


THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic
and Political Issues



Fall 2009 ; Volume 21 ; Number 2

VOLUME 21
NUMBER 2

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

*The Cyprus Review, a Journal of Social,
Economic and Political Issues,*

PO. Box 24005

1700 Nicosia, Cyprus.

Telephone: 22-353702 ext 301, 22-841500

E-mail: cy_review@unic.ac.cy

Telefax: 22-353682, 22-357481,

www.unic.ac.cy

To access site:

> Research

> UNic Publications

Subscription Office:

The Cyprus Review

University of Nicosia

46 Makedonitissas Avenue

1700 Nicosia, Cyprus

Copyright: © 2009 University of Nicosia, Cyprus.

ISSN 1015-2881.

All rights reserved.

No restrictions on photo-copying.

Quotations from *The Cyprus Review*
are welcome, but acknowledgement
of the source must be given.

TCR Editorial Team

Guest Editor: *Heinz-Jürgen Axt*

Editor in Chief: *Hubert Faustmann*

Co-Editors: *James Ker-Lindsay*

Craig Webster

Book Reviews Editor: *Olga Demetriou*

Managing Editor: *Nicos Peristianis*

Assistant Editor: *Christina McRoy*

EDITORIAL BOARD

VOLUME 21
NUMBER 2

Costas M. Constantinou

Keele University, UK

Ayla Gürel

Cyprus Centre of International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

Maria Hadjipavlou

University of Cyprus

Mete Hatay

Cyprus Centre of International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

Yiannis E. Ioannou

University of Cyprus

Joseph Joseph

University of Cyprus

Michael Kammas

Director General, Association of
Cyprus Commercial Banks

Erol Kaymak

Political Science Association, Cyprus

Costas P. Kyrris

Ex-Director of Cyprus Research
Centre, Cyprus

Diana Markides

University of Cyprus

Caesar Mavratsas

University of Cyprus

Farid Mirbagheri

University of Nicosia, Cyprus

Maria Roussou

The Pedagogical Institute of Cyprus /
Ministry of Education & Culture, Cyprus

Nikos Trimikliniotis

Centre for the Study of Migration,
Inter-ethnic and Labour Relations/
University of Nicosia and
PRIO Cyprus Centre

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

VOLUME 21
NUMBER 2

Peter Allen

Rhode Island College, USA

Othon Anastasakis

University of Oxford, UK

Floya Anthias

Roehampton University London, UK

Vassos Argyrou

University of Hull, UK

Heinz-Jürgen Axt

University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Gilles Bertrand

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de
Bordeaux, France

Hansjörg Brey

Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Germany

Van Coufoudakis

Indiana University-Purdue University
(Emeritus), USA

Thomas Diez

University of Tuebingen, Germany

Paul Gibbs

University of Middlesex, UK

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

University of Athens, Greece

Robert Holland

School of Advanced Study,
University of London, UK

Marios Katsioloudes

Abu Dhabi University
United Arab Emirates

John T.A. Koumoulides

Woodrow Wilson Centre, USA

Klearchos A. Kyriakides

University of Hertfordshire, UK

Peter Loizos

London School of Economics, UK

Yael Navaro-Yashin

University of Cambridge, UK

Phedon Nicolaidis

European Institute of Public
Administration, The Netherlands

Kalypso Nicolaidis

University of Oxford, UK

Oliver P. Richmond

University of St Andrews,
Scotland, UK

Heinz A. Richter

University of Mannheim, Germany

Robert I. Rotberg

Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, USA

Julie Scott

London Metropolitan University, UK

Zenon Stavrinides

University of Leeds, UK

Nathalie Tocci

Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

Andrekos Varnava

Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Cyprus Review is an international bi-annual refereed journal which publishes articles on a range of areas in the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus. As such it aims to provide a forum for discussion on salient issues relating to the latter. The journal was first published in 1989 and has since received the support of many scholars internationally.

Articles should be original and should not be under consideration elsewhere.

Submission Procedure:

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, *The Cyprus Review*, University of Nicosia, 46 Makedonitissas Avenue, PO. Box 24005, 1700 Nicosia, Cyprus.

Formatting Requirements:

- (i) Articles should range between 6000-9000 words.
- (ii) Manuscripts should be typed on one side of A4 double-spaced; submitted in four hard copies together with a CD or 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word saved as rich text format. Manuscripts can be forwarded electronically (saved as an attachment) to: cy_review@unic.ac.cy

Pages should be numbered consecutively.

The Cyprus Review uses British spelling, '-ise' endings (e.g. 'organise' and 'organisation').

As manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page. The author's full academic address and a brief biographical paragraph (approximately 60-100 words) detailing current affiliation and areas of research interest and publications should also be included.

Manuscripts and disks will **not** be returned.

- (iii) An abstract of no more than 150 words should be included on a separate page together with keywords to define the article's content (maximum 10 words).
- (iv) Headings should appear as follows:
Title left aligned, title case, bold, e.g.

International Peace-making in Cyprus

Subheadings: I. Left aligned, title case, bold.
II. Left-align, title case, bold, italics.
III. Left align, title case, italics.

- (v) Quotations must correspond to the original source in wording, spelling and punctuation. Any alternations to the original should be noted (e.g. use of ellipses to indicate omitted information; editorial brackets to indicate author's additions to quotations). Quotation marks (" ") are to be used to denote direct quotes and inverted commas (‘ ’) to denote a quote within a quotation.
- (vi) Footnotes should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes (see vii below) and should be numbered consecutively in the text. Acknowledgements and references to grants should appear within the footnotes.
- (vii) References: As *The Cyprus Review* is a multi-disciplinary journal, either of the following formats are acceptable for references to source material in the text:
 - a) surname, date and page number format (i.e. McDonald, 1986, p. 185) OR
 - b) footnote references.

Full references should adhere to the following format:

Books, monographs:

James, A. (1990) *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. London: Macmillan.

Multi-author volumes:

Foley, C. and Scobie, W.I. (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus*. Starpod, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Articles and chapters in books:

Jacovides, A.J. (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*. Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, pp. 13-68.

Journal articles:

McDonald, R. (1986) 'Cyprus: The Gulf Widens', *The World Today*, Vol. 40, No. 11, p. 185.

- (viii) Dates should appear as follows: 3 October 1931; 1980s; twentieth century. One to ten should appear as written and above ten in numbers (11, 12 etc.)
- (ix) Tables and figures should be included in the text and be numbered consecutively with titles.
- (x) **Essays and Research Notes.** Essays on subjects relating to Cyprus should be unreferenced and range between 2000-4000 words in length. Research Notes should be in the region of 5000 words.
- (xi) **Bibliography: Research and Publications on Cyprus:** new books, articles, book chapters, documents and PhDs are published annually in the Spring issue of the journal.
- (xii) **Book Reviews** are normally 2000 words maximum in length. Headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, ISBN registration, e.g. *Cyprus and International Politics*, Essays by Van Coufoudakis, Intercollege Press (Nicosia, 2007) 306 pp. ISBN: 978-9963-634-45-3. The reviewer's name should appear at the end of the review plus a brief biographical paragraph (60-100 words). Guidance notes are available for book reviewers. This section also hosts reviews of publications in Greek and Turkish to help facilitate cross-linguistic referencing and research awareness. Alongside attention to the specificities of the locality the journal deals with, there is also a geographical aspect to the section's broadening of scope. It strives to review publications of thematic relevance to Cyprus studies, even if the focus of the works is not necessarily Cyprus *per se*. The editors hope to enable the opening up of new avenues of intervention by Cyprus scholars in wider academic debates (as well as the awareness of such intervention amongst Cyprus-focused researchers). Suggestions for publications that should be featured in the section are welcomed and can be sent to bookreviews.tcr@unic.ac.cy.
- (xiii) Each author will receive two complimentary copies of the issue in which their paper appears in addition to a pdf to use for additional reprints.
- (xiv) Articles submitted to the journal should be unpublished material and must not be reproduced for one year following publication in *The Cyprus Review*.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in the articles and reviews published in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Nicosia, the Advisory Board, International Advisory Board, or the Editors.

Indexing: The contents of The Cyprus Review are now indexed in the following publications: Bulletin Signalitiques en Sciences, Humanities et Sociales; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; PAIS-Public Affairs Information Service; Sociological Abstracts; Social Planning, Policy and Development Abstracts and Reviews; Peace Research Abstracts Journal; ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews; Sociology and Social Anthropology; International Bibliography of Periodical Literature; International Bibliography of Book Reviews; International Political Science Abstracts; EMBASE, Compendex, Geobase and Scopus and other derivative products such as Mosby Yearbooks. In addition, TCR is available internationally via terminals accessing the Dialog, BRS and Data-Star data bases.

The Cyprus Review is disseminated via EBSCO, in their international research database service and subscription network of academic journals. It is assigned to EBSCO's EconLit database with full text. The journal's material is also distributed via ProQuest's products and services worldwide.

Advertising: Advertisements are welcomed. No more than ten full pages of advertisements are published per issue. Rates per issue: Full page \$200, €171, UK.£125; Half page \$140, €120 and UK.£90.

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

VOLUME 21
NUMBER 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ANDREAS CONSTANDINOS Britain, America and the Sovereign Base Areas from 1960-1978	13-36
GIANFABRIZIO LADINI Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus	37-61
<i>SOME REFLECTIONS ON 5 YEARS OF EU MEMBERSHIP</i> <i>GUEST EDITED BY HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT</i>	
HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT Introduction	65-68
HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT Cyprus: Conflict Resolution through Europeanisation? Most Recent Experiences and Perspectives	69-89
COSTAS MELAKOPIDES The EU's Role in the Cyprus Question	91-113
CHRISTINA IOANNOU, GIORGOS KENTAS The Mediating Impact of Corporatism on the Europeanisation of the Cypriot Labour Sector	115-135
<i>ESSAY AND RESEARCH NOTES</i>	
EROL KAYMAK Cyprus and the European Union	139-143
<i>BOOK REVIEWS</i>	
<i>Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey</i> by James Ker-Lindsay (BAHAR RUMELILI)	147-148
<i>Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis</i> by Jan Asmussen (ALEXIS HERACLIDES)	149-151
<i>Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974. A Multidisciplinary Analysis</i> by Ahmet Akgündüz (HEIDI ARMBRUSTER)	153-155
<i>The Government and Politics of Cyprus</i> by James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann (ANDREKOS VARNAVA)	157-161

CONTRIBUTORS

HEIDI ARMBRUSTER studied Social Anthropology in Munich, Vienna and London. She holds a PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and has done research on migration and diaspora-related issues in Turkey, Austria, Germany and Namibia. She works as a Lecturer in German and Transnational Studies at the University of Southampton, UK. E-mail: H.Armbruster@soton.ac.uk

HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT, born in 1946, is professor of political science at the University Duisburg-Essen. He studied Social Sciences at the University of Bochum, and gained his PhD in 1976 at the University of Marburg and his post-doctoral thesis (*Habilitation*) in 1984 at the Technical University of Berlin. For many years he was an external collaborator of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (a think-tank funded by the German Government), and has been Jean Monnet Chairholder since 1998. He was Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences from 2001 to 2005 and has been Vice President of Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft in Munich since 1999. His main subjects of research are European integration, EU enlargement, security policies and transatlantic relations, reform of EU's structural policy, conflicts in South East Europe (Balkans, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus). His publications include 18 books and more than 200 articles: more recent publications include *Greece and the European Union: Stranger among Partners?*, Baden-Baden 1997; *Cyprus and the European Union. New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?*, Munich 1997; *Solidarität und Wettbewerb - die Reform der EU-Strukturpolitik*, Gütersloh 2000; *Strukturpolitik. Einführung in die Politik des wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Zusammenhalts*, Opladen 2000; *Frieden und Sicherheit in (Südost-) Europa: EU-Beitritt, Stabilitätspakt und Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*, München 2001 *Konfliktbeilegung durch Europäisierung? Zypernfrage, Ägäiskonflikt und griechisch-mazedonischer Namensstreit*, Baden-Baden 2008 (together with Ö. Schwarz and S. Wiegand). Email: Heinz-juergen.axt@uni-duisburg-essen.de

ANDREAS CONSTANDINOS was born in London and is of Cypriot and German descent. After reading Law and German Law at the University of East Anglia, he qualified as a Barrister-at Law at the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple in 2005. From 2005-2008, he carried out research on the Cyprus crisis of 1974 at the University of East Anglia and completed his PhD in Modern European History in the summer of 2008. His thesis has since been converted into a recently published book entitled *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?* (Authorhouse, September 2009. Further information is available at www.cypruscrisis1974.com).

Email: andreasconstandinos@hotmail.com

ALEXIS HERACLIDES is professor of International Relations at the Panteion University (Athens). His books include *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London, 1991), *Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension* (London, 1993), *I Ellada kai o 'ex anatolon kindynos'* (Athens, 2001), also published in Turkish, as *Yunanistan ve 'Dogu'dan Gelen Tehlike'* Türkiye (Istanbul, 2002), *To Kypriako: sygkrousi kai epilyysi* (Athens, 2002) and *To Kypriako provlima, 1947-2004: apo tin enosi sti dihotomisi?* (Athens, 2006). His

forthcoming book is entitled *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies* (Palgrave-Macmillan). Email: aherac@panteion.gr

CHRISTINA IOANNOU (PhD in Politics, 2007 University of Manchester) is Lecturer in the Department of European Studies and International Relations of the University of Nicosia. Her area of specialisation is European integration, Europeanisation and social policy. Dr. Ioannou has completed a number of projects related to European politics and policy issues, and has participated in a number of conferences, colloquia and discussion networks, focusing mainly on Europeanisation, social policy, as well as European Union politics and policy issues. She is also a member of Team Europe, of the European Commission's Representation.
Email: ioannou.ch@unic.ac.cy

EROL KAYMAK is Associate Professor and Chair at the Department of International Relations at the Eastern Mediterranean University based in Famagusta. He has published on ethnic politics and on Cyprus in journals including *Mediterranean Politics*, the *European Journal of Political Research*, *The Cyprus Review*, and *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. He is co-author of the CIVICUS' Civil Society Index report of 2005 for Cyprus. Dr Kaymak also contributed to public opinion studies on Cyprus. To this end he has recently co-authored two books including *Building Confidence in Peace* and *A Peoples Peace in Cyprus* published by the Centre for European Politics (CEPS). He has also contributed to several edited volumes.
Email: erol.kaymak@emu.edu.tr

GIORGOS KENTAS (PhD Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2009) teaches International Relations and European Politics at the University of Nicosia. He is a Research Fellow at the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs. His research interests lie in the fields of international theory, philosophy of the social sciences, organised violence in world politics and Cyprus politics.
Email: kentasg@unic.ac.cy

GIANFABRIZIO LADINI was born in Italy and educated there. He gained his BA in philosophy from the University of Trieste and obtained a MA in 'Methods in European Policy-making' and a MA in 'International Peace Operations' from the Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia [Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia]. He has trained and holds diplomas in the areas of International Cooperation, European Studies and Conflict Analysis and Resolution. He worked with NGOs in the West Bank (Occupied Palestinian Territories), in Cyprus and in Kosovo. Between field experience in Cyprus and Kosovo he worked in international trade as an executive management assistant with the company La Distributrice s.r.l. He was employed as Project Officer for the 'Dialogues of Peace in Cyprus 2007-2008' project and is currently serving in Kosovo as Project Officer responsible on site. His research centres on international affairs, conflict analysis and resolution; and travelling and being engaged with people living in the trouble spots of the world offers a sense of accomplishment and fulfilment. Email: g_ladini@yahoo.it

COSTAS MELAKOPIDES is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Cyprus in Nicosia. He studied law, philosophy and politics at the Universities of Athens (Greece), Kent at Canterbury (UK) and Queen's

(Canada). After working as a research associate at the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, he taught International Relations at the University of Manitoba, Queen's University, and the Royal Military College of Canada. His most recent publications are: *Is There an Ethics in World Politics?* (2003) (in Greek); *Unfair Play: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the EU* (2006); and *Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations* (2009). He is Co-founder and President of the Cyprus Institute of Mediterranean, European and International Studies (KIMEDE). Email: comel@ucy.ac.cy

BAHAR RUMELILI is Assistant Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of International Relations, Koç University, İstanbul. She is the author of *Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia* (Palgrave, 2007). Her research articles on the construction of European identity and the EU impact on Greek/Turkish relations have been published in the *European Journal of International Relations*, *Review of International Studies*, and the *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Email: brumelili@ku.edu.tr

ANDREKOS VARNAVA was born and raised in Melbourne, obtained a BA (Honours) from Monash University (2001) and his PhD in History from the University of Melbourne (2006). He is the author of *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession* (Manchester University Press, 2009); and the co-editor of *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond* (I.B. Tauris, 2009) and *The Minorities of Cyprus: Development Patterns and the Identity of the Internal-Exclusion* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). He was Assistant Professor in History at the European University Cyprus from October 2006-January 2009 and in January 2009 he was appointed Lecturer in Modern History at Flinders University, South Australia. Email: andrekos.varnava@flinders.edu.au

ARTICLES

VOLUME 21

NUMBER 2



Britain, America and the Sovereign Base Areas from 1960-1978

ANDREAS CONSTANDINOS

Abstract

Government documents from the British National Archives, currently within the public domain, have revealed that Britain's preferred policy in 1974 was the total withdrawal from its two Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. However, the United States – in particular controversial US Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger – attached such importance to Britain's continued military presence in Cyprus, that British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan opted not to pursue Britain's preferred policy, exemplifying the extent to which Whitehall, despite Britain's growing financial difficulties, would allow British defence policy to be dictated and subjected to pressures from across the Atlantic.

This article looks at the history of the British Sovereign Base Areas from 1960 until 1978, their significance to the respective British governments and how American foreign and defence policy affected British decision-making vis-à-vis its geopolitically vital military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Keywords: Sovereign Base Areas, Britain, America, Cyprus, Kissinger

On the 1 January 2008, the two British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, became the first part of sovereign British territory to adopt the Euro. Unlike the Republic of Cyprus, the Sovereign Base Areas are not part of the European Union, but due to the introduction of the Euro in the Republic of Cyprus this decision was made in line with Britain's policy of 'harmonising their [the Sovereign Base Areas] laws as far as possible with those of the Republic of Cyprus'.¹ This unusual and undeniably anachronistic state of affairs exists today because, 131 years after Britain's first strategic involvement in Cyprus, Britain still retains sovereignty over ninety-eight square miles – a quarter of the size of Hong Kong – of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 4 June 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Cyprus was leased to Britain by the Ottomans so that Britain could use Cyprus as a *de facto* base in order to continue the traditional British policy of protecting the ailing Ottoman Empire from Russian encroachment. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli believed Britain had acquired a *place d'armes* "from which Britain's interests

1 *The Times*, 'Euro Reaches Field that is for ever England', by Michael Theodoulou, 27 December 2007.

could be secured". Nonetheless, within four years, Cyprus had been upstaged by Britain's acquisition of Egypt, which provided the British Empire with far superior military bases. The island became a financial loss and of little intrinsic interest.²

In 1923, under Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the newly-founded Republic of Turkey renounced any claim to sovereignty over Cyprus in favour of Britain and two years later Cyprus was declared a British Crown Colony. Britain's retention of the island can reasonably be described as an imperialistic move, as Cyprus had become strategically insignificant, exemplified even twenty years later, by its military non-involvement during World War Two.³

However, the Cold War and the emergence of the West's dependence on Middle Eastern oil changed everything. In 1948, British troops left Palestine and due to the increased Egyptian hostility towards Britain's base in Suez, which in 1954 forced Britain to agree to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal base by June 1956, Cyprus suddenly became what it had always threatened to be – strategically vital – with the island becoming the new home of Britain's Middle East Headquarters.⁴ Additionally, up until 1949, there existed a very real threat of a Communist takeover in Greece, with the subsequent possibility of Soviet encroachment in Cyprus, which further added to the importance of the island.⁵

Whilst the retention of Cyprus in the 1920s may have amounted to an imperialistic move, resisting Greek Cypriot claims for *Enosis* (union with Greece) in the 1950s could not be described as such. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden notoriously claimed:

"No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that to-day."⁶

However, Eden's Chiefs of Staff disagreed with this over-simplification. Retaining Cyprus was a matter of prestige and the only visible sign of British determination to maintain its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.⁷

2 TNA: FO 371/130112, RGG1051/23G, 'Policy on Cyprus', Bermuda Conference, 21 March 1957.

3 A good analysis of the value of Cyprus to the British government from 1878-1915 is given by Andrekos Varnava in "Cyprus is of no use to Anybody", *The Pawn, 1878-1915*, which can be found in H. Faustmann and N. Peristianis (eds.) (2006) *Britain in Cyprus. Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878-2006*, Mannheim and Moehensee: Peleus, Studien zur Archæologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, pp. 35-60.

4 J. Darwin (1988) *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war Period*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 206-214 and S. Dockrill (2002) *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez*, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, p. 18.

5 TNA: FO 371/67084, R13462/G, 'Cyprus: Question of Cession to Greece', Minute by Foreign Office official Charles Johnston, 24 October 1947.

6 *The Times*, 2 June 1956.

7 TNA: DEFE 4/87, 'Nos 51-60', Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of 58th Meeting, Chief of Imperial General Staff, Sir Gerald Templar, doc.165, 12 June 1956.

Two years later, in September 1957, Whitehall and Washington conducted secret, informal and exploratory talks at the US Embassy in London over the future of Cyprus.⁸ This was the first time that such Anglo-American talks had taken place and was the first time Washington suggested it favoured a specific solution to the 'Cyprus Question'. A few months earlier, in March 1957, Whitehall indicated to Washington that Britain no longer needed the whole island as a base, but only required bases on the island, so it was agreed that the criteria for a solution should be:⁹

1. Britain to retain sovereign control over essential military facilities;
2. To prevent Communist subversion; and
3. To maintain peace and stability in Cyprus.¹⁰

Washington favoured independence as the "ultimate solution" as it could be "guaranteed by a number of NATO powers".¹¹

A few months earlier, Washington had expressed its concern to Whitehall, over fears that in the light of Britain's experience in Egypt that Britain might pull out of Cyprus altogether.¹² The US wanted the military installations on Cyprus to be controlled by a reliable ally, namely Britain.¹³ A National Security Council paper drafted in 1957 reveals that Washington's primary interest in Cyprus was indirect in that it involved three NATO allies, Britain, Greece and Turkey, and that their continued failure to reach an agreement over Cyprus and its consequence of weakening the Alliance, was interpreted with a degree of concern by some officials in Washington.¹⁴

Independence and the Sovereign Base Areas

Geopolitics played a decisive role in structuring the type of 'independence' that Cyprus gained in 1960 and it was during the pre-independence negotiations that both Whitehall and Washington set about securing their own strategic interests on the island. According to some sources,

8 TNA: CO 926/627, 'NATO Interest in Political Situation in Cyprus', unsigned tel.811, from the Foreign Office to the permanent British NATO delegation in Paris, doc.285, 12 September 1957.

9 TNA: FO 371/130112, RGG1051/25G, 'Policy on Cyprus', Bermuda Conference, 26 March 1957.

10 TNA: CO 926/627, 'NATO Interest in Political Situation in Cyprus', 'Minutes of a Meeting with Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General of NATO', Paris, 18 October 1957.

11 *Ibid.*

12 TNA: CO 926/977, 'Facilities Required by UK Armed Forces in Cyprus', British Ambassador in Moscow, William Hayter to the Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, R.C. Chilver, doc.215, 4 June 1957.

13 *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, XII*, 309, Memorandum, 289th Meeting, National Security Council, 28 June 1956.

14 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, United States, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records 1952-1961, National Security Council Series, Briefing Notes Subseries 6003, Box 28, doc.9, Supplement to National Security Council 5718, 'US Policy toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute', 18 July 1957.

Washington became active participants in the post-Zürich/London negotiations, “but shied away from acknowledging” it, by securing:¹⁵

1. A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in a co-operative relationship, and willing and able to resist Communists subversion, and
2. The continued availability to the West of the British military facilities on Cyprus.¹⁶

In fact, Britain’s negotiations over her military facilities in Cyprus became so protracted that Cypriot independence had to be postponed for almost six months.¹⁷ Ultimately, an agreement was reached on the detail and Cyprus gained its independence on 16 August 1960.

The independence agreements of 1960 allowed Britain to retain numerous defence sites and installations across the island, as well as two Sovereign Base Areas, 2.9 per cent, ninety-nine square miles of the island, as sovereign territory. With this development, Britain’s policy-decisions on its former colony became inextricably linked to the two Sovereign Base Areas. The value of these military facilities was not only viewed as being important in Whitehall. In Washington too, the strategic significance of these bases became increasingly evident. By 1970, the Sovereign Base Areas could:

“... accommodate the Headquarters of Near East Air Force and of Near East Land Forces. There are some 5,500 RAF personnel serving with NEAF and about 2,500 Army personnel with Near East Land Forces. Together with United Kingdom-based civilians and dependents there are some 26,000 British personnel serving in Cyprus and a large proportion of them are resident in the Sovereign Base Areas. The most important military installation in the Sovereign Base Areas is the RAF airfield at Akrotiri on which two Vulcan squadrons and one Lightning squadron are based ...”¹⁸

The Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Akrotiri is the largest such British base in the world and is used to survey as well as defend NATO’s southern flank. Additionally, the communication and surveillance centres at Britain’s disposal are capable of intercepting unidentified aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of the Retained Sites at Britain’s disposal, three were regularly identified

15 Frontline Diplomacy: The US Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, eds. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, CD-Rom, Arlington, VA: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 2000. William Chase, Political Officer, US Embassy Ankara 1955-1959 interviewed by Charles Kennedy, 24 July 1990.

16 *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume X*, part 1, National Security Council Report: ‘Statement of US Policy toward Cyprus’, 6003, 9 February 1960, pp. 819-828.

17 ‘Independence Postponed: Cyprus 1959-1960’, by Hubert Faustmann, which can be found in H. Faustmann and N. Peristianis (eds.) (2006) *Britain in Cyprus, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878-2006*, Mannheim and Moehensee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, p. 413.

18 TNA: DEFE 13/961, ‘Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Cyprus’, ‘The Purpose Served by the Sovereign Base Areas’, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force, John Brynmor, doc.EI, 9 July 1970.

throughout the 1960s and 1970s as virtually indispensable:

1. *Mount Olympus*, home to various radars which provide all-round radar coverage essential to the air defence of the Sovereign Base Areas, and provision of early warning for national and NATO forces. Also, it houses communications equipment necessary for the Joint Air Traffic Control Centre at Nicosia and to the services radio relay and internal security networks. It is the most powerful station in the area and provides invaluable supplementary information to that obtained from stations in Greece and Turkey. Further, it provides intelligence gathering and surveillance facilities which contribute to US and NATO assessment agencies, helps to reduce the freedom of action of Russian maritime and air forces, and is considered irreplaceable as the UK derives benefits from their input to the Anglo-American global effort out of all proportion to the size of that input.
2. *RAF Troodos*, which functions as the support base for Mount Olympus and houses very important intelligence facilities and radio equipment vital to the air defence of Cyprus which cannot be located at Olympus for technical reasons.
3. *Cape Greco*, which houses the NATO ACE HIGH Tropospheric Scatter Station and provides the air defence to the Sovereign Base Areas as well as being important to NATO as, for example, it provides communication with the NATO Area Control Centre in Turkey.¹⁹

Britain's position in relation to its facilities on Cyprus was summarised in 1967, when the Wilson government determined that if the Sovereign Base Areas were given up "we would have difficulties negotiating new arrangements" for Cape Greco and Mount Olympus.²⁰ A few years later, the Heath government was less equivocal, in that Cape Greco, Mount Olympus and RAF Troodos could not be retained without the Sovereign Base Areas, thereby complicating any considerations Britain might have had of withdrawing from Cyprus.²¹ Crucially, both the Wilson and Heath governments concluded that if Britain were to withdraw from the Sovereign Base Areas, its position *vis-à-vis* these Retained Sites would also become untenable.

Britain's rights, governed by the Treaty of Establishment, essentially allow Britain to use the whole of the island as a military base.²² These comprehensive rights have been described as "more

19 Cited in: TNA: CAB 130/703, 'Interdepartmental Working Group on Cyprus', 'The Importance to Britain of Military Facilities in Cyprus', Note by the Ministry of Defence, 17 October 1973.

20 TNA: CAB 148/81, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Report by the Defence Review Working Party, 2 June 1967.

21 TNA: CAB 130/703, 'Interdepartmental Working Group on Cyprus', 'The Importance to Britain of Military Facilities in Cyprus', Note by the Ministry of Defence, 17 October 1973.

22 TNA: AIR 20/10126, 'Cyprus: Air Defence of Sovereign Base Areas', 'Loose Minute', S.5224/S.9, Senior Executive Officer, Head of Section 9, Air Ministry, L.G. Perry, 28 June 1962.

extensive as those accorded to a sending state under the standard NATO arrangements”.²³ However, because the Retained Sites are scattered across the island, and because the Sovereign Base Areas rely upon fresh water, food, labour supplies and services from the Republic of Cyprus, administrators of the Sovereign Base Areas have always been instructed to establish and maintain good relations with Nicosia.²⁴

Brigadier Francis Henn, Commander of the British Contingent in the United Nations Force in Cyprus in 1974, believed that these extensive rights afforded to Britain were tied into a responsibility to protect the Republic of Cyprus. Henn believed there was a tacit assumption that the retention of the Sovereign Base Areas:

“... afforded Britain a capability to fulfil its responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee comparable to that allowed to Greece and Turkey by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance.”²⁵

James Callaghan, who was the British Foreign Secretary in 1974, also recognised that Britain’s presence in the Sovereign Base Areas meant they had a continuing responsibility, but he did not reach the same conclusion as Henn.²⁶ This issue remains the subject of much debate. What remains unquestionable is that throughout all the political and military crises that were to erupt across the island from 1960-1974, Whitehall’s military priority remained the defence of the Sovereign Base Areas and Retained Sites.²⁷ In fact, the continued failure to reach a settlement to the seemingly insoluble Cyprus Problem helped facilitate Britain’s policy of retaining the Sovereign Base Areas as encapsulated in a letter written by the British Minister for Public Works, Julian Amery to the then Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington in 1970, in which Amery stated that:

“As long as there is tension between Turks and Greeks I think we have little to worry about in terms of our tenure of the Sovereign Base Areas ...”²⁸

23 Quote from Klearchos Kyriakides in his paper ‘The Sovereign Base Areas and British Defence Policy Since 1960’, which can be found in H. Faustmann and N. Peristianis (eds.) (2006) *Britain in Cyprus, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878-2006*, Mannheim and Moehnssee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, pp. 511-534.

24 TNA: FO 371/152927, ‘Sovereign Base Areas’, Directive from the Secretary of State to Air Marshal Sir William MacDonald, Administrator of Sovereign Base Areas, RC1192/213(c), 5 August 1960.

25 F. Henn (2004) *A Business of Some Heat: The United Nations Force in Cyprus before and during the 1974 Turkish Invasion*, Barnsley: Pen and Sword, p. 11.

26 TNA: FCO 9/2186, ‘Relations between UK and Cyprus’, letter from James Callaghan’s Private Secretary, Anthony Acland to the head of the Southern European Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Alan Goodison, doc.13, 28 February 1975.

27 TNA: DEFE 11/460, ‘Cyprus’, Report by Major-General Carver on Peace-Keeping Operations in Cyprus, 14 February-15 July 1964, attached to a covering letter, paragraph 4, 27 October 1964.

28 TNA: DEFE 13/854, ‘British Base Areas in Cyprus’, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Julian Amery to Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, 29 September 1970.

1960-1965

From the moment Britain had secured the Sovereign Base Areas, Whitehall pursued a policy of maintaining harmonious relations with Nicosia. Nonetheless, wanting to avoid the risk of offending one of the two communities in the ever increasingly intractable Cyprus Problem, Britain showed little concern for events on the island. In fact, as suggested by Julian Amery, it could quite reasonably be argued that Whitehall actually benefited from the perpetuation of the Cyprus Problem. In May 1971 Prime Minister Edward Heath commented that Britain had more interest than most countries in maintaining stability on the island, but that despite the cost and political disadvantages of the continued absence of a solution to the "Cyprus Problem", the "situation in Cyprus does not suit us too badly."²⁹

Even so, within four years of independence, Britain gave serious thought to giving up one of her bases. The following considerations were made in the context of the Acheson Plan, when the possibility of ceding Dhekelia was discussed as an alternative to Turkey obtaining a military base in the Karpass. (There were four Acheson Plans that were all essentially based upon the premise that the majority of the island should unite with Greece with some form of concession being made to Turkey.) Documents released in the British National Archives reveal that the British Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, himself contemplated this possibility. Ultimately, both Douglas-Home, his Secretary of State, Rab Butler and the Ministry of Defence felt this was not a good idea and should only be used as a last resort and in the end the idea was rejected for practical and constitutional reasons.³⁰ Under the agreement that Britain has with Cyprus, if Britain should ever wish to divest itself of the Sovereign Base Areas, sovereignty or control of this land has to be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.³¹

29 TNA: PREM 15/2028, 'Extension of UNFICYP Mandate', 'Cyprus', Prime Minister, 15 May 1971.

30 TNA: FCO 9/65, 'UK Policy: Cyprus', Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office draft paper, 'Cyprus', Annex E, 'A NATO Base in Cyprus?', doc.18, which includes a brief synopsis of the events of 1964 and concludes that a NATO base forming part of a solution on Cyprus to be 'remote', from the former British representative at Geneva Lord Hood to British Ambassador Ralph Murray, Athens, 28 March 1967.

31 "... In the event, however, that the Government of the United Kingdom, in view of changes in their military requirements, should at any time decide to divest themselves of the aforesaid sovereignty or effective control over the Sovereign Base Areas, or any part of, it is understood that such sovereignty or control shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus", 'Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Cyprus Concerning the Future of the Sovereign Base Areas Referred to in Article 1 of the Treaty of 16 August 1960 Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 16 August 1960'. Signed on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus by Archbishop Makarios and Dr Fazil Küçük and agreed to by British Governor Sir Hugh Foot: "I have the honour further to state that the Government of the United Kingdom are in full agreement with the views contained in that Note." Quoted in N. Macris (2003) *The 1960 Treaties on Cyprus and Selected Subsequent Acts*, Mannheim and Moehnsee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 24, Bibliopolis, pp. 89-90.

A report compiled by the Ministry of Defence's Chief of Staff Committee reveals that although the Sovereign Base Areas are British, NATO was privy to the Cape Gata Radar in Akrotiri and the RAF control/reporting radar station at Cape Gata, as information from here was used for the air defence of NATO's south-eastern flank. Amongst the Retained Sites, NATO was also privy to the RAF Communications and Radar stations in the Troodos Mountains and on Mount Olympus, the NATO Communication Station at Cape Greco and the RAF Radio Relay System.³²

With Nicosia not rejecting the idea of a Turkish base within the Sovereign Base Areas in the context of the Acheson negotiations, the possibility of having Dhekelia under NATO management was also considered by Whitehall.³³ However, with the rejection of the idea of ceding Dhekelia came the realisation, much to the *chagrin* of Washington, that as nothing happened in Cyprus without the co-operation of Cyprus' President Archbishop Makarios, who since 1960 had espoused a non-aligned foreign policy for the Republic of Cyprus, the possibility of having the base under NATO management was remote.³⁴ Nonetheless, Washington had managed to secure the next best thing, as the Sovereign Base Areas were, as we have seen, used for NATO purposes.³⁵ During a question and answer session at the Ministry of Defence in December 1973, two references were made equating Mount Olympus and the Sovereign Base Areas with NATO facilities:

“... no public acknowledgement is given to the use by NATO of our facilities in Cyprus due to [sic] Cyprus Governments' susceptibilities.”³⁶

Washington's interest in and willingness to help Whitehall in maintaining its bases continued to develop as a withdrawal from Dhekelia was also raised during the 1965 Defence Review consultations. The following year, the question of abandoning Dhekelia was answered

32 TNA: DEFE 11/455, 'Cyprus', Chiefs of Staff Committee, 'Possible Use of Facilities in the Cyprus Base by NATO', Note by the Secretary, signed J.R. Hallett, Colonel for the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 'Top Secret' Report, Annex to COS 236/64, doc. 3430, 12 August 1964. At a meeting on 11 August 1964, the Chiefs of Staff examined which facilities in the Sovereign Base Areas and Retained Sites in Cyprus could be offered by Britain to NATO should Cyprus be united with Greece. Included within this report, is an outline of the existing facilities in Cyprus which NATO used at the time.

33 TNA: DEFE 11/456, 'Cyprus', tel.2152, British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Sir Alec Bishop to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 August 1964.

34 NARA: RG39, CFPE, 1964-1966, Political and Defence, Cyprus, airgram A-156 from Robert Schott, First Secretary at the US Embassy in Nicosia to the State Department, 1 December 1964.

35 TNA: AIR 2/18887, 'Defence Review: Sovereign Base Areas', 'loose minute', doc.E133, Chief Press Secretary, Civil Service Department, Air Ministry, D. Longland, 13 August 1973.

36 TNA: DEFE 68/90, 'Cyprus Policy after the Defence Review', session 3, attended by C.A. Whitmore, Assistant Under Secretary of State (Defence Staff), Air-Vice Marshall J. Gingell, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Policy and Rear Admiral FW. Hearn, Assistant Chief of Personnel and Logistics, 9 December 1973.

negatively by the Defence Review Working Party.³⁷ It was argued that there was no great financial advantage to giving up Dhekelia, that it would be bad for service morale (as people would have to be moved to areas where they would not enjoy similar amenities), it would cause large-scale local redundancy of civilian labour and would ultimately, and most crucially, lead to a deterioration in Anglo-Cypriot relations.³⁸ As we have seen, since independence, the importance of maintaining harmonious relations with Nicosia had been of paramount importance to officials within Whitehall, who believed that the Cyprus Government would not welcome the large amount of local redundancies the loss of Dhekelia would inevitably lead to.

As Britain had been told by Dean Acheson, the US President's special representative to Cyprus in 1964, that Ankara's primary concern was a base on the island rather than the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots, Britain considered giving up Dhekelia as part of a political solution to the Cyprus Problem.³⁹ Washington, however, opposed such a venture on strategic and intelligence grounds, which might constitute another reason why Dhekelia was never given up.⁴⁰

Interestingly, in 2004, in the context of the Annan Plan and during the intensive negotiations which followed the Copenhagen European Council, Whitehall had come to believe that the issue of territorial readjustment had become key for both Cypriot communities and needed to be resolved if there was to be a settlement. Britain, therefore, gave urgent consideration to whether it could in some way "help to bridge the remaining gap", and decided to inform the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan that Britain would be prepared to cede 45 square miles of its Sovereign Base Areas, just under half of the total area of the SBAs. Crucially, the areas involved did not contain military infrastructure, and the offer would consequently not have an adverse impact on the functioning of the Sovereign Base Areas and would only become valid if an agreement on the UN's proposals was reached.⁴¹

The abovementioned developments highlight the varied importance afforded to the Sovereign Base Areas by British Governments, depending on the prevailing defence, foreign and economic policies at the time. During Harold Wilson's tenure as British Prime Minister from 1964-1970, he oversaw considerable defence budget cuts as well as Britain's landmark retreat from its military bases East of Suez.⁴² During this period the strategic importance of the bases often

37 TNA: CAB 148/29, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 'Rundown of Forces,' 16 November 1966.

38 TNA: CAB 148/54, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 11 October 1966 and TNA: CAB 148/25, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 18 November 1966.

39 TNA: DEFE 11/457, 'Cyprus', Secretary of State, Rab Butler, PM64/98, undated doc.1A.

40 NARA: RG59, CFPE, 1964-1966, Political and Defence, Cyprus: telegram, from the US Embassy in London to the State Department, 28 November 1966.

41 Foreign Affairs Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, Minutes of Evidence, Annex 1 Written Statement to the House of Commons on the UK's Offer of Sovereign Base Area Land, Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Jack Straw, dated 15 March 2004 [www.parliament.co.uk], accessed on 1 November 2009.

42 S. Dockrill (2002) *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez*. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, pp. 43-226.

marched in line with the gradual decline of overall British political power, especially with regards to Cyprus. The intercommunal violence that erupted across the island in late 1963 which continued in 1964 saw a reversal of the roles hitherto played by both Britain and the US, mirroring the respective historical development of the ever decreasing influence and ever increasing influence enjoyed in international affairs by Britain and America respectively.

1965-1974

The Sovereign Base Areas are not only used for NATO purposes. From 1970 onwards American U-2 planes could be seen taking off from Akrotiri in order to supplement Israeli reconnaissance efforts just west of the Suez Canal. Initially, Washington's approach to use the bases was received with a 'cool' reaction from Whitehall, as Britain was concerned about how these missions would be viewed in the Arab world. It required several days of urging from 'high levels' within the Nixon administration before Britain finally allowed the US to use Akrotiri. British agreement was ultimately given on condition that Makarios and all other parties concerned raised no objection – they did not.⁴³

Shortly afterwards, members of the press began to realise what was going on and as Nicosia came under increasing criticism from the left-wing press and the United Arab Republic, Washington observed that Britain was becoming more and more nervous about the situation. Washington decided to voluntarily withdraw the U-2 planes before it appeared they were doing so under pressure, as this would enhance its position to ask to use the bases again in the future. Documents declassified in US National Archives suggest that it was Whitehall which viewed the American presence with greater concern than Makarios.⁴⁴ This supports the belief that Makarios' presence did not adversely affect US interests. Despite his vacillation over the siting of a Voice of America station in 1963, which eventually led to its establishment in Rhodes, Makarios granted Washington access to the Sovereign Base Areas, co-operated with the US in receiving hostages from the Middle East, as well as granting Washington extensive facilities across the island.⁴⁵

In 1972, Britain received a bill from Makarios for the use of the bases, potentially jeopardising Britain's continued military presence on the island.⁴⁶ Whitehall's initial response was one of little

43 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1970-1973, DEF 15, CYP-US, from Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Alfred Atherton to Under-Secretary, 'Background on Use of Akrotiri Base for our U-2 Flights', 22 October 1970.

44 NARA: RG59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1970-1973, DEF 15, CYP-US, memorandum for National Security Adviser Dr Henry Kissinger, 'Our U-2 Aircraft on Cyprus', 10 December 1970.

45 NARA: RG59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1970-1973, Political and Defence, Cyprus, Box 2224, memorandum for President Richard Nixon before his meeting with Makarios, 22 October 1970.

46 NARA: RG59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1970-1973, Political and Defence, Cyprus, unsigned telegram, from the US Embassy in Nicosia to the State Department, 3 April 1971, which reveals that Whitehall committed a tactical mistake as it was Britain which pressed the Cyprus Government for payment as they were requesting

concern, as the Sovereign Base Areas are sovereign territory, which means that no rent was to be paid under the signed agreement:

“During the 1960 negotiations, Cyprus dropped earlier claims for payment for sites and facilities. Instead, she accepted the United Kingdom proposal to determine at five-year intervals, after full consultation with the Cyprus Government and taking all factors into account, the amount of financial aid to Cyprus to be provided in the succeeding five years. This was set out in an Exchange of Notes which provided for £12 million of aid up to 1965, paid in instalments tapering to £1.5 million in the final year. No subsequent determinations have been made.”⁴⁷

In fact, Nicosia was told in March 1965 that further payment was dependent upon progress toward an intercommunal settlement, as this was the only way Britain could guarantee equal distribution of the aid amongst the two communities, thereby demonstrating and ensuring British impartiality. Additionally, the then Foreign Secretary, George Brown, gave Ankara an undertaking that no further aid would be given to Cyprus unless such equal distribution could be guaranteed.⁴⁸

The following year, a second request for payment was made, in which the Cypriot Government asked for £76.5 million for the use of facilities and services, not the Sovereign Base Areas, on Cyprus for the period of 1 April 1965 to 31 March 1972. A second request was made for a subsequent annual payment of £11.48 million as of 1 April 1972.⁴⁹ Consequently, Whitehall asked the Chiefs of Staff to re-evaluate the strategic importance of Cyprus. In their view Cyprus:

1. Provides intelligence gathering and surveillance facilities which contribute to US and NATO assessment agencies and help to reduce the freedom of action of Russian maritime and air forces.
2. Having the Sovereign Base Areas secures a strategically valuable site from Moscow.
3. Cyprus is crucial for the support of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and the effective use of the CENTO air route.⁵⁰

CENTO, originally known as the Baghdad Pact (after the military coup in Iraq in 1958, Iraq withdrew from the alliance and the name Baghdad Pact was dropped), was modelled on NATO and its members were Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Britain. Its aim was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of allied states on the Soviet border. Washington encouraged Britain's

some Sovereign Base Areas' land near Famagusta in order to develop a tourist project (Golden Sands), after which the Makarios Government decided to issue a counterclaim.

47 TNA: AIR 20/12691, 'Cyprus Emergency', 'Cyprus – Financial Claims for Facilities', November 1974.

48 TNA: PREM 15/31, 'PM Meeting with Foreign Minister Kyprianou, July 1970', see Appendix R.

49 TNA: FCO 46/1017, 'Importance of Military Facilities in Cyprus to the UK', B. Stanbridge, Air Commander, Secretary, Chief of Staff Committee, 13 September 1973.

50 TNA: FCO 46/1017, 'Importance of Military Facilities in Cyprus to the UK', Chief of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff paper, 'The Strategic Importance of Cyprus', 24 September 1973.

participation in CENTO in order to keep Soviet interests out of the Mediterranean, but America's opposition to colonialism and its close relationship with Israel meant that Britain had to take responsibility for making CENTO militarily viable.⁵¹ In 1964, as part of Whitehall's CENTO commitments, the CENTO Military Committee approved the "Joint Campaign (Requirements) for the CENTO Area – 1966/67" which meant that Britain had a nuclear deterrent in the region, as four squadrons of Canberra medium bombers were located in Cyprus.⁵²

The first point mentioned in the Chiefs of Staff evaluation had become increasingly important during the 1960s, as Moscow significantly increased its naval power in the Mediterranean.⁵³ At the same time Britain's force was substantially reduced and the French, despite maintaining a naval force, did not submit it to NATO command. By 1967 a total of forty-six Soviet ships could be found in the Mediterranean, including "some of the latest guided missile cruisers and about ten submarines together with numerous support ships".⁵⁴ Additionally, the Chiefs of Staff found that:

- (a) Western Europe and the US are becoming increasingly dependent on oil produced by countries in the vicinity of Cyprus which gives the island increased importance.
- (b) Certain intelligence gathering facilities in Cyprus are irreplaceable and the UK derives benefit from their input to the Anglo-American global effort out of all proportion to the size of that input. The nature of the facilities is such that they should be located in sovereign territory and for technical reasons both Sovereign Base Areas are needed for their protection.
- (c) The nuclear bomber force declared to the CENTO, must be located in Cyprus in order to achieve maximum effect on the regional members of the alliance.
- (d) Akrotiri airfields provide an excellent base for the conduct of air reconnaissance and maritime support operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The ground radars and air defence fighters in Cyprus provide a valuable extension of NATO's air defence system.⁵⁵

The geopolitical importance of Cyprus to Britain and the West was therefore clear. In December 1973, Whitehall informed Nicosia that the presented claims were not legally well-

51 S. Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

52 TNA: DEFE 13/539, 'Defence Expenditure Study No. 3 – CENTO and Cyprus in the Mid-1970s', doc.21, Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Policy), Ministry of Defence, F. Cooper, 13 June 1967.

53 F. Vali (1972) *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, California: Hoover Institution Press, p. 114.

54 Former US Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, in an address to the National Press Club, 23 August 1967 and R. Weinland (1972) 'Soviet Transits of the Turkish Straits: 1945-1970 – An historical note on the establishment and dimensions of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean', *Centre for Naval Analyses*, Professional Paper No. 94, 14 April 1972, Virginia, US.

55 TNA: FCO 46/1017, 'Importance of Military Facilities in Cyprus to the UK', Chief of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff paper, 'The Strategic Importance of Cyprus', 24 September 1973.

founded, as all payments under the Treaty of Establishment were being honoured and that any resumption of payment should be made in accordance with the 1960 Exchange of Notes.⁵⁶ However, Foreign Secretary, Lord Home believed that Britain would need to resume financial assistance to ensure continued use of the Sovereign Base Areas. Consequently High Commissioner Stephen Oliver was instructed to inform Nicosia that although the claim was legally not well-founded, Britain did not rule out discussing the matter.⁵⁷ Of course Britain had actually paid the Cyprus Government £12 million over a five-year period ending on 31 March 1965, but this was for the sites, installations and other facilities Britain had on Cyprus, and not for the Sovereign Base Areas.⁵⁸ According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Britain tacitly recognised that this was what the payment had been made for but "... at the time ... naturally we did not admit it to the Cypriots".⁵⁹

1974

On 9 May 1974, with Edward Heath having now been replaced as Prime Minister by Harold Wilson, British policy was once again set on course for a defence review. Stephen Oliver was instructed to deliver a message from Wilson to Makarios, informing him that due to Britain's serious economic situation, it could not, for the time being, discuss the financial request made by the Archbishop. Makarios was sympathetic, but explained that he too, was under pressure from his Minister of Finance, Mr. Patsalides, and put it to Oliver whether Britain could pay the Cypriot Government the sum of £10 million.⁶⁰ In his message to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the High Commissioner recognised that the future of the Sovereign Base Areas and the Retained Sites depended "ultimately on the goodwill of the Cyprus Government".⁶¹

56 TNA: CAB 148/131, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Britain pays £1 million per annum for certain services and facilities and TNA: AIR 20/12691, 'Cyprus – Financial Claims for Facilities, November 1974'.

57 TNA: CAB 148/13, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 14 December 1973.

58 Originally, Britain retained thirty-four sites on Cyprus, but by 1973, these had been reduced to seventeen, the others having been handed over to the Republic of Cyprus. Information on the Retained Sites is contained within the Treaty of Establishment which was signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960 as part of Cyprus' independence agreement and is cited in full by Nicolas Macris (2003) in *The 1960 Treaties on Cyprus and Selected Subsequent Acts*, Mannheim and Moehnssee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 24, Bibliopolis, pp. 18-123.

59 TNA: FCO 46/1017, 'Importance of Military Facilities in Cyprus to the UK', WSC6/548/4, Note by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 September 1973.

60 TNA: DEFE 11/729, 'Defence Review: Cyprus', Stephen Oliver to Under-Secretary Southern European Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Charles Wiggin, 13 May 1974. The letter was written by Prime Minister Harold Wilson on 20 April 1974.

61 TNA: DEFE 11/729, 'Defence Review: Cyprus', British High Commissioner Stephen Oliver to Under Secretary at the Southern European Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Charles Wiggin, 13 May 1974.

We now know that prior to Labour's return to government, a paper was prepared proposing annual payments of up to £2.5 million from April 1974 to March 1980 as well as a retrospective sum of £10 million which was to be paid to the Cyprus Government. This changed following the general election in February. Once Wilson committed himself to the defence review, it would have been unwise for Britain to commit itself to facilities which it might not want to hold onto for much longer.⁶²

In 1974, Britain found itself in a situation of "unparalleled economic crisis".⁶³ To many within Whitehall, the idea of withdrawing from Cyprus was most appealing, as the annual maintenance cost of the Sovereign Base Areas amounted to £58 million. Upon closer inspection, Britain would not have saved all this money, as £35 million was being spent on local expenditure. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had already concluded that Nicosia would therefore make claims of compensation for this revenue loss in addition to the already mentioned outstanding claims.

As Britain considered approaching the European Community for help, officials within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recognised the possibility that this would upset US Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger, who attached great importance to the presence of the Sovereign Base Areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was later suggested that withdrawing from the Sovereign Base Areas would only save Britain very little money, whilst significantly damaging American interests and thereby adversely affecting the 'special relationship':

"Unless the Americans will foot the bill (which they will presumably be reluctant to do on foreign policy as well as financial grounds) we may have no alternative but to turn to the Nine."⁶⁴

In early 1974, stories began to emerge that Britain was not only contemplating withdrawing from its bases, but was considering handing them over to Washington. Consequently, Makarios gave several press interviews, in which he refuted these claims by advancing the fact that the Treaty of Establishment precluded Britain from handing over the bases to anyone other than the Republic of Cyprus.⁶⁵ The Archbishop's attempts at pacifying the left-wing press were dealt a severe blow when, in April, American marines and helicopters landed in the Sovereign Base Areas, in order to help with the Suez Canal clearance operation. Washington had requested Whitehall's agreement to this in March and Callaghan revealed that Washington unofficially also asked to station U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in the Sovereign Base Areas in a separate operation to "monitor the

62 TNA: AIR 20/12691, 'Cyprus Emergency', 'Cyprus – Financial Claims for Facilities', November 1974.

63 H. Wilson (1979) *Final Term, The Labour Government, 1974-1976*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 13.

64 The quote is from: TNA: FCO 9/1693, 'Cyprus and the EEC', Head of Planning Staff and Assistant Under-Secretary of State, J.E. Cable to Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, John Killick, 28 August 1974. In 1974, the European Economic Community comprised nine member states and was often referred to as 'the Nine'.

65 TNA: WO 386/12, 'Intelligence Summaries', 5-18 February 1974.

disengagement between Israel and Egypt". As in 1970, Britain demanded the consent of all concerned before agreeing. Foreign Secretary Callaghan told the Ministry of Defence that if the press questioned whether Britain was considering renting part of the Sovereign Base Areas to the US on a permanent basis, "we can deny this firmly on the record".⁶⁶

On 31 May 1974, the United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, announced the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli troops from the Golan Heights. Dr Kissinger had been instrumental in these negotiations and was greeted by a standing ovation in Congress when he returned from the Middle East. Damascus would not accept an official document showing restrictions on its forces deployed against Israel, which meant that the reductions of Syrian forces had to remain a secret. Kissinger told the British Ambassador in Washington, Peter Ramsbotham that reconnaissance would be needed, and that the US hoped to use Cyprus for this. An approach to Britain would be made at some point in July. Kissinger secured a secret agreement from Syrian President Assad that Damascus would not encroach over the demarcation line, and had therefore been able to assure Israel that no such attacks would be made. He had committed Washington to using its veto at the UN against any resolution condemning any retaliatory Israeli attacks, if the Syrians were to encroach. It was therefore crucial to Kissinger's authority and reputation amongst the Israelis that he was, at all times, aware of developments across the demarcation line.⁶⁷ He needed Cyprus in order to best achieve this.

Media criticism of the American presence in Cyprus, when the obvious place for their deployment in their operation was Egypt, did not relent. The conclusion reached by many observers was that:

"... from the British point of view the American presence would be a source of much needed financial aid, and from the American point of view a base from which to monitor the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean."⁶⁸

Makarios did manage to calm some of the speculation, when in a press conference on 4 May 1974, he stated that the Cyprus Government had in fact given its consent to the American presence in the Sovereign Base Areas in order to contribute to the Suez clearance operation.⁶⁹

Washington knew full well that any visible sign of her military activity on the island was undesirable and despite British denials of their presence, ensured that US personnel would not be seen wearing American uniforms.⁷⁰ The need for American access to Britain's facilities had

66 TNA: DEFE 11/729, 'Defence Review: Cyprus', doc.54, Callaghan, 1 May 1974.

67 TNA: DEFE 11/729, 'Defence Review: Cyprus', guidance tel.54, 'US military presence in the British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus', James Callaghan 'to immediate certain missions', 1 May 1974.

68 NARA: Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Security Council Files: Subject Files: 'Mediterranean Policy', memorandum from Robert Osgood, Harold Saunders and Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 27 February 1970.

69 TNA: WO 386/12, 'Intelligence Summaries', 23 April 1974-1976 May 1974.

70 NARA: RG39, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Cyprus, Defence, tel.1261, from the US Embassy in Nicosia

increased since 1960 and in 1974, CIA Director William Colby and US Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger told Kissinger at a 'British Defence Review Breakfast', that not only were the facilities on Cyprus important, they were unique. Colby explained that the intelligence facilities were crucial not just to the Eastern Mediterranean, but to the whole area and that he could not envisage how they could be replaced.⁷¹

In the summer of 1974, British policy on the Sovereign Base Areas changed dramatically, as Whitehall seriously considered a 'total withdrawal' from Cyprus. Cabinet Secretary Sir John Hunt has since revealed that the starting point for this discussion was made by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan.⁷²

Regrettably, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the Cyprus crisis of 1974, but suffice it to say that during the summer of 1974 Turkey used a Greek-sponsored *coup d'état* against Cypriot President Makarios as a pretext to invade and ultimately occupy a third of the island, during which Callaghan's perceived frustration at Britain's military impotence and inability to adequately effect the situation without American consent, led him to believe that Britain's presence in the Sovereign Base Areas was more of a burden to Britain than an asset. Ironically, therefore, it was Britain's Foreign Secretary who now constituted the greatest threat to the continued existence of Britain's colonial footprint on Cyprus.

Following Callaghan's decision, the Defence Review Steering Committee commissioned several papers looking at the option of total withdrawal. Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) Lieutenant-General Sir David Willison was also instructed to determine what the minimum intelligence requirement in Cyprus might be upon total withdrawal.⁷³ One conclusion was that the Sovereign Base Areas were "more a liability than an asset" and that Cyprus' military importance was declining. On 23 August Callaghan exclaimed: "I see no future in Cyprus for us ... So, let's not be too long about getting out". Callaghan summarised Britain's role during the 1974 Cyprus crisis as having been in a position of "responsibility without power".⁷⁴

Having observed Britain's military impotence, despite the presence of the Sovereign Base

to the State Department, 24 July 1970. On 24 August 2007, in Bangkok, Thailand, the author met with Bill Ridlinghafer, who was stationed in Akrotiri from 1974-1975, to fly one of the U-2 planes. Bill Ridlinghafer confirmed the fact that the American pilots were aware of the covert nature of their presence in the Sovereign Base Areas.

71 DNSA, KT01412, MemCons, Kissinger with Cabinet Secretary Sir John Hunt, Chief of Defence Staff Michael Carver, British Ambassador in Washington Peter Ramsbotham, US Secretary of Defence Dr Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby, 12 November 1974.

72 *The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976*, Record of a meeting at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, WSC10/14, doc:98, 1515, 8 November 1974.

73 TNA: DEFE 11/729, 'Defence Review: Cyprus', 'Value of Intelligence Collecting Facilities in Cyprus', doc:E24, No.7155/6, Secretary/CNS, 5 June 1974.

74 *Southern Flank in Crisis*, Record of a meeting of Heads of Mission, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, WSC3/548/3, doc:89, 10 September 1974.

Areas, withdrawing Britain from its prominent position appeared the most advisable next step.⁷⁵ On 5 September 1974 the Cabinet was presented with the Committee's findings and four days later the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee agreed that Britain's:

"Preferred course would be the total withdrawal of [British] forces from Cyprus which should, if possible, be presented in the context of a satisfactory settlement to the Cyprus Problem."⁷⁶

The withdrawal was to be completed by 31 March 1976.⁷⁷ Wilson knew that any decision on Cyprus could only be made in the context of Britain's relationship with the US in the intelligence field. In August, Wilson had told the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee to consider how a total withdrawal from Cyprus would affect Anglo-American relations.⁷⁸ Callaghan also acknowledged that a serious discussion with Washington was needed, adding that:

"... if the Americans attached importance to the continuance of our intelligence facilities in Cyprus a way might be found for them to help in meeting the cost."⁷⁹

Wilson flew to Washington to discuss Britain's plans with Kissinger and US Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger. Kissinger strongly opposed a withdrawal from Cyprus and did not feel it would help achieve a political settlement. Washington made it very clear to Britain that for political reasons it would not agree to a British withdrawal from Cyprus. Concerned with the West's declining influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Kissinger was anxious for Britain to retain her 'strategic nuclear deterrent' in Cyprus.⁸⁰

The role played by Washington, especially Dr Kissinger, in forcing British foreign and defence policy to re-evaluate the situation with reference to American interests, is quite

75 *Ibid.*

76 *The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976*, Draft paper by Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence, Sir G. Arthur, DP 13/441/1, 'The Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus', WSC10/14, doc.82, 20 August 1974.

77 TNA: CAB 148/145, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, note by the Secretary, 18 October 1974.

78 TNA: CAB 148/145, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 1 August 1974.

79 TNA: CAB 148/145, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 9 September 1974.

80 TNA: CAB 148/145, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 'Bilateral Consultations', 14 November 1974 and TNA: CAB 164/333, 'UK Forces in Cyprus': E. Broadbent, Ministry of Defence, to D. Maitland, 1 November 1968: Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent, in relation to Cyprus, consisted of a squadron of Canberra aircraft. These had tactical nuclear capability, were affiliated to the Central Treaty Organisation and were stationed at Akrotiri. Between January and March 1968, the Canberra force was replaced with Vulcan aircraft. For an account of the defence review's 1974 assessment of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent, see: TNA: DEFE 69/464, 'Nuclear Matters: Defence Review, 1974', Doc. E29, loose minute, 18 November 1974, DUS (P) to Secretary of State, 'Defence Review: Strategic Nuclear Deterrent', attached is 'Note by the Cabinet Office', 'The Strategic Nuclear Deterrent', 15 November 1974 and doc.4, '1974 Defence Review – Nuclear Weapons', 15 May 1974, ACNS, P. 144/10, attached in 'Nuclear Matters, Part I, The UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, The Present UK Polaris Force'.

astounding.⁸¹ In November, Callaghan informed Kissinger of Britain's decision not to withdraw from Cyprus:

"We shall not in present circumstances proceed with our preferred policy of withdrawing from the Sovereign Base Areas altogether ... The fact that the US Administration and you personally attach such importance to our presence in Cyprus ... was the determining consideration."

Callaghan added that he was "not entirely happy" about this, as in the recent Cyprus crisis, the Sovereign Base Areas had been a complicating factor:

"... as you know, I have been unhappy about my position of responsibility without power. I hope this outcome will give you satisfaction and the feeling that, in matters of this sort, we continue to give full weight to the views and interests of the US wherever we can, even at some cost, [sic] be reconciled with our own."⁸²

1975-1978

Be that as it may, less than six months later, officials within the Ministry of Defence were advocating a reduction of a third of Britain's expenditure *vis-à-vis* the Sovereign Bases whilst maintaining that complete withdrawal should remain Britain's preferred policy.⁸³ A Ministry of Defence document from 1976 confirms that despite Callaghan's decision to yield to Washington's wishes in 1974, the Ministry of Defence's planning continued to be, "unknown to the Americans and contrary to FCO advice", based on the assumption that Britain would withdraw from Cyprus by 1979. Provision was made for the possibility that should the political circumstances not be conducive to such a move, withdrawal could be postponed until 1981.⁸⁴

Not only did Britain plan to withdraw by 1979, but the Ministry of Defence's 'Long Term Costing' had made no financial provision for a British presence after 31 March 1979.⁸⁵ "No hint"

81 TNA: DEFE 68/90, 'Cyprus Policy after the Defence Review', brief for the visit of US Defence Secretary Dr Schlesinger from 24-26 September 1975, by Howard Banks.

82 *The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976*, letter from Callaghan to Kissinger, tel.2427, Callaghan to Britain's Ambassador in Washington, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, 'Defence Review: Cyprus', WSC10/14, doc.101, 26 November 1974.

83 TNA: DEFE 13/1085 'Defence Review: Consultation with Allies, 1975-1976', Doc.9, from A.P. Hockaday, DUS (P) Ministry of Defence to Roy Mason, Secretary of State for Defence, 14 February 1975, 'The Defence Review – Consultation with Allies', attached draft Overseas Policy and Defence Paper, OPD (75), 'Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence'.

84 TNA: DEFE 68/373 'Cyprus – Policy', doc.11/2, 353/14, William John Anthony Wilberforce, head of the Defence Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Richard Adam Sykes, Superintending Under Secretary, Defence Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Future British Military Commitment in Cyprus', 16 July 1976.

85 TNA: DEFE 68/373 'Cyprus – Policy', doc.E4, R.K. Guy, Brigadier, Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of

should be given that Britain might one day withdraw, were the instructions sent out by the Ministry of Defence.⁸⁶ Further, by the end of 1976, the planned rundown of forces, as stipulated by the Defence Review, had been completed, which meant that expenditure in Cyprus was now at a minimum necessary to protect the Sovereign Base Areas and to support the intelligence facilities in their present scale.⁸⁷

Although the completed rundown had saved a considerable amount of the former expense, the annual cost of maintaining the Sovereign Bases remained at around £42 million a year.⁸⁸ This prompted officials within the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office to suggest, that although the American stance on withdrawal was unlikely to have changed, the issue of cost should be raised with Washington.⁸⁹ On 5 October 1976 officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Treasury met in the office of Sir John Hunt, Secretary of the Cabinet. This meeting was prompted by a draft Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Defence and Overseas Policy Committee paper which impelled Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Dr David Owen to support the idea of approaching the US. The meeting concluded with the decision to promote discussions with Washington and that these should not centre on Britain's financial difficulties but on the possibility of a political settlement on Cyprus and its consequences for the Sovereign Base Areas.⁹⁰

Four months later Dr David Owen presented the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee with two papers outlining Britain's long-position on the Sovereign Base Areas. These included the possibility of relocating the intelligence gathering facilities in Cyprus and whether the territory that would be given up in such a move could be used in securing a political settlement on the

Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, 'Cyprus – Future UK Military Commitment', attached 'Draft, Letter to [Anthony Crosland], the Foreign Secretary', Attachment 2, TO 2032/4, 15 June 1976.

86 TNA: DEFE 68/373 'Cyprus – Policy', doc.E3, Miss M.S. Wilkin, Defence Secretariat Division II, responsible for overseas defence policy, draft answers, note for supplementaries and background note, PQ4724B, 'Background Note', 7 June 1976.

87 TNA: FCO 9/2500 'Cyprus: Annual Review for 1976', Diplomatic Report No.106/77, WSC 014/1, from the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Donald McDonald Gordon, to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, 4 January 1977.

88 TNA: DEFE 71/260 'Sovereign Base Area Administration – Military Policy – Joint US/UK Study on the future of the Sovereign Base Areas', doc.E37, paper from the Ministry of Defence 'Cyprus: The Military and Financial Implications of a Reduced British Presence', Annex to a letter from Philip Adams, Chief Officer, Sovereign Base Area Administration, Episkopi to Assistant Secretary Edward Pendlebury, Head of S4 (Air), Ministry of Defence, 14 June 1977.

89 TNA: DEFE 68/373 'Cyprus – Policy', doc.E25, 449/14, Clive Whitmore, Assistant Under Secretary (Defence Staff), 'Cyprus: Review of the Long-Term Position in the Sovereign Base Areas', attached is OPD (76), Cabinet, Defence and Overseas Policy, 'Cyprus: HMG's Long-term Position in the Sovereign Base Areas', Memorandum by the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, 7 September 1976.

90 TNA: DEFE 11/916 'Cyprus: Policy/Defence Review', doc.E78, Note of a meeting held in Secretary of the Cabinet Sir John Hunt's room, Cabinet Office, 'Cyprus: Retention of the Sovereign Base Areas', 5 October 1976, 4.30 pm.

island. Almost simultaneously, the Chiefs of Staff presented British Prime Minister James Callaghan, at his request, with a paper outlining the fact that there were no overriding military reasons preventing Britain's withdrawal from Cyprus and that the current military presence was maintained to ensure the continued supply of information which Britain:

“... derives from its intelligence relationship with the US, the intelligence obtained on Cyprus being our major contribution to reciprocal arrangement with the US.”⁹¹

As Britain needed to obtain “American agreement or acquiescence to any withdrawal”, the visit at the end of February of Clark Clifford, President Carter's special emissary to the Eastern Mediterranean, to London presented Whitehall with the perfect opportunity of broaching the subject. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland was instructed to inform Clifford that Britain's preferred policy remained the complete withdrawal from Cyprus and that if Britain were to stay “in all or part of the Sovereign Base Areas we would look for an American monetary contribution to our costs”. Crosland communicated the first point, but “no mention of a US financial contribution was made”. In a subsequent meeting between Dr Owen, who had now replaced Anthony Crosland as British Foreign Secretary and his American counterpart Cyrus Vance, it was agreed to hold Anglo-American talks, which would proceed from the standpoint of which intelligence facilities in Cyprus the Americans deemed essential.⁹²

The talks were scheduled to take place in June, and in preparation a steering brief was drafted to ensure:

“... that nobody on the British side forgets that what the talks with the Americans are all about is money and that the origin of the proposal to approach the Americans was the need to relieve the growing pressures on the defence budget which the cost of the Cyprus commitment was imposing”.

Britain's aims were:

“... to find ways and means of achieving maximum reduction in the cost to ourselves of maintaining our presence in Cyprus [and] if we cannot withdraw, to secure a substantial American contribution to the cost of the continuing British presence.”⁹³

91 TNA: DEFE 71/260 'Sovereign Base Area Administration – Military Policy – Joint US/UK Study on the future of the Sovereign Base Areas', doc.E59, 'Future policy towards Cyprus', from B.M. Norbury, Assistant Secretary, Head of Defence Secretariat Division I2 (responsible for NATO policy and strategy as well as overseas defence policy), Ministry of Defence, attached doc.E57, 'Background', Defence and Overseas Policy Papers 77(4) and (5), 16 December 1977.

92 *Ibid.*

93 TNA: DEFE 71/260 'Sovereign Base Area Administration – Military Policy – Joint US/UK Study on the future of the Sovereign Base Areas', doc.E41, from Clive Whitmore Assistant Under Secretary of Staff, Head of Defence Secretariat Division II, Ministry of Defence to the Secretary of State 'The Future of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas', Defence and Overseas Policy (77), 13, 22 June 1977.

By now the Americans had been made aware of the fact that Britain wanted a financial contribution and Washington had already made it clear to Prime Minister Callaghan, during his visit to the US in March, that they were “not happy about the idea”. As a result of which the steering brief advocated that Britain commence the negotiations with an opening bid at two-thirds of the cost, with the hope of obtaining Britain’s desired target of 50 per cent.⁹⁴

The concept of Britain retaining sovereignty over a territory which the US financially contributes to in exchange for its use is certainly not an unprecedented scenario in the history of the ‘special relationship’. In the 1960s, Britain and the US negotiated a 70-year lease (with a 50-year opt-out) for Diego Garcia, an island in the middle of the Indian Ocean, in exchange for a discount on Polaris nuclear submarines which Britain purchased from the US. As a result, the island remains ‘British only in name’ whilst the 3,000 American military personnel stationed on Diego Garcia have turned the island into a sprawling US military base.⁹⁵ The talks which could have created a ‘Diego Garcia-type’ arrangement on Cyprus began in June 1977.

As Britain had tried to focus attention away from its financial difficulties by focusing on the possibility of using the bases in conjunction with a political solution, this was the issue first addressed. The US delegation revealed that it could not “foresee circumstances in which the surrender of all or part of the Sovereign Base Areas to the Cypriots would be a helpful gesture towards a peaceful settlement in Cyprus”. Whilst the possibility of modest reductions following a settlement was conceded, Washington warned that any attempt at reduction in advance of a settlement would have destabilising political consequences.

On the issue of cost sharing, Washington initially stated that they would “seriously consider” it, as the loss of the facilities on Cyprus would have a serious irreparable impact on intelligence. It was later believed that this was done in the context of a letter written by the US Secretary of Defence Dr Harold Brown to his British counterpart, Fred Mulley in April, during which he declared that the US wished to extend the capability of an intelligence gathering facility jointly operated by the US and Britain, parts of which were located in each of the bases, called COBRA SHOE OTHR. Dr Brown made it clear that the US was prepared to finance this project, but as it would commit Britain to a presence in Cyprus beyond 1979, the British response was that the subject should be discussed during the June talks. The subject was never raised.

Ultimately, Washington’s response, taken at the ‘highest level’, to Britain’s cost sharing proposal was negative. Reports later picked up by the Ministry of Defence from Washington, suggested that the US Intelligence Agencies were ‘extremely reluctant’ to make a financial contribution and that it was thought that the greatest opposition to the idea came from the Pentagon.⁹⁶

94 *Ibid.*

95 *The Times*, ‘Analysis: beautiful Diego Garcia makes forces blush’, by Robert Beeston, Foreign Editor, 21 February 2008.

96 TNA: DEFE 71/260 ‘Sovereign Base Area Administration – Military Policy – Joint US/UK Study on the

Despite the obvious disappointment at this negative outcome, just a few months later, Britain's Foreign Secretary was receiving advice from high ranking officials in the Ministry of Defence that although Britain would have to accept the US response as final, the door needed to be kept open for future discussions. Nonetheless, it was finally accepted that, realistically, it would not be possible to implement the 1974 Defence Review proposal of a complete withdrawal from Cyprus and that Britain now needed to make, for the time being, financial provisions for the next five years.⁹⁷

Over thirty years later, Britain still retains its colonial footprint in Cyprus in the shape of the Sovereign Base Areas. The extent to which this remains an obligation to Washington and whether the US does now financially contribute to the continued existence of the Sovereign Base Areas will remain a matter for speculation until the relevant documents become available. However, according to the documents that have been released and declassified in the British and US National Archives, what we can now deduce is that Britain wanted to withdraw from Cyprus in 1974, continued to advocate a policy of complete withdrawal until 1977, and that it was American insistence which ensured they did not, exemplifying the extent to which Whitehall allowed British defence policy to be dictated and subjected to pressures from across the Atlantic.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

The National Archives (TNA), Kew, United Kingdom:

- AIR 2 Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Papers accumulated by the Air Historical Branch.
- CAB 130 *Ad hoc* Committee of the Cabinet.
- CAB 148 Cabinet Office: Defence and Overseas Policy Committees.
- CAB 164 Cabinet Office: Subject (Theme Series).
- CO 926 Colonial Office: Mediterranean Department.
- DEFE 4 Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes.
- DEFE 11 Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files.
- DEFE 13 Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files.
- DEFE 68 Ministry of Defence: Central Staffs: Registered Files and Branch Folders.
- DEFE 69 Ministry of Defence (Navy): Registered Files and Branch Folders.

Future of the Sovereign Base Areas', doc.E59, 'Future Policy towards Cyprus', from B.M. Norbury, Assistant Secretary, Head of Defence Secretariat Division I2 (responsible for NATO policy and strategy as well as overseas defence policy), Ministry of Defence, attached doc.E57, 'Background', Defence and Overseas Policy Papers 77(4) and (5), 16 December 1977.

97 TNA: DEFE 71/260 'Sovereign Base Area Administration – Military Policy – Joint US/UK Study on the Future of the Sovereign Base Areas', 'Cyprus: British Policy and Military Commitments', Defence and Overseas Policy (77) 34, doc.E63, from Desmond Bryars, Assistant Under Secretary (Defence Staff) to the Secretary of State, 22 December 1977.

- DEFE 71 Ministry of Defence (Air): Registered Files and Branch Folders.
 FCO 9 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
 FCO 46 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Defence Department and successors: Registered Files.
 FO 371 Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966.
 PREM 15 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers.
 WO 386 War Office and Ministry of Defence: Headquarters Middle East and successors: Records.

**National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),
 Archives II, College Park, Maryland, United States:**

- (a) Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1970-1973, Political and Defence, Cyprus.
 (b) Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Defence, Cyprus.
 (c) Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political and Defence, Cyprus.

Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, at Archives II, College Park, Maryland

- National Security Council Files, Subject Files, (Mediterranean).

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

- White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records 1952-1961.

Other

- *The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976* (2006) Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume IV, edited by Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon. New York: Routledge.

Newspapers: (Newspaper Library, Colindale, London)

- *The Times*.

Memoirs

Wilson, H. (1979) *Final Term, The Labour Government, 1974-1976*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Unpublished Primary Sources

Digital National Security Archive:

- Cyprus Crisis, Kissinger Transcripts, A verbatim record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977, Memorandum of Conversation, 5 October 1973 – 26 October 1976.

State Department, Foreign Relations of the US (FRUS):

- *Eisenhower Administration*: FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII Near East: Multilateral Relations; Iran; Iraq (1992) and 1958-1960 Vol. X, Part I: incl. Cyprus.
- *Johnson Administration*: FRUS, 1964-1968 Vol. XVI, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey.
- *Nixon/Ford Administration*: FRUS, 1969-1972 Vol. XXIV, Eastern Mediterranean.
- *Nixon/Ford Administration*: FRUS, 1973-1976 Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey.

Oral History

From Frontline Diplomacy: *The US Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection*, eds. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, CD-Rom, Arlington, VA: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 2000:

- William Chase interviewed by Charles Kennedy, 24 July 1990.

Books

- Asmussen, J. (2008) *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Carver, M. (1992) *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945*. London: Hutchinson.
- Chrysostomides, K. (2000) *The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law*. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Darwin, J. (1988) *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war Period*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dickie, J. (1994) *'Special' No More, Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Dockrill, S. (2002) *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez*. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.
- Faustmann, H. and Peristianis, N. (2006) *Britain in Cyprus, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878-2006*. Mannheim and Moehensee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis.
- Henn, F. (2004) *A Business of Some Heat: The United Nations Force in Cyprus before and during the 1974 Turkish Invasion*. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.
- Macris, N. (2003) *The 1960 Treaties on Cyprus and Selected Subsequent Acts*. Mannheim and Moehensee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 24, Bibliopolis.
- Nicolet, C. (2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*. Mannheim and Moehensee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 9, Bibliopolis.
- O'Malley, B. and Craig, I. (2004) *The Cyprus Conspiracy, America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Stephens, R. (1972) *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Vali, F. (1972) *The Turkish Straits and NATO*. California: Hoover Institution Press.
- Weinland, R. (1972) 'Soviet Transits of the Turkish Straits: 1945-1970 – An historical note on the establishment and dimensions of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean', *Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses*, Professional Paper No. 94, 14 April 1972.

Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus

GIANFABRIZIO LADINI*

Abstract

Peacebuilding is the political action which aims to promote the development of peaceful structures of social interaction after wars and conflicts. As such it deals with long-term processes and involves complex dynamics and a wide range of agencies, each of them with its own specific strengths and shortcomings. The paper begins by examining briefly the way peacebuilding ideas have emerged in the international system and especially in the United Nations, intended both as an international organisation and as the international institutional framework where the problems of war and conflict are tackled. An historical account of the changing nature of warfare, the emergence of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the related involvement of civil society agencies in international peace efforts is provided, along with a relevant theoretical framework developed by the World Bank. Cyprus is then cited as a case in point for the traditional form of UN peace operations and the role played by civil society peacebuilding. UNFICYP is examined and Cypriot civil society peacebuilding introduced. Finally, the 'Home for Cooperation' project is presented as a noteworthy development which deserves local and international monitoring, support and involvement.

Keywords: Conflict analysis, Peacebuilding, International affairs, Civil society, Cyprus conflict, UNFICYP, Peacebuilding in Cyprus, Cypriot civil society, 'Home for Cooperation'

Introduction

The complex phenomena of war and violent conflict have impacted on human societies since the beginning of time. Far from stopping with mere ceasefire agreements, violent conflicts are typically used to foster social norms and structures that are able to protract the conflict after armed clashes

*

I would like to thank members of the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research, and especially Chara Makriyianni, Charis Psaltis, Marios Epaminondas and Stavroula Philippou. A first version of this paper was written as part of my work with them and with their support. I am also grateful to Stephanie Polycarpou for our discussions on the Cyprus problem and to Christina McRoy and two reviewers at *The Cyprus Review* for the time they gave to an earlier draft of this paper. It goes without saying that I bear sole responsibility for any errors the reader may find.

have passed, thus hindering conflict resolution possibilities and peaceful social changes to take effect. History, nevertheless, shapes human societies but it is also shaped by them: past actions and interactions influence the context where we live but our living actions and interactions are what mould the future form it will come to embrace.¹ Ultimately, the past and the future are what we make of them and there is always the possibility of focusing on a conflicting past of enmity, painful thought it may be, in order to build a peaceful and shared future.

Peacebuilding is commonly intended as a political action which aims to promote self-sustainable peaceful structures of social interaction in conflict-affected contexts. Hence, its goals and ideals involve long-term social and institutional changes that cannot be viewed in isolation from other types of conflict resolution efforts. Peace actions and initiatives are undertaken by different actors, groups and organisations, each with its own peculiarities, resources and shortcomings too. International organisations, individual states, non-governmental organisations, business groups and ordinary citizens alike act individually or in cooperation, and sometimes in conflict, with others, while the effectiveness of their networks and interventions is far from predictable in the changing circumstances that generally shape conflicts. Building peace, in sum, involves complex phenomena and dynamics in much the same way as making war does.

Although peace efforts are not confined to the UN system and agencies, with their distinctive potentials and constraints, the UN is perhaps the most relevant player on the field. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005, pp. 326-327) argue, “the UN remains a hybrid organization, reflecting the coexisting aspects of the international collectivity: At the same time an instrument manipulated by the great powers, a forum for the mutual accommodation of state interests, and a repository of cosmopolitan values”. As such, the UN still retains its specific reservoir of legitimacy and integrative power in the international and global community. “That is why most of those engaged in conflict resolution see the United Nations as the essential institutional global framework for the realization of conflict resolution goals” (p. 327). It provides the reason for this analysis in relation to the way peacebuilding ideas have developed throughout the history of the UN as an international organisation and as an international forum, more generally, where the problems of war and peace are tackled in one way or other.

1 See Brown (2000) for some socio-psychological perspectives of the processes taking place within and between groups. It provides good insight into the ways that social norms emerge, structure and evolve. It also deals with conflict dynamics. Berger and Luckman (1966) focus on the social phenomena of transmission and construction of knowledge. See Schutz (1960) for a more philosophical account of the ways individuals are shaped by their social context in addition to how they shape it as well. See also Hayek (1973) for an analysis of the social norms’ often unintended evolution through individual actions and group interactions. Using the ‘game theory’ framework, Axelrod (1984) and Taylor (1987) show how cooperative norms of interaction can evolve out of intercourse between rational egoist players. Axelrod, for instance, applies his model in explaining cooperative norms that emerged on World War I battlefields between groups of enemy soldiers.

In light of the changing nature of war, a brief account is given here as background to the rules and practice of UN interventions in armed conflicts. It is pinpointed, however, that social changes on a longer-term level are simply not in the mandate or in the culture of traditional UN peacekeeping, neither are they a proper matter for international concern. Although this article will not examine the evolution of UN peacekeeping through its so-called 'first', 'second' and 'third generations' (*ibid.*, pp. 132-158; Arielli and Scotto, 2003, pp. 140-148; Durch, 1993), it will follow the emergence of peacebuilding ideas within the UN system until the recent establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The difference between *keeping* and *building* peace has prompted the UN to involve civil society actors in its peace operations – a noteworthy development for the UN as an international organisation as well as in its role as the international body coping with the problems of war and peace.

The need to understand the role that civil society agencies can play in building a sustainable peace out of conflict and war has prompted many institutions and organisations to systematically analyse the issue. One interesting attempt, published by the World Bank (2006), will be evaluated later.

Following a short account of the links between the international system and peacebuilding, with the related involvement of civil society and NGOs in peacebuilding efforts, the case of Cyprus will be examined. Assuming that readers possess sufficient knowledge of the island's recent past, and given the space constraints of this paper, the history of the Cyprus conflict or its mutual influence in current world affairs will not be covered in depth.² The mission and activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will be explored initially in order to underline its strengths and limits. It will be argued that a stronger involvement of civil society actors is needed in Cyprus to provide a peace process which is less dominated by political leadership. It will also be observed how strengthened bi-communal cooperation to enhance civil society's impact, visibility and influence on the high-level, 'track one' peace process, calls for institutionalisations and structures for bi-communal initiatives. Finally the recent bi-communal project 'Home for Cooperation' (H4C) will be introduced, suggesting that, once realised, the H4C could provide the island with a visible structure of cooperation between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and NGOs. As such the H4C might constitute both a peacebuilding means and an end in itself.

The case of Cyprus is instructive for many reasons. Together with the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine and the discord between India and Pakistan centred in the Kashmir area, Cyprus, in fact, hosts one of the world's most protracted conflicts. Analysing the Cyprus case may, therefore,

2 On current affairs in Cyprus and its links with regional, European and international politics see, for instance, International Crisis Group (2006, 2007, 2008a and 2008b); Michaletos (2007); Natali (2007a); Lindenstrauss (2008); Ker-Lindsay (2008); Pope (2008a and 2008b); Theophanous (2008); Mullen, Oguz and Kyriacou (2008).

provide useful and relevant information when studying other war-affected contexts. Indeed, the Cyprus case concurrently portrays local variables and external influences, various networked interests and escalation processes, and the connections between a local context and the broader geopolitical circumstances as they relate in conflict dynamics. The strengths and shortcomings of traditional UN peacekeeping are also highlighted and may indicate the absolute relevance of local civil society agencies in any reliable peacebuilding effort. Additionally, as much as international actors and dynamics have been crucial for Cyprus, the island may be of special importance in trying to solve some of the problems affecting international society.

United Nations and Peacebuilding

UN involvement in peacebuilding efforts is considered in this section. In order to provide an account of changing responses to the ever evolving climate in which contemporary wars take place, a synopsis of the historical context that led to the formation of UN peacebuilding is presented.

The Historical Context

The United Nations was created following the demise of the League of Nations and its failure to prevent the eruption of violent conflicts, i.e. the outbreak of World War II. The general aims of the new international organisation, as envisaged in its *Charter* (1945) 'Preamble', were "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".

Notwithstanding these wide ideals and the juridical provisions set in the *Charter's* articles, the adversarial decades shaping Cold War geopolitics made it difficult for the UN to fulfil its promises and to act independently from the two blocks rivalry and the related possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Moreover, the UN system began life as an intergovernmental body according to international law, which at that time was clearly rooted – particularly before developments in the human rights jurisprudence – in the primacy of the state as the sovereign source of international juridical obligations. The constraints established by the Cold War and the primacy of state sovereignty in international law posed serious limits to the UN's flexibility and effectiveness. Limitations also led the UN involvement in peace operations to follow a narrow vision of action under strict conditions of intervention.³ The practice of UN peacekeeping was not

3 The 2006 document published by the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations [www.challengesforum.org] provides an easy and brief overview of some developments of UN peace operations.

clearly stated in the *Charter* and was introduced in 1948 like a pragmatic instrument for conflict management. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was mainly limited to maintaining ceasefires between regular forces so that efforts could be made at intergovernmental level to resolve the conflict by more peaceful means. The guiding principles for UN involvement in peace operations were the consent of the parties involved, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. There is a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing as envisaged under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN *Charter*, which does not require the consent of the main conflict parties. The role for more active peacebuilding was marginal, if present at all.

These guiding principles still hold today but their application has evolved in response to the shifting geopolitical context with the demise of the Cold War and the fluid nature of violent conflicts. On one hand the end of the Cold War opened new opportunities as well as challenges for peace and security in the global arena, but on the other hand the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new type of warfare that was neither understandable nor manageable according to the traditional patterns of interstate wars, as structured in international law and affairs since the seventeenth century in Europe.⁴

The decolonisation process, the end of the Cold War and the globalising markets have indeed paved the way for armed conflicts which rather than being fought between states and national armies, are waged within a state's territory between different armed groups. Moreover, in the new wars the civilian population is the main victim and target. Kaldor (1999) notes that, whereas during World War I the ratio between civilian and military victims was 1:8, in World War II the ratio was about 50:50 – now it is 8:1. Although these wars clearly involve ethnic variables, the “ethnic hatred” seems to be caused and shaped by existing conflict dynamics, rather than causing and shaping them. Although hatred and violence are often intentionally organised by local actors interested in presenting the conflict along ethnic identity lines in order to gain local and international acknowledgement as leaders of the ethnic group, external actors may well be interested in fostering a “divide and rule” policy, thereby fomenting mistrust and conflict to retain control over a territory's population or resources.

Contemporary warfare peculiarities are also shaped by the global context of the world

4 See Vasquez (1993) for an analysis of interstate war from the modern age onwards, with some related suggestions on the ways to handle it by more peaceful means. Schmitt (1950) provides a deep insight into the relations between political dynamics, wars and procedures, rules and laws that emerged in modern age Europe and have since then spread internationally. One of these rules, perhaps the most basic one, is the formal and mutual recognition of sovereignty rights as the legal ground of the international community of states. Black (2004) tackles the history of warfare after World War II. Kaldor (1999) addresses the distinctions between the traditional form of warfare and the ‘new wars’, taking especially into consideration the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Istituto Geografico DeAgostini (2005) and (2008) are very useful, clear and updated textbooks about current violent conflicts. See Duffield (2001) for an interesting viewpoint on the relations between global governance and new wars.

economy, where the marketing of local resources and arms procurement takes place. The end of the Cold War and of the superpowers' rivalry certainly diminished interests in the controlling of local conflicts. It severed the political and financial involvement of the USA, the Soviet Union and the former blocs that were previously able to freeze existing conflicts by arming and supporting one of the parties. Once this external patronage was no longer available, then striving for control of the local economy, population and resources became a fund raising strategy used by warring parties to forge flexible links with opportunities provided by current globalising markets and commercial networks. Warfare, then, becomes a worthy economic enterprise, with violence against the civilian population being its mode of accumulation in order to acquire the commodities that global markets demand. As an example, Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord, was able to make \$400 million per year during the 1992-1996 war (Berdal and Malone, 2000a, p. 5).

In environments where political and economic agendas become intimately linked, war transforms not only the "continuation of politics with other means" – as Clausewitz said – but also reshapes economics, providing pecuniary interests in fighting on instead of approaching the negotiation table sooner.⁵

Changing Context and Changing Response

Intrastate violent conflicts involving many different interests, actors, war economies, conditions and implications provide a far more complex situation than an external intervention does in a traditional interstate war. Under these conditions peace efforts require more tangled strategies than simple interpositions of military forces and observers.⁶

The shortcomings of traditional UN peace operations were brought to the fore, recognised, and tackled by the UN system in the 1990s. Intrastate wars constitute the overwhelming majority of post-Cold War and contemporary violent conflicts. And as a result UN peacekeeping operations have become more intricate and broader in scope but without the tools to effectively address this new reality. This paved the way for many failures that have damaged the UN's image and credibility, i.e. in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, where the Blue Helmets did not prevent

5 The wars in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Peru, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Aceh (Indonesia), Sudan, Nigeria or Nepal present some common features that make them different from the traditional type of interstate war. See Berdal and Malone (2000a and 2000b) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) for the contemporary civil wars' political economy. See Gobbi (2004) for viewpoints and analysis on the relations between globalisation, conflicts and security.

6 As the war was changing, so did international law. "As non-international armed conflicts has become the dominant form of conflict", Cerone (2006, p. 232) observes, "so has the law applicable to non international conflicts been expanded through the practice of international criminal courts. Similarly, challenged by the increasing consolidation of power in the hands of non state actors, international criminal law has extended its reach to regulate their conduct".

bloodshed and ethnic cleansing. These cases have urged the rethinking of UN doctrines, strategies and operations.

In 1992 the UN Security Council asked the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to prepare “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peace-making and for peace-keeping” (Statement by the President of the Security Council, 31 January 1992). Following this invitation, Boutros-Ghali developed a report titled *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping* (1992) where, amongst other things, he dealt with ‘post-conflict peace-building’ (pt. VI), and suggested the close relationship between all dimensions for a successful UN operation: “peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” (par. 55). In 1995, on the occasion of the UN’s fiftieth anniversary, the Secretary General presented another report to specify and better define some ideas already introduced in *Agenda for Peace*. In *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* the idea of peacebuilding is tackled again (parr. 47-56) and defined as

“comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal or informal processes of political participation”.

In the 2000 systematic report known as *Brahimi Report* – named after the Chairman of the Panel on UN Peace Operations – the role of peacebuilding is addressed as a crucial element in contemporary conflict resolution and a fundamental UN deficiency.⁷ This *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000) represents a systematic attempt to analyse the changing context in which the UN peace work gave rise to patent limits and many failures during the 1990s. Suggesting the close relationships between development and conflict prevention and arguing again about the complementarity of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in complex operations (parr. 25-47), the report advocates the involvement of local actors in self-sustainable peacebuilding efforts, taking into account human rights and national reconciliation issues. The

7 It is very interesting to note that the *Brahimi Report* cites the case of Cyprus as an example of these UN shortcomings in peace operations. The report states that “traditional peace-keeping, which treats symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan)” (par. 17).

final recommendation regarding peacebuilding is “to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies” (par. 47d).

The need for a single intergovernmental agency with clear cut peacebuilding objectives and coordination functions was explicitly addressed in the 2004 UN Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (*A more secure world*, par. 221-230), that requested a UN Peacebuilding Commission to be established to fill this institutional gap (par. 261-269) These arguments and calls were raised again in the 2005 Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan titled *In larger freedom*, where the Peacebuilding Commission proposal is strongly endorsed in order to “effectively address the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace” (par. 114). Kofi Annan began to effectively operationalise the idea of the Peacebuilding Commission with the related involvement of civil society actors in peacebuilding efforts. By encouraging reports, conferences and summits, this idea was spread and gained support. The report was published on 21 March 2005, and on 20 September, a *Statement by the President of the Security Council* was issued underlining the role and potentialities “a vibrant and diverse civil society” could perform in conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes and national reconciliation attempts. “A well functioning civil society”, it stated, “has the advantage of specialized knowledge, capabilities, experience, links with key constituencies, influence and resources, which can assist parties to conflict to achieve peaceful solution to disputes”. A proper civil society involvement, it further underscored, can provide leadership, positively influence public opinion and perform an important bridge building function for reconciliation efforts.

Finally, on 20 December 2005, the Security Council (*Resolution 1645*) and the General Assembly (*Resolution 60/180*) adopted similar, concurrent resolutions establishing a new UN Peacebuilding Commission to marshal resources at the disposal of the international community and to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery. Attention would be focused on countries emerging from conflict or reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development; coordination would be promoted among all actors within and outside the UN system involved in assisting the recovery of a country.⁸ The Peacebuilding Commission was set up as an intergovernmental advisory body to work in cooperation with other UN agencies as well as international financial institutions. Furthermore, both resolutions stressed that local civil society organisations’ involvement would be crucial to any reliable and sustainable peacebuilding effort. This was worded in general terms without specifying the operational details of participants. Hawkins Wyeth (2006, pp. 3-4), in the report on the conference “Getting the Peacebuilding Commission off the ground – How to include civil society on the ground” (New York, 5

8 See Hufner (2007) for a more detailed analysis of the Peacebuilding Commission development, structure, functions and shortcomings.

September 2006), noted that “the principal stakeholders in post-conflict peacebuilding are the citizens of the state in question, and their perception of gaps are a valid barometer as to whether progress is taking root. (...) A crucial role of the Peacebuilding Commission will be to ensure that national actors have sufficient space for dialogue and priority-setting processes to take place. Civil society – and particularly organisations with deep ties to local communities – has a crucial role to play in ensuring that citizens are included in these processes”.

On 25 July 2007 the Commission published its *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its first session* that summed up the activities undertaken, the work with its first target countries (Burundi and Sierra Leone) and the challenges for future improvements. It is perhaps too soon to properly assess the strengths, weaknesses and initial results of the Peacebuilding Commission, not least because peacebuilding itself is a long-term activity. It also seems premature to propose scenarios on ways that civil society organisations might be involved in peacebuilding activities within the international system. Whereas peace efforts actually take place in the broad global context – of which the international system and the UN play a part – if the various actors, strategies and activities are able to coordinate to a greater extent, the more effective they could prove to be in the pursuit of shared goals.

This overview shows that the international system, and notably the UN, has gradually come to recognise the positive role of civil society organisations in any feasible and sustainable prospect of conflict transformation in war-torn societies. This fact may authorise a quiet reliable optimism, offering something concrete whereupon further improvements might be built. The next step is to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of civil society organisations and indicate how instrumental they might be in contributing to peace efforts. These issues are discussed in the next section.

Peacebuilding and Civil Society: An Analytical Framework

As can be perceived, peacebuilding efforts involve a wide range of activities which aim at promoting structures for cooperative social interactions out of wars and conflicts. Institution building, state reforms and good governance are typical peacebuilding objectives involving state structures.⁹ There are, however, other types of action belonging to the so-called ‘peacebuilding from below’, where solutions to the root causes of conflict are proposed and built by civil society’s resources and agencies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005, ch. 9). Although state actors and international organisations may well have a role to play, local communities, associations and civil society organisations are decisive players at the grassroot level of peacebuilding work by providing local knowledge, leadership and networks.

As mentioned earlier the last decade has witnessed the growing participation of NGOs and

9 See UN-DESA (2008) for state-related peacebuilding measures.

civil society organisations in peacebuilding initiatives. In recognition of this role together with the need to understand its potential and limits, the World Bank (2006) has developed an analytical framework which the author believes worthy of note. The World Bank's framework is not the only attempt to analyse systematically the relations between peacebuilding and non-governmental agencies. It is particularly interesting, however, because it is field work-oriented and constitutes a kind of working model of an authoritative international organisation in its partnerships with civil society actors. The relevancy of the World Bank's framework is twofold in a sense: while it provides a theoretical model to clarify the links between civil society and peacebuilding, with the related limits and potentials, the model is also a noteworthy attempt by a prominent international organisation to address the role of civil society actors in conflict resolution efforts. On the one hand the latter appears to constitute an appropriate evolution of the international system before the changing nature of war and violent conflicts, but on the other hand it seems apropos of conflict management actors and processes.

The report initially begins by defining the analysis' subject: "civil society", then, defines "the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values" (p. 2). A methodological choice is further clarified by arguing that a functional, rather than an actor-centred approach, helps to better analyse the potentials and shortcomings of different types of civil society actors. A framework is then built from theoretical analyses and historical cases, from which there are seven functions that civil society actors can perform in peacebuilding efforts (listed in table 1 opposite).

As every conflict is unique in terms of its particular conditions, dynamics and actors, then any kind of peacebuilding intervention must be able to tackle precise problems using specific resources. In other words, peacebuilding needs are defined by the circumstances of each conflict and, therefore, the ways to transform them are similarly context-specific, along with the types of actors used and the function they can effectively perform in a conflict resolution framework. For these reasons abstract analyses are necessary but, at the same time, they should be complemented by exact conflict contextual accounts. As far as the World Bank's framework is concerned, it provides scholars and practitioners with one such abstract analysis that helps us to clarify the role of civil society in peacebuilding efforts. As such it is useful as a working model through which to explain our understanding as well as to assess policies and initiatives on the processes in the field of conflict resolution. Like any other abstract analysis, however, its practical use stems from its utilisation in a given conflict analysis, in an attempt to understand what has already been done in specific fields and what has still to be achieved in order to improve civil society involvement in building peace.

Table 1: Seven functions of civil society peacebuilding (World Bank, 2006, p. 12)

Function	Activities	Typical actors
Protection	Protecting citizens' life, freedom and property against attacks from state and non-state actors.	Membership organisations, human rights, advocacy NGOs.
Monitoring/ early warning	Observing and monitoring the activities of government, state authorities and conflict actors. Monitoring can refer to various issues (human rights, corruption), particularly those relevant for drivers of conflict and early warning.	Think tanks, human rights NGOs, operational NGOs (in conjunction with CBOs).
Advocacy/public communication	Articulation of specific interests, especially of marginalised groups and bringing relevant issues to the public agenda. Creation of communication channels, awareness raising and public debate. Participation in official peace processes.	Advocacy organisations, independent media, think tanks, networks.
Socialisation	Formation and practice of peaceful and democratic attitudes and values among citizens, including tolerance, mutual trust and non-violent conflict resolution.	Membership organisations.
Social cohesion	Strengthening links among citizens, building bridge social capital across societal cleavages.	CBOs and other membership organisations.
Intermediation/ facilitation	Establishing relationships (communication, negotiation) to support collaboration between interest groups, institutions and the state. Facilitating dialogue and interaction. Promoting attitudinal change for a culture of peace and reconciliation.	Intermediary NGOs, CSO networks, advocacy organisations, faith-based organisations.
Service provision	Providing services to citizens or members can serve as entry points for peacebuilding, if explicitly intended.	NGOs, self-help groups.

In this spirit Cyprus will be examined as a case in point for the previous discussion. It is intended to explore the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus together with a short account of Cypriot civil society peacebuilding activities to enable the assessment of the strengths and limits of both before proposing the project 'Home for Cooperation' as a recent noteworthy development in the field of civil society peacebuilding.

The Case of Cyprus: UN Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Civil Society

The Cyprus case clearly shows the traditional form of UN peacekeeping intervention, with its strengths together with its weaknesses. In light of this it is worth examining the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in order to underline not only the benefits for the conflict resolution process but also the need for other actors, with different functions, to become involved in it. Some peacebuilding initiatives will be examined that have been carried out since the 1960s under the auspices and facilitation of the UN. More recently there has been a growing role for Cypriot civil society organisations, which have proved competent to organise joint initiatives across the north/south division of the island. The UN and international support for activities involving Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and civil society organisations followed a case-by-case logic. It consisted of a general approach rather than framing clear-cut strategies of partnership with Cypriot civil society agencies in shared peacebuilding efforts. UNFICYP facilitated and hosted bicomunal meetings and workshops in a kind of natural yet low-profile extension of its mandate, involving civil society actors in something more than only *keeping* peace but also *building* it. After exploring UN peacekeeping in Cyprus, a short account of Cypriot civil society peacebuilding is provided and at this point the 'Home for Cooperation' will be broached as a worthy innovation.

UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus

In March 1964, after increasing violence in Cyprus between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of the UNFICYP. This decision was taken with the consent of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and in close consultation with the governments of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. UNFICYP's mandate was clearly stated in the Security Council Resolution 186, adopted 4 March 1964, by recommending "that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". Furthermore, the Security Council recommended the designation by the Secretary General, in agreement with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, of a mediator in charge of promoting an agreed settlement of the conflict with the representatives of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities (Security Council Resolution 186, points 4 and 7).

Besides this facilitating role in the hands of the UN-appointed mediator, however, the UN mission was not conceived in an active guise of promoting peace out of the previous interethnic clashes. Rather, as Mirbagheri (1998, p. 38) rightly points out, UNFICYP "was an impartial, objective body which had no responsibility for political solutions, and would not try to influence events one way or another" (see also Lindley, 1997).

Such a role constitutes the traditional form of UN interventions in war-affected areas, namely that of interposition between opposite armed forces with the aim of fostering peace talks between political leaderships.¹⁰ UNFICYP, in sum, seems to show both the strengths and limits of traditional UN peacekeeping, whose basic function is to maintain the military *status quo* on the ground by means of military yet unarmed interposition. Such a relatively passive role may be complemented, as in the Cyprus case, with the appointment of high-level mediators in charge of facilitating talks and negotiations between the conflicting parties' political leaderships.

This type of traditional peacekeeping is easy to understand given the intergovernmental nature of the UN. Its limits, however, have been well acknowledged by the same organisation when, as in the *Brahimi Report* mentioned earlier, it is said that traditional peacekeeping "treats symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan)" (par. 17).

Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Cyprus: An Overview

Social changes are simply not in the mandate of traditional UN peacekeeping and, thus, they were not foreseen in UNFICYP's. In the words of Michael Moller, former UN Secretary General's Special Representative and Head of UNFICYP, "the question is whether we are still part of the solution or we are part of the maintenance of a status quo ... that would be a kind of stop progress. I can't give you a clear answer, I think maybe a little bit of both. (...) We are in the middle. There is no aggressive posturing now on either side and I don't think there is any intention by the military of either side to do anything aggressive but, in fact, our presence here prevents small incidents from escalating into big ones, and this is our role basically to maintain the lid on the pot" (in Berruti, 2008, p. 27).¹¹ Eleni Mavrou, major of south Nicosia, notes that, although in Cyprus there is not a bloody conflict, "this perhaps leads somebody to the easy conclusion that there is no need for the peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, but I think that this is a conclusion reached superficially. There are areas or periods of time when the presence of UNFICYP is really vital for keeping peace and this calm we feel today. But apart from that, there are also issues that will be left unresolved if UNFICYP moved out from the island. For example UNFICYP is now in charge of patrolling along the buffer zone. How will contact between the two communities or crossing between the two areas be controlled if UNFICYP is not present? Who will play the role of the facilitator in solving small, sometimes local, problems that can easily lead to a violent conflict? So,

10 It is the so-called 'first generation' of UN peacekeeping that has witnessed the transformation, especially in the 1990s, that resulted in mixed outcomes on the field. See Arielli and Scotto (2003), pp. 140-148 and Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005), pp. 132-158.

11 See also Moller's farewell article (2008).

even if I understand that the international community may be tired [of] keeping the UN presence in Cyprus when no solution is foreseen soon, I believe that it is important to have UNFICYP in Cyprus" (*ibid.*, p. 32).¹²

Now the problem, according to Moller again, "is to push the Cypriots, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, to take greater responsibility for their own problems. At the end of the day it is their problem, they have to solve it. Individuals need to get involved much more and by doing so, in a structured way, you also remove some of the reasons why the international community should continue to be here. It's not just how you configure the UN presence, or the international presence, or the EU presence, but it's also how you act as a catalyst for the people whose future you are dealing with to take responsibility for their own future" (*ibid.*, p. 29).

The involvement of politicians and ordinary citizens alike in some kind of peacebuilding activity has a long history in Cyprus and provides a case in point for the previous discussion on the UN and peacebuilding. The involvement of Cypriot civil society in peacebuilding efforts has indeed received more attention and funding from the UN than other international organisations since the 1990s, in line with emerging peacebuilding ideas and their structuring within the international community.

The first problem-solving workshop dates back to 1966 in London, when John Burton and his colleagues hosted a group of representatives from both communities, in an academic environment, with the aim of discussing and proposing joint ideas on how to overcome the 1964 crisis in Cyprus (Hadjipavlou and Kanol, 2008, p. 14). In 1973 Leonard Doob facilitated an informal seminar in Rome with political leaders from both communities and, notwithstanding the events of summer 1974, similar workshops took place in 1979 and 1984 with the aim of providing training in controlled communication and conflict resolution skills (Doob, 1974). From the 1980s onwards many seminars of this kind have been held, mostly by academics with Cypriot citizens, both in Cyprus and abroad, often paving the way for political harassment and accusations on participants of being traitors of their own community.¹³ In 1981 the Committee of the Missing Persons (CMP) was established as an international organisation working under the UN with representatives of both communities, although it did not produce many results until the 1997 agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. In

12 UNFICYP (2007) provides an opinion poll of both communities in Cyprus on the role of the UN, UNFICYP as well as other issues and stakeholders of the Cyprus conflict and peace process.

13 See, for instance, Angelica (1999). See Hadjipavlou Trigeorgis (1993) on the unofficial inter-communal contacts in Cyprus. See also Jakobsson (1998) on civil society peacebuilding with special reference to the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Demetriou and Gürel (2008) give an interesting account on the relations between human rights, civil society and conflict in Cyprus. In Cyprus, as in other conflicts, human rights discourses can both enhance peacebuilding efforts and be used to fuel conflicts. Though not explicitly related to Cyprus, Mertus and Helsing (2006) provide many viewpoints, analyses and case studies on the complex relationships between human rights, conflicts and peacebuilding.

1996 the CMP issued a press release stating that “no committee, especially a humanitarian one, can operate successfully without the full cooperation of its Members. Until now, however, the indispensable spirit of collaboration between the Parties had not been sufficient” (cited in Sant Cassia, 2005, p. 66). Despite its beginning when the CMP was little more than a politicised forum, now it is generally regarded as a successful case of bi-communal cooperation and coordination with the UN. Rana Zincir Celal (2008) notably suggests that the CMP could well perform a similar function to that of the truth commissions in Africa or the Balkans, where past acts of violence were publicly brought to light, thereby promoting a shared understanding of the past and facilitating common visions for the future.

In 1990 The Citizens Joint Movement for a Federal and Democratic Cyprus was formed as the first bi-communal social movement but it was then closed in 1991 when Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities stopped permission to attend the meetings at the buffer zone’s Ledra Palace. In 1991 the Peace Centre Cyprus was the first formally registered NGO with the explicit mission of promoting peace. With workshops, seminars, discussion groups, youth camps, bi-communal sport, business and environmental groups mushrooming with USAID funds and UNFICYP facilities, the 1990s have also seen efforts to set up a bi-communal management centre for civil society organisations. These efforts, eventually, resulted in the 2001 establishment of two centres: the Management Centre in north Nicosia and the NGO Support Centre in south Nicosia. In 1998 the Peace Centre carried out a petition campaign for a speedy conflict solution which was signed by 41 organisations and then sent to the UN. In the meantime Youth Encounters for Peace was formed as a bi-communal youth organisation highly critical of the political leaderships on both sides. From 1998 to 2005 the UN managed the Bi-Communal Development Programme with the task of funding projects of common interest for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. About 300 organisations and 220 projects benefited from the programme, which was later replaced in 2005 by the UNDP Action for Cooperation and Trust (the so-called UNDP-ACT). The latter has also sponsored the Cyprus Civil Society Strengthening Programme jointly run by the Management Centre and the NGO Support Centre. After the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the EU, the European Commission opened the Cypriot Civil Society in Action funding programme which has recently entered its third call for proposals. In 2000, Youth Encounters for Peace organised the first bi-communal meeting in Pyla without third party mediation, which brought hundreds of Cypriots together in the village. In 2003, the bi-communal women’s NGO Hands across the Divide was formed to develop explicit peace actions such as the efforts to revive Famagusta area, Varosha included. In the same year the bi-communal Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR) was born with the aim of addressing education in general, and history education in particular, as a concrete means of promoting democratic citizenship, critical thinking and mutual understanding. AHDR has been working closely with the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-eastern Europe, EUROCLIO and the Council of Europe in order to promote ‘multiperspectivity’ and a humanistic, rather than nationalistic

approach in history teaching and learning. AHDR, moreover, coordinated with POST Research Institute on the project 'Education for Peace', which examined the revision of history textbooks in the Turkish-Cypriot community, and has been active in lobbying for education reform in the Greek-Cypriot school system.¹⁴ AHDR was also project partner with the Turkish-Cypriot Folk Art Foundation (HASDER) in 2007-2008 'Dialogues of Peace in Cyprus 2', carried out by the Italian NGO Tangram with the support of the Italian municipality and province of Ferrara (Natali, 2007b). AHDR, is currently following the major project 'Home for Cooperation' that will be examined shortly. It is also worth adding that, in 2005, the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) officially opened its Cyprus Centre with the aim of fostering research, dialogue and an informed public debate.

According to Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008, pp. 51-78) a great deal of peacebuilding work actually did take place in Cyprus. The question, however, "is what impact these peacebuilding activities had on the bigger peace process" (p. 51). Despite the high number of workshops that have endowed Cyprus civil society with skilled people in conflict management techniques, such seminars usually host a surprisingly small elite of activists.¹⁵ Research continues: indeed, until the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, peacebuilding initiatives were aimed "at the level of intellectual idealists who could benefit from these trainings and who were bold enough to face the accusation of being 'traitors' and 'foreign agents' and become marginalized in their own communities" (p. 53). The intensity of peacebuilding work was also intimately linked with the high-level negotiation process and the more general international climate. When this so-called 'track one' level gave rise to some optimism – as in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s – then the unofficial, 'track two' peace process flourished as well (*ibid.*, pp. 51-54).

Although the 2004 referenda on the Annan Plan witnessed a lack of coordination between the "yes" campaign in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, very different attitudes were experienced towards each community's authorities. The Plan was the most comprehensive peace plan in Cyprus' history and it had the support of the EU, the UK and the US alike. Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders Papadopoulos and Denktash were against it even though the Turkish government of Erdogan, albeit with some tension within the army, officially upheld the plan including its provisions for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. These external circumstances set forth the mass mobilisation "yes" campaign in the north which was radically critical towards the Denktash's regime and its dogma of the impossibility for the two

14 See AHDR website [www.hisdialresearch.org]. Philippou (2006) argues the case for the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research. On the links between education and ethnic conflict see Lord and Flowers (2006) and Bush and Santarelli (2000). Makriyianni and Psaltis (2007) deal specifically with history education in Cyprus and mainly in the Greek-Cypriot community, while POST (2007) gives an analysis of the new Turkish-Cypriot history schoolbooks. See Papadakis (2008) for a comparison of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks.

15 "We have always been the same old gang": Interview with a Greek-Cypriot activist, south Nicosia, January 2008.

communities to live together. Civil society organisations, trade unions, activist groups, and the Chamber of Commerce played a leading role in organising pro-solution initiatives and demonstrations which found strong popular support.¹⁶

The situation in the Greek-Cypriot community proved to be very different and the strong anti-solution stance of Papadopoulos found friendly media and weak opposition from a relatively low-profile “yes” campaign. Although “no” to the Annan Plan does not at all mean “no” to peace and it may well be true that widespread fears and concerns in the Greek-Cypriot community were not properly addressed, the referendum’s opposite results, with around 65% of Turkish-Cypriots voting “yes” and around 75% of Greek-Cypriots voting “no”, gave rise to deep disillusionment and loss of hope especially amongst the Turkish-Cypriots (see note 9). Feelings of mistrust, ethno-nationalistic attitudes and incidents were renewed, accentuating the fact that despite a great deal of peacebuilding work, much still needs to be done in the way of trust-building and reconciliation in Cyprus.¹⁷

The main weakness of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus seems to be the absence of visible structures for bi-communal initiatives. Conflict management workshops did actually take place, NGOs have increased in number on both sides of the buffer zone, and international funding programmes have financed hundreds of projects. All these efforts, however, followed a case-by-case logic which, until now, has not produced any institutionalisation of peacebuilding aims in a social movement able to collect and coordinate single actors’ initiatives and multiply the visibility and effectiveness of their peace claims. It is also worth citing that, according to some research, civil society is weak both in southern and northern Cyprus while the political debate is strongly dominated by political parties that mediate citizens’ involvement in the peace process (CIVICUS, 2005).¹⁸ At the end research on the impacts of peacebuilding work on the Cyprus conflict, Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008, pp. 55-56) conclude that cross community activities need to be

16 “It was a cathartic moment for us. Everybody was discussing, pushing the others to do something. Everyone felt involved. Before the referendum we were sure we had the power to change things and, you know, the old politics. Denktash was thrown off but the Greek-Cypriot “no” was a disaster for us and maybe Talat is now turning back to the old politics. We felt betrayed. We did a lot, sometime[s] we faced violence from the police and ... nothing. Now I don’t know, let’s wait and see Christofias”: Interview with a Turkish-Cypriot activist, north Nicosia, June 2008.

17 A number of researches and opinion polls seem to confirm it. See, for instance, Sitas, Latif and Loizou (2007); Lordos, Faiz and Carras (2005); Lordos (2005 and 2006). See also Demetriou (2007) and Psaltis (2008).

18 In June and July 2008 the author spoke with some volunteers of a Greek-Cypriot youth organisation and they said that the parties’ youth groups have the tendency of monopolising any initiative carried out jointly with other organisations. “We try to be independent as much as possible. Somehow you need to work with them because they have money and they are well organised but the way they work it’s always the same: they organise a big event, concerts with big names from Greece for the same target of people and that’s all. You cannot be creative or organise something new. That’s why we want to be independent.”

more coordinated in order to enhance their impact and influence on the high-level, 'track one' peace process.

"There is a need to develop a third space in which all the peacebuilding groups and independent thinking individuals will have the opportunity to meet and work together. The efforts should be to make peace process more civil society driven and less political leadership dominated. It is at this very junction that the bi-communal peace activists can play a leading role with their experience and skills and the necessary networks they have built over the years across the divide" (p. 56).

Based on this premise, the project 'Home for Cooperation' is proposed. It is the author's belief that this project attempts to address the above-mentioned weaknesses of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus and, at the same time, enhances the bi-communal experience of Cypriot NGOs.

Cypriot Civil Society Peacebuilding: The Case of the 'Home for Cooperation'

'Revitalising the 'Dead Zone': an Educational Centre and Home for Cooperation' – briefly: Home for Cooperation (H4C) – is a project that the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research has been undertaking since 2007, and will be finalised in 2010. The project's background, objectives, activities and timeframe can be located and downloaded at [http://www.hisdialresearch.org/news/HOME_FOR_COOPERATION.pdf].¹⁹

AHDR's idea is to restore a building in the UN buffer zone, in front of Ledra Palace (Nicosia), which is actually not used but nevertheless lies in a symbolic place. AHDR states that "the present project will offer notable opportunities for employment, education, archiving, research and production of cooperative ideas and publications, drawing on local resources". It will also "contribute to promoting communication between people from different ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds at a local, regional, European and international level". In this way, "the foundations will be placed for the establishment of sustainable cooperation within the civil society of Cyprus, across the divide. Cyprus can become an example of successful cooperation based on mutual respect", giving the 'dead zone' "a new meaning: from a symbol of separation to (...) a new symbol of cooperation". The H4C will explicitly address the limited infrastructure for bi-communal activities and the lack of skills in finding institutional support that seems to affect Cyprus civil society and NGOs. The intended outcome is, therefore, to foster a process of skilled cooperation from below in Cyprus by endowing its civil society with a physical and visible bi-communal structure.

Although AHDR's vision and identity are strongly rooted in education as a means to pursue critical thinking, democratic citizenship and mutual understanding, the H4C aims at fostering this and other objectives within a broader peacebuilding framework. As Rana Zincir Celal (2008,

19 See also Hope (2008).

p. 27) argues, the H4C could for instance collect the work of researchers such as Sevgul Uludag and Andreas Paraschos in an archive open to consultation.

In terms of the civil society peacebuilding functions the H4C will be likely to perform,²⁰ the H4C's activities would likely address the formation and practice of peaceful and democratic attitudes and values among citizens, including tolerance, mutual trust and non-violent conflict resolution ('socialisation' function). They would strengthen links among citizens, building bridge social capital across societal cleavages ('social cohesion' function). By facilitating dialogue and interaction, as well as promoting attitudinal change for a culture of peace and reconciliation, they would establish relationships to support collaboration between interest groups, institutions and the state ('intermediation/facilitation' function). The H4C would provide help and assistance in order to articulate specific interests and to bring relevant issues to the public agenda, thus influencing the public debate and raising awareness ('advocacy/public communication' function).



Photograph by G. Ladini

Celebration for the beginning of the H4C renovation in front of Ledra Palace, Nicosia buffer zone, 30 June 2008. The Special Representative of UN Secretary-General and Head of UNFICYP, Taye-Brook Zerihoun, is delivering a speech before foreign diplomats, Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot political authorities, representatives of Cypriot and international NGOs, UNFICYP officials and ordinary citizens. His speech can be downloaded from UNFICYP website [www.unficyp.org] (UNFICYP, 2008). AHDR vice-president and president: standing behind him from left Fezile Isik and Chara Makriyianni, respectively.

There are, in Cyprus, not only attitudes of mistrust but also local resources for social change: the H4C might be able to address the former while, at the same time, enhancing the latter. It may

20 See the World Bank's working framework outlined above.

well be argued that the H4C represents a sign of the development of Cypriot civil society in relation to the conflict resolution process. The project, indeed, draws on the training, workshops and international funding for peace in Cyprus and it is also managed by an independent bi-communal NGO which has been able to enrich such resources in a common vision and mission. The H4C, thus, provides civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus with good news that the author believes deserving of local and international monitoring, support and involvement.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed issues of war and peace. It has pointed out that war and violent conflict are a somewhat integral part of human history. As such, they are used to influence social norms and institutions that structure the individuals' social interaction and life. Wars, indeed, never stop with mere ceasefire agreements and violent conflicts continue to shape the social context in which armed confrontations have taken place. Such conflict-affected social structures are subsequently able to protract the conflict after armed clashes have ceased, thus obstructing any conflict resolution possibility or allowing peaceful social changes to occur.

History, nonetheless, shapes human societies but it is also shaped by them as well. In this regard, it has been noted that "peacebuilding" is commonly intended as a political action which aims to promote self-sustainable peaceful structures of social interaction in conflict-affected contexts. Peacebuilding goals and ideals, thus, involve social and institutional changes in the long-term perspective that cannot be viewed in isolation from other types of conflict resolution effort. Peace actions and initiatives are carried out by different actors, groups and organisations, each with its own peculiarities, resources and shortcomings. Building peace involves complex phenomena and dynamics in much the same way as making war.

The paper began by examining the way peacebuilding ideas have emerged in international affairs and, especially, within the UN system. An historical account on the changing nature of warfare has been provided along with the changing UN responses eventually leading to the 2005 UN Peacebuilding Commission. The latter explicitly calls for the involvement of civil society and NGOs in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts. The UN's evolution both as an intergovernmental organisation and as the international framework where problems of war and peace are tackled, has been worthy of mention.

The growing relevance of civil society actors in peace processes has prompted other institutions to analyse the relations between civil society and peacebuilding. In this regard, the World Bank's theoretical framework has been introduced and discussed as being interesting both conceptually and as an effort by a prominent international organisation to understand the role of its civil society's partners.

Finally, Cyprus was examined as a case in point for the immediate discussion. UNFICYP's mandate and role are totally in line with the traditional form of UN peacekeeping and show the latter's strengths and limits. It has been noted that UNFICYP's mission has been successful overall

in the sense that, without its presence, incidents would most likely have led to major confrontations that might have spiralled into credible threats of war. Changes at a societal level are simply not in the mandate of traditional UN peacekeeping and thus, they were not foreseen in UNFICYP. Social changes call for the involvement of civil society and, it has been argued, the involvement of Cypriot civil society in peacebuilding efforts has received more UN and international attention and funding since the 1990s, in line with the emerging and structuring of peacebuilding ideas within the international community.

A short account of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus has been offered from the 1960s onwards concluding that, despite a great deal of peacebuilding work, its target has attracted a small *elite*. Its visibility, impact and influence on the official peace process have furthermore met with a lack of institutionalisations and structures of bi-communal cooperation. This research ended with an introduction of the recent project 'Home for Cooperation', suggesting that this project might be able to address widespread attitudes of mistrust while, at the same time, enhancing local resources for social change. The H4C represents a sign of the development of Cypriot civil society in relation to the conflict resolution process. The project, indeed, draws on the training, workshops and international funding for peace in Cyprus and it is also managed by an independent bi-communal NGO that is able to strengthen such resources in a common vision and mission. The H4C and, more generally speaking, the Cyprus conflict and its civil society peacebuilding deserve local and international attention. Cyprus hosts one of the world's most protracted conflicts, therefore, its peace process and civil society initiatives may be helpful in shedding light on other conflict resolution processes and the people involved therein, to whom the case of Cyprus will hopefully constitute a successful example.

Bibliography

- Angelica, P.M. (1999) *Evaluation of the Conflict Resolution Training Efforts Sponsored by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission 1993-1998*. Nicosia: Fulbright Catalogue.
- Arielli, E. and Scotto, G. (2003) *Conflitti e Mediazione* [Conflicts and Mediation]. Milan: Mondadori.
- Axelrod, R. (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ballentine, K. and Sherman, J. (eds.) (2003) *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed and Grievance*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Berdal, M. and Malone, M. (2000a) 'Introduction' in Berdal, M. and Malone, M. (eds.), Ch. 1, *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- (eds.) (2000b) *Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Double Day and Co.
- Berruti, D. (2008) 'Cyprus: A Cold Peace', *Processi Storici e Politiche di Pace* [Historical Processes and Peace Politics], Vol. 4, pp. 21-35.

- Black, J. (2004) *War since 1945*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Brown, R. (2000) *Group Processes. Dynamics within and between Groups*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Bush, K.D. and Santarelli, D. (eds.) (2000) *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict. Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*. UNICEF, available from [www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/insight4.pdf], accessed on 23 April 2008.
- Cerone, J. (2006) 'Holding Military and Paramilitary Forces Accountable' in Mertus, J.A. and Helsing, J.W. (eds.), *Human Rights and Conflict. Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding*, pp. 217-237.
- CIVICUS (2005) *An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus. A Map for the Future*, Civic Civil Society Index for Cyprus, available from [www.civicus.org], accessed on 14 May 2008.
- Demetriou, O. (2007) 'Freedom Square: The Unspoken Reunification of a Divided City', *Hagar Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 55-77.
- Demetriou, O. and Gürel, A. (2008) 'Human Rights, Civil Society and Conflict in Cyprus: Exploring the Relationships'. *SHUR Working Paper* 03/08, June 2008.
- Doob, L.W. (1974) 'A Cyprus Workshop: An Exercise in Intervention Methodology', *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 94, pp. 161-178.
- Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London/New York: Zed Books.
- Durch, W.J. (ed.) (1993) *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gobbicchi, A. (ed.) (2004) *Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino.
- Hadjipavlou, M. and Kanol, B. (2008) 'The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict'. Collaborative Learning Projects, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project. (Cumulative Impact Case Study from a working document, February 2008). Available from [http://www.cdainc.com/cda/www/pdf/casestudy/rpp_cyprus_cumulative20case20final_20806031_Pdf_1.pdf], accessed on 16 November 2009.
- Hadjipavlou Trigeorgis, M. (1993) 'Unofficial Intercommunal Contacts and their Contribution to Peacebuilding in Conflict Societies. The Case of Cyprus', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 68-87.
- Hayek, F.A. Von (1973) 'Rules and Order' in Hayek, F.A. Von (1973-1979), Vol. I, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- (1973-1979) *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 3 Vols. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Hawkins Wyeth, V. (2006) *Getting the Peacebuilding Commission off the Ground: Including Civil Society*, Dialogue on Globalization. New York: FES.
- Hope, K. (2008) 'Education: History becomes Weapon in Bid to End Mistrust', *The Financial Times*, 28 October 2008.
- Hufner, K. (2007) *Reforming the UN: The Case of the Peacebuilding Commission*, Global Policy Forum, January 2007, available from [http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/topics/pbc/2007/01_klaus.htm], accessed on 17 April 2008.
- International Crisis Group (2006) 'The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?', *Europe Report* 171, available from [www.crisisgroup.org], accessed on 29 November 2007.
- (2007) 'Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead', *Europe Report* 184, available from [www.crisisgroup.org], accessed on 15 December 2007.
- (2008a) 'Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition', *Europe Report* 190, available from [www.crisisgroup.org], accessed on 20 May 2008.

- (2008b) 'Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet', *Europe Report* 194, available from [www.crisisgroup.org], accessed on 13 June 2008.
- International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (2006) *Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, available from [http://www.challengesforum.org/cms/Saltsjobaden_Documents.do?pageId=138], accessed on 30 April 2008.
- Istituto Geografico De Agostini. (2005) *Conflitti e Aree di Crisi nel Mondo. Scenari Geopolitici dopo la Caduta del Muro di Berlino* [Conflicts and Crisis Areas in the World. Geopolitical Scenarios after the Fall of the Berlin Wall]. Novara: Istituto Geografico DeAgostini.
- (2008) *Guerre. I Conflitti e le Aree di Crisi Oggi* [Wars. Today's Conflicts and Areas of Crisis]. Novara: Istituto Geografico DeAgostini.
- Jakobsen, A.S. (1998) 'Peacebuilding in Divided Societies. A Theoretical Framework and Some Findings from Northern Ireland and Cyprus'. International Society for Third Sector Research, paper presented at the ISTR Third International Conference in Geneva, Switzerland.
- Kaldor, M. (1999) *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. London: Polity Press.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2008) 'Cyprus and the Kosovo Precedent', *Friends of Cyprus*, 51, p. 32.
- Lindenstraus, G. (2008) 'Pockets of Instability: What Links Kosovo, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh?', *The Institute for National Security Studies, INSS Insight*, 46.
- Lindley, D. (1997) *UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution: A Strategic Assessment*. Cambridge: MIT Centre for International Studies.
- Lordos, A. (2005) *Civil Society Diplomacy: A New Approach for Cyprus?*, September 2004 and January 2005, available from [www.help-net.gr/CivilSocietyDiplomacy.pdf], accessed on 7 March 2008.
- (2006) *Building Trust. An Inter-communal Analysis of Public Opinion in Cyprus*, 10-25 April 2006, available from [www.CyprusPolls.org], accessed on 23 February 2008.
- Lordos, A., Faiz, M. and Carras, C. (2005) *Options for Peace. Mapping the Possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus*, 15-30 May 2005, available from [www.cypruspolls.org], accessed on 23 February 2008.
- Lord J.E. and Flowers, N. (2006) 'Human Rights Education and Grassroots Peacebuilding' in Mertus, J.A. and Helsing, J.W. (eds.), Ch. 15, *Human Rights and Conflict. Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding*. Washington: United States Institute Press.
- Makriyianni, C. and Psaltis, C. (2007) 'The Teaching of History and Reconciliation', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 43-69.
- Mertus, J.A. and Helsing, J.W. (eds.) (2006) *Human Rights and Conflict. Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Michaletos, I. (2007) *Eastern Mediterranean Oil Politics: The Emerging Role of Cyprus*, available from [www.balkananalysis.com], accessed on 13 October 2008.
- Mirbagheri, F. (1998) *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*. London: Hurst and Company.
- Moller, M. (2008) 'Goodbye and Good Luck!', *Friends of Cyprus*, 51, pp. 15-16.
- Mullen, F., Oguz, O. and Kyriacou, P.A. (2008) *The Day After. Commercial Opportunities Following a Solution to the Cyprus Problem*. Nicosia: PRIO Paper 1/2008.
- Natali, G. (2007a) *Cipro tra Europa e Medio Oriente: Un Ponte tra Culture o una Portaerei Anglo-Americana?* [Cyprus between Europe and the Middle East: Bridge between Cultures or British-American Aircraft Carrier?], available from [www.geopoliticalnotes.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/],

- accessed on 18 January 2008.
- (ed.) (2007b) *Diplomazia dal Basso* [Diplomacy from Below]. Milano: Edizioni Punto Rosso.
- Papadakis, Y. (2008) *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus"*. Nicosia: PRIO Report 2/2008.
- Philippou, S. (2006) Education for Peace, Freedom and Respect of Human Rights in Cyprus: The Case of the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, presented during the 4th Board Meeting of MedNed, 2 September 2006.
- Pope, H. (2008a) 'Settling Cyprus', *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 February 2008.
- (2008b) 'Cyprus: Things are Looking Up', *euro/topics*, 17 September 2008.
- POST Research Institute (2007) *Project on Education for Peace II: Textual and Visual Analyses of the Lower Secondary School History Textbooks*, available from [www.postri.org], accessed on 1 March 2008.
- Psaltis, C. (2008) *A Social Psychological Perspective on Contact between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots and Confidence Building Measures*, presented at the English School, Nicosia, 16 April 2008.
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2005) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Sant Cassia, P. (2005) *Bodies of Evidence. Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus*. New York/Oxford: Berghan Books.
- Schmitt, C. (1950) *Der Nomos der Erde im Voelkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europeum* [The Nomos of Earth in the Law of Peoples and the Jus Publicum Europeum]. Köln: Greven; trad. it. *Il Nomos della Terra*. Milano: Adelphi, 1991.
- Schutz, A. (1960) *Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt* [The Phenomenology of the Social World]. Wien: Springer-Verlag; trad. it. *La Fenomenologia del Mondo Sociale*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974.
- Sitas, A., Latif, D. and Loizou, N. (2007) *Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-existence and Forgiveness in Cyprus in the Post-Referendum Period*. Nicosia: PRIO Report 4/2007.
- Taylor, M. (1987) *The Possibility of Cooperation*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Theophanous, A. (2008) *The Political Economy of a Cyprus Settlement*. Nicosia: PRIO Report 1/2008.
- United Nations (1945) *Charter of the United Nations*, 26 June 1945. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 December 2008.
- (1948) *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 7 October 2008.
- (1964) Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 12 December 2008.
- (1992) *Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/23500*, 31 January 1992. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 12 December 2008.
- (1992) *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary General A/47/277 - S/24/11, 17 June 1992. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 27 October 2006.
- (1995) *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary General A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 27 October 2006.
- (2000) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809*, 21 August

2000. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 27 October 2006.
- (2004) *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 March 2008.
- (2005) *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary General A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 13 January 2008.
- (2005) *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2005/42, 20 September 2005. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 February 2008.
- (2005) Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 February 2008.
- (2005) *The Peacebuilding Commission*, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/180, 20 December 2005. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 February 2008.
- (2007) *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its First Session*, A/62/137 - S/2007/458 25 July 2007. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 14 May 2008.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008) *State Building in Post Conflict Countries Requires a Different Approach*, UN-DESA Policy Brief 7, September 2008.
- UNFICYP (2007) *The UN in Cyprus. An Intercommunal Survey of Public Opinion by UNFICYP*, 26 January - 19 February 2007. Available from [www.unficy.org/Survey%202007/SurveyPress ENG.doc], accessed on 20 February 2008.
- (2008) *Remarks of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission – Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun – at a Ceremony to Mark Start of Renovation of Home for Cooperation of Association for Historical Dialogue and Research*, 30 June 2008. Available from [www.unficy.org], accessed on 13 September 2008.
- Vasquez, J.A. (1993) *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- World Bank (2006) *Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Potentials, Limitations and Critical Factors*. Social Development Department, Report No. 36445-GLB.
- Zincir Celal, R. (2008) 'Truth and Reconciliation in Cyprus', *Friends of Cyprus*, 51, pp. 26-27.

SOME REFLECTIONS
ON 5 YEARS OF EU MEMBERSHIP

GUEST EDITED BY

HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT

Introduction

It was on 24 September 1994 when the author of this script had the honour of participating in a high ranking International Conference in Limassol. The Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed the seminar, "Cyprus' Course to the European Union. The Political and Economic Problems of an Applicant State". Party leaders of all relevant political forces in Cyprus and scholars convened to discuss what the consequences would be of the formal application for EU membership made by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on 3 June 1990. The Commission, in its opinion provided on 30 June 1993, had argued that Cyprus' integration with the community "implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question". The Council confirmed the Commission's Avis on 30 June 1993, and the European Council concluded in June 1994 that Cyprus would be included in the next round of enlargement. This was the background when the debates in the conference started. Over and above this, two questions had to be answered: What would the consequences of EU membership be for Cyprus and what would the implications be for the EU? It was not surprising that the chances to settle the intercommunal dispute were the focal point in nearly all statements. But it should be made clear that other relevant issues came to the fore as well. Some discussants argued that bad experiences regarding the association agreement with the European Community of 1962 made it clear that Cyprus' membership would benefit the EU more than the island. The balance of trade was taken to substantiate this argument and this assumption was countered by authorities from the Ministry of Finance: As far as the Maastricht Criteria indicated at the time, the economy of Cyprus was assessed as competitive *vis-a-vis* EU member states. Cyprus' budget and public deficit were below the criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty and interest rates also met the conditions. The Cyprus Pound was already bound to the ECU, but the rate of inflation exceeded the benchmark. Positive assumptions were based on the high rates of growth since 1974, which endorsed the Cyprus "economic miracle". So far the conference had good cause to look ahead optimistically as far as the Government controlled area was concerned. The economy of the Republic of Cyprus was competitive to a great extent. But this was not the case in the northern part of the island, where the economy lagged behind. Shortcomings were identified in the Republic of Cyprus with respect to offshore enterprises, dependence on tourism and harmonisation with EU standards. Viewed from today's perspective the debates during the conference proved to be well founded. Cyprus managed the challenge of competitiveness when it became a member of the EU in 2004 and introduced the Euro in 2008.

In the course of the conference the debate about the Cyprus problem gave fewer grounds for optimism. There was consensus among the Greek Cypriot participants that the principle of the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus had to be secured through negotiations with the EU. Whether EU membership could serve as a catalyst to solve the political problem was deliberated much more. Later, during dialogue on the Annan Plan, politicians representing the Government

were sceptical that EU accession could function in that way. Others were more positive as the *acquis communautaire* could safeguard elementary rights as well as security. At that time it was challenging to evaluate Cyprus' future in the EU in light of four alternative scenarios. The first one, "settlement of the conflict before EU accession", was perceived by some discussants as the optimum but least probable version. The second scenario, understood as "competence-mixture in a weak federation" because it was designed by the UN Secretary-General in his "Set of Ideas", was criticised on two accounts: firstly, it was doubted that principles of democratic and efficient governance would be secured, and secondly, criticism was raised as to Cyprus' ability to take over its responsibilities as a member of the EU. A third scenario, "two Cypriot states in the EU", was not even a topic for academic discussion as it contravened international law and relevant decisions of the UN. The last scenario was modelled along the German experiences of reunification: The Republic would enter the EU first and the northern part would be included later. It was anticipated that this version implied a great deal of risk, but gave signs of hope as well. This scenario, as we know today, came nearer to reality than any other. The whole of the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 and the *acquis* was suspended in the north. The Cyprus question still has to be settled. Another opportunity to do this is given by the ongoing intercommunal negotiations.

The second part of this edition is dedicated to some reflections on five years of membership of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union. Five years after Cyprus joined the EU, the academic agenda has been reorganised to some extent. Economic competitiveness, stability of the currency, participation in EU decision making, rearranging foreign and security policy, striving for a just and durable solution of the intercommunal division – all these issues are still of importance. An additional theoretical and methodological approach has, however, become more prominent: this is the phenomenon of Europeanisation. All member states are confronted with different impacts from the EU's policies, decisions, financial redistribution, legal acts, and "ways of doing things" which are adapted or rejected by the receivers. On the other hand member states are also creators of Europeanisation impacts when they participate in decision making on an EU level. It seems logical, therefore, that two articles in this volume address Europeanisation aspects directly and two papers address the long-standing debate of conflict settlement but broach it in light of the changed environment of Cyprus' membership in the EU. It becomes evident that new aspects are revealed, but there is still much to do. There seems to be consensus that Cyprus membership has decisively helped in the improvement and modernisation of various aspects of Cypriot life. But as far as the Cyprus problem is concerned, Europeanisation has either failed or has only been partially adopted by both sides. The catalytic role of the European Union for a settlement has not been forthcoming. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots – for very different reasons – are disappointed by the role of the European Union within the Cyprus dispute since 2004.

The section, which reflects on five years of EU membership, begins with an article by the guest editor. He questions whether conflict settlement can be promoted by the process of

Europeanisation, and in so doing the experiences of the failed unification and reconciliation plan of Kofi Annan are recalled. As Europeanisation tends to become a catch-all term, an innovative concept of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement” is introduced which is also used to analyse the current process of negotiations between the leaders of both communities. The prospect of success in the current process of negotiations – according to this concept – is dependent on two factors set against a backdrop of experiences with the Annan Plan: firstly, President Christofias must succeed in changing his compatriots’ and the Greek-Cypriot media’s negative attitude towards compromise and concession into one of positive thinking by means of a massive publicity campaign. Secondly, in Turkey, not only the government but also the military and the diplomats must support the results of the negotiations.

Costas Melakopides prefers a different and more normative approach when he discusses the role of the EU in the Cyprus Question. Describing the EU as a normative power he identifies an *ethical acquis* which has been established by the EU over the years when the EU made public statements on the Cyprus problem. As the Annan Plan, in the perception of the author, served the strategic interests of the US, the UK, Turkey, and the needs of the Turkish Cypriots, the EU should actually promote its essential normative principles. This could best be achieved by imposing sanctions on Turkey as it still occupies parts of Cyprus territory. Irrespective of the actual process of intercommunal negotiations the EU should insist on the speedy withdrawal of Turkish troops, the departure of settlers, put a stop to the construction of houses on Greek Cypriot properties in the northern area and demand the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey. What others might expect as a result of negotiations, is understood by the author, to be a precondition for such a process.

The concept of Europeanisation is elaborated in the paper written by Christina Ioannou and Giorgos Kentas when they analyse the labour sector in Cyprus. It is argued that the process of Europeanisation followed an instrumental logic that furnished a consciously promoted national strategy of EU accession. Three expectations have been embraced within the “national mission” to become an EU member: The Cyprus problem should become Europeanised and the EU should be involved in the solution process; Cyprus’ negotiating position *vis-à-vis* Turkey should be improved; and finally the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities should benefit from EU membership. As Cyprus has a deep-rooted tradition of corporatism the Europeanisation of the labour sector is made easier.

Erol Kaymak concludes the section with a more sceptical outlook. He argues that the EU might still work as a carrot for the Turkish Cypriots but it has less and less to offer to Turkey, and for this reason the chances for a settlement of the Cyprus problem in 2010 are perceived as being bleak. As the EU sends negative signals, Turkey promotes itself as a regional power which does not acknowledge an obligation to make any concession to the EU and to withdraw its troops unilaterally from the island or to open its ports to the Republic of Cyprus. The expectations of the Turkish Cypriots have not been met since Cyprus joined the EU. Direct trade has neither been

established nor have funds been made available to support civil society or intercommunal cooperation. Additionally, poor economic performance in northern Cyprus strengthens reliance on Turkish subsidies. As a result elections in April 2010 may bolster political forces which are less interested to conclude the actual process of negotiations successfully. The above may lead Turkey to promote the international recognition of Turkish Cypriots who themselves could demand “self-determination” drawing on the Kosovo experience as inspiration. In this event the expectation to settle the Cyprus problem by Europeanisation would have failed.

HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT
Guest Editor

Cyprus: Conflict Resolution through Europeanisation? Most Recent Experiences and Perspectives

HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT^{*}

Abstract

Since September 2008 the leaders of both ethnic groups in Cyprus have been looking for a solution for the island's long-standing conflict. Anyone wishing to evaluate the chances of this new initiative must recall the experience of the failed unification and reconciliation plan of Kofi Annan. As this plan connected the goal of conflict resolution with the perspective of accession to the European Union (EU) this article pursues the question of the extent to which Europeanisation promotes a solution of the Cyprus problem. For this purpose the theoretical concept of the "Hexagon of Conflict Settlement" is introduced. The prospects of success of the current process of negotiation – according to this concept – are dependent on two factors set against a backdrop of experiences with the Annan plan: firstly, President Christofias must succeed in changing the attitude of his compatriots and the Greek Cypriot media against compromises and concessions from a negative one to positive by means of a massive publicity campaign. Secondly, in Turkey not only the government but also the military and the diplomats must support the results of the negotiations.

Keywords: Cyprus conflict, conflict resolution, mediation, European integration, Europeanisation

Since 3 September 2008 the leaders of both ethnic groups, Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, have met on a regular basis to revive negotiations in their attempts to find a solution for the Cyprus conflict. It is to be a solution "made by Cypriots for Cypriots". If the negotiators reach an agreement, separate referenda are intended to be held on the result of the negotiations. Anyone wishing to evaluate the chances of this new initiative must recall the experience of the failed unification and reconciliation plan of Kofi Annan. This plan was approved by the Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. In contrast to all prior mediation attempts, this plan had had a unique selling point: it connected the goal of conflict resolution with the perspective of accession to the European Union (EU). This perspective is also significant in the current negotiations: should the unification plan be successful, the Turkish Cypriots would be EU citizens

^{*} I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers as well as Hubert Faustmann and Phedon Nicolaidis for comments and suggestions on a previous draft. Of course the author bears full responsibility for the final version.

not only *de jure*, but also *de facto*. This article pursues the question of the extent to which Europeanisation promotes a solution of the Cyprus problem. The prospects of success of the current process of negotiation – according to these hypotheses – are dependent on two factors set against a backdrop of experiences with the Annan plan: firstly, President Christofias must succeed in changing the stance of his compatriots and the Greek Cypriot media against compromises and concessions (as had been asked of them by the Annan plan) from a negative attitude to a positive one by means of a massive publicity campaign. Secondly, in Turkey not only the government but also the military and the diplomats must support the results of the negotiations. This article pursues first the question of why the Annan plan, connected with the perspective of Europeanisation as identified then, was not successful. For this purpose the theoretical concept of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement” is introduced. Finally, the current negotiations and their conditions for success are addressed. It would be worthwhile to examine the ongoing process of negotiations on the basis of the Hexagon of Conflict Settlement more in detail but due to lack of information currently this must be left to future analysis.

The “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement”

The year 2004 opened a “window of opportunity” for Cyprus: on 24 April votes were held in separate referenda on Kofi Annan’s unification and reconciliation plan, and the accession of Cyprus to the EU was planned for the 1 May – doubtless a one-off chance for resolution of the conflict through Europeanisation. In order to assure success for conflict settlement through Europeanisation, the parties in a conflict would have had to be willing and in a position to resolve an existing conflict within the framework of European standards and values, procedures and institutions. Europeanisation can be understood as a “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies”.¹ Formal values and norms are incorporated in the treaties of the EU, informal ones can be identified within the decision-making processes.² To date the EU

-
- 1 C. Radaelli (2004) ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’, *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 8, No. 16, p. 4. Available at [<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf>]. More information on the concept of Europeanisation and a comprehensive list of different definitions can be found in: H.-J. Axt, A. Milososki and O. Schwarz (2007) ‘Europäisierung - ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht und Forschungsfragen’ [Europeanisation - a Vast Area. Literature Report and Research Questions], *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 136-149.
 - 2 For a list of such norms and values see H.-J. Axt, O. Schwarz and S. Wiegand. (2008) *Konfliktbeilegung durch Europäisierung? Zypernfrage, Ägäiskonflikt und griechisch-mazedonischer Namensstreit* [Conflict Settlement through Europeanisation? Cyprus Question, Aegean Conflict and Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute]. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, pp. 48-51.


resembles to a greater extent the model of a consociational democracy.³ As far as conflict settlement is concerned Europeanisation implies that conflict partners are not focusing on their perceptions of an “ideal” solution of the conflict but are willing to compromise and to make use of EU institutions and procedures for the purpose of conflict settlement. That is all the more relevant when the EU offers membership to conflicting partners. The author does not exclude the possibility that parties in a conflict are prepared and willing to resolve the conflict in another way – either bilaterally or with the support of international organisations.

Since Europeanisation has with time become something of a “catch-all” term, this term must be operationalised. The Hexagon of Conflict Settlement provides a useful theoretical framework for this.⁴ The Hexagon consists of six variables (see figure 1). The “Level of Europeanisation” is the determining one of those variables. The level of Europeanisation is the key determining factor to identify the probability of conflict settlement through Europeanisation. As described above, Europeanisation refers to norms, values, procedures and institutions. The other variables can only play an obstructive or facilitating role in the process of conflict settlement. Among them, the “Actor EU” is characterised as an intervening variable. The other four variables are added to the model as modifying variables. These variables are “Conflict Perception”, “Conflict Intensity”, “Economic Interdependence” and “External Actors”. To avoid misunderstandings from the very beginning of this paper, the level of Europeanisation has nothing in common with “European maturity”, meaning a country’s grade of readiness to be or to become a member of the EU. With the level of Europeanisation no differentiation between “good” or “bad” Europeans is made. The determining variable only concerns a conflict party’s ability and will to settle a conflict by Europeanised logic of acting. To make it clear: When it is argued in the following text that the Greek Cypriots did not follow an approach of Europeanisation when they had to decide on the Annan plan, this does not disqualify the Greek Cypriots as being uninspired by European ideals or as not meeting the Copenhagen criteria of EU membership. It means that the Greek Cypriot side did not link the Annan plan with the Europeanisation approach as described above. The first part of this text will analyse the situation in 2004. When it is argued by Greek Cypriot leaders that a reunification can be reached on a more solid base when Cyprus is a member of the EU, this constellation must be subject of an analysis in the future.

3 See A. Lijphart (1974) ‘Consociational Democracy’ in K.D. McRae (ed.), *Consociational Democracy. Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library, pp. 70-89.

4 The “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement” is the result of a research project (funded by the Volkswagen Foundation from 2005 until 2008 at the Jean Monnet Chair of the author) that aimed to specify the impact of Europeanisation on conflict settlement. The main research interest was the central question of the conditions under which parties in a conflict manage their conflicts through Europeanisation and lead their conflicts to a final solution. The focus of the empirical analysis was laid on three different cases: the Greek-Macedonian name dispute, the Aegean conflict and the Cyprus question. For the theoretical concept and more empirical data see H.-J. Axt, O. Schwarz and S. Wiegand (2008) *Konfliktbeilegung durch Europäisierung... op. cit.*

Figure 1: The Hexagon of Conflict Settlement



Before the fruitless efforts for conflict resolution within the framework of the Annan plan are analysed with the help of the Hexagon, it should first be shown how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots envisage a resolution of the conflict which would be “ideal” from their point of view.⁵ For the Greek Cypriots the following are essential: a return to the pre-1974 *status quo* though modified into a (bi-zonal and bi-communal) federal state with strong powers, consideration for the numerical disparity between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot, transferral of the *Acquis Communautaire* (personal freedom of settlement, right of establishment, and acquisition of property), returning of property instead of compensation, complete retraction of the Turkish troops’ comprehensive return of the settlers to Anatolia⁶ and an end or at least modification of the Treaty of Guarantee. For the Turkish Cypriots the following are particularly important: equal political rights of both ethnic groups, a strong position of the “constituent states”, recognition of two separate peoples with different cultures, religions and languages, restrictive handling of personal freedom of settlement, right of establishment and acquisition of property, compensation for property instead of return, as well as maintenance of the Turkish troops and a Turkish right to intervene as a guarantee of safety. For a successful resolution of the Cyprus conflict within the framework of Annan’s plan, both parties in the conflict would have had to be prepared to make concessions and to accept the political cost incurred.

We will begin the analysis of the failure of the Annan plan with the *modifying variables* of the Hexagon. Two variables can be noted here which proved to be helpful for conflict resolution:

5 What is described here does not only reflect official positions but also the desires of the majority of citizens as they can be detected from different surveys in the past. See e.g. UNFICYP (2007) *The Blue Beret. The UN in Cyprus. An Inter-Communal Survey*. Special Edition, Nicosia April 2007; A. Theophanous (2004) *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise*, Nicosia: Intercollege Press; H.-J. Axt (1999) ‘The Island of Cyprus and the European Union’ in C. Dodd (ed), *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, pp. 174-194, here p. 190.

6 The Greek Cypriot side had accepted prior to Annan Plan V that more than 40,000 settlers could stay.

- The intensity of conflict between both ethnic groups has been (and is) relatively low. Even when the Green Line was opened in April 2003, there were hardly any serious incidents. Principally it is assumed that a conflict settlement is facilitated when both parties abandon the usage of violence. The United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) no doubt contributed to the prevention of large-scale violence. Riots of nationalist zealots at the Green Line, however, could not be prevented. According to the “Conflict Barometer” of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) the Cyprus conflict can be characterised as a non-violent manifest conflict on a low level of intensity.⁷
- As far as the *external actors* were concerned their policies were largely coherent when it came to the Annan plan. The United Nations, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and the USA supported the initiative of the General Secretary. An essential condition for a successful conflict resolution is to be seen in the mutual coordination of the external actors’ activities. Only an efficient and complementary strategy for settling conflicts can be beneficial for the resolution of a conflict. The bilateral differences between Greece and Turkey did not hinder both countries to endorse the Annan plan. Turkey clearly was driven by the motivation to avoid all that might have interfered with the attempt to start accession negotiations with the EU. So, the Turkish government did no longer side with Rauf Denktash and his preference for a “two state solution” as it had done in the past but gave support to Mehmet Ali Talat. Turkey’s calculus proved successful, the EU started negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. Greece was hindered in playing a more important role as national elections were held on 7 March 2004 and the government of Kostas Simitis was replaced by a new administration headed by Kostas Karamanlis. As far as Great Britain and Greece are concerned it must be noted that both countries are member states of the EU; they have participated in the internal decision-making of the EU, and the key decisions with respect to Cyprus have been made unanimously in the EU. Greece especially, managed to insert into the Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, a provision that solving the Cyprus problem was not a precondition for Cyprus to become a member of the EU. When Greece is subsumed as an external actor here, it refers to the national foreign policy activities of Athens during the process of negotiations on the Annan plan.

On the other hand, however, with respect to the modifying variables, attention must be drawn to the following facts which proved to be counter-productive:

- Often it is an essential part of the nature of conflicts that the *conflict perceptions* of the parties involved are not compatible with each other. The perception of the Cyprus conflict has been and still is highly contradictory between the two ethnic groups. While the Greek Cypriots –

7 See Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (2007) *Konfliktbarometer 2006*, Heidelberg [http://www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2007.pdf] p. 15

particularly remembering the Turkish invasion of the year 1974 – perceive Turkey to be the main security problem, the Turkish Cypriots almost exclusively remember the events of 1963 (Christmas riots) and 1964, and perceive the primary threat as being the Greek side that wished to deprive them of their political equal rights.⁸ It is assumed that conflict settlement is brought about when both conflict parties agree with their perception of the conflict item. Disagreement on this point obstructs conflict settlement.

- The low level of economic exchange across the Green Line did not produce any positive effects relating to *economic interdependence*. A high degree of economic interdependence between the conflict parties – that is the argument – is seen as a positive impetus on the process of conflict settlement. There are enough empirical evidences to show that the risk of conflict escalation sinks the more both sides in a conflict carry on a trade with each other.⁹ In addition, there is an apparent de-escalating effect when both conflict parties maintain high degrees of trade interaction.¹⁰ What has been the situation in Cyprus since 2004? Even after a slight revival of domestic trade in Cyprus from 2003 onwards (the opening of the Green Line), its scale remains relatively negligible in both relative and absolute terms. According to Greek Cypriot sources, between August 2004 and mid-May 2005 north Cypriot goods amounting to a value of approximately €1.1 million were delivered to the Republic of Cyprus.¹¹ The Green Line trade from north to south was then in the region of approximately €100,000 per month. The biggest deliveries to date have been vegetables, construction materials and paper products. By way of comparison: the imports of the Republic of Cyprus in 2006 totalled an average of US\$483.33 million per month. Hence north Cypriot goods have only reached the south to a very small extent, but conversely almost no products at all are “exported” into the Turkish Cypriot part. Only in March 2005 was there agreement in the north regarding the delivery of goods from the south, and the publication of a corresponding list of goods was announced.¹² This makes it clear that to date trade between the two parts of

8 For the collective memory of both communities see Z. Stavrinides (1999) ‘Greek Cypriot Perceptions’ in C. Dodd (ed), *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, pp. 54-96.

9 See J.R. Oneal (1996) ‘The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict’, *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 11-28; B. Russett and J.R. Oneal (2001) *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

10 See E. Gartzke, Q. Li, and C. Boehmer (2001) ‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict’, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 391-438.

11 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2004) Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the Situation Resulting from its Application. Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 320 final, Brussels, 14 July 2005, p. 4.

12 Since 2004-2005 (the time span which is analysed in this part of the article) interdependence has increased to some extent as trade has risen. The total trade value which crossed the Green Line from north to south amounted to €6.1 million (1 May 2008 – 30 April 2009). The value of trade from south to north amounted to €1.1 million in

Cyprus has played an absolutely negligible role, and no substantial political effects can be expected from it in the sense of any strengthening of interdependencies.

Among all six variables of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement”, the actor EU has the most important influence on the process of Europeanisation together with the level of Europeanisation. This variable is, therefore, characterised as the intervening one. If we wish to assess the role of the European Union as an *intervening variable*, the fact that conflict resolution through Europeanisation has failed in the case of Cyprus must be viewed as a grave factor. The EU gave political support to the Annan plan and assisted the UN as the main mediator to make the Annan plan compatible with the *Acquis Communautaire* of the EU.¹³ On the other hand the EU offered the chance of accepting Cyprus as a member, but it did not attach the condition that Cyprus first had to solve the conflict and attain reunification. Admittedly this gave the Turkish Cypriots a strong incentive to support the Annan plan. For the Greek Cypriots, however, this was not the case as EU accession was guaranteed even without any solution of the ethnic conflict. The fact that the EU did not give conditional acceptance of accession to Cyprus was ultimately due to the threat made by Greece that it would otherwise block the whole eastern expansion of the EU by veto.¹⁴ If on the one hand we must see the conduct of the EU as being responsible for the failure of the conflict resolution through Europeanisation in the case of Cyprus, on the other hand the same is also true with regard to the level of Europeanisation of the Greek Cypriot ethnic group (see below).

If the instruments available in the EU are differentiated according to “compulsory” and

the same period. See Commission of the European Communities (2009) *Report from the Commission to the Council. Annual Report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the situation resulting from its application*, SEC (2009) 1182, Brussels, 14 September 2009 [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkish_cypriot_community/glr_report_en.pdf].

- 13 On the one hand, it was important for the EU that the unification and reconciliation plan was compatible with the *Acquis Communautaire* of the EU. At the same time, the EU had nonetheless accepted the fact that the final Annan plan contained several rulings which had to be seen as deviations from the *Acquis Communautaire*, a fact which was criticised particularly by the Greek Cypriots, because their ideas of an ideal conflict resolution were connected with full implementation of the European “basic freedoms” (free movement of goods, free movement of capital, freedom of establishment, and freedom of acquisition of real estate). As it has been noted, some problems occurred because coordination between the EU and UN did not take place until very late (2003) when the accession treaty of Cyprus had already been signed. For the details see Claire Palley (2006) *An International Relations Debacle. The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices 1999-2004*, Oxford UK/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.
- 14 The development of the EU Cyprus relations has been described in H.-J. Axt (1999) ‘The Island of Cyprus and the European Union’ in C. Dodd (ed.), *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, pp. 174-194.

“connective impacts” as interpreted in literature,¹⁵ the following can be noted: In accordance with the concept of “compulsory impact”, in the case of Cyprus the EU certainly tried to make use of “carrots”. The EU used the most attractive offer available to it – that of membership. This, however, occurred in an asymmetric manner – it appealed positively to the Turkish Cypriots. The same cannot be said for the Greek Cypriots as they could be sure of being accepted into the EU regardless, which is also the reason why the government did not feel obliged to rally citizens to a positive verdict in favour of the Annan plan. The guarantee of financial aid (“connective impact”) may initiate and deepen contacts between participants in a conflict and in positive cases such contacts can lead to the establishment of trust. The EU tried particularly to promote bicomunal contacts and dialogue forums,¹⁶ but such initiatives were often countered by the demand of the Greek Cypriot authorities to represent the Republic of Cyprus alone and the insistence of Turkish Cypriots to participate in their official TRNC capacity.¹⁷

The Conflict Parties’ Level of Europeanisation

Among all six variables, that are relevant for the settlement of conflicts through Europeanisation, the level of Europeanisation is the most important factor. In general, Europeanisation processes are either the result of a “calculus approach” or a “cultural approach”. The first one is interpreted in literature mainly as rational choice-institutionalism, whereas the second one is framed in the context of sociological institutionalism.¹⁸ Contrary to the assumption that decisions are mainly driven by cost-benefit-calculations James March and Johan Olsen argue that decision making in institutions does not derive from a “logic of consequences” but from a “logic of appropriateness”.¹⁹

15 The research project under the direction of Thomas Diez has differentiated a total of four different impacts: “compulsory, enabling, connective and constructive impacts”. See T. Diez, M. Pace, B. Rumelili and V. Jevgenia (2006) *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association (EUBorderConf)*. Final Report (2003-2005), Birmingham, September 2006 [<http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/EUBorderConf%20Final%20Report%20revised.pdf>].

16 See M. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis (1997) ‘Little Confidence in Confidence Building? Conflict Resolution in the Context of the United Nations’ in H.-J. Axt and H. Brey (ed.), *Cyprus and the European Union. New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?* Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, pp. 36-54.

17 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

18 See C. Hay and D. Wincott (1989) ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism’, *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 951-957, here p. 952.

19 See J.G. March and J.P. Olsen (2005) ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”’ (ARENA Working Paper II), Oslo 2005 [http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/papers/wp05_II.pdf], accessed: 20 January 2008; J.G. March and J.P. Olsen (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis*, New York: The Free Press; J.G. March and J.P. Olsen (1998) ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, *International Organisation*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 943-969.

Normative and cognitive Rules are internalised by individuals. A “calculus approach” is dominated by actors’ cost-benefit calculation, the “cultural approach” is the result of a process of social learning whereby actors accept and identify with European norms and values. Sure enough there is also the third possibility that at least one party does not choose a Europeanisation strategy consciously and prefers other forms of conflict management. When Europeanisation processes are the result of a calculus approach, the outcome is more short-range and dependent on external offers or threats. Calculus driven Europeanisation is only an option as long as it promises gains and has no value by itself that brings sustainability and reliability with it. When conflict parties follow a cultural orientated Europeanisation approach by contrast, they expect not to gain benefits in a short-term perspective. Rather they are persuaded that a conflict management through Europeanisation will realise benefits in the longer perspective. In this context the management of conflicts through European norms, values, and actions is seen without an alternative and is outstanding. In the following section the logics of conflict management of the governments, the parliamentary actors, the media and the citizens of both communities will be classified as non-Europeanised, following a “calculus” or a “cultural approach”. The basic assumption of this classification is that a cultural level of Europeanisation of both conflict parties maximises *ceteris paribus* the chance of a final peaceful conflict settlement through Europeanisation.

The Greek Cypriots

As far as the government is concerned, the President plays the dominant political role, especially with respect to intercommunal affairs.²⁰ Outside of Cyprus it was scarcely noticed that 16 February 2003 was something akin to an early referendum for the Annan plan. It was on this day that Tassos Papadopoulos emerged as victor from the presidential elections and was able to replace Glafkos Klerides, who had been in office since 1993 and had been a supporter of the Annan plan. Even in the past, Papadopoulos had displayed himself as a more hard-line oriented politician who was less prepared to compromise on the Cyprus issue. The fact that the solution to the island’s problem was to consist of a bicomunal, bi-zonal federation in which – with regard to political rights – majority and minority relations were to play no part, in other words the fact that the Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic group were to have the same political influence as the majority population of Greek Cypriots, was unacceptable for Papadopoulos. His understanding of democracy was tied to the idea that the majority should have the decisive influence.

During the negotiations on the Annan plan it was noticeable that the Greek Cypriot president – as far as could be perceived by the outside observer – energetically verbalised the

20 See J. Ker-Lindsay and H. Faustmann (eds.) (2008) *The Government and Politics of Cyprus*. Oxford: Peter Lang; H.-J. Axt and J. Choisi (1998) ‘Politisches System’ [Political System] in K-D. Grothusen, W. Steffani and P. Zervakis, (eds.), *Zypern. Südosteuropa-Handbuch* [Cyprus. Southeast Europe Handbook], Vol. VIII, Göttingen, pp. 196-239.

standpoints and interests of his own ethnic group, but contributed little to finding compromise solutions.²¹ Papadopoulos' preferences apparently lay not in aiding the Annan plan to come to a successful conclusion, but instead in first securing EU accession for Cyprus, and then from his strong position to attain a solution of the Cyprus issue according to Papadopoulos' own desires. Alvaro de Soto, the special adviser of the UN Secretary General on the Cyprus issue, blamed president Papadopoulos for having ensured, through his speech on 7 April 2004, that the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan. According to de Soto this speech had a "galvanising effect" against the acceptance of the unification plan.²² The president spent "55 minutes outlining its flaws and barely five seconds on its advantages".²³ Instead of trying to gain support for the compromise, Papadopoulos strengthened the expectation among Greek Cypriots that a resolution of the Cyprus issue was possible which fit their ideal of a perfect conflict resolution to a great extent. The attitude taken by the government must be evaluated as not following a Europeanisation approach.²⁴

In the parliament only the DISY party (Dimokratikos Synergasmos, Democratic Assembly) supported the Annan plan. The President's party DIKO (Dimokratiko Komma, Democratic Party), EDEK (Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosis Kentrou/Kinima Sosialdemokratikon, United Democratic Union of Centre/Movement of Social Democrats) as well as AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazemenou Laou, Progressive Party of the Working People) were against the Annan plan. AKEL presented itself in a rather contradictory manner. More than other parties, AKEL had been engaged in bi-communal initiatives in the past. AKEL's leader Dimitris Christofias created the slogan that he was in favour of a "soft No" towards the Annan plan in order "to cement the Yes" for a better settlement of the conflict. AKEL had supported the election of Papadopoulos as President, and on the other hand Christofias was elected as the Parliament's speaker. This fact may have had an influence on AKEL's rather incoherent behaviour. It became evident that the Greek Cypriot parties, apart from DISY, did not follow an approach of Europeanisation.

The same must be said with respect to the media. About ten newspapers in Greek language appear regularly in the Republic of Cyprus. Among them only two papers made positive comments on the Annan plan: "Alithia", as a newspaper with a restricted circulation, and "Politis", which is estimated to be No. 2 among all newspapers. "Alithia" is affiliated to the DISY party,

21 See A. Heraclides (2004) 'The Cyprus Problem: An Open and Shut Case? Probing the Greek-Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 375-4.

22 See V. Coufoudakis (2004) 'Cyprus – the Referendum and its Aftermath', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 67-82.

23 N. Kadritzke (2004) 'Cyprus: Saying No to the Future', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 21 May 2004 [<http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07/cyprus>].

24 There is a huge debate about the alleged or real pro-Turkish/Turkish Cypriot bias of the Annan plan in its five versions. For the Greek Cypriots this was one of the major reasons to reject the plan and not to open the way for conflict settlement through Europeanisation. The perspective of EU membership was a lever to overcome the No-say tradition among Turkish Cypriots.

whereas "Politis" declares itself to be independent. When it came to the Annan plan, all the other newspapers saw more negative than positive aspects. They thereby strengthened an already existing critical and negative mindset among the Greek Cypriots. The fact that "Politis" did not follow the mainstream had consequences: The paper lost the majority of its advertisements, and the Orthodox Archbishop Chrysostomos I blamed "Politis" for being a "Greek-speaking Turkish newspaper".²⁵ The media's attitude must be characterised as not being Europeanised.

As many opinion surveys have confirmed impressively, the Greek Cypriot *people* also opposed the Annan plan, for three main reasons: firstly because of security regulations, secondly because of property regulations, and thirdly because of the prospective restrictions on freedom of settlement. In the evaluation of the Annan plan, the question as to what extent the acceptance of European values and norms as well as the handling of the conflict through European institutions would have eased resolution of the conflict between the ethnic groups, was not paramount.²⁶

Rather, the question was always whether the Annan plan corresponded to participants' ideas of an ideal conflict resolution or not. Seen in this light, the Annan plan demanded too many compromises for the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots. The Annan plan was, therefore, unable to succeed because among the Greek Cypriots:

- only 14.7% saw the bicomunal federation as being an "ideal solution",
- 76% saw it as necessary for the Turkish troops to be retracted more quickly,
- 60.7% found a one-sided right of intervention unacceptable,
- 40.2% did not want to have international judges sitting in the highest court,
- 42.9% were against permanent restrictions on freedom of movement,
- 50.2% supported territorial adjustments on a larger scale in favour of the Greek Cypriots,
- 63% advocated more generous returning of property,
- 74.7% wished to bring back more settlers to Anatolia than provided for in the Annan plan
- 72.7% perceived the costs for a reunification of Cyprus as being too much to be passed on to the Greek Cypriots.²⁷

As regards a unified Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side understood this to mean that the state would then be a successor of the Republic of Cyprus, and that according to the *Acquis Communautaire* the freedoms of establishment, acquisition of property and the return of refugees

25 For more empirical details here as well as in other parts of the article see H.-J. Axt, O. Schwarz and S. Wiegand (2008) *Konfliktbeilegung durch Europäisierung?...*, *op. cit.*

26 When it is argued by the Greek Cypriot side that the property regulations and the restrictions on the freedom of settlement were violating the norms of the European Union it should be remembered that the EU has accepted these deviations.

27 See A. Lordos. (2005) *Civil Society Diplomacy: A New Approach for Cyprus?* Nicosia [<http://www.help-net.gr/CivilSocietyDiplomacy.pdf>].

should be restricted as little as possible. Compared to this, less importance was attached to the fact that orientation towards the EU also held an offer for conflicts to be resolved in accordance with norms and values aimed at compromises. The Greek ethnic group did not pursue any policy of Europeanisation in 2004. Whether they will adapt such a policy now that Cyprus has become a EU member is an open question and will be the subject of future analysis.

The Turkish Cypriots

On the Turkish Cypriot side a clear strategy of Europeanisation was pursued with regard to the Annan plan. Here the calculation of EU membership for the Turkish Cypriot ethnic group was clearly of primary importance. It was therefore a “calculus approach” towards Europeanisation:

In the *government* Rauf Denктаş, who was against the Annan plan, was challenged by Mehmet Ali Talat, who wanted to secure EU accession by agreeing to the plan. The president in the north of Cyprus had a position which was not as strong as that of the Greek Cypriot president. Only his strong charismatic aura and his uncontested position as leader of the ethnic group (backed by Turkey) had secured Denктаş an absolutely dominant role when it came to negotiations between both ethnic groups. However, Denктаş had lost this position since the Turkish Government backed him no longer and the Turkish Cypriots had begun in increasing measure to express a favourable attitude towards the Annan plan and the EU perspectives tied in with it. This allowed Prime Minister Talat greater freedom to act. The parties which emerged as victors of the elections of 13 December 2003 were those which had shown a positive attitude to the Annan plan. In contrast to Denктаş, Talat described the Annan plan as the “best plan” that could be attained.²⁸ Hence Talat was in accordance with the mood among his compatriots and was able to gain something like “cultural hegemony”.

The parties who were in favour of accepting the Annan plan and were represented in the *parliament*, CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Turkish Republican Party) and BDH (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi, Movement for Peace and Democracy) were largely able to prevail against their rivals from the UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, National Unity Party) and DP (Demokrat Parti, Democratic Party). In the parliamentary elections of 13 December 2003 those parties who had expressed support for the Annan plan were able to win. On 13 January 2004 Talat was elected Prime Minister. He replaced Derviş Eroğlu, who was among the opponents of the Annan plan. On one hand Talat’s deputy Serdar Denктаş, who simultaneously functioned as Foreign Minister, took a clearly critical position towards the unification initiative of Annan. On the other hand the BDH party under Mustafa Akinci also expressed support for the Annan plan.²⁹ Like Talat, the

28 Press and Information Office (2004) *Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 01-02.04.2004* [<http://www.moi.govcy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/59C8631EA0F6F930C2256E6A00388B59?OpenDocument>].

29 The distribution of seats in the parliament elected in 2003, with around 50 members of parliament, was as follows: CTP 19, UBP 18, BDH 6 and DP 7 seats. Speaking purely in terms of numbers, a coalition between the two pro-

parties CTP and BDH also supported a course of Europeanisation, according to the “calculus approach”.

In the media the position of the supporters of the Annan plan was more strongly represented than that of the opponents. While negotiations were taking place on the Annan plan, the media in the north of Cyprus reported intensively. The same was true for the electronic media: “In the immediate weeks leading up to the referendum, Turkish Cypriot radio and television channels broadcast debates and question-and-answer sessions on the Annan Plan several days of the week”.³⁰ “Kıbrıs” can be seen as being the newspaper with the greatest circulation and influence. Its circulation exceeds that of all other newspapers together. Along with “Afrika”, which is admittedly much less widely distributed, “Kıbrıs” expressed support for the Annan plan and the EU perspective. “Kıbrıs” found its way into the camp of the supporters in a surprising manner. The newspaper was a supporter of the Denktaş course for a long time, but switched sides and supported the negotiation efforts of Kofi Annan.³¹ The mass demonstrations in northern Cyprus may well have played an important role in determining this. Among the supporters a decisive argument was that the plan of the UN General Secretary satisfied the desire for equal political rights held by the Turkish Cypriots. In this respect the referendum was seen as an act of self-determination. The fact that northern Cyprus was under the control of Turkey was criticised sharply again and again. A few examples of this are: when Denktaş stayed away from the negotiations in Bürgenstock – this was criticised by the press. “Kıbrıslı” wrote that the “trick” had been in vain, because Greece and particularly Turkey with their Prime Minister had been present.³² In the newspaper “Afrika”, massive doubt was cast over whether Denktaş had pursued the negotiations “with good intentions”, as every night on television he had made an appeal for a “No” campaign, and behind the scenes he had organised demonstrations against peace and unification.³³ It can therefore be noted for the majority of the media that they supported a course of Europeanisation according to the model of the “calculus approach”.

And in the *people* a clearly utilitarian trait was expressed, as the general agreement with the Annan plan was connected to the hope of gaining a higher standard of living as soon as they

Annan parties CTP and DP would have gained a majority in the parliament. Talat decided against this combination. It is presumed that influence from Turkey was responsible for this.

30 A.-S. Jakobsson Hatay (2004) ‘Popular Referenda and Peace Processes: The Twin Referenda on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus Put in Perspective’ in *Turkish Daily News*, 4 May 2004 [<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/>].

31 See T. Bahçeli (2004) ‘Saying Yes to EU Accession: Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome’, *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 55-65.

32 See Press and Information Office (2004) *Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 19.03.2004* [<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/A11/A54AEE8821D43454C2256E5C00430AD6?OpenDocument>].

33 See Press and Information Office, *Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 06.-07.-08.03.2004* [<http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/A11/ADB1F64F47E012F7C2256E51003C8A3E?OpenDocument>].

became a member of the EU. This is confirmed by corresponding surveys.³⁴ According to Lordos, Kaymak and Faiz, 69% of the Turkish Cypriots saw the prospect of EU membership as a decisive motive for a positive attitude towards the Annan plan: "For Turkish Cypriots, an indirect aspect of the Annan plan was that it would immediately render them full members of the European Union. This factor was indeed a prime determinant of referendum vote: For Turkish Cypriots the Annan plan referendum was partly a referendum on EU accession".³⁵ With regard to the question of what motivated the desire for a solution of the Cyprus problem, answers ranged from the pursuit of better economic conditions – mentioned most frequently – followed by the desires to have a stronger international voice, to avoid the risk of a war and to enjoy the benefits of EU membership.³⁶ Above all, on the Turkish Cypriot side the following motives were connected with a resolution of the Cyprus conflict: "To become members of the European Union, to escape economic isolation, to become 'the masters of their own house', to overcome the risk of another war, to be re-united with the Greek Cypriots (secondary motive), to be able to return to ancestral homes that are now in the south (secondary motive)".³⁷

The positive evaluation of the Annan plan was also reflected in the numerous demonstrations and initiatives on the part of civil society which took place in favour of the unification of the island. On 14 March 2002 around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots, representing around one-third of the entire population, had already demonstrated in support of the mediation efforts of Kofi Annan and EU accession. Mass demonstrations repeatedly took place under the slogan "This Land is Ours". In August 2002, eighty-six Turkish Cypriot organisations, with a total of 38,000 members, had signed a common statement called "Common Vision", which characteristically began with the sentence: "We support the direct talks aimed at finding a political settlement in Cyprus and the European Union membership of the new Partnership State that will be formed with the solution ... In order to solve our problems, we need a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU membership ..."³⁸ It must therefore be concluded that Turkish Cypriot society followed a course of Europeanisation corresponding to the model of the "calculus approach".

As demonstrated in table 2 the Hexagon of Conflict Settlement assumes that the probability to settle a conflict through Europeanisation is the highest when both conflict partners prefer a

34 In the evaluation of the surveys the problem arose that it could scarcely be distinguished whether the informants were Turkish Cypriots or immigrants from Anatolia.

35 See A. Lordos (2005) *Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survey-based Profile Analysis of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Referendum Voters* [<http://www.cypruspolls.org/RationalOrUnthinking.pdf>].

36 See A. Lordos, M. Faiz and C. Carras (2005) *Options for Peace. Mapping the Possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus*, Nicosia, p. 32 [<http://www.cypruspolls.org/OptionsForPeaceTextAndCharts.pdf>].

37 See A. Lordos and M. Faiz: *Getting to "Yes". Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Public Perceptions Concerning a Possible Solution to the Cyprus Problem*, [<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/LordosFaizPresentation.pdf>].

38 See *The Common Vision of the Turkish Civil Society* [<http://www.dzforum.de/0501001.php>].

cultural approach of Europeanisation. If both sides prefer a calculus approach the probability is considered to be moderate, and if no Europeanisation can be identified on both sides it is assumed that the probability of conflict settlement is non-existent. Considering the situation in Cyprus the following must be noted: The fact that only the Turkish but not the Greek Cypriots took advantage of the chance to understand the Annan plan as conflict resolution through Europeanisation ultimately led to the failure of the Annan plan. While the Greek Cypriots did not hope for a resolution of the conflict through Europeanisation, the Turkish Cypriots did, although with a clearly formed “calculus approach”. It is concluded that this configuration was unable to lead to a successful resolution of the conflict.

Table 2: Probability of Conflict Settlement through Europeanisation

		Turkish Cypriots		
		<i>(no Europeanisation)</i>	<i>(calculus approach)</i>	<i>(cultural approach)</i>
Greek Cypriots	<i>(no Europeanisation)</i>	no	no	low
	<i>(calculus approach)</i>	no	low	moderate
	<i>(cultural approach)</i>	low	moderate	high

The Current Negotiation Process

Since 3 September 2008 a total of twenty-nine rounds of negotiation have taken place between the leaders of the two ethnic groups. Six intercommunal working groups on the topics of government, EU, property, security, economics and territory have been set up. Seven working groups are working on aspects of criminality, trade, cultural heritage, crises, humanitarian activities, health and the environment. The atmosphere for negotiations, by Cypriot standards, is unusually constructive and familiar. From time to time, of course, the conflicts of interest become clear, as for instance when Talat insists on the continued presence of Turkish troops or the role of Turkey as a guarantor power as well as the principle of the “virgin birth of the new state” or when Prime Minister Eroğlu stated that it is impossible to compromise on the Greek Cypriots’ proposals on the issue of property as that would imply that the “two states” principle would be removed. The same applies for statements of Christofias when he emphasises again and again that any conflict resolution must be compatible with the *Acquis Communautaire* of the EU, implying the right, which is unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots, to free settlement and acquisition of property in the north. On 23 May 2008 Talat and Christofias agreed on basic principles of the reunited Cyprus. Both leaders committed themselves to a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions. This partnership will comprise a Federal Government with a single international personality, along with a Turkish Cypriot

Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status".³⁹ As observers noted, progress was made with the working groups concerning government, EU and economy. On the other sensitive issues like security, territory and property no obvious progress was made.⁴⁰

As regards the current moods of both ethnic groups, the EU perspective still seems to be attractive among Turkish Cypriots, even if there is disappointment with relation to the fact that the EU has been unable to fulfil the hopes it had fed of direct trade and comprehensive financial help. While in early 2007, 67% of respondents still spoke positively about the EU, in the autumn it was only 55%.⁴¹ The polls indicate that the Turkish Cypriots are far less supportive of a future settlement and the concessions made in the Annan plan. The parliamentary elections of 19 April 2009 gave the UBP a majority of 44.02%, so that Derviş Eroğlu, who was one of the opponents of the Annan plan, became the new Prime Minister – a setback for the will to compromise and for Talat, but one which did not change the fact that he remains responsible for intercommunal dialogue. The judgement of the European Court of Justice in the "Orams" case revived resentment against the EU.⁴² The fact that the EU suspended eight items in the accession negotiations with Turkey is also commented on negatively by Turkish Cypriots. Talat stated that the opening of the Turkish ports for ships and aircraft from the Republic of Cyprus as demanded by the EU would be evaluated as a step backwards in Cyprus negotiations.⁴³ Statements like this made it clear that Talat followed a policy which was more in line with the policy of Turkey after the Annan plan failed. As far the Greek Cypriots are concerned, President Christofias presents himself as being much more flexible and willing to compromise than his predecessor Papadopoulos was. The fact that the Greek Cypriot side insists so much on the implementation of the *Acquis Communautaire* of the EU is not interpreted in the north as faithfulness to the EU, but as the attempt to pursue the traditional goals of unlimited property acquisition and settling in northern Cyprus. As far as the media and the public are concerned, they remain unchanging in their rejection of a unification plan which demands compromises such as those stipulated in the Annan plan.

39 UN News Service [<http://un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=26778>].

40 See H. Faustmann (2008) 'History in the Making? A New Drive for a Solution of the Cyprus Problem', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 453-458, here p. 458.

41 See European Commission (2007) *Standard Eurobarometer 67. Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels, November 2007 [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf]; European Commission (2008) *Standard Eurobarometer 68. Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels, May 2008 [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf].

42 The case concerns a Greek Cypriot who is seeking to regain possession of his land in Lapta, north Cyprus which is currently occupied by the Orams. See 'Raised Voices and Increased Opposition from North Cyprus Community', *The Observer 12.06.2009* [http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/News_Details.aspx?id=4040].

43 See K. Hughes (2006) 'Glimmer of Light on Cyprus', BBC News [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/5256414.stm>].

Current surveys in both parts of Cyprus suggest that there continue to be contrary perceptions and interests, but also some convergent attitudes between the two ethnic groups.⁴⁴ Concerning these surveys Turkish Cypriots mistrust Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community, whereas Greek Cypriots mistrust Turkey, bringing to the fore the double-minority characterisation of the conflict. On the other hand Greek and Turkish Cypriots tend not to identify themselves as Greeks or Turks exclusively, and both communities share an affinity to Cyprus. It is interesting to take note of the perceptions regarding the locus of political control within the other community: the Greek Cypriots note that the Turkish Cypriots are mere puppets in the hands of Ankara, whereas the Turkish Cypriots perceive that the Orthodox Church in the Greek Cypriot Community is somehow an equal partner of the president and the National Council in the formulation of Cyprus problem policy. This reflects a narrative that has been frozen in time since the early days of the conflict. Both sides are rather pessimistic regarding the actual peace process: only 18% of Greek Cypriots and 13% of Turkish Cypriots express unambiguous hope about a positive outcome. Among Turkish Cypriots support for federalism is waning. Support for an 'ideal' two-state solution has increased since the failed referendum of 2004. Greek Cypriots on the other hand consider a unitary state solution satisfactory. Under these circumstances a federal settlement might be a compromise for both sides. As shown in table 3 both sides do not converge on the most sensitive issues such as veto rights in the decision-making process, property, settlers, security, residence and census.

Table 3: Sensitive Issues between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

	Acceptance	
	Greek Cypriots	Turkish Cypriots
"Each community should have the right to unilaterally block any decision or legislation of the federal government that it considers to be incompatible with its own communal interests"	41%	72%
"The property issue should be solved primarily through restitution, so that affected individuals will regain control of their properties as they had them before the events of the Cyprus problem"	91%	42%
"All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of those who have married Turkish Cypriots and the children of such mixed marriages"	65%	23%
"After the settlement, Cyprus should be fully demilitarised. All foreign troops should withdraw and all Cypriot armies should be disbanded"	66%	17%
"In the context of a settlement, all, or almost all of the Greek Cypriots should live in the Greek Cypriot state, while all, or almost all of the Turkish Cypriots should live in the Turkish Cypriot state"	27%	66%

44 See E. Kaymak, A. Lordos and N. Tocci (2008) *Building Confidence in Peace. Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process*, Brussels [http://shop.ccps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1748].

Whereas confidence-building measures such as fighting organised crime, bi-communal sporting events, protecting cultural heritage, reconciliation committees and Turkish Cypriot EU harmonisation are widely accepted by both communities, it is important to note that the acceptance of compromises as they were incorporated within the Annan plan and as they will reappear in one form or another in a new settlement plan is more opposed by the Greek Cypriots. Nine per cent of the Greek Cypriots could imagine that the compromises laid down in the Annan plan could be the basis of a future settlement, whereas 29% of the Turkish Cypriots answered positively in this respect – both figures are not promising ones.⁴⁵ This is the foundation upon which perspectives for the coming future can be elaborated.

Perspectives

Of course, at the present time it cannot be predicted whether, and in what way, the process of negotiation which began in 2008 will succeed. The analyses carried out with the help of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement”, in combination with the current opinion polls, makes two conclusions seem highly plausible.

Firstly, the attitude of the Greek Cypriots towards concessions to the Turkish Cypriot side is still very critical. This is expressed particularly in the attitude towards the Annan plan. Even if it is currently emphasised again and again precisely in the south that the current negotiations are to bring different results from those contained in the Annan plan, in view of the heterogeneous interests of the two ethnic groups, compromises will have to be found which mirror the philosophy of the Annan plan. The compromise-making possibilities are, after all, not limitless. Even if it seems to be very advantageous from the point of view of the Greek Cypriots that a solution “from Cypriots for Cypriots” is now to be found, agreement to the result of the negotiations on the Greek Cypriot side will depend on the political leaders of the south, above all President Christofias, applying all political impetus to gain support for the result of the negotiations not only among the people, but also among the media. This is a key lesson from the failed Annan initiative, in which President Papadopoulos did not carry out this task, but instead mobilised feeling against the reconciliation plan. If a referendum would be held in early 2010 time is running short.

Secondly, EU perspectives remain attractive for the Turkish Cypriots, whatever unification plan they are tied to, regardless of all disappointments regarding the conduct of the EU after 2004. Problems, however, may loom with Turkey. In 2004 Ankara supported the Annan plan primarily because goodwill was required in order to avoid creating obstacles for the opening of the EU accession negotiations; nevertheless, this is no longer the current situation. The EU is no longer holding out any “carrots” for Turkey. On the contrary, eight issues have become blocked in the accession negotiations, and no agreement is in sight between Ankara and Brussels with respect to

45 See *op. cit.*, p. 30-31.

the requirement to open Turkish harbours and airports for ships and aeroplanes from the Republic of Cyprus, and signals from EU states are increasing which are critical of or even oppose EU membership for Turkey. In a traditional manner Turkey is, however, following a “give and take” policy. It demands concessions from the EU if it is to show itself ready to compromise with regard to Cyprus. For this reason, it is difficult to calculate the likely attitude of Ankara if the two ethnic groups of Cyprus were to agree on a unification plan. It cannot be ruled out that Ankara might withhold its support. What will be decisive will be whether the Turkish military figures who see the Cyprus problem exclusively from the point of view of national security, can prevail. The “window of opportunity” held open in 2004 may be closed in the near future by Turkey.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Commission of the European Communities (2004) *Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the Situation Resulting from its Application. Communication from the Commission*, COM (2005) 320 final, Brussels, 14 July 2005.
- Commission of the European Communities (2009) *Report from the Commission to the Council. Annual Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the Situation Resulting from its Application*, SEC (2009) 1182, Brussels, 14 September 2009 [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkish_cypriot_community/glr_report_en.pdf].
- European Commission (2007) *Standard Eurobarometer 67. Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels, November 2007 [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf].
- European Commission (2008) *Standard Eurobarometer 68. Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels, May 2008 [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf].
- Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (2007) *Konfliktbarometer 2006*, Heidelberg [http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2007.pdf].
- Press and Information Office (2004) *Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 06.-07.-08.03.2004* [http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/All/ADB1F64F47E012F7C2256E51003C8A3E?OpenDocument].
- Press and Information Office (2004) *Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 19.03.2004* [http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/All/A54AEE8821D43454C2256E5C00430AD6?OpenDocument].
- Press and Information Office (2004) *Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 01.-02.04.2004* [http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/59C8631EA0F6F930C2256E6A00388B59?OpenDocument].
- The Common Vision of the Turkish Civil Society* [http://www.dzforum.de/0501001.php].
- UN News Service [http://un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=26778].
- UNFICYP (2007) *The Blue Beret. The UN in Cyprus. An Inter-Communal Survey*, special edition. Nicosia, April 2007.

Secondary Sources

- Axt, H.-J. (1999) 'The Island of Cyprus and the European Union' in Dodd, C. (ed.), *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, pp. 174-194.
- Axt, H.-J. and Choisi, J. (1998) 'Politisches System' [Political System] in Grothusen, K.-D., Steffani, W. and Zervakis, P. (eds.), *Zypern. Südosteuropa-Handbuch* [Cyprus. Southeast Europe Handbook], Vol. VIII, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, pp. 196-239.
- Axt, H.-J., Milososki, A. and Schwarz, O. (2007) 'Europäisierung – ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht und Forschungsfragen' [Europeanisation – A Vast Area. Literature Report and Research Questions], *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 136-149.
- Axt, H.-J., Schwarz, O. and Wiegand, S. (2008) *Konfliktbeilegung durch Europäisierung? Zypernfrage, Ägäiskonflikt und griechisch-mazedonischer Namensstreit* [Conflict Settlement through Europeanisation? Cyprus Question, Aegean Conflict and Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute]. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.
- Bahceli, T. (2004) 'Saying Yes to EU Accession: Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 55-65.
- Coufoudakis, V. (2004) 'Cyprus – The Referendum and its Aftermath', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 67-82.
- Diez, T., Pace, M., Rumelili, B. and Jevgenia, V. (2006) *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association (EUBorderConf). Final Report (2003-2005)*, Birmingham, September 2006 [<http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/EUBorderConf%20Final%20Report%20revised.pdf>].
- Faustmann, H. (2008) 'History in the Making? A New Drive for a Solution of the Cyprus Problem', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 453-458.
- Gartzke, E., Li, Q. and Boehmer, C. (2001) 'Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict', *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 391-438.
- Heraclides, A. (2004) 'The Cyprus Problem: An Open and Shut Case? Probing the Greek-Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 375-4.
- Hughes, K. (2006) 'Glimmer of Light on Cyprus', BBC News. Available at [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/5256414.stm>], accessed on 5 January 2008.
- Jakobsson Hatay, A.-S. (2004) 'Popular Referenda and Peace Processes: The Twin Referenda on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus Put in Perspective' in *Turkish Daily News*, 4 May 2004 [<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/>].
- Kadritzke, N. (2004) 'Cyprus: Saying No to the Future', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 21 May 2004 [<http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07/cyprus>].
- Kaymak, E., Lordos, A. and Tocci, N. (2008) *Building Confidence in Peace. Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process*, Brussels. Available from [http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1748], accessed on 17 November 2009.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. and Faustmann, H. (eds.) (2008) *The Government and Politics of Cyprus*. Oxford: Peter Lang.
- Lijphart, A. (1974) 'Consociational Democracy' in McRae, K.D. (ed.), *Consociational Democracy. Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library.
- Lordos, A. (2005) *Civil Society Diplomacy: A New Approach for Cyprus?* Nicosia. Available from [<http://www.help-net.gr/CivilSocietyDiplomacy.pdf>], accessed on 17 November 2009.

- (2005) *Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survey-based Profile Analysis of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Referendum Voters*. Available from [<http://www.cypruspolls.org/RationalOrUnthinking.pdf>], accessed on 17 November 2009.
- Lordos, A., Faiz, M. and Carras, C. (2005) *Options for Peace. Mapping the Possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus*, Nicosia. Available from [<http://www.cypruspolls.org/OptionsForPeaceTextAndCharts.pdf>], accessed on 17 November 2009.
- Lordos, A. and Faiz, M. (2005) *Getting to "Yes". Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Public Perceptions Concerning a Possible Solution to the Cyprus Problem*. Available from [<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/LordosFaizPresentation.pdf>], accessed on 17 November 2009.
- Oneal, J.R. (1996) 'The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 11-28.
- Palley, C. (2006) *An International Relations Debacle. The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices 1999-2004*, Oxford UK/Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.
- Radaelli, C. (2004) 'Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?', *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 8, No. 16, p. 4. Available at [<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf>], accessed on 17 November 2009.
- 'Raised Voices and Increased Opposition from North Cyprus Community', *The Observer*, 12 June 2009. Available from [<http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/NewsDetails.aspx?id=4040>], accessed on 14 June 2009.
- Russett, B. and Oneal, J.R. (2001) *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: WW. Norton and Company.
- Stavrinides, Z. (1999) 'Greek Cypriot Perceptions' in Dodd, C. (ed.), *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, pp. 54-96.
- Theophanous, A. (2004) *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise*. Nicosia: Intercollege Press.

The EU's Role in the Cyprus Question

COSTAS MELAKOPIDES

Abstract

In contrast to erstwhile arguments to the effect that the EU has no, or only limited, role to play in the settlement of the convoluted Cyprus Question, this essay will try to show, first, that, not only has the EU been actively involved in the concomitant issues for years, but this involvement has been perforce enhanced since the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Second, the profound legal, political and ethical anomaly caused by the continuing Turkish occupation of 37% of Cyprus should mobilise the EU even further, since the illegal occupation of Cypriot territory entails today the military occupation of EU territory. Third, the EU's self-proclaimed principles and values should be applied fully to the Republic of Cyprus on pain of a striking normative self-contradiction. Finally, while the EU's obligation to facilitate the settlement of the Cyprus Question is demonstrable, its satisfaction will bring about enormous benefits, beyond the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to Turkey, Greece, and the EU itself.

Keywords: "Normative power Europe", Cyprus Question, EU principles and values, Turkey's EU candidacy, Cyprus' "ethical acquis"

Introduction

Besides notorious legal, political, and geopolitical issues, the 'Cyprus Question' is burdened by heavy 'conceptual' or definitional problems while being a source of deep methodological puzzles. *Inter alia*, the former problems include the very nature of the 'Cyprus Question' as either primarily an 'inter-communal conflict' or as a paradigm case of an international dispute. Needless to say, the decision on this matter affects immediately the analyst's methodological choice: in the latter case, the proper method necessitates employing the instruments and means of international law, international ethics, institutional analysis, and so forth; whereas conceiving the question as essentially 'inter-communal' carries with it distinct analytic tools.

Similarly, what 'Cyprus' denotes today differs radically depending on whether it is treated by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) or by the Greek Cypriots (GCs) and the international community, including the EU. For whereas the 'Republic of Cyprus' is the only internationally recognised state and an EU full member since 1 May 2004, Turkey, although a candidate for membership, tenaciously refuses to recognise it. Moreover, it remains alone in the world in recognising the secessionist 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC'). This results from Turkey's 1974 military intervention and the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the secessionist regime. Turkey's problem, however, is that the international community – through

such organisations, as the United Nations and the EC/EU, and such courts as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Communities – has condemned the 1974 action as “invasion”, that is, by definition *illegal*. Moreover, the international community condemned immediately the UDI as legally null and void. Therefore, it has not recognised it because it *could* not. Turkey, however, refuses to abide by the cardinal principles and norms of the global legal culture for two primary reasons: first, its attributes of hard power – including size of territory and population, and geo-strategic and geo-economic significance – have ingratiated it to powerful friends (such as Washington and London) who tolerate Turkey’s disregard of the aforementioned principles and norms for crude *Realpolitik* reasons. And secondly, the first reason, *in tandem* with a host of historical, demographic, socio-psychological and ideological characteristics, has resulted in Turkey’s *sui generis* political culture. This political culture determines in large measure its foreign policy-making, which is marked, *inter alia*, by narcissistic arrogance, excessive ambition, and inventive pettifoggery.

For its part, the EU has supplied Cyprus with a helping – political, legal and ethical – hand *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Among other things, the Union has raised consistently the issue of the occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory; it condemned immediately the 1983 UDI; and has accepted the entire Republic as a full member since 2004. For the Greek Cypriots, however, this cannot possibly suffice: first, the massive and traumatic violation of their, and the Turkish Cypriots’, human rights has lasted for too long; second, the fact that Cypriot territory is under illegal occupation entails that EU territory suffers similarly; and third, it follows that the long overdue application of the EU’s celebrated principles and values to the ‘Cyprus Question’ is necessary, and may become sufficient, to bring about the fair and functional reunification of the Island. In other words, and besides its other dimensions, the ‘Cyprus Question’ emerges today as an *ethical test-case* for the EU.

The GCs insist that they are working diligently to settle the Cyprus problem. They regard their goodwill as self-evident, since they extend friendship and material support to the TCs; they raised no obstacles to the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations; and they work towards the problem’s fair and functional resolution. Simultaneously, they perceive Turkey’s bad faith and intransigence – in ignoring the international legal and ethical pronouncements – as deriving from the arrogance of hard power and exploitation of the occupation as leverage for eventual EU accession. Meanwhile, although the entire Republic is now a full member state, the presence of 40,000 Turkish occupation troops prevents the *acquis communautaire* from being applied to the ‘TRNC’ until the settlement of the country’s (legal/political/ethical) problem. Numerous international initiatives – primarily by the UN – to settle the problem have failed. The last such initiative, known as the ‘Annan Plan’, was endorsed by the TCs and the thousands of illegal Turkish settlers in ‘TRNC’; the GCs, however, rejected it as unfair and nonviable, by an overwhelming 76%.¹ According to that plan, its rejection by either Cypriot community would

1 See C. Melakopides (2006a) *Unfair Play: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the EU*. Kingston, Canada: Queen’s University Centre for International Relations.

render it 'null and void'. And yet, those who worked for the plan's endorsement – primarily the UK, the US and Turkey – are at pains to revive it. All this explains why the Greek Cypriots are experiencing anger and frustration caused by their unbearable condition. These sentiments are mitigated by the EU accession in 2004 and the EURO zone entry on 1 January 2008. However, neither these successes nor what this author refers to as Cyprus' "*ethical acquis*" – denoting the Union's tendency to apply its principles and values to the Republic of Cyprus – suffice to eradicate the Greek Cypriots' sense of intolerable unfairness.

It is the author's considered opinion that this schematic account of the 'Cyprus Question' implies that it constitutes an *essentially international dispute*, as shown by the manifest and persistent involvement in it of numerous states and groups of states, and by the countless decisions and actions of international organisations and international courts. Needless to say, the 'inter-communal' dimension of the Cyprus problem is not nugatory: but being secondary or tertiary – as compared to the problem's international character – it should not be elevated to its 'essential' character or level. For to do the latter would only serve those who, fastening on exclusively *Realpolitik* perceptions and conceptions, want to escape or evade the legal and ethical issues that have marked the protracted tragedy of Cyprus. Therefore, this essay is obliged to demonstrate: (1) the solid legal grounds for the international condemnation of Turkey's invasion and occupation; (2) the EU's Cyprus-related decisions and actions that amount to Cyprus' "*ethical acquis*"; (3) the Union's self-proclaimed principles and values that should – on pain of self-contradiction – be applied fully to the Republic's 'existential' problem; and (4) European Union instruments and means that can be mobilised to clear the way for the *principled and functional* resolution of the Republic's legal, political, and ethical problem. Consequently, this essay will combine legal/institutional analysis with a presentation of the normative implications.

The 'Cyprus Question' and International Law

Given that the 1974 Turkish invasion was immediately and universally condemned, it is not necessary to provide here yet another historical 'narrative' of pre-1974 Cypriot history. For, if all such historical accounts are thoroughly affected by ideological, methodological, nationalistic, and other biases, it follows as far wiser to rely on the universal consensus generated by the international community's response to Turkey's 1974 double military intervention.² Since this response was

2 Alternative approaches are weakened, *inter alia*, by the subjectivism clouding the identification of those responsible for past 'inter-communal' conflicts; the question of the precise guilt of the pre-independence colonial power; the issue of the numbers and comparisons of casualties; the problem whether the Turkish Cypriots were bent on, and preparing for, *Taksim* (partition) since the mid-1950s or were just 'kicked out' of running the newly-founded Republic; and, perhaps most important, the question of deciding on the starting point and historical time-frame of the 'inter-communal' analysis. When all is said and done, the latter analysis is favoured by those holding the Greek Cypriots primarily – if not exclusively – responsible for 'the Cyprus Question'. It is submitted however, that to give pride of analytic place to the pre-1974 inter-communal conflicts and allege the Greek Cypriots' primary

premised on the fundamental principles and norms of international law, the critical question becomes: Why did the international community condemn the military intervention as an “invasion”, i.e. as by definition contrary to international law? For present purposes, the following schematic answer should suffice.

To begin with, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter establishes the solid prohibition of force, and even of the threat to use it, in inter-state relations. Ankara and its defenders, therefore, have been forced to orchestrate a massive *rationalisation* of the 1974 invasion. The relevant arguments have been premised primarily on (a) the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, frequently on (b) individual self-defence, and occasionally on (c) humanitarian intervention.

Treaty of Guarantee

This is the prime stereotype long employed in Ankara’s ‘justification’ of the invasion and the continuing occupation. As recently as February 2005, asked by a Greek Cypriot journalist, “When will your occupation troops leave Cyprus?”, Mr. Abdullah Gül replied: “What occupation troops? Our troops are there because of international treaties!”³ The *only* thing Mr Gül could refer to is Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Signed by Britain, Greece and Turkey as “guarantors” of the Republic’s 1960 Constitution, this treaty stipulated that, should a constitutional breach occur, consultations among the three should lead to concerted action. Failing this, each guarantor reserved the right “to take action” but “with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the treaty”. Manifestly, therefore, Turkey’s refusal, since 1974, to re-establish the *status quo ante* equals the blatant violation of the territorial integrity and full sovereignty of Cyprus. Clearly, this should suffice to render Turkey’s rationalisation a non-starter. But Turkey’s claim that “to take action” allowed the use of *armed force* is also fatally flawed, since, if this were the case, the treaty would have been null and void *ab initio*. Indeed, according to Article 103 of the UN Charter,

guilt should entail confrontation with the following normative question: Could all this alleged guilt counterbalance and obliterate Turkey’s devastating invasion, the 35-year-long occupation, and the resulting massive and gross violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all legitimate Cypriots? In other words, could any Greek Cypriot guilt exculpate Turkey’s own guilt and consequent multifarious obligations? (Those untutored in the Cyprus Question may be shocked to know that the human cost of the invasion on the Greek side included: 6,000 dead; 180,000 refugees; and hundreds of missing persons. As for the material implications, they included the appropriation by Turkey of around 70% of Cyprus’ productive resources, according to *Strategic Survey 1974*, London: IISS, 1974, p. 82n).

- 3 Mr Gül’s interview with Ms Soula Chatzikiyriakou, *CyBC Evening News*, 11 February 2005. The very same formulation was used by Chief EU Negotiator, Egemen Bagish, in Ankara on 27 October 2009, in response to Dutch MEP Madlener, who called for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops: “The Turkish army is [in Cyprus] in the framework of international treaties ... in order to safeguard peace on the island”. Bagish Furious with Dutch MEP, *Philelefttheros* (Nicosia daily), 28 October 2009.

in case of conflict between UN Members' obligations under the Charter and obligations under other agreements, "their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". In fact, this is a cardinal reason why world-renown Canadian Law Professor, R.St.J. Macdonald, has evaluated Ankara's actions as clearly violating international law. He added, moreover, that his interpretation (i.e. "that treaty provisions inconsistent with the Charter are void *ab initio*") is also "preferred by Guggenheim, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice, McNair, and Schwarzenberger".⁴

Now it might be asked whether Turkey *could appeal* to the only two exceptions to Article 2(4), that is, Articles 51 and 53 regarding the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" and enforcement action based on a regional arrangement or agency. Professor Macdonald has addressed such a move as follows: "That the 1974 invasion was not an 'enforcement action' within the meaning of Articles 52 and 53 is fairly obvious". For whereas Article 53 necessitates submission to the Security Council, Turkey never made any such submission. Hence, before considering Article 51, here is Macdonald's general conclusion: "Unless the invasion is justified under Article 51 of the Charter, in which case it would be legal independently of the terms of the treaty, it would contravene Article 2(4). Since the intervention does not fall within the Article 53 exception to Article 2(4), then, by virtue of Article 103, compliance with the Treaty of Guarantee would not save it from illegality".⁵

Individual Self-Defence

As regards this exception, two possible grounds may be distinguished: (a) danger to the Turkish Cypriots; and (b) danger to Turkey itself. The former has been another attempted defence by Ankara's apologists. Its first major problem, however, is that the Turkish Cypriots are not, of course, *its nationals*. This fact suffices to cancel out Turkey's relevant move. Moreover, as Ian Brownlie has long established, Article 51 cannot be stretched to protect *even nationals* outside one's territorial jurisdiction.⁶ In this respect, noteworthy is also Professor Rosalyn Higgins' opinion on extraterritorial intervention: namely, that "at least a case" could be made for Israel's well-known "*in-and-out*" intervention at Entebbe because it did not "in any real sense infringe the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the state".⁷ Indeed, being "in-and-out", Israel's action to save *Israeli citizens*, strikes most of us as legally and morally permissible. And yet, respecting the established legal norms, the UN Secretary-General called it at the time "a flagrant aggression". Therefore, Turkey's "intervention", which *did not* involve Turkish nationals, which has resulted in

4 R.St.J. Macdonald (1981), p. 15.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

6 I. Brownlie (1963) *International Law and the Use of Force by States*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, as discussed by Macdonald (1981).

7 R. Higgins (1984), pp. 38-39.

the occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory, and lasts for over 35 years, must qualify *a fortiori* as “flagrant aggression”.

An identical conclusion is reached by the second aspect of the self-defence claim, concerning Turkey’s own security. To make a case, Turkey should have demonstrated either an imminent danger in 1974 or the certainty of a future attack against it. Because, however, both such claims are demonstrably absurd, Ankara itself never resorted to them. Hence Professor Macdonald concluded his own analysis as follows:

“[T]he facts are that Turkish Cypriots are not nationals of Turkey, and that Turkey was not in imminent danger of an armed attack as a result of the Greek coup d’etat”.⁸

Needless to say, precisely the same applies to any notion of a ‘future attack’ against Turkey by Cyprus or even by Cyprus and Greece combined. Suffice it to contemplate their foreign and defence policies, their asymmetrical military capabilities as compared to the Turkish colossus, and their distinct political cultures.

Humanitarian Intervention

It may be the case that the post-Cold War world has experienced some – albeit quite controversial – exceptions to international customary law regarding humanitarian interventions. At the time of Turkey’s invasion, however, the relevant customary law had recognised, as only exception, the *multilateral* confrontation of *genocide*. Moreover, it necessitated *proof* of an impending extermination. This is why the Security Council condemned, in January 1979, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, despite the utter barbarism perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime. Therefore, once again, Ankara’s 1974 invasion had to be condemned *a fortiori*: besides being unilateral, not even a remote suspicion of “genocidal” inclinations by or against anyone could arise. In addition, by trying to create and exploit a military *fait accompli*, Turkey’s invasion contradicted the *sine qua non* condition of purity of motives. As Professor McDonald anticipated back in 1981:⁹

“It is inappropriate to invoke the right of humanitarian intervention in regard to the 1974 invasion: as an anticipatory action, the intervention was premature and of a nature and duration in excess of what might have been necessary to achieve its humanitarian objective ... [I]t may lead to de facto secession of part of the state’s territory, and for this reason alone it seems difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the prohibition of Article 2(4). The intervention appears to have become an occupation”.

It follows that, whereas the first (July 1974) intervention *would have been* defensible had it

8 Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

restored the *status quo ante*, Turkey's second (August) invasion constitutes a 'flagrant aggression':¹⁰ first, it violated the cardinal norm of international law which prohibits the use of force; second, no available exception could negate its illegality; and third, the 1974 invasion has resulted in an over 35-year-old illicit occupation. It follows that any toleration of Turkey's actions contradicts the spirit of fundamental norms of international law, which are premised on disdain for the illegal use of military force and for the cynical exploitation of geo-strategic power. In Cyprus' case, the cynicism that has envisaged the exculpation of Turkey was legally and morally unbearable: for this exculpation would violate the cardinal principle *ex injuria jus non oritur*, that is, injustice does not create right.

The thesis that the 'Cyprus Question' constitutes an EU 'ethical test-case' is fortified by acknowledging that Turkey's invasion abused also the ethical principles of the time-honoured Just War Theory.¹¹ Its principal criteria include (a) a just cause, (b) the right intention, (c) war as a last resort, and (d) the principle of proportionality. A moment's reflection demonstrates that Turkey's invasion violated all of them. Therefore, to exculpate Ankara and to allow it to 'profit' from, as against paying for, its Cyprus aggression would compound the accumulated immorality.

For these reasons, the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights in *Loizidou v. Turkey* (1996 and 1998) and in the Fourth case of *Cyprus v. Turkey* (May 2001) are literally historic.¹² Equally historic is Turkey's paying Ms Loizidou about €1 million in November 2003 to compensate her for the violation of her right to enjoy her property in occupied Kerynia. Therefore, the Annan Plan's provision (see below) to wipe out Turkey's identical compensatory obligation towards all the Cypriot victims was legally and morally contemptible.

Such solid premises of international law have formed the central pillar of the international community's condemnation of Turkey's ongoing victimisation of Cyprus. *Inter alia*, employing the fundamental global legal norms and their implications, the United Nations Security Council condemned immediately the 1983 UDI by Resolution 541 (1983), stating that it:

"1. *Deplores* the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus; 2. *Considers* the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal; ... 7. *Calls upon* all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus ..."

10 The same point was conceded by D.A. Rustow (1987) in *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, who wrote on p. 96 that "the second intervention ... came after any acute danger to the Cypriot-Turkish minority had passed and democracy in Greece had been restored. Hence it was this second intervention far more than the first that, immediately and over the years, subjected Ankara to severe criticism in Greece and among its friends, in Europe, America, and the Third World".

11 This argument was first presented in C. Melakopides (1996) *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative*. Kingston, Canada: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, pp. 51-52.

12 See, for instance, Council of Europe, *Case of Loizidou v. Turkey*, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, judgement 40/1193/435/514, 28 July 1998.

Six months later, in May 1984, UNSC Resolution 550 emphasised that it

“... 1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation; 2. *Condemns* all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal; 3. *Reiterates* the call upon all States not to recognize the purported state of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ set up by secessionist acts ...; 4. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus ...”

Therefore, the appeal to the cardinal legal premises used by the international community’s condemnation of Turkey’s illegal actions in Cyprus does not constitute a ‘legalistic approach’, as commonly asserted by the aficionados of (amoral) *Realpolitik*, who are forced (methodologically) to bypass or downgrade the international legal culture. Instead, the *legal approach* adopted here forms a solid humane platform from which rational and far more objective political and ethical conclusions can be fairly deduced.

The Formation of the EU’s Cyprus-related ‘Ethical Acquis’

Although widely ignored, the negative political implications of Turkey’s demonstrated illegality in Cyprus have been very costly. To begin with, Ankara’s first application for European Community accession was rejected in December 1989, in part because of its post-1974 and post-1983 Cyprus guilt. As the relevant section of the Opinion concluded:

“At issue are the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations”.¹³

Six years earlier, the 1983 UDI by the ‘TRNC’ in the occupied north could not escape the EC’s immediate condemnation:

“... The Ten reiterate their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. They continue to regard the Government of President [Spyros] Kyprianou the sole legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus. They call upon all interested parties not to recognize [the UDI], which creates a very serious situation in the area”.¹⁴

As illicit, the secessionist regime remains unrecognised by the entire world except Turkey. And yet, it was elevated to “a constituent state” in the UN-sponsored ‘Annan plan’. The UN was thereby contradicting its countless resolutions on Cyprus, including SC Resolutions 541 and 550.

13 *Europe/Documents*, No. 1589 Luxembourg-Brussels: Agence Europe, 20 December 1989, p. 3.

14 *Bulletin of the European Communities* 16, No. 11. Brussels: General Secretariat, Commission of the European Communities, 1984: point 2.4.1, p. 68.

By implication, it was contravening Article 2(4), one of the UN Charter's definitive norms. For its part, however, the EU felt obliged to reaffirm the exclusive legal status of the Republic of Cyprus over the ensuing years, as we will see.

Despite the Republic's vicissitudes in the long pre-accession period, the building of the EU's *ethical acquis* regarding Cyprus was being progressively solidified. Thus, recognising that the post-1974 victimisation would have to end, the Council decided in March 1995 that Cyprus (with Malta) would start accession negotiations six months after the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference. In spite of the Turkish government's protestations and the vehement opposition of TC leader, Rauf Denktash, these negotiations did begin in March 1998. Then, in November of that year, the first *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession* painted an optimistic picture of the Republic's preparations for membership. Meanwhile, conceiving these negotiations as a potential 'catalyst' for the resolution of the Cyprus Question, the Nicosia government continued to invite Mr Denktash to join the Cypriot negotiating team – albeit to no avail. Brussels, however, openly expressed its satisfaction with President Glafkos Clerides' March 1998 invitation, calling it "fair and generous".¹⁵ Moreover, the EU's moral consistency was also demonstrated through the persistent legal-political statement, in every Progress Report on Cyprus, that "the status quo [in Cyprus] is unacceptable".

Next, a decisive moment was reached at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. With Turkey now being accepted as eligible for membership, Cyprus could celebrate the presidency conclusions:

"The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors".¹⁶

All the above signify already the Union's ethical commitment to Cyprus. But perhaps the most telling proof of the EU's Cyprus-related *Moralpolitik* is the very accession. Being the culmination of the accumulated *ethical acquis*, it entailed, *inter alia*, the Union's recognition that the Republic's victimisation should be contained.¹⁷ In any event, the accession was preceded by the 16 April 2003 signing of the Treaty of Accession to the Union by President Tassos Papadopoulos. This Treaty declared that the entire Republic of Cyprus would be a full Member State on 1 May 2004, while Protocol 10 clarified that the *acquis communautaire* will be applied to the occupied territory upon settling the country's problem.

15 *Unfair Play, op. cit.*, p. 20.

16 Helsinki 1999 European Council Conclusions, para. 9(b).

17 The author recognises that the EU's motives here were *not exclusively* "ethical". A parallel role was played by Athens' warning that, were Cyprus' accession to be denied, Greece would be forced to veto the Eastern enlargement. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who recommended that recognition of this should be stated explicitly.

Be that as it may, the Greek Cypriots' rejection of the Annan plan, in the April 2004 twin referenda, caused consternation in the capital's long campaigning for its promotion. Hence, for a few months, the life and times of the Republic and President Tassos Papadopoulos were made far from ecstatic in Brussels. However, Nicosia soon after began to accumulate moral and political support in COREPER and the Council of General Affairs and External Relations. One reason could well be the increasing appreciation of the inappropriate plan's unfairness. But Ankara itself helped a lot towards changing the previous climate. Aspiring to start accession negotiations on 3 October 2005, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to its Customs Union agreement on 29 July 2005. However, it "declared" simultaneously that its signature *does not amount to any form of recognition* of the Republic of Cyprus.¹⁸

Turkey's novel provocation was deemed 'incomprehensible' at least in Athens, Nicosia and Paris. It need not be surprising, however, to those sharing this viewpoint, that Turkey's foreign policy cannot be fully comprehended, and therefore assessed, if disassociated from its idiosyncratic political culture.¹⁹ This political culture has been long perceived by the author as consisting in pessimism, self-doubts and confusion, co-habiting simultaneously with narcissism and arrogance resulting in aggressive tendencies.²⁰ For instance, disregard of such considerations helps explain the inability of two younger Turkish scholars to account for the EU's alleged "inability" to resolve "the Greek-Turkish conflicts": instead of acknowledging the arrogant and maximalist urges of Turkey's political and military elites, they blamed the EU for limited and "biased" results.²¹ Moreover, Turkey's July 2005 "declaration" revealed that the collective reasoning of "the many Ankaras"²² can contradict what "the rational actor model" would dictate or expect from even *Realpolitik* decision-making. For it seems *prima facie* absurd to deny recognition of a member state of the very organisation you aspire to join, and to pose as oblivious to the entailed political risks.

In any event, after protracted consultations, an EU "Counter-declaration" was issued on 21 September 2005. Manifesting anew the Union's intention to affirm its essential principles and values, the "Counter-declaration" embodied telling legal, political and ethical commitments. It

18 See both Turkey's "declaration" and the EU's "Counter-declaration" in C. Melakopides, A. Emilianides and G. Kentas (eds.) (2007) *The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2006*. Nicosia: Power Publishing, pp. 203-205.

19 See, for instance, C. Melakopides (2006c) 'Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter, pp. 91-97.

20 The valiant efforts by the Erdogan government and by Dr Ahmet Davutoglu to change this traditional picture, are recognised; however, given many improvisations and some apparent contradictions, far more time is needed before concluding that the former picture has not remained essentially the same.

21 A.B. Celik and B. Rumelili (2006) 'Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in Resolving Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts', *European Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. 11, pp. 203-222.

22 This notion has been introduced to account for the numerous conflicting decision-making centres and circles among Turkey's various elites, in C. Melakopides (2006b) "Turkey's Identity Conundrum and the Foreign Policies of 'the Many Ankaras'", *The Cyprus Yearbook 2006*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-199.

stressed that Turkey's declaration "is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has *no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol*" (para. 2). According to Paragraph 4, "The European Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They underline that they *recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law*".²³ Equally explicit was the next paragraph: "Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the *accession process*. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalization of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible". Finally, while reiterating support for the UN's efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, the Union's anti-declaration (para. 7) stated that Cyprus's settlement should now be "*in line with the principles on which the Union is founded*".²⁴

Unambiguous support for the Cypriot cause was also entailed by the Council's endorsement, on 3 October 2005, of the "Negotiating Framework for Turkey". Here, the Union demanded *inter alia*: Turkey's "continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and *in line with the principles on which the Union is founded ...*"; and "progress in the *normalisation* of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus" (emphases added).

Next, the *Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities, and Conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey* reiterated that Turkey should "Continue to support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded". Moreover, Turkey should "Undertake steps towards *normalisation of bilateral relations* between [itself] and all EU Member States, *including the Republic of Cyprus*".²⁵ Throughout this period, therefore, the Commission was adamant that the Cyprus settlement should be *co-determined* by the Union's axiological principles and norms.

In 2006, Cyprus' case received additional moral and political support from many European capitals, distinguished MEPs, and the European Parliament itself, all increasingly impatient with Turkey's antics. Most revealing was the September 2006 Report of the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs, written by Dutch MEP Camiel Eurlings (EPP).²⁶ Turkey's non-fulfilment of its obligations to Cyprus was the central preoccupation. Hence the Committee expressed "disappointment over the fact that, *in spite of its contractual obligations*, Turkey continues to

23 See Appendices I and II, *The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2006*, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-205 (emphasis added).

24 *Ibid.*, emphases added.

25 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 9 November 2005, COM (2005), p. 10, emphases added.

26 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, Final, A6-0269/2006, 13 September 2006, Rapporteur: Camiel Eurlings.

maintain restrictions against vessels flying the Cypriot flag ...; reminds Turkey that this practice *constitutes a breach* by Turkey of the Association Agreement, the related Customs Union and the Additional Protocol, as the restrictions infringe the principle of the free movement of goods; ... regrets that Turkey maintains its veto against the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and in multilateral agreements” (para. 52 emphases added).

Equally important, paragraph 53 “Urges Turkey to take concrete steps for the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, as soon as possible; in this context, recalls the Council’s Declaration of 21 September 2005”. In the next three paragraphs (54-56) the Report transcends the Council’s September 2005 “Counter-declaration”. It talks again of an “equitable solution based upon the principles on which the EU is founded”, but then adds: “*as well as on the aquis, and, pursuant to the relevant UN resolutions, to effect an early withdrawal of their forces in accordance with a specific timetable[.]*”²⁷ Then again, the Report reiterates the withdrawal of the occupation troops, recognising them as pivotal to Turkey’s intransigence and muscle-flexing: “Points out that the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers could facilitate the resumption of substantive negotiations and, *pursuant to the relevant UN resolutions, calls on the Turkish government to effect an early withdrawal of Turkish forces in accordance with a specific timetable[.]*”²⁸

The *ethical aquis* was further strengthened by leading MEPs such as Elmar Brok and Jan Marinus Wiersma, who responded to the November 2006 publication of the *Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession*. Thus, Mr Brok (EPP) – then Chairman of the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee – lamented a “shift of responsibility” by the Commission to the December 2006 summit: “The Commission evades a final evaluation of Turkey, in particular with respect to the unresolved Cyprus question. This means *not only lack of credibility towards the European public*, but also *continues to weaken the EU negotiation position vis-à-vis Turkey*.” Similarly, Socialist Group Vice-President, Jan Marinus Wiersma, stated: “[The] Ankara protocol *is an important question of law*: it is not up for negotiation and it must be implemented fully”.²⁹

Finally, the EU’s “ethical role” concerning Cyprus was reaffirmed quite dramatically by the December 2006 “freezing” of eight chapters in the EU-Turkey negotiations. Moreover, it was demonstrated by the decision to “re-assess” that country’s candidacy after a “grace period” of three years. Therefore, in order to pronounce on what more the EU can and ought to do concerning the legitimate EU citizens of the Republic, we may now review schematically the Union’s treasured principles and values.

27 *Ibid.*, paragraph 53, emphasis added.

28 *Ibid.*, paragraph 57, emphases added.

29 See “Last Opportunity for Turkey” [www.euractiv.com], accessed on 8 November 2006, emphases added by the author.

The EU's Essential Principles and Values

Despite sceptical reservations in some circles,³⁰ and some well-known structural drawbacks and concomitant crises (such as Iraq and Kosovo), the Union keeps advancing its role towards a “better global order”, banking primarily on its “soft power”.³¹ Indeed, the Union is accumulating international ethical prestige through the protection of human rights, peace-keeping and peace-making, generous development aid, the international advancement of democratic governance, humanitarian assistance, and conscientious ecological measures. Therefore, and especially if one endorses the notion of ‘mixed ethical motives’ – acknowledging as morally permissible some quota of self-regarding EU intentions – the European Union may qualify by now as a *prima facie* ‘ethical power’.

Accordingly, the literature on “civilian power EU” or “normative power Europe” has continued to expand during the last decade.³² By implication, expanding also is the broadly ‘ethical’ discourse on the EU’s cardinal principles, norms and values, and their professed implementation world-wide. It is, therefore, intriguing that no scholarly discussion had, until recently, raised the EU’s moral obligations towards the Republic of Cyprus.³³ Indeed, two of the best recent books on EU foreign policy do not even mention Cyprus, while a third one contains only seventeen Cyprus-related words.³⁴ Given, however, that 37% of Cypriot – and therefore EU – territory remains occupied by over 40,000 Turkish troops; given the proven illegality and immorality of the occupation; and given Turkey’s stubborn pettifoggery – it follows logically, legally and morally that the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all legitimate Cypriots must be promptly restored. Therefore, while the EU should maintain advancing its global ethical role, its moral obligation towards one of its Members should have *logical and political priority*, if the Union’s persistent self-characterisation as a “value-based community” is to be authenticated.

Elaborating on the normative character of this “value-based community”, Professor Ian Manners noted in 2002:

“The broad normative basis of the European Union has been developed over the past 50 years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions. It is possible

30 For a brief review of sceptical arguments, see D. Armstrong (2009) ‘Normative Power Europe – or Normative Power Germany?’ in Melakopides, C. (ed.), *The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2008-2009*. Nicosia: Power Publishing, pp. 13-22.

31 Hence, some years ago the author called the EU, “an emerging superpower with a moral difference” (Melakopides, 2000).

32 See, for instance, Manners (2002); Lucarelli and Manners (2006) and the rich bibliography therein. See also Armstrong, *op. cit.*

33 Until Melakopides (2008).

34 The first two are Smith and Light (2001); and Lucarelli and Manners (2006). Karen Smith (2003, p. 146) refers to Cyprus thus: “The prospect of enlargement to the Republic of Cyprus, for example, increased tension in the Eastern Mediterranean”.

to identify five 'core' norms within this vast body of Union laws and policies which comprise the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*" (Manners, 2002, p. 242).

These five "core norms" consist of the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (*ibid.*). These norms – referred to in this article as "the EU's essential principles and values" – are celebrated in every programmatic or constitutive document of the EC/EU: from the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Communities (TEC, art. 177 and art. 11) to the "Reform Treaty" or "Lisbon Treaty" of December 2007.

Building on the EU's "founding principles", Manners has added the "fundamental rights" implied by the Union's normative corpus: dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice. More recently, he clarified further the notion of "EU normativeness" (Manners, 2006a); and he also extended its scope to cover the EU's ("normative") obligations for "sustainable peace" by employing a set of EU "normative principles".³⁵

Respecting fully Manners' sustained contribution to demonstrating the EU's inherent ability to help civilise further the life of international society, it is submitted that, once the EU's "normative basis" is coupled with its constantly expanding internationalist record, and then judged by Joseph Nye's "three-dimensional moral reasoning", i.e. the criteria of motives, means and consequences (Nye, 1986), the outcome may qualify for an even stronger thesis: namely, the Union's (international) *ethical distinctiveness*. Similarly, when the scope, the commitment, and the results of the EU's ethical role are compared today with those of most international actors, many may agree that the EU is, after all, "an emerging superpower with a moral difference".

In any case, subsuming the case of Cyprus under the ethical facts associated with the EU's "core norms" and "founding principles" should demonstrate that, despite the "ethical acquis", the EU is today experiencing a profound *internal ethical anomaly*. Indeed, the post-1974 Cyprus *status quo* keeps violating all these essential EU principles and norms: liberty, justice, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, dignity, and solidarity. All these, of course, constitute the treasured elements of European modernity. The following puzzle, therefore, arises: can the EU qualify as an *authentic and consistent* "normative" power, if it keeps tolerating such a colossal ethical anomaly?

Before addressing this 'puzzle', however, let us turn to the promised excursus to the Annan Plan, necessary both because it demonstrates yet another attempted victimisation of Cyprus by crude *Realpolitik* and because clear echoes of that plan keep reverberating during the current inter-communal negotiations.

35 The nine normative principles in question are: good governance, sustainable development, social solidarity, equality, rule of law, human rights, freedom, democracy, and sustainable peace (Manners, 2006b).

A Schematic Recollection of the 'Annan Plan'

The attempt to sell the 'Annan Plan' constitutes a blatant recent instance of *Realpolitik* immorality towards Cyprus. Although promoted as a "UN reunification plan", it transpired on reflection that it was orchestrated to serve the strategic interests of the US, the UK, and Turkey, and the idiosyncratic needs of the TCs. Aiming to *get rid of* the Cyprus problem, as opposed to *settling it fairly*, the plan intended primarily: to exculpate Turkey for the invasion and the occupation; to strengthen thereby Turkey's aspirations for EU accession; to ascertain the Cypriots' legitimization of the British 'Sovereign Base Areas'; to give George W. Bush's Washington a desperately needed 'diplomatic victory'; and to proffer the TCs dignified liberation from the Turkish occupation, EU-sponsored human rights, and asymmetrical power in the new state. To this end, the plan had to circumvent the complete restoration of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots and ignore the additional insecurities and anxieties of the primarily victimised GCs.

The work *Unfair Play* (Melakopides, 2006a) shows how the plan is manifestly unworkable, and blatantly unfair to the GCs, given its fundamental structural flaws. Moreover, the plan violates cardinal principles and norms of international ethics and international law, setting thereby a deleterious precedent in the European and global legal and ethical culture. Here is a laconic survey of some telling flaws:³⁶

- (1) Constitutional provisions for inter-communal majorities essentially gave the minority TCs veto powers.
- (2) Cases of inter-communal decision-making impasse were to be resolved by resorting to the new Supreme Court. Besides the GC and TC judges, however, the plan had imported three foreign judges!
- (3) The primary economic burden of running the new state would fall necessarily on the GCs, whose present per capita income is about three times that of the TCs and their population around nine times that of the *legitimate* TCs.
- (4) The fact that pivotal property issues were handed to a Property Commission was causing insecurity and frustration: many – very foggy – compensations could stretch to 35 years while its unclear funding and obscure mechanism were unfathomable by most ordinary persons.
- (5) Behind "calculated ambiguities", the plan had legitimated most of the illegal settlers. Demonstrating utter insensitivity towards the GCs, the plan also ignored the settlers' serious – social, economic, psychological and political – tensions with the indigenous TCs. This conflict was explicitly recognised by the 2003 Report on Cyprus of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe:³⁷

36 Some of the following arguments are borrowed from *Unfair Play, op. cit.*

37 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Colonisation

“The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed regions of Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population who tend to view them as a foreign element”.

Additionally, the plan sinned on the following legal *cum* ethical, substantive and “procedural” matters:

- (1) it offered, surreptitiously, even continental shelf to the British ‘Sovereign Bases’, following the reported discovery of large hydrocarbon deposits south of Cyprus;
- (2) it annulled the citizens’ right to appeal to the ECHR for compensation regarding the violation of their right to enjoy their occupied properties, obliterating thereby the historic precedent in the *Titina Loizidou v Turkey* case;
- (3) it caused disappointment and anger by the asphyxiating timetables of the entire process, which included the UN Secretary-General’s “discretionary power” to fill in any gaps in the negotiations;
- (4) the Secretary-General’s entourage exhibited insulting arrogance against the GC negotiators; and
- (5) finally, Kofi Annan fully endorsed PM Erdogan’s “terms” at Bürgenstock, while rejecting all requests by then President Tassos Papadopoulos.

All these points convinced even further the GCs that this plan had grossly violated the rules of fairness. The plan’s rejection by 76% of the Greek Cypriots was, therefore, fully rational. And as Annex IX of ‘Annan V’ put it, “Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate simultaneous referenda ... it shall be null and void, and have no legal effect”. And yet, influential power-centres in Europe and beyond embarked immediately on ‘punishing’ the Republic for the GCs’ rational rejection while attempting to ‘reward’ the TCs for the plan’s endorsement. Manifestly, this made a mockery of the very notion of *referendum*. Moreover, it was cynically immoral: for one just cannot ‘punish’ the rejection of something unfair and unworkable or ‘reward’ the endorsement of what serves one’s interests and needs! It follows that the “Annan plan affair” demonstrated an additional attempt to victimise the Greek Cypriots by ruthless *Realpolitik*, instead of enhancing their protection by *Moralpolitik*.

Confronting Anew Turkey’s Victimisation of Cyprus

To recapitulate, Turkey’s accumulated guilt *vis-à-vis* Cyprus has resulted from the sustained use of military force in the illegal occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory; the gross and massive violation

by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus, Doc. 9799, 2 May 2003, Rapporteur: Mr Jaakko Laakso (Finland), p. 2.

of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike; the refusal to recognise the Republic, in contrast to the entire worldwide community and the EU itself; recurrent threats and military muscle-flexing (the latest concerning Nicosia's search for hydrocarbons in its exclusive economic zone); the constant exercise of veto against the Republic's membership in various international organisations; the unrelenting application of psychological warfare against a small EU state; the deliberate distortion of legal, political and ethical *facts*; and the callous violation of the cardinal norm *pacta sunt servanda*.

Such illegal behaviour is morally and politically unbearable. It demonstrates Turkey's readiness to disregard the EU's *normative* (i.e. *legal and ethical*) *acquis* in order to satisfy narcissistic geopolitical ambitions. Also blameworthy is that *some* among the '27' and (at times) the European Commission have stood idly by Turkey's legerdemain. Finally, the role of Washington and London *vis-a-vis* the Republic leaves a lot to be desired regarding respect for the fundamental principles of international law and the essential EU principles and values. Therefore, once the Republic's orchestrated victimisation is exposed, any further delay to satisfy its rightful claim to liberation from the illegal and immoral occupation amounts to an ethical, legal, and political scandal.

Now, Immanuel Kant has demonstrated that "ought implies can". Accordingly, having shown why the Union ought to satisfy fully the rights of its legitimate Cypriot citizens – for otherwise it would be in clear contradiction to its professed principles and values – can the EU be shown as *capable* of satisfying them? This article responds as follows.

First, we have seen how the Union – through the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and various distinguished personalities – has demonstrated, repeatedly, both the will and the ability to protect Cyprus' rights to a considerable extent. It has done so by criticising, chastising and even *punishing* Turkey for its Cyprus policies. The last term, for instance, reflects the "freezing" of the eight negotiating chapters, following Turkey's disregard of its signature on the Additional Ankara Protocol, which also forced the EU essentially to "threaten" the very re-assessment of Turkey's candidacy.

Second, this article has shown that an *ethical acquis* regarding Cyprus has been crystallised by resolutions, declarations, statements and actions, issued by central EU institutions, by the UN with EC/EU participation, and by distinguished Europeans. This *acquis* entails the Union's proven *capability to protest* against the persecution of Cyprus.

Third, the EU does apply grave sanctions to Third Parties should they violate their citizens' human rights. Karen E. Smith has recalled countless cases of "aid suspended and sanctions imposed by the European Union for violations of human rights and democratic principles in third countries since 1988" (Smith, 2003, pp. 205-208, Appendix 1). It is, therefore, morally and politically indefensible that no *substantial sanctions* have been imposed on a candidate state that continues to violate the human rights and fundamental freedoms of *EU citizens*. To be sure, it was traditionally argued that the EC/EU relies on the UN to settle the Cyprus problem. Today,

however, the Cyprus picture has changed dramatically: since May 2004 the Republic has been a full EU member; the UN's role in the 'Annan plan' has been exposed and discredited; and Turkey's unreliability and bad faith are being demonstrated. Now, therefore, the EU can and ought to assert its essential principles and values *in tandem* with securing a fair UN role: beyond protecting the human rights of all legitimate Cypriots, it can and must defend its own credibility, prestige, and self-respect.

Fourth, regarding the measures of an effective EU *modus operandi*, it is within the Union's power to demand: (a) the speedy withdrawal of Turkey's troops of occupation; (b) the gradual departure of the illegal settlers; (c) an immediate stop to the illicit construction of houses and hotels on GC properties in the occupied territory; and (d) full respect by Turkey of *pacta sunt servanda*. As regards (d), the EU can and should prioritise Turkey's legal commitment to honour its obligations according to the Additional Protocol and the September 2005 "counter-declaration", including the *normalisation* of Turkey-Cyprus relations which should lead to the Republic's *recognition*. Of course, the latter should entail Turkey's *de-recognition* of the secessionist regime. But this, like the normalisation of Turkey-Cyprus relations, will not be an act of generosity. Turkey should have done it long ago, given the legal analysis provided herein, the explicit obligations that EU candidacy entails, the countless UN and EC/EU Resolutions and decisions, and the unambiguous decisions by international courts.

In fact, the argument for Turkey's legal obligations was recently fortified even further. The 28 April 2009 judgement by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in *Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams and Linda Elizabeth Orams*, confirmed once again the demonstrable illegality of the occupation and the consequent illegality of purchasing Greek Cypriot properties in the occupied territory.³⁸

Towards December 2009

Following the electoral defeat of former President Tassos Papadopoulos, in February 2008, the international engagement in settling the Cyprus Question was intensified anew. Structured encounters under UN auspices between newly-elected President Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat have taken place in direct, 'face-to-face negotiations'. In recent months, there is room for both optimistic and deeply pessimistic predictions about the outcome.

38 See Court of Justice of the European Communities, *Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams and Linda Elizabeth Orams*, 'A Judgment of a Court in the Republic of Cyprus Must be Recognised and Enforced by the Other Member States Even if it Concerns Land Situated in the Northern Part of the Island', Press Release No. 39/09, 28 April 2009.

On the optimistic side, there is insistence that the two community leaders exhibit “the will” to reach a settlement; have seen eye-to-eye on some issues; and they appreciate that yet another failure “might be fatal” to the cause of “reunification”.

But then, there is mounting evidence that, since 3 September 2008, little or no progress has in fact been achieved on such critical issues as the future form of governance, on properties, the notorious “security guarantees”, the illegal settlers, etc. On them, the two sides are separated by an abyss. Moreover, President Christofias’ “generous offers” – including his proposals for a “rotating presidency” and the legitimization of 50,000 illegal settlers – have not been reciprocated in the least. Leading members of the GC political elites, many academics, and influential opinion-makers have been lamenting that “the will” of the TC side is not autonomous, since Mr Talat admits constantly seeking “guidance” from Ankara; that TC (i.e. Turkey’s) maximalism involves the never-ending alteration of the initial negotiating terms; that Mr Christofias’ concessions have been “pocketed” by the other side, while Ankara officials continue to perform provocative verbal and non-verbal acts against Cyprus; and that Turkey is once again engaged in a game of international impression-making in view of its December 2009 evaluation.

Hence the rising pessimism is accompanied by an incessant debate on the advisable stance until and during the December 2009 European Council. During newly elected Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou’s official visit to Nicosia on 19-20 October 2009, his precise intentions on this matter remained essentially obscure. Admittedly, Papandreou and Christofias re-emphasised the long-standing position of Athens and Nicosia in support of eventual Turkish accession – assuming Turkey fulfils the established for all candidates requirements. To be sure, after a long hiatus, George Papandreou – in a rare emulation of his late father, Andreas – “defined” the Cyprus Question as “a problem of invasion and occupation”. He then insisted that Athens will “stand by Nicosia in every sense”. But he also referred to a “new road map for Turkey”, leaving unclear whether this should operate before or after December 2009.

Meanwhile, the political forces of centrist DIKO, centre-left EDEK, of (*sui generis*) EVROKO as well as the Ecologists, all concur on Nicosia’s need to “assert itself” at long last. In fact, Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou and President Christofias himself reaffirmed regularly in October 2009 what all political forces unanimously agreed in the latest four-day-long National Council: namely, that – given Turkey’s obstinate violation of its post-December 2006 EU-imposed, obligations – “Turkey cannot escape *unscathed*’ in December 2009”. In addition, political elites, some serious academics, influential opinion-makers and activist members of Cypriot civil society anticipate the support of, at least, Athens, Berlin, Paris and Vienna when they urge Nicosia to stand up and raise its objections at the forthcoming “historic summit”. And for the first time, most political figures, respected columnists and commentators *in tandem* with the *vox populi* were employing the self-same term, «*διεκδίκνον!*», i.e. “*Claim* (our rights!)” regarding the December 2009 Summit.

The picture, crystallising in Nicosia in October 2009, owes a lot to the widely-held perception that Ankara’s recent policy-making *vis-à-vis* Cyprus (and Greece), has turned even more

narcissistic, arrogant and aggressive. President Barack Obama's warm geopolitical gestures to Ankara during his April visit to the country; the encouraging impressions generated by a number of activist foreign policy initiatives in recent months; rather promising results of Turkey's diplomatic openings to a few neighbours; and new Foreign Minister, Dr Ahmet Davutoglu's "hyperkinetic" diplomatic creativity – all these help account for the said attributes of Turkey's novel political-cultural tendencies.

Thus, while Greek Cypriot political classes and activist members of civil society are at pains to identify effective measures that the EU ought to take at the end of 2009, here is a preliminary catalogue of what Nicosia can assert in December 2009 that the Union can do, and *therefore* morally ought to do: First, to recognise explicitly – in novel statements, declarations, decisions and actions – that one of its members is being *victimised* by a candidate state. Second, it should call on Turkey to begin withdrawing its troops and the illegal settlers. Third, it should *demand* that Turkey recognise the Republic of Cyprus, as per the "anti-declaration" of September 2005. Fourth, the European Parliament, as the proverbial 'moral conscience' of the Union, should sustain its own pressure and propose further bold initiatives, besides its constant assertion that Turkey should withdraw its troops. Fifth, the EU's role in the ongoing 'inter-communal' negotiations should be strengthened so as to set the outer limits of *acquis communautaire* permissibility, as opposed to almost standing idly by while Ankara and its candidacy's more passionate supporters are exercising unconscionable intransigence and pressure. Sixth, and simultaneously, a "Committee of Wise Persons", guided by *Moralpolitik* and the concomitant norms of the Union could well be formed to act as 'honest broker' between Nicosia and Turkey and between the two main Cypriot communities. Finally, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – envisaged by the 'Lisbon Treaty' – should include among his/her first priorities the coordination and implementation of the above.

If, however, some of the proposed measures are not adopted by the Union despite its proven moral and political duties to Cyprus; and if Turkey does not abandon in time its arrogant obduracy; then the Nicosia government, supported by the like-minded fellow-Members, should declare its considered decision: unless and until Ankara fulfils its obligations to the Republic and the Union, Nicosia could well veto the opening of any new chapter in Turkey's negotiations with the EU during the December 2009 European Council.

The author fully acknowledges the manifold support that Turkey enjoys within the EU and beyond the Atlantic on account of its geopolitical value, its growth potential, its possible role as a 'bridge' between the EU and the Muslim world, etc. As a matter of fact, these reasons, combined with an eagerness to see a zone of permanent peace and friendship established among Turkey, Cyprus and Greece – once Turkey became 'Europeanised' – explain the author's earlier warm support for Turkey's EU accession (Melakopides, 2000). But the assumption of Turkey's 'Europeanisation' has been undermined regarding both Cyprus and Greece. On the one hand, Greece distinguished itself both during the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, where it arguably 'led' the Member States in defence of Turkey's European vocation; it also led the way to

the (quite bumpy) 'détente' with Ankara ever since. For its part, semi-occupied Cyprus did not exercise any veto to Turkey's EU trajectory in either 2004 or 2005, voting twice in favour of starting its accession negotiations. On the other hand, the Turkish government has opted for a protracted, bellicose challenge to Greece's sovereignty through 'revisionist' tactics in the Aegean Sea, which include the *casus belli* threat, incessant violations of its airspace, and the current flights by armed military aircraft over Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean; it has sustained the victimisation of the Republic since 1974; it violated its signature to the Additional Protocol of July 2005; it has taken no measures whatsoever towards fulfilling its EU obligations arising from the "Counter-declaration" of September 2005 during the three-year-long "grace period"; it persists in referring to "two nations, two governments, and two states" in Cyprus in clear opposition to its established legal, political and moral obligations; finally, Ankara has sustained aggressiveness and bellicosity both in the occupied territory and beyond, as we have seen.

Such realities conspire to cause anger and frustration to the GCs for their predicament and the missed opportunities to establish a radically new period in the trilateral relationship of Cyprus-Turkey-Greece, with its tangible positive implications for Turkey's own EU prospects. These sentiments were intensified by the realisation that the UK government, the Swedish EU presidency during 2009, and Commissioner Olli Rhen were openly at pains to obliterate Turkey's established obligations before the December 2009 "re-evaluation".

To be sure, we have long heard, *inter alia*, that since Turkey's road to full accession looks increasingly bumpy; one should not expect it now to conform to EU values and norms. Such reasoning, however, is premised on a serious political, legal and moral fallacy: for it entails either that the EU must alter its normative identity to accommodate Turkey; or that accession must precede conformity to EU values and norms. Both readings imply that the Union should yield to Turkey's essential blackmail – something politically, legally, and morally unbearable.

There is, however, a third way: first, whatever the EU-Turkey future holds, including "privileged partnership", Turkey should fulfil its legal-political-moral obligations, *for its own good*, without either affirmative action or negative discrimination. And second, the Union's demonstrable political and moral obligations to Cyprus must be fulfilled promptly and at all costs: because of the manifest necessity to end the victimisation of all the legitimate citizens of a member state; and because these obligations currently represent a test-case of the European Union's normative *authenticity*, ethical *consistency*, and moral *identity*, on which, in the final analysis, its internal credibility and international prestige largely depend.

Needless to say, Nicosia's endorsed assertiveness in Brussels in December 2009 would aim to force Turkey to merely honour its demonstrated obligations. By fulfilling them, Turkey would validate its assertion that it cares about the negotiations in Cyprus and remove the disingenuous insistence that it has met its obligations by supporting the Annan plan. Only such developments, giving Turkey the opportunity to exhibit good faith, could usher in promising conditions for the ongoing inter-communal negotiations. Therefore, Nicosia's expected political assertiveness would

entail serving the EU's own principles and values, for the ultimate benefit of the peoples of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, and the European Union itself.³⁹

Bibliography

- Armstrong, D. (2009) 'Normative Power Europe – or Normative Power Germany?' in Melakopides, C. (ed.), *The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2008-2009*. Nicosia: Power Publishing.
- Brownlie, I. (1963) *International Law and the Use of Force by States*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Celik, A.B. and Rumelili, B. (2006) 'Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in Resolving Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts', *European Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. II.
- Commission of the European Communities (2005) *Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities, and Conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey* Brussels, 9 November 2005, COM .
- Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2003) Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus, Doc. 9799, 2 May 2003, Rapporteur: Mr Jaakko Laakso (Finland).
- European Parliament (2006) Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, Final, A6-0269/2006, 13 September 2006, Rapporteur: Camiel Eurlings.
- Higgins, R. (1984) 'Intervention and International Law' in Bull, H. (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 38-39.
- Lucarelli, S. and Manners, I. (eds.) (2006) *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Macdonald, R.St.J. (1981) 'International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus', *Canadian Yearbook of International Law 1981*.
- Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-258.
- (2006a) 'The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 167-180.
- (2006b) 'European Union "Normative Power" and the Security Challenge', *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December), pp. 405-421.
- Melakopides, C. (1996) *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative*, Martello Papers 15, Kingston, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.
- (2000) 'On the Mediterranean "Fuzzy Edge" of the EU: The Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 22, pp. 299-334.

39 This article was submitted some weeks before the December 2009 European Council. In mid-January 2010, it is worth recording that, in fact, Nicosia opted for a "softer" than anticipated stance: that is, Cypriot Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou presented a declaration to the effect that the Republic of Cyprus will block in the future six further chapters in Turkey's accession negotiations should Ankara fail to satisfy Nicosia's conditions or terms. Clearly, Nicosia's relevant decision was determined by the desire to prevent further obstruction in the ongoing inter-communal negotiations.

- (2006a) *Unfair Play: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the EU*, Martello Papers 29, Kingston, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University.
- (2006b) 'Turkey's Identity Conundrum and the Foreign Policies of the "Many Ankaras"', in Melakopides, C., Emilianides, A. and Kentas, G. (eds.), *The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2006*, Nicosia: Power Publishing.
- (2006c) 'Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 91-97.
- (2008) 'The Moral Obligations of the European Union to the Republic of Cyprus' in Melakopides, C., Emilianides, A. and Kentas, G. (eds.), *The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 2007*, Nicosia: Power Publishing.
- Nye, J.S., Jr. (1986) *Nuclear Ethics*. New York: Free Press.
- Rustow, D.A. (1987) *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Smith, K.E. and Light, M. (eds.) (2001) *Ethics and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, K. (2003) *European Union's Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

The Mediating Impact of Corporatism on the Europeanisation of the Cypriot Labour Sector

CHRISTINA IOANNOU, GIORGOS KENTAS

Abstract

In this article a domain-specific analysis of Cyprus' Europeanisation process is advocated. It is argued that the overall process of Europeanisation was governed by an instrumental logic that furnished a consciously promoted national strategy of EU accession. It is suggested also that this logic had a cross-sector impact. The Europeanisation of the labour sector is the crux of this discussion. The article concludes that the pre-existence of a deeply-rooted corporatist tradition in the field of industrial relations acted as the mediating mechanism that facilitated a smooth and speedy adjustment process.

Keywords: Europeanisation, industrial relations, corporatism, national mission, instrumental logic, mediating mechanism, norm-guided behaviour

Introduction¹

In a seminal paper, Featherstone argues that Cyprus' Europeanisation process was inevitably top-down (Featherstone, 2001). As a small state, Cyprus was exposed to Brussels' pressure and "forced a fulsome response" (*ibid.*, p. 156). This was indeed an unprecedented situation for political elites and Cypriot society. The government had to pursue some fundamental structural, institutional and legal reforms in order to meet the requirements of the *acquis communautaire*.

In this framework, the objective of this paper is to show how exactly this pressure was perceived and internalised in the Cypriot context. The main argument advanced is that the process of Europeanisation was fundamentally governed by an instrumental logic that demanded a speedy reform process to enable the country to accede to the EU within an envisaged timeline. This, in effect, was the primary norm-guided behaviour upon which the Cypriot accession process was essentially based. In this spectrum, we examine the manner in which Cyprus internalised the external pressures and managed to deal with the relevant challenges associated with them, in an effective way.

It is vital, however, for the process of Europeanisation to be studied in a domain-specific fashion. In this respect, we focus here on the Cypriot labour sector, and analyse the way in which

1 The authors wish to thank Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou for their constructive comments on a preliminary version of this paper that was presented at the 5th ECPR Conference.

certain established practices were used as a mediating instrument in order to deal effectively with the pressures and complete the process of harmonisation in the sector swiftly. More explicitly the corporatist practices that have successfully governed policy-making in the industrial field of the country for years are investigated. These practices have created a traditional 'way of doing things' in this sector and corporatist culture was thus seen as a readily available instrument that could be used to carry out reforms effectively, efficiently and within the anticipated time frame.

The discussion is organised in four sections. The first section reviews the relevant Europeanisation literature so that the peculiarities of the Cypriot experience can be illustrated. In the case of candidate countries, the Europeanisation process entails the transposition of a pre-existing body of laws, regulations, processes, models and paradigms. The EU, however, does not prescribe a particular mode or mechanism for transposition. It is thus necessary to explore the way in which the Europeanisation process is mediated by national mechanisms and political/social cultures in order to facilitate this change. The impact of Europeanisation, it is argued, cannot be explained independent of the national process of transformation.

In the second section the primary mediating factor of Cyprus' process of Europeanisation is explored, namely the emergence of a notion of a 'national mission' – in the period preceding accession – for a speedy adjustment process. The 'national mission' of Cyprus was governed by an 'instrumental logic' that embraced three expectations: (1) to Europeanise the Cyprus problem, and secure the EU's active involvement in the process of solution; (2) to use EU accession as a lever on Turkey, so as to improve the negotiating position of the Government of Cyprus *vis-à-vis* Turkey; and (3) to accede to the ranks of the EU as a whole, so that both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community would form part of the Union and benefit from it. This instrumental logic furnished a norm, namely a consciously promoted political strategy in order to fulfil the 'national mission'. This strategy entailed a brisk reform process to show that Cyprus could be 'the best student in the class' (Vassiliou, 2005, p. xii). This norm-guided behaviour had a cross-sector effect as the *acquis* had to be quickly transposed in all the relevant policy domains. Hence, the actors involved in the process of adjustment had to manage two types of pressures: (1) the pressure that came from Brussels and involved the adoption of the *acquis* and (2) the pressure associated with the 'national mission' as explained above.

In the third section the traditional 'way of doing things' in the labour sector is explored, namely the well-embedded culture of corporatism. The operational grounds of the tripartite cooperation that governed policy-making in the industrial sector over the years are explicated. It is advanced that the process of Europeanisation in the industrial field was mediated by the pre-existing culture of corporatism as this was seen as the safest way to harmonise the sector expeditiously with the relevant *acquis*, without encountering many problems.

By advancing this argument, the fourth section illustrates exactly how corporatist culture was used as the mediating factor in the process of Europeanisation in the Cypriot industrial field. It is argued that the pre-existence, in the labour sector, of this deeply rooted tradition was ultimately

used in order to carry out the transformation process effectively, efficiently and speedily, thus meeting the goals of the ‘national mission’.

SECTION 1

Europeanisation as a Conceptual Background

The concept of Europeanisation is highly contested, yet this concept enjoys considerable popularity in the literature. This article considers some perspectives on Europeanisation that illustrate the peculiarities of Cyprus’ process of Europeanisation. An established practice in the literature can be followed, which takes the concept of Europeanisation as a “*starting point*” or as a “*conceptual framework*” (Maarten, 2002; Featherstone, 2003; Grabbe, 2006). The main idea is to juxtapose the ‘transformative power’ of the EU with the way in which Cyprus internalised certain rules, procedures and norms during the process of accession negotiations.

According to Radaelli (2000a, 2000b), Europeanisation refers to the transfer of the EU’s political structures, institutional frameworks, practices, representational structures and cognitive structures to countries which aspire to join the EU, as well as to countries which are members of the Union. Radaelli (*ibid.*) puts forth a working definition of Europeanisation which is instructive:

“Europeanisation consists of (a) constitution, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (2000a).

Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation seems to be compatible with two strands of social inquiry, namely rationalism and constructivism (cf. Fearon and Wendt, 2002). On the one hand, the *process of transfer* of EU rules, procedure, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms, is governed by a notion of *instrumental rationality*. These elements of Europeanisation are constructed at a higher political level (i.e. at the EU level) and they are thus taken as unproblematic and given. States need to adopt and implement them at the national level, so that their policies, decision-making procedures, and institutional models are in line with EU standards. On this reading of Europeanisation, states’ instrumental logic refers to their effort to ‘work’ with the ‘external reality’ of the EU in an effective and efficient way in order to be able to function as competent members of the Union, as well as to be in a position to further their national interest within the framework of the organisation.

Radaelli’s definition has a second connotation. *The construction* of rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms at the EU level, as well as their *transfer* to the domestic level, have both transformative and cognitive impacts. It is thus suggested that the impact of the EU’s rules, norms, standards, models and paradigms, on national (and subnational) discourses, identities, political structures and public policies, is pertinent to

social constructivism (cf. Checkel, 2008). The constructivist element of the process of Europeanisation, however, must not be seen as a 'top-down' process that imprints certain rules, standards, norms and models on state and non-state actors, but as a dialectic process that illustrates the interplay between domestic, transnational, and supranational identities, discourses, structures and policies.²

On this account, the process of Europeanisation refers to two 'logics': (1) instrumental rationality and (2) complex learning. Furthermore, these two logics have different kinds of connotations for member states, candidate states and associated states. To begin with, a distinction may be drawn of the process of Europeanisation at three stages. The first stage refers to the *accession process*, the second to *membership*, and the third to an *interim period* whereby a country becomes a member of the Union, but still needs to adopt some aspects of the *acquis*³ (e.g. Featherstone, 2008). Beyond these three stages there are many variations of Europeanisation that refer to the degree of participation as well as to some peculiarities of membership. Some countries may opt-out from certain EU policies (e.g. Denmark from the 'Euro-zone') or 'immunise' particular segments of their territory against Europeanisation (e.g. the status of the UK's Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus). In this case, a member state may follow a two-track process of 'politicisation'; that is to say, some aspects of state-policy are subject to Europeanisation, whereas other aspects of state-policy are national-centric.⁴ Last but not least, the process of Europeanisation refers to various types of associations between the EU and third countries and/or organisations (e.g. Teld, 2001). The EU's rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, '*ways of doing things*' and shared beliefs and norms seem to have an impact on the discourses, identities, political structures and public policies of third countries which are associated with the EU (e.g. the countries in the Western Balkans) and regional organisation which collaborate with the EU and draw on its norms, experience and practices (e.g. Mercosur).

These degrees and processes of Europeanisation imply different kinds of research agenda. In this article the authors are interested in a particular category of Europeanisation, specifically the Europeanisation process of candidate countries. Candidate countries are expected to constitute, diffuse and institutionalise pre-existing policies, norms, standards and models of the EU which must be taken as unproblematic and given. In other words, the adoption and implementation of the *acquis communautaire* must be seen as a process of Europeanisation that is 'enforced' upon candidate member states. Potential member states would need to abide by the so-called 'conditionality' of the EU. Nevertheless, the process of accession must not be considered as a

2 This facet of Europeanisation is essential for understanding the cognitive dimension of European integration, though we shall not pursue this issue here.

3 This applies to countries that have been granted derogations on certain issues.

4 We need to bear in mind, however, that there is a considerable degree of interaction between national, transnational, EU, and global policies and processes. The literature on Europeanisation acknowledges this interaction.

'deterministic' process, but as a voluntary process of a candidate country to adopt the pre-existing body of EU laws, regulations, norms, standards and institutional models, and the eagerness of the Union and its member states to negotiate the process of transformation with the candidate country and the steps of adaptation in line with a mutually agreed Negotiating Framework, on the basis of a National Strategy. The overall process of accession is supervised by the European Commission, but the actual negotiations take place within an intergovernmental conference.

Thus it is necessary to differentiate between 'transfer' and 'determinacy'. Candidate countries need to adopt the *acquis communautaire* and customise their institutional frameworks in accord with EU practices. The overall process of accession, however, (1) is mutually agreed and voluntary, (2) is supervised by the European Commission, and (3) proceeds in the framework of an intergovernmental conference. The focal point of the literature on Europeanisation is the impact of this process on the domestic (national and subnational) structures, institutions, discourses, identities and public policies. Seen from the vantage point of the (candidate) state as an organisational unit, its ultimate goal is to absorb the EU 'logic' and 'norms' into domestic politics, "so that the distinction between EU and domestic policy requirement disappears" (Grabbe, 2006, p. 51).

The process of Europeanisation at the stage of accession negotiations has some peculiarities that must be taken into consideration.⁵ Firstly, there is an element of *power* in the overall process of (first-stage) Europeanisation. On the one hand the candidate country's degree of flexibility in negotiating the process of transformation with the EU, and on the one hand the EU's lever on the candidate country for speeding-up the process of reforms, or emphasising the necessity for accurate compliance with certain aspects of the *acquis*, dependent on their power-relationship. According to Featherstone (2001), the size and relative power of the candidate country is an important aspect of the process of Europeanisation. Furthermore, following Börzel (1999),⁶ lesser candidate states have a minor impact on influencing the process of Europeanisation, whereas larger candidate states may affect the process even before joining the EU.

Secondly, political elites and/or private actors refer to the EU's 'conditionality' as an objective constraint in order to promote political, institutional, and/or structural reforms that would not otherwise have been accepted. In this sense, the process of Europeanisation refers to the emergence of a dominant discourse about national transformation as a result of EU pressures. According to Grabbe (2006), Europeanisation has the effect of empowering 'modernisers' to change specific policies and reform political institutions.⁷

5 Although there is considerable overlap between them, theories of Europeanisation must not be conflated with theories of, or approaches to, enlargement.

6 Börzel suggests that large states have a considerable influence in the process of the so-called 'uploading' Europeanisation. Lesser states are more susceptible to the process of 'downloading' Europeanisation.

7 It should be noted here that it is beyond the scope of our analysis to delve into "goodness of fit" arguments (Börzel and Risse, 2000a,b), as the main concern here is the mediating factors of the adaptation process.

Thirdly, during the process of negotiations there is a constant interplay between EU-level and national-level mechanisms and cultures. Among others, Ruggie (1982) and Haas (1990) stressed that pre-existing norms and instructional frameworks at the national level mediate the impact of transformation during the process of adjustment. Political norms and procedures which are embedded in the political system of a candidate country mediate the process of adaptation to EU standards. Put this way, the process of Europeanisation is an empty vessel without the national mechanisms that mediate/facilitate the overall process of adjustment. This does not mean, however, that (pre-existing) national mechanisms remain unaffected. We have already stressed that the process of Europeanisation refers both to the instrumental logic of candidate states and the constitutional impact that accession negotiation has on national (and subnational) discourses, identities, institutions and policies. Hence, the process of Europeanisation anticipates the transformation or social elaboration of pre-existing institutional frameworks and 'ways of thinking and doing things'. Moreover, it is equally necessary to emphasise that the process of Europeanisation does not unravel in a political vacuum.⁸ Europeanisation alone does not explain change.

Against this conceptual background the process of Europeanisation is explored in a specific sector of the Cypriot society, namely the transformation of the labour sector during the process of accession negotiations.⁹ It is argued that the process of transformation in this sector was mediated by two national-centric factors: (1) a notion about the national mission of the country that created mounting pressures for a swift adjustment process and (2) the pre-existence, in the labour sector, of a deeply-rooted corporatist tradition that was used as the mediating mechanism in order to carry out the transformation process effectively, efficiently and speedily, thus satisfying factor 1 above. In other words, the super-imposition of the norm-guided behaviour, which was created by the national-centric notion of essentially using an expeditious EU accession as a political instrument, facilitated a smooth harmonisation process that was mediated, in the field of industrial relations, by the pre-existing corporatist mechanisms.

SECTION 2

The Concept of a 'National Mission'

The Cyprus problem has been the primary issue on the agenda of the country for over thirty years. Successive Governments of the Republic have sought a viable solution to the political dispute by engaging in constant and extensive negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, mainly

8 This point is illustrated further in section 4 where we explicate the impact of the culture of corporatism on the process of transformation of industrial relations in Cyprus.

9 It should be clarified that this paper deals exclusively with the *acquis* transposition phase of the Europeanisation process. The implementation phase of the process lies beyond the scope of this paper.

under UN auspices. Grasping the magnitude of this political issue is vital to understanding the force with which EU membership had been anticipated and pursued by Cyprus.

The application for EU membership by Cyprus was made on behalf of the whole of the island. EU membership would help enhance the standing of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate authority on the island – internationally recognised – with sovereignty over its entire territory.¹⁰ The island's application for membership was strongly resisted by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.¹¹ The main grounds for this objection were that Cyprus should not join until the political problem is resolved. Yet, despite fierce Turkish protests, Cyprus proceeded with its application for membership, even in the absence of a settlement to the problem, and over time the island developed steady relations with the Union (until finally it became a full member on 1 May 2004). It is in view of both the critical dispute with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership over the country's EU accession and the on-going obstinate diplomatic struggle over the island's future, that the application of the country for EU membership cannot be disentangled from this wider political setting.

To all intents and purposes, the application of Cyprus for EU membership has predominantly been driven by political considerations. Cyprus has, for a long time, sought to 'Europeanise' its political problem as successive Governments viewed the EU as a 'hope' for the island's future and as a 'safe ground to stand on'. The idea that '*Cyprus is our homeland but Europe is our future*'¹² has almost become a 'dictum' in the minds of the political elite. In other words, the EU was largely perceived as the forum within which a solution to the political problem – likely to be propitious to the Greek-Cypriot side – could possibly be found. Effectively,

"entry was seen as a foreign policy lever vis-à-vis Turkey, a means by which a settlement of the island's division, favourable to the Cyprus Government's stance, could be engineered" (Featherstone, 2001, p. 144).

Nevertheless, even in the absence of a negotiated settlement, it was still foreseen that EU entry could perhaps provide a solution to the long-standing dispute in a more indirect way. This was by

10 This point is also made by Featherstone. He argues that the rationale of the Cypriot Government was that EU entry would reinforce the status of the Republic of Cyprus as the only internationally recognised authority on the island (Featherstone, 2001, pp. 144-145).

11 Although in 1997 (during the Luxembourg European Council) some member states expressed their concern with regard to Cyprus' potential accession to the EU in the absence of a settlement to the island's political problem, two years later (in the Helsinki European Council) Cyprus was given the green light without solution to the problem constituting a prerequisite. Moreover, as a member state, Greece overtly stated that Cyprus must be treated on an equal footing with other candidate countries. Some commentators, at the time, stressed that the Greek Parliament would not ratify the accession Treaty of former Eastern and Central European countries in case Cyprus was not allowed to proceed with accession as a result of the Cyprus problem.

12 The phrase was first used in 2003 by a former spokesman of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, Kypros Chrysostomides.

creating a climate of security, within which a compromise between the two sides could ultimately be facilitated:

“The accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation [...] In this context, the European Council request[ed] that the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating delegation be acted upon” (European Council 1997).¹³

In other words, the perception was that the political problem of the country could be resolved in the context of the EU.

On its part, the Union would also like to see the problem resolved as the persistence of it would only threaten stability and security in its south-eastern borders:

“As Cyprus cannot be considered separately from Greek-Turkish relations we can ask: Can the division of the country be solved in the context of the dynamic European integration process? ‘When you change the context, you change the problem’ (Jean Monnet). Accession of Cyprus to the EU and the needs to promote peace, stability and security in Southeastern Europe can be among the top priorities of the EU” (Freyer, 1999, p. 74).

Clearly in the event of a solution, but also in the absence of one, it was still believed that a number of advantages would accrue from EU membership, favourable to the country’s political situation. As Nugent notes,

“At a minimum, it [membership] would mean that the EU would assume some of the responsibility for trying to find a solution to the problem – as in practice it has. On the other hand – and this would be especially important if no progress was made with the Cyprus problem – membership would provide the Greek part of the island with, if no security guarantee, a measure of soft security in the form of a protective arm in respect of its relations with Turkey” (Nugent, 2000, p. 136).¹⁴

It was hoped in Cyprus that, once the country entered the EU, even in the absence of an actual settlement to the problem, Turkey would have to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and ultimately negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement of the island’s political problem.

Apart from these goals that were to be pursued within the EU forum, and which were related to the hope of ensuring a settlement to the Cyprus problem, there was another underlying objective in Cypriot diplomacy, which related to the speed with which entry should eventually be achieved.¹⁵

13 This request was turned down by the Turkish Cypriot community. Both the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the EU expressed their regret over this development (European Commission, 1998).

14 It should be noted that it is hard to assess the impact of the Europeanisation process on the Turkish Cypriot community since its leadership refused to participate in the harmonisation process.

15 This was also related to Turkey’s application for EU membership, and, according to Featherstone (2001), it involved the concern that should Turkey accede to the Union before Cyprus, it might block the entry of the latter. It was

The objective of the Cypriot Government was for the country to accede to the Union before the latter reached a decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. This was deemed vital for Cyprus in order to secure her input regarding the conditions that would govern Turkey's accession process.

It can thus be seen that the accession process of Cyprus to the EU was largely governed by a number of strategic concerns. In view of these anxieties the country sought an early accession to the Union and also worked to 'Europeanise' its political problem.

"The accession of Cyprus to the European Union is not only the successful outcome of our strenuous efforts, but also a promising start to a new era in the historical, political, economic and social life of our country" (Papadopoulos, 2003, p. v).

In this respect, it is asserted in this account that EU entry was almost a 'vision' to Cyprus – something that had been anticipated with eagerness, and with great expectations for the shaping of its future political condition. This is indeed the key to understanding the adaptation process that was effected in the country. According to Nugent,

"the approach of the government of the Republic of Cyprus to the Cyprus problem is inextricably part of its approach to the EU" (Nugent, 2000, p. 136).

It can, therefore, be clearly advanced that the 'national mission' of Cyprus, preceding the period of accession, was governed by an instrumental logic. The 'logic', as mentioned earlier, consisted of three expectations:

1. to Europeanise the Cyprus problem in order to secure the EU's active involvement in the solution process;
2. to use EU accession as a lever on Turkey so as to improve the negotiating position of the Government of Cyprus *vis-à-vis* Turkey, and
3. to accede to the ranks of the EU as a whole, so that both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community would form part of the Union and benefit from it.

These three expectations were to be best achieved by a quick adjustment process, which is clearly illustrated by Vassiliou:

"All the time [during the whole period of negotiations] we were fully aware that we could not afford, under any circumstances, to fall behind. We fought hard and succeeded in protecting and promoting the interests of the Republic. At the same time we convinced our negotiating partners that we were taking the accession process very seriously. We were negotiating impeccably and doing our utmost to promote harmonisation. To be, as they say, "the best students in the class" (Vassiliou,¹⁶ 2005, p. xii).

thus essential for Cyprus to "weaken Turkey's potential to block Cyprus' entry" (Featherstone, 2001, p. 145). This could conceivably be accomplished by an early accession.

16 Ex-president of the Republic of Cyprus (1988-1993) and Chief Negotiator in the accession process.

This instrumental logic provided a calculated plan to attain the 'national mission' (cf. Katzenstein 1996). It required the expedition of reform procedures that would portray Cyprus in a good light, i.e. to be 'the best student in the class'. This action meant that the *acquis* needed to be converted quickly in all pertinent areas of policy and the actors processing these adjustments had to handle both the pressure that came from Brussels and involved the adoption of the *acquis* together with the pressure associated with the 'national mission' as explained above.

Although these findings ultimately convey the effects of Europeanisation on a wider scale in relation to policy adjustment in Cyprus, the analysis here is neither meant to provide a blueprint for other sectors nor to claim a general cross-sector finding. The aim is rather to explore how these pressures were mediated through existing mechanisms in a specific field: the labour sector. To this end, we examine how the pre-existing policy instrument of corporatism in the domain of labour relations was used as a mediating mechanism in order to facilitate a smooth yet rapid adjustment that would effectively respond to the pressures.

SECTION 3

The Culture of Corporatism

The industrial relations structure of the Republic of Cyprus is defined by cooperation between three parties: the trade unions, the employers' representatives and the Government. Evidently, organised interests – in the form of organised employers and organised labour – play a central role in this structure, as they are actively incorporated into the policy-making process. This system of interest intermediation is often recognised to be the central core of the *notion of corporatism* (Schmitter, 1979). Within the boundaries of this investigation, the authors attach to the Cypriot industrial relations' structure the 'corporatist' label, thus giving it the name, the 'Cypriot Corporatist Model'. This model works in institutional practice in the following way.

Workers are represented through their trade unions, ranging from national, multi-sectoral bodies, to smaller ones that stand for independent sectoral interests (Christofides, 2003, p. 8).¹⁷ Employers are represented through either or both of the two main organisations: OEB and KEBE, which represent their members on a number of tripartite bodies across the island as well as internationally.¹⁸ Finally, the Government is represented through the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance (as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Bureau, which are responsible for the economic aspects of the system). The Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance

¹⁷ For a detailed analysis of the trade unions existing in Cyprus, see C. Ioannou (2009).

¹⁸ At an international level, OEB is a member of the Industrial Organisation of Employers and of the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), while KEBE is a member of the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EUROCHAMBERS), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME) (Christofides, 2003, pp. 7-8).

is mainly responsible for controlling and supervising the overall administration of the labour market, and in particular, it is the body that oversees the system of industrial relations. Specifically, the Industrial Relations Service monitors the collective bargaining process.

For a number of years it has traditionally been an important part of the official philosophy of the Republic of Cyprus that in the realm of labour policy, cooperation between the parties involved and affected is an essential element of the success of the system. The main philosophy determining the foundations of the system can, therefore, be neatly summarised as follows:

“The Government of the Republic has built its labour policy on the belief that steady and sustained socio-economic progress and development requires strong, free, democratic and independent workers’ and employers’ organisations which interact between them and with the Government as equal partners” (Sparsis, 1998, p. 25).

This, for more than four decades, has been put into practice through the ‘Basic Agreement’, which was the first ‘social contract’ signed between the social partners in 1962, shortly after independence. This secured the right to organise, negotiate, sign collective agreements, and the right to strike, and additionally provided for a procedural framework dealing with industrial disputes. In 1977 this Agreement was replaced by the Industrial Relations Code:

“[...] an agreement which was to a much larger extent in a position to ensure the fundamental rights of both participating sides in the field of industrial relation” (Messios, 2004, p. 2).

The latter adopted the main conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It guaranteed the right of freedom of association for all citizens, while the right to strike was safeguarded for all workers (except those in the police force, the army or the fire service). The Industrial Relations Code is essentially a gentlemen’s agreement (not governed by law) that regulates the collective bargaining process, and presents a conflict resolution mechanism when employers’ and employees’ representatives fail to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. A violation of the Code does not involve any legal sanctions. Nevertheless, this Code has rarely been violated as it always commanded a great degree of respect. The practice of corporatism has generally been very successful in Cyprus and cooperation between the parties involved has been relatively good. Owing to the small size of the Cypriot industrial sector, which exhibits the wider Cypriot society reality of “everybody knowing everybody”, plus the many informal contacts that usually take place between actors involved, a generally good climate of smooth co-existence between the parties has always been maintained. As a result, almost all major issues proposed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance followed tripartite discussions between the parties. In fact, “scarcely an activity of the Ministry is without its tripartite board, committee or council” (Sparsis, 1998, p. 9). The policies and programmes of the Ministry are only prepared after consultation and with the full support of the employers’ and workers’ organisations of Cyprus; in this respect, “tripartite cooperation is the cornerstone of the policies of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance of the Republic” (*ibid.*, p. 10).

The operational grounds of the 'Cypriot Corporatist Model' rest on collective bargaining agreements, which involve negotiations between the parties concerned. As Christofides identifies, these collective agreements may either be sector-wide and national,¹⁹ or they may apply only at the enterprise level. In the case of the former, negotiations take place between the relevant multi-sectoral trade unions and the relevant employers' organisation.²⁰ As far as collective bargaining agreements at the enterprise-level are concerned,²¹ these take place between trade union representatives and the employer directly (Christofides, 2003, pp. 11-12).

In fact, collective bargaining, based on the principle of tripartite cooperation, has traditionally played a chief role in regulating industrial relations in the country. At the same time, legislation has largely constituted a secondary tool for regulation (Yannakourou and Soumeli, 2004, p. 29). This limited role of statutory regulation in the Cypriot labour market is one of the key features of the 'Cypriot Corporatist Model'. Collective agreements are not legally binding, and their success rather rests on the willingness of the social partners to abide by them, and the voluntary cooperation of the workers and the employers. Hence, the system of collective bargaining undoubtedly involves continuous social dialogue and compromises between employers, employees and the Government.

In the case of Cyprus, the lack of '*erga omnes*' (i.e. legally binding contractual obligations for the parties involved) in the industrial relations system that prevailed prior to harmonisation with the *acquis communautaire*, meant that collective agreements could be violated at any point, as the reliance of the system of respect did not necessarily guarantee future stability. Arguably, there was a need in the European context for a more solid system that would enjoy a greater legal foundation and would be universally binding at the national level. The necessity for this was demonstrated plainly in the 2000 EU Common Position Paper:

"While the funding and organisation of social protection systems remain the responsibility of individual Member States, they must have the capacity to develop and operate sustainable and universally applicable social protection systems in line with the Treaty objectives" (European Commission, 2000, p. 2).

There was clearly a need for introducing legislation, which would render policy absolutely obligatory, and indeed there was an apparent emergence of consensus that a legally enforceable system was required as a condition for EU membership. It is worth stressing, however, that adjustment to the provisions of the *acquis* involved a great number of changes in the social policy field, where regulation was largely determined, until that time, through '*a-legal*' arrangements. As a result there were important legislative gaps that had to be closed.

19 As Christofides clarifies, owing to the country's small size, the terms '*sectoral*' and '*national*' are sometimes considered as synonymous (Christofides, 2003, p. 11).

20 As far as the public sector (public administration, hospitals and schools) is concerned, collective bargaining is carried out by special joint mechanisms, while employees in the armed forces do not have the right to organise themselves in a trade union (*ibid.*).

21 According to Christofides, around 450 enterprise agreements were in force in 2003 (*ibid.*).

In order then to appreciate the process of EU adjustment in this sector, it is imperative to fully grasp first the corporatist arrangements that prevailed in the country's labour market. This essentially is the key to understanding a long-standing culture, deeply rooted in traditional ways of doing things in the Cypriot labour market. Albeit the fact that the process of harmonisation moved a system that was hitherto exclusively based on collective bargaining to the direction of more statutory legislation, social partners were not excluded from the adaptation procedures in the process. On the contrary, the Government involved them in the process of drafting by inviting them on to technical committees.²² For the most part this was done in order to facilitate a smooth process of adjustment; a lesson that was learnt by closely observing the experience of Greece. In their analyses of the social policy of the Greek state, Papadimitriou (2005), Kioukias (2003), and Venieris (2003), record a failure in its responsiveness to EU adaptation. An un-cooperative climate between the social partners, and a failure on the part of the state to provide adequate incentives to involve them in the adaptation process was largely to blame for this.

By contrast, in the Cypriot case it was the strong corporate tradition and the cooperative climate between the social partners that supported the adjustment process. Taking into account the problems that were experienced in the case of Greece, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus successfully managed to secure the social partners' involvement in the process of drafting and introducing new legislation to ensure a steady untroubled adjustment course. As a result, their lengthy good record of cooperation ultimately rendered the process smooth and predominantly conflict-free.²³

To summarise briefly it can be maintained that, in the Cypriot industrial sector, the process of adjustment was mediated by the pre-existing culture of corporatism, because it was viewed the safest method of harmonising the sector with the relevant *acquis* without encountering many difficulties and to facilitate the completion of the reform process within the expected schedule.

SECTION 4

Corporatism as a Mediating Factor

In addition to the primary norm that stemmed from a consciously promoted political strategy

22 These technical committees had the task of drafting the bills prior to presenting them to the competent department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, which then prepared a draft law in cooperation with the Law Office of the Republic. Once the draft law was prepared, it was re-submitted to the technical committees as a working document for discussion. At this stage, the technical committees also had the task of preparing a report expressing the views of the parties concerned.

23 For a more empirical analysis of the adjustment process, see C. Ioannou (2008-2009), where the transposition process of the bulk of directives that were transposed in three social/industrial policy fields in order to comply with the European *acquis* is examined (employment rights and working conditions, health and safety at work, and gender equality in the labour sector). It is observed that the changes effected were extensive and radical, yet they surprisingly took place time-efficiently (even ahead of the deadlines set in most cases) and in the profound absence of any political conflict.

which aimed at a rapid accession, the sector-specific norm forms the second piece of the Europeanisation puzzle. It is clear from the analysis above that in the sector under scrutiny in this article; this norm-guided behaviour was associated with a deeply-rooted corporatist culture. This readily available medium could conveniently be deployed to carry out the reforms required effectively and efficiently. In other words, when Europeanisation became a stipulation, this culture of traditional corporatism was an established practice that could facilitate a fast result smoothly because despite the lack of the *erga omnes* feature, this *modus operandi* assumed the respect of the parties involved, particularly as it had been practiced successfully for many years.

To illustrate this point, we turn to delve into the harmonisation process in the industrial sector – a process that began in earnest in 1999. Prior to adjustment, considerable legislative gaps existed, which needed to be filled through the enforcement of legal statutes based on the relevant EU directives. By way of example, it is worth considering a number of industrial issues to simply appreciate the extent and capacity of reform required:²⁴

- In the area of employment rights and working conditions, the legislative gaps that existed, prior to adjustment to the provisions of the *acquis*, necessitated the enforcement of legal statutes on eleven different areas: collective redundancies, transfer of undertakings, employer insolvency, information on individual employment conditions, working time, health and safety in fixed-term and temporary employment, part-time and fixed-term work, young people at work, the posting of workers, and the establishment of European Works Councils.
- In the area of health and safety at work, the gaps in existing legislation in the country necessitated the enforcement of legal statutes that were based on twenty-two different issues, which related to provisions for workplaces and work equipment, for different sectors of activity, certain specific risks, the manual handling of loads, visual display units, exposure to carcinogens, chemical agents, biological agents, physical agents, and asbestos, as well as the protection of different categories of workers.
- Finally, in the area of gender equality, the legislative gaps made it necessary to enforce legal statutes that were based on the issues of equal pay for men and women, equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, equal treatment for men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity, the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood, the health and safety at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, parental leave, equal treatment in matters of social security and in occupational social security schemes, and the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.

In spite of the extent of reform required, it was judged by the Cypriot authorities, from the start of the process of harmonisation that the country had the capacity to achieve full compliance

24 For a detailed analysis of these legislative gaps, see C. Ioannou (2008-2009).

as the machinery was largely in place: “The necessary institutional and organisational structures to implement the *acquis* in this area are generally in place” (Republic of Cyprus, 1999, p. 2). The country’s Position Paper made it explicitly clear that problems associated with the lack of *erga omnes*’ that characterised collective agreements in the past would be overcome as enforceable laws would be introduced to cover the whole sector, including everyone involved (*ibid.*). It is evident that the potential was believed to be there from the beginning and the harmonisation process was viewed with optimism: “the sound industrial relations system of Cyprus and the highly unionised labour force will further facilitate the implementation of the *acquis*” (*ibid.*).

As regards the timing of the harmonisation process, the Republic of Cyprus stated plainly from the outset that full compliance would be achieved by the time Cyprus was expected to accede to the Union. As a working hypothesis, the deadline was set for 1 January 2003:

“As a working hypothesis the Government of the Republic of Cyprus considers that accession to the European Union will take place not later than 1 January 2003 (31 December 2002). [...] The existing framework is partly in conformity with the *acquis* and full compliance will be achieved gradually by 1/1/2003” (*ibid.*, pp. 1-2).²⁵

The indicated date was considered to be a theoretical target for serving the purpose of legislative programming. It can be commented here that the optimism expressed in the 1999 Position Paper of the Republic was surely astonishing, especially considering the fairly extensive adjustments that were needed to revise the existing regulatory framework in the country. It was, however, visualised that the adoption of the bulk of the laws would be concluded by the target date set (1 January 2003). Unquestionably, an intensive process of harmonisation had to take place. In the industrial field, hopes were set on the already existing corporatist practices acting as sponsor for a rapid adjustment process.

By the end of the harmonisation process it was evident that, in their vast majority, the timeline targets that had been set out in the legislative programming of the country in its 1999 Position Paper, were realised. Most of the laws were enforced in Cyprus by the target date set (with only a few exceptions²⁶).

The relative success of legislative programming can be closely correlated with the fact that not many problems were encountered in the country during the process of directive transposition, and even in the limited cases where problems did arise, these were overcome fairly smoothly. This was the result of the well-established, deeply-rooted corporatist practice, and because a good climate of cooperation existed among the social partners that assisted the process. Additionally, the embedded

25 It must be clarified that this date (1 January 2003) was only set as a target, or as a ‘working hypothesis’, whereby all the chapters of the *acquis*, including the chapter on social policy, would be concluded.

26 Even in these exceptional cases, however, and even in cases where the date of enforcement even beat the deadline for full compliance (1 January 2003), all the new laws, with just two exceptions (Law 68(I)/2002 and Law 137(I)/2002), were enforced before the country’s actual accession into the EU on 1 May 2004.

instrumental logic of a speedy adjustment was conveyed in the specific field, to the extent that the actors involved felt a sense of obligation – the need to ‘conform’ to the country’s ‘national mission’.

By way of example, the few problems that were encountered and the methods of overcoming them are considered next:

- One problem related to the terminology used during the drafting process of the law on collective redundancies (Law 28(I)/2001), as disagreement arose on the actual definition that should be used; the national definition for redundancies, did not exactly correspond to the one used in the actual directive.²⁷ Yet this problem was relatively easily and smoothly overcome as it was finally decided that the national law would incorporate the definition of the relevant directive.
- A more serious problem was one regarding the law dealing with fixed-time employees (Law 98(I)/2003). The fact that under the provisions of the law, fixed-term contracts could be terminated or not renewed upon expiration without any notification or any kind of compensation, created problems as the Parliament was reluctant to approve such legislation (N. Ioannou, 2005, p. 204). Nevertheless, despite the ostensible dimension of this problem the legislation was approved as it was, with only a few months delay and without causing intense debate. Moreover, the legislation was approved without gaining any publicity whatsoever.
- In the area of health and safety at work, the only problem that arose in the negotiation procedures concerned specifically the ‘phasing in’ provision that some of the health and safety directives contained, and the possibility of requesting derogation. The importance of the ‘phasing in’ provision contained in some health and safety directives is that it gives EU member states a certain period of ‘grace’. Within this period, employers must take up all the obligations of the *acquis* as these are set out in the directives. For example, workplaces (including vessels and fishing vessels) and work (protective) equipment must be made to comply with the various provisions; the different sectors of activity (such as mobile construction sites, surface and underground mineral-extracting industries) must improve their health and safety protection measures; specific risks (such as the manual handling of loads and the use of visual display units as well as the use of carcinogens, asbestos, chemical, biological and physical agents) must be addressed in all enterprises; and specific categories of workers (such as young people, pregnant women and women who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding) must be protected. The problem with this provision is that in the case of acceding EU countries, the ‘phasing in’ provision only applies as long as it falls within the deadlines of the date of accession. The period of ‘grace’ is only given to the potential entrant state, in other words, during the harmonisation phase, and no additional ‘grace’ period can be granted if this exceeds the accession date. Any request for the ‘phasing in’ provision for a period

27 The national definition was not as broad as that used in the directive and did not cover all types of dismissals.

past the accession date is regarded by the EU as a request for derogation (*ibid.*, p. 216). This apparent complication with the 'phasing in' provision of directives led to tensions in the technical committees during the adjustment process as employers believed that the financial burden upon them was too heavy to bear in such a short period of time. Having to comply with health and safety directive provisions in relation to all aforementioned issues (workplaces and work equipment, different sectors of activity, specific risks as well as specific categories of workers), involved an extensive process of change that would also prove to be very costly. This heavy financial burden on employers gained even more significance in view of the small size of the enterprises on the island. The Cypriot employers felt disadvantaged in relation to other EU employers in existing member states, and also discontented with the Cypriot authorities as the negotiating team did not wish to ask for derogation. As stated in the official Position Paper of the Republic, "no problems are foreseen in accepting the *acquis* [...] and no derogation or transitional period is requested" (Republic of Cyprus, 1999, p. 10). Indeed, the negotiating team decided not to make a request for derogation, and the directives were thus transposed within the accession date deadline. Despite the obvious significance of this problem, the laws in the area of health and safety were passed without any delays in most cases. Those delays that were recorded related to very few issues and even in those cases, the delays totalled a few months only. Moreover, the controversy that developed with the 'phasing in' provision of the health and safety directives gained no wider significance in the press, and as per the case of problems encountered in the area of employment rights and working conditions, the contested issue was ostensibly solved with remarkable straightforwardness. Negotiators even seem to have overridden the wishes of a potentially powerful group – the employers. This enhances the argument proposed here of a lack of politics in the process.

- Finally, in the area of gender equality in the labour sector, the only notable problem that actually developed in the course of harmonisation was in relation to Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. In theory, in order to fully harmonise with the provisions of this directive, the Government of the Republic should first renounce ILO Convention No. 45, which deals with underground work for women: "Full harmonisation with this Directive will occur only when Cyprus renounces ILO Convention No. 45 on underground work for women, which according to the ECJ violates the principle of equal treatment" (N. Ioannou, 2005, p. 208). The Convention could not, however, be renounced prior to 30 May 2007. This meant that the Cypriot Government should ask for derogation on this issue until the date that the Convention could be renounced. Nevertheless, no derogation was requested by the Government; the latter merely offered assurance that it would renounce the Convention on the date that this was possible, and until that time both parties (the Cypriot Government and the European Commission) agreed that the issue had no practical significance as no underground activities

existed in Cyprus which could occupy the Cypriot workforce, i.e. mines or quarries (*ibid.*). Again, the issue gained absolutely no press attention and even in the phase of such an inconsistency, no controversies developed.

The evidence presented points to the conclusion that the adjustment process in the Cypriot industrial sector took place with a remarkable straightforwardness. Even issues that proved to be relatively problematic were easily and smoothly resolved: there were no serious delays observed, or any derogation or period of 'grace' requested by the Cypriot Government. By 1 May 2004, when Cyprus officially acceded to the EU, the greatest bulk of the directives in the industrial field had been transposed.

The vital point that emerges here is that the procedures and cultures described cast light on the peculiarity that surrounded the profoundly smooth Europeanisation process in the labour sector of Cyprus. The fact that the social partners, via a process of dialogue, had customarily been involved in an environment of smooth cooperation with very few industrial disputes, accounted partly for the relatively unproblematic experience during the Europeanisation process due to deeply-rooted traditions in the industrial field. In effect, it was because of the pre-existence of tradition that the parties involved were able to deliver. It is questionable whether this could have been possible in the absence of this mechanism, as the *modus operandi* essentially acted as a sponsor to the Europeanisation process in the specific sector.

Ultimately, the success of this strategy fundamentally lay in this collective bargaining process that was consciously promoted over the years as a political strategy that furthered the interests of the parties involved, and eventually became a norm that intrinsically constituted the best readily available compromise to deliver on the 'national mission' statement during the accession process. Thus, the pre-existing, well-established and generally successful corporatist tradition was the means essentially used as the mediating mechanism in the Europeanisation process of the Cypriot labour sector.

Conclusion

The literature suggests that the process of Europeanisation is mediated by pre-existing national mechanisms and structures. Our analysis here has further shown that domain-specific examination is instructive for illustrating the peculiarities of each sector. In other words, not only should the process of Europeanisation be appraised on the basis of the idiosyncrasies of each candidate country, but also on the basis of the traits of each specific sector within that country structure. To be succinct, in order to explicate the process of Europeanisation for a particular country, a domain-specific analysis is essential.

In this respect, this article did not attempt an inductive analysis, as the objective was not to convey the general effects of the Europeanisation process in the country, but rather to apply a theoretical hypothesis on the labour sector, specifically the hypothesis that the pressures that derive

from the process of Europeanisation are mediated through pre-existing national mechanisms, cultures and traditional 'ways of doing things'.

Our findings point to the conclusion that the fast and relatively unproblematic process of adjustment experienced in the field can be explained as a result of (1) the pressures exerted by the instrumental logic of the country's 'national mission' and (2) the pre-existence of the corporatist tradition. The key is to consider that there was a general norm-guided behaviour that was associated with the consciously promoted speedy accession reform process. This norm dominated strategic considerations and, as a result, mediating mechanisms had to be identified in the various policy sectors that were affected by the adoption of the *acquis*. These mediating mechanisms would serve the purpose of facilitating the reform process through policy practices which would not precipitate too many problems and would be time-efficient.

In the sector under scrutiny in this paper, a mechanism that could be used to deliver on the 'national mission' was readily available. This was the deeply-rooted corporatist practice that assumed a great deal of respect and support among the actors involved. It was thus decided that this mechanism was the best mediating factor that could be adopted in the process of Europeanisation in the specific field as it provided the medium to secure an expeditious adjustment through a traditional practice that had proven to be generally successful over time. It was, in other words, a strategy that was consciously promoted as a result of a super-imposed norm-guided approach to the Europeanisation process.

Bibliography

- Börzel, T. (1999) 'Toward Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation in Germany and Spain', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 573-596.
- Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2003a) 'Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe' in Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C.M. (eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-80.
- (2003b) *When Europe Hits Home*. Integration Online Papers 15, available at [<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf>], accessed on 10 October 2009.
- Checkel, J. (2008) 'Constructivism and Foreign Policy' in Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72-79.
- Christofides, L.N. (2003) *National Study for the Republic of Cyprus*, RILSA-ILO Research Project, Nicosia, Cyprus.
- European Commission (1998) *Regular Report on Cyprus' Process towards Accession*, 15 November 1998.
- (2000) *European Union Common Position, Chapter 13: Employment and Social Affairs*, Conference on Accession to the European Union – Cyprus, CONF-CY 9/00, Brussels, 15 March 2000.
- European Council (1997) *Presidency Conclusion*, 12-13 December 1997.
- Fearon, J. and Wendt, A. (2002) 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View' in Carlsnaes, W., Risse-Kappen, T. and Simmons, B.A. (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage, pp. 52-72.

- Featherstone, K. (2001) 'Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanisation' in Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (eds.), *Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 141-162.
- (2003) 'Introduction: In the Name of Europe' in Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C.M. (eds.), *The Politics of Europeanisation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-26.
- (2008) "Europeanisation" and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 23-39.
- Freyer, E. (1999) 'European Financial Integration: Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Accession of Cyprus' in Theophanous, A., Peristianis, N. and Ioannou, A. (eds.), *Cyprus and the European Union*. Nicosia: Intercollege Press, pp. 67-81.
- Grabbe, H. (2006) *The EU's Transformative Power*. Hampshire: Palgrave.
- Haas, E. (1990) *When Knowledge is Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ioannou, C. (2008-2009) 'The Europeanisation of Cypriot Social Policy: An "Apolitical" Europeanisation Process', *Journal of Modern Hellenism*, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 97-128.
- (2009) 'The Development of the "Cypriot Corporatist Model": The Emergence of a "Corporatist Culture" and its Impact on the Process of Europeanisation', *Cyprus and European Law Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 700-736.
- Ioannou, N. (2005) 'Social Policy and Employment' in Stefanou, C. (ed.), *Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 199-219.
- Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) 'Introduction' in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-32.
- Kioukias, D. (2003) 'Reorganizing Social Policies through Social Partnerships: Greece in European Perspective', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 121-132.
- Maarten, V. (2002) 'What is Europeanisation?' Paper for the Second YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation, University of Bocconi, Milan, 22-23 November 2002.
- Messios, O. (2004) *Social Dialogue and Conflict Resolution in Cyprus*. Report financed by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, EF/04/46/EN, Dublin.
- Nugent, N. (2000) 'EU Enlargement and the Cyprus Problem', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 131-150.
- Papadimitriou, D. (2005) 'The Limits of Engineering Collective Escape: the 2000 Reform of the Greek Labour Market', *West European Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 381-401.
- Papadopoulos, T. (2003) 'Message by H.E. the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr Tassos Papadopoulos', in Maital, S. and Pierides, A. (eds.), *Reinventing Cyprus: The Role of Entrepreneurs in the Era of Innovation*. Nicosia: Antonis Pierides and Associates.
- Radaelli, C. (2000a) 'Wither Europeanisation? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change', paper prepared for the International Workshop 'Europeanisation: Concept and Reality', Bradford University, 5-6 May 2000.
- (2000b) 'Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy', *Governance*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 25-43.
- Republic of Cyprus (1999) *Chapter 13: Employment and Social Affairs, Position Paper CONF-CY 9/00*. Nicosia: Office of the Coordinator for Harmonisation.
- Ruggie, J. (1982) 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in Post-War Economic Order', *International Organization*. Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 379-415.

- Schmitter, P. (1979) 'Still the Century of Corporatism?' in Schmitter, P. and Lehbruch, G. (eds.), *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation*. New York: Sage, pp. 7-52.
- Schmitter, P. and Lehbruch, G. (eds.) (1979) *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation*. London: Sage, pp. 7-49 (First published in *Review of Politics* 36, 1974).
- Sparsis, M. (1998) *Tripartism and Industrial Relations: The Cyprus Experience*. Nicosia.
- Stefanou, C. (ed.) (2005) *Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Telo, M. (ed.) (2001) *European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Vassiliou, G. (2005) 'Foreword by President Vassiliou' in Stefanou, C. (ed.), *Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. xii-xvi.
- Venieris, D. (2003) 'Social Policy in Greece: Rhetoric versus Reform', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 133-147.
- Yannakourou, M. and Soumeli, E. (2004) *The Evolving Structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990-2004*. Research Project co-financed by the European Commission and the University of Florence, VS/2003/0219-S12.359910.

ESSAY AND
RESEARCH
NOTES

VOLUME 21

NUMBER 2



Cyprus and the European Union

EROL KAYMAK

The Republic of Cyprus acceded to the European Union as a divided territory in 2004. At the time there remained hope that the impasse resulting from the failed round of UN mediation could be overcome. On the Greek Cypriot side, European Union membership had long been posited as a means to the end of reuniting Cyprus. Even the rejection of the Annan Plan was portrayed as an opportunity to return to the negotiation table with new European parameters. This proved to be a convincing rationale to the vast majority of Greek Cypriots who overwhelmingly rejected the UN mediated blueprint. Yet, five years on, this European factor has not materialised in any tangible sense. Worse, the European Union no longer serves to mobilise Turkish Cypriots to favour a compromise settlement.

On paper, the European factor was tailor made to help facilitate an amicable settlement in Cyprus. Through rule of law, the EU could have enabled the Cypriot sides to build trust, where it had been scarce. After all, the failure to enforce contracts tends to create 'prisoners' dilemmas'. Despite – or due to – the Guarantor powers in Cyprus, agreements were violated despite international treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus. The EU, on the other hand, offered an environment where the hierarchy of norms and laws prevailed. As such, the EU also offered the respective 'motherlands', erstwhile regional rivals despite mutual NATO membership, the benefits of a 'peace dividend'.

In the years leading to accession, momentum was with the Europeanizing dynamic. This was evident in Helsinki in 1999, which effectively reversed the climate from Luxembourg in 1997. Turkey was offered candidacy to full EU membership, and the road was paved for Cyprus' accession. In 2004 Cyprus acceded, albeit divided, and this anomaly/derogation was accommodated in the Accession Treaty, leading to the current impasse.

And despite the launch of formal negotiations with the EU in 2005, Turkey remains far from its goal of joining the Union. At this stage, there are doubts that Turkey will ever be admitted, either stemming from a lack of progress in meeting technical criteria, or, more likely, due to political factors both in Turkey and within EU member states. This is the real impasse that might plague the Cyprus problem indefinitely.

But this is not met with much concern these days in Ankara or in the streets of Istanbul. Turkey, unlike many Eastern European countries, retains strategic options. Turkey's relative autonomy, even in the realm of security (despite NATO membership), reflects in its increasingly diverse foreign policy objectives. Turkey now fancies itself a bona fide regional power, and not only in the material sense. Turkey now boasts of its 'strategic depth' – a term coined by its current foreign minister – a form of 'soft power' stemming from Turkey's Ottoman history and cultural affinities to neighbouring states in the Middle East.

Moreover, Turkey's developing economy and trade relations makes Turkey relatively more attractive to various actors.

More generally, globalisation seems to be lifting the BRIC nations, financially and economically, resulting in an apparent shift in relative power capabilities in the international system favouring the emerging markets. In this context, Turkey's relative autonomy, in turn, is only enhanced.

This development coincides with the lacklustre performance of euro-land economies, especially of neighbouring Greece. Public debt in Greece is a growing concern, partly induced through Greece's commitments to the European Union and the Euro as a common currency. Unable to devalue, the only response has been for the market to increase the spread on Greek sovereign debt and the German benchmark. Thus far Greek politicians have not been able to aggregate social forces and embark on a new course. Instead, chaotic scenes in the streets of Athens have dominated, giving the impression of a permanent crisis.

Thus, the lustre of the EU as a model for Turkey and other nations has been somewhat diminished over the course of a decade. It will be recalled that when the world was ushering in a new millennium, it was still assumed that emerging markets were fragile and that 'good governance' was still at a premium outside the West. Hence, despite reservations on the IMF prescriptions, we note that the 'Washington consensus' prevailed, effectively imposing banking and financial reforms on Asian countries and later, following the 2001 crisis, on Turkey.

So, part of the problem is that Greece, which once was meant to 'domesticate' Turkey, is proving to be an illusory case of 'good governance'. These lessons can be gleaned more generally, considering former EU 'miracles', including Ireland, which proved to be a financial and real estate 'bubble'.

Dreams die hard, of course. Formally, Turkey remains a candidate for full EU membership, and the Cyprus problem remains 'destined' to be solved amicably, through some sort of federal, power sharing arrangement.

Yet, these notions give the impression of being 'retro'. Even the election of George Papandreou in Greece provides some nostalgic relief for those committed to an EU that incorporates the ambitions of the Cypriot sides and Turkey alike. However, if we are to go 'back to the future' and consider the possibility of a renewed period of Greek-Turkish cooperation, we realise that the strategic view of the EU at the time coincided with initiatives of the Clinton administration that effectively lobbied European allies to take a broader perspective on its enlargement strategy.

Successive electoral cycles in Europe undermined this strategic orientation, bringing to power governments in France and Germany that prefer to consolidate the EU minus Turkey. The shift to the right continues in the current cycle, with anticipation that Prime Minister Gordon Brown's Labour must step aside for the Tories. This, in turn, may have also affected the EU presidency, where someone such as Tony Blair may have been suited to virtually put the EU on the diplomatic map. Alas, this was not the course chosen. Upon the naming of Herman Van Rompuy as the EU's

first president, French President Sarkozy was quoted as saying that Rompuy came from “an important country but not one of the most important countries, so that no one will feel excluded”. This, in turn, suggests that ‘important’ member states – and their representatives – are not ready to be upstaged by EU officials.

EU leaders must demonstrate the viability of the Lisbon Treaty that was designed to circumvent referenda as the mode of ratification – save for Ireland where it is constitutionally required. Given the unpopularity of enlargement, it is understandable that the EU member states settled on Van Rompuy, someone whose scepticism on eventual Turkish membership dovetails well with prevailing public sentiments.

These proclivities, in turn, are unlikely to change in the near term. Whereas Europe boasts some very competitive, export-oriented industries, the reality is that labour and an array of import-competing sectors cannot be too keen on further liberalisation and competition. If we add to this the perceived cultural incompatibilities with Turkey, as well as concerns regarding the apparent Islamic-revival in Turkey, the chances of European public sentiment turning is slim. The utility in rhetorically echoing these concerns – as opposed to allaying them – is all too apparent to politicians, and not only to those on the margins of politics.

So, what does all this mean for Cyprus? If the impasse between Europe and Turkey continues, it may serve to consolidate a ‘fault line’ that currently runs through Cyprus. Analogies to plate tectonics are not new. Controversially the late Samuel P. Huntington pushed such metaphors to describe the ‘clash of civilisations’. But whether intellectuals choose to ridicule crude generalisations or not, it is fair to say that we are emerging from a unipolar world, and this should compel the European Union into action. However, with an aging population and resources stretched through demands for social welfare, the EU, and its member states, is not equipped to respond effectively to the changing geopolitical contours.

The result may be that Europeans will increasingly hear Turks speak of ‘alternatives’; alternatives to full membership, and by extension, alternatives to a federal settlement in Cyprus. This is ironic, insofar as it is the Turkish side that rejects a ‘privileged partnership’.

Prior to emergence of Erdogan’s AKP party, dissidents in the top brass looked to alternative alliances/coalitions (Russia and Iran), but it was left to AKP foreign policy makers to chart a new direction and to conceive of Turkey’s regional ‘strategic depth’ or some sort of soft power. The slogan, ‘zero problems with the neighbours’, is meant to convey trust, yet rhetoric is no match for facts on the ground. Turkey is unlikely to withdraw troops unilaterally from Cyprus, or make any other significant gesture, hence the *status quo* continues.

Should accession negotiations lead to a genuine moment of truth, Turkish politicians may be induced to consider far reaching reforms in Turkey, despite domestic opposition. To the extent that Turkey is incorporated as a full member of the EU it may be conceivable that Turkish citizens will embrace ‘European’ values, notwithstanding concessions on Kurdish issues and other matters that have hitherto been regarded as national ‘red lines’. But, with Turkey only offered some sort of

'privileged partnership' these reforms lack internal legitimacy. Erdogan once referred to 'Ankara criteria' as opposed to 'Copenhagen criteria', but without an external anchor there are serious doubts regarding the viability of sustainable reform.

Thus, if Turkey is told that it must accept 'privileged' partnership, which means 'derogations', it only makes sense that TCs would also insist on 'derogations' in turn. However, since the accession of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot expectations have not been met, either in respect to reciprocity for the Annan Plan 'yes' or in terms of domestic democratisation. The Turkish Cypriots realised 'gains' from saying 'yes' to the Annan Plan, in the form of a property boom that brought in new capital, increasing the wealth of households, but this only serves to increase vested interests in the existing property regime. And the Turkish Cypriots have also faced uncertainty in the face of challenges to the property regime in the north through litigation. This makes them wary of the EU.

The various programmes and funds available to the Turkish Cypriots were meant to engender significant dynamic, building institutions and civil society, thus contributing to inter-communal cooperation as well as a process of economic harmonisation that would be phased in during a transition period.

There is little point in recounting how these policies proved slow to develop in the face of contestation and varying interpretations of the EU mandate. Thus, the proposed regulation on direct trade between the Turkish Cypriot community and the Union has been shelved indefinitely, and various opportunities to embed the Turkish Cypriot institutions of governance (i.e. the internationally unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or TRNC) into the EU have similarly failed. This in turn, has left the Turkish Cypriot economy fragile and fraught with fear of international competition, as comparative advantages have not been realised in any relevant sector. The result is the rise of economic nationalism among groups and sectors that would prefer to continue with Turkish subsidies indefinitely.

Recent electoral results in the TRNC¹ attest to the fact that whatever 'societal transformation' or political realignment that coincided with the Annan Plan period has not been reversed. Should Mehmet Ali Talat also lose the presidential poll to be held in April 2010 we will have come full circle.

Given all this, and quite independent from the intentions of the leaders in the ongoing Cyprus problem negotiations, there is the likelihood of imminent failure to reach consensus. Hence another referendum may not be in the offing for Cyprus.

Despite this, the impasse over and in Cyprus will come to an end one way or another. Should the negotiations fail, Turkey will be compelled to make good on its promise to move away from the current federal settlement paradigm and thus seek to promote the international recognition of the TRNC.

1 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

All of this will further complicate Turkish–EU relations, given Turkey’s legal obligations to open ports to the Republic of Cyprus under the terms of the custom union. So, there is a pending crisis.

Should this come to pass, nationalism will have marginalised alternative prisms through which the Cyprus problem is conceived among islanders. The EU will then have to consider Turkish Cypriot demands for ‘self-determination’, drawing on the Kosovo experience as inspiration.

Instead of contributing to the post-nationalisation of the Cyprus problem, the experience risks the ‘re-modernisation’ of the conflict, with conflicting claims to sovereignty consolidated among the ethno-nationalist elites that maintain their respective grips on the two communities.

2010 will prove to be a decisive year in the current attempt to resolve the Cyprus question. Neither in the internal nor the external dynamics of conflict resolution has the EU managed to play a significant constructive role since 2004. The EU membership prospect might still work as a carrot for the Turkish Cypriots but the organisation has less and less to offer to Turkey. So, as the year 2009 comes to a close the chances for a settlement of the Cyprus problem in 2010 are bleak.

BOOK
REVIEWS

VOLUME 21

NUMBER 2



Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey

JAMES KER-LINDSAY

I.B. Tauris (London and New York, 2007), 168 pp.

ISBN: 978-1-84511-504-3

In *Crisis and Conciliation*, James Ker-Lindsay offers us a very detailed and eloquent account of the developments in Greek-Turkish relations during the critical year of 1999, when “[the] relations ... went from the brink of conflict to an unprecedented outpouring of friendship and solidarity” (p. 2). This detailed account of the critical year is preceded by a comprehensive summary of bilateral relations, starting with the Greek rebellion for independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821. It is followed by an epilogue, where the author follows developments in Greek-Turkish relations until roughly the end of 2005.

The transformation of Greek-Turkish relations is of high interest to academics working in the areas of conflict resolution, the impact of European Union on its periphery, the international relations of Southeastern Europe, and Cyprus conflict, as well as to the numerous intellectuals, activists, artists, business associations, civil society organisations and journalists, who have pursued and contributed in various ways to Greek-Turkish friendship over the years. Through its accessible style and meticulous coverage, *Crisis and Conciliation* is likely to capture a broad audience among specialists and the general public alike. Due to its focus on a very important historical period, it will remain as a valuable reference source for many years.

Many academics, including myself, casually identify 1999 as the turning point in Greek-Turkish relations, and focus on the periods before and after. In this respect, Ker-Lindsay’s book is a forceful reminder that turning points are not simply ‘points’. Change happens through a painful process that involves progress as well as set-backs, courage as well as hesitation and frustration.

One key argument advanced by Ker-Lindsay is that Greece, rather than Turkey, has been the main driver of the rapprochement process. After Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem initiated the process with the letter he sent to the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreu, “Greece took the more active role”. “Indeed, all things considered, Turkey did very little in substantive terms to push the process forward” (p. 115). The main evidence that Ker-Lindsay puts forward is that Turkey refused to provide a gesture, such as the opening of the Halki Seminary, as also suggested by the US President Bill Clinton during his visit to Turkey in October 1999, in return for Greece’s lifting of its veto on Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki European Council. This led Greece to search for a gesture from its EU partners, in the form of linking the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes to Turkey’s EU membership path.

While the media reporting of the times may have spurred expectations of a gesture in Greece (and fears of a concession in Turkey), I believe that the absence of a Turkish gesture in 1999 loses its significance in retrospect. A better characterisation of the Turkish approach to the rapprochement process, in my opinion, would be as 'reactive' rather than 'inactive'. The change in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, as epitomised in the lifting of its veto against Turkey's EU candidacy, was grounded in a fundamental rethinking of Greek security, as better served not through the exclusion but through the Europeanisation of Turkey. In that sense, it needs to be underscored that the linkage of Greek-Turkish disputes to Turkey's EU membership path was essential, not a second-best alternative for the revised Greek foreign policy. In contrast, the Turkish approach to the rapprochement process in the initial years lacked such an ideational basis. The rethinking of Turkish foreign policy priorities came about only in 2004 in the form of giving its full backing to the Annan plan and the reunification of Cyprus. It would be fair to conclude that Turkey played a more active role in relation to the Cyprus conflict in this period than Greece.

As of summer 2009, one can sense a certain level of disappointment in Greece regarding the fruits of the rapprochement process. In this respect, it is puzzling why the Karamanlis government chose not to insist on the referral of the Aegean disputes to the International Court of Justice before the EU gave the green light to the start of accession negotiations with Turkey at the end of 2004. With neither side insisting on legal resolution, the disputes are put to sleep. I would submit that this is not such a bad outcome for the rapprochement process if we take into account how the Aegean disputes remained 'undiscovered' prior to the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict. By way of an example, one can debate why Turkey did not object to the extension of Greek airspace to 10 n.m. in 1931, and did not dispute the limits of Greek airspace until 1975.

In conclusion, Ker-Lindsay makes the powerful observation that "in situations where an EU member is in conflict with a state that desires membership the EU is not simply a tool of leverage. Instead, if the example provided by Greece is anything to go by, it would appear that EU membership has the potential to change the way in which a member state approaches conflict ... Obvious examples of where this finding could have relevance in the future include Cyprus ..." (p. 116). I, too, agree that this is a key lesson to be extracted from the course of Greek-Turkish relations. But, before jumping to optimistic conclusions, it is worthwhile to explore the conditions under which EU membership produces this result. In this context, the counterfactual scenario necessary to entertain is what would have transpired had the other EU member states not supported Turkish candidacy in 1999. The complexity of EU-Turkey relations is certainly beyond the scope of Ker-Lindsay's book, but it is necessary to note that neither before 1999 or afterwards, has Greek foreign policy been the only factor affecting EU-Turkey relations. It would be more correct to assert that EU membership can change the way a member state approaches conflict when the EU adopts an inclusive approach towards the other conflict party. This point is especially pertinent to keep in mind in the context of the lukewarm relations between EU and Turkey since 2006.

BAHAR RUMELILI

Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis

JAN ASMUSSEN

I.B.Tauris (London, 2008), 364 pp.

ISBN: 978-1-84511-742-9

The 1974 Cyprus mega-crisis has been a source of a heated debate among supporters of conspiracy theory and its critics. The conspiracy theorists, most of them journalists, point to US and perhaps British collusion to divide Cyprus between Greece and Turkey (see in particular Stern, 1977; Hitchens, 1984; O'Malley and Craig, 1999).¹ The initial premise of conspiracy theorists is that an independent Cyprus under Makarios ('the Castro of the Mediterranean'), with the biggest communist party in Europe (AKEL) as his supporters to boot, was against the interests of the West, the US in particular, hence the conspiracy to overthrow him.

However, scholars that base their research on archival material (mainly US and British archives) have found no evidence of conspiracy or collusion by the US or Britain (see in particular Slengesol, 2000; Nicolet, 2001; Rizas, 2002).² Turkish analysts (see Birand, 1985; Bölükbaşı, 1988; Firat, 1999 and 2000)³ concur on this point, even though Ecevit was initially of the view (in July 1974) that the CIA may have encouraged the Greek Junta. However, until a few years ago the archives on the question were far from complete. Moreover the conspiracy theorists could console themselves with the thought that such evidence is concealed and so may be unavailable to researchers. The conspiracy line has been dashed once again by the book under review, written by

-
- 1 Laurence Stern (1977) *Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, New York: Times Books; Christopher Hitchens (1984) *Cyprus: Hostage to History*, London: Quartet Books; Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig (1999) *Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, London: I.B. Tauris.
 - 2 Ivar-André Slengesol (2000) 'A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. II, No. 2; Claude Nicolet (2001) *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*, Mannheim: Bibliopolis; Sotiris Rizas (2002) *Oi Inomenes Politieis, i Diktatoria ton Synthgmatarhon kai to Kypriako Zitima, 1967-1974* [The United States, the Colonels Dictatorship and the Cyprus Question, 1967-1974], Athens: Patakis.
 - 3 Mehmet Ali Birand (1985) *Thirty Hot Days*, Nicosia; Suha Bölükbaşı (1988) *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*. Lanham: University Press of America; Melek Firat (July 1998-March 1999) 'Oi Politikes tis Tourkias sto Kypriako' [The Politics of Turkey regarding the Cyprus Problem], *Syghrona Themata*, No's 68-69-70; Melek Firat (2001) 'Yunanistan'la İlişkiler' [Relations with Greece], in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası, (Cilt I 1919-1980)* [Turkish Foreign Policy, Vol. I, 1919-1980], Istanbul: İletişim, pp. 742-749.

Jan Asmussen, the most complete book to date that focuses exclusively on the dramatic events of July-August 1974.

One of the main research questions of the book is precisely to address and test the conspiracy theory. Asmussen asks, among other things, the following questions:

- (1) Why did Washington not stop the coup against Makarios by the Greek Junta (July 1974), in view of the fact that it is well established that the Americans (at State Department level) were well aware that it was hatched by early July 1974. Is this lack of resolute behaviour on the part of Washington a proof of collusion or can it be attributed to indifference and sheer incompetence?
- (2) Why did the US and Britain not stop the Turkish military intervention (20-26 July). Was it because they did not try hard enough (which may imply collusion) or because the Turks could not be convinced (Ankara was adamant in its decision, early on, to intervene drastically so as to forestall *enosis* and save the Turkish Cypriots from the likes of EOKA-B)?
- (3) Why were the US and Britain unable to halt the second Turkish intervention (14-16 August), which would have been no modest achievement. In the first operation the Turks had taken control of some 7-9% of the territory, while in the second – which was far bloodier than the first one – they secured almost 37% of Cyprus, far greater a region than the percentage of Turkish Cypriots in the island.

In what is a careful, balanced and convincing presentation, using newer archival data unavailable previously (such as records of conversations, telephone communications, telegrams, etc) Asmussen reinforces the previous findings of Slengesol, Nicolet and Rizas (though he is not aware of the work of the latter), demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that the conspiracy theory does not hold water.

The picture that emerges is the following. To begin with, in the period 1968-1974, for the US under the Nixon administration, Makarios was more of 'a nuisance than menace'. Washington was well aware that the Cypriot president, however unpredictable, was a staunch anti-communist and had AKEL well under control. More crucially, in 1974 or before that, no one in his right mind in the US, Britain or NATO contemplated yet another international border in an island the size of Cyprus, between the two rivals, Greece and Turkey. Kissinger (1999) in particular points out that he was no madman to risk a Greek-Turkish war by orchestrating the division of the island via a coup by the fanatic brigadier Ioannidis.⁴ The US was indeed aware of the upcoming Greek coup in Cyprus but did little about it, mainly due to Kissinger's lack of great interest on the matter (he was of the view that the State Department officials, such as desk officer Thomas Boyatt were crying 'wolf'). The US intervention was limited to a forewarning by a lesser US official of the embassy in Athens to a Greek official. When the coup did take place, the diplomats of Britain as

4 Henry Kissinger (1999) *Years of Renewal*, New York: Simon and Schuster.

well as the US went into high gear, but then again Kissinger was of the view that little could be done about it, other than putting pressure on Athens, for Ankara had decided to intervene militarily whatever the risk and was unstoppable. Britain and especially the US (Kissinger) were instrumental in bringing about the ceasefire at the 1st Geneva conference, but from then on their various attempts though constant (in the course of the 2nd Geneva conference, where a solution to the Cyprus problem via a federal framework was sought) were uncoordinated between the two of them, a factor that made them appear less convincing to the main party that needed convincing – Turkey. As we already know from the memoirs of Callaghan (1987) and Kissinger (1999),⁵ the latter was unprepared to use US and British military force or a blockade to stop the Turks and was furious with the British foreign minister's proposals to this effect.

Asmussen goes about his task admirably, painstakingly deconstructing all the conspiracy conjectures. Of particular importance for those of us that regard the 2nd Geneva conference as a great missed opportunity of the Greek Cypriots and Greeks, that could have stemmed the second Turkish invasion (see e.g. Heraclides, 2002)⁶ is the extended chapter 'Second Geneva Conference, 8-14 August 1974' (pp. 181-224), where one sees in considerable detail the various attempts by Kissinger (by phone though not in person), with his cantons idea (that Ankara accepted with difficulty), and those of Callaghan in Geneva, but also the flexibility shown momentarily by the Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş, but also Clerides and even by Greek Foreign Minister Mavros. As in previous presentations, Makarios again comes out as mainly responsible for the deadlock in Geneva with Karamanlis unable and unwilling to dissuade him, and with the hawks in the Turkish military-diplomatic establishment keen to oblige.

To conclude, this is a thorough book and a worthwhile contribution to the literature on the Cyprus problem.

ALEXIS HERACLIDES

5 James Callahan (1987) *Time and Change*, London: Collins; Kissinger, *op. cit.*

6 Alexis Heraclides (2002) *To Kypriako: Syngrousi kai Epilysi* [The Cyprus Problem: Conflict and Resolution], Athens: I. Sideris, pp. 178-187.

Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974. A Multidisciplinary Analysis

AHMET AKGÜNDÜZ

Ashgate (Aldershot, 2008), 234 pp.

ISBN: 978-0-7546-7390-3

The book investigates the migration process from Turkey to Western Europe during the period of state-initiated 'guestworker' recruitment from 1960 to 1974. Its examination of migration triggers, migration management, and migrant profiles on both sides of the migratory chain aims to critically respond to some prevailing assumptions in the literature, and to fill gaps in the understanding of this particular example of state-sponsored migration.

The study presents itself as a 'multidisciplinary analysis', however, the quantitative data guide the overall analytical approach. It is based on the evaluation of primary and secondary sources which includes data drawn from the German Federal Labour Office, the Turkish Employment Service and the OECD, as well as from a wide range of Turkish, German and Dutch national statistics information. The author considers a number of receiving states, such as Belgium, Austria, Sweden, France and the Netherlands, but places most emphasis on Germany which received the largest number of Turkish nationals during and after this period. The evaluation of statistical and official data across different national and linguistic contexts represents one of the strengths of this book. It provides key comparative insights into a process that was based on bi-national agreements and therefore part of an attempt of bilateral migration management. Here, the author's examination of the Turkish material in particular offers an invaluable contribution to a field that is often dominated by data solely sourced from host countries. At the same time, the strong focus on statistical data limits the analysis to the officially documented cases, in a situation where undocumented migration was substantial. The author's figures are instructive: while 800,000 workers left Turkey as part of the Turkish employment service's (IIBK) recruitment scheme, 500,000 departed outside the official channels during the same historical period. The consequences of this fact are left rather under-addressed.

The analysis focuses on four main themes discussed in four separate chapters: the 'push factors'; the role of the Turkish state in promoting this process; the recruitment policies of the receiving states; and finally the socio-economic circumstances of the migrants themselves. Against what he sees as widespread assumptions in the literature which locate migration pressure in the three factors of 'slow economic growth', 'unemployment' and 'population growth', Akgündüz's study shows that the Turkish economy was growing in the 1960s, and that the majority of the

migrants who initially left were not the stereotypical 'rural poor' but often skilled, employed and from the more affluent, urban areas of Turkey. From the 1950s onwards, migration pressure stemmed not from an underperforming economy but from high economic growth rates, and the challenges that a 'rapid capitalist transformation' (p. 30) posed to Turkey's socio-economic structure. The pressures of a more pronounced capitalist and mechanised mode of production stimulated rural flight to the cities and threatened small-scale peasants, producers and artisans with proletarianisation. At this juncture emigration to Western Europe was seen as a chance to improve the economic *status quo*, and was actively promoted as such by the Turkish state. The instrumental role of the Turkish government is particularly well explained in chapter 3. It documents very comprehensively how the 'exit of labour' (p. 56) was bureaucratically regulated, the monopolist role of the IIBK (Turkish Employment Service) in channelling workers according to foreign demand and national economic objectives, and the specific aspirations for future economic development resulting from the temporary export of labour. The Turkish government hoped that future returnees would impart skills, modern values, and investment capital to their home communities and boost Turkey's economic modernisation and Westernisation. As the author states this idea was still adhered to in the 1970s, as families began to follow the initial migrants to Europe.

The chapter on receiving countries reiterates the well-known facts that Western European countries sought to manage incoming labour according to their economic needs, and that Germany in particular depended on the labour supply of the guestworker system. It provides useful statistical data on migration volume, trans-European distribution and sectors of the economy that were filled with migrant labour. According to the author the advantages of Turkish labour were perceived to be its ready supply when other sources dried up and the opportunity to import a fair number of skilled labourers, but also the relative geographical proximity (people could be transported by train), together with the migrants' 'racial-cultural' (p. 127) characteristics which were deemed more acceptable than those of 'non-Europeans'. This latter point is not developed though.

The final chapter focuses on the migrants themselves and supports some of the earlier chapters. The chapter shows how those who the Turkish government sought to export abroad, namely people from poorer central and eastern regions, were initially reluctant to leave. Rather than government incentives, growing transnational social networks became instrumental for these populations' journeys abroad, particularly once they really began to take off after 1974 and after the politically motivated exits set in. The author rightly points out how social networks shaped individuals' migration incentives and routes, not only outside but also within the recruitment programme, and often circumvented the intentions of official planning.

The book succeeds in offering a comprehensive picture of the significance of Turkish migrant labour for the post-war economies of the major recruiting countries, and of the importance assigned to it by the Turkish authorities. It provides useful reminders of the very recent history of concerted European efforts in propagating, and exploiting the advantages of economic migration

at a time when present-day governments denounce the economic migration of all but elite migrants. The text is clearly structured and regular summaries provide useful pointers for the reader, though it would have benefited from more rigorous language editing. The strength of this study lies in the comparative macro-analysis of a large range of quantitative data, and it undoubtedly provides a very rich source for those studying the 'guestworker' system and for migration scholars more widely. In addition, the historically entrenched socio-economic West-East divide in Turkey clearly runs through this discussion. It seems though that the established official Turkish discourse, which conventionally associates this divide with categories such as developed/undeveloped, modern/backward, progressive/conservative etc., also runs through the text as accepted truth. A more qualitative approach to class, ethnicity, the Turkish state and nationhood (none of which figure as analytical categories in the text) may have given the statistical data more depth, especially since the author also explains that the majority of those from the 'underdeveloped' eastern provinces (many of whom can be assumed to be Kurds and minority Christians) left through unofficial channels.

While this book sets out to discuss the specifics of the guestworker programme linking Turkey and Western Europe, some of its insights would be valuable to consider in examining other migration movements including those to and from Cyprus. Migrations from Turkey to the island as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriot emigrations post-1963 are clearly bound up with the island's history of conflict. At the same time though, it might prove useful to examine how the political factors interacted with socio-economic, labour market and demographic considerations and how Turkey as a sending and receiving state, but also Greece, Britain, Australia and other destination countries sought to further their own geopolitical and economic interests by shaping migration flows to and from Cyprus

HEIDI ARMBRUSTER

The Government and Politics of Cyprus

Edited by JAMES KER-LINDSAY AND HUBERT FAUSTMANN

Peter Lang (Bern, 2008), 293 pp.

ISBN: 978-3-03911-096-4

I recommend this book, especially to undergraduate students requiring an introduction to the government and politics of Cyprus; however I do so with certain reservations.

The editors, James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann, state that the book's scope is the government and politics of Cyprus. To them 'Cyprus' means the Republic of Cyprus, although in recognising a second entity on the island they include a chapter on it – Turkish Cypriot politics. They give no clear explanation for this discrepancy, although imply that this is because "the Greek-Cypriot-dominated Republic of Cyprus is ... a member of the United Nations and the European Union" and the internationally unrecognised Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC)¹ is not. They make no case for this discrepancy on the grounds of space or lack of qualified experts, in what seems a political rather than a scholastic decision. Thus, the scope of the book is problematical because it largely excludes the Turkish Cypriot community, which, according to the 1960 constitution, is an equal community with the Greek Cypriot community and which, like them, implemented the 'law of necessity' in order to govern themselves and their people in 1964. Whether this is recognised internationally or not is irrelevant to a scholarly book that claims in its title to deal with Cyprus. Erol Kaymak's brilliant chapter on Turkish Cypriot politics somewhat rectifies the omission.

The book attempts to fill a void in the historiography of the government and politics of Cyprus and, aside from the above, it mostly succeeds. It enlightens on various facets of the government and politics of Cyprus, but falls short of providing the analytical dimension. Taken as a whole, the book is informative, sometimes illuminating, but lacks an argument. It does not ask: why the government and politics of the island developed this way?

About half of the book, which has eleven chapters and an introduction, is primarily researched and written by Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann: five of the chapters have their imprint. The fact that much of the book was researched and written by them is a good thing, but by no means does it make their contributions immune from critique. Indeed the two best chapters are those by Yiouli Taki and David Officer (co-authors) and Erol Kaymak. The two weakest are by Altana Filos and Diana Markides. The book suffers from the lack of a conclusion, which would have tied up the loose ends, encapsulated the themes and given an insight into the future.

1 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this review, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

Chapter 1 is a timely and fine chapter on political culture. Faustmann's examination of clientelism and *rousfeti* is admirable. My criticism relates to his discussion of identity and specifically when he states that polls on identity should be taken with a grain of salt, yet he spends about two pages on such surveys. Also, he does not pursue what 'Cypriot' identity means for DIKO, when he argues that it has a "strong predominance of Cypriot identity". In my view, DIKO champions independent Cypriot Hellenism, that is, an independent Cypriot state dominated by Greek Cypriots, therefore, Cypriot identity means social and cultural sameness with the Greek nation, but political independence from Greece. This nationalist ideology rejects the island's historical multiculturalism from the Frankish period, with Cypriots of Maronite, Latin, Turkish, and Armenian heritage, and their influence on the Cypriot Eastern Orthodox Christian identity.

The second chapter, also by Faustmann, on the British colonial legacy of division, is also good, particularly the discussion of the 1931 uprising and the EOKA campaign and their consequences. I agree that after the 1882 constitution, a Liberal *laissez faire* policy prevailed, but this was because Cyprus' Christian-Muslim society was integrated and unthreatening, and the island was a backwater, not because of some colonial plan. However, I disagree that "the Orthodox community had gradually developed a Greek national identity based on ethnic and cultural roots shared with the newly founded Greek state since the first half of the 19th century", that "originally this identity was embraced by the small educated elite and the Church but it was soon passed on to the wider population" so that by the second half of the nineteenth century, Greek nationalism was "engulfing the lower strata". Much has been published showing that the educated Greek Cypriot elite and Church were divided on the question of identity: a small – almost insignificant number – of Greeks (with no Cypriot heritage) and even fewer Hellenised Cypriots identified the Cypriot Orthodox Christians as Greeks and due to British Colonial Office sympathy indoctrinated the new educated generations; while a larger faction of educated Cypriots, which included Archbishop Sophronios III, resisted and did not.² It is true that in this battle the Hellenists won, but this

2 Michalis N. Michael (2005) *The Church of Cyprus during the Ottoman Period (1571-1878)*, (in Greek), Nicosia; Andrekos Varnava, «Αρχιεπίσκοπος Σωφρόνιος Γ΄: «Πατρίδα μὲν ἔσχουν τὴν Κύπρον, γονεῖς δὲ Χριστιανοὺς Ὀρθόδοξους τοῦ Ανατολικοῦ Δόγματος», *Περιπέτειες Ἰδεῶν* ["Archbishop Sophronios III: 'My Homeland is Cyprus and my Parents are Orthodox Christians of the Eastern Dogma'"] (*Politis* Newspaper), 27 May 2007, 72; «Ἡ Κυπριακὴ Ὀρθόδοξη Ταυτότητα κατὰ τὴς Περιόδους τῆς Ὀθωμανικῆς καὶ Βρετανικῆς Κυριαρχίας», *Χρονικό* ["The Cypriot Orthodox Identity during the Period of Ottoman and British Rule"], (*Chronicle*), free periodical with *Politis* (newspaper), 29 March 2009; Chapter 6 in Andrekos Varnava (April 2009) *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Obviously, Faustmann could not access the literature above because of the language barrier or because it was published after he had published this chapter, but he did witness this presentation. Andrekos Varnava, 'The British and the Cypriot Orthodox Christians: Imperialism, Modernity and the Imposition of National Identity, 1878-1900', Cyprus Academic Forum, *The Emergence of Greek and Turkish National Identity in Cyprus*, 25 May 2006, Nicosia, Cyprus.

victory was not complete until 1910. This does not mean that by this date the lower strata were engulfed by feelings of national sameness with Greeks.

The next chapter, co-authored by Faustmann and Ker-Lindsay, deals with the Cyprus 'Issue'. Nobody can deny that the Cyprus problem has dominated Cypriot political life since the 1950s, or that this chapter is well written. My issue is whether in a book on the government and politics of Cyprus a chapter on the impact of the Cyprus problem on the development of government and politics would have been more appropriate?

Chapter 4 by Christophoros Christophorou provides necessary information on Greek Cypriot political parties and has an excellent conclusion, but suffers from too many generalisations: examples include the first two lines; the statement that "foreign" rule left Cyprus socially and economically underdeveloped (compared to? Greece? Turkey? Syria? Lebanon? Egypt? Perhaps it would have been better to remain under Ottoman rule with only speculation as to how Cyprus would have fared during the bloody Ottoman collapse); and the comment "the rejection of the demands of the people" in relation to the British, implying a monolithic people versus the British oppressor.

The next two chapters, by Ker-Lindsay, cover the issues of presidential power and the National Council. The first contains a 'historical background' which seems an unnecessary 100+ pages into the book, and contains generalisations: for example, that the Greek Junta backed Grivas when there were two Junta Regimes, one under George Papadopoulos not supporting Grivas and another under Demetris Ioannides strongly supporting him. Ker-Lindsay mentions that there was one assassination attempt on Makarios, when there were several. He also states that in the 2003 election DISY switched its support to Clerides, but fails to mention who it initially supported, Yiannakis Omirou of EDEK, which is important given that EDEK is hardline regarding reunification and subsequently supported Papadopoulos. The constant referral to the president as a 'he', when not actually referring to a particular president, resulted in me questioning why the book never explores the role of women in Cypriot politics. In an otherwise enlightening chapter on the National Council, the conclusion lacks analytical insight, while his claim that Makarios had given up *enosis* contradicts Makarios' often repeated statements that it was desirable, but not feasible at present: giving something up for the time being is not the same as giving it up altogether.

Chapter 7 by Giorgos Charalambous provided a comprehensive survey of the functions of the House of Representatives and my only main criticism is that it did not provide enough on the composition of the first parliament. I remain to be convinced that the majoritarian system is a relic of the colonial period, as well as the use of Achilles Emilianides as a source for the 1960-1963 tensions, given the significant literature on this subject (James Ker-Lindsay, Richard Patrick and Makarios Droushiotis).

The next two chapters are the weakest because the authors approach Cyprus through Greek lenses. The chapter on the legal and judicial system, by Altana Filos, is riddled with generalisations and errors. Cyprus was not a British colony for 82 years since it became a crown colony only in

1925. Although attributed to the invasion, no evidence is given as to why Greek administrative law was introduced to Cyprus. The claim that the introduction of laws allowing civil marriage and divorce by consent in 1989 followed Greece is speculation: civil marriage had been valid in Cyprus since 1923; while Vassiliou's government wanted to liberalise Cypriot society.³ The statements blaming the 1960 Constitution for creating problems for the legal system are unsubstantiated, and are aimed at contradicting Professor Ernst Forsthoff, who resigned as first President of the Supreme Constitutional Court in May 1963, because Makarios refused to implement key constitutional provisions. Filos claims that Forsthoff stated that the constitution was unworkable, but fails to mention that Forsthoff, a German scholar of constitutional law and a prominent theorist of administrative law, was one of the authors of the constitution, and meant that it was unworkable because there was a lack of will (on Makarios' part, something that was borne out). Markides' chapter is even more problematical. Her claim that the displaced Greek Cypriots in 1974 equated to one-third of the entire population is wrong. According to the information on the Press and Information Office map showing ethnic distribution in 1960, 142,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced in 1974, one-quarter of the entire population. In fact it is less than one-quarter, since, if the 142,000 is accepted, with a total population of 630,000 (according to the 1973 Census estimate), this means that displaced Greek Cypriots amounted to 22% of the entire population. The problem is not so much that her figures are misleading, but that she neglects to mention the displaced 50,000-60,000 Turkish Cypriots, which amounted to about half of the entire Turkish Cypriot population (estimated at 116,000 in the 1973 Census). Further, her claim that Ankara feared that London would withdraw from Cyprus after the Suez crisis and resisted Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals cannot be substantiated because Markides has not consulted Turkish archives, however, she misleads the reader by failing to mention that the Greeks and Greek Cypriots also opposed the Radcliffe proposals. Her assertion that in 1958 Turkish Cypriots "violently" established municipal councils implies, at least for the novice, that they did so across the island. To be sure, this occurred in Limassol and Nicosia – indeed there were very bloody murders of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots and ethnic cleansing – but there is no evidence or claim (at least in her monograph)⁴ that it took place elsewhere. More significantly, Markides' failure to fairly address the Turkish Cypriot position appears on page 188 in the paragraph starting with "Differences over municipal governance were at the heart of the struggle for Cyprus in the early 1960s". No doubt, the municipalities issue divided Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships during the 1960s and 1970s. No doubt too, the Greek Cypriot leadership wanted to secure a majority-ruled unitary state; but, despite what Markides implies, this was not the aim of the 1960

3 See George Vassiliou's book on his presidency, George Vassiliou (2008) *Pragmatism Vs Populism*, II, Athens: Ellinika Gramata.

4 Diana Weston Markides (2001) *Cyprus 1957-1963 from Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis: The Key Role of the Municipal Issue*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 16-23.

consociational constitution, while the Turkish Cypriots insisted on the implementation of the constitution because it assured the administrative autonomy of each community and the protection of the minority against the tyranny of the majority. Markides' claim that Turkish Cypriot policies in the 1970s proves "creeping Turkish tactics" in favour of a federal element in the government implies that Turkish Cypriot policy was monolithic throughout the 1960s and early 1970s and that it was they who contravened the constitution. This is a fallacy: official Turkish Cypriot policy in the early 1960s aimed at the full implementation of the 1960 constitution; unofficially, Denktash pursued partition through TMT and suppressing, even murdering, Turkish Cypriots who believed in the consociational Republic; after the civil war of 1963-1964 Turkish Cypriot policy became pessimistic because a Turkish invasion did not come, and Rauf Denktash agreed to most of Makarios' 1963 thirteen points during negotiations with Glafkos Clerides after 1967; after 1974 it becomes more confident and extreme. Markides' implication that the implementation of separate municipalities was counter to the integrity of the unitary state is the official Greek Cypriot position, but contradicts the 1960 constitution and its authors, and reduces the Turkish Cypriots to the enemy. Moreover, she does not mention Greek Cypriot efforts to undermine the Republic and relations with Turkish Cypriots, namely through the Akritas Plan. What perhaps best reflects Markides' Greek Cypriot bias is the fact that on page 191 she quotes 'the Nicosia Mayor', but the reader is not told which mayor, and evidently she has unconsciously forgotten to mention that it was the Greek Cypriot.

By comparison, the final two chapters are first-rate. Taki and Officer's chapter on civil society and public sphere fills a gaping hole in the historiography. The discussion of the trade unions, but especially of civil society and the media are illuminating, although some hard questions are not asked, such as: why did Cyprus' civil society develop the way it did? My only criticism is the statement that "the island was valued (by the British) not for its natural resources or abundance of exploitable labour, but for its strategic location", a received wisdom I have 'debunked'.⁵ Kaymak's chapter on the development of Turkish Cypriot politics is excellent not simply because of the information, but because he is analytical. My only criticism is his failure to mention Ahmet Berberoglu, an important figure in Turkish Cypriot politics.

Despite inconsistencies and discrepancies, this book fills a void in the historiography and is indispensable to those wishing to be introduced to the politics and government of Cyprus.

ANDREKOS VARNAVA

5 See footnote 2, my monograph, which focuses on this subject.

Call for Submissions

The Cyprus Review invites submissions for papers, which may address any topic relevant to Cyprus. We also welcome critical reviews of recent scholarly books of interest to the Island. We are interested in topics relating to the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus.

Scholarly essays should be written in English and range in length between 6,000 and 9,000 words. The use of graphics or illustrations is supported where appropriate.

Please send four copies of the manuscript together with a CD or 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word and saved as rich text format, with the author's name deleted from two copies, to

The Editors
The Cyprus Review
University of Nicosia
PO Box 24005
1700 Nicosia
Cyprus

For more information

Tel: +357 22-353702 ext 301
Fax: +357 22-353682
E-mail: cy_review@unic.ac.cy

THE CYPRUS REVIEW (TCR)

Subscription Invoice

Volume 22, Number 1, 2010 and Volume 22, Number 2, 2010

Payment is Due in Advance

Please Complete the Appropriate Blanks Below

Annual Institutional Rate

Annual Personal Rate

US\$70 _____	Renewal _____	US\$48 _____
Cyp£35 (EU €59.80) _____	New Subscription _____	Cyp£18 (EU €30.76) _____
UK£48 _____		UK£24 _____
Euro€60 _____		Euro€30 _____

[1 Euro = CYP£0.585274]

The national currency of Cyprus is the Euro

Two and three year subscriptions are accepted at the current rate.

Single copies are available at half the annual subscription rate.

Back Issues are available (details on request).

Make cheques or bank drafts payable to

University of Nicosia

Send to The Cyprus Review, University of Nicosia,

P.O. Box 24005, 1700 Nicosia, Cyprus.

For payment by bank transfer, details as follows:

Bank of Cyprus

Account Name: University of Nicosia

Current Account No: 0182-11-007377

Swift Code: BCYPCY2N010

IBAN: CY35002001820000001100737700

Name/Institution _____

Address _____

City _____


State or Province _____

Country _____ Zip / Postal Zone _____

Date _____

Subscribers are requested to notify the Editors immediately of change of address.
Please give both old and new addresses.






Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies

FOUNDING AND MANAGING EDITOR:

Vassilis K. Fouskas, *University of Piraeus, Greece*

The region of the Balkans and the Near East has assumed an important geo-political and global economic significance since the end of the Cold War. This territory, which includes old and new nation-states of the former Ottoman Empire and Soviet Union, stands at the crossroads of an expanding West (NATO, the EU) and a re-emerging East (Russia, China, India). A focus on the Balkans and the Near East in a more globalized world must involve the re-examination of widely held assumptions, modern historical claims, and political, economic and security assertions concerning the nation-states of Southeastern Europe and the Near East. In this context, the *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* seeks to address, in an historical and theoretically-informed manner, the complex historical, economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and security issues that confront the region, in the light of such important developments as the process of European integration, the evolution of NATO, and the more general changes in the international governance system after the end of the Cold War in Eurasia and the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001.



The journal encourages modern historical research, comparative approaches, critical scholarship and a diversity of international relations and geo-political views on the region, as it seeks to construct an academic forum to bring together disparate scholarly perspectives. The *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, which expands and complements the research agenda and fruitful academic experience of the *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, is a strictly peer-reviewed quarterly publication.

To sign up for tables of contents, new publications and citation alerting services visit www.informaworld.com/alerting




Register your email address at www.tandf.co.uk/journals/eupdates.asp to receive information on books, journals and other news within your areas of interest.



For further information, please contact Customer Services at either of the following:

T&F Informa UK Ltd, Sheepen Place, Colchester, Essex, CO3 3LP, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7017 5544 Fax: 44 (0) 20 7017 5198
Email: subscriptions@tandf.co.uk

Taylor & Francis Inc, 325 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106, USA
Tel: +1 800 354 1420 (toll-free calls from within the US)
or +1 215 625 8900 (calls from overseas) Fax: +1 215 625 2940
Email: customerservice@taylorandfrancis.com



View an online sample issue at:
www.tandf.co.uk/journals/cjsb

To access international literature as diverse as the study of sociology, start here.

ProQuest Sociological Abstracts offers a world of relevant, comprehensive, and timely bibliographic coverage. Over 890,000 easily searchable abstracts enhance discovery of full-text articles in thousands of key journals from 35 countries, along with books, conference papers, and dissertations, as well as citations to reviews of books and other media. This continuously growing collection is updated monthly, and offers backfiles to 1952—plus scholar profiles, browsable indexes, and a searchable thesaurus through the ProQuest Illumina™ interface.



The ProQuest Sociological Abstracts Discovery Prize.

Tell us how ProQuest Sociological Abstracts has advanced teaching and learning at your institution, and you may win the ProQuest Sociological Abstracts Discovery Prize.

Visit info.csa.com/sociologicaldiscovery

ProQuest Sociological Abstracts

For a free trial, contact pqsales@proquest.com
or log onto www.proquest.com/go/csasoc today.






The Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS) is a non-profit organization which promotes and contributes to projects of social, political, and economic

themes relating to gender with an emphasis on the Mediterranean region. MIGS aims to act as a main contributor to the intellectual, political, and socio-political life of the region as this relates to issues of gender and to do so using a multidisciplinary approach and in collaboration with other institutions.

MIGS' aims are to stimulate interest in gender research in the Mediterranean region and identify key areas of concern and action in the area; systematically address, analyse, and conduct research on, for, and by women; review and use existing information on women and the gender system such as research, statistical information and other available data and make relevant recommendations on policy and practices in related areas; identify the need to develop new legislation that corresponds to the new conditions and protects women's rights effectively; increase awareness of gender issues in civil society and facilitate the capacity for action by providing all interested parties with information and organizing training, campaigns, seminars, workshops, and lectures.

MIGS is actively involved, both as a coordinating institution and as a partner, in the administration and implementation of a number of projects related to issues of gender. The Institute has conducted work on interpersonal violence against women, gender and migration, gender and the media, women in the political and public life, women in economic life, and gender and civil society, among others. All MIGS projects encompass research and analysis which informs all our advocacy work and include training of relevant stakeholders including policy makers, awareness-raising campaigns, open discussion involving policy makers and beneficiaries to encourage citizen participation in decision-making, interventions in the media, and others.

For more information on MIGS' projects and activities, please visit our website at: <www.medinstgenderstudies.org>




Mediterranean Historical Review

Recently accepted into the Social Sciences and Arts & Humanities Citation Indexes

CHIEF EDITORS:

Irad Malkin, *Tel Aviv University, Israel*
Benjamin Arbel, *Tel Aviv University, Israel*

Mediterranean Historical Review encourages the study of issues whose significance transcends a particular area or period. It integrates various problems in the ancient, medieval, early modern and contemporary history of the Mediterranean basin. The aim of *Mediterranean Historical Review* is to publish articles which emphasize contacts, relations and influences within the Mediterranean context as well as questions of a comparative and comparable nature.



To sign up for tables of contents, new publications and citation alerting services visit www.informaworld.com/alerting



Register your email address at www.tandf.co.uk/journals/eupdates.asp to receive information on books, journals and other news within your areas of interest.



For further information, please contact Customer Services at either of the following:

T&F Informa UK Ltd, Sheepen Place, Colchester, Essex, CO3 3LP, UK

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7017 5544 Fax: 44 (0) 20 7017 5198

Email: subscriptions@tandf.co.uk


Taylor & Francis Inc, 325 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106, USA

Tel: +1 800 354 1420 (toll-free calls from within the US)


or +1 215 625 8900 (calls from overseas) Fax: +1 215 625 2940

Email: customerservice@taylorandfrancis.com

When ordering, please quote: XF28301A



View an online sample issue at:
www.tandf.co.uk/journals/fmhr



Mediterranean Politics

Now listed in the Thomson Reuters Social Sciences Citation Index®

EDITOR:

Richard Gillespie, *Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool, UK*

Emma Murphy, *Durham University, UK*

Mediterranean Politics is the only refereed academic journal to focus on the politics, international relations and political economy of the entire Mediterranean area - 'Mediterranean' here being understood to refer to all those countries whose borders are defined partially or wholly by the Mediterranean Sea. This focus involves consideration not only of the region itself, but also the significance of developments there for other parts of the world.

The journal analyses the central issues that concern Mediterranean countries and assesses both local and international responses to them. While its prime concern is with political developments, the focus of *Mediterranean Politics* extends to all the factors and dimensions affecting political life. These include social movements and issues, regional and domestic conflicts, the political economy of the Mediterranean, migration, political reform processes and issues of cultural identity. The journal does not accept articles on historical subjects that lack direct contemporary linkage, or general economics articles with a Mediterranean context.

Since its inception, the journal has given extensive attention to the expanding relationships between Europe and its southern neighbours, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Equally, we welcome contributions on other international initiatives concerned with the area, such as the southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the US Greater Middle East project and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.



To sign up for tables of contents, new publications and citation alerting services visit www.informaworld.com/alerting




Register your email address at www.tandf.co.uk/journals/eupdates.asp to receive information on books, journals and other news within your areas of interest.



For further information, please contact Customer Services at either of the following:

T&F Informa UK Ltd, Sheepen Place, Colchester, Essex, CO3 3LP, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7017 5544 Fax: 44 (0) 20 7017 5195
Email: subscriptions@tandf.co.uk

Taylor & Francis Inc, 325 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106, USA
Tel: +1 800 354 1420 (toll-free calls from within the US)
or +1 215 625 8900 (calls from overseas) Fax: +1 215 625 2940
Email: customerservice@taylorandfrancis.com



View an online sample issue at:
www.tandf.co.uk/journals/medpol



Published by

UNIVERSITY OF NICOSIA

TYPESETTING, ELECTRONIC PAGINATION & PRINTING
BY CASSOULIDES PRINTING WORKS

ANDREAS CONSTANTINOS

Britain, America and the Sovereign Base Areas from 1960-1978

GIANFRANZIO LA DINI

Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus

SOME REFLECTIONS ON 5 YEARS OF EU MEMBERSHIP

GUEST EDITED BY HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT

HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT

Introduction

HEINZ-JÜRGEN AXT

Cyprus: Conflict Resolution through Europeanisation?
Most Recent Experiences and Perspectives

COSTAS MELAKOPIDES

The EU's Role in the Cyprus Question

CHRISTINA IOANNOU, GIORGOS KENTAS

The Mediating Impact of Corporatism on the Europeanisation of the
Cypriot Labour Sector

ESSAY AND RESEARCH NOTES

EROL KAYMAK

Cyprus and the European Union

BOOK REVIEWS