Studies (MIGS), the Observatory for Equality, (Paratiritirio Isotitas) the UNESCO Chair for gender equality and women's empowerment at the University of Cyprus, the 'Washing-Up Ladies' women artists' project (Lia Lapithi and Marianna Kafaridou), and the Cyprus Federation of Business and Professional women (BPW) which carried out a number of research projects on gender stereotypes and treatment of women in the employment sector. In the north the Women's Studies Centre in the Eastern Mediterranean University organised a number of seminars and conferences on gender issues, and their Journal 'Kadın 2000' publishes articles on gender and feminist issues. The Turkish Cypriot Association of University Women has also engaged in research and has introduced public debates on gender issues thus broadening the political agenda and challenges the predominance of the 'national problem' agenda.

Concluding Remarks

We have tried to show that the social position of the Cypriot women over the last fifty years has been closely connected to the political upheavals whereby the 'national' problem dominated public discourse and the structure of patriarchy becomes mediated with nationalist politics to 'keep'

certain agendas visible while marginalising others. As we have shown in this article, Cypriot society has been male dominated, and patriarchal structures gave rise to social stereotypes, gender prejudices, and sexual division of labour. Nevertheless, we have noted a number of changes in women's lives over the last fifty years such as in education, travels abroad, professional development, economic independence and a contribution to peace building and reconciliation efforts. Despite the fact that their participation in public life and politics is still low, women are becoming more aware of the lack of social support systems to empower them to enter political life and be active in struggles for social change. Though women's solidarity networks across the divide have weakened since 2004, there are indications today that new women's groups have started recognising shared issues that need to be addressed such as gender roles, inequalities, limitations of their rights, domestic violence, sex trafficking, and their desire for peace and human security. These groups should come out of the margins. There exists a need to form women's alliances across ideologies, class and ethnicities so as to strengthen democratic procedures and together co-create the much needed Cypriot feminist movement on the island. Such a movement will benefit the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society as a whole because it will connect people across ethnicities, gender, age, class, race, sexual orientation, language, disabilities, and religious affiliations. In the last thirty years the demographics have changed drastically in both communities and this must be addressed with new policies of integration and inclusion of women. For this to happen, men and women need to develop a gender consciousness and recognise that social change means to include women's talents and abilities in the construction of a new Cypriot imaginary. This is a fundamental principle of participatory democracy and social justice. The challenge which lies ahead is how to create partnerships and convince men that patriarchy works to their detriment too as they are deprived of the full enjoyment of human experiences. Men and women ought to question the power structures which keep them both in restrictive roles. It is important to recognise that women suffer in times of conflict and wars in particular ways and they need to be given a voice to allow their skills to be used for peacemaking.

The many universities in Cyprus should encourage the establishment of graduate programmes on gender studies, and women's research centres to produce the long overdue history of Cypriot women's contribution to the civilization and creativity on the island; their achievements and struggles over the centuries and bring visibility to the unknown women's stories and experiences. Such research and knowledge should be incorporated in the school curricula. We believe that today there is a growing desire by women for a Cypriot feminist movement which would be inclusive of and responsive to the needs of all women and men who live on the island. The challenge for such a Cypriot feminism would be to question the power systems such as the economic, the ethno-national and the sex/gender power – all three intersect and promote inequality and are sustained by coercion and violence. A Cypriot Feminist movement could question such phenomena and mobilise social and cultural change which is as important as solving the 'Cyprus conflict'.

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Rusfeti and Political Patronage in the Republic of Cyprus

HUBERT FAUSTMANN

Abstract

This article analyses the roots, transformations and current workings of political patronage in the Republic of Cyprus during the fifty years since the country's independence. It attempts to assess how politicians and political parties during the various presidencies have managed to establish their far reaching control over many aspects of Cypriot society through a highly sophisticated system of favours (rusfeti). The establishment of clientelistic relationships between the citizen on the one side and politicians and political parties on the other is at the centre of the analysis. The primary but by far not only areas where clientelistic relationships are formed through rusfeti are the public sector and the semi-governmental organisations where parties and politicians are most capable of exercising influence. It will be argued that a Cyprus Consensus has been established between the political parties but also between individual politicians and a large number of the citizens that sustains and perpetuates the firmly entrenched structures and widespread clientelistic practices as a mutually beneficial arrangement for all sides involved. Political patronage undermines the principle of meritocracy and has led to the establishment of oversized and privileged public and semi-governmental sectors at the expense of the wider Cypriot public, which is footing an increasing bill that the Republic of Cyprus might soon be unable to afford.

Keywords: Rusfeti, Clientelism, Political Patronage, Party Patronage, Political Parties, Public Service, Semi-Governmental Sector, Cyprus Consensus

Introduction

A key element of the political culture in Cyprus[1] is the way in which political parties and politicians firmly control almost all aspects of Cypriot society and have far reaching influence over the individual citizen. The stranglehold that parties and their leaders have is based on various

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[1]   Parts of this article are based on: H. Faustmann, 'Aspects of Political Culture in Cyprus' in J. Ker-Lindsay and H. Faustmann (eds.), *The Government and Politics of Cyprus.* (Bern et al: Peter Lang, 2008), pp. 17-44. The author would like to thank Christophoros Christophorou, Andrekos Varnava, and Emilios Solomou for their helpful comments on the draft of this article and Anastasia Adamidou for proof reading the manuscript. Moreover, this article would not have been possible without information provided by efficient, friendly and helpful employees of various public and semi-governmental institutions in Cyprus.

pillars. The small size of Cypriot society is one of them: the Greek Cypriot electorate comprised only 526,000 in 2009.[2] Consequently, small town political patterns shape the relation amongst the elites and between the politicians and the ordinary citizen. In small societies, personal connections inevitably become vital for the interaction of the individual with the state and the promotion of personal goals. The members of the elites know each other but also most ordinary citizens have personal contacts to leading politicians or at least know somebody who has the contacts needed. As a result, public and private interaction is shaped by a highly developed system of mutual favours, through which one can achieve almost anything, if one only has the right connections. Greek and Greek Cypriots use the Turkish term *rusfeti* to describe this practice.[3] Between ordinary citizens, those favours are often done without any immediate service in return (exceeding the feeling of a moral obligation to return the favour one day) and in many (but by far not all) cases they have more to do with just helping a friend or a friend of a friend.

However, if one looks at the role favours play in the relationship between political parties, politicians and the citizen the picture becomes less favourable and by far more detrimental for the development of Cypriot society as a whole. Today, Cypriot politics are conducted within the framework of widespread and deeply rooted clientelistic patterns and structures. Clientelism means that an influential patron dispenses favours, i.e. politically motivated *rusfeti* (appointments, promotions, transfers, exemptions from the implementation of laws, access to services, administrative favours) to his less influential client in exchange for political support. If the client is already a party member or a supporter of an individual politician then he/she expects to be rewarded through the favour. Failure to deliver favours might result in the loss of the client's support. From a patron's perspective, the client has to vote for the party or the politician in exchange for the favour. Often, clients are expected, sometimes even pressured, to join the party responsible for the favour if they are not already members. Essential for clientelism in contrast to nepotism, corruption or favouritism is the establishment of a patron-client relationship which includes the commitment of the client to vote for the individual politician and/or the party in return for the favour. Clientelistic networks can spread via powerful politicians who integrate or build their networks within political parties over the entire country. In clientelistically structured societies, the execution of state power is extensively used to distribute favours to the supporters of the ruling parties or individual politicians within the public service, semi-governmental organisations and any other area where parties or politicians have influence. Since these networks cover almost all aspects of public life, they exceed what Western European societies know

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2   The Turkish Cypriot electorate in 2009 was only 161,000. E. Kaymak and H. Faustmann: 'Cyprus' in: *European Journal of Political Research. Political Data Yearbook 2009.* Vol. 49, (forthcoming in 2010), Tables 2 and 5.

3   The term *rusfeti* in a wider sense describes any act of granting a favour or service. In a political context it is used to describe a favour by a minister or Member of Parliament to party followers, friends or acquaintances. G. Bambinioti, Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας [Lexicon of Modern Greek Language], 2nd edition, (Athens: Lexicological Center, 2005).

themselves as clientelism in the form of party patronage, favouritism and nepotism.[4] Sotiropoulos even argues that patronage and clientelism are the most common characteristics of southern European states which share a different administrative tradition than core Western or Central European countries like Britain or Germany.[5] While patronage and clientelism are widespread in both communities of Cyprus and the two separate political entities they live in today, this article will focus on the Republic of Cyprus whose political institutions are since 1963 exclusively in the hands of the Greek Cypriot community and not on the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. Nevertheless, many of the following observations apply to the Turkish Cypriot entity as well though there are also significant differences - the most important being the role and influence of Turkey within its domestic affairs.

Methodologically, it is impossible to precisely quantify the extent of politically motivated favours due to their covert nature. But one – imprecise – indicator of the extent of clientelism next to anecdotal evidence, political patronage related scandals, public confessions/accusations and legal prosecutions is an examination of the growth of the public and semi-public sectors. Appointments, transfers and promotions in these state controlled sectors are important tools available to politicians and parties to gain, keep and reward supporters. For this reason, clientelistically structured societies are usually marked by large public and semi-public sectors. Employment by far exceeds administrative needs. Recruitments, promotions and transfers are very often influenced by political interference. Obviously, it would be too simplistic to explain the growth of the public and semi-governmental sectors exclusively as the outcome of clientelistic practices. Administrative needs and changes (created, for example, by the institution building after independence or the EU accession process and membership), pressure created by trade unions and the inherent tendency of organisations to grow play an important and often decisive role as well. Nonetheless, it is argued here that the large number of new appointments in an already oversized public service by all governments since independence cannot be convincingly explained by administrative and organisational needs. Moreover, a quantitative evaluation does allow – with a degree of caution and imprecision – an assessment of the scope of *rusfeti* practices by the various administrations since 1960. Additionally, even necessary organisational expansion and transformation in Cyprus takes

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4   For further information on clientelism as a concept and its occurrence in Cyprus see: E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, *Patrons and Clients* (London: Duckworth, 1977) as well as H. Faustmann, 'Clientelism in the Greek Cypriot Community of Cyprus', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 41-77.

5   He argues that in Mediterranean countries the Weberian rational bureaucracy model was only superficially adopted since it remained inchoate and there is a deep dependence of the administration on the politicians in power. While the last point clearly also applies to Cyprus, the British colonial administration left Cyprus arguably with a more Western and Central European administrative system in a Weberian sense than that of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal which were investigated by Sotiropoulos. D.A. Sotiropoulos, Κράτος και Μεταρρύθμιση στη σύγχρονη Νότια Ευρώπη: Ελλάδα-Ισπανία-Ιταλία-Πορτογαλία [Government and Reform in Contemporary Southern Europe: Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal] (Athens: Potamos, 2007), p. 27.

place in a context shaped by political patronage, i.e. many governmental and semi-governmental employees were employed or promoted with the help of politicians and political parties who expect their votes in return.

The costs of political patronage for the society are enormous. Sustaining an oversized public service requires huge resources. The financial burden is exacerbated by considerable privileges acquired by employees in the governmental and semi-governmental sectors with the help of politicians seeking re-election: according to the head of the Cypriot Employers and Industrialists Federation, Andreas Pittas, 'in the space of 20 years, the number of civil servants has increased by 52 per cent, their earnings by 445 per cent and their pensions by 961 per cent'.[6] At the presentation of the 2011 budget, the Finance Minister, Charilaos Stavrakis, lamented the 'dramatic increase' in public servants by around 20,000 to around 53,000 in the last twenty years. These figures indicate an even higher increase (about 61%) for the same period than the 52% claimed by Pittas. According to Stavrakis, the state payroll for the salaries, pensions and bonuses of public servants is expected to eat up €2.7 billion or 33.7% of the total state budget of €8.02 billion in 2011. He very bluntly called for an urgent change of policy in order to avert the collapse of the country's economy:

> 'We should reach measures to contain the state payroll and the whole pension framework of the public and wider public sector. [...] The current system is a time-bomb and if measures are not taken it will blow the country up'.[7]

The figures given for the number of public servants by Pittas and Stavrakis should be taken with a grain of salt since they exceed the official numbers provided by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. But also according to official statistics, the state expenditure for the salaries and pensions of the public servants alone almost quadrupled from €519 million (which consumed even 38.4% of the total expenditure) in 1993 to the projected figure of €1.955 million in 2011 (31.9%).[8] The picture becomes bleaker if one adds the state's expenditure for salaries in the semi-governmental sector. Whatever the exact figures, it is safe to conclude that after 50 years of independence, the financial consequences of clientelistic practices constitute a serious threat to the country's public finances.

The Development and Transformations of Political Patronage in Cyprus

The roots of modern political patronage within the Greek Cypriot community date back to the Ottoman but mostly the British colonial period. Within the very limited scope of political activity allowed during British colonial rule, elections for the Legislative Council (until its abolition in 1931) but also the elections of the Archbishop, the municipal councils as well as rural local

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6   'We are in One Big Financial Mess', *Cyprus Mail*, 21 May 2010.
7   'State Payroll a "time bomb"', *Cyprus Mail*, 16 September 2010.
8   Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

administration (during the periods when the British allowed their election) were the realm in which popular electoral support was required by the Greek Cypriot elites. When significant segments of those elites started to challenge British colonial rule more forcefully in the 1920s, the colonial administration introduced reforms which gradually broke many of the links between the local power holders and their electorate. Consequently, during the second half of British rule, the limited clientelistic networks which had been created during the Ottoman and the first half of the British colonial period and which were mostly based on economic dependency were largely destroyed.[9]

Moreover, Britain implemented Western European norms and values in the areas of administration and law. The efficiency and impartiality of the administration and judiciary based on the principle of meritocracy as well as the freedom of speech and the press during most of the period of British rule has left a lasting legacy, even if the British impact on the conduct of politics was substantially less. These changes took deep roots in the mentality of the Cypriots of both communities during the 82 years of British rule. After independence, many of these Western European norms, regulations and patterns of behaviour remained in the Republic, despite the emergence of a more personalised form of politics and the re-emergence and evolution of clientelistic practices ensuring much more efficient, well run and considerably smaller administration than that of their - at least in a cultural sense – kin in Greece.[10]

The era of mass politics in Cyprus began in 1941, when the foundation of political parties was tacitly allowed again at the end of a dictatorial period following the failed uprising of 1931. Elections in 1943 were for the first time based on universal male suffrage on a political level. Having said that, only elections on a municipal level were permitted and the sphere of influence and the area of favours where politicians or parties could exert authority remained limited to the areas of local politics, trade unions and cooperative societies strictly within the framework of a colonial administration.

After independence, a refined system of political patronage by powerful politicians became one of the most important features of Cypriot society. The violent struggle against British colonial

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9   For an account on the emergence and historical transformation of clientelism within the Greek Cypriot community as well as the British reforms, see H. Faustmann, 'Clientelism', *op. cit.*, pp. 41-77.

10 According to official statistics, in 2010, 768,000 or 17.5% of the working population in Greece were employed in the public service. It is estimated that a further 250,000 to 300,000 are employed in the semi-governmental sector. In Cyprus, the percentage of public servants was 11.5% (46,000) in 2009 and 45,000 in 2008. The number of employees in the semi-governmental sector in 2008 was around 22,000. For 2008, the total percentage of employees in the public and semi-public sectors in Cyprus was 17.1%. 'Greece Concludes Civil Servant Census as Further Cuts Loom', *Deutsche Welle*, 19 August 2010. Available at [http:/www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5926884,00.html], accessed on 25 September 2010. For the figures on Cyprus, see Ministry of Finance, Labour Force Survey 2009, available at: [http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/1C367FF67CB41D48C2257770002CE4DA?Open Document&sub=1&e=], accessed on 30 August 2010 and the table in the Appendix, p. 287.

rule (1955-1959) had led to an elite change where large segments of the traditional Greek Cypriot elite were marginalised and replaced by a new one recruited from the leading EOKA members and close associates of the political leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios. The most visible sign that the traditional Greek Cypriot elites were largely left out of the power centres of Greek Cypriot politics and that *novi homines* were now in charge was the average age of the Greek Cypriot ministers in the first two cabinets. The first ministers chosen by Makarios served as a Provisional Cabinet in 1959-1960 during the final phase of British rule while the second were appointed in the first cabinet after independence in 1960. Their average age was 32 and 37 respectively.[11]

During the first years after independence, the power centres within the Greek Cypriot community were the first president, Archbishop Makarios, and his closest associates as well as former EOKA members who became ministers or held other key positions in the administration. Through christenings, the creation of paramilitary groups and *rusfeti*, those few built powerful personalised networks. Former EOKA fighters and the networks created during the struggle were used to exercise power or even violently intimidate those who crossed vital interests of the new ruling elite outside the official and legal channels if deemed necessary.[12] Moreover, in the first years after independence, many EOKA fighters and their relatives demanded and obtained jobs in the civil service. This led to the creation of new posts which were not always necessary thereby laying the foundations for the politically motivated growth of the public sector within the Greek Cypriot community.[13] This practice is clearly illustrated by the massive increase in public servants from 15,000 to 25,000 during the 17 years of the Presidency of Archbishop Makarios, though one needs to take into consideration that considerable institutional change was necessary to provide the new state with fully functioning institutions. Accordingly, the proportion of the state budget needed for the salaries and pensions of the public servants grew between 1961 and 1977 from 21.1% to 33.2%.[14]

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11 Greek Cypriot members of the Transitional Cabinet serving from March/April 1959 to August 1960: Archbishop Makarios (46), Antonios Georghiades (26), Polycarpos Yiorkadjis (27), Paschalis Paschalides (30), Glafkos Clerides (39), Tassos Papadopoulos (25) and Riginos Theocharis (32). The first Greek Cypriot cabinet after independence: Archbishop Makarios (born 1913), Andreas Apaousos (1906), Polycarpos Yiorkadjis (1930), Spyros Kyprianou (1932), Riginos Theocharis (1929), Andreas Papadopoulos (1922), Stella Souliotis (1920) and Tassos Papadopoulos (1934).

12 Confidential interview with a high ranking Greek Cypriot public servant.

13 L. Ierodiakonou, Τεθλασμένη Πορεία – Κύπρος 1959-2003, Πολιτικό Σύστημα, Πολιτικοί Θεσμοί, Διαδρομή Εκδημοκρατισμού, [A Zigzag Course: Cyprus 1959-2003, Political System, Political Institutions, Democratisation Process] (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 2002), pp. 208-209. The structural pressure to increase the public service in excess of its actual needs dates already back to 1960. From the inception of the Republic until the breakdown of the constitutional order in 1963, the 30% job ratio for Turkish Cypriots in the public service guaranteed in the constitution had already created pressure for hiring public servants in excess of administrative needs.

14 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. In 1960, the percentage for salaries

A typical example of how rules and regulations were bypassed in the public service to provide loyal followers with jobs in the early years of the Republic is the admission of the former minister of Justice and Public Order Nicos Koshis, who disclosed how policemen were recruited by him in the 1960s though he held no official office at that time:

> 'I was sharing a house with (former interior minister Polycarpos) Yiorkadjis. [...] I personally had the main say, with Makarios approval. They [the applicants] had to come to me to be given a certificate, so that they would be able to join the police force'.[15]

The most skilful man to create personalised clientielistic networks next to Makarios is widely seen to be the house mate of Koshis, the Minister of Interior Yiorkadjis, whose network even survived his assassination in 1970 in the public service as well as within the party of DISY until the 1990s. Originally, the towering political figure and ultimate decision maker in confrontations between power holders remained Makarios. His power was unsuccessfully challenged by members of the traditional elites in confrontations between the mayors of the major towns and the Archbishop during the Transitional Period as well as in the first presidential elections in 1959. After independence, his main opponents were the followers of Georgios Grivas, the former military leader of EOKA, whenever the two fell out. On top of that, by the late 1960s, some of the autonomous sub networks and their leaders that were known and approved of by Makarios had also become so influential that they formed alternative power centres and a potential threat for the archbishop. The most significant case was the network created by Yiorkadjis. Some even openly turned against him, like that of the Ethniko Metopo (National Front) formed in 1968. Many of its members later became part of Grivas' EOKA B.

The death of Makarios in 1977 together with the foundation of two new parties, DIKO and DISY in 1976, mark a watershed in Greek Cypriot domestic politics. Although the communist party AKEL and the Socialist EDEK (both loyal supporters of Makarios) had existed long before 1977 (as well as a number of usually short lived parties) it was only after the death of the towering figure of Greek Cypriot domestic politics that the country was transformed into a modern liberal democracy within a few years. Together with the contemporary party system and also the emergence of effective party competition for power, the contemporary system of political patronage evolved. It is characterised by a mixture of favours of political parties in order to gain or maintain votes overlapping with the previous individualised system of favours by politicians towards followers of this specific power holder. The democratisation of Cyprus also increased the needs and opportunities for clientelistic practices as well as the power of the parties by dramatically

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and pensions had been 35.7%. But in order to measure the post-independence growth, the 1961 figures need to be used since the 1960 data includes the payments for a large number of high level British colonial civil servants who left the island shortly before or after independence. If the 1960 figures for the numbers of civil servants include the British officials then the increase during the Makarios presidency is even higher.

15   L.G. Charalambous, 'Dirty Laundry and the Mess We're in', *Cyprus Mail*, 31 January 2010.

enlarged numbers of elected officials. During the first two decades after independence, only 36 Greek Cypriot officials (35 parliamentarians and the president) were elected. In the last three decades various reforms and changes (the numerically most significant being the introduction of municipal/mayoral elections) increased their number to more than 2,600. More than 10,000 candidates, who need to be a member or at least associated with a party in order to stand any chance of winning, are today competing for those offices, which in turn provide opportunities for the granting of favours.[16]

The first president after Makarios, Spyros Kyprianou, is widely considered to be the man, during whose terms in power, clientelistic practices peaked and were exercised more openly and excessively than ever before or after.[17] Kyprianou, more than any other president, was extensively and openly personally involved in granting *rusfeti*. He systematically used clientelism to maintain his rule and as a basis for building his party, DIKO.[18] In exchange for a favour or as a prerequisite for being recruited in the public sector party membership was often requested which had to be proven by a DIKO membership identity card. Favouritism also became more organised and even institutionalised. As was the case with all Cypriot governments after Makarios, the coalition partner also expected and got its share. The Deputy Secretary General of AKEL, Andreas Fantis, admitted in 1998:

> 'During Kyprianou's presidency I cannot testify responsibly about what happened in the first five year term (1978-1983). However, I can testify responsibly, as personal testimony, about what was happening with regard to rusfeti during Kyprianou's second presidential term and particularly and more specifically during the period since his election in 1983, on the basis of the Minimum Program, until December 1984. I therefore testify that in the 20 month period between February 1983 – December 1984, rusfeti was institutionalized following an agreement between our parties. Specifically, Mr Dinos Michaelides was then appointed as Minister of the Presidency with an office at the presidential palace and following mutual agreement, for each appointment or promotion DIKO and AKEL would prepare lists-catalogues which were discussed in regular meetings between an AKEL delegation – Yiannis Katsourides and myself – and Mr Michaelides'.[19]

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16   C. Christophorou, 'Party Change and Development in Cyprus (1995-2005)', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, September-December 2006, p. 514.

17   One example for this widespread perception is that of the DISY member and minister under Clerides, Leontios Ierodiakonou, who claims in his well researched book that compared to the Kyprianou presidencies favouritism continued but decreased under Vassiliou and Clerides. He concedes that both also failed to control the growth of the public service. Ierodiakonou, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

18   C. Christophorou, 'A New Communist Surprise – What's Next? Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus. February 2008', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2008, p. 221.

19   *Phileleftheros*, 30 January 1998, here quoted from Ierodiakonou, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

As a consequence, large numbers of Greek Cypriots became party members and expected employment, promotion or another favour in return. The phenomenon of large scale membership growth in the parties of a ruling coalition became ever since a characteristic of Cypriot politics and one indicator of *rusfeti* practices. The DIKO vote increased from 19.5% in the parliamentary elections of 1981 to 27.7% in 1985 and its membership grew to 13,000 by 1987.[20] The numbers for the growth of the public service during Kyrianou's presidencies vary greatly however. Loucas G. Charalambous claims in an article in the Cyprus Mail that at the end of the Makarios era, the Republic of Cyprus had employed 18,000 public servants. At the end of the Kyprianou era, their number allegedly reached 32,000.[21] An increase of almost 14,000 public servants in 11 years during a period without any significant institutional changes that would have warranted such an increase, would clearly confirm the widespread impression that the Kyprianou administration was the most notorious, in terms of *rusfeti*. Despite this, if the official data provided by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus is correct, then the opposite can be argued at least as far as employment in the public service is concerned. Never did the civil service grow more slowly than during Kyprianou's terms in office. According to the official figures, between 1977 and 1988, 5,192 public servants were engaged, an average of 472 per year in office. All other presidents of the Republic have a considerably higher annual average ranging from 581 (Makarios) to 803 (Papadopoulos).[22] Furthermore, according to the official statistics, he inherited many more than the 18,000 civil servants from Makarios as Charalambous claims: officially 25,017 were employed in 1977.

Kyprianou's successor, AKEL backed but independent George Vassiliou, enhanced the possibilities of parties to extend their influence into the semi-public sector. Consultation and

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20   There are no figures available for DIKO party membership in 1978. Ierodiakonou, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

21   L.G. Charalambous 'Tame the Civil Service Beast or the IMF Will', *Sunday Mail*, 25 July 2010.

22   If one counts the increase in numbers and divides them by the years in office thereby obtaining the average increase of public servants per year the results are: Makarios (9,876/581), Kyprianou (5,192/472), (Vassiliou 3,542/708), Clerides (7,515/751), Papadopoulos (4,018/803), Christofias (970/970). See for absolute numbers the table in the Appendix (p. 287). However, the data given above is necessarily imprecise and conclusions should be drawn with a grain of salt. First of all, the figures provided by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus are given by calendar year. They do not allow for any distinguishing between people hired by the incumbent before the takeover of power in the year of elections and government change. Therefore, a potentially considerable but not specifiable number of public servants were actually not hired during the presidency for which they are counted above. Secondly, any judgment solely based on the above figures ignores causes for institutional growth unrelated to *rusfeti* mentioned above. However, it is argued here that clientelism is also prevalent in 'necessary' appointments and therefore any hiring which allows parties to exercise influence is potentially affected by it. Thirdly, the figure for Christofias presidency refers only to 2009. Clearly, the large number points to widespread rewards for party followers but arguably the periods immediately before and after an election are for any president and his coalition parties the times when the largest number of *rusfeti* based appointments are made. What is more, the 2010 figures will put his administration statistically in a much more favourable light. Forced by the dire condition of state finances and the European Union the government is currently reducing the size of the public service aiming at a reduction of 1,000 by the end of 2010 and further reductions in the years to come.

cooperation between the government and the political parties became an important characteristic of Greek Cypriot politics during his presidency. This worked much to the benefit of all sides and the state but compounded the possibilities for favours for both the ruling party but also the opposition. He tried to ensure support for his handling of the Cyprus issue by offering 'political parties functions and prerogatives that in some cases proved excessive, if not unlawful'.[23] A law allowing party officials to attend the meetings of the boards of directors of the semi-governmental bodies was even declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.[24] Ever since 1960, the members of the board of directors of the semi-governmental organisations were appointed formally by the government but effectively by the president. Vassiliou's well intended attempt to cooperate with the political parties resulted in a new practice whereby the parties of a ruling coalition increase their influence in the semi-governmental bodies by providing non-paper nominations of their candidates for the various boards. The president then chooses from those lists effectively apportioning influence in the various organisations to the parties since these appointments are vital for the exercise of *rusfeti* within the respective organisation. Another negative side effect of this extensive party influence is the fact that the party faithful who are appointed to a board often lack the necessary qualification or expertise for their position. According to Charalambous, during Vassiliou's five years in office, another 4,000 civil servants were appointed while the figures of the Statistical Service are only slightly lower: 3,542.[25] AKEL membership remained steady at around 14,000 to 15,000 during the 1980s and early 1990s since it maintains a ceiling on membership in order to control who joins the party.[26] Vassiliou's unwillingness to employ a widespread clientelistic practice led to his downfall in the elections of 1993. He did not fly-in student supporters from abroad to vote for him believing that his re-election was certain. His rival, Glafkos Clerides, and his party DISY as well as the parties that supported him brought their supporters and Clerides won by 0.62% or 2,176 votes.

The use of *rusfeti* continued and in particular in his second term an ageing Clerides was widely perceived to be exclusively preoccupied with the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem allowing his ministers largely to run their own *rusfeti* practices within and across their ministries and organisations. However, unlike Kyprianou who, according to anecdotal evidence, extensively directly contacted and pressured alleged and real receivers of favours to join and vote DIKO in return, Clerides (as well as his predecessor and his successors) was perceived to conduct (or at least tolerate) *rusfeti* in a more statesman like manner though Kyprianou and his party were his coalition partner. The presidents after Kyprianou were certainly aware of the clientelistic

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23   C. Christophorou, 'The Evolution of Greek Cypriot Party Politics' in J. Ker-Lindsay and H. Faustmann (eds.), *The Government and Politics of Cyprus*. (Bern *et al:* Peter Lang, 2008), p. 92.

24   C. Christophorou, 'Party Politics', *op. cit.*, pp. 92 and 104.

25   Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus and Charalambous, *op. cit.*

26   Ierodiakonou, *op. cit.*, p. 242 and Christophorou, 'Party Change', *op. cit.*, p. 522.

practices, but their personal involvement is very difficult to assess since they seem to have been more hesitant to become openly personally implicated. What can safely be said is that all Cypriot presidents so far at least tolerated *rusfeti* and most, if not all, had it conducted through their close associates. According to Charalambous, within the ten years of Clerides' presidency, the size of the public service grew by 8,000 to 44,000. Here, the figures of the Statistical Service are similar: the administration grew by 7,515 to a total of 41,266. As is the case with Vassiliou, only some of these appointments in an already oversized public service can be justified by Cyprus' EU accession process or other administrative needs. Employment in the semi-governmental sector – for which there are no comprehensive figures available for the years before 1993-1994[27] – grew from 8,284 in 1994 to 12,058 in 2003, an increase of more than 31% in ten years.[28] However, next to the EU accession process, the creation of new semi-governmental organisations and offices for independent officials, like the Ombudsman, during the 1990s also explains at least partly this massive increase. Not surprisingly, DISY party membership during Clerides' ten years in office grew from 18,400 to 33,000.[29]

To its credit, the Clerides' administration introduced a law that made *rusfeti* a punishable offence in 2001. But a closer look at its provisions and in particular its non implementation sheds further light on the role of *rusfeti* within Cypriot politics and society. Until 2001, neither granting nor requesting *rusfeti* was punishable. Since 2001, 'influencing the authorities' within the context of employment, promoting, placing, transferring or exercising disciplinary power in public office, in favour of oneself or any other person became a criminal offence punishable by up to 12 months in prison and/or up to Cy£1,000/€1,708.60. Moreover, any member of any public authority or any committee approached for such purposes is legally obliged to report any person to the Head of Police or he/she is guilty of a legal offence (punishable by up to 12 months in prison or Cy£2,000/ €3,417.20). Any criminal prosecution for *rusfeti* has to be initiated or at least approved by the Attorney General. Since punishment reflects the seriousness of a crime, the light punishment for requesting or exercising *rusfeti* is already telling. Even more striking is the prosecution record: in the 9 years since the law came into effect only one case has been filed and is still pending for trial despite a plethora of *rusfeti* related scandals, accusations and admissions to which the various Attorney Generals remained (with one exception) completely inactive.[30]

In 2003, Clerides lost the elections to Tassos Papadopoulos, whose party, DIKO, is widely

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27 The growth of the two largest semi-governmental organisations, the telecommunications authority CYTA, and the electricity authority AHK, is listed in the table in the Appendix (p. 287) to provide some statistical information about the increase of employment in the semi-governmental sector prior to 1994.

28 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

29 Christophorou, 'Party Politics', *op. cit.*, p. 104.

30 Law no 27(I)/2001 came into effect on 9 March 2001. It added a new section 105 to the existing Penal Code, Cap. 154. The information about the implementation of the law was provided confidentially to the author by a member of the legal service of the Republic of Cyprus.

perceived as being in absolute need to stay in power in order to distribute favours.[31] DIKO came to power in 1977 and has remained there since with the exception of Vassiliou's 5-year presidency and Clerides' second term. It is therefore ironic that Papadopoulos was the initiator of the law making *rusfeti* a criminal offence in 2001. But, also during his presidency as in all previous governments, DIKO as well as the other coalition partners – in this case AKEL and EDEK – demanded and received their share of the spoils of power. Although Papadopoulos had a sound understanding of the need to bring technocrats from outside the traditional party system into powerful positions and seemed to have resisted the pressure of several groups for *rusfeti* even at election times, clientelistic practices remained widespread. The *rusfeti* law remained unimplemented despite numerous scandals.[32] According to Christophorou,

> 'nepotism and favouritism gained new dimensions, [when] the President's close relatives or supporters were appointed to key positions, as his close aides, ministers and administrators, promoted to party posts in DIKO or even placed in the public broadcasting corporation'.[33]

In terms of administrative growth, Charalambous claims that the public service increased by another 6,000 in only five years. The numbers provided by the Statistical Service are considerably lower, 4,018, but still indicate the highest average growth per year of all presidents in office (803). The semi-governmental organisations grew from 12,058 to 13,524 employees.[34] DIKO membership alone almost doubled since 2002. It grew from 9,750 in 2002 to 14,320 in 2006, reaching more than 19,300 by 2009.[35]

In 2008, when Papadopoulos lost the elections to his former coalition partner, the communist leader Demetris Christofias, the latter's party AKEL sensed that now was the time to make amends for the long periods when its supporters had been discriminated against and denied equal promotions and posts as other parties had. AKEL had supported all presidents since independence with the exception of Clerides. Up until 2003 they had not had AKEL members in any cabinet, for Cold War reasons. Instead they had nominated non-members that the party had confidence in, who seem to have been less willing or at least less successful in promoting AKEL members. The three party coalition of EDEK, DIKO and AKEL swiftly embarked on the distribution of the spoils of power amongst themselves. As 'punishment' for not supporting Christofias in the first round of elections and as a clear sign that it was now AKEL's turn to benefit most from being in

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31 See for example the description of Patroclos in his satirical column 'Tales from the Coffee Shop': '... the traditional values and ideals of DIKO – horse trading, rusfeti and total focus on the spoils of power' 'Struggle for the Soul of DIKO', *Sunday Mail*, 21 February 2010.

32 See for example: 'Rusfeti Scandal Explodes', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 24-30 November 2006 and 'Rusfeti in the Spotlight Again', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 26 May-1 June 2006.

33 Christophorou, 'Party Politics', *op. cit.*, p. 104 and Christophorou, 'Communist Surprise', *op. cit.*, p. 222.

34 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

35 *Phileleftheros* 23 October 2006 and 13 March 2009.

power, the three most important ministries for administering *rusfeti* (Interior, Defence and Justice and Public Order) all went to AKEL or, in the case of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, to a supporter of Christofias. Charalambous specifies that in the first two and a half years of Christofias' government, the number of public servants increased by another 3,200 to a total of almost 53,000. The Statistical Service provided only data for 2009, indicating an increase of 970 public servants within one year to a total of 46,254. The number of employees in the semi-governmental sector grew during the same period from 13,524 to 14,150.[36] The figures clearly indicate widespread *rusfeti* practices by the new administration. For reasons outlined above AKEL membership stayed at around 13,000.

If one includes the semi-governmental organisations the extent to which political parties and politicians can exercise influence on large segments in today's Cypriot society becomes even more apparent. In 2008, out of a total workforce of 393,377,[37] 67,300 work in the public or semi-public sector.[38] Many were appointed, promoted or transferred with the help of *rusfeti*. At least potentially, therefore, the Cypriot parties and politicians can currently exercise influence over about 17% of the workforce. Employees of other organisations need to be added to this number like trade or farmers unions attached to parties (AKEL-PEO/EKA, DISY-SEK/Panagrotikos, EDEK-DEOK), or companies owned or controlled by parties (for example, the beverage producer LOEL which is owned by AKEL).

Although there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence for the pervasiveness of *rusfeti*,[39] which also features prominently in pre-election debates, and is frequently denied and denounced by all parties, there is very little quantitative research about the degree of favouritism in Cyprus. The EU's Eurobarometer survey published in February 2010 claims that 54% of those Cypriots polled stated that many appointments in the Cypriot public administration were not attained through

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36   Charalambous, *op. cit.*, and data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

37   Ministry of Finance, Labour Force Survey 2008, available at: [http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/1C367FF67CB41D48C2257770002CE4DA?OpenDocument&sub=1&e=], accessed on 30 August 2010.

38   Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. Journalists and Politicians provide repeatedly even a higher figure for the current number of public servants: 53,000 instead of the official figure of 46,254 in 2009 (in 2010 there was a decrease in the number of public servants due to the government policy to cut the service by 1,000 by the end of the year). One reason for the difference in numbers could be that the figures provided by the Statistical Service do not include public servants employed by the army. See for example Charalambous, *op. cit.*, or the Finance Minister, Charilaos Stavrakis, quoted in: 'State Payroll a "time bomb"', *Cyprus Mail,* 16 September 2010.

39   The then House Speaker and leader of AKEL, Demetris Christofias, who became President of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008, openly admitted the widespread practice when confronted with a scandal within the Cypriot National Guard concerning transfers based on nepotism and favouritism. He stated in a press conference that, 'it was normal for parties to interfere in such matters'. When asked what people who are not affiliated with parties should do, he answered that, 'they should go see their local deputy'. 'Probe Called Into Military Scandal. Top Names on List of People who Pulled Strings in the Army', *Cyprus Mail,* 21 November 2006.

merit.[40] The results of the only empirical study on favouritism, published in 2006, confirm its widespread nature. On a scale ranging from 0-4, where 0 amounted to no favouritism and 4 represented extreme favouritism, the category 'prevalence of favouritism' was given a staggering 3.65 by the 150 Greek Cypriots interviewed. The personal frustration with favouritism was again very high, at 3.13. Unsurprisingly, the belief in the fairness of Cypriot society, in other words its meritocracy, was low, scoring 2.41. The average number of known cases of favouritism was 43.34 while the belief of the respondents in the prevention of favouritism showed a realistic fatalistic low score of 0.29, on a scale where 0 signified that it could not be prevented and 1 amounted to a belief that it was preventable.[41]

As far as anecdotal evidence is concerned, *rusfeti* related scandals regularly dominate the local news and shed some light on the true extent of favouritism in Cyprus.[42] Regularly, the accused either denies any wrongdoing or declares that this a normal and widespread practice, while in a satirical show of hypocrisy the opposition denounces the ruling parties or the individual for their abuse of power. In reality, all parties in Cyprus practice it extensively once in power and during recent years there seems to be little if any difference in the degree to which they practice it. A textbook example occurred at the time of writing in July 2010 when the director of the office of President Christofias, Vassos Georgiou, resigned over *rusfeti* allegations. The opposition party DISY used the opportunity and accused Christofias of an 'extremely professional large-scale and unrestrained way of granting political favours' alleging that Georgiou's 'real job' was to 'deal full time with rusfeti' using computerised lists 'for easy filing and assessment of the benefit' to AKEL. The government spokesman, Stefanos Stefanou, fired back in kind:

> 'Is DISY talking about meritocracy? The party that during its ten years in power increased the number of public sector employees by 10,000, who, according to its then leader but also DISY MPs, were basically hired from among DISY voters ...?'[43]

The defence minister, Costas Papacostas, whose ministry was at the centre of the *rusfeti* allegations against Georgiou, then publicly stated that

> 'he regularly received requests for favourable transfers and secondments from MPs, ministers, state officials and political party bigwigs "and don't let anyone tell me that there is a single politician who has never made any kind of intervention" '.[44]

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40   'Almost Everyone Thinks Police and Public Service are Corrupt', *Cyprus Mail*, 3 February 2010.

41   S.D. Georgiades, 'Favouritism as a Form of Injustice in Cyprus: Ubiquitous and Eternal?', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 115-117 and 125-127.

42   For some other examples of *rusfeti* related scandals during recent years see: 'AKEL: Jobs for the Boys', *Cyprus Mail*, 29 June 2010; 'It is Very Easy for Us Politicians to Start Rumours about Anyone', *Cyprus Mail*, 3 May 2007; 'Rusfeti Scandal Explodes', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 24-30 November 2006 and 'Rusfeti in the Spotlight Again', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 26 May-1 June 2006.

43   'Top Aide Quits in Nepotism Scandal', *Cyprus Mail*, 28 July 2010.

44   'State Officials Seek Army Favours for their Own Sons', *Cyprus Mail*, 30 July 2010.

Given the above, it is hardly an exaggeration to argue that in Cyprus not even in the lowest paid positions is someone appointed or promoted in the public and semi-public sector without the intervention of political parties. Only a few regulations like the waiting list for the appointment of teachers effectively limit or prevent *rusfeti* practices.[45]

The upshot is that most Cypriots do not rely on meritocracy in their career pursuits knowing perfectly well that it is not 'the best' but 'the best connected' candidate who is likely to secure the job/promotion in the public and semi-governmental sectors. What preserves the remarkable efficiency of the Greek Cypriot public service – next to the British administrative tradition – is the fact that since Vassiliou's presidency any candidate for a post in the public service needs to possess the required qualifications before party patronage can come into play at all. Moreover, often the courts revoke – in many cases after years – unwarranted promotions thereby preserving some elements of meritocracy within the system.

The Cyprus Consensus

Party patronage in Cyprus occurs in two interrelated forms: the first can be called impersonal party patronage in which the party as an organisation dispenses favours to its supporters, hence their votes are expected in return. In addition, some corporate organisations are attached to parties, which firmly control them. For instance, the left wing trade union, PEO, is linked to communist AKEL. Whichever way you look at it, all major parties in Cyprus have institutionalised the distribution of *rusfeti* through specialised committees. Of particular importance in this context is to secure for a party at least one of the three 'Rusfeti Ministries' – Interior, Defence or Justice and Public Order – whenever a government is formed because they provide by far the largest opportunities for appointments and promotions. As already stated above, a particular form of party patronage during elections was the widespread practice of paying for return flights to the island for thousands of Cypriots studying or living abroad since only in-country voting was allowed. This is about to change though as out-country voting is currently being introduced. Up until 2010 political parties spent millions of euro and chartered dozens of planes for this purpose and neither the parties nor the students seemed to have had any ethical problem with this undisguised

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45 Public school teachers are so far exclusively appointed on the basis of a waiting list, which erases any possibility for clientelistic practices. But, once appointed teachers are under the same pressure as other public servants to attach themselves to parties and politicians since the latter become involved in transfers or promotions of teachers. Those who defend the waiting lists, a practice which has proven to have many negative consequences – including appointments of middle aged teachers after waiting periods of 20 years which they spend in other professions – use the fact that this hinders *rusfeti* as their most powerful argument. This line of defence indirectly provides further evidence for the widespread character of these practices in other areas which lack such regulations. Moreover, a switch to a mixed system of waiting lists and appointments by a board is currently debated. Such a change would increase the possibilities for party influence in the appointment of teachers dramatically.

practice.[46] In most cases, the voters had to pick up the tickets from party offices or party officials following a selection process which involved recommendations by party members.

The second form of party patronage is exercised by individual politicians such as ministers, members of parliament, or other appointed or elected power holders. Being personally approached by citizens, they distribute *rusfeti* thereby creating clientelistic sub-networks attached to them. A peculiar – though not quantifiable – form is the practice of vote buying in parliamentary elections in which candidates are willing to pay money, or do other favours, in exchange for a vote. During the 2006 parliamentary elections, Cy£100 (€170) was frequently demanded and paid.[47]

The overwhelming power of political parties in Cyprus also enhances 'reverse *rusfeti*', in other words, the punishment of critics or opponents of the government or power holders by preventing them from taking posts or obtaining promotions.[48]

The personalised conduct of public-citizen relations through '*rusfeti*' has been refined over the years becoming a powerful, encompassing and self-perpetuating system based on what can be called 'The Cyprus Consensus'. This consensus functions on two levels. Political parties in Cyprus have established an informal and unofficial *modus vivendi* to share the spoils of power with each other. Peaceful co-existence on a live and let-live basis allows all parties access to the state machinery including the opposition. Often, politicians help each other across party lines to do favours. The degree and number of favours vary and are largely determined by the power the parties and politicians hold within the system. Moreover, the inter-party elite is linked to other power bodies – economic, trade unionist, church – thereby controlling almost all aspects of social life.[49]

On a citizen level, the Cyprus Consensus results in a self-perpetuating paradox: Since personal contacts are the most efficient and often the only way to achieve one's objectives within the public and semi-public sector and since almost everyone else is attached to a party and to one or more politicians in order to safeguard against job or promotion competition, there is a strong systemic pressure to enter into a clientelistic relationship. Those who want to remain outside the system find it far more difficult though not impossible to succeed in their professional life. Alternatively, they simply opt to try their luck in the private sector. Although most Cypriots detest

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46 During the 2008 presidential elections, the three main candidates booked at least 15,000 seats for their voters. AKEL admitted that they were bringing about 7,500. DISY was estimated to bring around 6,000. The figures for the incumbent ranged from 3,000-7,500. The total costs were estimated at €7-8 million. DISY and AKEL offered to pay two-thirds of the ticket price while supporters of President Papadopoulos were flown-in for free. 'Parties Fill CY Flights to Bring Voters', *Cyprus Mail*, 5 February 2008.

47 Confidential information provided to the author by an employee of a Cypriot member of parliament.

48 'The Coffee Shop: Reverse Rusfeti and "Holidays" in China', *Cyprus Mail*, 11 February 2007.

49 C.V. Mavratsas, Εθνική Ομοψυχία και Πολιτική Ομοφωνία. Η Ατροφία της Ελληνοκυπριακής Κοινωνίας των Πολιτών στις Απαρχές του 21ου Αιωνα. [National Unity and Political Consensus. The Atrophy of the Greek Cypriot Community at the Beginning of the Twenty First Century] (Athens: Katarti, 2003), p. 161.

and protest this widespread practice, at the same time they benefit from it and are very willing to use it once they are personally affected. To a large degree this is based on necessity, given that the chances are slim of securing a lucrative post without having 'mesa' (which 'means', connections inside the power apparatus). As a result, western-European norms like meritocracy, efficiency and non-corruption stemming from the British colonial period coexist in an uneasy semi-harmonious relationship with clientelistic patterns of behaviour.[50]

Greek Cypriot parties have developed quite efficient mechanisms to control the electoral behaviour of their clientele. Local party organisations can often ascertain who votes for whom by examining participation in their periodic activities, their regular contacts via labour unions, party and labour union membership lists, and so on. Their task is further facilitated by the small size of the electorate and the fact that since 1981 voting is compulsory in presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections. Most helpful for party control is a peculiarity of Cypriot political culture: Being a highly politicised society, Cypriots are very open about their political affiliations and preferences and usually friends, acquaintances but often also parties know where they stand. It is also not considered offensive to ask for whom somebody votes even for people who hardly know each other. Parties use this freely provided information bonanza to control the electorate, and punish 'deviators' once they find out.

Conclusion

As far as party patronage and *rusfeti* practices in Cyprus are concerned, things do not look good for the promoters of meritocracy and opponents of political favouritism. The systemic pressure of the Cyprus Consensus from the parties and politicians but also the citizens seems to be too overwhelming in this small society. The practices and structures established since independence are too entrenched to allow radical changes and improvements. Besides, any party or president credibly fighting political patronage and not granting any or only a few favours is likely to make more enemies than gain supporters. Such a party or president will in all probability not be able to retain his coalition partners and lose supporters of his own party and thereby almost certainly be defeated in the next election. Pressure from the outside is the most likely instrument for change in the absence of revolutions or other radical systemic changes from within which are extremely unlikely in this prosperous, liberal democratic EU member state. Even the European Union, as the most likely reformist catalyst, has traditionally only a very limited impact on clientelistic domestic structures. Budgetary discipline demanded by the EU is likely to lead to a reduction of the public service in the foreseeable future as one way to reduce the current budget deficit of 6.1% in 2009 to EU acceptable standards. The current government has committed itself to reducing the number of

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50   This is not to say that the British civil service is without its own flaws or clientelistic structures. For example many British would claim that high civil service posts are class based and 'Oxbridge' influenced.

public servants by 1,000 per year for the next four years by not replacing all retiring public servants. But it remains to be seen if this policy survives economic recovery and the traditional domestic pressures to appoint supporters or make temporary employments permanent, particularly at election times.[51] Either way, there is every likelihood that the Cyprus Consensus and therefore large scale political *rusfeti* is in Cyprus to stay.

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51   'Reductions in Public Sector', *Cyprus Mail*, 20 April 2010.

Appendix

Table: Growth of Public and Semi-Governmental Sector and its Cost

Year	Number of Civil Servants according to the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus[i]	Number of Civil Servants according to Loucas G. Charalambous[ii]	Number of Employees in the Semi-Governmental Sector [iii]	Number of Employees in CYTA (ex Cable & Wireless/CYTA)[iv]	Number of Employees in AHK[v]	Percentage of the National Budget for the Salaries and Pensions of the Public Servants[vi]	State Expenditure for the Salaries and Pensions of the Public Servants in Millions of Euro[vii]
1960/61	15.141/17.835	-	-	733	935	35.7/21.1[viii]	10.84/6.94
1977	25.017	18.000	-	1357	1449	32.4	64.60
1988	30.209	32.000	-	2246	1527	30.3	321.17
1993	33.751	36.000	8.284[ix]	2352	1838	38.4	518.87
2003	41.266	44.000	12.058	2410	2060	31.7	1233.24
2008	45.284	50.000	13.524	2403	2343	30.6	1733.67
2009/2010	46.254/-	53.000/-	14.150/-	-/July 2010: 2333	2466/September 2010: 2465	-/30.9[x]	-/1878.68[xi]

i   The data refer to the number of the civil servants engaged in the wider public sector i.e. Ministries, Independent Authorities, Police & Fire Service, Educational Service & Local Authorities. The figures do not include the employees of the Cyprus' Army which could explain at least partly the higher figures provided by L.G. Charalambous.

ii   L.G. Charalambous, 'Tame the Civil Service Beast or the IMF will', *Sunday Mail*, 25 July 2010.

iii   Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

iv   Data provided to the author by the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA). CYTA transformed since 1960 from a solely fixed telephone provider to a provider of a variety of telecommunications and electronic services requiring an increasing number of employees.

v   Data provided to the author by Electricity Authority of Cyprus (AHK).

vi   Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

vii   Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

viii   For an explanation for this decrease see footnote 14 in the main text.

ix   This figure refers to 1994.

x   This figure refers to the projected percentage for 2010

xi   This figure refers to the projected percentage for 2010. The projected figure for 2011 is 1954.61 (31.9%).

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Escaping the Polarising Gaze – Gambling Spaces in Cyprus

JULIE SCOTT[*]

Abstract

Fifty years of Cypriot independence have been marked by the progressive spatial segregation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In public discourse, the island's spaces are discussed largely in terms of the legitimisation of claims to ethno-national territory, whilst the discursive and non-discursive spaces opened up for officially sanctioned encounter, collaboration and co-existence, remain subject to the polarising scrutiny of the public sphere. In this paper I briefly discuss another kind of space to which I was alerted in the course of carrying out research on gambling in the north over the past 15 years. Gambling in coffee shops and at cockfights has traditionally been both semi-clandestine and tolerated, forming a kind of 'third space' in which people recalled Greek and Turkish Cypriots gambling together. The paper considers the range of gambling spaces and their potential as zones of indeterminacy and agency to counter the polarising tendencies of the Cypriot public sphere.

The 50 years following independence in Cyprus have seen the progressive spatial segregation of its Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Separated, since 1974, by the Green Line, and, before that, by the more fragmented and informal, but nevertheless militarised, boundaries and checkpoints which criss-crossed Cyprus during the 1960s and 70s (cf Thubron, 1986) we have become used to hearing Greek and Turkish Cypriot relations discussed primarily in terms of the contested legitimacy of competing states. Until the relaxation of restrictions in 2003, contact on the island itself – other than on the British sovereign bases, which have remained in place, and have continued, since independence, to employ both Greek and Turkish Cypriots – has been largely limited to a few highly regulated sites of officially sanctioned encounter, collaboration and co-existence. These have included the bi-communal and conflict resolution groups meeting in Ledra Palace and other points in the buffer zone; and the mixed village of Pyla, where Greek and Turkish

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Cypriots have continued to go about their daily lives within a shared village space, in the process confirming, or, alternatively, confounding, a range of expectations concerning the ability of Cypriots to get along together. For, as Papadakis (1997) has argued, the anomalous status of Pyla, which came about due to its location bordering the British sovereign base area of Dhekelia, has placed the village and its inhabitants under intense scrutiny, transforming the intimate spaces of the village into analogues of competing ethno-national polities. This polarising gaze has continued to permeate moves towards the 'normalisation' of relations following accession of the Republic of Cyprus to EU membership in 2004, ensuring that quotidian undertakings, from attempts to establish collaborative tourism ventures (Scott and Topcan, 2006), to individual decisions to cross or not to cross the Green Line (Dikomitis, 2005; Demetriou, 2007), take on a character which is both politically and symbolically highly charged.

It is in this context that the popularity amongst Greek Cypriots of gambling in casinos in the north should be addressed (cf Webster and Timothy, 2006; Rollins, nd). Demetriou (2007), for example, argues convincingly that reports of Greek Cypriots 'flocking' to the casinos and brothels of the north contributed much to the 'moralization of the practice of crossing' in the south (p. 998), permitting the state to reformulate the discourse of the border, and in so doing to reassert the presence and authority of the state, which the atmosphere of liminality and euphoria accompanying the initial opening up of the Green Line had appeared to challenge. There is another aspect to these gambling expeditions, however, which positions the state somewhat differently, and which is fraught with ambiguity. Gambling is one of those activities which, publicly at least, tends to provoke embarrassment, disapproval and denial, and as such falls squarely within the ambit of what Herzfeld (1997) has labelled 'cultural intimacy'. He uses this term to refer to those aspects of lived experience which are deemed to detract from the dignity of the public image promoted by the nation state, but which form a kind of secret insider knowledge which is the basis for a shared identity and sense of solidarity amongst its citizens. In this sense, it simultaneously undermines, and underpins, more formal versions of national identity and belonging. Cultural intimacy, in contrast to official ideology, argues Herzfeld, is characterised by its lability and ambiguity. Unencumbered by the 'literalness' (p. 53) that characterises official discourses of the state, cultural intimacy revels in the creative spaces opened up through the emergence, distortion and slippage of contextually generated meaning. Thus contingency and indeterminacy are features of cultural intimacy in general, as of gambling more particularly, where uncertainty is not simply a matter of unpredictable stochastic processes, but arises from the unreadability and, ultimately, unknowability, of the intentions and capacities of others (Malaby, 2003). Moreover, the world of gambling is not that of the zero sum game – in contrast to the way in which 'the Cyprus problem' is frequently played out in the public arena. Cassidy's (2009) work on casinos and betting shops in London, for example, draws attention to the practice of gifting 'luck money'– evidence of the belief amongst regular gamblers that spreading the luck and the money around is the way to generate more of both.

In this short paper I should like briefly to consider the cultural intimacy of gambling spaces

and their creative potential to counter the polarising tendencies of the public sphere. The impetus for this approach came from research I conducted on gambling and casino tourism in Cyprus, prior to the relaxation of Green Line restrictions which saw large numbers of Greek Cypriots appear at the gaming tables in the north (c.f. Scott, 2001, 2003; Scott and Aşıkoğlu, 2001). Whilst carrying out that research, I was alerted to the persistence of long-established gambling traditions and behaviours in unregulated and semi-clandestine venues, as well as in the casinos themselves, and to accounts of gambling involving Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the course of which, informants insisted, much Turkish Cypriot land around Kyrenia was lost to Greek Cypriots in card games.[1] Even more interestingly, others subsequently vehemently denied that such 'mixed' gambling could ever have taken place. Many Turkish Cypriots I spoke to, aged in their forties and fifties, remembered cockfights in Larnaca before 1974, which took place around the back of St. Lazarus' Church, and featured both Greek and Turkish Cypriot participants. And in a recent thesis exploring attachment to place among Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees, Dikomitis (2009) recounts an event reported to her by Greek Cypriot friends:

> 'At the funeral of a Greek Cypriot man there appeared four bodybuilder-like men in black suits who insisted on carrying the coffin. Nobody knew who these men were, not even his close relatives. It turned out that these men were bouncers in a Turkish Cypriot casino and they wanted to pay their last respects to their good client!' (Dikomitis, 2009, p. 157).

I shall return later to the possible constructions placed on these gambling stories, and others like them. Drawing largely on my research in the north of Cyprus, and recent ethnographic work on gambling and contingency more generally,[2] my aim in what follows is to contextualise such stories within the discursive space of gambling where, I suggest, complex, cross-cutting and transgressive gender, class, and ethno-national relations have traditionally been articulated and expressed. In considering their significance to Cyprus 50 years after independence, my conclusions are, as befits the subject matter, speculative.

Gambling and the State

In both parts of the island, gambling has been the object of regulatory activity, which has had the effect of sanctioning certain types of gambling in particular licensed locales, whilst criminalising

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1   I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this paper for bringing to my attention a recent case of the rumoured loss of a popular Greek Cypriot-owned restaurant on the gaming tables of the north. Whilst 'historic' cases of pre-1974 gambling debts have largely retrospective significance in terms of what they say about the remembered past of ethnic and property relations on the island, current cases can be expected to play more directly into contemporary post-Annan Plan political discourses of sovereignty and ethno-national territory. In the case referred to, the debt was reportedly repaid from within the Greek Cypriot community.

2   For example, new work by ethnographic researchers in this field presented at the conference *Calculated Risks: New Perspectives on Gambling*, at Goldsmiths College, University of London 17-18 September 2009.

unregulated gambling in unlicensed venues. This can produce bizarre effects. In November 2009, the UK's *Daily Mail* newspaper reported the arrest in Limassol of forty-two 'elderly women' for playing cards for small stakes in a private house (Theodoulou, 2009). Police in the north routinely confiscate the tables and chairs of coffee shops where illegal gambling has been reported (Scott, 2003). Whilst the state lottery, horse-racing and football betting are the only licensed forms of gambling in the south,[3] the north has, additionally, licensed upwards of 30 live gaming casinos, mostly attached to the larger hotels and dedicated resorts. State involvement in gambling has been accompanied by its incorporation into the discourse of 'the Cyprus problem': a recent review of the advisability of opening casinos in the south, commissioned by the Commerce Ministry, argued strongly for the 'repatriation' of Greek Cypriot gamblers within a gambling regime authorised and legitimised by the state (Theodoulou, 2006);[4] whilst the development of the casino sector in the north is heavily imprinted by its post-colonial history and dependent relationship on Turkey (Scott, 2001), and serves further to reinforce the ambivalence towards state institutions, which, as Navaro-Yashin (2006) has argued, runs through Turkish Cypriot society. The onward march of the state-regulated gambling industry brings with it a relentless squeeze on the intimate spaces of 'traditional' gambling: the coffee shops, the private clubs and houses, the cockfighting pits – which, nevertheless, continue to adapt and survive in the new conditions by becoming increasingly clandestine and intimate. Yet, as Herzfeld (1997) reminds us, it would be a mistake to overestimate the capacity of 'the state' to proceed as a coherent unitary actor. Throughout the period of my research, Turkish Cypriots were technically barred from entering or gambling on casino premises; and yet this same period saw them become established as fashionable 'modern' leisure venues for Turkish Cypriots in groups and couples (Scott, 2005). In numerous establishments, I was told, the management would be informed in advance of impending raids, so that any Turkish Cypriots could be ushered out of a back door; whilst others counted off-duty police officers among their regular clients. Meanwhile, in the village setting, where technically illegal card games and other forms of gambling continue in unlicensed informal venues, gamblers, coffee-shop owners and off-duty policy officers strive to maintain a delicate balance between the conflicting calls of duty and village sociality. Rather than fall into one of two oppositional categories, as the terminology of licensing would suggest, gambling spaces could be said to occupy positions along a continuum, framed by the large, externally operated leisure casinos at one extreme, and the village coffee shops at the other. Indeed, the manager of one such large modern casino, whom I interviewed, disparagingly dismissed the smaller, locally owned licensed casinos as 'coffee shops'. What this

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3   In addition, betting shops offer on-line 'casino' gambling, operated from outside the country. I am grateful to the anonymous journal reviewers for reminding me of this development.

4   Thus I would argue that the discourse of the state's control of gambling is framed rather differently in respect of Greek Cypriots gambling in the north, compared with the issue of off-shore operated internet gambling. (See note 3 above.)

manager had in mind were the casinos operated by an older generation of Turkish Cypriot owner-manager, whose venues retain a strong flavour of the private gambling clubs they had operated in London's Mayfair and Soho before the advent of the 1968 Gambling Act.[5]

Unregulated Gambling Spaces

Ten years ago, aficionados of cockfighting in the north were bewailing the combined effects of the animal rights lobby and the steady emigration of the Cypriot gypsy population on the availability of fighting birds and the ability to hold events. My own visit to a village cockfight — accompanied by the sister of a cockfighting enthusiast of the village, and her nine-year old daughter — reflected both the changes and continuities of the passing years: the event was marked by heightened secrecy and security, but also by its informality and sociability. Informed of the time and location at only the last minute, we joined an otherwise exclusively male crowd in a large hangar-type construction full of light and noise, set up behind a house in the centre of the village, and were greeted by a number of the men and young boys present, who knew my friend's family, and asked why I had not brought along my three-year old son, whom my friend had minded during the day. Seated on tiered wooden benches arranged around the ring, and sipping tea, beer and soft drinks, we watched as men preened and fluffed up the birds in the ring, and listened to the banter from the crowd, as combatants were matched up, odds offered, and side-bets entered into by individual pairs of men around the ring. Meanwhile sentinels, stationed with mobile phones on the road leading in and out of the village, kept watch for signs of unwelcome police presence.

In fact, much of the action around cockfighting occurs elsewhere, before or after the actual bouts, in people's homes and back gardens where the breeding, purchasing, and care of the birds, takes place. In this, as in other types of gambling, particularly in unregulated venues, cockfighting is a highly gendered activity. Whilst women raise chickens for family consumption and take care of the egg-laying birds, men care for the fighting birds, and, women joked, would spend hours either alone with their birds, or visiting other aficionados, discussing and experimenting with the best regime of food and vitamin supplements, breeding future fighters, or caring for injured birds. Appearance at the cockfight marks the brief public display of competitive masculinity by both the birds and their owners. Each individual bout, on the occasion I witnessed, was short, and ended before any serious injury could be inflicted. Unlike the Balinese cockfight, famously analysed by Geertz (1973), the birds in Cyprus are not equipped with spurs, and the aim is not to kill or cause serious damage. Rather, male bonding and competition, as evidenced in the matching of combatants, the acceptance or rejection of challengers, the tending of injured birds, and in the betting and banter which takes place during the fight, is the name of the game.

The cockfight creates a temporary space which, like the pre-1974 cockfights remembered by

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5   For a vivid account of one such club, see Ackers, 1968.

my informants, is at the heart of the village, and simultaneously hidden away; visible and invisible, it creates a space apart, whilst at the same time it is embedded in the social relations which surround it. These are features it shares in common with other unregulated venues, such as the coffee shops where card players gather. These features create the conditions for a particular type of knowledge and reciprocity, which are the stuff of cultural intimacy. They arise in part from the dynamics of play itself; from the shared suspension of conventional temporality, in games which may go on for hours or days; and from the willingness of the players to take a risk; in particular, to engage with the unknowability of others in games such as poker, where '... the game behind the game ... is one of strategic concealment and disclosure as one attempts to give others an inscrutable posture while simultaneously making one's own guesses about other players' situations' (Malaby, 2003, p. 86).[6] The bounded spaces of gambling simultaneously constitute highly creative spaces for the exercise of agency, the situation of willed indeterminacy opening up room for negotiation and manoeuvre to a degree scarcely realisable in daily life. But these bounded gambling spaces are also anchored in a wider social world, through which they are also made possible and sustained.

Reference has already been made to the significance of gender in the moral and symbolic economy of gambling. Class, too, has a role to play in the articulation of gambling relations. The town-based gentlemen's clubs, for example, form self-selecting socially homogenous gambling groups where approximate parity of income establishes the conditions for reciprocity within the group. In contrast, reciprocity in the democratic atmosphere of the village coffee shops, where men of all classes play together, is assured by reference to wider village relations. The self-interest of the coffee shop owner in encouraging play to go on in order to increase his takings from the rent of the tables, is tempered by his consideration of public opinion in the village, and the social pressures which can be brought to bear on him through female and kinship networks, when a man spends too much time or money, or runs up excessive gambling debts. Equally, social pressure and the threat of local gossip are effective in ensuring that gamblers' debts are paid. Gambling does not take place within a separate moral universe, but within a framework of structural reciprocity, which is held in place by the balancing of social obligations in a wider context – even if, as sometimes happens, these obligations have to be met by family or kin, rather than by the gambler himself.[7]

As Malaby's (2003) careful ethnography of gambling locales in the Cretan town of Chania illustrates, sums of money won or lost are but secondary considerations in the elaboration and performance of masculine prowess in these all-male games. But what is 'real' masculinity, and how is it most effectively expressed? The content of these categories is far from clear or fixed. I have listened to stories of village coffee shop card games that have gone on for days, and been struck by

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6   As Malaby observes, games in which unpredictability derives primarily from social indeterminacy, tend to be
     characterised by a higher degree of social intimacy than those where the emphasis is on 'the gambler's luck', as the
     games in casinos tend to be.
7   Or herself. The articulation of class with gender works rather differently for women than men. Cf Scott, 2003.

the ambivalence evidenced in the narrator's account. Part admiration at the heroic recklessness and disregard for sleep, comfort or domestic concerns, and part condemnation of their irresponsibility and lack of self-control, this equivocality reflects a tension at the heart of what it means to be a man – also aptly expressed in the story of Şevket Kısmet, published as part of a series *İçimizden Biri* – 'one of us' (literally: one from inside us) – in the newspaper *Kıbrıs* in July 1998. This is the tale of a gambling man going to the dogs, who is saved by the love and restraint exercised by his wife. It is notable both for the strong message about gender roles, and for the nostalgia which informs the story of the man of the people who, we are told, embodies *real* Cypriotness, in the form of a reckless but big-hearted masculinity typical of the chaotic, cosmopolitan port of Limassol where he grew up, a world lost in both time and space. At the same time, the article also suggests, this figure of the gambler is contradictory. It has a darker side, associated with 'cultural backwardness', addictive behaviour, and domestic violence, which is 'out of place' in modern Cypriot society.

Stereotypes, Reciprocity, and Contingent Identity

When Cypriots began to pour across the Green Line in 2003-2004 to visit the villages, houses and property left behind decades previously, fears that the re-opening of old wounds would lead to renewed tension and conflict proved to be unfounded. Neither, however, following the initial euphoria, did the opportunities for encounter radically advance the desire for reconciliation. In important recent ethnographic research with Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees, Dikomitis (2009) explored the nature of the longing for home amongst Greek Cypriot former inhabitants of the village of *Larnakas tis Lapithou* and the Turkish Cypriots now living in *Kozan*, as the village is known to them. The visits of the former inhabitants, returning after decades of dreaming of an idealised village, produced profoundly ambiguous feelings in both the *Larnatsjiotes* and the *Kozanlılar*. In most cases, the interest of the *Larnatsjiotes* was in renewing their links with buildings, landmarks, and sacred spaces, and the remembered social relationships they embodied, rather than negotiating their difficult feelings towards those currently occupying their properties, who themselves had been similarly uprooted from villages in the Paphos region. Significantly, Dikomitis found that the visits reinforced rather than dispelled the stereotypes which each held of the other. Gestures towards establishing relations of reciprocity – through small acts of kindness, consideration or hospitality – continued to be filtered, in subsequent discussion, through persistent stereotypes which, ultimately, were expressive of a certainty that 'the other' is a known quantity and that, moreover, 'they' lack some essential quality possessed by 'us' (Herzfeld, 1997). The sense of 'damaged reciprocity' implicit in these judgments is indicative, not of 'structural nostalgia' for a vanished time of shared cultural intimacy *(ibid);* but rather, of the persistence of belief in the fundamental incommensurability of the losses that have been endured (Jackson, 2005).[8]

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8   'Another way of making this point is to say that all exchange involves a continual struggle to give, claim or redistribute some scarce and elusive existential good – such as recognition, love, humanity, happiness, voice, power,

I should like to suggest here that anecdotes about Greek and Turkish Cypriot gambling offer a kind of heterotopic alternative to the experience of damaged reciprocity evidenced by such visits. Gambling anecdotes themselves are recognition of shared cultural intimacy – just as their denial amounts to a repudiation of the same. The stories are double-edged. I first heard about joint gambling in relation to land and property losses, a sensitive topic which plays into ethno-national narratives of grievance and victimhood, for example, in the case of Turkish Cypriot-owned land lost as a result of violent conflict, or to more economically powerful Greek Cypriot interests during the 1960s and 70s. Yet attitudes in the case of land said to be lost as a result of gambling seemed more ambiguous. One possible reason for this is the acknowledgement of contingency in matters relating to gambling. With its emphasis on uncertainty, individual agency and performance, the blame for gambling outcomes is not so easily apportioned.[9] This ambiguity is further reinforced by the social context in which gambling took place, that is, in the spaces of social intimacy outlined earlier – semi-public and semi-private, in clubs, coffee shops and private homes. Both factors suggest a situation in which gender and class could be more salient boundary markers than ethno-national identity, and it is thus not surprising that card parties were a favoured social pastime amongst Greek and Turkish Cypriot couples of the island's elite. In this connection, friends drew my attention to the figure of Dr İhsan Ali (1904-1978), a medical practitioner and one of the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community in the Paphos region, who was also known to enjoy gambling at cards with Greek and Turkish Cypriot friends. An active public figure in sports and cultural organisations as well as in national politics, Dr Ali steadfastly opposed separatist politics and took a number of controversial stands, which earned him the hostility of extremist nationalists on both sides (Irkad, nd). When he accepted the post of Special Political Advisor to President Makarios in 1964, 'Dr Ali was classed as a traitor by his own nationals and seen as peculiar by the Greek Cypriots' (Kouzali, 2009). 'His efforts', wrote his nephew Özdemir Özgür 'were all directed towards achieving harmonious, friendly relations between the communities in Cyprus' (*In Memory of Dr Ihsan Ali,* 1995).

Whilst Dr Ali remains a controversial figure, efforts are being made to prompt a public re-evaluation of his work, his contribution to conciliation, and his legacy for a future united Cyprus. According to a tribute recently published on the website of a Paralimni-based firm of lawyers, 'It was very hard for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots *at the time* to understand Dr İhsan Ali's morals and visions' (Kouzali, 2009) *(emphasis added)*. The question I raise here is whether the

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presence, honour or dignity – whose value is incalculable. And it is precisely this ambiguity that makes it impossible to reduce intersubjective reason to a form of logico-mathematical reason – for while the latter works with precise concepts abstracted from material, bodily and affective contexts, the logic of intersubjectivity never escapes the impress and imprecision of our lived relationships with others' (Jackson, 2005, p. 43).

9   Unless there are accusations of cheating, and even these are tempered by the circumstances and company in which such accusations arise. Cf Malaby, 2003. See also note 1, above.

values represented by Dr Ali in the early days of Cypriot independence were simply 'out of *time*' — in other words, ideas which required the passage of time and the growth of historical understanding in order to become widely accepted — or whether they were, more properly speaking, 'out of *place*' — that is, rooted in a mode of reciprocity and knowing which was not at home in the literalness and fixity of the formal public sphere, but rather in the social spaces of cultural intimacy, of which gambling and play form an important part.

Conclusion

Fifty years of independence have, despite raised hopes and false dawns, been characterised by growing polarisation on a number of levels. My aim, in this short paper, has been to draw attention to a space in Cypriot life which escapes the polarising gaze. In closing, I return to the story of the Greek Cypriot gambler's funeral, attended by the burly Turkish Cypriot casino 'bouncers' — an excellent gambling anecdote, which draws not only on the stereotypical figures of casino life, but also on the ways in which gambling can lead to surprises — good as well as bad — and the confounding of expectations. But I should also like to draw attention to the ways in which this anecdote is made, in the telling, to conform to certain other expectations, through the presumption, for example, of the instrumentality of the relations displayed — in other words, that the deceased is the *client* of the casino bouncers, rather than their *friend*. I suggest that gambling activity — whether in the unregulated spaces of past and present, or even in the present-day casinos of the north — constitutes a kind of 'third space' characterised by ambiguity, the embrace of indeterminacy, and shared cultural intimacy, which is not generally a feature of current relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Might it also offer a functional alternative to the model of damaged reciprocity dominant in so many other areas of Cypriot life?

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APPENDIX

CYPRUS: INAUGURATION OF THE REPUBLIC

CYPRUS: INAUGURATION OF THE REPUBLIC

Acting United Kingdom Representative in Cyprus to the Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations

(No. 1. Confidential)   *Nicosia, 7th September, 1960*
Sir,   *Received 15th September, 1960*

Cyprus became an Independent Republic on Tuesday, 16th August, 1960. In this despatch I have the honour to report on the principal events which marked the attainment of Independence by the Republic of Cyprus.

2. Cyprus had not prepared for Independence in the same way as say Ghana or Malaya, or in the way that the Federation of Nigeria is now preparing. Indeed, up to six weeks before the date eventually chosen for Independence, the Island's political leaders were engaged in the long drawn out and intricate negotiations which finally led to the initialling of the Treaty of Establishment and of the various Draft Agreements subsequently printed in the White Paper on Cyprus (Cmnd. 1093). Until the initialling of these documents there was no certainty as to when Independence would occur. Thus the celebrations on the Island have not been elaborate and long planned—no triumphal arch has been built, foreign guests have not poured into the capital (other than a small corps of newspaper men) and money has not been spent on a lavish scale. Instead the principal ceremonies marking the occasion have tended to be simple, unpretentious and to a large extent improvised. This was in tune with the rather muted and uncertain feeling which prevailed among the population of Cyprus generally in the final few days before Independence. The Archbishop's present plans are for a more elaborate celebration in the spring. It is reported that he intends to invite the Prime Minister and also the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and also General Grivas.

3. The ceremony marking the transfer of power took place in the modern but undistinguished building of the Council of Ministers. At midnight, before an audience of Diplomats, Ministers of the transitional Government, Members elect of the House of Representatives and distinguished Cypriots from all walks of life, Archbishop Makarios, Dr. Kutchuk, Mr. Christopoulos, the Greek Consul-General, and Mr. Turel, the Turkish Consul-General, took their places on the dais in the auditorium. Sir Hugh Foot ascended the rostrum and read out a formal statement ending with the words "Accordingly the Independent Sovereign Republic of Cyprus was established as from the commencement of to-day the 16th day of August, 1960". There followed a 21-gun salute fired by a troop of 42 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery. Sir Hugh Foot, the President and the Vice-President elect, and the representatives of Greece and Turkey then settled down to the business of signing the Treaty and other documents, a ceremony which took nearly an hour. The temperature was well over 100°.

4. After the signing Archbishop Makarios made a short speech entirely appropriate to the occasion, and was followed by Dr. Kutchuk, Mr. Christopoulos and Mr. Turel. The speeches of Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk* are reproduced in the Appendix to this despatch. Mr. Christopoulos, who addressed his audience with a rhetoric which would have been more appropriate at an election rally, alone seemed out of key with the spirit of the proceedings. Sir Hugh Foot then read, with effect, the messages from Her Majesty the Queen and the Prime Minister, he added his own good wishes to the Republic, and the proceedings closed.

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* Dr. Kutchuk's speech not printed

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5. After the signing ceremony Sir Hugh and Lady Foot returned to Government House where they bid farewell to members of the Diplomatic Corps. At 7.30 a.m. they began to say good-bye to their many personal friends in Cyprus from all walks of life who had been invited to Government House for the occasion. At 8 o'clock Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk and the Ministers of the Republican Government paid their farewell calls, followed shortly afterwards by the Service Commanders from the Middle East Joint Headquarters at Episkopi. Sir Hugh inspected a guard of honour provided by the Second Battalion the Parachute Regiment and left by road for Famagusta. There he performed his final act on Cyprus soil, the inspection of a Guard of Honour mounted by the First Battalion the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) and two troops of the Royal Horse Guards (the Blues). Then, with his family he boarded H.M.S. *Chichester,* and as the ship cast off Pipe-Major Rodden played a bagpipe lament followed by his own composition, "Sir Hugh Foot's Farewell to Cyprus".

6. Meanwhile in Nicosia the investiture of the President and Vice-President was taking place. At 10 o'clock members of the House of Representatives took their place in the Chamber and first the Greek members, and then the Turkish members raised their hands in collective affirmation. The business of the House was then the formal election of Mr. Glafcos Clerides as President of the House and Dr. Orhan Muderrisoghlou as Vice-President. Clerks of the House were elected. The President and Vice-President elect were then invited by the President of the House to enter the Chamber for the ceremony of their investiture. Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk entered and made the same affirmation as the members of the House of Representatives in the form laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; "I do solemnly affirm faith to and respect for, the Constitution and the Laws made thereunder, the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity, of the Republic of Cyprus". At the close of this simple and dignified ceremony, the President and Vice-President left the Chamber to take their stand outside and watch as the flag of the Republic of Cyprus was raised for the first time on the mast-head above the Council of Ministers building. The President then proceeded to Phaneromeni Church where, at a Te Deum service, he gave an address in which he pledged that he would devote himself to the service of the Cypriot people. The text of his address is reproduced in the Appendix to this despatch*. Also reproduced in the Appendix is the text of a message from Archbishop Makarios to the people of Cyprus on the occasion of Independence.

7. At 11.30 the same morning there was a short ceremony in Episcopi for the investiture of Air Marshall Sir William MacDonald as Administrator of the Sovereign Base Areas which I attended on behalf of the Representative. The swearing in was performed by Mr. Ian Williams, Chief Officer, Sovereign Base Areas, in the presence of the Administrator's advisory council and a small number of guests.

8. After the ceremony there was a fly past of Canberras and Hunters formed by units of M.E.A.F. and then Air Marshal MacDonald inspected a guard of honour mounted by the Royal Air Force Regiment. Her Majesty's health was drunk and the dignified and pleasant ceremony lasted for no more than half an hour.

9. The afternoon and evening of the 16th of August were marked by two main events, the disembarkation of the contingents of Greek and Turkish armies at Famagusta and their arrival by different routes at their respective camps outside Nicosia, and the return from Athens of the EOKA exiles. The Turkish Cypriots turned out in great strength to greet the contingent of the Turkish army. There were large crowds at Famagusta where Mr. Turel, the Turkish Consul-General, Mr. Denktash, Dr. Kutchuk's second-in-command, and Mr. Orek, the Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defence in the Cyprus Government, were among the official reception party, and within the walled city of Nicosia, where the contingent marched past the home of Dr. Kutchuk, there were further scenes of enthusiasm. There could be no mistaking the warmth of the welcome accorded by the Turkish Cypriots. By contrast, the reception given to the Greek contingent was mild and reserved, and except at Famagusta relatively few people turned out to greet them. There was an official welcome in the port at Famagusta where the Greek contingent was addressed by the May and by a local EOKA leader, now a member of the

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House of Representatives, Mr. Costas Christodoulides. Mr. Christodoulides said that the Greek Cypriots had tried to unite with Greece, but hard circumstances had made it necessary for the daughter to be kept apart temporarily from the mother—a remark which led to criticism in the Turkish Cypriot Press on the grounds that it demonstrated that Greek Cypriot claims for ENOSIS were only temporarily in abeyance.

10. Greek Cypriot enthusiasm was concentrated on the return to Cyprus of 21 EOKA members who had been in exile in Greece. These were men with particularly vicious records who had only been released from custody after the conclusion of the Zurich and London Agreements on the understanding that they would go to Greece and not return to Cyprus until so permitted by the Cyprus Government. Among the most dangerous are Nicos Sampson, a young journalist who is believed to have been responsible for at least 24 murders (and is proud enough of the fact to boast of it) and Renos Kyriakides, a brother of the fanatical Bishop of Kyrenia, and an extremist who is known to have little love for Archbishop Makarios. The party arrived by charter place at 5.30 p.m. at Nicosia Airport where vast crowds had gathered. A special reception party garlanded the "heroes" one by one as they came down from the plane and carried them shoulder high across the field to the airport lounge where their parents and relatives awaited them. Nicos Sampson was the first to emerge from the plane and it was apparent throughout the proceedings that evening that he was the leader and dominant character among them. In a triumphal procession through crowded roads to the Nicosia Stadium it was Nicos Sampson who rode in the first of the decorated Land Rovers. Within the stadium, where Archbishop Makarios extended a formal welcome to the EOKA fighters, it was Nicos Sampson who replied. The content of what he had to say was not extraordinary, but he spoke with power and authority, and handled his crowd skilfully. A copy of his speech and that of the Archbishop's is annexed*. The stadium was thronged to capacity and the squares and streets outside were filled with people who had been unable to gain admittance and who listened to the proceedings on the loud-speakers. Many of those present were villagers, brought by the bus-load from the country round about. There were no incidents. They were indeed good humoured crowds who gave to the onlooker an impression that they had come simply to enjoy a night out. They seemed predominantly loyal to the Archbishop—the cheers for MA-KA-RI-OS and E-O-K-A were a good deal more frequent and more enthusiastic than those for DI-GEN-IS (the legendary Byzantine hero whose name was assumed by Grivas).

11. It is fair comment that the events of Independence Day went off far better than many had expected in the sense that both law and order were maintained and that there was a good deal less apathy among the general public when the day came than had earlier seemed likely. At the very last moment the face of Nicosia was changed. The street around the Council of Ministers building were transformed by gangs of Greek Cypriot youth, who hung up fairy lights and improvised illuminations and streamers of Greek flags. People turned out to celebrate in great numbers, although it was not always evident what they were celebrating, for the birth of the Cyprus Republic attracted far less enthusiasm than, on the one hand, the return of the EOKA exiles or, on the other hand, the arrival of the Turkish army. The Cyprus flag was little in evidence. Street decorations, according to the area, were either of Greek or Turkish flags. The only non-communal decorations were those on the Shell garages. It was perhaps a happy coincidence that at approximately the same hour on the 16th of August each community had its separate focus of celebration in different sectors of Nicosia.

12. The communal nature of the celebrations is not surprising. The Cypriots have been conditioned to think of themselves not as Cypriots, but as Greeks, Turks or Armenians and the local Press are quick to jump on any public figure who is rash enough to imply that Cypriots might now develop some sort of national consciousness as Cypriots. The events of recent years have hardened the split between the two communities, and the process may well be continued under the new Constitution with its emphasis on the racial separateness OF Greek and Turk. (Although there is a chance that the Constitution may in this respect prove not entirely negative, for it at least points a way to co-ordination for common purposes.) For all this there was much that was encouraging and positive in the events of 16th August—the absence of any clash or indeed any real tension between Greek

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* Not printed

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And Turk, the fairly capable handling of the crowds by the police (working for the first time without any British direction) and Archbishop Makarios' persistently repeated message of reconciliation.   Moreover these positive signs have been reflected in the trend of events since 16th August. There has been little overt intercommunal antagonism. Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk continue to set an example of friendly co-operation and the Archbishop in particular is clearly most anxious to work with the Turkish Cypriots to establish a responsible Government and to make the rigid and artificial Constitution work as best it can. In his Press conference and statements since 16th August he has continued to develop the themes of his initial speeches and has endeavoured to turn people's minds away from the bitterness and fraction of the past, towards the constructive task of building up the new State.   The Archbishop and his Ministers in their relations with us have gone out of their way to make as good a start as possible— at the ceremony of the presentation of credentials, the arrangements for which were faultless, the President received the Representative with the greatest courtesy; similarly the President received in a most friendly manner the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and the Administrator of the Sovereign Base Areas when they paid their formal calls on him (and indeed I am given to understand that the President has directed that he will always find time to see British visitors, including service visitors from Episcopi); and the Ministers on whom I myself have called have been uniformly friendly and helpful.

    13. It would however be wrong to assume that the encouraging trend of developments since the new Republic came into being will easily be maintained. A glance at the Nicosia daily Press is sufficient to show how uncertain are the foundations on which rests the Archbishop's policy of establishing a responsible Government in co-operation with the Turkish Cypriots. I receive in my office 11 daily papers (seven Greek, two Turkish, two English) and a number of weekly reviews. Cypriots are addicted to reading newspapers and the Greek and Turkish newspapers snipe at each other continuously. They will seize on any straw to work on the feelings of communal hostility and mistrust that exist so close to the surface. *Ethniki,* the newspaper of the Democratic Union Party, continues to conduct a virulent campaign against the Zurich and London Agreements, against the very nature of the new Republic and against Archbishop Makarios in particular as personally responsible for foisting on an unwilling Cyprus a freedom that is not a freedom and an independence that is not an independence. While the other Greek papers do not actively propagate this point of view, one can sense that they feel a good deal of sympathy towards it (although supporting Makarios) and they show relatively little enthusiasm for the new Republic in the form in which it has been established. While the line taken by *Ethniki* is perhaps not influential at the moment, there are seeds of danger in its perpetual reiteration, and the danger would be the greater if any of the younger and abler Greek Cypriot leaders became attracted to it. It is perhaps to minimise this risk that the President has chosen a young Cabinet in which ex-EOKA members are well represented, and has been careful in making his senior appointments to avoid any offence to his ex-EOKA supporters (even though this has meant that in his search for a Foreign Minister he has had to cut rather an undignified figure).

    14. In summary, it can be said that the Republic has got away to a good start; that the President and Vice-President are, at the moment, jointly prepared to do all they can to build up the authenticity of a new State and to make the Constitution work as best it can and to govern in a responsible and sober manner, but the tensions and emotional strains of the last few years are still very close to the surface.

    15. I am sending copies of this despatch (without enclosures) to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Athens, Ankara, Beirut and Tel Aviv, to Her Majesty's Representative in Cairo and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces, Episcopi.

                                              I have, &c.
                                                 I. F. PORTER.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History

In *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History*, Michális Michael pursues a methodical and structured investigation of the protracted UN led Cyprus intercommunal negotiations, starting with the collapse of the 'common' state during the intercommunal clashes of 1963-1964 and culminating in the failed referendum of 2004 on the Annan Plan. However, although the narrative is the main corpus of the book, it is no more than the background against which the author sets forth his strenuous investigation of the reasons why the conflict has resisted so much peace effort and why successive UN Secretaries-General have failed to achieve a settlement. At the same time as keeping the principal actors on the stage, i.e. the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and their respective 'motherlands', he focuses mainly on the conflict resolution strategies employed by the UN and other third parties, namely the United States and Britain, and, since the Helsinki Summit of 1999 with an ever increasing presence, the European Union. After this exposition, the book comes full circle by exploring, as indicated in the title, ways of 'resolving the Cyprus conflict'.

In tracing the emergence and development of Greek Cypriot nationalism, Michael rightly discerns its two conflicting trends, the pragmatist and the idealist, which, through various transformations, have plagued Greek Cypriot politics ever since their earliest incarnation in Archbishop Sofronios and Bishop Kyprianos at the onset of British rule. Nevertheless, in tracing the origins of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, he shares Greek Cypriot historiography according to which it appeared in the 1940s as a result of British instigation and encouragement, whereas recent research by Turkish Cypriot scholars has established the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, as a direct reaction to Greek Cypriot irredentism and as an offshoot of Young Turk nationalism, four decades earlier. Owing to this misconception, he considers ethnic division and segregation to be a result of British colonial policies and practices. However, given the incompatible envisioning of the future of Cyprus by the two communities (union with Greece versus re-incorporation into the Ottoman state/partition), it is nearer to historical fact, at least until the collapse of the Consultative Assembly in 1948, that British policies influenced developments in the above direction only as a side effect, by keeping, in many respects, the millet ruling and social system that had been inherited from the Ottomans.

The main strength of Michael's book lies in the insights it gives into the role of the UN Secretariat in the effort to resolve the Cyprus conflict, particularly as this role developed from the

facilitative 'good offices mission' in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of 1974 to the full scale mediation of the Annan initiative and the run up to the referendum of 2004. With the scholarly approach of a conflict resolutionist, Michael focuses primarily on how this mediation evolved through the input of successive UN Secretaries-General and the conflict resolution strategies they deployed vis-à-vis the positions of the conflicting parties, always within the framework of the conditions involved in their mandate and, needless to say, their limitations.

He first explores the positions, motivations and expectations, of the key protagonists, who are correctly identified as the Greek Cypriots on the one side and the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey on the other. Placing the Greek Cypriots face to face with the devastating consequences of the Turkish invasion, he amply demonstrates their confused attitudes towards geographical federation which, by that time, was the only realistic option for a settlement. Even after Makarios had formally endorsed bizonal bicommunal federation in his Four Guideline Agreement with Denktaş (February 1977), Greek Cypriots found it hard to process the idea that not all refugees would return back to their homelands and that there could not be any form of majority rule. This confusion, both at people and leadership level, is shown by Michael to have persisted up until the referendum of 2004 and, in fact, to have played a major role in their resounding NO to the Annan Plan. As for the Turkish positions, Michael shows how the strategic advantage that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots won after 1974 allowed them to think that they could get along without returning any of the occupied lands; that they could play with time, using it to consolidate the *fait accompli* of the invasion and, in relation to the constitutional aspect, to put forth such conditions that actually meant confederation of two sovereign states. It was this unbridgeable gap that successive UN Secretaries from Kurt Waldheim, through Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Ghali, to Kofi Annan, had to grapple with, equipped as they were with no muscle for enforcement apart from persuasion.

Within this political landscape, which is subsequently interweaved in the narrative of the negotiating process, Michael places the deployment of the UN Secretaries' 'good offices mission' and identifies Waldheim's 'evaluation' of 1981 as a significant landmark which 'assisted future mediating efforts by structuring the negotiating agenda and setting a precedent for future Secretaries-General to intervene and propose median solutions to intractable issues'. He then shows how Cuellar built on Waldheim's 'evaluation' with his 'indicators', his 'working points', and then his three 'draft frameworks' for an overall agreement of November 1984, April 1985, and March 1986, and the new methodology of the 'proximity talks' he introduced in the face of the polarisation caused by Denktaş ' UDI.

In a critical analysis of the reasons of the failure of this Cuellar's three-year initiative, Michael correctly sees, apart from the unbridgeable gap separating the two sides on crucial issues despite substantial progress on rather technical matters, grave mishandling on the part of Cuellar as well as a confused attitude on the part of President Kyprianou. One significant insight he brings forth in this analysis is the 'linkage' theory, which he further pursues in his account of the Annan initiative, asserting that a necessary prerequisite of success was the 'synchronization' of all the actors

involved, which was not present at that time as the military takeover in Turkey and the ascent of Andreas Papandreou to power in Greece had led Greek-Turkish relations to unmitigated tension. By analysing internal social change within the two communities during the 1980s, in which he correctly perceives gravitation towards divergent directions partly as a result of the stagnant disposition of the talks, he explains the renewed failure of Cuellar's 'ideas' during the 'Davos interlude' in terms of his 'synchronization' theory. In fact, though President Vassiliou was forthcoming, Denktaş still insisted on refusing to talk territory and on 'self-determination' or separate sovereignty. This same missing 'tug', Michael convincingly argues, was one of the main causes of the failure of Boutros Ghali's 'set of ideas' in 1992. At this juncture, the author brings in the idea of 'second track diplomacy' within the framework of which he places Ghali's last ditch effort with his Confidence Building Measures (1993-1994). By bringing in relevant bibliography, he points out the 'failure of national integration and nation building' of the two Cypriot communities and the lack of 'civic nationalism' that might 'web together both the Greek and Turkish communities'.

In his approach of the Annan initiative leading to the Annan Plan and the run up to the referendum (1999-2004), Michael applies his 'synchronization' model to show that the one 'tug' missing this time was the Greek Cypriot community's compliance, which, during the 1990s was experiencing a resurgence of ethno-nationalism (militarization, Joint Defence Doctrine, confrontational incidents in the buffer zone, S-300 missiles). And this against the background of an unprecedented warming of Greek-Turkish relations ('earthquake diplomacy'), the decisive presence of the European Union – both as a paradigm and as a stabilising security factor – and, more importantly, at a time a moderate solution-oriented government was taking the reigns in Turkey, and when Denktaş was sidelined under the pressure of the Turkish Cypriot uprising. In my view, however, he is a bit unjust with the UN, the EU, and the international community at large, when he places at their door the main responsibility for the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan on the reasoning that they had failed to take on board the message of Greek Cypriot dispositions and employ 'second track diplomacy' to overcome this impeding factor. After all, the Cyprus conflict is not the mediators' problem but the Cypriots' and mainly the Greek Cypriots', who are still faced with foreign occupation and displacement. Lack of leadership in the Greek Cypriot community at that critical moment may prove, in a final analysis, to have been the main cause behind the failure of the Annan initiative.

Nevertheless, when in his final chapter Michael explores '3+1 settlement scenarios', he does not lose sight of the crux of the matter. He demonstrates that a realistic settlement might be the acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of a loose federation in exchange for territorial concessions from the Turkish side. And he concludes by showing a deep awareness that 'the challenge confronting Cyprus ultimately lies in its capacity to transform itself into a postmodern society with a political arrangement that transcends its historical insecurities'. I would add that this challenge lies at our (the Cypriots as a whole), not at the mediators', door.

CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS

Zypern und der Vordere Orient im 19. Jahrhundert. Die Levante im Fokus von Politik und Wissenschaft der europäischen Staaten

[Cyprus in the Near East in the 19th Century.
The Levante in the Focus of Politics and Science of European States]

This volume is the result of a symposium held at the 10th anniversary of the institute. The sequel of the articles is not always obvious. The first three contributions deal with the political historical background of modern Cyprus. The theme of the following articles is mainly the archaeology of Cyprus and of the Near East in the nineteenth century. Some of them focus on the Orient only. However, it has been a tradition to link Cypriot archaeology with that of the Near East and not with the Greek world and to a certain degree this is justified. Thus this book contains ample information on archaeology, the history of excavations and art history though its title suggests that the book is devoted to nineteenth century policies.

The first contribution by Rolf Ahman (pp. 9-32) analyses British oriental policy in the nineteenth century. It reveals that Britain acquired Cyprus to safeguard the Life Line of the Empire from England through the Mediterranean to India. As regards Cyprus Ahman follows the classical studies of Lee (1934) and Hill (1952). He mentions the Tribute to be paid by the Cypriots but he does it in such a vague manner that the real problem of this payment is not made clear. The author still believes that Britain acquired Cyprus as a *Place d'Armes* though there was no deep water harbour in Cyprus then. He seems unaware that in the decisive phase it was the Exchequer and not the military that wanted Cyprus in order to compel the Cypriots to pay the interest of a bounced Ottoman bond of 1855 to the British shareholders. And this they did up until the end of the 1920s, hence Ahman's account reflects the state of research 40 years ago.

Winfried Baumgart is a renowned specialist on nineteenth century imperialism and power politics. He describes the Oriental Question (pp. 33-42) from the viewpoint of the Great Powers: Russia, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France and Prussian Germany. He correctly states that the First World War brought closure to the Oriental Question as it was known. 'The hereditary titles were claimed by the three Entente Powers, by Italy, by the Arabs and by the Jewry.' At that time, however, Russia was no longer a member of the Entente community of heirs as she had

become the Soviet Union. Strange as it may seem the author does not mention another heir with a claim: Greece and her *Megali* Idea. Consequently, despite the fact that the Treaty of Lausanne terminated the Greek-Turkish War, the author describes it as a Treaty concluded between the Allies and Turkey. A sound knowledge of history on Great Power politics does not obviously necessitate a detailed understanding or an intimate familiarity with developments on a lower level.

Daniel Bertsch's contribution (pp. 43-62) chronicles the special mission of Anton Graf von Prokesch-Osten to Palaestine in 1829. This article is excellent reading and covers the period during the Greek War of Independence when Prokesch travelled widely and gained a wealth of experience in the area. Prokesch was subsequently sent to Palestine to negotiate with the Pasha of Akkon, Tripolis and Saida in an attempt to settle the conflict between the Pasha and the Austrian Vice-Consul Catafagio and end the persecution of Austrian subjects. As the Pasha did not receive Prokesch immediately the latter travelled to Jerusalem, and it was later, on his return to Akkon that he succeeded in closing the matter by signing an agreement. His success was based on his intimate knowledge of Levantine mentality:

> 'To persuade someone in Turkey is no easy task because in general words do not count much. Ambassadors will not get far by using words. A correct way of handling the Turks needs a deep insight into their customs, manners, prevailing ideas, weaknesses and way of thinking. Even the cleverest European cannot acquire this insight in a few months' contact not even in years without closely mixing with them. Much of our art of persuasion cannot be used with the Turks who are capable to recognize the truths and the lies. Energy and mildness based on absolute tranquility are the keys to their trust which has to be acquired always first. But once it is acquired one can lead them like children on reigns [a leash?].'

Reading this article might even be highly profitable for today's diplomats and negotiators engaging with the successors of those Turks who Prokesch met almost 200 years ago and it might even apply for Cyprus today ... .

Three articles deal with the Ancient Near East in general: Reinhard Dittmann's contribution (pp. 63-100) presents an overview of the relevance of the nineteenth century excavations in the Near East. Following the unearthing of archaeological finds in that area he describes the competition between the British Museum and the Louvre as to which museum might obtain the most beautiful objects from graves in Mesopotamia, which in turn, would inspire the German Empire to follow up. But the purchase of Sargon's II stele found at Kition should not be mentioned in this context. The early treasure hunters had almost no scientific knowledge and caused a lot of damage when excavating. Dittmann points to the special importance of Leon Heuzey in regard to the methodology used to treat the finds for historic interpretation. As a result the damage to excavated finds reduced as the treasure hunters became more skilled. Hans Neumann (pp. 199-224) exemplifies this development on the basis of German scholars at the time of Emperor Wilhelm II. And lastly, Dietrich Meijer (pp. 189-198), underlines the important role played by Henri Frankfort in the advancement of near eastern archaeology. His reference to 'new

archaeology', and to processual and post-processual developments in archaeological studies, is rather tense.

Reinhard Senff (pp. 256-269) recounts the study of ancient Cypriot art during the nineteenth century beginning with the so-called consular excavations and ending with the first scientific conception of Cypriot archaeology. Andreas Mehl (pp. 153-187) characterises the scholarly results of Ludwig Ross, whose aim in travelling to Cyprus in 1845 was to explore the influence of Phoenicia and Greece on the island's art. Antoine Hermary (pp. 101-113) contrasts the French consular excavations in the mid-nineteenth century which led to the purchasing of the Cypriot collection of the Louvre, with the scientific exploration of Cypriot archaeology by Heuzey, Perrot and Chipiez.

Hartmut Matthäus (pp. 115-151) demonstrates the importance of Max Ohnefalsch-Richter for the systematisation of Cypriot archaeology. He prepared the systematic basis for the first chronological account of ancient Cypriot culture but sensed that his own psychological problems led to his isolation and the ultimate loss of the subject he himself had helped to create. Eftychia Zachariou-Kaila (pp. 271-293) adds a new aspect to nineteenth century archaeological research on Cyprus by quoting the statements of Greek scholars, D. Vikelas and J. Gennadiuos, in Cypriot newspapers of 1899, attacking the continued export of art which the British had not stopped when Cyprus became British in 1878.

Finally, Dirk Sangemeister (pp. 225-253) gives an enlightening insight into the role of Cyprus in German romanticist literature by referring to some typical examples; significantly all those poems, novels or drama plays of the Lusignans and the Venetians in the late mediaeval period. The most important representative of this group is Goethe's brother-in-law, Christian August Vulpius, with his novels 'Armidoro' (1804) and 'Lucindora die Zauberin' (1810). His heroes are illegitimate descendants of the Lusignan family who, in an act of homage to the island's patron goddess, fight against Venice for the freedom of Cyprus and pay the ultimate price with their lives. In 1822 he added another work entitled 'Bublina, die Heldin Griechenlands unserer Zeit' – a typical example of philhellenistic propaganda. Although Bublina acts for Cyprus, there is no resemblance whatsoever with the historical figure of the real heroine Bouboulina.

<div align="right">

Heinz A. Richter

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Please send four copies of the manuscript together with a CD or 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word and saved as rich text format, with the author's name deleted from two copies, to

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Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies

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The region of the Balkans and the Near East has assumed an important geo-political and global economic significance since the end of the Cold War. This territory, which includes old and new nation-states of the former Ottoman Empire and Soviet Union, stands at the crossroads of an expanding West (NATO, the EU) and a re-emerging East (Russia, China, India). A focus on the Balkans and the Near East in a more globalized world must involve the re-examination of widely held assumptions, modern historical claims, and political, economic and security assertions concerning the nation-states of Southeastern Europe and the Near East. In this context, the *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* seeks to address, in an historical and theoretically-informed manner, the complex historical, economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and security issues that confront the region, in the light of such important developments as the process of European integration, the evolution of NATO, and the more general changes in the international governance system after the end of the Cold War in Eurasia and the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001.

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